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Brazil

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ON NEXT
ROLL



Cuba

The O Estado lead editorial of May 4 on Cuba is a strong exhortation that the national government clearly commit itself against the threat offered by the Communist regime in Cuba. An interesting feature of the editorial is its evident distrust of President Quadros and the clear demand that he act according to the conscience of Brazil and not according to his own dictates. Noting that Argentina and Uruguay are apparently prepared to face the issue and to defend at any cost what has taken over a century to build, the editorial then asks what will be the response of Brazil and answers that only the people can reply. Because of "the delicacy of the moment and the fatal consequences of a false step...it would not be sufficient or admissible that we leave to one alone the mission of responding for Brazil". The presidential system, continues the editorial, gives the president the function of "interpreting" national views on foreign policy, but "in no way the right to dispose of our destinies and much less that of directing us according to his tendencies and sympathies". The president must conform to what he has solemnly affirmed, "that we are a Christian democracy, and, as such, we could never facilitate the infiltration in the hemisphere of the brutal materialism of the dictators of the left". After recalling the various commitments of Brazil to democracy and liberty, the editorial then reminds that it was in defense of the principles of democracy and liberty that the armed forces in 1945 overthrew the "new state". To Mesquita Filho the lack of popular response in Brazil to communist-nationalist attempts to stir up public demonstrations of Support for Cuba on May 1, constituted a national plebiscite. Evidently referring to President Quadros' stand on self-determination, the editorial observes that "Brazil demands that all countries be recognized to have the right of self-determination, but always that the people are able to express themselves without coercion". The editorial concludes that in the face of the Cuban dictator's refusal to permit elections, "it shall not be" that the Brazilian nation will resign itself "that our authorities maintain an equivocal attitude before the gravest crisis we have ever confronted".

The editorial not only expresses what would appear to be a justified vote of non-confidence in Janio on the question of Cuba but also appears to carry a note of warning that Brazil has no choice, that it must for the preservation of liberty and democracy in the Americas join with sister American Republics in acting against the Cuban dictatorship. A similar posture in being taken in other newspapers.

For the Minister Consul General

Ralph J. Burton

Ralph J. Burton
Consul

organisms, we inadvertently permit infiltration of elements which are not dangerous, in themselves, for the ideas which they profess or propound - because the democratic conscience feeds and grows strong on all ideas - but for their fanaticism, for their sectarian spirit, capable of placing above country and family the blind fidelity which the doctrines of a foreign power avow. It is they which in the shade of the liberties which they propose to destroy, sabotage and distort newspaper articles, foment indiscipline and rebellion in the schools, disrupt (conturbam) labor meetings and predispose the worker, not to contribute by his efforts for the production of greater riches, but to paralyze by means of strikes and riots the national development." The article concludds with a query, "And the question of conscience which presents itself to all in this moment is whether we can permit that, in the name of democratic tolerance, the enemy stab us in the back."

As this post has previously reported, publishers of anti-Communist newspapers knowingly employ Communists on their payrolls. They will often admit to this. In part the action seems to derive from a kind of schizophrenia which philosophically challenges and rejects Communism but refuses to recognize it as a danger within the immediate household. In some respects it is like the enlightened socially conscious housewife who supports various social legislation, including the minimum wage, but also resents possible resultant salary increases for household help. In part it seems that the explanation lies in a kind of Machiavellian selfishness which accepts the idea of doing business with Communists (to forestall foreign competition, to obtain political attack against an opposing candidate, etc.) so long as it serves or does not damage immediate private ends. In part the explanation lies in a sort of philosophic approach to democracy which says in brief that intolerance is anti-democratic.

While the publisher of O Estado in the above quoted editorial admits that Communism and Communists in the country must be combatted, it remains to be seen whether he himself will follow through in his own newspaper. Frederico Heller, Economic Editor of the newspaper, in a luncheon discussion with the reporting officer, expressed the belief that such tangible action would not follow. From his own long association with the publisher, he would interpret the editorial as reflecting a confused and unhappy state of protest. Heller recalled a discussion at which the leftist line being followed by the radio owned by O Estado was vigorously condemned. When the suggestion was made to Mesquita Filho that he exercise ownership powers and make some changes to correct this, the publisher backed away. Nevertheless, it is a refreshing and encouraging sign to see such a forceful and vigorous acknowledgement of the Communist threat from within accompanied by such a vigorous challenge to decide whether "we can permit that, in the name of democratic tolerance, the enemy stab us in the back".

1209

AIR POUCH
PRIORITY

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(Security Classification)

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XR 737.00

FOREIGN SERVICE DESPATCH

DEPARTMENT OF STATE
BUREAU OF
INTER-AMERICAN AFFAIRS
MAY 15 1961

FROM : Amcongen, São Paulo
TO : THE DEPARTMENT OF STATE, WASHINGTON.
REF :

411
DESP. NO.

May 5, 1961
DATE

DEPARTMENT OF STATE
BUREAU OF
INTER-AMERICAN AFFAIRS

For Dept. Use Only	ACTION	INFO
55	ARA-4	ARM/A-2 INR-7 P-3 W/O-1
REC'D 5/11		OTHER CIA-10 USIA-10 OSD-5 army-4 navy-4 air-6 NSA-4 NSC-2

SUBJECT: Communism and Cuba

Two recent lead editorials in the powerful conservative São Paulo daily newspaper O Estado de São Paulo, deserve special mention because

(1) One suggests a drastic shift in the customary orientation toward Communism and Communists within the country,

(2) The other reflects considerable doubt about, and lack of faith in, President Quadros on the issue of hemispheric solidarity vis-a-vis Cuba.

Because both were lead editorials and addressed to foreign affairs, they were undoubtedly written by the publisher himself, Mesquita Filho.

The Threat of Communism from Within

The editorial of May 3 on the threat of Communism and Communists in Brazil refers to current difficulties in Brazil due to past administrative corruption and inflation, which difficulties are being exploited by "internal enemies of the regime". These internal enemies work in collusion with declared enemies of the country, says the editorial, to undermine the people's moral resistance in opposing the "momentary adversities which the government intends to combat and overcome". Secondly, the editorial observes that "in the press, in the theatre, in the universities, shops and military quarters, everywhere the Communists insinuate themselves with the purpose of weakening and dividing democratic resistance, to sabotage and mock all the plans, to incite scepticism, discouragement and revolt in the popular masses". The editorial then cites a statement from President Kennedy's speech at the recent Democratic Party banquet that the greatest enemies of the United States are those Americans who resist doing what needs to be done. Brazil, it was observed, is in an even unhappier position because its internal enemies go to the extreme of obstructing what others are doing. "And of this there is not, perhaps, in the country a responsible individual exempt from some blame. Our love of liberty has brought us to an excessive tolerance toward its enemies. In public administration, in the editorial staffs of newspapers, in the labor unions, in military posts, in all private and official

RJBurton/lfw
REPORTER

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CLASSIFIED FILE

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Santos on the Partido Trabalhista Nacional (PTN) ticket and was elected, together with Silvio FERNANDES LOPES of the Partido Social Progressista (PSP). Fernandes Lopes accepted communist support in this election, which fact was publicly recalled to the local electorate four years later on March 22, 1961, by Arlindo Alves LUCENA, a portworker and First Political Secretary of the Santos branch of the Communist Party of Brazil. During the 1957 campaign Peres violently attacked the Brazilian Government for its having "surrendered" Fernando de Noronha Island to the United States and for entering into the U.S.-Brazilian Military Agreement. These intemperate accusations and his earlier tirades over the "Voice of the People" radio program resulted in his being indicted by the legal division of the Santos City Government (of which he was by then its #2 official). In September 1957 Peres again incited the municipal employees to strike, even personally joining in their assemblies. This flagrant conduct brought him expulsion from the PTN.

Mayor Fernandes Lopes in the meantime determined to isolate Peres by studiously refraining from allowing him any share in the municipal government. From 1958 until the end of his term as vice mayor Peres as a consequence enjoyed no power or influence whatever in the municipal government, and Fernandes Lopes kept the communists at arm's length. In 1960 Peres first supported Marshal Henrique Teixeira LOTT for President, and welcomed him on behalf of the City of Santos on August 26 of that year. But towards the end of the campaign Peres broke with the Lott forces and went over to Jânio QUADROS, attempting to rally the Santos communists to his side.

Since the end of 1960 Peres has been in opposition to the local communists, and is not now considered by the Santos police to be an active communist, possibly owing to his ostensible support of the President.

In 1961 Peres was a candidate for re-election as Vice Mayor on the PDC ticket, running with Athié Jorge COURY, an anti-communist. In the election held March 26 of this year the communists gave their support to the PSP and thus helped elect the late Luiz LA SCALA, Jr. and José GOMES of the PTB. Peres was badly defeated, running a poor third and well behind Coury. Peres conducted a quiet and dignified campaign, making few if any public utterances.

The reporting officer considers Peres, at least for the time being, politically dead. It remains to be seen, however, if his break with the communists is permanent, or only a tactical maneuver of a clever and unscrupulous politician with an activist communist history.

Virgil P. Randolph, III
Virgil P. Randolph, III
American Consul

1207

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PRIORITY

LIMITED OFFICIAL USE
(Security Classification)

DO NOT TYPE IN THIS SPACE
732.001/4-1861
XR 732.521

FOREIGN SERVICE DESPATCH

FROM : Amconsul SANTOS, Brazil
DESP. NO. 34

TO : THE DEPARTMENT OF STATE, WASHINGTON.
DATE April 14, 1961

REF : -----

APR 19 1961

20 For Dept. Use Only	ACTION	DEPT.
	ARA-4	RM/R-2 INR-7 P-3 SY-2 AIR6
	REC'D 4-28-61	INFO OTHER CIA-10 USIA-10 FBI-1 OSD-5 NSA-4 ARMY-4 NAVY-4

(1) SUBJECT: Communist Activities of the ex-Vice Mayor of Santos

The reporting officer has made reference in recent months to Jayme PERES, the recent incumbent Vice Mayor of this city. Peres served as Vice Mayor from April 1957 until April 14, 1961, and unsuccessfully contested the vice mayoralty of Santos on March 26, 1961, on the Partido Democrata Cristão (PDC) ticket. The reporting officer has gathered the following information concerning Peres' past communist affiliations from a trustworthy source.

Peres is an intelligent but demogogic individual now about 40, the son of José PERES Alvarez and of Mercedes PEREIRA Peres. An active communist sympathizer since 1951, in that year he was a member of a pro-communist committee which issued a manifesto entitled the "Autonomous Alliance for Peace and Against the High Cost of Living". In 1952 he was a member of the São Vicente Study Center for the Defense of Petroleum and the National Economy and head of its propaganda committee. At this time Peres has his own local, and very popular, radio program called the "Voice of the People", through which medium he was accustomed to incite the Santos workers to strikes, notably the employees of the Santos wheat mills, the local municipal transportation workers, the seamen's union and the dockworkers. Peres' radio broadcasts grew so extreme that he was prosecuted in 1953 for inciting city employees to strike. Peres' radio program was discontinued in 1954, bringing protests from a number of local labor leaders, including communists. Peres became director of the communist-front "Movimento Pro-Candituras Populares"; and he was active in the "Santos Commission for the Rejection of the U.S.-Brazilian Military Agreement", the "National Emancipation League", the "Electoral League for the Progress of Santos", the Intersindical organization, and the "Pacto da Unidade", all communist-front organizations. Peres was an organizer of the "Movimento Nacional Po[illegible]balhista" and president of the Santos unit of this communist organization, representing it at its national convention.

In 1955 Peres attempted to run for City Councilman on the Partido Trabalhista Brasileiro (PTB) ticket, but his candidacy was quashed by the Santos Electoral Tribunal, whose decision was confirmed by the Regional Election Tribunal. In 1957 Peres stood for Vice Mayor of

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BUREAU OF INTER-AMERICAN AFFAIRS
MAY 2 1961

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1206

W I T H D R A W A L N O T I C E

RG: 059

TAB #: 34

ENTRY: CDF60-63

1 / 4 / C /

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The item identified below has been withdrawn from this file:

Folder Title: 732.001/3-2461 HBS

Document Date: 24/03/61

Document Ser.#:

DESP 858 FR RIO DE JANEIRO TO STATE

In the review of this file this item was removed because access to it is restricted. Restrictions on records in the National Archives are stated in general and specific record group restriction statements which are available for examination. The item identified above has been withdrawn because it contains:

X Security-Classified Information

NND: 949515

WITHDRAWN: 02/24/95 by: JAS

FOIA RETRIEVAL #: 949515 01582 00034



W I T H D R A W A L N O T I C E

RG: 059 TAB #: 33

ENTRY: CDF60-63 1 / 3 / C / ---

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Folder Title: 732.001/1-561 XR832.062

Document Date: 05/01/61

Document Ser.#:

DESP 19 FR SANTOS TO STATE

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NND: 949515 WITHDRAWN: 02/24/95 by: JAS

FOIA RETRIEVAL #: 949515 01582 00033

1204

recently threatened O Expresso's Santos distributor with bodily harm and are conducting a whispering campaign that O Expresso "is subsidized by the American Embassy." Baptista declared that the editors of O Expresso were in no way intimidated by these threats and intend to continue attacking communism and all its works.

COMMENT:

The reporting officer believes that O Expresso's account of communist activity among the Santos students and Baptista's remarks on the subject are true. The majority of the students here, as everywhere, are young, impressionable and politically unsophisticated, and provide an ideal field for proselytizing by well-trained communist cadres. It would be surprising indeed if the communists were to overlook this susceptible field of endeavor. The reporting officer hopes that exposés of communist infiltration of student organizations such as O Expresso's will serve to prod public awareness of the threat to Brazilian youth now posed by communist agitators of the stripe of Luiz Corvo and Osvaldo Leituga.

Virgil P. Randolph, III
American Vice Consul

cc: American Embassy, Rio de Janeiro
American Consulate General, Sao Paulo



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Baptista explained that Leituga had been brought into Santos by the communist party from Rio de Janeiro, and that his contact man in Santos, from whom he receives money and orders, is Corvo, whom he, Baptista, considers the most aggressive, if not fanatical, younger communist in this city. Together Corvo and Leituga have organized a minority group, comprised mostly of political innocents, dupes and fellow-travellers, which has been able to seize and keep control of the Students Center by steam-rollering communist policies over the ill-organized and un-militant anti-communist majority, many of which failed to appear when officers were to be elected, resolutions were to be adopted or important plans were to be discussed.

All the foregoing is confirmed by Dr. Antonio Jose BRANDAO, Chief of the USIS section of this Consulate and a recent graduate of the Catholic Law School here, who has many student contacts.

According to Baptista, Corvo, Leituga & Co., for the labor participation in the Convention, relied upon the following five union figures: Valdemar Neves GUERRA, President of the 2,200-member Sindicato dos Empregados na Administraçao dos Serviços Portuarios de Santos (the union of the white and blue-collar employees of the Santos Dock Company); Oswaldo LOURENÇO, First Secretary of the same union; Orlando SPOSITO, long-time President of the Sindicato dos Trabalhadores nas Industrias Graficas de Santos; Benedito TERESO, a streetcar motorman active in, but not an officer of, the 1000 plus-member Sindicato dos Trabalhadores nas Empresas de Carris Urbanos, Troleibus e Cabos Aereos de Santos; and Jose BARRETO, Secretary of this latter union. Guerra, Sposito and Lourenço have long been known to the reporting officer as communists.

Baptista went on to say that these five union leaders are members of the Communist Party of Brazil and collaborate with Corvo and Leituga at the party's orders. Again repeating Baptista, these communists packed the Worker-Student Convention with communist sympathizers, dupes and the like drawn from the various Santos labor unions, especially the portworkers, and carefully excluded any anti-communist elements. Thus the Convention, while presenting an air of student-labor cooperation, was in actual fact a communist-controlled and attended foregathering held for purposes of propaganda and strengthening communist infiltration of student and labor groups here.

Baptista added that some months ago Leituga joined the Junior Chamber of Commerce in Santos, and shortly afterwards the newspaper O Expresso was approached by representatives of that organization urging the paper's editors to "take it easy" on Leituga. Out of consideration of this group O Expresso agreed and until this month had not mentioned Leituga in its reporting. But now, according to Baptista, O Expresso felt that his activities were too dangerous to be ignored, and the weekly plans to dig deeper into Leituga's work at the Students Center. Baptista also stated that communists had



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Leituga has been president of the Students Center for about six years. His principal communist confederate in the Center is Luiz Rodrigues CORVO, a 22-year-old student leader of the Catholic Law Faculty in Santos. Corvo, who is notorious for his communist activity, is chefe de reportagem for the newspaper O Diario here, and has been instrumental in slanting this newspaper's reporting toward the communist line. It should be recalled that on July 8, 1960, Corvo spoke at a political rally here ostensibly in favor of Marshal Henrique Teixeira LOTT but actually taken over by the communists. Corvo, sharing the platform with Luiz Carlos PRESTES, Secretary General of the Communist Party of Brazil, violently denounced the United States on that occasion.

As reported in O Expresso, a group of anti-communist students had the following to say about Leituga, Corvo and the II Worker-Student Conference:

"The so-called II Worker-Student Convention had little student and much less worker to it. This undertaking of the Santos Students Center had as its purpose getting closer together the members of the well-known gang in the Students Center and a few workers who are in league with that outfit.... He /Leituga/ prevented from participating five student groups, whose total membership was considerably more than was present during the sessions of this farcical Convention." This from a young student named Cley Gama de CARVALHO.

According to another student, Paulo Roberto MAGALHAES, "The present leadership of the Santos Students Center is full of defects which need correcting.... The Students Center is now at the service of the enemies of our country, communists who are led by Osvaldo Leituga and his friend Corvo.... Osvaldo Leituga privately guaranteed to me that, in accordance with the Center's by-laws, he would allow all the delegates present to speak, but not to vote.... But not even the right to speak was given us. In full 'convention' one of our democratic companions was beaten up when he tried to speak." Joao Carlos CURADO, president of the Vicente de Carvalho gremio, was quoted by O Expresso as adding that "Osvaldo Leituga is trying to create disunity between our student gremios", and he attacked Leituga for being a communist trouble-maker.

In a conversation December 29 with Oduvaldo BAPTISTA, Director to the newspaper O Expresso, the reporting officer was assured that the statements attributed to the anti-communist students were entirely true, that the Santos Students Center is run by communists, and that the II Worker-Student Convention was a communist-front rally, ordered, financed and led by the communist party through Corvo and Leituga. Baptista himself is a self-confessed former communist who broke with the party three or four years ago. Until recently he was employed by the newspaper O Diario and hence is well acquainted with his ex-colleague Corvo.



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XR 832.432
XR 832.062

FOREIGN SERVICE DESPATCH

FROM : Amconsul SANTOS, Brazil

DESP. NO. 16

JAN 6 - 1961

TO : THE DEPARTMENT OF STATE, WASHINGTON.

DATE December 31, 1960

REF : ----

For Dept. Use Only	ACTION	INFO DEPT.
20	ARA-4	RM/R-2 REP-1 INR-7 P.3 M/G-1 M/OP-1 ICA-11
	REC'D 1-11-61	OTHER CIA-10 USIA-10 GAB-6 OCB-2

SUBJECT: Communist Infiltration of Santos Student and Worker Groups

R/MR

732.001/12-3160

CAA

CLASSIFIED FILE

SUMMARY

In its edition for the week December 29-January 4, 1961, the Santos anti-communist labor weekly O Expresso published a lead article entitled "The Farce Against Workers and Students Provokes Indignation". This article purports to expose the communist infiltration of the II Worker-Student Convention held December 19-21, 1960, in Santos. Basing the article upon lengthy quotations drawn from a group of anti-communist students themselves, O Expresso attempted to document this phase of communist activity in this city. This despatch summarizes what the reporting officer has been able to learn of this Convention and the communist efforts to infiltrate student and labor groups in Santos.

The II Worker-Student Convention (the first was held here last year) was attended by several hundred workers and students, and was called by the Centro dos Estudantes de Santos (Santos Students Center), which theoretically is composed of all the students, male and female, of the secondary schools here plus the students of the Catholic University of Santos. In fact, most students are grouped into gremios, one to a school, which are in turn affiliated with the Students Center. On the other hand, a minority of the Santos students are members directly of the Students Center without belonging to a gremio. There are about 1,200 students who are nominally affiliated directly with the Santos Students Center.

The President of the Centro dos Estudantes is one Osvaldo Celso Novoa LEITUGA, reliably identified to the reporting officer as a militant member of the communist party. A native of Santos in his mid-twenties, he is an employee of the Bank of Brazil here, is connected with the Sao Vicente Jockey Club and is a poet who has written at least one play. A man of considerable ability and active habits, he actually finds little time to study, although he is nominally enrolled in the Law Faculty of Niteroi in the State of Rio de Janeiro. In this way he is not a bona fide Santos student at all and technically ineligible to belong to the Santos Student Center.

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REPORTER

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JAN 18 1961

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1200

W I T H D R A W A L N O T I C E

RG: 059 TAB #: 32

ENTRY: CDF60-63 1 / 4 / C /
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BOX: 1582

ACCESS RESTRICTED

The item identified below has been withdrawn from this file:

Folder Title: 732.001/9-3060

Document Date: 30/09/60

Document Ser.#:

DESP 287 FR RIO DE JANEIRO TO STATE

In the review of this file this item was removed because access to it is restricted. Restrictions on records in the National Archives are stated in general and specific record group restriction statements which are available for examination. The item identified above has been withdrawn because it contains:

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NND: 949515 WITHDRAWN: 02/24/95 by: JAS

FOIA RETRIEVAL #: 949515 01582 00032



of Rio is consistently anti-Communist, the Cardinal of São Paulo sometimes supports the working class which Prestes tried to equate with Communism.

As might be expected of any party leader Prestes maintained that the CP was gaining strength steadily although he refused to venture a guess as to the impact of the party on the coming election. Prestes refused to admit that the party was planning a party congress during the next few weeks. While admitting that there were disagreements among members of the party - only natural since the movement is essentially "democratic" - he denied that there was a dissident group within the party planning to dislodge him as head of the Brazilian movement. At the same time he refused to comment on the positions expressed by members of the party as disclosed in a recent issue of the magazine Visão.

For local consumption he closed his interview by stating that the party would grow here in Minas as the state industrialized, and that in the present campaign the local organization was backing the candidacy of Tancredo Neves (PSD) for Governor and Santiago Dantas(PTB), for vice-governor.

COMMENT:

The interview appeared to be a simple rehash of the well known position and problems of the CP in Brazil. The only comments heard locally were to the effect that "He does not seem to be the revolutionist that we used to know! He looks like he's tired out." Press coverage was limited to one critical editorial in "O Diário" complaining that Prestes should not be allowed to express his views on television. It seems apparent that little local excitement was generated by the visit.

The Consulate has in its possession a tape recording of the interview in question and will forward it to the Embassy or Department if it will serve any useful purpose.

Richard Reynolds Martin
American Vice Consul

cc: Political Section/Rio

1198

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XR 732.50

FOREIGN SERVICE DESPATCH

FROM : AMCONSUL, Belo Horizonte, Brazil
DESP. NO. 25

TO : THE DEPARTMENT OF STATE, WASHINGTON.
DATE June 21, 1960

REF :

For Dept. Use Only	ACTION	DEPT.
	REC'D 6-28	INFO OTHER

DEPARTMENT OF STATE
BUREAU OF
INTER - AMERICAN AFFAIRS
JUL 1 1960

SUBJECT: LUIS CARLOS PRESTES IS INTERVIEWED ON BELO HORIZONTE TV

In a surprise television interview at Belo Horizonte on June 18, 1960, Luis Carlos Prestes stated that the Communist Party (CP) would continue to support the candidacy of Mar. Teixeira Lott despite the position taken by Lott concerning the CP. Prestes declared that CP support was not affected by Lott's apparent determination not to re-establish diplomatic relations with the USSR or to push an increase in trade with the Soviet bloc. Neither has CP position been affected by the "grave mistake" made by the Kubitschek administration while Lott was Minister of War in granting missile tracking facilities to the US on Fernando Noronha island. Instead, CP support is based on Lott's position as a nationalist, defined by Prestes as Lott's support of constitutional authority on November 11, 1955, his support of Petrobras and other measures of benefit to the people of Brazil.

Concerning Janio Quadros, Prestes stated that the position taken by the opposition candidate in support of re-establishment of diplomatic relations with the USSR is fine as far as it goes, but Janio also has a reputation as an entreguista and his financial and economic policies are those of the International Monetary Fund. Prestes made several disparaging comparisons between Quadros and Arturo Frondizi of Argentina and then declared: "We do not want a Frondizi in Brazil".

In a frank disclosure of Communist thinking as far as support of non-Communist candidates is concerned, Prestes admitted that, since the CP had no candidates of its own, the party supported those candidates whose platform or actions show them to be in agreement with at least some parts of Communist policy. To this he added the necessary corollary that the supported candidate must have a reasonable chance of being elected. He indicated that it was useless to back a candidate who was in, perhaps, greater agreement with CP policy, but had no chance of winning.

Prestes also trotted out the old story that Communists are not anti-religious. It is the religions that are anti-Communist. He did admit however that even in the Roman Catholic Church there was some difference of opinion on this matter. He cited the cases of the two Brazilian Cardinals, stating that whereas the Cardinal

732.00/6-2160

RRMartin/pk
REPORTER

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1197

FORM DS.10
4.1.55

DEPARTMENT OF STATE
REFERENCE SLIP

DATE 5/2

TO: NAME OR TITLE	ORGAN. SYMBOL	ROOM NO.	BLDG.	INITIALS	DATE
1. Jan Oakley					
2. [RECEIVED]					
3. MAY 3 1960					
4. A.M. 7 8 9 10 11 12 1 2 3 4 5 6 P.M.					
5.					

	APPROVAL		NOTE AND FORWARD
	AS REQUESTED		NOTE AND RETURN
	COMMENT		PER CONVERSATION
	FOR YOUR INFORMATION		PREPARE REPLY
	INITIAL FOR CLEARANCE		SEE ME
	NECESSARY ACTION	X	SIGNATURE

REMARKS OR ADDITIONAL ROUTING

1 routine OM WIROM

1 instruction to Belem - this is a commendation to the post for a job well done. It originally came in the form of an OM, but since EP's commendations are so few & far between I thought that an instruction would receive wider dissemination & be a greater morale booster.

FROM (NAME AND ORGANIZATION)	ROOM NO. AND BLDG.
SIGNATURE	PHONE NO.

1196

DEPARTMENT OF STATE INSTRUCTION

33 33

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FOR DC USE ONLY

NO.: A-2, May 2, 1960

SUBJECT: FOREIGN PUBLICATIONS: Procurement for ICD/FP

TO: The American Consulate, BELEM

Reference is made to the Department's instruction No. CA-2145 of September 3, 1959, regarding retail outlets for Communist and Communist-line publications. The Department commends the Consulate for implementing the provisions of CA-2145, as exemplified in its despatch No. 22 of March 17, 1960. There is a continuous need for this type of information among the principal Washington intelligence agencies, and each has expressed sincere appreciation to the Department for the Consulate's endeavors.

DILLON, ACTING

732.001/5-260

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LWS 732.001/5-260

DRAFTED BY: IRC:ICD:CEPhelps/wb 4-29-60

APPROVED BY: IRC:ICD:R. Kenneth Oakley

CLEARANCES:

S/S-CR

MAY 2 1960 P.M.

1195

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the forthcoming Brazilian Presidential elections.

On Monday, March 28, he visited the city of Feira de Santana, about 130 kilometers northwest of Salvador and was scheduled to return to Rio via air on March 30.

Comment

Prestes' visit to Salvador is not considered to have been particularly significant and it is doubted that the political beliefs or impressions of the baianos have been influenced. Apart from factual background concerning his visit and articles carrying his press comments, his presence received little publicity and there was no editorial comment. The cool reception given Prestes, however, cannot be used as an accurate measure of the numerical strength of the Communists in this capital, nor of the political power they could wield given certain circumstances.

For the Consul,

Paul B. McCarty
American Vice Consul

cc: Amembassy, Rio de Janeiro, Political Section.
" " , Supervisory Consul General.

PBM

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1194

AIR POUCH
PRIORITY

OFFICIAL USE ONLY
(Security Classification)

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732.001/3-3160

FOREIGN SERVICE DESPATCH

FROM : Amconsul SALVADOR, Brazil.

-28-
DESP. NO.

TO : THE DEPARTMENT OF STATE, WASHINGTON.

March 31, 1960
DATE

REF :

EUR

For Dept. Use Only

ACTION: ARA-4
REC'D 4/9
INFO DEPT: 194/2-2 IRC-5 M/O-1 M/OP-1 SY-2
OTHER CIA-10 USIA-10 FBI-1 ARMY-4

SUBJECT: Political Comments - Visit of Luiz Carlos Prestes to Bahia. INR/R-3 OSD-4 OCB-1

Luiz Carlos Prestes, titular head of the outlawed Partido Comunista Brasileiro (PCB), visited Bahia from March 26 to 30. It was observed that automobiles and taxis, fitted with loud speakers, were utilized to inform the citizens of Salvador of his forthcoming visit, apparently in an attempt to create an enthusiastic reception. However, his entrance into the city was unspectacular and outside of a press conference held at his hotel on the night of arrival, his visit received little coverage. The Jornal da Bahia, Salvador's sometime pro-leftist newspaper, carried his press statement on the first page of its Sunday, March 27 issue, with a caption stating that in his opinion, "OPA (Operação Pan Americana) is an instrument for war against Russia!" Other newspapers carried his statements but with less spectacular billing.

In general, he indicated that the present political line of the communists of Brazil is legalistic, but does not exclude the possibility of revolution. He further intimated that revolution does not necessarily mean violence as usually interpreted in Latin America and Brazil, but merely "modification of the political regime."

Concerning the development of Brazil, he stated that the route of development adopted by President Kubitschek is not in the interest of Brazil. He inferred that the present policy depends on monopolies and trusts. He further stated that the development of Brazil needs to be independent of politics and supported by funds which do not demand political conditions -- such as loans from Russia.

Regarding OPA (Operação Pan Americana), he stated that such an organization is not a solution for the problems of Brazil. The OPA "is reactionary and....is an instrument for the United States to equip Brazil with arms and in turn require her support in case of war against Russia."

During his visit, Mr. Prestes called on Governor Juracy Magalhães and the Mayor of Salvador, Heitor Dias. He appeared to have been accorded an official but cool audience by both.

On the evening of his arrival, after his press conference, Prestes attended a meeting at Largo dos Mares and participated in a debate at the Associação dos Funcionários Públicos do Estado promoted by "students and intellectuals" concerning

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CAA

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DEPARTMENT OF STATE
BUREAU OF
INTER-AMERICAN AFFAIRS
APR 1 1960

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1193

simply said that "it fell into my hands." (Soviet fishing in troubled waters was something he was always aware of but definite proof is difficult to come by and he happened, by luck, to receive this proof.)

Dr. Helio Cyrino was trained as a bacteriologist. He studied in both Rio de Janeiro and São Paulo. Following graduation, he worked at his profession in São Paulo. He career was interrupted by the war and he served as a captain with the Brazilian Expeditionary Force in Italy. After discharge, he did not wish to continue his profession in São Paulo and decided to buy a fazenda in the western part of the state. He went there wanting some peace and quiet but his dynamic nature would not allow that. Soon he had moved to President Prudente and was owner of three or four fazendas and a radio station. Now he has nine stations, four newspapers, several fazendas, is vice-president of the President Prudente Football Club, president of the Santa Casa Charity Hospital, and deeply involved in politics. He appears to be close to 50 years of age, is a friendly, open kind of man who enjoys a sound combination of common sense, industriousness, humor and intelligence.

William P. Cochran, Jr.
Consul General

cc: Amembassy, Rio

1192

AIR POUCH
PRIORITY

CONFIDENTIAL
(Security Classification)

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732.001/3-3060
732.00/3-3660
XR 532.61

FOREIGN SERVICE DESPATCH

FROM : Amconsul, SÃO PAULO

DESP. NO. 351

TO : THE DEPARTMENT OF STATE, WASHINGTON.

DATE March 30, 1960

REF :

APR 5 - 1960

20 For Dept. Use Only	ACTION	DEPT.
	ARA-4	RM/R-2 IRC-8 EUR-5 P-3 M/G-1 M/OPI SY-5
	REC'D 4-8-60	INFO OTHER CIA-5 USIA-10 OCB-1 FBI-1 ARMY-2

DEPARTMENT OF STATE
BUREAU OF
INTER-AMERICAN AFFAIRS
APR 12 1960

SUBJECT: Communist Activity in President Prudente

Dr. Helio Cyrino, a leading citizen in the President Prudente area of São Paulo, recently informed the information officer and the deputy principal officer of this post as follows regarding communist activities in that area and elsewhere:

1. The USSR had invited ten persons from the city of President Prudente to visit Russia within the past two years.

2. Three trained communist leaders were sent to President Prudente to agitate and the local civic leaders forced them out. They were all Spaniards who had fought Franco and stayed for years in exile from Spain. Their activities in Prudente were "intense" -- so intense that those responsible for the public welfare could not permit them to remain.

3. The Russian Embassy in Montevideo is exceptionally active in spreading propaganda and encouraging agitation throughout Latin America. Dr. Cyrino believes that Brazil is the main target of the Embassy in Uruguay.

4. Dr. Cyrino has absolutely conclusive proof that the Soviets had given monetary support to the president of the Sorocabana Railroad Workers Union, Sr. Aguarmo. Dr. Cyrino did not elaborate but

732.001/3-3060

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RJB
RJBurton/MMcLean/tar
REPORTER

CONFIDENTIAL

APR 15 1960

DEPARTMENT OF STATE
BUREAU OF
INTER-AMERICAN AFFAIRS
APR 12 1960

ACTION ASSIGNED TO:	ACTION TAKEN	
NAME OF OFFICER & OFFICE SYMBOL	DATE OF ACTION	DIRECTIONS TO RM/R

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1191

732.001/3-3060

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W I T H D R A W A L N O T I C E

RG: 059

ENTRY: CDF60-63

TAB #: 31

1 / 10 / S /
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BOX: 1582

ACCESS RESTRICTED

The item identified below has been withdrawn from this file:

Folder Title: 732.00(W)/1-2963

Document Date: 29/01/63

Document Ser.#:

AGRAM A-866 FR RIO DE JANEIRO TO STATE

In the review of this file this item was removed because access to it is restricted. Restrictions on records in the National Archives are stated in general and specific record group restriction statements which are available for examination. The item identified above has been withdrawn because it contains:

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WITHDRAWN: 02/24/95 by: JAS

FOIA RETRIEVAL #: 949515 01582 00031



Peru's OAS Ambassador Juan Favelle's statement of January 18 was prominently played as Correio Braziliense's lead story under the headline "Cuban Subversion Threatens the Peace of the Hemisphere."

President Kennedy's State of the Union address was given much space. Most papers emphasized the request for a tax cut, but foreign policy-minded Jornal do Brasil headlined "Kennedy Says Cold War to Continue." (UNCLASSIFIED)

For the Ambassador:

John Keppel
Counselor of Embassy
for Political Affairs

Contributors: CDKeyser, HWeiner, TBarrett, JPMcLean, FSharp, CCarson, JKrizay, HShapiro, Capt. JIreland, Col. RKalb

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1188

of 170 Marine Corps Officers who are in opposition to RADM Aragao's political action. Minister Suzano has taken no disciplinary action against either RADM Salles or RADM Leonidas. Consensus of opinion in the Brazilian Navy is that Minister Suzano hopes this incident will "quickly pass" and that his chances of remaining Naval Minister in President Goulart's new cabinet will increase. (CONFIDENTIAL)

New Director of Naval Personnel. At 1500, 10 January 1963, VADM Augusto Roque Dias Fernandes assumed duties as Director of Naval Personnel. (UNCLASSIFIED)

Comment: On 20 Dec. 1962, VADM Moreira Maia submitted his resignation as Director of Naval Personnel together with a note to Naval Minister of his refusal to issue orders for 10 days arrest of 22 active duty naval officers who returned their Order of Naval Merit. VADM Dias Fernandes had been announced on 20 December as the new Commandant of the 3rd Naval District at Recife. Upon hearing this news VADM Toscano, Commandant 3rd Naval District, threatened to resign. Minister Suzano, since that time, has been able to convince VADM Toscano to remain as Commandant, 3rd Naval District, and also to persuade VADM Dias Fernandes to assume duties as Director Naval Personnel. (CONFIDENTIAL)

11. Air

New Chief of Staff, BAF: Lt. Brig. Francisco de Assis Correa de Mello took office as Chief of Staff, BAF, on 14 January 1963. (See Weeka 51, 31 Dec. 1962) (UNCLASSIFIED)

PSYCHOLOGICAL

12. Press Review

While the domestic situation continued to capture the most prominent space in the Brazilian press this week, indications of a resolution of the crisis atmosphere caused the press to lift its eyes to the broader horizon of world affairs. International news items were given greater and more conspicuous coverage than during the last week.

Among these were the UN's successes in the Congo, West Germany's break with Cuba and the intra-Communist conflict. Fidel Castro's speech before the Latin American Women's Congress served as the lead story in several papers and stirred some of the most significant editorial comment of the week. Danton Jobim, writing in Goulart-controlled DC-Brasilia, stated that "the simple presence of a leader of the type of Fidel--communist of the Chinese type, partisan of revolutionary war--represents a danger to the Americas." Jornal do Brasil, a paper which had been one of the loudest voices proclaiming Brasil's "independent" foreign policy, stated that "Castro needs to know that Brazil will not admit the foreign intervention, no matter where it comes from..."

1187

MILITARY

9. Army

Lt. Gen. Nestor Penha Brasil was unexpectedly named President, JBUSMC by Goulart. Penha Brasil, one of closest U.S. friends in Brazilian military is an artilleryman, father of Brazil's airborne, and was a staff officer with FEB in Italy during World War II. Formerly Commander III Army Porto Alegre, he was removed by Goulart at Brizola's behest in July 1962, then assigned as Director Production & Works in the War Ministry. Very recently Penha Brasil was the indirect spokesman of the Rio general officer corps in making known to Goulart that group's strong opposition to Osvino's possible accession to the War Ministry in upcoming presidentialist cabinet.

Penha Brasil's appointment is viewed most favorably by the U.S. delegation and other U.S. representatives here. However, Goulart's strategy could be not only to isolate Penha Brasil from likeminded Brazilian General Officers, but also to open an additional (another already created) vacancy in Lt. Gen. grade in order to promote a pro-Jango worthy. Senior Major General now is II Army Commander Peri Bevilacqua who must retire in March if not promoted, but now may be in disfavor as result of his recent statements against political strikes by pro-Goulart "labor". Two vacancies would make possible the promotion of Peri, if Goulart desires to serve notice on labor that his previous soft stand is to be reversed. Another possible promotion to offset Peri's advancement would be that of pro-Goulart Benjamin Gallando Rodrigues, appointed Commander, 1st Military Region two months ago from 1st Cavalry Division in Rio Grande do Sul in place of General Enro Maurell Filho, outspokenly anti-leftist. (CONFIDENTIAL)

10. Navy

Continued Unrest in Brazilian Navy. Following RADM Aragao's "military-political" luncheon 5 January, RADM Salles (2nd ranking MarCorps Admiral), Chief of Staff and Sub-Commandant, Marine Corps, in writing, violently protested RADM Aragao's luncheon to the Commandant, Marine Corps. He further stated to the Commandant that it would be impossible for him to remain as Chief of Staff unless disciplinary action was taken against RADM Aragao (3rd ranking Marine Corps Admiral). RADM Salles was relieved as Chief of Staff of the Brazilian Marine Corps at 1500, 16 January by Captain FINEAS Alves Carneiro. (CONFIDENTIAL)

Comment: Minister Suzano could not relieve RADM Salles as Sub-Commandant of the Marine Corps, which he undoubtedly wanted to do, without presidential approval. He did not want to bring a new crisis before the President at this time. Instead, he relieved RADM Salles as Chief of Staff to the Commandant. RADM Leonidas Ribeiro (4th ranking Marine Corps Admiral) in a separate letter to Minister Suzano, strongly supported RADM Salles' position and submitted a list

1186

story of the mysterious shooting of Pedro Fernandez and Ramón Padilla, Cuban asylees in the Brazilian Embassy at Habana, have something to do with the GOB's failure to announce this particular service to Cuba. (CONFIDENTIAL)

5. Government Serves Ultimatum to End Shipping Strike

Transport Minister Helio de Almeida has issued official notice to Merchant Marine strikers giving them until noon today, January 21, to return to work. Those who do not show up for work may be dismissed. The strikers recently turned down a new scale of wages offered by the Government which was less than the scale being paid to the Niteroi ferry boats.

Separate strikes by the Ishikawagima shipyard workers, telecommunications workers, bank workers and Rio bus drivers were settled this week. (UNCLASSIFIED)

6. Congressman Requests Copy of Document Dealing With Communist Revolutionary Plan for Brazil

Federal Deputy Abel Rafael (PRP-Minas Gerais) sent official protest to the Presidency of Congress, calling upon Itamaraty to make available to the general staff of the armed forces and to the public, the details of a document found on the person of a Cuban national who was killed in a recent Varig plane crash in Peru. The document which is being kept in secrecy by Itamaraty is reported to contain details of a communist revolutionary plot to be set off in Brazil. Rafael also requested that a copy of the report of General Albino da Silva, Chief of the Presidential Military cabinet, be made available. (CONFIDENTIAL)

7. Ligas Camponesas Francisco Julião and Paraguayan Plot

Ligas leader, Francisco Julião, recently elected federal deputy, was implicated in a communist plot to seize power in Paraguay on 31 December 1962. Julião, according to press reports, met in Montevideo with Uruaguayan communist leader Oscar Creydt, Cuban communist leader Blas Roca, two Soviets and other lesser lights in order to lay the groundwork for the plan. (CONFIDENTIAL)

8. Ford to Invest in Brazil

According to press reports, Henry Ford II, following a meeting with President Goulart, announced that the Ford Motor Co. would invest 3.5 million dollars in Brazil in equipment for manufacturing passenger cars and would study the advisability of an additional 21 million dollars in its existing facilities. (UNCLASSIFIED)

1185

The day following the increase in petroleum prices, the government also announced that the Council of Ministers had agreed to eliminate the special import rate which had been applied to wheat. Additionally, there were suggestions that there would be adjustments in rail rates with a view toward reducing the level of subsidies to that area. (OFFICIAL USE ONLY)

Comment: Undoubtedly a major factor leading toward the decision to eliminate various subsidies which had been aggravating the budget deficit and the level of new currency issuances was the necessity of taking some stabilization action prior to beginning financial talks with the U.S. and IMF from whom financial assistance is desperately needed to avoid a major foreign exchange crisis in 1963. Secondary, but also important motivations likely were (1) the contribution the petroleum price hike will make toward helping Petrobras out of its current financial difficulties and (2) the effect increasing import costs may have in reducing the level of imports as an additional means of saving foreign exchange. In the latter connection, it should be noted that in addition to raising the wheat import rate, the government announced that wheat imports would be reduced approximately 20% and that the wheat imported would be of a lower grade, cheaper variety. (CONFIDENTIAL)

4. Brazil Takes Over the Protection of Cuban Interests at Bonn?

News of West Germany's rupture of diplomatic relations with Cuba was given prominent, factual, coverage in the Brazilian press of January 15. (UNCLASSIFIED)

Comment: On January 21 a German Embassy officer mentioned to Embassy officers that the Brazilian Embassy at Bonn on January 17 delivered a note to the Foreign Office stating that, pursuant to the request of the Cuban Government, Brazil would take over the protection of Cuban interests in the Federal Republic. The German Embassy is considerably puzzled and embarrassed over the fact that up to January 21 no official announcement had been made by Itamaraty or had any hint of the development appeared in the local press. To add to the Germans' chagrin, the German Ambassador on January 16 had had a long conversation with Under Secretary Bernardes and the latter made no mention of the Brazilian intentions in the matter. It is the German Embassy's view, and one this Embassy is inclined to share, that Brazil was chosen as the Latin American country with ties with Cuba most likely to endure. As regards the absence so far of a Brazilian announcement, we can only speculate. It is possible the Foreign Office did not consider the matter of sufficient importance to warrant a communique. On the other hand, the Foreign Office is prone to give full publicity to all matters relating to "the projection of the Brazilian personality upon the international stage." It may well be that the events leading to and following the current

1184

Valladares Act, a simple majority (164) would be required. (CONFIDENTIAL)

Comment: The indirect modification of the Constitution by extra-constitutional means suggested by the proposed amendment to the Valladares Act is a study in Brazilian constitutional procedure, and closely parallels enactment of Ato Adicional and Valladares Act in first place. (CONFIDENTIAL)

2. A "Non-offensive" Cabinet?

The key figure in public Cabinet maneuverings this week was far-leftist federal deputy Almino Afonso (PTB-Amazonas), who is his party's Chamber leader. Sent on a "mission" to Rio by the President, Almino told newsmen that the new Cabinet (which may be appointed momentarily) would not be offensive to the country's conservatives, neither would it betray the people's confidence in the President as expressed in the January 6 plebiscite. Most observers felt that Almino had made clear to General Osvino Alves that he would not get the War Ministry. Almino said the one name certain not to be in the Cabinet is that of Leonel Brizzola, who, he said, did not wish to participate in a government that did not share his radical views. This has lead to speculation that the Cabinet may be one of "transition," with far leftists like Brizzola and General Osvino making the grade later this year.

A high Brazilian official informed us that Goulart had told him that Dantas was in the lead for Finance Minister. Hermes Lima would remain at Itamaraty, presumably until a vacancy occurred for him on the Supreme Court. According to this version, the War, Transport and Mines and Energy ministries would stay in the hands of the incumbents with other ministries still to be negotiated for. (CONFIDENTIAL)

Comment: While in the economic field, Goulart shows definite signs of heeding U.S. advice, the political side shows him using standard Goulart operating procedure: juggling the Left and the Center with most indications that he is telling the former to wait just a bit longer. (CONFIDENTIAL)

3. Government Begins Elimination of Subsidies per Furtado Recommendation

As a first step in what has been termed by the press as "execution of the Furtado 3-year plan," the government ended the privileged import rate for importation of petroleum products, at the same time raising the conversion rate applied in levying the single tax on fuels from Cr$247 to the dollar to the currently effective fiscal dollar rate. As a consequence internal prices of petroleum products were raised an average of 70% with gasoline prices being most affected.

1183

POLITICAL

1. Congressional Action Restoring Presidentialism Awaited

Final Congressional action restoring presidentialism may be expected by January 23 or 24, PTB federal deputy Sergio Magalhães told an Embassy officer on January 17.

Action may take the form either of a constitutional amendment, already passed unanimously by the Senate on the night of January 17, or by an amendment of the Valladares Act which would restore the 1946 Constitution provisionally during the 90-day period allotted by that act for Congressional discussion of possible amendment of the Constitution, and definitively at the end of the 90 days if no amendment is forthcoming.

According to press reports, the Chamber hopes to muster enough deputies in Brasilia on January 22 or 23 to obtain the necessary two-thirds vote to pass the Constitutional amendment already approved by the Senate. Two-thirds of the present Chamber, which numbers 326 deputies, would be 218, and according to press reports, 194 were in Brasilia on the evening of January 21.

The amendment approved by the Senate revokes the Fourth Amendment (Ato Adicional) which established parliamentarism in September, 1961, and also provides that in case of a vacancy in both the presidency and the vice presidency, succession would pass in order to the president of the Chamber of Deputies, the president of the Senate, and the Chief Justice. This is the form preferred by the PTB, since it restores the 1946 Constitution without modification. The UDN would prefer an amendment which would provide a period of four to six months during which Congress could amend the 1946 Constitution by a simple majority, rather than by the difficult two-thirds majority. The UDN would hope during such a period and under such ground rules to amend the constitution to provide that the Senate would have power of review in foreign policy and to give Congress greater fiscal control over the executive.

There is thus a possibility that the Chamber will be unable to obtain a clear two-thirds majority in favor of the Senate's constitutional amendment, in which case the PSD and PTB would seek to obtain their goal of restoration of presidentialism through the passage of a "lei complementar" amending the Valladares Act. The Valladares Act provides that the 1946 Constitution would return to force 90 days after the proclamation of the results of the January 6 referendum (expected January 22-25), this period being set aside for consideration of possible modification of the 1946 Constitution. The proposed amendment to this act would provide that the 1946 Constitution would enter into effect immediately. To amend the

1182

ORIGIN/ACTION

INR. 10

RMR 1	REP	AF
ARA 4	EUR	FE
NEA	CU 5	INR
E	S/P 1	IO 2
L	FBO	AID 17
PC 1	H/LB 1	USIA 1
AGR 2	COM 2	FRB
INT	LAB 2	TAR
TR 2	XMB	AIR 13
ARMY 25	CIA 15	NAVY 14
OSD 17	USIA 11	NSA 3
	HEW 1	NSC 3

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

AIRGRAM

732.00(W)/1-2263

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A-832 NO. | CONFIDENTIAL | AIR POUCH HANDLING INDICATOR

1963 JAN 25 AM 7 39

TO : Department of State

RM/AN ANALYSIS & DISTRIBUTION BRANCH

FROM : Amembassy, Brasilia Office DATE: January 22, 1963

SUBJECT: JOINT WEEKA 4

REF : Embassy Airgram A-805, January 15, 1963.

CONTENTS

POLITICAL

1. Congressional Action Restoring Presidentialism Awaited
2. A "Non-offensive" Cabinet
3. Government Begins Elimination of Subsidies per Furtado Recommendation
4. Brazil Takes Over the Protection of Cuban Interests at Bonn?
5. Government Serves Ultimatum to End Shipping Strike
6. Congressman Requests Copy of Document Dealing With Communist Revolutionary Plan for Brazil
7. Ligas Camponesas Francisco Julião and Paraguayan Plot
8. Ford to Invest in Brazil

MILITARY

9. Army
10. Navy
11. Air

PSYCHOLOGICAL

12. Press Review

FILED

FEB 13 1963

DEPARTMENT OF STATE RECEIVED

1963 JAN 25 PM 5 04

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FORM DS-323 4-62

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Drafted by: See last page/jhm

Contents and Classification Approved by:

Clearances:

Castro added up to "the opportunity for us (Brazil) to make up for time wasted in these last two years (of independent foreign policy)."

Moderate Correio da Manha tied the Kennedy-Kuznetsov meeting and the U.S. call for stronger measures against Cuba together in one story under the headline "End of the Cold War with the Isolation of Cuba." The same front page included an editorial praising the move, but adding that the U.S. action was possible because the cold war was at an end, as the conversations between the two leaders indicated. (UNCLASSIFIED)

For the Ambassador:

John Keppel

John Keppel
Counselor of Embassy
for Political Affairs

Contributors: CDKeyser, JFishburn, FMicelotta, Col.RKalb, BGoldstein, JPMcLean

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1180

plebiscite. The new regulation, based on a law dating from 1946, will require that applicants for the license specify what they intend to film and for what purposes. (UNCLASSIFIED)

Comment: All the motives behind Justice's move are not clear. A charitable view would explain the administration's aim as intended to protect tourists and newspapermen from the sometimes over-zealous Guanabara political police. The Censorship chief officially explained that "in many cases motion-picture taking is harmful to Brazil instead of constituting positive propaganda." This explanation would square with a known quantity: Brazilian hyper-nationalism. On the other hand, the regulation may be an additional demonstration of the administration's apparent interest in manipulating opinion, foreign in this case, through regulation of communication media, an interest earlier evidenced by presidential vetoes of items in the telecommunications bill, which, if sustained, would have resulted in increased government control over press, radio and TV. (CONFIDENTIAL)

13. Press Review

During the last week news columns and editorial space were dominated by the results of the plebiscite (Item 1), conflicting views about the manner of the return to "presidentialism" (Item 2) and the composition of the new cabinet (Item 3). Goulart mouthpiece Ultima Hora had little space for other news as its headlines and editorials proclaimed "Goulart's victory" and urged the President's early assumption of full powers.

The U.S. $30 million credit to Brazil was given light treatment by the press. Typical items commented on the small size and short terms of the agreement. Conservative O Estado de São Paulo said that this was not the way a great nation dealt with a friend and went on to attack the present government's foreign policy.

Several papers, stimulated by recent signs of strained U.S.-Brazil relations and anticipating the pronouncement of Goulart's "presidentialist" foreign policy, chose during the week to point out the path that each paper thought the government should take. The most interesting approach was taken by Rio's Jornal do Brasil, whose Foreign Office connections give its words added weight when the paper speaks on matters of foreign affairs. JB felt that Brazil should more realistically appraise the changed world balance of power. The paper viewed the meeting of President Kennedy and Vice Chancellor Kuznetsov and the agreement to withdraw the Cuban issue from the UN agenda as further evidence of a division of the world between the two great powers. But the editorialist stressed that Brazil should maintain its independent foreign policy because "an agreement between the Soviet Union and the United States opens the way to peace, without closing the way of self-determination" and "any policy that, in the name of peace, denies self-determination, or vice-versa, would end by bringing the world to war." Conservative O Globo saw reality differently. The changed U.S.-U.S.S.R. relationship, Cuba's entrance into the Soviet Bloc and the U.S. appeal for stronger measures against

1179

seeking an interpretation of a recent law abolishing Saturday work which would also leave them with a 30-hour week. The banks had insisted on having the men work an extra half-hour on the other days of the week to make up for the Saturday closing since the law was not clear on that point. Apparently the bank owners expect to win on the Christmas issue and lose on the weekly work period. The owners have offered to accept the decision of the courts on both points but the bank workers have refused to let the cases go to the courts, apparently fearful they would lose on the Christmas bonus issue.

The employees of some bus concerns in Rio de Janeiro are on strike to enforce payment of additional wages to which they were entitled some time ago. While some of the bus firms are paying them the increase and are not being effected by the strike, other firms allege that their inability to increase fares, upon which the wage increase was predicated, keeps them from being able to pay the increases. A recently decreed increase in bus fares should settle this issue. (OFFICIAL USE ONLY)

MILITARY

9. Army - negative

10. Navy - negative

11. Air

Reliable source in BAF informs following promotions: Brig. Benjamin Manoel Amarante to Maj. Brig.; Brig. Anysio Botelho to Maj. Brig.; Col. Doorgal Borges to Brig.; Col. Olavo Nunes de AssumpçÃo to Brig.; Col. Othelo da Rocha Ferraz to Brig. (UNCLASSIFIED)

Death of Brig. Ernani Pedrosa Hardman, 7 January 1963. (UNCLASSIFIED)

Comment: Several BAF officers informed Air Attaché of circumstances surrounding death. Brig. Hardman was planning a trip to the Congo or Cairo. In order to prepare himself for this trip he received anti-rabies shots which are compulsory. Brig. Hardman had a violent reaction and suffered a fatal heart attack. (UNCLASSIFIED)

PSYCHOLOGICAL

12. Federal Government to Control Visitors' Film-making

The Federal Censorship Department of the Ministry of Justice issued a regulation January 10 requiring all foreign non-residents planning to make motion pictures in Brazil to obtain a special license from the Foreign Office. The move seems to have grown out of an incident which occurred January 6 in Rio de Janeiro. Two German journalists were arrested by Rio police for filming, or attempting to set up, a scene showing two bikini-clad young women voting in the

1178

at a time when the administration is attempting, one way or another, to work its will with the Congress with respect to Goulart's resumption of full presidential powers, the present wave of rural agitation, taken together with numerous strikes and strike threats, cannot help but call to mind the mobilized campaign of popular agitation that accompanied Goulart's attempt to force San Tiago Dantas as Premier on a reluctant Congress last July. (CONFIDENTIAL)

6. Brazil to Import 100 Thousand Tons of Soviet Wheat

While negotiations are taking place for the conclusion of a Brazil-USSR long-term bilateral trade and payments agreement (see Weeka A-788, Item 6), representatives of CACEX (Foreign Trade Department of the Bank of Brazil) and the Soviet EXPORTKLEB have signed a contract for the importation of 100 thousand tons of Soviet wheat at US$73 a metric ton. The contract, valued at US$7,300,000, provides for the exchange of Brazilian coffee, cotton, cacao, vegetable oils and sisal in payment for the wheat; the first shipment of 30 thousand tons of wheat will arrive in February, with 40 thousand tons scheduled for March delivery, and 30 thousand tons for April.

The wheat contract is the fourth such contract to be signed between Brazil and the USSR, and was entered into in accordance with a 1959 trade agreement under which all commercial relations between the two countries have been carried out. (UNCLASSIFIED)

7. Ambassador Concerned Over Communists in Street-Car Union

On January 12, 1963 Ambassador Gordon expressed to Ambassador Roberto Campos the Embassy's concern over the government-aided efforts of the Communists to take over the leadership of the National Federation of Street-Car Workers through an illegal election scheduled for January 15, 1963. Communist domination of the Federation would endanger democratic control of the National Confederation of Land Transport Workers when the next biennial election is held in June 1963. (A separate report is being prepared.) (CONFIDENTIAL)

8. Strikes in Rio de Janeiro

Partial strikes in the Brazilian Merchant Marine, banks of Rio de Janeiro, and bus transport in Rio de Janeiro have continued or erupted in the past week.

The Merchant Marine strike continues, though it now seems likely that the striking workers led by the non-Communists may gain their objectives and win a real victory.

The Communist-led bank workers struck for one day on January 11, 1963 in five banks in the City of Rio de Janeiro. They are seeking an interpretation of the recent Christmas bonus law, which would give them, in effect, a 14-month bonus since most of them already received a Christmas bonus before the law took effect. They are also

1177

may have had his name circulated in order to disarm opposition before the referendum, and also to build him up as of nuisance value in negotiations for the support of Ademar de Barros, leader of the PSP and SÃo Paulo rival of Carvalho Pinto.

Goulart has reportedly decided to concentrate now on establishing a presidentialist system before continuing with cabinet negotiations, particularly because cabinet nominations now could hurt his position in these negotiations, and cabinet positions could be good bargaining counters. (LIMITED OFFICIAL USE).

4. Goulart Likened to Napoleon and de Gaulle

In commenting on the referendum results on January 10, Justice Minister JoÃo Mangabeira (PSB) is reported to have said that he disagreed with those who alleged that the plebiscite was dictatorial in nature, and cited Napoleon, empowered by acclamation by the plebiscite he convoked, "not as an imposition on the people, since he was an idol adored by the people, over which to this day he casts his shadow." Mangabeira is then said to have exalted de Gaulle, whose resurgence in France with the adoption of the plebiscitory style "saved France and saved the world." (UNCLASSIFIED)

Comment: This is not the first time that Goulart has been likened to de Gaulle, but it is the first time he has been compared with Napoleon, as far as the Embassy knows. Mangabeira presumably refers to Napoleon III. [redacted] (OFFICIAL USE ONLY)

5. Violence and Agitation Disturb Countryside

Some half-dozen workers died in Pernambuco in clashes between field and factory hands and their employers, the mill owners and cane planters. In Rio State, para-military state troops (Policia Militar) forced 3000 squatters off private lands they had been cultivating for months. Reports of rural agitation and violence came out of Parana, Goias, and Rio Grande do Sul.

Some reports put the Pernambuco shootings down to worker demands for payment of the "13th salary"; others claimed a "pre-established plan of subversion" under the direction of Francisco JuliÃo's Peasant Leagues. Though the Rio State squatters vacated their illegal holdings, latest reports indicate that the state administration may expropriate the lands in question for concession to them. News of the other rural distrubances has been extremely sketchy, though the Parana violence seems to have grown out of a local blood-feud. Rio Grande developments have been too skimpily reported so far to give any but the vaguest picture. (UNCLASSIFIED)

Comment: Disturbances in the countryside may be attributable to nothing more sinister than coincidence and, in fact, a common denominator in the several instances seems to be lacking. Nevertheless,

1176

period in which the Congress discusses whether or not to amend it. (UNCLASSIFIED)

Comment: Although a number of other proposals have been advanced (Mangabeira thesis, constitutional amendment, and juridical decision, among others), Goulart's statement and that of Hermes Lima seem to indicate that the government favors Magalhães' situation. Under the psychological battering of the results of the referendum and the victory dancing of the Goulartists, Congress may well accept the Magalhães solution as the most palatable of a number of proposals. It would require only a simple majority, rather than a two-thirds majority, as in the case of constitutional amendment, which could not be undertaken during a special session in any case. The Goulartists would thus hope to see the Magalhães amendment passed in time to allow Goulart to name his new cabinet either 48 hours after proclamation of the results of the referendum (i.e., sometime around January 24-27), or early in February, after the January 31 expiry of the mandate of the present Congress and Cabinet. As previously reported, it seems unlikely that Congress will be able to muster a two-thirds majority for any amendment to the 1946 Constitution during the 90-day period allotted under the Valladares Act, and the 1946 Constitution would return to full force after the expiry of the 90-day period. The Magalhães bill would simply hasten the return to force of the 1946 Constitution without prejudicing the Congress' already slim chances of modifying it.

In order to get a simple majority for the Magalhães proposal in the present Congress, Goulart seems to be seeking the support not only of the PTB, but also of the PSD and the PSP. The alignment of Ademar de Barros, the leader of the PSP, with Goulart on this issue may be ad hoc, but it also may reflect a more substantial agreement.

Acquiescence of parts of the UDN may also be forthcoming. Not only does the return of the 1946 Constitution seem more or less inevitable, but also there are muffled threats of union and military action to back Goulart's scheme. (LIMITED OFFICIAL USE)

3. Carvalho Pinto Name Fades from Cabinet Speculation

Current cabinet speculation centers around the names of Antonio Balbino (PSD, Bahia) for Finance, San Tiago Dantas (PTB, Minas Gerais) for Foreign Affairs, Helio de Almeida (the present Minister of Public Works), Eliezer Batista da Silva (the present Minister of Mines and Energy), and Oliveira Brito (PSD, Bahia), with the present military ministers remaining. (UNCLASSIFIED)

Comment: The list would also undoubtedly include Celso Furtado for Planning, while Tancredo Neves, Hermes Lima, Elyseu Paglioli in Health, Alfredo Nasser in Justice, Darcy Ribeiro, and Henrique Lott continue in the running. The most noticeable change in the past week is the fading of Carvalho Pinto (UDN, São Paulo) for Finance. Goulart

1175

2. January Revocation of Parliamentarism Possible

In a January 12 exclusive interview granted to Edísio Gomes de Mattos of the Jornal do Brasil (the paper's second Goulart exclusive in a month), Goulart said "I await the proclamation of the official results of the expressive popular manifestation of January 6 to integrate myself in the plenitude of my duties to the nation, certain as I am that the understanding of the party leaders and the patriotism of the National Congress will be able to suppress all difficulties that chance to exist, so that the decision of the Brazilian people suffers no deformation or delay."

Elsewhere in the interview, Goulart said "I nourish no other intention than that of responding, to the extent of my abilities, to the unmistakable appeal represented by the practical unanimity of the Brazilian people. For this I will need, and I hope to count on, the collaboration of all those who place the interests of the country above all disagreements, since I well understand that among my duties are included the coordination of the indispensable efforts for the solution of the grave and pressing problems to which we are summoned."

In a cabinet meeting held on January 10 to consider the results of the referendum, Prime Minister Hermes Lima was authorized to take whatever steps he might feel politically most appropriate in light of the results, and on January 12 he issued an official statement to the press announcing that the mandate of the cabinet would expire on January 31.

"In the face of the unmistakable option of the electorate," his statement read, "there falls to Congress the decision that seems to it most appropriate in bringing about the constitution of the new ministry.

"There can be no doubt that Congress, whose cooperation in overcoming the institutional crisis was fundamental and decisive, will be able to find the appropriate way for the aspirations of the Brazilian people, so overwhelmingly manifested, to be promptly attended to."

On January 9, left-wing PTB deputy Sergio Magalhães (Guanabara) told newspapermen that he intended to present a bill during the special session of the old Congress opening on January 15 which would amend the Capanema-Valladares Act, but not revoke the Ato Adicional. The latter, which instituted parliamentarism, had been practically revoked by the Lei Complementar No. 2 (the Valladares Act), he maintained.

Magalhães' proposed amendment of the Valladares Act would read as follows: "Without prejudice to the provisions of Paragraph 1, the Constitution of 1946 is now in force." The Paragraph 1 referred to is that which provides that within 90 days of the proclamation of the results of the referendum, Congress would have to make the necessary changes in the Constitution to bring it into line with the results of the referendum. The Magalhães proposal would thus have the effect of returning the 1946 Constitution to force during the

1174

POLITICAL

1. Goulart Claims Victory Surpassing Janio's

According to semi-official results published by the conservative O Globo on January 14, the nation-wide count of the "no" vote (opposed to parliamentarism, and thus in favor of returning full presidential powers to President Goulart) in the January 6 referendum has reached the figure of 8,796,935, as opposed to 1,884,727 "yes".

Goulart himself is reported to have calculated on January 12 that when the final results are in, he will have a "no" vote on the order of 10 million.

It is expected that the TSE (Supreme Electoral Tribunal) will proclaim the final results of the referendum about January 22 to 25. (UNCLASSIFIED)

Comment: Goulartist Ultima Hora declared in a banner headline on January 11 that over nine million "no" votes had been tallied and termed the plebiscite vote a "victory unprecedented in the political history of Brazil." It has been reported that Goulart was hoping to obtain more than the 5,636,623 votes won by Quadros in the 1960 presidential election in order to advance the preposterous claim that he had won a record presidential mandate.

Though the proportion of "no" to "yes" votes is no surprise, the relatively low rate of abstention being reported (current estimates say that it will run to 20-30%) is counter to the expectations of Brazilian observers and the Embassy. Several factors may account for the unexpectedly high count in voter turn-out. Mangabeira's pronouncements that voting in the plebiscite was mandatory and that failure to do so would make voters liable to legal penalties may have had their effect. There was also the heavy Federal government campaign in the mass media. Allied to that campaign, and indeed the object of its major appeal, may have been sincere voters dissatisfaction with the present state of things leading to voter decision to do something to bring about a change. A fourth contributing factor may have been fraud, but this is very uncertain since no solid evidence has been adduced, and only one national newspaper seems even to have hinted at the possibility. (CONFIDENTIAL)

1173

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INR-10		
RM/R 1	REP	AF
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20

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

AIRGRAM

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TO : Department of State 1963 JAN 18 AM 9 40

RM/AN
ANALYSIS & DISTRIBUTION
BRANCH

FROM : Amembassy, Brasilia Office DATE: January 15, 1963

SUBJECT : JOINT WEEKA 3

REF : Airgram A-788, January 9, 1963.

Contents

POLITICAL

1. Goulart Claims Victory Surpassing Janio's
2. January Revocation of Parliamentarism Possible
3. Carvalho Pinto Name Fades from Cabinet Speculation
4. Goulart Likened to Napoleon and de Gaulle
5. Violence and Agitation Disturb Countryside
6. Brazil to Import 100 Thousand Tons of Soviet Wheat
7. Ambassador Concerned Over Communists in Street-Car Union
8. Strikes in Rio de Janeiro

MILITARY

9. Army - negative
10. Navy - negative
11. Air

PSYCHOLOGICAL

12. Federal Government to Control Visitors' Film Making
13. Press Review

DEPARTMENT OF STATE RECEIVED 1963 JAN 18 PM 5 09

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Drafted by: See last page/jhm

Concurrences and Classification Approved by:

Clearances:

1172

PSYCHOLOGICAL

13. Press Review

As the day of the plebiscite approached and passed, the Brazilian press had eyes for little else. Editorial comment was cautious and reserved for domestic matters except for speculating on the future of U.S.-Brazil relations. (UNCLASSIFIED)

For the Ambassador:

John Keppel
Counselor of Embassy
for Political Affairs

Contributors: CDKeyser, FMiceliotta, PMcLean, Capt Ireland, BAGoldstein, HShapiro, JTFishburn, Col. VWalters, Col. RDKalb

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1171

MILITARY(Cont)

fact that most of the invited guests did not attend. On 20 December RADM Aragao issued invitations to all Admirals in the Rio area, plus other distinguished guests. The only Admirals at this luncheon were Minister Suzano, Rear Admiral Goyano (Chief of Navy Minister's Cabinet) one Marine Corps Admiral, VADM Bustamante, plus host. In fact Rear Admiral Salles (Sub-Commandant of the Marine Corps) and Rear Admiral Telles, Marine Corps, did not attend the luncheon. Furthermore, six captains who are chiefs of various regiments in the Marine Corps did not attend. The fact is that Admiral Jose Luiz (CNO) and the remaining 37 Admirals in the Rio area did not attend. Although advance press publicity stated that Governor Brizola, War Minister Kruel and Air Minister Reynaldo would attend this luncheon, these three also did not attend, although Brizola did send a representative. Minister Suzano asked the CNO why he did not attend and CNO expressed the general feeling of all the Admirals when he said "I do not care for or approve of the action or policy of Rear Admiral Aragao". This is further evidence of the continued resistence within the Brazilian Navy towards Minister Suzano and Admiral Aragao. At this luncheon RADM Aragao stated "Minister Suzano is the right man to serve the Navy and the Marine Corps". Only Aragao thinks this. (CONFIDENTIAL)

12. Air

Reliable source stated Colonel Mario Calmon Eppinghaus was relieved as Commander of Salvador Air Force Base. Press indicates Colonel Eglon Marques will be named as the new commander. (UNCLASSIFIED)

Comment: Recent reports indicate that Air Minister Reynaldo transferred a sergeant to 3rd Air Zone, Rio de Janeiro, following the sergeant's appeal against disciplinary action by Base Commander Colonel Eppingheus. Some officers BAF believed Eppinghaus was transferred for this reason. The press also stated that the sergeant was guilty of passing out subversive literature, and for that reason was given several days of confinement by base commander. Air Minister claims sergeant is a mental case and has had a past history of disciplinary problems. Air Minister was emphatic in his assurance that Colonel Eppinghaus was not relieved of his command over this incident. He added that Eppinghaus had been in Salvador for two years and it was time for normal reassignment. Actually, Colonel Eppinghaus had been in Salvador for 1 year and 10 months. (CONFIDENTIAL)

Numerous Brazilian Air Force Officers indicate the Polish helicopter deal is still pending. (CONFIDENTIAL)

Comment: Evidently no definite action has been taken to finalize this transaction. Believe Air Minister is waiting to see if U.S. will provide helicopters for BAF. How long he will wait is not known; at times he seems impatient. (CONFIDENTIAL)

Brig. Ernani Pedrosa Hardman, Commander of the Air-Naval Tactical Command, died 7 January 1963 of a heart attack. (UNCLASSIFIED)

1170

POLITICAL (Cont)

All Brazilian tankers and large merchant ships are now reported to be operating, either with Navy crews or normal crews which are not obeying the strike orders. (CONFIDENTIAL)

Comment: The 3 unions involved have turned down the wage increases offered by the government as "not satisfactory". Without the support of the other leading labor organizations on ships and on the waterfront the 3 unions' positions are weak. Although the government has threatened to take drastic steps against strike leaders, these steps have not as yet been taken. The rumor that the International Transport Workers would support the strike by boycotting Brazilian ships in the U.S. turned out to be just a rumor. In fact, the International Transport Workers have offered their services to help resolve the dispute.

The significant portion of the Brazilian merchant marine is operating and there seems to be no danger to the national economy from the strike. (CONFIDENTIAL)

MILITARY

10. Army

Strong rumors are that General Osvino Ferreira Alves will be appointed War Minister, but many reports also allege Amaury Kruel will be maintained.

Kruel issues statement that he understands need for Military pay raiseand is supporting same. He adds that agitation in units and Military Club should stop. Osvino supporters have been equating his appointment as War Minister with better living conditions for Military. (UNCLASSIFIED)

11. Navy

Rear Admiral Aragao's Luncheon. Rear Admiral Aragao, Commandant Central Headquarters Command, Brazilian Marine Corps, held the Annual Marine Corps Luncheon on 5 January, inviting many Brazilian civilian and military personalities. Special guests at this luncheon were the Minister of the Navy, Admiral Suzano, the Commandant of the Marine Corps, Vice Admiral Bustamante, Commander of the 1st Army, General Osvino, Commander 3rd Air Zone, Brigadeiro Teixeira, Vice Governor, State of Guanabara, Eloy Dutra, Senator Aurelio Viana, Mr. Gilberto Crockett de Sa (President Goulart's labor liaison officer) and others of nationalistic and leftist tendencies. (CONFIDENTIAL)

Comment: One reason the bulk of the Brazilian Navy resist Minister Suzano is his close association with RADM Aragao. Most admirals detest and refuse to even speak to RADM Aragao. What is interesting about this particular luncheon is the

1169

7. Head of COFAP Victim of Rice Politics

Max de Rego Monteiro, President of COFAP, Federal price-fixing organ, was fired by Prime Minister Hermes Lima. Monteiro tripped himself up when he refused to withdraw the decree he had issued last week changing rice controls from rigid ceilings on the product to the system known as the "CLD Regime" or one in which the consumer price would be determined by figuring production cost, expenses, and a reasonable profit margin. (custo, lucro, despesas). Rio Grande do Sul Governor Leonel Brizola reportedly protested the measure, insisting instead that higher prices be guaranteed the rice producers of his state. General Albino Silva, head of the special Executive Rice Group as well as Chief of the President's Military Household, supported Brizola, and Monteiro was fired. Monteiro's decree has not entered into effect. (UNCLASSIFIED)

Comment: The target remains the same--Guanabara Governor Carlos Lacerda. Monteiro (reportedly not very bright) got in the line of fire. Monteiro's measure would almost certainly have ended rice shortages in Rio de Janeiro and the squeeze on Lacerda would have been off. Another factor in the situation was probably Brizola's interest in IRGA, the Rio Grande Rice Institute, which buys rice from the producers when they find open market sales unprofitable; Brizola's control of IRGA is probably politically (perhaps financially) profitable to him. (CONFIDENTIAL)

8. Ishikawajima Shipyard Struck on December 27

The workers at the Ishikawajima shipyard are on strike in support of 4 workers who were fired by the shipyard as a result of the last general shipyard strike on November 20. The management of the shipyard has refused to re-hire the 4 workers stating that the case was in the hands of the Labor Court. Although other shipyard unions in the area have threatened to go on strike in sympathy, no such action has yet been taken. (UNCLASSIFIED)

9. Maritime Strike

The Maritime strike that was called on December 21 by 4 national unions (ships' Officers, Ships' Engineers, Carpenters, and Storeroom Handlers) for reclassification of wages is still going on in spite of government intervention and threats against the striking workers. The Carpenters Union pulled out of the strike and on some ships the other 3 categories have been replaced by Naval personnel.

As of December 28 the Communist-led National Confederation of Workers in Maritime, River and Air Transport and National Federations of Stevedores and Longshoremen had condemned the strike.

1168

After a week of questioning editorials, Campos' remarks and rumors of a new loan from the U.S. government to Brazil had a lifting effect on the Brazilian scene. During the last week, the several segments of the press have written pessimistically of the direction each government was moving in regard to the other. Typically, conservative O Globo compared the Brazilian government to a child who had murdered his mother and his father and now bewailed his orphanhood. Jornal do Brasil complained of the American press attacks against Brazil and wondered out loud why the U.S. could not understand Brazil.

Statements of Brazilian government officials like those of Campos noted above and those of President Goulart to the New York Times, supported by editorials in the press, indicate that Brazilians are placing a heavy emphasis on the Three-Year Plan and see it as the means of convincing the U.S. of Brazil's good intentions. (UNCLASSIFIED)

Comment: Recent U.S. moves including the visit of U.S. Attorney-General Kennedy, have left in their wake a mood of uncertainty and uneasiness. It would seem that an exaggerated reliance is now being placed on the ability of the Three-Year Plan to restore good relations. (OFFICIAL USE ONLY)

6. Major Problem Confronts Brazil-USSR Trade Negotiations

Press accounts suggest that a major problem confronting the Brazil-USSR trade agreement negotiations is the surprise demand made by the Soviets in behalf of their permanent trade mission. According to one source, the Soviets requested diplomatic status for their resident mission; another version reports that the Soviets asked for an increase in their staff to four times the present number, "in view of the Soviet intention to centralize in Brazil the entire Soviet trade effort for all Latin America." (A 1961 Protocol establishing a permanent Soviet trade mission limits the number of members to ten -- see Embdes 377, November 6, 1961).

Reportedly, the Brazilians were caught completely off guard and replied that they were without authority to decide on a matter of a political nature since their instructions related exclusively to the negotiation of a trade and payments agreement. The report suggests that the matter will be "resolved in a future session", after the Brazilian delegation has been given appropriate instructions, although no guesses were hazarded as to what the instructions will be. (UNCLASSIFIED)

Comment: The reports of the Soviets using Brazil as a base for their Latin American "trade" efforts lends further evidence of an intensification of bloc economic penetration in this country. The Embassy is attempting to confirm the reports of the Soviet demands and to determine how, if actually made, they will be handled by the Brazilians. (LIMITED OFFICIAL USE)

1167

POLITICAL (cont)

Herbert Levy, national chairman of the UDN, is reported to have described it as "wordy and confused", while Bilac Pinto, another UDN leader with aspirations to succeed Levy as National Chairman, has noted the plan's proposed reduction in subsidies for petroleum products without specifying how much these subsidies should be reduced.

According to the Jornal do Brasil, PSD leaders have been more reserved. Ademar de Barros, the PSP governor-elect of Sao Paulo, has said that the plan is very good, but that in his opinion, Brazils' problem is neither one of regimes nor of plans, but uniquely of men. The chairman of the economic council of the National Manufacturer's Association of Brazil, Mário Ludolf, said the ideas presented were hackneyed, and implied that the plan was more akin to totalitarian economic plans than to democratic ones, which, he said, give priority to private industry.

One reason for this lack of enthusiasm might lie in political suspicion of the plan. It was used as a campaign device, both in Goulart's New Year's Eve address to the nation and in Furtado's statement that a rejection of the parliamentarist form of government would not only be a vote for the presidential system but also for the plan, which could be put into effect only with the presidential system. Augusto Frederico Schmidt, writing in O Globo on January 8, specifically charged that plan would be used by Furtado to reshape Brazil according to his own ideological lights.

One of the few pro-plan statements coming from a non-PTB source was Correio da Manhã's January 8 editorial statement to the effect that the Three-Year Plan would have to be put into effect as soon as possible in order to contain inflation. (OFFICIAL USE ONLY)

Comment: If Furtado does succeed with his plan in putting Brazil on its feet by 1965, he will indeed be a leading candidate for the presidency, offering a challenge to Juscelino Kubitschek and Leonel Brizzola, two of the most prominent possibilities at this time. (LIMITED OFFICIAL USE)

5. Campos Returns With Words of Optimism

In the midst of indications of a growing concern by Brazilian government officials and the press over U.S.-Brazil relations, Ambassador Roberto Campos arrived in Brazil from his post in Washington and spoke optimistically of USG reactions to the Furtado Three-Year Plan. The day after his arrival, Campos was summoned to Brasilia by President Goulart, apparently to brief the President on current U.S. attitudes.

1166

POLITICAL (cont)

been exercising, and there would be no point to his rushing the cadence now. He has, in fact, already indicated that he intends to go ahead with a presidential cabinet and the Furtado plan as though he were already the de jure presidential chief executive, disguising this procedure by calling the cabinet provisional until such date as it is either approved by Congress or he has full power to install it himself. The new cabinet will probably be appointed on a provisional basis early in February. (LIMITED OFFICIAL USE)

3. Goulart Considers Cabinet Choices

Speculation regarding the composition of the post-plebiscite cabinet continued space. None of the names mentioned for the various ministries seemed sure bets, but likeliest candidates for the jobs seemed to be, or lie among the following: Finance - Carvalho Pinto or San Tiago Dantas; Planning - Celso Furtado; Foreign Affairs - San Tiago Dantas or Hermes Lima; Labor - Joao Pinheiro Neto, Hugo de Faria, Floriscêno Paixao; War - Amauri Kruel or Osvino Ferreira Alves; Navy - Admiral Suzano or Admiral Aragao; Air - Reynaldo de Carvalho or Brigadeiro Henrique Fleuiss; Health - Elyseu Paglioli; Commerce and Industry - Antonio Balbino or Tancredo Neves; Education - Darcy Ribeiro, Oliveira Brito, Antonio Balbino, Hermes Lima; Mines and Energy - Tancredo Neves, Marshall Henrique Lott, Eliezer Batista da Silva; Justice - Alfredo Nasser; Agriculture - Renato Costa Lima; Public Works - Helio de Almeida. (UNCLASSIFIED)

Comment: It is impossible to narrow down the probabilities any further than the above listing, and indeed, some ministries will probably be given to horses so dark as to be, at present, invisible. Some of the names have undoubtedly been mentioned merely as trial balloons or attempts at pressuring parties and political figures into supporting the plebiscite. Goulart's final choices will depend on a variety of factors, such as how much he feels he will be able to get away with, with respect not only to domestic forces but to the US as well; how fortified he regards himself as a result of the plebiscite. (Item 1); and the overall politico-economic picture at the time of the cabinet's nomination, now expected for early February. (CONFIDENTIAL)

4. Reactions to Three-Year Plan Cool

Reactions by Brazilian political and economic leaders to the Furtado Three-Year Plan have been cool, possibly because it is viewed as a partisan PTB document, and perhaps also because some see it as Celso Furtado's step-ladder to the presidency in 1966.

1165

POLITICAL (Cont)

registered voters came out to vote in favor of presidentialism, while in Natal the figure was approximately 54 per cent, in Curitiba on the order of 60 per cent, and perhaps 66 per cent in São Paulo state. If the over-all turn-out turns out to have been on the order of 70 per cent, the total "no" vote will have to be as low as 70 per cent in order to bring the pro-presidentialist voters' strength under the 50 per cent mark.

The significance of this vote for Goulart's policies may well be that of a vote of confidence. As noted above, Goulart may feel more independent of the PSD in his negotiations with that party, and may find the arguments of the left-wing Grupo Compacto faction of the PTB more persuasive in future intra-party discussions. (CONFIDENTIAL)

2. Return to 1946 Constitution Foreseen

Speculation regarding the means of implementation of the revocation of the parliamentary system (see Weeka 1), in response to the results of the January 6 referendum, tends increasingly to the view that after the 90-day period allowed Congress under the Capanema-Valladares Act, the Ato Adicional of 1961 will simply expire.

Although Justice Minister João Mangabeira (PSB, Bahia) reiterated in a press interview on January 7 his view that the previous day's voting had automatically revoked the Ato Adicional, and although this view is popular in the left-wing Grupo Compacto faction of the PTB, there is no clear indication that Goulart intends overtly to assume presidential powers until they have been voted by Congress or until they are restored automatically by the expiry of the Ato Adicional 90 days after the proclamation of the referendum results. Prime Minister Hermes Lima himself said on January 7 that his cabinet's mandate will expire on January 31 with that of the Congress to which it is responsible. (OFFICIAL USE ONLY)

Comment: There is really no need for Goulart to do anything unconstitutional at this point. It is generally conceded that Congress will be unable to pass any enabling legislation restoring presidentialism in any form unacceptable to him, since he will control more than the necessary blocking one third of the Chamber. Moreover, the main effect of the referendum is to start the process for giving de jure status to what already exists de facto, since Jango has to all intents and purposes exercised presidential powers ever since Congress accepted the Brochado cabinet in July, 1962. Jango has gained no powers that he has not already

116.4

POLITICAL Cont)

Rio Grande do Norte		(80 per cent in Natal, 70 per cent in Interior)
Rio Grande do Sul:	62 per cent	(60 per cent in interior, 79.5 per cent in Porto Alegre, 70 per cent in São Borja)
Santa Catarina		(72 per cent in Florianopolis and 70 per cent in interior)
São Paulo:	75-82 per cent	

The general thrust of these statistics seems to run on the order of 62-80 per cent, the Embassy inclining to estimate the turn-out at 62-70 per cent, while some newspapers give figures running from 58 to 80 per cent. Pre-referendum estimates on the part of the Goulartists ran on the order of 65 to 70 per cent, while the normal turn-out for an election is about 80 to 85 per cent.

It thus appears that the Goulartists won a psychological victory by doing about as well as they hoped to in terms of turnout, particularly in the face of indifference on the part of many centrist and conservative politicians who would normally be active in getting out the vote. In one Northeastern state, for instance, politicians observed that the voters would not be offered the usual free transportation to the polls and free meals at the polls, while in Parana triumphant Goulartists claimed that they had obtained a near normal turn-out through the agency of the UNE (União Nacional de Estudantes) and the unions; these organizations are heavily influenced by Communists and radical left-wing nationalists.

Goulart seems to have demonstrated his ability to get out the vote without assistance from the PSD and other party machines, although in general the PTB worked hard. This may incline him to harder bargaining with the PSD in working out constitutional revision and cabinet make-up.

Similarly, the break-down of the vote, as expected, was heavily for presidentialism, with the vote running against the parliamentarist system by such figures as 76.7 per cent in Vitoria, capital of Espirito Santo; 82 per cent in Rio de Janeiro state; 90.9 per cent in Natal; 77.5 per cent in Curitiba; 79.3 per cent in the state of São Paulo; and 89.4 per cent in the Distrito Federal.

The "no" (anti-parliamentarist and thus against the 1961 restraints on Goulart's exercise of the presidential powers) vote percentage against the turn-out percentage indicates that in the Distrito Federal, about 78 per cent of all

1163

POLITICAL

1. Early Results of Referendum Favorable to Goulart

Early results of the counting of the January 6 referendum vote appear favorable to Goulart and may indicate a strengthening of his position vis-a-vis moderating centrist influences.

Scattered press reports of the turn-out in various states are as follows:

Alagoas:	40 per cent	
Amazonas:	55 per cent	(60 per cent in Manaus)
Bahia:		(60-70 per cent in Salvador, 40 per cent predicted in interior)
Ceará:		(60-65 per cent in Fortaleza, 50-60 per cent in interior)
Distrito Federal:	85-95 per cent	
Espirito Santo		(80 per cent in Vitória)
Goias	60 per cent	(65 per cent in Goiania)
Guanabara:	80 per cent	
Maranhão:	50-60 per cent	(50 per cent in interior and 60 per cent in São Luis)
Mato Grosso:	60-70 per cent	
Minas Gerais:		(65 per cent in the interior, 75 per cent in Belo Horizonte)
Natal:	60 per cent	
Pará:	60 per cent	(55-70 per cent in Belem, as low as 50 per cent in some municipios)
Paraiba	30 per cent	
Parana:		(77.5 per cent in Curitiba)
Pernambuco:		(55-60 per cent in Recife, 50 per cent in interior)
Piaui:		(60 per cent in Teresina)
Rio de Janeiro:		(65 per cent in Niteroi)

1162

ORIGIN/ACTION: INR-10

RM/R	REP	AF
1		
ARA 4	EUR 5	FE
NEA	CU 5	INR
E	P 1	IO
L	L/PM 1	AID 12
PC 2	4/18 1	
AGR 2	COM 2	FRB
INT	LAB 2	TAR
TR 2	XMB	AIR 15
ARMY 20	CIA 15	NAVY 14
OSD 12	USIA 11	NSA 3
	HEW 1	USC 2

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

AIRGRAM

17

732.00(w)/1-963

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A-788 NO. | CONFIDENTIAL | HANDLING INDICATOR

TO : Department of State 1963 JAN 11 AM 7 21

WDS

RM/AN ANALYSIS & DISTRIBUTION BRANCH

FROM : AmEmbassy RIO DE JANEIRO DATE: January 9, 1963

SUBJECT: JOINT WEEKA 2

REF :

1963 JAN 14 PM 2 15 DEPARTMENT OF STATE RECEIVED

INR COMMUNICATIONS CENTER

CONTENTS

POLITICAL

1. Early Results of Referendum Favorable to Goulart
2. Return to 1946 Constitution Foreseen
3. Goulart Considers Cabinet Choices
4. Reactions to Three-Year Plan Cool
5. Campos Returns With Words of Optimism
6. Major Problem Confronts Brazil-USSR Trade Negotiations
7. Head of COFAP Victim of Rice Politics
8. Ishikawajima Shipyard Struck on December 27
9. Maritime Strike

MILITARY

10. Army
11. Navy
12. Air

PSYCHOLOGICAL

13. Press Review

Action assigned to: Karloor

Action Taken: Noted

Date of Action: 1/21/63

Action Office Symbol: RPR

Name of Officer: Whitmore

Disposition to RM/R: Jill Kenen

FILED FEB 21 1963 INR COMMUNICATIONS CENTER

1963 JAN 11 PM 5 28 DEPARTMENT OF STATE RECEIVED

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FORM 4-62 DS-323

Drafted by: See last page/pm

Comments and Clearances Approved by: DCM - Minister Wood

Clearances:

1161

the Ambassador. The paper drew the conclusion that Ambassador Gordon should be declared "persona non grata." (UNCLASSIFIED)

For the Ambassador:

John Keppel
Counselor of Embassy
for Political Affairs

Contributors: CDKeyser, HWeiner, JMcLean, JKrizay, ARansome, BGoldstein, Col. VWalters

DISTRIBUTION: Amembassy San José (for DCM); all Embassies South America; all consulates Brazil; CGUSArmy CARIB, HQ CARIB, Army, Navy, Air JBUSMC; OIC Brazil Desk; INR, ARA/P; Embassy Rio: Amb, DCM, MMM, POLII LA, USIS, Econ (2), Cons, Labor, Army, Navy, Air Attachés; CF (3), POL-Rio (5), CF-Brasilia (2), POL-Brasilia (3)/75, Security; Science; Geographic; Minerals; Commercial; USAID Legal Advisor, Peace Corps,

1160

member of the left wing of Goulart's forces is therefore acting consistently. He had heretofore avoided committing himself publicly to this line of action although he had hinted broadly that it was coming. (CONFIDENTIAL)

MILITARY

17. Army

Speculation continues rife in the Army concerning the identity of the War Minister in post-plebiscite government. General Osvino's name has recurred more frequently in the past few days. Speculation also covers Armed Forces Chief of Staff Oswaldo Motta and in a lesser degree General Jair Dantas Ribeiro. As of now the Army appears to prefer Kruel's retention. (OFFICIAL USE ONLY)

18. Navy - negative

19. Air - negative

PSYCHOLOGICAL

20. Press Review

The Brazilian press was preoccupied again this week with the domestic scene. A few foreign news stories managed to crowd their way into the headlines, including coverage of the Cuban prisoner release and President Kennedy's remarks to the Cuban brigade in Miami.

Editorial comment centered on the home front with many newspapers inspired by the year's end to give general reviews of it. O Estado de São Paulo called it the worst in the history of the Republic and was joined in its pessimism by a large segment of the press. Ultima Hora chose to look to the coming year when supposedly all problems would be solved.

The moderate press tended to follow the line that the world situation had changed, and therefore Brazil's foreign policy should change as well. Correio da Manhã spoke of the understanding between Russia and the U.S. and the necessity for Brazil to recognize it, but also noted that the U.S. side (in the divided world) defended liberty and democracy. Jornal do Brasil more cynically aired the thesis that the world was now divided by a new "Treaty of Tordesillas" and Brazil lay within the area of U.S. influence.

Communist weekly O Semanario ran a three-column picture of Ambassador Gordon with the headline "Lincoln Gordon is an Undesirable Alien." The supporting story on page two criticized the Ambassador for his role in Attorney-General Kennedy's recent visit. The paper noted that Mr. Kennedy had come not at the invitation of President Goulart, but only after the initiative had been taken by

1159

the purchase of agricultural materials for his state." (OFFICIAL USE ONLY)

Comment: Consulate General Recife believes that, while it would be disheartening to see Alves develop a close relationship with Eastern Europe, this trip should not be taken as evidence that he intends to do so. On the other hand, although the Consulate General believes Alves is sincerely committed to the Alliance for Progress, it does not think it likely that he would reject out of hand any assistance that might be offered. (LIMITED OFFICIAL USE)

15. Brizzola Says He is Ineligible for the Presidency in 1965

Speaking at Belo Horizonte, Leonel Brizzola declared that he would not be a candidate for the Presidency in 1965 since he considers himself constitutionally ineligible. He said his sole interest is in the enactment of "basic reforms." (UNCLASSIFIED)

Comment: Brizzola was referring to Article 140 of the Constitution, which lists as among those ineligible for the Presidency "the spouse and blood relatives to the second degree" of the President. Since Brizzola is related to Goulart by being married to Goulart's sister, it may well be that in the future he will have a different view on whether or not he is a "blood relations." (OFFICIAL USE ONLY)

ALLIANCE FOR PROGRESS

16. Arrais Says He Will Annul US-Pernambuco Agreements

Pernambuco's Governor-elect Miguel Arrais told newsmen in Natal this week that on taking office February 1 he will annul aid agreements concluded by the previous state government with the U.S.

"The character of the Alliance is that of social welfare assistance ("assitencialismo") and this must be condemned. What is needed is economic development of the country and of the Northeast. And furthermore: the agreements concluded directly with the United States such as in the case of Pernambuco and Guanabara are unconstitutional since states and municipalities are not able to negotiate directly with foreign countries. In my state upon assuming the government that was confided to me by the people, I will annul agreements reached in this manner thereby obeying the Constitution of Brazil."

He also said "I have agreements neither with the Communists nor the anti-Communists. I enter the Governorship with a free hand." (OFFICIAL USE ONLY)

Comment: Direct negotiation between the U.S. and individual states has been a source of irritation to the Goulart Administration, which has complained about it on many occasions. Arrais, a key

1158

by virtue of their being "the area which represents the highest rate of continuous economic growth"; he also commented that expansion of trade with the bloc could be undertaken without prejudicing expansion of trade with traditional areas. In conclusion, he made clear that the government does not intend to be alone in the conduct of trade with the bloc, but that it is hoped both the public and private sectors (principally the latter) of the Brazilian economy may take better advantage of existing possibilities. (OFFICIAL USE ONLY)

Comment: The creation of an official agency to encourage and facilitate trade with the bloc had in the past reportedly been resisted by consumer and industry groups. Its existence now may serve to remove one of the "excuses" offered by the private sector for refraining from such trade, i.e., that negotiations with bloc trade agencies had been found to be cumbersome and generally unsatisfactory.

Although the "expanded markets" argument evoked considerable press comment on the undesirability, in general, of bilateral trade, the disadvantages of trading in inconvertible currencies, and the already sizeable "frozen" balances existing in Brazil's favor in its trade with the bloc, COLESTE now provides the mechanism for the expansion of such trade. (OFFICIAL USE ONLY)

13. Brazil and Nationalist China Sign Trade Agreement

A one-year trade agreement between Brazil and the Republic of China was signed on December 28 by Prime Minister Hermes Lima and Chinese Ambassador Ti-Tsun Li. The agreement provides for the facilitation of trade between the two countries, payments in U.S. dollars or any other freely convertible currency which the two parties may agree to accept, certificates of origin and quality, and the granting to products of each country, destined to the other, treatment no less favorable than that granted to similar products originating in or destined to any other country, in regard to exchange rate, export and import licensing and other measures pertaining to foreign exchange, with certain exceptions enumerated in the agreement.

Referring to the agreement as "opening up a new area for Sino-Brazilian economic cooperation," Ambassador Li said that although present trade between the two countries is modest, he is hopeful that "commercial interchange will gradually grow in volume to the benefit of our respective free economies." (UNCLASSIFIED)

14. Governor Aluizio Alves to Visit Soviet Union

It was reported during Christmas week that Rio Grande do Norte Governor Aluizio Alves would depart soon on a thirty-day trip to the Soviet Union, Poland, Czechoslovakia, and Israel. The purpose of the trip, according to the press, would be to discuss "programs of cooperation with his government, matters related to irrigation, and

1157

effectively driving meat, as well as rice, off the local market. The ceiling prices are fixed at about a half or a third the real price, but except in Guanabara, have not been generally enforced. (OFFICIAL USE ONLY)

Comment: The effect has been to harass the inhabitants of the city of Rio de Janeiro, governed by Goulart opponent Carlos Lacerda, UDN. The government seems by this tactic to set itself up as the benevolent supplier of meat and rice, the staples of the poor, and to discredit Lacerda, blamed for not maintaining the food supplies of the state. (CONFIDENTIAL)

11. Trade Negotiations with Soviet Union

There arrived in Rio de Janeiro on December 29 a delegation of the Ministry of Foreign Commerce of the Soviet Union headed by Sergei Micartumov, Chief of the Export Department of the Ministry, and including Victor M. Ivanov, vice chief of the Foreign Exchange Department; Nuri Ivanov, Chief of the Bank Department; and Boris Carpov, Vladimir Cutusov and Vladimir Gratchev. It was announced that negotiations would be opened on January 3 for the conclusion of the first long-term trade agreement between Brazil and the Soviet Union.

On arrival in Rio, the Russian delegation chief remarked that the present volume of trade between Brazil and the Soviet Union amounts to $70 million, and must be increased. Trade relations between the two countries are presently regulated by the Terms of Agreement of 1959 and by the Additional Protocol of 1961, both of which expired on December 31, 1962. The conditions of these two documents will remain in force until the new agreement goes into force. (UNCLASSIFIED)

Comment: According to one press report, coffee, cacau, and cotton are the Brazilian products most interesting to the Soviet Union, although it has been previously reported that the Soviets are less interested in coffee than in hides. (OFFICIAL USE ONLY)

12. Installation of COLESTE (Coordinating Group for Trade with Bloc)

At the December 27 installation ceremony of COLESTE (Joint Weeka 50), attended by Prime Minister Hermes Lima, Finance Minister Calmon, and Minister of Industry and Commerce, Ambassador Dias Carneiro, the Prime Minister proclaimed that "trade with the socialist area is an act of sovereignty based on reasons of an economic and commercial nature." He further indicated that "it is inadmissible to try to subordinate a legitimate national interest to problems of ideological conflict."

The Prime Minister pointed to the growing markets offered Brazilian primary and industrial products by the socialist countries,

1156

basis: (1) an immediate 40 % increase in the price of petroleum derivatives, i.e., gasoline, kerosene, etc.; (2) a massive loan from the Bank of Brazil; or (3) a 50% reduction in the company's investment program. (OFFICIAL USE ONLY)

Comment: Subsequent articles have been somewhat quieter--possibly because of Christmas--but the affair has not died down. On December 30 a full page report from Petrobras to the Brazilian people attempted to report favorably on the progress of the company, and in several press interviews Mangabeira has played up this theme of progress. Mangabeira stated that in 5 years Brazil would be self-sufficient in petroleum and backed up his statement by comparative data on drilling and daily production. What he did not say was that such purported increased output does not reflect newly-found fields, and that consumer demand will in all probability outstrip any such production rate increase. Crude petroleum from Brazil's Bahian fields only furnish roughly one third of the demand. It is inconceivable that the balance will be made up by new discoveries in 5 years. (OFFICIAL USE ONLY)

9. SUMOC Director Resigns

The Council of Ministers on December 27, 1962 accepted the resignation offered by Octavio Bulhões, Executive Director of SUMOC, whose dismissal had earlier been demanded by Labor Party (PTB) leaders because of his description of the profits remittance law as "national betrayal." Julio Avelar, Director of the Rediscount Department of the Bank of Brazil was appointed to replace Bulhões. Bulhões was the last of the Quadros appointees in high position, in the financial area. A well-known and competent technician, he was mainly responsible for SUMOC Instruction 204 which paved the way for the unification of the Brazilian multiple exchange rate system in 1961. (OFFICIAL USE ONLY)

Comment: How significant this development may be in terms of Brazil's future politico-financial policies is hard to figure. Bulhões actually provoked the action and made no effort to resist pressures to force him out. Indications are, in fact, that he even welcomed the opportunity having felt for some time that his influence and effectiveness were declining. It is interesting, however, that Goulart still finds it necessary to cater to the extreme left in spite of the fact that a more moderate approach would appear to be more expedient in terms of Brazil's critical need for reaching a new aid accord with the U.S. and IMF. In light of the circumstances surrounding Bulhões dismissal, however, we cannot say that this development in itself, indicates that an attempt at reaching such an accommodation will not be made. (CONFIDENTIAL)

10. Price Controls as Political Instrument

COFAP (Federal Price and Supply Commission) began enforcing absurdly low ceiling prices for beef in Guanabara (in effect, the city-state of Rio de Janeiro) shortly before Christmas, thus

1155

7. Kubitschek Attacks IMF

In a press conference held in SÃo Paulo on December 28, ex-President Juscelino Kubitschek spoke strongly against the International Monetary Fund which he said "is hostile to the economies of all Latin American countries." But expressing his habitual optimism he said that Brazil with its great potential would overcome all difficulties.

Kubitschek's remark was given headline treatment in several newspapers and inspired a reply from Clemente Mariani, Finance Minister in the Quadros Administration. Kubitschek had stated that the policy that the IMF adopted in March, 1961 was responsible for the ruinous condition of Brazil's economy. Mariani rebutted the statement saying that it was not the IMF which had changed its policy but the Brazilian Government which had been compelled to do so to check the effects of Kubitschek's policies in the previous administration. The former Minister stated the IMF had shown its confidence in Brazil by arranging credits for 160 million dollars. (UNCLASSIFIED)

Comment: Kubitschek continues to justify the inflationary policies of his Administration and uses the IMF as the villain of the piece. Though his economic views remain basically unchanged and he relentlessly plugs the importance of "growth" and the dangers of "stagnation," in the same press confrontation and in a later speech he hinted that "Goulart's" inflation must be curbed. He said the present rate of inflation was due to various factors including the recent political crisis and, significantly, the lack of confidence of foreign investors. This note of caution may well have been inspired by his talks with President Kennedy. The Brazilian press had earlier noted the uncharacteristic pessimism he had shown after his return from the United States. (UNCLASSIFIED)

8. Financial Difficulties of Petrobrás

During the pre-Christmas week increasing press publicity was given to statements made before the Parliamentary Inquiry Commission of the Federal Chamber of Deputies accusing Francisco Mangabeira of corruption, fraud and mismanagement within his administration of Petrobras, and creating huge deficits which threaten financial collapse of the state-owned petroleum monopoly. One of the more outspoken of the accusers was Hélio Fernandes, Director of the Tribuna da Imprensa. There were other accusations, including irregularities in tanker purchases, implied "pay-offs," and excess publicity expenses including an annual one to Leonel Brizzola's radio station.

Particularly significant was the reported testimony of Mangabeira before the Commission on December 20 in which he reversed original denials and admitted that the company was on the brink of financial collapse. According to Mangabeira there are three alternatives to the maintenance of Petrobras as a functioning company on a commercial

1154

Since it is generally accepted that the referendum will indicate a return to presidentialism (see Item 2 above), it is a matter of increasing concern to the government and the parties how this will be done. It seems extremely unlikely that Congress will be able to agree on any revision of the constitution which would substantially modify presidential power within the 90-day period allotted, since to do so would require a two-thirds majority in both the Senate and the Chamber--a move which the PTB could readily block. The Capanema-Valladares act provides that in such case, the Constitution of 1946 would return to force, with the Ato Adicional, which is an amendment to it, simply disappearing.

Nonetheless, in the belief that Goulart will not object to relatively minor changes in the presidentialist system as set forth in the 1946 Constitution, particularly if he can be convinced that those changes will help him to govern more efficiently, and in the hope of reaching some sort of agreement to this end, the PSD and the UDN reportedly plan to meet together on January 15.

Meanwhile, perhaps in hope of forestalling any possible action by Congress during the 90-day period, which in any case would presumably be against their interests, the Goulartists are once again airing the Mangabeira thesis, according to which a vote favorable to presidentialism would automatically revoke the Ato Adicional and return the full powers of the 1946 Constitution without Congressional action. (LIMITED OFFICIAL USE)

6. Francisco Julião and Sergio Magalhães Fall Out

The strangest event in a week noteworthy for contradictory reports of subversion in various parts of the country was the public denunciation by Federal Deputy Sergio Magalhães (PTB-Guanabara) of Federal Deputy-elect Francisco Julião (PSB-Pernambuco). Magalhães is a pillar of the far left of the PTB; Julião is a leader of the Ligas Camponesas. Magalhães told Rio journalists on December 31 that Julião is plotting with Governor Lacerda to illegally repress the leftist movement by force.

Other accusations of subversion came from the anti-administration press (O Globo) which said that important arms caches had been uncovered in São Paulo state as well as in Goiás. Pro-administration papers (Diario Carioca, Ultima Hora) decried the accusations as being anti-plebiscite obfuscation. (OFFICIAL USE ONLY)

Comment: Although Brazilian politics admittedly can make strange bed-fellows, Lacerda and Julião are a bit too much to believe. The motives for Magalhães' hostility are unclear; it may be that the Communists, whose servant Magalhães has often been, have decided that Julião the maverick is expendable. Or Julião's anti-administration stand on the plebiscite (see Item 1) may have brought the PTB's wrath down on him. (CONFIDENTIAL)

1153

calls for greater emphasis on the agricultural sector, an easier rediscount policy for financing capital investments, a vastly stepped-up educational program, large public outlays for transportation, communications, electrical energy and petroleum development programs as well as an extensive program for research regarding the nation's mineral resources. (UNCLASSIFIED)

Comment: It is difficult from the information thus far available to evaluate the program in terms of its efficacy. On the surface, it does not appear to be fundamentally different from the program submitted by the Prime Minister Tancredo Neves over a year ago except, of course, that the figures are now different. A reading of the complete plan may, however, change this impression. (OFFICIAL USE ONLY)

4. The Coming Cabinet

Rumors, maneuvers, and rumors of maneuvers regarding the coming Cabinet continued to occupy political writers. This week the stock of San Tiago Dantas (Finance), and Amaury Kruel (War), were down; that of Carvalho Pinto (Finance) and Osvino Alves (War) closed strong. The incumbents of Navy and Air held steady. Antonio Balbino, Hermes Lima, Tancredo Neves were mixed. Some tactical questions appeared headed toward solution: the previous date of January 10 for the new Cabinet was reportedly moved to January 31. This would solve the problem of having to present the new Cabinet to the lame duck (January 15-31) Congress (Weeka 50). Ranieri Mazzilli (PSD-São Paulo) reportedly received assurances of support from President Goulart in his bid for reelection to the Presidency of the Chamber of Deputies. The leading pretender at the moment is conservative Amaral Peixoto (PSD-Rio). Among the Chamber President's attributes is the fact that he is next in line for the Presidency of the Republic since there is no Vice President at present. (OFFICIAL USE ONLY)

Comment: On a newspaper space basis, Cabinet was a much livelier discussion topic than Plebiscite; an indication of what a dull issue the latter has become. (OFFICIAL USE ONLY)

5. Constitutional Revision Plans Inchoate

The purpose of the January 6 referendum is, of course, to obtain a popular pronouncement as to whether the constitution should be revised. The referendum was called under the provisions of the Capanema-Valladares Act, which provides that the people shall vote to determine whether they wish to retain the parliamentary system established by the September, 1961 Ato Adicional, or to return to the presidential system provided by the 1946 Constitution. According to the Capanema-Valladares Act, within 90 days after the formal announcement of the referendum results Congress must revise the constitution to conform to the will of the people as revealed by the referendum.

1152

the government's effort to obtain a large turn-out (see Weeka 50) is having little success. Campaign managers Hugo de Faria, Luis Araujo, and Raul Riff said to the Goulartist DC-Brasilia on December 31 that they expect a turn-out of 70 percent, but reports from Bahia, Minas Gerais and Paraiba indicate that in these three states, at least, the turn-out will be weak. Goulartist Governor Mauro Borges of Goias has predicted a good turn-out in his state, and has announced a quasi-mobilization to get out the vote; information reaching the Embassy, on the other hand, indicates that in rural Goias in many cases polling facilities may not even be available. UDN National Chairman Herbert Levy has declared that the turn-out will also be weak in Espirito Santo.

In Pernambuco, newly-elected PSB Federal Deputy Francisco Julião has urged his followers to abstain, arguing that neither a presidential nor a parliamentary regime offers any real hope for the people, to the dismay of his party, which is supporting Goulart's campaign.

The PSD's official position was circulated to the party's municipal directorates only on December 26, and in essence it left the question open. The UDN announced on December 29 that it would seek to defend any voters prosecuted for failing to vote. On December 27, the PRP adopted an agnostic position on the question, thus joining the PSD and the PDC. (LIMITED OFFICIAL USE)

Comment: Only the PTB, the PSB, and the PTN seem to be committed to getting out the vote. Other parties, by their failure to give wide publicity to their positions, or by their failure to adopt any position at all, seem to have opted out of the campaign.

The general belief is that those who do turn out will vote for a return to presidentialism, but the lightness of the turn-out may reduce the effect of the vote's being a success for Goulart. (LIMITED OFFICIAL USE)

3. Outline of Furtado Three-Year Development Plan Revealed

The Brazilian press gave the public its first glimpse of the long-heralded-three-year development plan drawn up by Minister for Planning Celso Furtado. As reported by one usually reliable newspaper, the plan calls for progressive reduction of the rate of inflation over a three year period while maintaining a growth rate of around 7 percent per annum. To that end, it is proposed that government investments be maintained at present programmed levels for 1963 but that total government expenditures be limited to slightly over Cr$1 trillion in 1963, - about Cr$700 billion less than "potential" expenditures projected. Two thirds of the anticipated deficit of Cr$300 billions would be financed by non-inflationary means. Externally, the plan calls for loans or rescheduling of debts amounting to $1.5 - billions over 3 years in order to maintain present import levels without increasing existing total external debt outstanding. The plan also

1151

POLITICAL

1. Goulart New Year Message Emphasizes Three-Year Plan

In a New Year's Eve address to the nation, President Goulart made what was in effect his major campaign effort for the return of the presidential system (see "Referendum Campaign Generating Little Interest," Item 2 below). In an effort to appear disinterested, he has personally avoided urging voters to vote against the parliamentary system, leaving that to his campaign managers; his own effort has been directed toward obtaining a large turn-out, since the way the people will vote, if they once reach the polls, appears to be a foregone conclusion. On New Year's Eve, Goulart departed somewhat from this pattern, declaring early in his speech that the coming "sovereign pronouncement of the people will mark the end of the institutional crisis set off by the events of August, 1961." "I do not fear new responsibilities, however weighty they may be. I accept them in advance as a duty to the Brazilian people."

The bulk of his address was devoted to a presentation of the Furtado three-year plan (see below), which he has in effect made his major campaign platform. He stated that Brazil has maintained an average GNP growth rate of seven percent since World War II, and can no longer be classified as an underdeveloped nation: it has attained the stage of pre-development.

He recognized that the price paid by the people has been high in terms of inflation, which hits the salaried worker hardest. The fundamental preoccupation of the government from now on would be containment of inflation, he promised.

He asserted that by the end of his government, agricultural production will have increased by 20 percent and industrial production by 37 percent, for a continued maintenance of an average annual GNP growth rate of seven percent. By 1965, he said, Brazilian industry will be supplying 70 percent of the capital goods required to maintain this growth rate.

Such a great task, he said, must be primarily the fruit of Brazilian efforts, but outside capital and technology animated by a spirit of loyal cooperation in the development of the country would be welcomed, encouraged, and offered security. (OFFICIAL USE ONLY)

Comment: This promise of performance if elected was preceded by a December 29 address in Porto Alegre in which Goulart rather frankly promised an end of the continual crises which have marked the period since August, 1961, presented as a sort of interregnum. (LIMITED OFFICIAL USE)

2. Referendum Campaign Generating Little Interest

As preparations for the January 6 referendum on the retention of the parliamentary system reach their final week, it is apparent that

1150

ORIGIN/ACTION		
	INR-10	
RM/R	REP	AF
1		
ARA	EUR	FE
4	5	4
NEA	CU	INR
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E	OSC	IO
4	2	2
4	FBO	AID
2		12
PC	USIA	W&B
2	1	1
AGR	COM	FRB
2	2	
INT	LAB	TAR
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TR	XMB	AIR
2		15
ARMY	CIA	NAVY
20	15	14
OSD	OSIA	NSA
12	11	3
HEW		NSC
1		2

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

AIRGRAM

732.00(W)/1-363

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TO : Department of State 1963 JAN 9 PM 3

RM/AN ANALYSIS & DISTRIBUTION BRANCH

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JAN 10 PM 4 53

DEPARTMENT OF STATE RECEIVED

FROM : Amembassy, Brasilia Office DATE: January 3, 1963

SUBJECT : JOINT WEEKA 1

REF : Embassy Airgram A-748

Contents

POLITICAL

1. Goulart New Year Message Emphasizes Three-Year Plan
2. Referendum Campaign Generating Little Interest
3. Outline of Furtado Three-Year Development Plan Revealed
4. The Coming Cabinet
5. Constitutional Revision Plans Inchoate
6. Francisco Julião and Sergio Magalhães Fall Out
7. Kubitschek Attacks INF
8. Financial Difficulties of Petrobrás
9. SUMOC Director Resigns
10. Price Controls as Political Instrument
11. Trade Negotiations with Soviet Union
12. Installation of COLESTE (Coordinating Group for Trade with Blec)
13. Brazil and Nationalist China Sign Trade Agreement
14. Governor Aluizio Alves to Visit Soviet Union
15. Brizzola Says He is Ineligible for the Presidency in 1965

ALLIANCE FOR PROGRESS

16. Arrais Says He Will Annul US-Pernambuco Agreements

MILITARY

17. Army -
18. Navy - negative
19. Air - negative

PSYCHOLOGICAL

20. Press Review

FILED JAN 18 1963

Action Assigned RBR noted

Action Taken 1/3/63 RBR WHSummers

Date Acted

CONFIDENTIAL

Action Officer

FOR DEPT. USE ONLY ☑ In ☐ Out

FORM 4-62 DS-323

Drafted by: See last page/jhm

Contents and Classification Approved by: Division

Clearances:

1149

W I T H D R A W A L N O T I C E

RG: 059 TAB #: 30

ENTRY: CDF60-63 1 / 11 / C /
COPIES/PPS/CLASS/SPECMARK

BOX: 1582

ACCESS RESTRICTED

The item identified below has been withdrawn from this file:

Folder Title: 732.00(W)/12-3162

Document Date: 31/12/62

Document Ser.#:

AGRAM A-748 FR RIO DE JANEIRO TO STATE

In the review of this file this item was removed because access to it is restricted. Restrictions on records in the National Archives are stated in general and specific record group restriction statements which are available for examination. The item identified above has been withdrawn because it contains:

X Security-Classified Information

NND: 949515 WITHDRAWN: 02/24/95 by: JAS

FOIA RETRIEVAL #: 949515 01582 00030

1148

W I T H D R A W A L N O T I C E

RG: 059

ENTRY: CDF60-63

TAB #: 29

1 / 11 / C /
COPIES/PPS/CLASS/SPECMARK

BOX: 1582

ACCESS RESTRICTED

The item identified below has been withdrawn from this file:

Folder Title: 732.00(W)/2-2062

Document Date: 20/02/62

Document Ser.#:

DESP 661 FR BRASILIA TO STATE

In the review of this file this item was removed because access to it is restricted. Restrictions on records in the National Archives are stated in general and specific record group restriction statements which are available for examination. The item identified above has been withdrawn because it contains:

X Security-Classified Information

NND: 949515

WITHDRAWN: 02/24/95 by: JAS

FOIA RETRIEVAL #: 949515 01582 00029

1147

W I T H D R A W A L N O T I C E

RG: 059 TAB #: 28

ENTRY: CDF60-63 1 / 11 / C /
COPIES/PPS/CLASS/SPECMARK

BOX: 1582

ACCESS RESTRICTED

The item identified below has been withdrawn from this file:

Folder Title: 732.00(W)/12-1862

Document Date: 18/12/62

Document Ser.#:

AGRAM A-708 FR BRASILIA TO STATE

In the review of this file this item was removed because access to it is restricted. Restrictions on records in the National Archives are stated in general and specific record group restriction statements which are available for examination. The item identified above has been withdrawn because it contains:

X Security-Classified Information

NND: 949515 WITHDRAWN: 02/24/95 by: JAS

FOIA RETRIEVAL #: 949515 01582 00028

1146

W I T H D R A W A L N O T I C E

RG: 059

ENTRY: CDF60-63

TAB #: 27

1 / 8 / C /
COPIES/PPS/CLASS/SPECMARK

BOX: 1582

ACCESS RESTRICTED

The item identified below has been withdrawn from this file:

Folder Title: 732.00(W)/12-1162

Document Date: 11/12/62

Document Ser.#:

AGRAM A-672 FR BRASILIA TO STATE

In the review of this file this item was removed because access to it is restricted. Restrictions on records in the National Archives are stated in general and specific record group restriction statements which are available for examination. The item identified above has been withdrawn because it contains:

X Security-Classified Information

NND: 949515

WITHDRAWN: 02/24/95 by: JAS

FOIA RETRIEVAL #: 949515 01582 00027

1145

W I T H D R A W A L N O T I C E

RG: 059

ENTRY: CDF60-63

BOX: 1582

TAB #: 26

1 / 9 / C /

COPIES/PPS/CLASS/SPECMARK

ACCESS RESTRICTED

The item identified below has been withdrawn from this file:

Folder Title: 732.00(W)/11-2762

Document Date: 27/11/62

Document Ser.#:

AGRAM A-601 FR BRASILIA TO STATE

In the review of this file this item was removed because access to it is restricted. Restrictions on records in the National Archives are stated in general and specific record group restriction statements which are available for examination. The item identified above has been withdrawn because it contains:

X Security-Classified Information

NND: 949515

WITHDRAWN: 02/24/95 by: JAS

FOIA RETRIEVAL #: 949515 01582 00026

1144

W I T H D R A W A L N O T I C E

RG: 059

TAB #: 25

ENTRY: CDF60-63

1 / 7 / C /

COPIES/PPS/CLASS/SPECMARK

BOX: 1582

ACCESS RESTRICTED

The item identified below has been withdrawn from this file:

Folder Title: 732.00(W)/11-2062

Document Date: 20/11/62

Document Ser.#:

AGRAM A-570 FR BRASILIA TO STATE

In the review of this file this item was removed because access to it is restricted. Restrictions on records in the National Archives are stated in general and specific record group restriction statements which are available for examination. The item identified above has been withdrawn because it contains:

X Security-Classified Information

NND: 949515

WITHDRAWN: 02/24/95 by: JAS

FOIA RETRIEVAL #: 949515 01582 00025

1143

W I T H D R A W A L N O T I C E

RG: 059 TAB #: 24

ENTRY: CDF60-63 1 / 6 / C /

COPIES/PPS/CLASS/SPECMARK

BOX: 1582

ACCESS RESTRICTED

The item identified below has been withdrawn from this file:

Folder Title: 732.00(W)/11-1462

Document Date: 14/11/62

Document Ser.#:

AGRAM A-553 FR BRASILIA TO STATE

In the review of this file this item was removed because access to it is restricted. Restrictions on records in the National Archives are stated in general and specific record group restriction statements which are available for examination. The item identified above has been withdrawn because it contains:

X Security-Classified Information

NND: 949515 WITHDRAWN: 02/24/95 by: JAS

FOIA RETRIEVAL #: 949515 01582 00024

1142

W I T H D R A W A L N O T I C E

RG: 059

TAB #: 23

ENTRY: CDF60-63

1 / 9 / C /

COPIES/PPS/CLASS/SPECMARK

BOX: 1582

ACCESS RESTRICTED

The item identified below has been withdrawn from this file:

Folder Title: 732.00(W)/11-662

Document Date: 06/11/62

Document Ser.#:

AGRAM A-514 FR BRASILIA TO STATE

In the review of this file this item was removed because access to it is restricted. Restrictions on records in the National Archives are stated in general and specific record group restriction statements which are available for examination. The item identified above has been withdrawn because it contains:

X Security-Classified Information

NND: 949515

WITHDRAWN: 02/24/95 by: JAS

FOIA RETRIEVAL #: 949515 01582 00023

1141

W I T H D R A W A L N O T I C E

RG: 059

TAB #: 22

ENTRY: CDF60-63

1 / 11 / C /
COPIES/PPS/CLASS/SPECMARK

BOX: 1582

ACCESS RESTRICTED

The item identified below has been withdrawn from this file:

Folder Title: 732.00(W)/10-3062

Document Date: 30/10/62

Document Ser.#:

AGRAM A-492 FR BRASILIA TO STATE

In the review of this file this item was removed because access to it is restricted. Restrictions on records in the National Archives are stated in general and specific record group restriction statements which are available for examination. The item identified above has been withdrawn because it contains:

X Security-Classified Information

NND: 949515

WITHDRAWN: 02/24/95 by: JAS

FOIA RETRIEVAL #: 949515 01582 00022

1140

W I T H D R A W A L N O T I C E

RG: 059 TAB #: 21

ENTRY: CDF60-63 1 / 7 / C /
COPIES/PPS/CLASS/SPECMARK

BOX: 1582

ACCESS RESTRICTED

The item identified below has been withdrawn from this file:

Folder Title: 732.00(W)/10-2362

Document Date: 23/10/62

Document Ser.#:

AGRAM A-462 FR BRASILIA TO STATE

In the review of this file this item was removed because access to it is restricted. Restrictions on records in the National Archives are stated in general and specific record group restriction statements which are available for examination. The item identified above has been withdrawn because it contains:

X Security-Classified Information

NND: 949515 WITHDRAWN: 02/24/95 by: JAS

FOIA RETRIEVAL #: 949515 01582 00021

1139

W I T H D R A W A L N O T I C E

RG: 059

ENTRY: CDF60-63

TAB #: 20

1 / 7 / C /

COPIES/PPS/CLASS/SPECMARK

BOX: 1582

ACCESS RESTRICTED

The item identified below has been withdrawn from this file:

Folder Title: 732.00(W)/10-1662

Document Date: 16/10/62

Document Ser.#:

AGRAM A-432 FR BRASILIA TO STATE

In the review of this file this item was removed because access to it is restricted. Restrictions on records in the National Archives are stated in general and specific record group restriction statements which are available for examination. The item identified above has been withdrawn because it contains:

X Security-Classified Information

NND: 949515

WITHDRAWN: 02/24/95 by: JAS

FOIA RETRIEVAL #: 949515 01582 00020



W I T H D R A W A L N O T I C E

RG: 059

TAB #: 19

ENTRY: CDF60-63

1 / 8 / C /
COPIES/PPS/CLASS/SPECMARK

BOX: 1582

ACCESS RESTRICTED

The item identified below has been withdrawn from this file:

Folder Title: 732.00(W)/10-962

Document Date: 09/10/62

Document Ser.#:

AGRAM A-401 FR BRASILIA TO STATE

In the review of this file this item was removed because access to it is restricted. Restrictions on records in the National Archives are stated in general and specific record group restriction statements which are available for examination. The item identified above has been withdrawn because it contains:

X Security-Classified Information

NND: 949515

WITHDRAWN: 02/24/95 by: JAS

FOIA RETRIEVAL #: 949515 01582 00019

1137

W I T H D R A W A L N O T I C E

RG: 059

ENTRY: CDF60-63

TAB #: 18

1 / 8 / C /

COPIES/PPS/CLASS/SPECMARK

BOX: 1582

ACCESS RESTRICTED

The item identified below has been withdrawn from this file:

Folder Title: 732.00(W)/10-262

Document Date: 02/10/62

Document Ser.#:

AGRAM A-384 FR BRASILIA TO STATE

In the review of this file this item was removed because access to it is restricted. Restrictions on records in the National Archives are stated in general and specific record group restriction statements which are available for examination. The item identified above has been withdrawn because it contains:

X Security-Classified Information

NND: 949515

WITHDRAWN: 02/24/95 by: JAS

FOIA RETRIEVAL #: 949515 01582 00018



732.00(W)/10-262

W I T H D R A W A L N O T I C E

RG: 059

ENTRY: CDF60-63

TAB #: 17

1 / 9 / C /
COPIES/PPS/CLASS/SPECMARK

BOX: 1582

ACCESS RESTRICTED

The item identified below has been withdrawn from this file:

Folder Title: 732.00(W)/9-2562

Document Date: 25/09/62

Document Ser.#:

AGRAM A-358 FR BRASILIA TO STATE

In the review of this file this item was removed because access to it is restricted. Restrictions on records in the National Archives are stated in general and specific record group restriction statements which are available for examination. The item identified above has been withdrawn because it contains:

X Security-Classified Information

NND: 949515

WITHDRAWN: 02/24/95 by: JAS

FOIA RETRIEVAL #: 949515 01582 00017

1134

W I T H D R A W A L N O T I C E

RG: 059 TAB #: 16

ENTRY: CDF60-63 1 / 9 / C /
COPIES/PPS/CLASS/SPECMARK

BOX: 1582

ACCESS RESTRICTED

The item identified below has been withdrawn from this file:

Folder Title: 732.00(W)/9-1862

Document Date: 18/09/62

Document Ser.#:

AGRAM A-342 FR BRASILIA TO STATE

In the review of this file this item was removed because access to it is restricted. Restrictions on records in the National Archives are stated in general and specific record group restriction statements which are available for examination. The item identified above has been withdrawn because it contains:

X Security-Classified Information

NND: 949515 WITHDRAWN: 02/24/95 by: JAS

FOIA RETRIEVAL #: 949515 01582 00016

1133

W I T H D R A W A L N O T I C E

RG: 059 TAB #: 15

ENTRY: CDF60-63 1 / 9 / C / ---

COPIES/PPS/CLASS/SPECMARK

BOX: 1582

ACCESS RESTRICTED

The item identified below has been withdrawn from this file:

Folder Title: 732.00(W)/9-1162

Document Date: 11/09/62

Document Ser.#:

AGRAM A-303 FR BRASILIA TO STATE

In the review of this file this item was removed because access to it is restricted. Restrictions on records in the National Archives are stated in general and specific record group restriction statements which are available for examination. The item identified above has been withdrawn because it contains:

X Security-Classified Information

NND: 949515 WITHDRAWN: 02/24/95 by: JAS

FOIA RETRIEVAL #: 949515 01582 00015

1132

W I T H D R A W A L N O T I C E

RG: 059

TAB #: 14

ENTRY: CDF60-63

1 / 9 / C /
COPIES/PPS/CLASS/SPECMARK

BOX: 1582

ACCESS RESTRICTED

The item identified below has been withdrawn from this file:

Folder Title: 732.00(W)/9-462

Document Date: 04/09/62

Document Ser.#:

AGRAM A-272 FR BRASILIA TO STATE

In the review of this file this item was removed because access to it is restricted. Restrictions on records in the National Archives are stated in general and specific record group restriction statements which are available for examination. The item identified above has been withdrawn because it contains:

X Security-Classified Information

NND: 949515

WITHDRAWN: 02/24/95 by: JAS

FOIA RETRIEVAL #: 949515 01582 00014

1131

W I T H D R A W A L N O T I C E

RG: 059

ENTRY: CDF60-63

TAB #: 13

1 / 9 / S /

COPIES/PPS/CLASS/SPECMARK

BOX: 1582

ACCESS RESTRICTED

The item identified below has been withdrawn from this file:

Folder Title: 732.00(W)/8-2862

Document Date: 28/08/62

Document Ser.#:

AGRAM A-247 FR BRASILIA TO STATE

In the review of this file this item was removed because access to it is restricted. Restrictions on records in the National Archives are stated in general and specific record group restriction statements which are available for examination. The item identified above has been withdrawn because it contains:

X Security-Classified Information

NND: 949515

WITHDRAWN: 02/24/95 by: JAS

FOIA RETRIEVAL #: 949515 01582 00013



W I T H D R A W A L N O T I C E

RG: 059

TAB #: 12

ENTRY: CDF60-63

1 / 9 / C /
COPIES/PPS/CLASS/SPECMARK

BOX: 1582

ACCESS RESTRICTED

The item identified below has been withdrawn from this file:

Folder Title: 732.00(W)/8-2162

Document Date: 21/08/62

Document Ser.#:

AGRAM A-217 FR BRASILIA TO STATE

In the review of this file this item was removed because access to it is restricted. Restrictions on records in the National Archives are stated in general and specific record group restriction statements which are available for examination. The item identified above has been withdrawn because it contains:

X Security-Classified Information

NND: 949515

WITHDRAWN: 02/24/95 by: JAS

FOIA RETRIEVAL #: 949515 01582 00012

1129

WITHDRAWAL NOTICE

RG: 059

TAB #: 11

ENTRY: CDF60-63

1 / 10 / C /
COPIES/PPS/CLASS/SPECMARK

BOX: 1582

ACCESS RESTRICTED

The item identified below has been withdrawn from this file:

Folder Title: 732.00(W)/8-1462

Document Date: 14/08/62

Document Ser.#:

AGRAM A-188 FR BRASILIA TO STATE

In the review of this file this item was removed because access to it is restricted. Restrictions on records in the National Archives are stated in general and specific record group restriction statements which are available for examination. The item identified above has been withdrawn because it contains:

X Security-Classified Information

NND: 949515

WITHDRAWN: 02/24/95 by: JAS

FOIA RETRIEVAL #: 949515 01582 00011

W I T H D R A W A L N O T I C E

RG: 059 TAB #: 10

ENTRY: CDF60-63 1 / 9 / C /
COPIES/PPS/CLASS/SPECMARK

BOX: 1582

ACCESS RESTRICTED

The item identified below has been withdrawn from this file:

Folder Title: 732.00(W)/8762

Document Date: 07/08/62

Document Ser.#:

AGRAM A-146 FR BRASILIA TO STATE

In the review of this file this item was removed because access to it is restricted. Restrictions on records in the National Archives are stated in general and specific record group restriction statements which are available for examination. The item identified above has been withdrawn because it contains:

X Security-Classified Information

NND: 949515 WITHDRAWN: 02/24/95 by: JAS

FOIA RETRIEVAL #: 949515 01582 00010



W I T H D R A W A L N O T I C E

RG: 059

TAB #: 9

ENTRY: CDF60-63

1 / 9 / C /
COPIES/PPS/CLASS/SPECMARK

BOX: 1582

ACCESS RESTRICTED

The item identified below has been withdrawn from this file:

Folder Title: 732.00(W)/7-3162

Document Date: 31/07/62

Document Ser.#:

AGRAM A-126 FR BRASILIA TO STATE

In the review of this file this item was removed because access to it is restricted. Restrictions on records in the National Archives are stated in general and specific record group restriction statements which are available for examination. The item identified above has been withdrawn because it contains:

X Security-Classified Information

NND: 949515

WITHDRAWN: 02/24/95 by: JAS

FOIA RETRIEVAL #: 949515 01582 00009

1126

W I T H D R A W A L N O T I C E

RG: 059

TAB #: 8

ENTRY: CDF60-63

1 / 10 / C /
COPIES/PPS/CLASS/SPECMARK

BOX: 1582

ACCESS RESTRICTED

The item identified below has been withdrawn from this file:

Folder Title: 732.00(W)/7-2462

Document Date: 24/07/62

Document Ser.#:

AGRAM A-102 FR BRASILIA TO STATE

In the review of this file this item was removed because access to it is restricted. Restrictions on records in the National Archives are stated in general and specific record group restriction statements which are available for examination. The item identified above has been withdrawn because it contains:

X Security-Classified Information

NND: 949515

WITHDRAWN: 02/24/95 by: JAS

FOIA RETRIEVAL #: 949515 01582 00008

1125

W I T H D R A W A L N O T I C E

RG: 059

ENTRY: CDF60-63

TAB #: 7

1 / 13 / C /
COPIES/PPS/CLASS/SPECMARK

BOX: 1582

ACCESS RESTRICTED

The item identified below has been withdrawn from this file:

Folder Title: 732.00(W)/7-1762

Document Date: 17/07/62

Document Ser.#:

AGRAM A-67 FR BRASILIA TO STATE

In the review of this file this item was removed because access to it is restricted. Restrictions on records in the National Archives are stated in general and specific record group restriction statements which are available for examination. The item identified above has been withdrawn because it contains:

X Security-Classified Information

NND: 949515

WITHDRAWN: 02/24/95 by: JAS

FOIA RETRIEVAL #: 949515 01582 00007

1124

W I T H D R A W A L N O T I C E

RG: 059

ENTRY: CDF60-63

TAB #: 6

1 / 7 / C /

COPIES/PPS/CLASS/SPECMARK

BOX: 1582

ACCESS RESTRICTED

The item identified below has been withdrawn from this file:

Folder Title: 732.00(W)/7-1062

Document Date: 10/07/62

Document Ser.#:

AGRAM A-32 FR BRASILIA TO STATE

In the review of this file this item was removed because access to it is restricted. Restrictions on records in the National Archives are stated in general and specific record group restriction statements which are available for examination. The item identified above has been withdrawn because it contains:

X Security-Classified Information

NND: 949515

WITHDRAWN: 02/24/95 by: JAS

FOIA RETRIEVAL #: 949515 01582 00006



W I T H D R A W A L N O T I C E

RG: 059

ENTRY: CDF60-63

TAB #: 5

1 / 8 / S /

COPIES/PPS/CLASS/SPECMARK

BOX: 1582

ACCESS RESTRICTED

The item identified below has been withdrawn from this file:

Folder Title: 732.00(W)/7-362

Document Date: 03/07/62

Document Ser.#:

AGRAM A-3 FR BRASILIA TO STATE

In the review of this file this item was removed because access to it is restricted. Restrictions on records in the National Archives are stated in general and specific record group restriction statements which are available for examination. The item identified above has been withdrawn because it contains:

X Security-Classified Information

NND: 949515

WITHDRAWN: 02/24/95 by: JAS

FOIA RETRIEVAL #: 949515 01582 00005

1122

W I T H D R A W A L N O T I C E

RG: 059

ENTRY: CDF60-63

TAB #: 4

1 / 9 / C /

COPIES/PPS/CLASS/SPECMARK

BOX: 1582

ACCESS RESTRICTED

The item identified below has been withdrawn from this file:

Folder Title: 732.00(W)/6-2662

Document Date: 26/06/62

Document Ser.#:

DESP 1042 FR BRASILIA TO STATE

In the review of this file this item was removed because access to it is restricted. Restrictions on records in the National Archives are stated in general and specific record group restriction statements which are available for examination. The item identified above has been withdrawn because it contains:

X Security-Classified Information

NND: 949515

WITHDRAWN: 02/24/95 by: JAS

FOIA RETRIEVAL #: 949515 01582 00004

1121

W I T H D R A W A L N O T I C E

RG: 059

ENTRY: CDF60-63

TAB #: 3

1 / 8 / C /

COPIES/PPS/CLASS/SPECMARK

BOX: 1582

ACCESS RESTRICTED

The item identified below has been withdrawn from this file:

Folder Title: 732.00(W)/6-1962

Document Date: 19/06/62

Document Ser.#:

DESP 1023 FR BRASILIA TO STATE

In the review of this file this item was removed because access to it is restricted. Restrictions on records in the National Archives are stated in general and specific record group restriction statements which are available for examination. The item identified above has been withdrawn because it contains:

X Security-Classified Information

NND: 949515

WITHDRAWN: 02/24/95 by: JAS

FOIA RETRIEVAL #: 949515 01582 00003

W I T H D R A W A L N O T I C E

RG: 059 TAB #: 2

ENTRY: CDF60-63 1 / 7 / C /
COPIES/PPS/CLASS/SPECMARK

BOX: 1582

ACCESS RESTRICTED

The item identified below has been withdrawn from this file:

Folder Title: 732.00(W)6-1262

Document Date: 12/06/62

Document Ser.#:

DESP 1003 FR BRASILIA TO STATE

In the review of this file this item was removed because access to it is restricted. Restrictions on records in the National Archives are stated in general and specific record group restriction statements which are available for examination. The item identified above has been withdrawn because it contains:

X Security-Classified Information

NND: 949515 WITHDRAWN: 02/24/95 by: JAS

FOIA RETRIEVAL #: 949515 01582 00002

1119

W I T H D R A W A L N O T I C E

RG: 059

TAB #: 1

ENTRY: CDF60-63

1 / 8 / S /
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COPIES/PPS/CLASS/SPECMARK

BOX: 1582

ACCESS RESTRICTED

The item identified below has been withdrawn from this file:

Folder Title: 732.00(W)6-562

Document Date: 05/06/62

Document Ser.#:

DESP 975 FR BRASILIA TO STATE

In the review of this file this item was removed because access to it is restricted. Restrictions on records in the National Archives are stated in general and specific record group restriction statements which are available for examination. The item identified above has been withdrawn because it contains:

X Security-Classified Information
-

NND: 949515

WITHDRAWN: 02/24/95 by: JAS

FOIA RETRIEVAL #: 949515 01582 00001



732.00(w)/6-562

W I T H D R A W A L N O T I C E

RG: 059 TAB #: 108

ENTRY: CDF60-63 1 / 8 / C /
COPIES/PPS/CLASS/SPECMARK

BOX: 1581

ACCESS RESTRICTED

The item identified below has been withdrawn from this file:

Folder Title: 732.00(W)/5-2962

Document Date: 29/05/62

Document Ser.#:

DESP 956 FR BRASILIA TO STATE

In the review of this file this item was removed because access to it is restricted. Restrictions on records in the National Archives are stated in general and specific record group restriction statements which are available for examination. The item identified above has been withdrawn because it contains:

X Security-Classified Information

NND: 949515 WITHDRAWN: 02/24/95 by: JAS

FOIA RETRIEVAL #: 949515 01581 00108

1116

W I T H D R A W A L N O T I C E

RG: 059 TAB #: 107

ENTRY: CDF60-63 1 / 7 / C /

COPIES/PPS/CLASS/SPECMARK

BOX: 1581

ACCESS RESTRICTED

The item identified below has been withdrawn from this file:

Folder Title: 732.00(W)/5-2362

Document Date: 23/05/62

Document Ser.#:

DESP 23 FR BRASILIA TO STATE

In the review of this file this item was removed because access to it is restricted. Restrictions on records in the National Archives are stated in general and specific record group restriction statements which are available for examination. The item identified above has been withdrawn because it contains:

X Security-Classified Information

NND: 949515 WITHDRAWN: 02/24/95 by: JAS

FOIA RETRIEVAL #: 949515 01581 00107

1115

W I T H D R A W A L N O T I C E

RG: 059 TAB #: 106

ENTRY: CDF60-63 1 / 10 / C /
COPIES/PPS/CLASS/SPECMARK

BOX: 1581

ACCESS RESTRICTED

The item identified below has been withdrawn from this file:

Folder Title: 732.00(W)/5-2262

Document Date: 22/05/62

Document Ser.#:

DESP 930 FR BRASILIA TO STATE

In the review of this file this item was removed because access to it is restricted. Restrictions on records in the National Archives are stated in general and specific record group restriction statements which are available for examination. The item identified above has been withdrawn because it contains:

X Security-Classified Information

NND: 949515 WITHDRAWN: 02/24/95 by: JAS

FOIA RETRIEVAL #: 949515 01581 00106

1114

W I T H D R A W A L N O T I C E

RG: 059

ENTRY: CDF60-63

TAB #: 105

1 / 8 / C /

COPIES/PPS/CLASS/SPECMARK

BOX: 1581

ACCESS RESTRICTED

The item identified below has been withdrawn from this file:

Folder Title: 732.00(W)/5-1562

Document Date: 15/05/62

Document Ser.#:

DESP 898 FR BRASILIA TO STATE

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RG: 059

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DESP 835 FR BRASILIA TO STATE

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WITHDRAWN: 02/24/95 by: JAS

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Progress agreement covering the Northeast. A press conference on April 13 with Mr. Bruno Luzzatto, the new AID Regional Director, was also given prominent treatment. Pictures of the conference were spread on the front page of Diario de Pernambuco for April 14 while Jornal do Commercio announced "Co-ordinator for Alliance for Progress Announces Implementation Phase for the Northeast." Jornal do Commercio the next day went off on another tack with the headline: "Brazil Will Control Alliance Funds for Northeast: Autonomy Will be Total: J. Goulart." The Radiopress despatch which followed quoted Foreign Minister San Tiago Dantas as stating that "the program is not a mixed Brazilian-American program, but is solely Brazilian, formulated and implemented by our technicians. Funds will come simultaneously from the United States and Brazil." The despatch assured that assistance from the United States had no bearing on Brazilian foreign policy, which would continue to be "independent."

The April 14 to 21 edition of the Communist weekly A Hora also featured the Alliance agreement, predictably declaring in its secondary headline: "Alliance for Progress: A New Form of Colonialism."

Lecturing its readers on the serious implications for Pernambuco and the Northeast of the forthcoming elections, the Jornal do Commercio called for an end to "politics of division, of resentment, of hatred," and "separation" which serve only the best interests of those elected. Instead of allowing parties to be organs of political resentment, the Jornal asked that they become the "sum total of the aspirations of the people." The Diario de Pernambuco also called for a revision in the state's political traditions, abolishing the "commerce of votes." Pointing out that by paying for votes, elected officials rid themselves of any obligation to the voters, the Diario warned that if the practice is not abolished soon, "all political activity will be the exclusive privilege of demagogues and rich men." (UNCLASSIFIED)

Eugene Delgado-Arias

/s/ Eugene Delgado-Arias
Consul General

1109

Department of International Technical Assistance, arrived in Recife on April 10. After confering with various SUDENE officials and members of the state government, Bannier gave a press interview in which he was quoted as saying that the Netherlands wanted to assist the Northeast and was now studying means of giving such assistance. Bannier mentioned the possibility of Dutch technicians helping with soil surveys, of establishment of a research center, of grants to permit Brazilian technicians to study in Holland, etc. (UNCLASSIFIED)

2. Governor Sampaio Continues to Seek Aid Funds.

The remaining Cr$ 500 million of the Federal Government's recent Cr$ 1 billion loan to Pernambuco is now being transferred to the state in Cr$ 100 to 200 million allotments. Governor Sampaio, armed with authority from the State Legislature to contract additional loans, is reported to be attempting to negotiate a Cr$ 4 billion loan from the Bank of Brazil for use in a low cost housing program. According to a Radiopress news despatch Sampaio warned the Bank that if they did not grant the loan, Miguel Arraes would be the next Governor of Pernambuco.

The Governor is also energetically going after a Cr$ 300 million Wheat Agreement fund slated for expenditure in Pernambuco. Sampaio cabled Simoes Lopez, a Treasury Ministry official, asking why the funds had been tied up in the Ministry for so long. When Lopez replied that the agreement was paralyzed in Minister Saccio's office and that the Brazilian Government could do nothing until the American Embassy approved the agreement, Sampaio fired back a stinging telegram informing Lopez that the American Embassy had long ago approved the agreement and that he had proof that it was resting in "your esteemed hands." (UNCLASSIFIED)

Comment: Sampaio has consistently taken the line that he leads the forces of Democracy and Arraes those of Communism, that the two are locked in struggle, and that he, Sampaio, must have immediate economic assistance or Arraes and his Communist forces will take over the Northeast. Sampaio has become increasingly impatient both with the Brazilian Federal Government and the United States Government for what he imagines to be the short shrift given his pleas. He regards American assistance given through SUDENE as dangerous since he considers SUDENE to be Communist controlled. (CONFIDENTIAL)

3. IADB Loan for Municipal Water Systems.

The Recife press reported last week and continued to comment favorably this week on an IADB loan of $12,978,000 to help finance improvement and expansion of water supply and sewer facilities in Recife, Maceio, Natal, Sao Luis, Terezinha, and Campina Grande. (UNCLASSIFIED)

PSYCHOLOGICAL

Topics treated heavily by the Recife press this week included President Goulart's return from his visit to the United States and Mexico, the activities in Paraiba of the Army and the Ligas Camponesas, and the signing of the Alliance for Progress agreement.

All Recife papers gave favorable headline treatment to the Alliance for

1108

Comment: The Consulate General has reason to believe that the anti-contraband effort was deliberately timed to coincide with the "passeata." It is certain that the deployment of Army troops throughout the interior had an inhibiting effect on the planners of the protest march, and partially accounted for its postponement. It is also certain that the Army was looking for more than coffee shipments when it erected its roadblocks and initiated its searches. General Costa e Silva, while denying that the Army had prohibited the mass protest in Paraíba, finally admitted that the anti-contraband operation had been sparked by reports of arms, munitions, and propaganda materials being shipped into the area. (OFFICIAL USE ONLY)

4. Stevedores Strike Cancelled.

Local Communists this week seemed to be attempting to push through and expand the stevedores strike called for April 16, hoping for a maximum of agitation. Their hopes were not realized. Recife dock workers only half-heartedly agreed to join the work stoppage, and the Trade Union Council of Pernambuco, meeting on April 13, also agreed, though not very enthusiastically, to support the strike. Climbing on the bandwagon in an effort to move things along, Francisco Juliao, his right hand man Carlos Luis de Andrade, and leaders of the UNE (National Union of Students) and the UEP (Pernambuco Students Union) also attended the Trade Union meeting in a show of support for the stevedores. On April 15, however, the local stevedores union announced that a telegram had been received from the National Federation reporting that the Council of Ministers had agreed to all demands, and directing that the strike be called off. The local union expressed gratitude for the support shown by workers, students, Ligas Camponesas, Recife Mayor Miguel Arraes and Vice-Mayor Lima Cavalcanti. (OFFICIAL USE ONLY)

Comment: Though it was to be expected that the government would make concessions, the Communists apparently were looking for a vehicle for agitation and wanted to push the strike through with or without concessions. Efforts to whip up enthusiasm and to mount tensions met with little success, however. (CONFIDENTIAL)

5. Foreign Communist Newsmen Visit Recife.

Recife was honored this week by the separate visits of two foreign Communist journalists, Moric Rapaport, Editor of the International Department of the Czechoslovak News Agency (C.T.K.), and Wong Wei Chen, Brazilian correspondent of the New China News Agency. Wei Chen remained in Recife for three days and visited local and state officials, including Mayor Arraes and Governor Sampaio, and the directors of both the Diario de Pernambuco and the Jornal do Commercio. He was escorted on all visits by Aloisio Falcao, a reputed Communist who is now head of the local Journalists Union. Of Rapaport's activities in Recife, little is known except that he gave an interview to the Diario de Pernambuco. His statements were limited to platitudinous expressions of friendship between the two countries. (UNCLASSIFIED)

ECONOMIC

1. Possible Netherlands Technical Assistance.

J. F. Bannier, described by the Recife press as the Director of the Netherlands

1107

of Recife), the support of two major parties, the UDN and the PTB, and virtually assures his election to the Senate. The UDN left for its next convention the designation of its other candidate for the Senate and its candidates for Vice Governor and the Federal Chamber of Deputies.

José Ermírio de Morais, the other PTB candidate for Senator, arrived in Pernambuco this week to begin his campaign. A wealthy São Paulo industrialist born in Pernambuco, who is said to control 42 different industries, Ermírio de Morais gives early indication of being a candidate of the nationalist, anti-"foreign economic trust" variety. Reportedly, he has purchased the presses of the now defunct Correio do Povo to launch his own newspaper and will purchase Radio Olinda, all to help wage his campaign. (OFFICIAL USE ONLY)

2. Paraíba Ligas Camponesas "Passeata" Postponed.

A widely-publicized "passeata" of "5,000" peasants, protesting the murder of Ligas Camponesas official João Pedro Teixeira (See Weekly Summary No. 8), was called off at the last moment and re-scheduled for May 1. The "passeata" was to have been held in the area of Sapé on April 10. Press reports out of João Pessoa indicated that the postponement was due to the arrest of two Ligas officials, President Assis Lemos and legal counsel José Gomes da Silva, and the presence in Paraíba of an augmented Army force because of "Operation Anti-Contraband" (See Item No. 3).

Meanwhile, details of the murder of João Pedro Teixeira began to come to light in the press while the investigation has not been completed, the finger of accusation points at two members of the state police who were said to have been hired for the job by local landowners. The landowners, presumably, would be members of the "Syndicate of Death," an organization of landowners reported to have been formed in Paraíba with the intention of using paid "capangas" (troublemakers) to rid themselves of the threat posed by the Ligas Camponesas. (UNCLASSIFIED)

3. IV Army Launches "Operation Anti-Contraband."

Coincidental with the threat of a mass demonstration in Paraíba sponsored by the Ligas Camponesas, the IV Army, in co-operation with the Navy and the Air Force, launched a concerted drive to uncover and seize shipments of contraband articles in the Northeast. According to the Army's original announcement, "Operation Anti-Contraband" was to involve air and sea patrols, road-blocks, and thorough searches of certain areas suspected of being contraband centers. The original announcement stated also that the operation had been launched in co-operation with, and at the request of, the Brazilian Institute of Coffee which was said to be concerned over the large amounts of coffee being shipped out of the country secretly.

When the threat of the "passeata" in Paraíba developed (See Item No. 2), the Army troops had already been deployed to various cities in the interior suspected of being contraband centers, and roadblocks had already been set up. As a result, the press reported that the Army had prohibited the Ligas Camponesas from staging its "passeata" and had "occupied" certain key cities in Paraíba. The Army, of course, denied that there was any connection between its anti-contraband drive and the postponement of the "Passeata." (UNCLASSIFIED)

1186

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FOREIGN SERVICE DESPATCH

175

FROM AmConGen RECIFE

TO THE DEPARTMENT OF STATE, WASHINGTON

DATE April 18, 1962

REF

FOR																			
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SUBJECT Weekly Summary No. 9.

TABLE OF CONTENTS

POLITICAL

1. Political Campaign Developments.
2. Paraiba Ligas Camponesas "Passeata" Postponed.
3. IV Army Launches "Operation Anti-Contraband".
4. Stevedores Strike Cancelled.
5. Foreign Communist Newsmen Visit Recife.

ECONOMIC

1. Possible Netherlands Technical Assistance.
2. Governor Sargeio Continues to Seek Aid Funds.
3. IADB Loan for Municipal Water System.

PSYCHOLOGICAL

POLITICAL

1. Political Campaign Developments.

The União Democratica Nacional held its state convention this week and formally nominated Noah Cantes as the party candidate for Governor. As expected, the vote on the nomination was unanimous. Also by unanimous vote, the UDN "indicated" Francisco Pessôa de Queiros as one of its candidates for the Senate. This gives Pessôa de Queiros, owner-publisher of the Jornal do Commercio and the Diario de Noite (constituting two-thirds of the daily press of Recife),

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deepening our dependence upon the North American trusts." But Novos Rumos left the door open for an eventual accomodation. (UNCLASSIFIED)

Daniel M. Braddock
Minister Consul General

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1099

go further than making promises. Asked about Peasant Leaguer Francisco JULIÃO, who recently spoke in Goiânia (very likely with the Governor's encouragement), Borges Teixeira replied: "The Pernambuco Deputy's words in Goiás did not meet with the receptivity they have found in other places. The conditions in Goiás are specific, different . . . ." (OFFICIAL USE ONLY)

Comment: The Goiás Governor is a useful weather vane, being sufficiently light in weight to twirl with political breezes. One gathers that his twirl to the left has not been giving entirely satisfactory results. (LIMITED OFFICIAL USE)

PSYCHOLOGICAL

1. Local Press Reaction

O Estado de São Paulo, commenting on the announced resumption of American atmospheric nuclear tests, said the decision would be severely criticized. "Yet -- said O Estado -- it is fully justified by the Soviet tests of last September and October." Diario de São Paulo was equally friendly, but other papers have yet to comment.

There was an almost unanimous reaction to recent U.S. press criticism of Brazil and of the expropriation of the Companhia Telefônica Nacional of Rio Grande do Sul. While disapproving of the expropriation, most local papers thought the American press reaction too violent. Some U.S. newspapers were accused of being reactionary and imperialistic; others of lacking an understanding of Latin American mentality and of Brazil. O Estado de São Paulo said "It is difficult to distinguish (in the criticism) what comes from sheer ignorance, what from ill will, what comes from an incapacity to understand Latin American problems . . . ." A Hora: "There will be no practical results from this shameful campaign of certain news agencies. . . ." Communist-sympathizing Ultima Hora took the usual line: There is no doubt that the politicians, as well as the U.S. newspapers, serve the old colonialist spirit." Few papers (Ultima Hora and A Hora) indicated any enthusiasm for Brizola's action. In a typical comment, Diario de São Paulo said: "The more the government of Rio Grande do Sul (Brizola's) tries to explain the expropriation, the more its demagogic purpose becomes plain. . . ."

Communist Novos Rumos (São Paulo edition) gives what appears to be the party line on Janio Quadros' return: "The position of the Communists, vis-a-vis Mr. Janio Quadros, is well known by the people. We were an opposition force to his reactionary administration. During the months he was at the head of the government, Mr. Janio Quadros put into practice an internal policy against the interests of the country. It was imposed by the International Monetary Fund and caused worsening of the living conditions for the workers,

GPO 802687

1098

of his visit. (OFFICIAL USE ONLY)

Comment: Local hopes are high for the housing project in general and "Alliance for Progress" aid in particular. The Consulate General does not know whether Montoro played down the potential U.S. role for political reasons or because of uncertainty concerning the outcome of his Washington conversations. The necessity of labor support for his political aspirations makes him understandably wary of excessive identification with the United States. Further observation will probably show that the grant increased his basically pro-American bent, however.

Magaldi apparently fears that the Brazilian government's development of the mass housing project needs careful watching. His worries may turn out to be well founded. Minister Montoro has been getting maximum political mileage for himself and his party out of the housing scheme, but he (with most of the rest of the Cabinet) will presumably have to resign within weeks. The housing project will then need another patron. (LIMITED OFFICIAL USE)

4. Estado Director Invited to Visit U.S. with Brazilian President

The newspaper Estado de São Paulo reports an "authorized Itamarati (foreign office) source" as saying that Julio de MESQUITA Filho, Estado's director, will be one of two journalists invited to accompany President Goulart on his forthcoming visit to the United States. (UNCLASSIFIED)

Comment: This appears to be dramatic evidence of President Goulart's desire for rapprochement with conservative Brazilian circles. Conservative (but reform-minded) Estado was recently one of his most vitriolic critics. It has lately been easier on him, but is still far from kind. Dr. Mesquita's inclusion among the high-level group of presidential travelling companions would imply, if not his approval of the President, at least tacit acceptance. According to latest information, Dr. Mesquita will be unable to accept because of a previously planned trip to Europe, but this does not alter the significance of the invitation. (LIMITED OFFICIAL USE)

5. Goiás Governor Hints at National Liberation Front Difficulties

Goiás Governor Mauro BORGES TEIXEIRA, visiting São Paulo on February 26, was quoted by reporters as saying that the leftist "National Liberation Front" -- of which he was a founder -- was in "financial difficulties," hindering [illegible] of its ideas. He did not have anything new to say about the Front's plans. By an emphatic mixed metaphor, he repelled the suggestion that there was Communist infiltration in his State government: "Absolutely not. Bad tongues are always seeing phantoms." He had confidence in the sincerity of President Kennedy and hoped that the Alliance for Progress would

GPO 932667

1097

candidate Nogueira has already won the backing of the Republican Party (Partido Republicano -- PR -- see Weeka 8) and is a favorite of others, including the Christian Democrats (Partido Democráta Cristão -- PDC). State Justice Minister QUEIROS Filho emerged from the convention as an almost sure UDN nominee for the Senate: a swap in the best interests of both parties. In a speech accepting his nomination, Coutinho Nogueira again stressed that his position was centrist, reformist, and unequivocably anti-Communist.

José Bonifacio (his preferred nom de guerre) has also gained the implicit support of another significant force. A regional convention of the Democratic Labor Movement (Movimento Sindical Democrático) on March 25 approved a strong motion praising the work of Governor CARVALHO PINTO and hoping for the continued success of his "Plan of Action" for economic development. "Administrative continuity" is José Bonifacio's strongest campaign pitch. (OFFICIAL USE ONLY)

Comment: In spite of internal party troubles (Weeka 6), nomination of UDN member Nogueira was almost a certainty. The significant aspect of the convention was the failure of the Janista (pro-Janio Quadros) wing to put up an effective struggle. The Quadros fans were handicapped by the timing of the convention a week before the ex-President's expected re-entry on the political scene (see first item).

The Democratic Labor Movement's position gives the administration another useful trump. In all, Carvalho Pinto and protégé Nogueira are in a strong position from which to confront Quadros. (OFFICIAL USE ONLY)

3. MONTORO Leader Grant Apparently Useful

Brazilian Labor Minister Franco MONTORO, just returned from a leader grant visit to the United States, gave the São Paulo press an interview on February 27. It was entirely devoted to plans for constructing three million low cost houses: a long-time pet project of Montoro and his Christian Democratic Party and the most important aspect of his grant. He emphasized Brazilian contributions to the housing project but also mentioned high hopes of "Alliance for Progress" aid. He called his talks in Washington "most promising," especially those with the Interamerican Development Bank. Antonio Pereira MAGALDI of the Democratic Labor Movement appeared to catch Montoro slightly off base with the suggestion that Unions be cut in on planning for the low cost housing project. "An important idea," said the Labor Minister. The local press gave intensive news and editorial coverage to the interview, the project, and the possibility of American aid.

During the short time in which Consulate General officers were able to talk with Minister Montoro, he expressed personal satisfaction with the results

GPO 802667

1096

competitor for the governorship. (Carvalho Pinto denied a rumor, printed in the Rio de Janeiro press, that Quadros had promised him to stay out of the race and support the administration candidate.)

When it became apparent that the reception committee was to be composed of second-rank politicians, other State Governors who had planned to participate changed their minds. Minas Gerais Governor Magalhães PINTO reportedly hopes, however, that Quadros will immediately travel to the resort town of Araxá, for a conference with him, Pernambuco Governor Cid SAMPAIO, Rio Grande do Norte Governor Aluisio ALVES, Bahia Governor Juracy MAGALHÃES, Guanabara Governor Carlos LACERDA, Paraná Governor Ney BRAGA, and lesser figures.

The ex-President's followers have arranged for him to make a speech immediately after disembarking, and some hope that he will choose the occasion to make a long-awaited explanation of the reasons for his sudden resignation. (OFFICIAL USE ONLY)

Comment: For Brazilian politicians (especially Paulistas) almost anything will be a relief from the present agonizing expectancy. Quadros is variously expected to return as a leftist, rightist, or centrist, and as a candidate to the São Paulo governorship or the Federal Chamber of Deputies. The fact that he has allowed the controversy to continue presumably means that he has some political intentions, but even his former intimates do not seem to have fathomed them. Logic and past performance -- for what they are worth -- indicate a preference for eccentric, authoritarian centrism.

The explanation (or lack of it) of Quadros' reasons for resignation should be of pivotal importance. It is hard to imagine anything he could find that has not already been tried by his "general staff". Public opinion so far has punctured every trial balloon sent up. He could decide to avoid the risk of a flop on the grounds that his resignation was self-explanatory. This too would be a disappointment for his remaining adherents.

It also remains to be seen who will attend the "Governors' Conference." Minas Gerais Governor Magalhães Pinto has been acting like a Janista, but some of the others supposed to attend have not. Quadros' attendance itself is far from definite. (LIMITED OFFICIAL USE)

2. Nogueira Gets Backing of UDN and Democratic Labor Movement

A São Paulo State convention of the National Democratic Union (União Democrática Nacional -- UDN) on March 1 nominated José Bonifacio Coutinho Nogueira for the October gubernatorial elections. A small but vocal wing of the party was for ex-President (and ex-Governor) Janio Quadros, but Nogueira received one hundred and ninety-eight votes to Quadros' eighteen. Administration

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1095

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SUBJECT: WEEKA NO. 10

TABLE OF CONTENTS

POLITICAL:

1. Interest in QUADROS' Arrival Intense
2. NOGUEIRA Gets Backing of UDN and Democratic Labor Movement
3. MONTORO Leader Grant Apparently Useful
4. Estado Director Invited to Visit U. S. with Brazilian President
5. Goiás Governor Hints at National Liberation Front Difficulties

PSYCHOLOGICAL:

1. Local Press Reaction

DEPARTMENT OF STATE RECEIVED MAR 12 8 01 4 43 INTELLIGENCE REPORTS

POLITICAL

1. Interest in QUADROS' Arrival Intense

Ex-President Janio Quadros' ship is still expected to arrive in Santos -- its first Brazilian port -- on Ash Wednesday, March 7. The Janista "general staff" is trying to arrange a rousing reception, but it appears that few important national figures will be on hand. President João GOULART apparently plans neither to attend nor to send a representative: a mild snub. Governor CARVALHO PINTO (once Quadros' State Secretary of Finance) plans to be represented by several State Secretaries, among them gubernatorial candidate Coutinho NOGUEIRA. If the "general staff" can be believed, the man Nogueira meets could be his strongest

See last page/fmw

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1092

Folha felt that funds could be better used in basic sectors of the economy than for Montoro's housing project. Even left-lining Ultima Hora agreed with Senator Mansfield's criticisms. Identifying the Senator as a relative of Jayne "The Bust," Ultima Hora gleefully took the position that Brazil's political tension and financial troubles should naturally keep U.S. aid out. O Estado applauded Senator Mansfield, warned that the Alliance is no panacea and that self-help and inflation-curbing austerity must accompany outside efforts.

Editorial reaction to Alexei Adjubei's São Paulo press conference (see Weeka 7) continued -- all negative. Nothing could have so convinced São Paulo's media of the lack of freedom of the Russian Press as Adjubei's slippery, weaving performance.

Janio Quadros' impending return occupied editorialists. Ultima Hora gave him a chance to recover as the country's leader due to enduring popularity, but considered it high time that he thought of Brazil's good rather than his own political vanity. Correio Paulistano considered his return to Brazil as a private citizen normal, but opined that his political star had set because of broken promises, broken faith, and tough current competition.

Daniel M. Braddock
Minister Consul General

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1091

4. GALVÃO and DELGADO React Differently to Portuguese Trial

Portuguese rebel Henrique Galvão, tried in absence by a Lisbon Court for his part in the "Santa Maria" episode, expressed his glee to the São Paulo press. He was reported as saying that his conviction "was not more pleasant only because it was not unforeseen." He was "thankful not to have suffered the dishonor of acquittal." Recently on the spot to explain reported new revolutionary intentions to the Ministry of Justice (Brasília Weeka 5), Galvão this time was said to have received reporters with paper and pencil in hand to "avoid distortions of my statements."

General Humberto Delgado, who has a quarrel with both the Salazar regime and Galvão, sounded less tickled. The press reported him as concerned that his conviction might limit his movements, preventing him from traveling to countries which might extradite him to Portugal. (UNCLASSIFIED)

PSYCHOLOGICAL

1. Local Press Reaction

Editorial comment this week covered a wide range of topics, with heavier accent on domestic matters than for several previous weeks. The East-West exchange of disarmament proposals received considerable attention, with all commenting papers in general agreement that Khrushchev's summit proposal was designed for purposes other than those of good faith, that the West's position was correct, and that the matter was of supreme importance. O Estado felt that the West had gained the initiative through the exchange of notes, that Mr. Khruschev would like to make the proposed conference a propaganda show, but that withal Russia's stakes in an accord were as high as the West's. Diário Comércio e Indústria called down a pox on both houses, saying that Russia's proposal shows flagrant insincerity, asking why the matter is not being handled within the UN, and answering: because, for reasons of commerce and influence, neither side wants disarmament. A Gazeta and A Hora were flattered by Russia's inclusion of Brazil among the addressees, but warned that Brazil would not be deceived by sweet-talk and that Russia was simply trying to woo her away from her Western position.

The Alliance for Progress and Senator Mansfield's statements re Brazil came in for comment in all leading papers. Most felt that Senator Mansfield's reserves were justified. Diário conceded Brazil's "treason" at Punta del Este, worried about the effects on Alliance funds, agreed with Senator Mansfield's criticisms, but said that Brazil would be reformed Cuba-style if not U.S.-style. A Gazeta awaited the results of Labor Minister Montoro's current visit to the U.S. as the first test of U.S.-Brazil relations after the Punta del Este conference.

GPO 902687

1090

his recent surprise visit (see item 1).

PRP - The integralist (fascist) Popular Representation Party (Partido de Representação Popular) is most likely to back the administration candidate.

MTR and PSB - The new Labor Renovation Movement (Movimento Trabalhista Renovador) of Fernando FERRARI and the Brazilian Socialist Party (Partido Socialista Brasileiro) insist that they will run their own candidates, probably meaning that they are holding out for sale to the highest bidder. (LIMITED OFFICIAL USE)

Comment: Insofar as this picturesque confusion can be evaluated, Coutinho Nogueira is front-running and gaining slightly. It is too early in the race to say more. (LIMITED OFFICIAL USE)

3. Second Plan of Action Under Preparation

On February 14, Governor Carvalho Pinto held a publicized ceremony to request suggestions for a second four-year "Plan of Action" (Plano de Ação) for the economic development of São Paulo in the years 1963-1966. Its predecessor for the years 1959-1961 was approved by the legislature so late as to make it in effect a three-year plan. The Governor reports, nevertheless, that 59.5 percent of its works are completed, 34.7 percent in process, and 3.0 percent in contract negotiations, leaving only 2.8 percent to be started. The first Plan should be satisfactorily completed when the current Governor leaves office next January. He hopes to will the second to candidate Coutinho Nogueira, whose main campaign issue is a promise to follow Carvalho Pinto's precedent.

Most of the local press -- both leftist and conservative -- greeted the plans for the Plan with enthusiasm, but Folha de São Paulo, which has often exercised restrained criticism of the State government, described two weaknesses: failure to propose reform of the São Paulo bureaucracy and failure to evolve a real plan rather than a simple list of works. (UNCLASSIFIED)

Comment: Whatever its failures -- and it is not perfect -- the first Plan of Action has been a great success. Nothing else in Brazil and probably little else in Latin America will stand comparison with it. Even with the incentive of the Alliance for Progress, the national government has done little effective economic planning, but São Paulo anticipated the Alliance. Politically, this has enabled one public figure -- the Governor -- to attract the support of both right and left (excluding the Communists, who dislike seeing any progress within a democratic framework). It is no coincidence that preparations for the second Plan will be in the news during the election campaign of the administration gubernatorial candidate. (OFFICIAL USE ONLY)

GPO 802667

1089

the party was unhappy with the commitment to Moura Andrade and may yet defect to Coutinho Nogueira. Senator Andrade will remain a contender in the foreseeable future, however, and could attract enough support from other parties to become a power to be reckoned with.

PR - The Republican Party (Partido Republicano) on February 18 became the first to nominate Coutinho Nogueira.

UDN - Though the National Democratic Union (União Democrática Nacional) is José Bonifacio's own party and a key member of the administration coalition, it has a militant Janista wing. Its State nominating convention is to take place before the ex-President's March arrival, however. Coutinho Nogueira has a good chance of winning out. (See Weeka 6.)

PTN - The split in the National Labor Party (Partido Trabalhista Nacional), another important member of the administration coalition, is still worse. Senator Juvenal Lino de MATOS, the Party President, is a Janista, as is Federal Deputy Emilio CARLOS, a dominant party figure, who probably feels that Governor Carvalho Pinto's opposition cost him the São Paulo mayoralty. Emilio Carlos has just done an abrupt about-face from an anti-Quadros position. His brother Fauze CARLOS, however, is State Secretary of Health and a likely candidate for the vice governorship under José Bonifacio. He and other important elements of the PTN are strongly for the administration slate. Anything could happen in the State convention, which the Janista wing has postponed until after Quadros' expected arrival.

PDC - The Christian Democrats (Partido Democrata Cristão) seem most likely to opt for Coutinho Nogueira, but many would prefer to lose with their own candidate or to back Quadros, if the ex-President should come up with an acceptable platform. The Governor leans more strongly toward the PDC than any other party and the Party President is his Secretary of Justice. The two may be able to keep the important PDC vote strength on their side.

PSP - The large and faithful block of voters which follows Adhemar de Barros' Social Progressive Party (Partido Social Progessista) keep it from being a wallflower. It is unlikely to back Quadros but could go for Senator Moura Andrade (logical), for José Bonifacio (fear of Quadros making strange bedfellows), or could run perennial candidate Adhemar.

PTB - The Brazilian Labor Party (Partido Trabalhista Brasileiro) has apparently been losing some of its following -- lukewarm in São Paulo for a long time -- and may well consider itself obliged to support Coutinho Nogueira, though it has been a member of the opposition. President Goulart's orders will make the difference, and he is probably much more worried about Janio Quadros than Carvalho Pinto. Carvalho Pinto may have won the President's support during

1088

The "general staff" is sufficiently hopeful that Mr. Quadros will arrive in Santos by the ides of March to proceed with reception arrangements (see Weeka 7). A preparatory meeting in Santos on February 13, however, seems to have been a disappointment. Some of the participants reportedly had the poor taste to ask for an explanation of the mysterious forces behind the ex-President's resignation. Moderates were also said to hinge their participation in the reception committee upon the attendance of Governor CARVALHO PINTO. The Communist-influenced port workers, on the other hand, find it difficult to cooperate so long as the Brazilian Communist Party maintains its traditional anti-Quadros line.

Most São Paulo political parties have a pro-Janio wing of some influence (see following item). These Janista elements were encouraged by persistent rumors (easily transmitted in the prevailing electric atmosphere) that Quadros would be backed for governor by the popular incumbent, with administration candidate Coutinho NOGUEIRA settling for the vice governorship. One version had it that Quadros would then resign the governorship for the Prime Ministry. Despite Carvalho Pinto's politely vague position toward Quadros (who preceded him as Governor), it is not likely that either he or Coutinho Nogueira would accept this convoluted scheme except as a last resort. He made this clear upon returning from a February 16 surprise visit to President João GOULART, stressing his determination to fight for Coutinho Nogueira's election and his "serious reasons" for believing that Quadros would not compete. (LIMITED OFFICIAL USE)

Comment: This is a progress report, not a prediction. Logically, Quadros should not run for the governorship, but logic has not been a good clue to his actions in the past. Carvalho Pinto would almost surely fight Quadros' gubernatorial candidacy unless the fight seemed hopeless, and publicity to the contrary, the Janista wave has not yet attained such dimensions. A Janio Quadros-Carvalho Pinto struggle could only weaken both and strengthen such dark horses as Social Democrat Auro MOURA ANDRADE or Social Progressive Adhemar de BARROS. The odds against Quadros just now are too high to be attractive. (LIMITED OFFICIAL USE)

2. Coutinho Nogueira Attracting Important Party Backing

For every administration party which wavers toward Janismo (support of ex-President Janio Quadros), an opposition party is frightened toward administration gubernatorial candidate José Bonifacio Coutinho Nogueira. The current -- and very fluid -- position is as follows:

PSD - The Social Democratic Party (Partido Social Democrático) has its own candidate: Senate President Auro Moura Andrade. (See São Paulo Despatch 162 of December 13, 1961.) No other parties back him as yet, and the PSD is not strong enough in São Paulo to be successful by itself. Realizing this, a wing of

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1087

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SUBJECT: WEEKA NO. 8

TABLE OF CONTENTS

POLITICAL:
1. Janio Quadros for Governor?
2. Coutinho Nogueira Attracting Important Party Backing
3. Second Plan of Action Under Preparation
4. GALVÃO and DELGADO React Differently to Portuguese Trial

PSYCHOLOGICAL:
1. Local Press Reaction

POLITICAL

1. Janio Quadros for Governor?

The question is at the top of the mind of every São Paulo politician. It is too complicated to answer and too important to dismiss. The local Janista "general staff" wages psychological warfare against vacillating politicians, trying to get across the notion of a pro-Quadros band wagon. Some have climbed on, but as yet not many. As the wagon begins to move, it frightens as well as attracts: there is a sound suspicion that Quadros would like to rule without the interference of a legislature, and politicians are not anxious to find themselves unemployed. Their fears were heightened on February 14 when ex-Justice Minister Pedroso HORTA gave another in a long string of unconvincing clarifications of the ex-President's reasons for resigning. In the gospel according to Horta, Congress was the devil. By failing to support Quadros, it had made his campaign promises unattainable.

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1086

Argentine crisis received heavy headline and news play, certainly increased because of Brazil's self-doubts about her own Punta del Este position. All editorialists noted lauded Frondizi for his stand against the military, condemned the latter for forcing a political crisis -- but split along lines of their Punta del Este opinions as to the correctness of Argentina's final break with Cuba. Folha summed up one position: "President Frondizi paid dear for his fear of extremists (at home, to whom his Punta policy catered). He now has to support the anti-democratic but corrective action of his country's Armed Forces, being forced to tolerate their 'going to the right place on a crooked path'." Alexei Adjubei came to town, got extensive press coverage and a general dismissal by editorialists as a source of new or worthwhile information. Castro's Second Declaration of Havana received surprisingly slight editorial attention. Gazeta picked it up, called Brazil's Deputy Francisco JULIÃO, leader of the Northeast's Ligas Camponesas, who had praised Castro's declaration, "One hundred percent Communist...engaged in a movement of social subversion whose headquarters are installed in Havana." (UNCLASSIFIED)

An interesting flip-flop in the editorial position of A Hora has become apparent. Condemnatory of Janio Quadros at the time of his "flight," and anything but Janista since, in the past two weeks A Hora has published one story or editorial after another favorable to the ex-President. The theme is that Brazil needs Janio, that the people are calling for him. So intense is the coverage that it is impossible not to suspect the paper of having bean "bought." (LIMITED OFFICIAL USE)

For the Minister Consul General

Scott C. Lyon

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1085

family bonus, agrarian reform through unionization of agricultural workers, and improved inspection and enforcement of labor legislation. (UNCLASSIFIED)

Comment: Cerqueira, if not a Communist Party member, gives a consistently excellent imitation of one. However, Clodsmith RIANI, recently elected President of the CNTI at President GOULART's behest, and regarded as a "Goulart man," was apparently not present at the above meeting. It is difficult to imagine the CNTI actually undertaking a campaign such as the one announced without Goulart's prior approval or at least acquiescence.

The Communist and democratic platforms overlap to some extent in the economic field, but the Communists' demands are generally more extreme. This may force the MSD leaders to adopt in turn a more extreme position or at least press their current demands more vigorously in order to maintain their support among the workers in the face of increased Communist efforts. (LIMITED OFFICIAL USE)

10. Communists Defeated in Glass Workers Union Election

Sr. José CHEDIAK was re-elected President of the São Paulo Local Union of Glass Workers on February 9 after a hotly-contested battle. (UNCLASSIFIED)

Comment: Although in the past opportunist CHEDIAK has more often than not played ball with the Communists, the opposition slate was headed by Communist members of the former board of directors and was actively supported by São Paulo Communist union leaders. Democratic union leaders affiliated with the MSD (Movimento Sindical Democrático) in turn supported Chediak. There are no known Communists on the winning slate. Chediak's reelection as President of the São Paulo State Federation of Glass Workers now seems probable. It remains to be seen whether Chediak will repay his debt to the MSD by endorsing its policies and participating in its activities. (LIMITED OFFICIAL USE)

PSYCHOLOGICAL

1. Local Press Reaction

Punta del Este disappeared from the headlines this week but remained the big favorite of editorialists. Second thoughts of almost all writers agreed basically with their earlier views. Correio Paulistano, Catholic Church-controlled, continued its surprising attitude: Dantas spoke for the people; Brazil and Argentina were dead-right; "trusts" influenced the Conference and put their interests above those of the American nations; the Cuban delegation's attitude was "moderate"; Secretary Rusk's comments on the Alliance for Progress threatened Brazilian-U.S. relations. Most important papers, however, remained anti-Dantas. The

GPO 902887

1084

the need acute. (OFFICIAL USE ONLY)

7. Second Army Commander Victim of Senseless Assault

A mental patient fired four shots into the car of General Nelson de MELO, Commander of the Second Army, on February 9. The General was not harmed. (UNCLASSIFIED)

Comment: The incident is mentioned only to refute some of the highly publicized conclusions of the sensational press, which tried to connect the assassination attempt to the so-called "wave of terrorism" (itself an exaggeration). There is no indication that political motives were involved. (OFFICIAL USE ONLY)

8. Changes in Military Commands

The following changes have recently been made in the top São Paulo military echelon:

(A) General Aurelio de Lyra TAVARES replaced General Nilo A. Guerreiro LIMA as Commander of the Second Military Region on January 18.

(B) Capitão-de-Fragata Herick Marques CAMINHA replaced Capitão-de-Mar-e-Guerra Jonathas do Rego Monteiro PORTO as chief of the Naval Commission on February 6. (UNCLASSIFIED)

9. Communists Compete with Democratic Union Leaders for Worker Support

In a meeting on February 11 in São Paulo, Communist labor leaders announced a national program of action emphasizing economic issues such as a reduction in the rising cost of living, family bonus, Christmas bonus, thirty-day annual vacations, workers housing, and "professional salary." On the political front they will fight for agrarian reform, union independence, and "defense of the national interests." Resolutions adopted included those supporting Cuba, Foreign Minister San Thiago DANTAS for his role at Punta del Este, Governor Leonel BRIZOLA of Rio Grande do Sul for his actions favoring the peasants, Minister of Mines and Energy Gabriel PASSOS for his defense of Petrobrás, and the CNTI (National Confederation of Industrial Workers) for its rejection of alleged intervention by ORIT (Inter-American Regional Organization of Workers) in Brazilian labor affairs. Benedito CERQUEIRA, CNTI First Secretary, promised that CNTI will lead a national campaign along the foregoing lines.

Meanwhile, the democratic union leaders comprising the MSD (Movimento Sindical Democrático) declared after a meeting on February 2 that they will press for reduction in the cost of living, workers' housing, Christmas bonus,

GPO 802567

1083

6. São Paulo Christian Democrats Push Electoral Reform

São Paulo Christian Democrats (their party is strongest here) have decided to ask the Federal Chamber of Deputies to pass "electoral reform" measures before April 30 -- soon enough to affect the elections of next October and not so late as to agitate the campaign. They are reported to have two specific reform measures in mind:

(A) Institution of a single ballot, to be supplied at the poll, for all elections. This system is already followed in presidential, gubernatorial, and mayoralty elections, which are won on the basis of direct popular vote. Candidates for legislative seats are chosen through a complicated "proportional" system which takes party as well as individual vote strength into consideration. All candidates run at large rather than from specific districts, and each has the expensive responsibility of printing his own ballot. It is this latter feature which the proposed reform intends to eliminate.

(B) Discipline of campaign propaganda, again with the thought of making it less expensive to be a candidate. (UNCLASSIFIED)

Comment: The Christian Democratic Party is fond of idealistic, difficult campaigns and may have an issue here, but electoral reform is easier to discuss than accomplish. There are obvious barriers to success in time for the October elections.

(A) The time is short.

(B) Many present Federal Deputies expect ample re-election difficulties without doing anything to make it easier for potential opponents.

(C) There are technical problems. São Paulo, for example, has forty-four Federal Deputies in the present Chamber and may have its representation increased to fifty-nine in the next. With this number of candidates listed under each of thirteen political parties, there would be seven hundred and sixty-seven names on the single ballot. Not an impossible problem, but a stumbling block.

(D) Some legislators believe that a little reform is better than none, but others may prefer to do nothing until it is possible to consider an electoral reform bill which would include a solution for the big problem -- that of substituting electoral districts for "at large" representation. The present system slights interior municipalities and allows many abuses. If both reforms were carried out at once, the single ballot would not become cumbersome.

In any case, over the long run pressure for electoral reform may be expected to mount in São Paulo, whose large electorate and multiplicity of parties make

GPO 902687

1082

line. It gives him excellent grounds for bargaining (for national support in return for State backing, for example). (LIMITED OFFICIAL USE)

4. Opinion Poll Favors Renewal of Relations with USSR

In a poll run by the "Institute of Social and Economic Studies" (Instituto de Estudos Sociais e Economicos -- INESE) and published by a local paper, 52 percent of the electorate of the city of São Paulo favored renewal of diplomatic relations with the Soviet Union, 33 percent were opposed, and 15 percent without opinion. Men were more favorably inclined than women, rich more than poor, and young more than old. There was a striking correlation between degree of education and approval of renewed relations: in those with higher education, 72 percent were for and 22 percent against, whereas persons with only primary education approved by the slim margin of 43 percent to 37 percent. Those with secondary education fell in the middle. The size of the poll sample was not stated. (UNCLASSIFIED)

Comment: INESE believed that approval of diplomatic relations had little connection with approval of the USSR itself. The much clearer approval of the classes which would be expected to be anti-Communist bears this out. The wealthy, the commerce-minded, and the educated would naturally give more thought to the economic advantages of renewal. The businesslike local press has always paid attention to the possibilities of trade with the Soviet Union. The fact that the percentage of the electorate with no opinion was so low indicates great interest. (OFFICIAL USE ONLY)

5. ADJUBEI Visits São Paulo

Izvestia director Alexei Adjubei arrived in São Paulo on February 9 for a three-day visit. The most enthusiastic member of the reception committee was said to be slum author Carolina MARIA de JESUS. The next day Adjubei conducted what appears to have been a rather hectic press interview, discussing Cuba and persecution of Jews and refusing to discuss the Molotov case. He informed his interviewers that in Russia there was real freedom of the press, because there were no advertisers to worry about. (OFFICIAL USE ONLY)

Comment: The heckling to which Adjubei was subjected by the less sophisticated of his interviewers may have led him to talk down to the local press, much of which is of high quality. On the whole, however, his performance seems to have been agile, if not very convincing to his audience. (LIMITED OFFICIAL USE)

1081

discount this possibility (see item 3). (LIMITED OFFICIAL USE)

Comment: Anyone who claims to know what the ex-President will do should be heard warily, since Mr. Quadros does not appear to know the answer himself. The local "general staff" is perhaps his best qualified mouthpiece, but that does not mean much. The Santos arrival information could turn out to be correct or to be Paulista wishful thinking. As to the possibility of Quadros' entering the important race for governor, he presumably retains enough acumen to wait to size up the situation personally before any decision. The race would be tough and its loss humiliating. (LIMITED OFFICIAL USE)

3. Coutinho Nogueira Building Platform

State Secretary of Agriculture José Bonifacio Coutinho NOGUEIRA, Governor CARVALHO PINTO's choice for the October gubernatorial election, has still not been nominated by any party but expects to be within days. He and the Governor have been holding meetings with unmistakable electoral content -- reportedly well-attended -- in several cities. A speech by Coutinho Nogueira in Baurú on February 10 was billed by the pro-administration press as the framework of his platform. Main plank: "Administrative continuity" (continuation of Carvalho Pinto's work, which almost everyone considers impressive). Narrower slats: (A) Specific reference was made to the guidance of the Mater et Magistra. (B) "There is no contradiction between liberty and social justice." In line with this, Coutinho Nogueira took repeated swats at "demagogy" and "disorder," leaving clear his centrist orientation. (C) Reforms, however, were not considered incompatible with centrism. The necessity of agricultural reform was emphasized.

Especially significant was the rupture of the silence barrier surrounding ex-Governor Janio Quadros, who might previously have been judged from administration silence to be dead. The new line: José Bonifacio represents continuity of the same reform forces which elected both Quadros and Carvalho Pinto. Simultaneously with this, the painted initials "JQ-CP-JB" began to appear on São Paulo walls and streets. (UNCLASSIFIED)

Comment: The "me too" plank was inevitable. Carvalho Pinto's popularity is formidable. José Bonifacio (not to be confused with a Minas Gerais Federal Deputy of the same name) is not quite the same sort of politician as his sponsor, however. He seems to give the public the impression of being more brash, more fond of resounding phrases. Psychological jargon is needed to describe another difference: he is not a "father image." Nevertheless, he may well be able to put over the "administrative continuity" slogan.

Some position toward Quadros had to be taken before the campaign started. It remains to be seen whether Mr. Quadros will go along with the "JQ-CP-JB"

GPO 902687

1080

vice-mayoralty and fifteen of the twenty-three seats in the new City Council were won by the four most important parties in the present State administration: the Christian Democrats (Partido Democrata Cristão -- PDC), National Labor Party (Partido Trabalhista Nacional -- PTN), National Democratic Union (União Democrática Nacional -- UDN), and Republican Party (Partido Republicano -- PR). The Mayor-elect, a member of the Republican Labor Party (Partido Republicano Trabalhista -- PRT), ran on his reputation as a fighter for Osasco autonomy. The PRT is a minor party which has often acted as a member of the administration coalition, but which ran independently in the Osasco elections. It elected three Councilmen in addition to the Mayor. Of the five remaining seats in the Council, three went to the Social Democrats (Partido Social Democrático -- PSD), and two to the Brazilian Socialist Party (Partido Socialista Brasileiro -- PSB). The Brazilian Labor Party (Partido Trabalhista Brasileiro -- PTB) entered a totally unsuccessful slate of candidates. (UNCLASSIFIED)

Comment: This was a small election with the unusual issue of recent autonomy, but some useful conclusions can still be drawn. The Mayor's success in electing himself and three colleagues had more to do with his own reputation than his party's. The administration parties' success, on the other hand, seems a strong vote of confidence in the State Government. The PTB's failure to win a single position is also noteworthy, since the suburb of Osasco is full of industrial workers. Only two Councilmen out of twenty-three -- those of the PSB -- were elected from a distinctly leftist slate. The bad showing of demagogic and/or leftist labor politics in this district, a typical industrial section of greater São Paulo, encourages the pro-administration moderates campaigning for next October's elections. (OFFICIAL USE ONLY)

2. Janistas at Work

The São Paulo Janista (for ex-President Janio QUADROS) "general staff" is as active as a beheaded chicken, with the difference that the head is expected to be restored soon. Ex-Private Secretary José Aparecido de OLIVEIRA says that Mr. Quadros will be back on March 10, implying that he will land in Santos rather than Rio de Janeiro (his ship is expected to dock in Rio on about March 1 and Santos on about March 10 -- see Weeka 5). The "general staff" then expects the ex-President to explain the reasons for his resignation and divulge a proposed new "Constitution of Janio." Ex-Chief of Civil Household QUINTANILHA RIBEIRO is said to be shopping for a newspaper to make into the official Janista organ. FARIA LIMA (ex-President of the National Bank of Economic Development) reportedly intends to undertake serious conversations with Minas Gerais Governor Magalhães PINTO, who recently made an important statement construed as pro-Janio (Brasília Weeka 3 and São Paulo Weeka 5). Faria Lima is a potential Janista candidate for the São Paulo governorship. Aparecido de Oliveira, however, is reported by the press as claiming that Quadros himself will probably enter the gubernatorial race. The present Governor's intended heir seems to

1079

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FROM : Amcongen SÃO PAULO — 202 NO.

TO : THE DEPARTMENT OF STATE, WASHINGTON. — February 14, 1962 DATE

REF :

FEB 14 1962

AID-11

			DEPT	RM/R	REP	AF	ARA	EUR	FE	NEA	CU	INR	E	P	IO	ICA
54 For Dept. Use Only	ACTION	INR-10	INFO	2	1		5	3			5					
			OTHER	AGR 2	COM 2	FRB	INT	LAB 2	TAR	TR 2	XMB					
	REC'D			AIR 15	ARMY 30	CIA 16	NAVY 20	OSD 2	OCB	USIA 11	NSA 3					

SUBJECT: WEEKA NO. 7

Moscow-1

TABLE OF CONTENTS

POLITICAL:

1. Administration Parties Strong in Osasco Election
2. Janistas at Work
3. Coutinho Nogueira Building Platform
4. Opinion Poll Favors Renewal of Relations with USSR
5. ADJUBEI Visits São Paulo
6. São Paulo Christian Democrats Push Electoral Reform
7. Second Army Commander Victim of Senseless Assault
8. Changes in Military Commands
9. Communists Compete with Democratic Union Leaders for Worker Support
10. Communists Defeated in Glass Workers Union Election

PSYCHOLOGICAL:

1. Local Press Reaction

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POLITICAL

1. Administration Parties Strong in Osasco Election

Finally successful in a long struggle for municipal autonomy, the São Paulo suburb of Osasco held its first elections on February 4. The

See last page/1fw

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1077

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1076

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DESP 624 FR BRASILIA TO STATE

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1075

diplomatic leadership in Latin America. Correio Paulistano pursued its honeymoon with Dantas. O Estado de São Paulo continued to heap ignominy on him: "It is neither national prestige or security that Mr. San Thiago Dantas has in mind when he insistently aims to align us with the Castrista adventure: what is worrying His Excellency is what the electorate which obeys the leadership of the communo-nationalist faction will think of his attitude in Punta del Este." Folha and Diario kept calling for a harder line. A Hora liked the "traditional dignity" of Brazil's diplomacy and came up with an old note with a new twist: intervention in Cuba's affairs now might lead the way to more Yankee intervention in Latin America later, when the Republicans get back in. A Gazeta continued to fear that measures taken against Cuba would only drive her more firmly into Russia's bear-hug, noting as of supreme significance the agreement between Mexico and Brazil.

Secretary Rusk's mid-week speech gleaned much comment -- along predictable lines ranging from Estado's highest praise, through warmth from most papers to scorn and insult from Ultima Hora. Editorialists hopped on the reported linkage of the Alliance for Progress with the outcome of Punta del Este. Ultima Hora once again saw clearly: "The 'Alliance for Progress' that was going to pull all the American countries out of underdevelopment, is nothing more than blackmail armed to explode in Punta del Este." Correio Paulistano warned the U.S. against putting conditions on the Alliance. At the end of the week, Folha set the matter right, citing Messrs. Rostow's and Goodwin's denials of the interpretation put on Rusk's words: "...that political problem (Cuba) should on no account influence and, much less, condition the execution of an essentially socio-economic plan... This is an attitude which, without a doubt, does honor to the North American government." For O Estado, the Secretary's speech was the big surprise of the conference: "Nevertheless, transcending the scope of the Cuban question itself, the speech of the North American Secretary of State was less an attack on Communism -- the sanctions which he proposes against Cuba were relatively bland...-- than a cry of alarm to America, or better, to those who retain the power in Latin America... Rusk shows that the North Americans understand that it is not only with dollars and arms that Communism is fought." (UNCLASSIFIED)

Daniel M. Braddock
Minister Consul General

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1074

Comment: The best reason for believing the above travel plans is that early March would be a strategic, suspenseful arrival date. Several of the thirteen or fourteen local political parties can wait that long -- but not much longer -- for nominations. Nothing seems to have gone wrong with Quadros' stage sense. (LIMITED OFFICIAL USE)

4. Sorocabana Railroad Strike Unsuccessful

An unsuccessful strike of workers on the State-owned Sorocabana Railroad which began on January 24 ended four days later when the union decided to accept the approximately forty percent wage increase originally offered by the State Government. After the Minister of Justice declared the strike illegal, police and military guarded trains, stations and depots affected, and arrested strike leaders and pickets. At first service on the Sorocabana line was partially interrupted but by January 27 was virtually normal. Unions representing workers on three other State-owned railroads initially threatened to strike also but instead accepted the State's wage offer. Although several incidents occurred between strikers and police, little actual violence was reported. (UNCLASSIFIED)

Comment: The striking union is Communist-led, and Communist agitators from São Paulo and other parts of Brazil were actively involved in the strike. There are indications that the Communists tried to parlay a local economic issue into a state-wide rail stoppage which, if successful, might have been expanded to a national tie-up. This maneuver was probably planned at the Communist-dominated Sixth National Congress of Railroad Workers in Salvador, Bahia on January 11 - 14, possibly with the help of Cuban labor agitators who were reliably reported to have attended. However, the São Paulo authorities mixed a great deal of firmness with what seemed to be a little pressure judiciously applied to the São Paulo non-Communist railroad unions, and thwarted the attempt. (LIMITED OFFICIAL USE)

PSYCHOLOGICAL

1. Cuba

The Punta del Este conference received extremely heavy play in headlines and news columns of almost all São Paulo papers throughout the week. All writers except leftist Ultima Hora's agreed on the need to do something about Cuba. Just what to do bothered the editorialists as it did the conferees, being intensified by Brazil's pose as leader of the "soft" school. (Ultima Hora saw through it all: the whole conference was nothing but a Yankee maneuver -- now that direct aggression had failed -- to destroy free, happy Cuba.) In editorialists' eyes, foreign minister Dantas' policy and conduct at the conference ranged from exemplary to venial. Diario da Noite extolled him as the great conciliator, nobody's servant, reaffirming Brazil's

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1073

Superintendent Celso FURTADO of SUDENE (Superintendency for Economic Development of the Northeast) detailed his philosophy of economic development rather than discussing specific problems. His statement that "the industrial worker... (has not been) bettering his standard of living" ruffled the Paulista audience, which had ideas to the contrary. Mr. Furtado saw little intrinsic value in free private enterprise. He briefly discussed the cold war and seemed to be advocating a policy of neutrality. In comparing methods of economic development, however, he analyzed Communist patterns and rejected them as unsuitable for Brazil, describing the reforms he thought would be required for democratic development. (OFFICIAL USE ONLY)

Comment: Both Messrs. Neves and Sampaio were convincing as to the urgency of the Northeast problem and the interest in solving it. Neves' much greater optimism is characteristic and perhaps a natural result of his position. Perhaps encouragement can be found in the similar grinding techniques of two politicians with different axes.

Celso Furtado's speech was the most revealing of the group. It was certainly not that of a Communist -- as some conservatives have called Furtado -- though his thoughts on capitalism showed unmistakable remnants of Marxist influence. He seemed to be on much more familiar ground in talking of agricultural development. His conclusions on that topic appeared moderate and realistic. (LIMITED OFFICIAL USE)

3. "Janio's on the Way -- Again"

Whether or not they add the sarcastic "outra vez" (again) to the shopworn "Janio vem aí" slogan, São Paulo politicians are acutely aware that Janio Quadros is indeed on the way. The ex-President's fans now prefer "Janio tinha razão" (Janio was right) without explaining what he was right about. They expect to find out soon: former private secretary José Aparecido de OLIVEIRA, a member of the Paulista "general staff" (see São Paulo Despatch 162 of December 13, 1961), announced that Sr. Quadros had left Hong Kong on a slow freighter scheduled to arrive in Rio de Janeiro and Santos in early March. There has been no confirmation of any of the rumors concerning detours to the United States, northeastern Brazil, or Rio Grande do Sul. Every local political thought converges on the October 7 elections and is halted somewhere by the question of Quadros' plans. Whether or not Quadros could win the governorship for himself or someone else (such as general-staffer FARIA LIMA), he could very likely convert it into a free-for-all by syphoning off some of the strength of front-running administration candidate José Bonifacio COUTINHO NOGUEIRA. Perennial candidate Adhemar de BARROS unconvincingly denies that he is licking his chops. Any number of lesser candidates are rumored to be getting ready for eventualities. Most political parties remain uncommitted. (LIMITED OFFICIAL USE)

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1072

tendency of the new parliamentary government to coalesce parties, however, he announced reversal of his own long-standing advocacy of parliamentarianism.

Asked if he knew of Quadros' plans, Governor Magalhães Pinto disclaimed any information but suggested two ways in which the political return could come about: through Quadros' appointment to the Presidency of the Council of Ministers (Prime Ministry) either immediately or after campaigning for a solid parliamentary majority in the elections of next October. The Governor made no mention of leftist tack of some Janista circles but stressed his own anti-Communist (and anti-Cuban) convictions. (OFFICIAL USE ONLY)

Comment: A skillful performance. Governor Magalhães Pinto veered much further toward Janismo (support of ex-President Quadros) than any other politician has done without incurring the ire of the anti-Janista São Paulo press. Most moderate papers gave him guarded praise, and only the Communists blasted him. Although São Paulo contains the Janista headquarters, it is the Minas Gerais Governor who has opened a middle road for Quadros' return. São Paulo Governor CARVALHO PINTO has not given expression to his probable discontent with this development. (LIMITED OFFICIAL USE)

2. Northeast Problems Discussed

Governor Cid SAMPAIO of Pernambuco, speaking at the "Second Northeast Study Cycle," suggested nothing new but clarified some of the old Northeast problems. He believed his troubles, like those of the rest of the country, to be a result of the "crisis of authority...without any central idea to draw Brazilians together." Criticism of the national government was often implied: "a hungry population cannot accept works which fill only the eyes." When pressed for his opinion of the government during a later interview, he would only point out that it had not been able to contain inflation. He barely touched on the role of SUDENE. When asked about the controversial financial proceedings of an American firm in Pernambuco, he made no mention of the anti-American aspects of the case, saying that his only interest was in keeping the factories open. His high praise of São Paulo Governor Carvalho Pinto got the quiescent "Governors' Movement" of last September (São Paulo Despatch 100 of September 26, 1961) back in the news briefly.

Despite the different point of view, closing speaker Prime Minister Tancredo NEVES saw many of the Northeast's problems in the same light. He emphasized the work of SUDENE, however, which he praised as having "the same flexibility as private firms." He thought that the present government had the tools to repair the Northeast and that "this year will be decisive as a test of the government's capacity...the definite proof of our capacity to solve the great national problems will be in the Northeast."

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1071

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TO : THE DEPARTMENT OF STATE, WASHINGTON. January 31, 1962 DATE

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FEB 2 1962

		DEPT	RM/R	REP	AF	ARA	EUR	FE	NEA	CU	OMB	E	P	IO	
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SUBJECT: WEEKA NO. 5

TABLE OF CONTENTS

POLITICAL:
1. Magalhães Pinto Explains Position
2. Northeast Problems Discussed
3. "Janio's on the Way -- Again"
4. Sorocabana Railroad Strike Unsuccessful

PSYCHOLOGICAL:
1. Cuba

POLITICAL

1. Magalhães Pinto Explains Position

With the national and State legislatures in recess and the news dominated by the Punta del Este conference, only one local event has been receiving much attention: the Second Northeast Study Cycle, in which important national political figures continued to participate (see Weeka 4). Minas Gerais Governor MAGALHÃES PINTO compared some regions of his State to the under-developed Northeast, but his informal political comments outside the Cycle were of more interest, being the first ramifications on his publicized January 22 pronouncement to the nation. He explained that it had not been the objective of his "manifesto" to resuscitate ex-President Janio QUADROS, but opined that public opinion by itself would bring about Quadros' renaissance unless the current government could earn more confidence. Magalhães Pinto had been met at the airport by part of the São Paulo Janista "general staff" (see Item 3) but would not comment on the result of long conversations with it. He insisted on the need of putting an end to all existing Brazilian political parties and beginning two or three new ones with definite programs. Without commenting on the apparent

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1070

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1068

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1067

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1066

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1065

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1062

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DESP 425 FR RIO DE JANEIRO TO STATE

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Document Date: 17/11/61

Document Ser.#:

DESP 408 FR RIO DE JANEIRO TO STATE

In the review of this file this item was removed because access to it is restricted. Restrictions on records in the National Archives are stated in general and specific record group restriction statements which are available for examination. The item identified above has been withdrawn because it contains:

X Security-Classified Information

NND: 949515 WITHDRAWN: 02/24/95 by: JAS

FOIA RETRIEVAL #: 949515 01581 00076

1055

W I T H D R A W A L N O T I C E

RG: 059

ENTRY: CDF60-63

TAB #: 75

1 / 12 / C /
COPIES/PPS/CLASS/SPECMARK

BOX: 1581

ACCESS RESTRICTED

The item identified below has been withdrawn from this file:

Folder Title: 732.00(W)/11-961

Document Date: 09/11/61

Document Ser.#:

DESP 391 FR RIO DE JANEIRO TO STATE

In the review of this file this item was removed because access to it is restricted. Restrictions on records in the National Archives are stated in general and specific record group restriction statements which are available for examination. The item identified above has been withdrawn because it contains:

X Security-Classified Information

NND: 949515

WITHDRAWN: 02/24/95 by: JAS

FOIA RETRIEVAL #: 949515 01581 00075

1054

W I T H D R A W A L N O T I C E

RG: 059

ENTRY: CDF60-63

TAB #: 74

1 / 12 / C /

COPIES/PPS/CLASS/SPECMARK

BOX: 1581

ACCESS RESTRICTED

The item identified below has been withdrawn from this file:

Folder Title: 732.00(W)/11-361

Document Date: 03/11/61

Document Ser.#:

DESP 372 FR RIO DE JANEIRO TO STATE

In the review of this file this item was removed because access to it is restricted. Restrictions on records in the National Archives are stated in general and specific record group restriction statements which are available for examination. The item identified above has been withdrawn because it contains:

X Security-Classified Information

NND: 949515

WITHDRAWN: 02/24/95 by: JAS

FOIA RETRIEVAL #: 949515 01581 00074



W I T H D R A W A L N O T I C E

RG: 059

ENTRY: CDF60-63

TAB #: 73

1 / 14 / C /

COPIES/PPS/CLASS/SPECMARK

BOX: 1581

ACCESS RESTRICTED

The item identified below has been withdrawn from this file:

Folder Title: 732.00(W)/10-2761 LWS

Document Date: 27/10/61

Document Ser.#:

DESP 354 FR RIO DE JANEIRO TO STATE

In the review of this file this item was removed because access to it is restricted. Restrictions on records in the National Archives are stated in general and specific record group restriction statements which are available for examination. The item identified above has been withdrawn because it contains:

X Security-Classified Information

NND: 949515

WITHDRAWN: 02/24/95 by: JAS

FOIA RETRIEVAL #: 949515 01581 00073



W I T H D R A W A L N O T I C E

RG: 059

ENTRY: CDF60-63

TAB #: 72

1 / 14 / C /

COPIES/PPS/CLASS/SPECMARK

BOX: 1581

ACCESS RESTRICTED

The item identified below has been withdrawn from this file:

Folder Title: 732.00(W)/10-2061 LWS

Document Date: 20/10/61

Document Ser.#:

DESP 330 FR RIO DE JANEIRO TO STATE

In the review of this file this item was removed because access to it is restricted. Restrictions on records in the National Archives are stated in general and specific record group restriction statements which are available for examination. The item identified above has been withdrawn because it contains:

X Security-Classified Information

NND: 949515

WITHDRAWN: 02/24/95 by: JAS

FOIA RETRIEVAL #: 949515 01581 00072

1051

W I T H D R A W A L N O T I C E

RG: 059

TAB #: 71

ENTRY: CDF60-63

1 / 14 / C /
COPIES/PPS/CLASS/SPECMARK

BOX: 1581

ACCESS RESTRICTED

The item identified below has been withdrawn from this file:

Folder Title: 732.00(W)/10-1361 LWS

Document Date: 13/10/61

Document Ser.#:

DESP 304 FR RIO DE JANEIRO TO STATE

In the review of this file this item was removed because access to it is restricted. Restrictions on records in the National Archives are stated in general and specific record group restriction statements which are available for examination. The item identified above has been withdrawn because it contains:

X Security-Classified Information

NND: 949515

WITHDRAWN: 02/24/95 by: JAS

FOIA RETRIEVAL #: 949515 01581 00071

W I T H D R A W A L N O T I C E

RG: 059

ENTRY: CDF60-63

TAB #: 70

1 / 8 / C /

COPIES/PPS/CLASS/SPECMARK

BOX: 1581

ACCESS RESTRICTED

The item identified below has been withdrawn from this file:

Folder Title: 732.00(W)/10-661

Document Date: 06/10/61

Document Ser.#:

DESP 283 FR RIO DE JANEIRO TO STATE

In the review of this file this item was removed because access to it is restricted. Restrictions on records in the National Archives are stated in general and specific record group restriction statements which are available for examination. The item identified above has been withdrawn because it contains:

X Security-Classified Information

NND: 949515

WITHDRAWN: 02/24/95 by: JAS

FOIA RETRIEVAL #: 949515 01581 00070

1049

732.00(W) / 10-661

1048

W I T H D R A W A L N O T I C E

RG: 059

ENTRY: CDF60-63

TAB #: 69

1 / 8 / C /

COPIES/PPS/CLASS/SPECMARK

BOX: 1581

ACCESS RESTRICTED

The item identified below has been withdrawn from this file:

Folder Title: 732.00(W)/9-2961 LWS

Document Date: 29/09/61

Document Ser.#:

DESP 251 FR RIO DE JANEIRO TO STATE

In the review of this file this item was removed because access to it is restricted. Restrictions on records in the National Archives are stated in general and specific record group restriction statements which are available for examination. The item identified above has been withdrawn because it contains:

X Security-Classified Information

NND: 949515

WITHDRAWN: 02/24/95 by: JAS

FOIA RETRIEVAL #: 949515 01581 00069

1047

W I T H D R A W A L N O T I C E

RG: 059 TAB #: 68

ENTRY: CDF60-63 1 / 10 / C /
COPIES/PPS/CLASS/SPECMARK

BOX: 1581

ACCESS RESTRICTED

The item identified below has been withdrawn from this file:

Folder Title: 732.00(W)/9-2261 HAJ

Document Date: 22/09/61

Document Ser.#:

DESP 224 FR RIO DE JANEIRO TO STATE

In the review of this file this item was removed because access to it is restricted. Restrictions on records in the National Archives are stated in general and specific record group restriction statements which are available for examination. The item identified above has been withdrawn because it contains:

X Security-Classified Information

NND: 949515 WITHDRAWN: 02/24/95 by: JAS

FOIA RETRIEVAL #: 949515 01581 00068



W I T H D R A W A L N O T I C E

RG: 059

TAB #: 67

ENTRY: CDF60-63

1 / 10 / C /
COPIES/PPS/CLASS/SPECMARK

BOX: 1581

ACCESS RESTRICTED

The item identified below has been withdrawn from this file:

Folder Title: 732.00(W)/9-1561 HAJ

Document Date: 15/09/61

Document Ser.#:

DESP 202 FR RIO DE JANEIRO TO STATE

In the review of this file this item was removed because access to it is restricted. Restrictions on records in the National Archives are stated in general and specific record group restriction statements which are available for examination. The item identified above has been withdrawn because it contains:

X Security-Classified Information

NND: 949515 WITHDRAWN: 02/24/95 by: JAS

FOIA RETRIEVAL #: 949515 01581 00067



W I T H D R A W A L N O T I C E

RG: 059

TAB #: 66

ENTRY: CDF60-63

1 / 9 / C /
COPIES/PPS/CLASS/SPECMARK

BOX: 1581

ACCESS RESTRICTED

The item identified below has been withdrawn from this file:

Folder Title: 732.00(W)/9-861 CS

Document Date: 08/09/61

Document Ser.#:

DESP 180 FR RIO DE JANEIRO TO STATE

In the review of this file this item was removed because access to it is restricted. Restrictions on records in the National Archives are stated in general and specific record group restriction statements which are available for examination. The item identified above has been withdrawn because it contains:

X Security-Classified Information

NND: 949515

WITHDRAWN: 02/24/95 by: JAS

FOIA RETRIEVAL #: 949515 01581 00066

1044

W I T H D R A W A L N O T I C E

RG: 059

ENTRY: CDF60-63

TAB #: 65

1 / 8 / C /

COPIES/PPS/CLASS/SPECMARK

BOX: 1581

ACCESS RESTRICTED

The item identified below has been withdrawn from this file:

Folder Title: 732.00(W)/8-2561 CS

Document Date: 25/08/61

Document Ser.#:

DESP 147 FR RIO DE JANEIRO TO STATE

In the review of this file this item was removed because access to it is restricted. Restrictions on records in the National Archives are stated in general and specific record group restriction statements which are available for examination. The item identified above has been withdrawn because it contains:

X Security-Classified Information

NND: 949515

WITHDRAWN: 02/24/95 by: JAS

FOIA RETRIEVAL #: 949515 01581 00065

1043

W I T H D R A W A L N O T I C E

RG: 059

TAB #: 64

ENTRY: CDF60-63

1 / 8 / C /
COPIES/PPS/CLASS/SPECMARK

BOX: 1581

ACCESS RESTRICTED

The item identified below has been withdrawn from this file:

Folder Title: 732.00(W)/8-1861 LWS

Document Date: 18/08/61

Document Ser.#:

DESP 129 FR RIO DE JANEIRO TO STATE

In the review of this file this item was removed because access to it is restricted. Restrictions on records in the National Archives are stated in general and specific record group restriction statements which are available for examination. The item identified above has been withdrawn because it contains:

X Security-Classified Information

NND: 949515

WITHDRAWN: 02/24/95 by: JAS

FOIA RETRIEVAL #: 949515 01581 00064

1042

W I T H D R A W A L N O T I C E

RG: 059

ENTRY: CDF60-63

TAB #: 63

1 / 8 / C /
COPIES/PPS/CLASS/SPECMARK

BOX: 1581

ACCESS RESTRICTED

The item identified below has been withdrawn from this file:

Folder Title: 732.00(W)/8-1161 LWS

Document Date: 11/08/61

Document Ser.#:

DESP 114 FR RIO DE JANEIRO TO STATE

In the review of this file this item was removed because access to it is restricted. Restrictions on records in the National Archives are stated in general and specific record group restriction statements which are available for examination. The item identified above has been withdrawn because it contains:

X Security-Classified Information

NND: 949515

WITHDRAWN: 02/24/95 by: JAS

FOIA RETRIEVAL #: 949515 01581 00063

1041

W I T H D R A W A L N O T I C E

RG: 059

TAB #: 62

ENTRY: CDF60-63

1 / 10 / C /
COPIES/PPS/CLASS/SPECMARK

BOX: 1581

ACCESS RESTRICTED

The item identified below has been withdrawn from this file:

Folder Title: 732.00(W)/8-461 LWS

Document Date: 04/08/61

Document Ser.#:

DESP 93 FR RIO DE JANEIRO TO STATE

In the review of this file this item was removed because access to it is restricted. Restrictions on records in the National Archives are stated in general and specific record group restriction statements which are available for examination. The item identified above has been withdrawn because it contains:

X Security-Classified Information

NND: 949515

WITHDRAWN: 02/24/95 by: JAS

FOIA RETRIEVAL #: 949515 01581 00062



W I T H D R A W A L N O T I C E

RG: 059 TAB #: 61

ENTRY: CDF60-63 1 / 11 / C /

COPIES/PPS/CLASS/SPECMARK

BOX: 1581

ACCESS RESTRICTED

The item identified below has been withdrawn from this file:

Folder Title: 732.00(W)/7-2861 LWS

Document Date: 28/07/61

Document Ser.#:

DESP 74 FR RIO DE JANEIRO TO STATE

In the review of this file this item was removed because access to it is restricted. Restrictions on records in the National Archives are stated in general and specific record group restriction statements which are available for examination. The item identified above has been withdrawn because it contains:

X Security-Classified Information

NND: 949515 WITHDRAWN: 02/24/95 by: JAS

FOIA RETRIEVAL #: 949515 01581 00061

1039

W I T H D R A W A L N O T I C E

RG: 059

ENTRY: CDF60-63

TAB #: 60

1 / 8 / C /

COPIES/PPS/CLASS/SPECMARK

BOX: 1581

ACCESS RESTRICTED

The item identified below has been withdrawn from this file:

Folder Title: 732.00(W)/7-2161 LWS

Document Date: 21/07/61

Document Ser.#:

DESP 56 FR RIO DE JANEIRO TO STATE

In the review of this file this item was removed because access to it is restricted. Restrictions on records in the National Archives are stated in general and specific record group restriction statements which are available for examination. The item identified above has been withdrawn because it contains:

X Security-Classified Information

NND: 949515

WITHDRAWN: 02/24/95 by: JAS

FOIA RETRIEVAL #: 949515 01581 00060



W I T H D R A W A L N O T I C E

RG: 059 TAB #: 59

ENTRY: CDF60-63 1 / 13 / C /

COPIES/PPS/CLASS/SPECMARK

BOX: 1581

ACCESS RESTRICTED

The item identified below has been withdrawn from this file:

Folder Title: 732.00(W)/7-1461 LWS

Document Date: 14/07/61

Document Ser.#:

DESP 30 FR RIO DE JANEIRO TO STATE

In the review of this file this item was removed because access to it is restricted. Restrictions on records in the National Archives are stated in general and specific record group restriction statements which are available for examination. The item identified above has been withdrawn because it contains:

X Security-Classified Information

NND: 949515 WITHDRAWN: 02/24/95 by: JAS

FOIA RETRIEVAL #: 949515 01581 00059



W I T H D R A W A L N O T I C E

RG: 059

ENTRY: CDF60-63

TAB #: 58

1 / 12 / C /
COPIES/PPS/CLASS/SPECMARK

BOX: 1581

ACCESS RESTRICTED

The item identified below has been withdrawn from this file:

Folder Title: 732.00(W)/7-761

Document Date: 07/07/61

Document Ser.#:

DESP 13 FR RIO DE JANEIRO TO STATE

In the review of this file this item was removed because access to it is restricted. Restrictions on records in the National Archives are stated in general and specific record group restriction statements which are available for examination. The item identified above has been withdrawn because it contains:

X Security-Classified Information

NND: 949515

WITHDRAWN: 02/24/95 by: JAS

FOIA RETRIEVAL #: 949515 01581 00058



W I T H D R A W A L N O T I C E

RG: 059 TAB #: 57

ENTRY: CDF60-63 1 / 11 / C / ---

COPIES/PPS/CLASS/SPECMARK

BOX: 1581

ACCESS RESTRICTED

The item identified below has been withdrawn from this file:

Folder Title: 732.00(W)/6-3061 CS

Document Date: 30/06/61

Document Ser.#:

DESP 1191 FR RIO DE JANEIRO TO STATE

In the review of this file this item was removed because access to it is restricted. Restrictions on records in the National Archives are stated in general and specific record group restriction statements which are available for examination. The item identified above has been withdrawn because it contains:

X Security-Classified Information

NND: 949515 WITHDRAWN: 02/24/95 by: JAS

FOIA RETRIEVAL #: 949515 01581 00057

1035

W I T H D R A W A L N O T I C E

RG: 059

TAB #: 56

ENTRY: CDF60-63

1 / 9 / C /
COPIES/PPS/CLASS/SPECMARK

BOX: 1581

ACCESS RESTRICTED

The item identified below has been withdrawn from this file:

Folder Title: 732.00(W)/6-2361 HBS

Document Date: 23/06/61

Document Ser.#:

DESP 1169 FR RIO DE JANEIRO TO STATE

In the review of this file this item was removed because access to it is restricted. Restrictions on records in the National Archives are stated in general and specific record group restriction statements which are available for examination. The item identified above has been withdrawn because it contains:

X Security-Classified Information

NND: 949515

WITHDRAWN: 02/24/95 by: JAS

FOIA RETRIEVAL #: 949515 01581 00056

1034

W I T H D R A W A L N O T I C E

RG: 059

ENTRY: CDF60-63

TAB #: 55

1 / 8 / C /

COPIES/PPS/CLASS/SPECMARK

BOX: 1581

ACCESS RESTRICTED

The item identified below has been withdrawn from this file:

Folder Title: 732.00(W)/6-1661 HBS

Document Date: 16/06/61

Document Ser.#:

DESP 1141 FR RIO DE JANEIRO TO STATE

In the review of this file this item was removed because access to it is restricted. Restrictions on records in the National Archives are stated in general and specific record group restriction statements which are available for examination. The item identified above has been withdrawn because it contains:

X Security-Classified Information

NND: 949515

WITHDRAWN: 02/24/95 by: JAS

FOIA RETRIEVAL #: 949515 01581 00055



W I T H D R A W A L N O T I C E

RG: 059

ENTRY: CDF60-63

TAB #: 54

1 / 14 / C /
COPIES/PPS/CLASS/SPECMARK

BOX: 1581

ACCESS RESTRICTED

The item identified below has been withdrawn from this file:

Folder Title: 732.00(W)/6-961 HBS

Document Date: 09/06/61

Document Ser.#:

DESP 1112 FR RIO DE JANEIRO TO STATE

In the review of this file this item was removed because access to it is restricted. Restrictions on records in the National Archives are stated in general and specific record group restriction statements which are available for examination. The item identified above has been withdrawn because it contains:

X Security-Classified Information

NND: 949515

WITHDRAWN: 02/24/95 by: JAS

FOIA RETRIEVAL #: 949515 01581 00054

1032

W I T H D R A W A L N O T I C E

RG: 059 TAB #: 53

ENTRY: CDF60-63 1 / 9 / C / ---

COPIES/PPS/CLASS/SPECMARK

BOX: 1581

ACCESS RESTRICTED

The item identified below has been withdrawn from this file:

Folder Title: 732.00(W)/6-261 HBS

Document Date: 02/06/61

Document Ser.#:

DESP 1081 FR RIO DE JANEIRO TO STATE


In the review of this file this item was removed because access to it is restricted. Restrictions on records in the National Archives are stated in general and specific record group restriction statements which are available for examination. The item identified above has been withdrawn because it contains:

X Security-Classified Information

NND: 949515 WITHDRAWN: 02/24/95 by: JAS

FOIA RETRIEVAL #: 949515 01581 00053

1031


732.00(w)/6-261
1030

W I T H D R A W A L N O T I C E

RG: 059 TAB #: 51

ENTRY: CDF60-63 1 / 10 / C /

COPIES/PPS/CLASS/SPECMARK

BOX: 1581

ACCESS RESTRICTED

The item identified below has been withdrawn from this file:

Folder Title: 732.00(W)/5-2661 HBS

Document Date: 26/05/61

Document Ser.#:

DESP 1064 FR RIO DE JANEIRO TO STATE

In the review of this file this item was removed because access to it is restricted. Restrictions on records in the National Archives are stated in general and specific record group restriction statements which are available for examination. The item identified above has been withdrawn because it contains:

X Security-Classified Information

NND: 949515 WITHDRAWN: 02/24/95 by: JAS

FOIA RETRIEVAL #: 949515 01581 00051

1029

W I T H D R A W A L N O T I C E

RG: 059

TAB #: 50

ENTRY: CDF60-63

1 / 11 / C /
COPIES/PPS/CLASS/SPECMARK

BOX: 1581

ACCESS RESTRICTED

The item identified below has been withdrawn from this file:

Folder Title: 732.00(W)/5-1961 LLR

Document Date: 19/05/61

Document Ser.#:

DESP 1036 FR RIO DE JANEIRO TO STATE

In the review of this file this item was removed because access to it is restricted. Restrictions on records in the National Archives are stated in general and specific record group restriction statements which are available for examination. The item identified above has been withdrawn because it contains:

X Security-Classified Information

NND: 949515

WITHDRAWN: 02/24/95 by: JAS

FOIA RETRIEVAL #: 949515 01581 00050



W I T H D R A W A L N O T I C E

RG: 059

ENTRY: CDF60-63

TAB #: 49

1 / 11 / C /
COPIES/PPS/CLASS/SPECMARK

BOX: 1581

ACCESS RESTRICTED

The item identified below has been withdrawn from this file:

Folder Title: 732.00(W)/5-1261 HBS

Document Date: 12/05/61

Document Ser.#:

DESP 1009 FR RIO DE JANEIRO TO STATE

In the review of this file this item was removed because access to it is restricted. Restrictions on records in the National Archives are stated in general and specific record group restriction statements which are available for examination. The item identified above has been withdrawn because it contains:

X Security-Classified Information

NND: 949515

WITHDRAWN: 02/24/95 by: JAS

FOIA RETRIEVAL #: 949515 01581 00049

1027

W I T H D R A W A L N O T I C E

RG: 059 TAB #: 48

ENTRY: CDF60-63 1 / 11 / C / ---

COPIES/PPS/CLASS/SPECMARK

BOX: 1581

ACCESS RESTRICTED

The item identified below has been withdrawn from this file:

Folder Title: 732.00(W)/5-561 HBS

Document Date: 05/05/61

Document Ser.#:

DESP 984 FR RIO DE JANEIRO TO STATE

In the review of this file this item was removed because access to it is restricted. Restrictions on records in the National Archives are stated in general and specific record group restriction statements which are available for examination. The item identified above has been withdrawn because it contains:

X Security-Classified Information

NND: 949515 WITHDRAWN: 02/24/95 by: JAS

FOIA RETRIEVAL #: 949515 01581 00048

1026

W I T H D R A W A L N O T I C E

RG: 059

ENTRY: CDF60-63

TAB #: 47

1 / 11 / C /
COPIES/PPS/CLASS/SPECMARK

BOX: 1581

ACCESS RESTRICTED

The item identified below has been withdrawn from this file:

Folder Title: 732.00(W)/4-1961 CJ

Document Date: 26/04/61

Document Ser.#:

DESP 954 FR RIO DE JANEIRO TO STATE

In the review of this file this item was removed because access to it is restricted. Restrictions on records in the National Archives are stated in general and specific record group restriction statements which are available for examination. The item identified above has been withdrawn because it contains:

X Security-Classified Information

NND: 949515

WITHDRAWN: 02/24/95 by: JAS

FOIA RETRIEVAL #: 949515 01581 00047

1025

W I T H D R A W A L N O T I C E

RG: 059

TAB #: 46

ENTRY: CDF60-63

1 / 14 / C /
COPIES/PPS/CLASS/SPECMARK

BOX: 1581

ACCESS RESTRICTED

The item identified below has been withdrawn from this file:

Folder Title: 732.00(W)/4-1961 CJ

Document Date: 19/04/61

Document Ser.#:

DESP 940 FR RIO DE JANEIRO TO STATE

In the review of this file this item was removed because access to it is restricted. Restrictions on records in the National Archives are stated in general and specific record group restriction statements which are available for examination. The item identified above has been withdrawn because it contains:

X Security-Classified Information

NND: 949515

WITHDRAWN: 02/24/95 by: JAS

FOIA RETRIEVAL #: 949515 01581 00046

1024

W I T H D R A W A L N O T I C E

RG: 059 TAB #: 45

ENTRY: CDF60-63 1 / 15 / C / ---

COPIES/PPS/CLASS/SPECMARK

BOX: 1581

ACCESS RESTRICTED

The item identified below has been withdrawn from this file:

Folder Title: 732.00(W)/4-1261 CJ

Document Date: 12/04/61

Document Ser.#:

DESP 918 FR RIO DE JANEIRO TO STATE

In the review of this file this item was removed because access to it is restricted. Restrictions on records in the National Archives are stated in general and specific record group restriction statements which are available for examination. The item identified above has been withdrawn because it contains:

X Security-Classified Information

NND: 949515 WITHDRAWN: 02/24/95 by: JAS

FOIA RETRIEVAL #: 949515 01581 00045

1023

W I T H D R A W A L N O T I C E

RG: 059

ENTRY: CDF60-63

TAB #: 44

1 / 7 / C /
COPIES/PPS/CLASS/SPECMARK

BOX: 1581

ACCESS RESTRICTED

The item identified below has been withdrawn from this file:

Folder Title: 732.00(W)/4-561 HBS

Document Date: 05/04/61

Document Ser.#:

DESP 907 FR RIO DE JANEIRO TO STATE

In the review of this file this item was removed because access to it is restricted. Restrictions on records in the National Archives are stated in general and specific record group restriction statements which are available for examination. The item identified above has been withdrawn because it contains:

X Security-Classified Information

NND: 949515

WITHDRAWN: 02/24/95 by: JAS

FOIA RETRIEVAL #: 949515 01581 00044

1022

W I T H D R A W A L N O T I C E

RG: 059 TAB #: 43

ENTRY: CDF60-63 1 / 11 / C /
COPIES/PPS/CLASS/SPECMARK

BOX: 1581

ACCESS RESTRICTED

The item identified below has been withdrawn from this file:

Folder Title: 732.00(W)/3-2961 HBS

Document Date: 29/03/61

Document Ser.#:

DESP 890 FR RIO DE JANEIRO TO STATE

In the review of this file this item was removed because access to it is restricted. Restrictions on records in the National Archives are stated in general and specific record group restriction statements which are available for examination. The item identified above has been withdrawn because it contains:

X Security-Classified Information

NND: 949515 WITHDRAWN: 02/24/95 by: JAS

FOIA RETRIEVAL #: 949515 01581 00043

1021

W I T H D R A W A L N O T I C E

RG: 059 TAB #: 42

ENTRY: CDF60-63 1 / 15 / C / ---

COPIES/PPS/CLASS/SPECMARK

BOX: 1581

ACCESS RESTRICTED

The item identified below has been withdrawn from this file:

Folder Title: 732.00(W)/3-2261 HBS

Document Date: 22/03/61

Document Ser.#:

DESP 838 FR RIO DE JANEIRO TO STATE

In the review of this file this item was removed because access to it is restricted. Restrictions on records in the National Archives are stated in general and specific record group restriction statements which are available for examination. The item identified above has been withdrawn because it contains:

X Security-Classified Information

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1 / 7 / C /

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1 / 9 / C /
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
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FOIA RETRIEVAL #: 949515 01581 00023

1001

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7
178
São Paulo

173 São Paulo Agricultural Reforms
174 Current Situation Regarding Trade Exhibit
175 Information for Firms Receiving Continuing or Evolving Credit from Export-Import Bank
176 IBOPE Estimates of Presidential Election
177 Industrialization of Coffee-Coffee Oil
178 São Paulo Weekly Summary No. 70

William P. Cochran, Jr.
Consul General

Contributors:

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An opposite reaction was shown by leftist Ultima Hora. Adalgisa Nery, a "Nationalist" leader and a feature writer, stated that the United States has two ways of looking at Brazil: "When the Americans want to sell machinery and equipment, Brazil is an industrial country; when Americans want to export cereals, then Brazil is a country of agriculture".

9. Cuba (Unclassified)

The Cuban situation was also prominently featured by most papers. Fidel's accusation of an invasion staged by the U.S. brought forth, significantly, editorials in the three leading São Paulo papers, O Estado, Folha, and Diário de S.Paulo. Their tone was the same. O Estado, commenting on the "invasion", said that Fidel, for his own purposes, creates an atmosphere of collective hysteria, but "even anti-Fidel leaders acknowledge as a common-sense imperative that the U.S. should keep out of the Cuban counter-revolution". Folha declared "No one would admit that the United States, directly or through mercenaries, is preparing to invade Cuba. The stories to that effect, coming from Havana, certainly are part of a plan -- primary in fact -- which consists of two parts: one, to insult the U.S. in all ways; two, to throw against the American nation the world's public opinion, and especially this Hemisphere's". Continuing, Folha said: "The Americans may be sure that they have on their side the conscientious opinion of the Hemisphere. No American nation wants to invade Cuba. No nation, on the other hand, wants Cuba to keep undermining continental solidarity and to practice with impunity acts contrary to the simplest rules of civilized coexistence between nations". In the same tone, Diário de S.Paulo said the Cuban dictatorship is deteriorating: "Shaken to its foundations by the growing unrest of the Cuban population, Havana's government adopts the purest Communist tactics, pretending to be the victim of a coming armed aggression by the U.S.".

10. El Salvador (Unclassified)

The overthrowing of El Salvador's government was noted by O Estado. The paper conceded that President Lemus could have made mistakes, but emphasized that the worst of the democracies is better than the best of the dictatorships. "There is no mood, in any country of this Hemisphere, for another Castro-type revolution".

Miscellaneous

11. List of Substantive Despatches

167 Russia Asks for Quotation on Brazilian Cotton
168 International Conference of Metalworkers
169 President-Elect Janio Quadros' Television Broadcast
170 Local Importers Concerned at Reported Large Scale Illegal Imports of Chemical Products
171 Injunction Obtained Against Sumac Instruction Requiring Certain Shipments to be Carried by Brazilian Vessels
172 U.S. Import Trade Opportunity No. 7, 8-18-60 of IMECA S.A.

0999

Labor

7. Metal and Typographical Workers Strike (Confidential)

São Paulo metal, machine, and electrical plants have been closed by a strike of some 120,000 metalworkers in the capital city. The strike was called at midnight on October 30 and was only partially effective during the morning of October 31. However, the strike spread during the day and by afternoon it was almost 100% effective with many large firms, including Ford, shut down. The metalworkers strike was accompanied by a strike of typographical workers which was ineffective during the first day. However, this strike spread throughout the capital and to Santos and resulted in the closing of two dailies in both cities.

The metalworkers struck in support of their demands for an increase in wages of 50%, plus Christmas and family bonuses. The employers countered with an offer of 30%. Paulo Marzagão, state Secretary of Labor, is holding around-the-clock discussions with representatives of both groups in an attempt to settle the dispute. Extra police units have been assigned to the strike. However, no major incidents of violence have yet to be reported.

COMMENT: Approximately two weeks ago it appeared that the metalworker issue would be settled without a strike. However, since that time a number of complications set in. Worker discontent with the rapid rise in the cost of living increased even more with sharp rises in food prices, particularly meat, and also an announced increase of streetcar and bus fares. Employers who were forced to increase their minimum wage 60% from Cr$5900 to Cr$9440 stiffened during negotiations. The ever present Communists formed a committee of 33 São Paulo trade union leaders headed by José da Rocha Mendes Filho, Communist Party member and state deputy (PTB), president of the local union of typographical workers, to stir up worker discontent and to coordinate all strike activities. Non-Communist trade union leaders report that if the São Paulo strike is successful, attempts will be made by Communists to promote a nationwide wave of strikes.

Psychological

8. Benson's Visit (Unclassified)

Secretary of Agriculture Ezra Taft Benson's statements during his two day visit to São Paulo this past week received extensive coverage in the local press. O Estado de São Paulo editorially featured the Secretary's suggestions for increasing trade between the two countries. Folha de São Paulo spread its approval across a 7-column headline. Diário de S. Paulo summed up the general reaction when it editorially noted that "The statements by Mr. Taft Benson, United States Secretary of Agriculture, to São Paulo's press, as well as the meetings he had at São Paulo's own Agriculture Department, had great significance for Brazilian hopes in the field of foreign trade... We now find out that there is an opportunity to increase our sugar exports, and thus obtain wheat needed for our country's consumption. Sugar-cane growers in the State of São Paulo believe that they could increase our sugar exports by 300,000 tons this year, without jeopardizing the normal internal supply". This, stated the paper, is an opportunity Brazil cannot afford to lose.

0998

made a two day visit to São Paulo during this past week. The secretary called on São Paulo governor Carvalho Pinto (mayor Adhemar de Barros was absent), his counterpart in the state of São Paulo, agricultural secretary José Bonifácio Coutinho Nogueira, with whom he discussed trade, Food for Peace, economic development, agricultural programs, agrarian reform, and São Paulo's Plan of Action. Secretary Benson delivered a speech at the luncheon given in his honor by the American Chamber of Commerce of São Paulo, which was attended by more than 300 guests, and held a press conference. He also participated in the signing of a protocol between the São Paulo Federation of Industries and the Great Plains Wheat Growers Association, for the development of a nutrition education program.

Secretary Benson emphasized the strong ties that exist between the United States and Brazil; the close economic relationship; he discussed agricultural surplus problems, wheat in the United States, coffee in Brazil; the Food for Peace program; the utilization of Public Law 480 to aid economic development in Brazil; the extensive American public and private investments and loans in Brazil; the Act of Bogota; the United States Rural Development Program to aid underprivileged rural people, and the danger to the Americas from the Communists. Ezra Taft Benson expressed the hope that more Brazilian sugar could be imported into the United States.

COMMENT: The Secretary's visit was exceptionally well received. His obvious honesty, conviction, sense of humor, frankness and discretion received favorable comment. He received an excellent press in São Paulo.

6. Philippine Vice-President Visits São Paulo (Official Use Only)

Vice-president and presidential candidate Diosdado Macapagal, accompanied by his wife, visited São Paulo during this past week. He called on São Paulo governor Carvalho Pinto, visited the state farm institute at Campinas where he "learned all about coffee", and held a press conference. The vice-president declared that his country wished to develop closer relations with Brazil, "the leader of Latin America". In this connection he noted that the Philippines had only one diplomatic mission in South America, at Buenos Aires, a situation "which does not seem just". Should his presidential aspirations be fulfilled in 1961, Macapagal declared that he intends to increase Philippine contracts with Latin American countries, where strong historical ties exist. Macapagal expressed great interest in the rapid economic development of Brazil; that many in the Philippines wish to emulate Brazil's economic development, even if it were accompanied by inflation. On the latter point he stated he would reserve his opinion until he had studied the matter further. Referring to his own country Macapagal stated that the three great problems in the Philippines are poverty, slow development and Communism. Cuba, he said, with the support of the USSR, has become the focal point for the dissemination of Communist propaganda to the Americas.

COMMENT: (Confidential) It would appear that Macapagal, if he is elected, will give serious consideration to the opening of a diplomatic mission in Brazil.

0997

problems and plans with the president-elect. Upon his return to Brazil Lino de Matos has indicated that he will propose a new program and a restructuring of the party designed to increase its strength and effectiveness.

5. Agricultural Reform Bill Makes Progress (Official Use Only)

During this past week the São Paulo state Legislative Assembly, by a 43 to 5 vote, approved the first reading of Governor Carvalho Pinto's proposed agricultural reform bill. The state Legislative Assembly also accepted for discussion the amendments reported out of committee by the Assembly's Commission of Justice; all others were rejected.

COMMENT: The state administration has made intensive efforts to secure approval of this important legislation, as evidenced by the fact that 11 extraordinary day and night sessions of the state Legislative Assembly preceded approval of the first reading. However, an important milestone toward final approval has been passed. It is expected that José Bonifácio Coutinho Nogueira, the state Secretary of Agriculture, will offer a number of amendments to the bill, particularly relating to and modifying some of its progressive tax provisions, before the bill comes up for a second reading (the bill must be passed in three hearings to clear the Legislative Assembly). Amendments to the original bill will doubtlessly be designed to make the bill more palatable to the opposition, and enhance the prospects for favorable consideration when debate of the measure is resumed. It is expected that the state Legislative Assembly will consider the proposed 1961 budget and the supplementary budget proposal for the fiscal year of 1960, before returning to the agricultural revision bill. However, the state administration hopes for legislative approval of an agricultural reform measure this year.

4. Magalhães Pinto in São Paulo (Official Use Only)

Governor-elect Magalhães Pinto of Minas Geais visited São Paulo during this past week. Magalhães Pinto, the UDN national president, conferred with local party colleagues and with Janio Quadros before the president-elect departed on his European trip.

COMMENT: The governor-elect's most significant remark was his statement that political parties should study the means that might be used to reduce the number of parties in Brazil. He indicated that an amalgamation of parties could not be achieved unless (1) the smaller parties joined with one of the larger political groups, (2) that the new government of Janio Quadros actively support the attempt to reduce the number of parties to more reasonable proportions.

5. Ezra Taft Benson in São Paulo (Official Use Only)

The Secretary of Agriculture, Ezra Taft Benson, accompanied by two daughters, officers of the Embassy in Rio, members of his personal staff, and a number of Americans representing various newspaper and farm magazines in the United States,

0996

pro-administration political parties was seemingly in the offing should they refuse to accept the "unity" candidate who might be proposed, for UDN federal deputy Herbert Levy stated this week that the governor would reshuffle his cabinet to exclude members of parties who failed to support the candidate of his choice. Meanwhile, the members of the state Legislative Assembly began to circulate a petition among pro-administration forces pledging support and confidence in the governor. By the end of last week 31 state deputies had signed the petition; others stated they would have to consult with their respective party leaders before signing. PSP leaders, noting the stalemate in pro-administration forces, considered that it bode well for their candidate, which Mayor Adhemar de Barros indicated was likely to be vice-mayor Cantidio Sampaio, since 90% of the PSP leaders supported him. The mayor added that he would not interfere in the PSP choice for the mayoralty.

COMMENT: (Confidential) This could be one of the first acid tests of the ability of the victorious pro-administration forces to hold together. Surface indications reinforce the suspicion that strains and tensions are developing in the top command. Division has arisen in the UDN; the president of the State Assembly, UDN deputy Abreu Sodré, who has strongly supported Emilio Carlos, now suggests that time should be allowed to permit the dust to settle; the president of the São Paulo UDN Regional Directorate, Ernesto Pereira Lopes, stated that the party was not yet ready to support any candidate. There are those in São Paulo who say that Faria Lima supports the candidacy of Emilio Carlos; others aver that Faria Lima is the one person who might be acceptable to all of the pro-administration forces.

2. Senator Lino de Matos to Head the PTN (Official Use Only)

Federal senator Lino de Matos during this past week accepted the invitation made by federal deputy and party leader Emilio Carlos to join the PTN. Before his departure for Israel and Europe at the end of the week, the senator was formally inducted into the PTN.

COMMENT: (Confidential) The likely stepping aside of Emilio Carlos as PTN national president in favor of Lino de Matos has several interesting aspects. Emilio Carlos, apart from his obvious desire to bring political power into his fold, must hope to profit thereby. The quid pro quo involved is doubtlessly related to Emilio Carlos' strong passion for the mayoralty of São Paulo. It will be recalled that Lino de Matos was a faithful supporter of Adhemar de Barros until 1958. When Mayor Adhemar refused to sponsor Lino de Matos' candidacy in that year for the vice-gubernatorial position in São Paulo, however, the senator severed his connection with the mayor's PSP. Lino is now a good and true supporter of Janio Quadros. During the recent presidential campaign he organized political rallies and campaigned extensively throughout the state for the president-elect. It would appear significant that Lino de Matos, who is expected to represent Brazil at the forthcoming FAO conference in Rome, apparently plans to meet president-elect Janio during the latter's European tour. Reportedly, Lino will discuss federal legislative

0995

AIR POUCH
PRIORITY

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DESP. NO. 178

TO : THE DEPARTMENT OF STATE, WASHINGTON.
DATE November 1, 1960

REF :

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ACTION	DEPT.
REC'D 11/7	INFO RMR-2 INR-7 REP-1 E-3 ICA-11 FE-4 CIA-10 USIA-10 LAB-6 Army-4 Navy-4 NSA-2 Com-10 AGR-8

SUBJECT: São Paulo Weekly Summary No. 70, Week Ending October 29, 1960

Index:

Political
1. São Paulo's Mayoralty Race
2. Senator Lino de Matos to Head the PTN
3. Agricultural Reform Bill Makes Progress
4. Magalhães Pinto in São Paulo
5. Ezra Taft Benson in São Paulo
6. Philippine Vice-President Visits São Paulo
Labor
7. Metal and Typographical Workers Strike
Psychological
8. Benson's Visit
9. Cuba
10. El Salvador
Miscellaneous
11. List of Substantive Despatches

DEPARTMENT OF STATE
BUREAU OF
INTER-AMERICAN AFFAIRS
NOV 8 1960

Political

1. São Paulo's Mayoralty Race (Official Use Only)

São Paulo's Governor Carvalho Pinto rejected the proposal made this past week by the Society of Friends of the City, a civic organization, that the state return to the system whereby the governor chose the mayors for the various municipalities, and continued his efforts to find a "unity" candidate for the São Paulo mayoralty around which janistas and carvalhistas could rally. Although president-elect Janio Quadros says the decision rests with the governor, it is widely reported in São Paulo that Janio has participated with the governor, leaders of the state Legislative Assembly, his lieutenants Quintanilha Ribeiro and Pedroso Horta, as well as other pro-administration politicians, in discussions during this past week of a possible candidate. Janio, reportedly, has shown a tendency to favor the candidacy of federal PTN deputy Emilio Carlos, a solution which Carvalho Pinto so far is apparently not ready to accept. In response to an appeal by Emilio Carlos, PTN candidate Ardrige Sarg, a São Paulo state deputy, announced his retirement this week from the mayoralty contest. At the same time the PL has indicated that it will support Emilio Carlos. The state Secretary of Public Works Brigadier Faria Lima, emphasized that he is not a candidate. Retaliation against

see last page/lfw
REPORTER

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NOV 7 1960

732.00(W)/11-160 HBS

CLASSIFIED FILE

0994

W I T H D R A W A L N O T I C E

RG: 059

ENTRY: CDF60-63

TAB #: 22

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DESP 347 FR RIO DE JANEIRO TO STATE

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X Security-Classified Information

NND: 949515 WITHDRAWN: 02/24/95 by: JAS

FOIA RETRIEVAL #: 949515 01581 00022

0993

W I T H D R A W A L N O T I C E

RG: 059

ENTRY: CDF60-63

TAB #: 21

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ACCESS RESTRICTED

The item identified below has been withdrawn from this file:

Folder Title: 732.00(W)/10-1960 HBS

Document Date: 19/10/60

Document Ser.#:

DESP 331 FR RIO DE JANEIRO TO STATE

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X Security-Classified Information

NND: 949515

WITHDRAWN: 02/24/95 by: JAS

FOIA RETRIEVAL #: 949515 01581 00021

0992

W I T H D R A W A L N O T I C E

RG: 059

TAB #: 20

ENTRY: CDF60-63

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ACCESS RESTRICTED

The item identified below has been withdrawn from this file:

Folder Title: 732.00(W)/10-1260 HBS

Document Date: 12/10/60

Document Ser.#:

DESP 313 FR RIO DE JANEIRO TO STATE

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X Security-Classified Information

NND: 949515

WITHDRAWN: 02/24/95 by: JAS

FOIA RETRIEVAL #: 949515 01581 00020

0491

W I T H D R A W A L N O T I C E

RG: 059

ENTRY: CDF60-63

TAB #: 19

1 / 7 / C /

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ACCESS RESTRICTED

The item identified below has been withdrawn from this file:

Folder Title: 732.00(W)/10-560 HBS

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DESP 299 FR RIO DE JANEIRO TO STATE

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X Security-Classified Information

NND: 949515

WITHDRAWN: 02/24/95 by: JAS

FOIA RETRIEVAL #: 949515 01581 00019



732.00 (w)/10-560

0989

W I T H D R A W A L N O T I C E

RG: 059

TAB #: 18

ENTRY: CDF60-63

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ACCESS RESTRICTED

The item identified below has been withdrawn from this file:

Folder Title: 732.00(W)/9-2860 CAA

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DESP 272 FR RIO DE JANEIRO TO STATE

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X Security-Classified Information

NND: 949515

WITHDRAWN: 02/24/95 by: JAS

FOIA RETRIEVAL #: 949515 01581 00018



W I T H D R A W A L N O T I C E

RG: 059 TAB #: 17

ENTRY: CDF60-63 1 / 8 / C /

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ACCESS RESTRICTED

The item identified below has been withdrawn from this file:

Folder Title: 732.00(W)/9-2160 HBS

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Document Ser.#:

DESP 246 FR RIO DE JANEIRO TO STATE

In the review of this file this item was removed because access to it is restricted. Restrictions on records in the National Archives are stated in general and specific record group restriction statements which are available for examination. The item identified above has been withdrawn because it contains:

X Security-Classified Information

NND: 949515 WITHDRAWN: 02/24/95 by: JAS

FOIA RETRIEVAL #: 949515 01581 00017

0987

W I T H D R A W A L N O T I C E

RG: 059 TAB #: 16

ENTRY: CDF60-63 1 / 10 / C /
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BOX: 1581

ACCESS RESTRICTED

The item identified below has been withdrawn from this file:

Folder Title: 732.00(W)/9-1460 CAA

Document Date: 14/09/60

Document Ser.#:

DESP 221 FR RIO DE JANEIRO TO STATE

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X Security-Classified Information

NND: 949515 WITHDRAWN: 02/24/95 by: JAS

FOIA RETRIEVAL #: 949515 01581 00016

0986

W I T H D R A W A L N O T I C E

RG: 059 TAB #: 15

ENTRY: CDF60-63 1 / 9 / C /
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ACCESS RESTRICTED

The item identified below has been withdrawn from this file:

Folder Title: 732.00(W)/9-660 HBS

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DESP 198 FR RIO DE JANEIRO TO STATE

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X Security-Classified Information

NND: 949515 WITHDRAWN: 02/24/95 by: JAS

FOIA RETRIEVAL #: 949515 01581 00015

0985

W I T H D R A W A L N O T I C E

RG: 059

TAB #: 14

ENTRY: CDF60-63

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Folder Title: 732.00(W)/8-3160 HBS

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DESP 174 FR RIO DE JANEIRO TO STATE

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X Security-Classified Information

NND: 949515

WITHDRAWN: 02/24/95 by: JAS

FOIA RETRIEVAL #: 949515 01581 00014

0984

W I T H D R A W A L N O T I C E

RG: 059

TAB #: 13

ENTRY: CDF60-63

1 / 9 / C /
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ACCESS RESTRICTED

The item identified below has been withdrawn from this file:

Folder Title: 732.00(W)/8-2460 HBS

Document Date: 24/08/60

Document Ser.#:

DESPO 146 FR RIO DE JANEIRO TO STATE

In the review of this file this item was removed because access to it is restricted. Restrictions on records in the National Archives are stated in general and specific record group restriction statements which are available for examination. The item identified above has been withdrawn because it contains:

X Security-Classified Information

NND: 949515

WITHDRAWN: 02/24/95 by: JAS

FOIA RETRIEVAL #: 949515 01581 00013

0983

W I T H D R A W A L N O T I C E

RG: 059

ENTRY: CDF60-63

TAB #: 12

1 / 9 / C /

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ACCESS RESTRICTED

The item identified below has been withdrawn from this file:

Folder Title: 732.00(W)/8-1760 HBS

Document Date: 17/08/60

Document Ser.#:

DESP 125 FR RIO DE JANEIRO TO STATE

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X Security-Classified Information

NND: 949515

WITHDRAWN: 02/24/95 by: JAS

FOIA RETRIEVAL #: 949515 01581 00012



W I T H D R A W A L N O T I C E

RG: 059

ENTRY: CDF60-63

TAB #: 11

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ACCESS RESTRICTED

The item identified below has been withdrawn from this file:

Folder Title: 732.00(W)/8-1060 CAA

Document Date: 10/08/60

Document Ser.#:

DESP 111 FR RIO DE JANEIRO TO STATE

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X Security-Classified Information

NND: 949515

WITHDRAWN: 02/24/95 by: JAS

FOIA RETRIEVAL #: 949515 01581 00011

0981

W I T H D R A W A L N O T I C E

RG: 059 TAB #: 10

ENTRY: CDF60-63 1 / 10 / C / ---

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ACCESS RESTRICTED

The item identified below has been withdrawn from this file:

Folder Title: 732.00(W)/8-360 HBS

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DESP 90 FR RIO DE JANEIRO TO STATE

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X Security-Classified Information

NND: 949515 WITHDRAWN: 02/24/95 by: JAS

FOIA RETRIEVAL #: 949515 01581 00010

0980

W I T H D R A W A L N O T I C E

RG: 059

ENTRY: CDF60-63

TAB #: 9

1 / 11 / C /

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ACCESS RESTRICTED

The item identified below has been withdrawn from this file:

Folder Title: 732.00(W)/7-2760 CAA

Document Date: 27/07/60

Document Ser.#:

DESP 69 FR RIO DE JANEIRO TO STATE

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X Security-Classified Information

NND: 949515

WITHDRAWN: 02/24/95 by: JAS

FOIA RETRIEVAL #: 949515 01581 00009

0979

W I T H D R A W A L N O T I C E

RG: 059

ENTRY: CDF60-63

TAB #: 8

1 / 12 / C /

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ACCESS RESTRICTED

The item identified below has been withdrawn from this file:

Folder Title: 732.00(W)/7-2060 CAA

Document Date: 20/07/60

Document Ser.#:

DESP 44 FR RIO DE JANEIRO TO STATE

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X Security-Classified Information

NND: 949515

WITHDRAWN: 02/24/95 by: JAS

FOIA RETRIEVAL #: 949515 01581 00008

0978

W I T H D R A W A L N O T I C E

RG: 059 TAB #: 7

ENTRY: CDF60-63 1 / 9 / C / ---

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ACCESS RESTRICTED

The item identified below has been withdrawn from this file:

Folder Title: 732.00(W)/7-1300 CAA

Document Date: 13/07/60

Document Ser.#:

DESP 28 FR RIO DE JANEIRO TO STATE

In the review of this file this item was removed because access to it is restricted. Restrictions on records in the National Archives are stated in general and specific record group restriction statements which are available for examination. The item identified above has been withdrawn because it contains:

X Security-Classified Information

NND: 949515 WITHDRAWN: 02/24/95 by: JAS

FOIA RETRIEVAL #: 949515 01581 00007

0977

W I T H D R A W A L N O T I C E

RG: 059 TAB #: 6

ENTRY: CDF60-63 1 / 10 / C /
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BOX: 1581

ACCESS RESTRICTED

The item identified below has been withdrawn from this file:

Folder Title: 732.00(W)/7-660 CAA

Document Date: 06/07/60

Document Ser.#:

DESP 8 FR RIO DE JANEIRO TO STATE

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X Security-Classified Information

NND: 949515 WITHDRAWN: 02/24/95 by: JAS

FOIA RETRIEVAL #: 949515 01581 00006

0976

W I T H D R A W A L N O T I C E

RG: 059

TAB #: 5

ENTRY: CDF60-63

1 / 10 / C /
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BOX: 1581

ACCESS RESTRICTED

The item identified below has been withdrawn from this file:

Folder Title: 732.00(W)/6-2960 CAA

Document Date: 29/06/60

Document Ser.#:

DESP 1258 FR RIO DE JANEIRO TO STATE

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X Security-Classified Information

NND: 949515

WITHDRAWN: 02/24/95 by: JAS

FOIA RETRIEVAL #: 949515 01581 00005

0975

W I T H D R A W A L N O T I C E

RG: 059

ENTRY: CDF60-63

TAB #: 4

1 / 9 / C /

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ACCESS RESTRICTED

The item identified below has been withdrawn from this file:

Folder Title: 732.00(W)/6-2260 CAA

Document Date: 22/06/60

Document Ser.#:

DESP 1237 FR RIO DE JANEIRO TO STATE

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X Security-Classified Information

NND: 949515

WITHDRAWN: 02/24/95 by: JAS

FOIA RETRIEVAL #: 949515 01581 00004

0974

W I T H D R A W A L N O T I C E

RG: 059

ENTRY: CDF60-63

TAB #: 3

1 / 8 / C /

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BOX: 1581

ACCESS RESTRICTED

The item identified below has been withdrawn from this file:

Folder Title: 732.00(W)/6-1560 CAA

Document Date: 15/06/60

Document Ser.#:

DESP 1220 FR RIO DE JANEIRO TO STATE

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X Security-Classified Information

NND: 949515

WITHDRAWN: 02/24/95 by: JAS

FOIA RETRIEVAL #: 949515 01581 00003

0973

W I T H D R A W A L N O T I C E

RG: 059

TAB #: 2

ENTRY: CDF60-63

1 / 10 / C /
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ACCESS RESTRICTED

The item identified below has been withdrawn from this file:

Folder Title: 732.00(W)/6-860 CAA

Document Date: 08/06/60

Document Ser.#:

DESP 1200 FR RIO DE JANEIRO TO STATE

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X Security-Classified Information

NND: 949515

WITHDRAWN: 02/24/95 by: JAS

FOIA RETRIEVAL #: 949515 01581 00002

0972

W I T H D R A W A L N O T I C E

RG: 059

TAB #: 1

ENTRY: CDF60-63

1 / 11 / C /
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BOX: 1581

ACCESS RESTRICTED

The item identified below has been withdrawn from this file:

Folder Title: 732.00(W)/6-160

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Document Ser.#:

DESP 1170 FR RIO DE JANEIRO TO STATE

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X Security-Classified Information

NND: 949515

WITHDRAWN: 02/24/95 by: JAS

FOIA RETRIEVAL #: 949515 01581 00001

0971

732.00 (W) / 6-160



W I T H D R A W A L N O T I C E

RG: 059

TAB #: 32

ENTRY: CDF60-63

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BOX: 1580

ACCESS RESTRICTED

The item identified below has been withdrawn from this file:

Folder Title: 732.00(W)/5-2560

Document Date: 25/05/60

Document Ser.#:

DESP 1163 FR RIO DE JANEIRO TO STATE

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X Security-Classified Information

NND: 949515

WITHDRAWN: 02/24/95 by: JAS

FOIA RETRIEVAL #: 949515 01580 00032

0969

W I T H D R A W A L N O T I C E

RG: 059 TAB #: 31

ENTRY: CDF60-63 1 / 12 / C /

COPIES/PPS/CLASS/SPECMARK

BOX: 1580

ACCESS RESTRICTED

The item identified below has been withdrawn from this file:

Folder Title: 732.00(W)/5-1860

Document Date: 18/05/60

Document Ser.#:

DESP 1132 FR RIO DE JANEIRO TO STATE

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X Security-Classified Information

NND: 949515 WITHDRAWN: 02/24/95 by: JAS

FOIA RETRIEVAL #: 949515 01580 00031



W I T H D R A W A L N O T I C E

RG: 059

TAB #: 30

ENTRY: CDF60-63

1 / 10 / C /
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BOX: 1580

ACCESS RESTRICTED

The item identified below has been withdrawn from this file:

Folder Title: 732.00(W)/5-660

Document Date: 06/05/60

Document Ser.#:

DESP 1074 FR RIO DE JANEIRO TO STATE

In the review of this file this item was removed because access to it is restricted. Restrictions on records in the National Archives are stated in general and specific record group restriction statements which are available for examination. The item identified above has been withdrawn because it contains:

X Security-Classified Information

NND: 949515

WITHDRAWN: 02/24/95 by: JAS

FOIA RETRIEVAL #: 949515 01580 00030



W I T H D R A W A L N O T I C E

RG: 059

TAB #: 29

ENTRY: CDF60-63

1 / 10 / C /
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BOX: 1580

ACCESS RESTRICTED

The item identified below has been withdrawn from this file:

Folder Title: 732.00(W)/4-2960

Document Date: 29/04/60

Document Ser.#:

DESP 1048 FR RIO DE JANEIRO TO STATE

In the review of this file this item was removed because access to it is restricted. Restrictions on records in the National Archives are stated in general and specific record group restriction statements which are available for examination. The item identified above has been withdrawn because it contains:

X Security-Classified Information

NND: 949515

WITHDRAWN: 02/24/95 by: JAS

FOIA RETRIEVAL #: 949515 01580 00029



W I T H D R A W A L N O T I C E

RG: 059

ENTRY: CDF60-63

TAB #: 28

1 / 12 / S /

COPIES/PPS/CLASS/SPECMARK

BOX: 1580

ACCESS RESTRICTED

The item identified below has been withdrawn from this file:

Folder Title: 732.00(W)/4-2260

Document Date: 22/04/60

Document Ser.#:

DESP 1025 FR RIO DE JANEIRO TO STATE

In the review of this file this item was removed because access to it is restricted. Restrictions on records in the National Archives are stated in general and specific record group restriction statements which are available for examination. The item identified above has been withdrawn because it contains:

X Security-Classified Information

NND: 949515

WITHDRAWN: 02/24/95 by: JAS

FOIA RETRIEVAL #: 949515 01580 00028



W I T H D R A W A L N O T I C E

RG: 059 TAB #: 27

ENTRY: CDF60-63 1 / 10 / C /
COPIES/PPS/CLASS/SPECMARK

BOX: 1580

ACCESS RESTRICTED

The item identified below has been withdrawn from this file:

Folder Title: 732.00(W)/4-1460

Document Date: 14/04/60

Document Ser.#:

DESP 1005 FR RIO DE JANEIRO TO STATE

In the review of this file this item was removed because access to it is restricted. Restrictions on records in the National Archives are stated in general and specific record group restriction statements which are available for examination. The item identified above has been withdrawn because it contains:

X Security-Classified Information

NND: 949515 WITHDRAWN: 02/24/95 by: JAS

FOIA RETRIEVAL #: 949515 01580 00027

0964

W I T H D R A W A L N O T I C E

RG: 059 TAB #: 26

ENTRY: CDF60-63 1 / 10 / C /
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BOX: 1580

ACCESS RESTRICTED

The item identified below has been withdrawn from this file:

Folder Title: 732.00(W)/4-860

Document Date: 08/04/60

Document Ser.#:

DESP 982 FR RIO DE JANEIRO TO STATE

In the review of this file this item was removed because access to it is restricted. Restrictions on records in the National Archives are stated in general and specific record group restriction statements which are available for examination. The item identified above has been withdrawn because it contains:

X Security-Classified Information

NND: 949515 WITHDRAWN: 02/24/95 by: JAS

FOIA RETRIEVAL #: 949515 01580 00026



W I T H D R A W A L N O T I C E

RG: 059

TAB #: 25

ENTRY: CDF60-63

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BOX: 1580

ACCESS RESTRICTED

The item identified below has been withdrawn from this file:

Folder Title: 732.00(W)/4-160

Document Date: 01/04/60

Document Ser.#:

DESP 960 FR RIO DE JANEIRO TO STATE

In the review of this file this item was removed because access to it is restricted. Restrictions on records in the National Archives are stated in general and specific record group restriction statements which are available for examination. The item identified above has been withdrawn because it contains:

X Security-Classified Information

NND: 949515

WITHDRAWN: 02/24/95 by: JAS

FOIA RETRIEVAL #: 949515 01580 00025



W I T H D R A W A L N O T I C E

RG: 059

TAB #: 24

ENTRY: CDF60-63

1 / 8 / C /
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BOX: 1580

ACCESS RESTRICTED

The item identified below has been withdrawn from this file:

Folder Title: 732.00(W)/3-2560

Document Date: 25/03/60

Document Ser.#:

DESP 939 FR RIO DE JANEIRO TO STATE

In the review of this file this item was removed because access to it is restricted. Restrictions on records in the National Archives are stated in general and specific record group restriction statements which are available for examination. The item identified above has been withdrawn because it contains:

X Security-Classified Information

NND: 949515

WITHDRAWN: 02/24/95 by: JAS

FOIA RETRIEVAL #: 949515 01580 00024



W I T H D R A W A L N O T I C E

RG: 059

TAB #: 23

ENTRY: CDF60-63

1 / 11 / C /
COPIES/PPS/CLASS/SPECMARK

BOX: 1580

ACCESS RESTRICTED

The item identified below has been withdrawn from this file:

Folder Title: 732.00(W)/3-1860

Document Date: 18/03/60

Document Ser.#:

DESP 907 FR RIO DE JANEIRO TO STATE

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DESP 833 FR RIO DE JANEIRO TO STATE

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DESP 796 FR RIO DE JANEIRO TO STATE

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DESP 782 FR RIO DE JANEIRO TO STATE

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NND: 949515

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FOIA RETRIEVAL #: 949515 01580 00017



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DESP 749 FR RIO DE JANEIRO TO STATE

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NND: 949515

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FOIA RETRIEVAL #: 949515 01580 00016



W I T H D R A W A L N O T I C E

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DESP 723 FR RIO DE JANEIRO TO STATE

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DESP 693 FR RIO DE JANEIRO TO STATE

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FORM FS-439a
6-1-60

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Informal English Translation of Reply by Sr. Antonio Pereira MAGALDI, President of the Democratic Union Movement (MSD) to Domingos ALVARES, President of the São Paulo State Federation of Metal Workers, as published in São Paulo newspapers of May 13,1962.

There is no doubt that once again the May Day that we have just celebrated, as during last year, furnished the opportunity to emphasize the difference which exists in the labor organizations in our State.

We saw, however, that this time the ideals of democratic unionism bore fruit, in contrast to the evident retreat of those who now, far from the prestige which they formerly enjoyed, reap in their rejection by the workers the results of their subversive union activities. We are justified therefore in our satisfaction in seeing the courageous and fearless attitude assumed by our brother, faithful to his democratic spirit and understanding of union principles, in repudiating the maneuvers of a minority of federations and unions which showed lack of respect for the meaning of Labor Day by holding a flagrantly partisan political-ideological meeting, as if the working classes sentiments could serve as a toy in the hands of those who openly revolt against the democratic and Christian traditions which indelibly mark our country's history. We congratulate effusively our brother for his position adopted in those circumstances, and we are sure that his repudiation of those insidious maneuvers has deserved the support and admiration of the working class whom he has served once more with dedication and courage.

JLiebof:vaga

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FORM FS-630a
6-1-60

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Page 1 of
Encl. No. 2
Desp. No. 280
From Amcongen, São Paulo

Informal English translation of communiqué published by Sr. Domingos ALVARES, President of the São Paulo State Federation of Metal Workers, in principal São Paulo newspapers on May 3, 1962.

The undersigned President of São Paulo State Federation of Metal Workers feels he has the duty of making public the reasons which prevented him from participating in the Labor Day celebrations held in this city.

The Metal Workers Federation presided over by us received, welcomed and tried to comply with the instructions of the National Confederation of Industrial Workers (CNTI) which ordered the holding of May Day celebrations together with other entities in the city of São Paulo. Observing this order we joined with other labor entities and were present at the preparations for the festivities. It was decided that the commemoration would be held in the morning in the Paramount Theater. We colaborated in the drafting of the manifesto which was made public, because we believed that the workers' interest is above possible differences regarding labor politics. However, we made very clear that we opposed the participation in this celebration of all politicians, whether they are candidates or not for elective office. Consequently we were very surprised when we saw inside the Paramount Theater the chief of the Communist Party, invited by some of the labor leaders who promoted the celebration, as well as several other politicians. Our surprise was even greater when we saw that while there were speeches referring to legitimate popular aspirations, the celebration soon became a propaganda meeting of political parties.

We are not discussing the merits of these parties. At this time we are not interested in examining whether they are in tune with the demands of the masses. What matters is that the celebration was to be a reunion of workers and their leaders as well as of the people in general, and not a political meeting.

In protest against the misuse of this celebration for political ends, we refused to participate, remaining outside the Paramount Theater and refraining from addressing the audience.

Our union experience has led us to seek only that which interests the worker. Our sole objective is to end all types of exploitation of man. Our ideological and political convictions are only dictated by our knowledge of the interests of the masses and therefore we are only bound to the worker, and we vehemently condemn those who being prisoners of sectarianism of one side or another, at times even receiving orders from political entities completely foreign to the workers' interests, if not receiving the rewards of treason.

São Paulo, May 1st., 1962.

(signed) Domingos Alvares

JLiebof:vsgs

GPO 902667



We understand that the rural workers have no union organization, one of the effective means of defense and of obtaining what they want; it is completely justifiable that they be assured the privilege of unionization so that united they may represent the force which they cannot achieve if they continue dispersed.

The workers affiliated with the Democratic Union Movement demonstrated their strong desire to benefit from the protection which the National Housing Plan can afford them. For this reason the democratic labor leaders have colaborated in every way so that that plan will correspond in its execution to the desire of the workers to posess their own appropriate and decent home, freeing them from the worrying problem of rentals and of precarious dwellings without minimum conditions of comfort and hygiene.

By the same token we ask from the Federal Government a substantial improvement in the social security system. The Organic Law of Social Welfare, which represented a victory for the workers after fifteen years of struggle, has been a disappointment in many aspects of its application. The social security system continues to suffer from chronic difficulties which undermine its objectives. The worker, who is bled every month by payroll deductions for social security, receives very little in return. Medical care is still a myth in the interior cities after a quarter century of existance of social security. The benefits which do not conform to the needs of the participant are delayed by a stubborn bureaucracy. Therefore, the re-structuring of the social security system and above all the full assurance of the rights which the worker expects from the law but does not receive in practice, are pressing necessities.

These in general are the objectives of the struggle of the workers' organizations which make up the Democratic Union Movement and which celebrate today Labor Day, its first birthday, as this movement was formed precisely on May 1, 1961. Its creation has opened a breach in our labor organization allowing the worker to see for himself on which side is true unionism and where are those who make of unionism a vehicle for the preaching of ideologies which are directly contrary to our country's traditions and to our people's Christian sentiments. That is Brazilian unionism's banner of redemption, carried in the hands of the Democratic Union Movement's leaders and which will be kept aloft at the cost of our very lives, if necessary, since in its highest expressions it is the banner which will lead the working class to less troubled days and to the not very distant period in which Brazil, enriched by its people's efforts, will be able to overcome the obstacles which make difficult but do not prevent its progress toward a glorious destiny, when all its children will be able to live as dignified human beings and reaffirm, as we do now, their pride in having been born in this land blessed by God.

JLiebof:vsgs

GPO 802867

0948

They commit an unpatriotic act all those who take advantage of the difficult situation we are passing through to further enrich themselves and then put on an impious display of that fact by giving wide publicity to banquets and parties similar to the Roman bacchanals and by wearing Carnival costumes whose cost would be sufficient to ameliorate hunger in many humble homes.

On the other hand, the working class demands more energetic action from the federal authorities to satisfy with great urgency their most sincere, legitimate and just demands.

Containing the increase in cost of living is no longer a mere aspiration of the working class and has become an imposition dictated by the supreme interest of the country, above all with respect to the preservation of the democratic regime and the development of our economy.

For this reason the Brazilian workers have supported with great enthusiasm the Alliance for Progress program, because they see in it the latent possibility of freeing ourselves from the calamitous situations which we are suffering. It is for this reason that we show our great pride in the admirable way in which our illustrious President of the Republic, Dr. João Goulart, carried out his mission in the great Northern nation, when he proudly and with admirable dignity explained our people's feelings with respect to the sacred democratic postulates which we inherited from our forefathers, also emphasizing our sincere desire of giving Brazil the assurance it needs for its projection as a true power in the concert of nations.

On this May Day, Christians and Democratic workers reaffirm those deeply felt aspirations which they have had for some time and which point toward the assurance of a more effective protection of working and living conditions.

We demand the approval by the National Congress among other things of the proposed laws regarding the Christmas bonus, just and human claim of those who live by their work; 30 days holidays per year, so that the worker is guaranteed sufficient rest to replace the energy spent during twelve months of work; family bonus, as stipulated by the Federal Constitution; agrarian reform, an imperative measure which can no longer be postponed because the development of the country also depends upon it; and regulations guaranteeing the right to strike so that this right will be in fact a defensive arm of the worker and not an instrument of oppression as it is now under decree No. 9070.

Unionization of rural workers has deserved the entire attention of Labor Minister Franco MONTORO. With basis in the constitutional principle of equality for all before the law, we have demanded from His Excellency the extention to the man on the farm of the rights which the city worker has been enjoying for a long time.



Informal translation of speech delivered by Sr. Antonio Pereira MAGALDI, President of the Democratic Union Movement of the State of São Paulo, in commemoration of May Day 1962, at a meeting in the Praça da Sé in São Paulo.

Here we are, workers and union leaders, gathered in a public square in one of the most expressive commemorations of Labor Day, to demonstrate through our unity, a sincere desire that this Day signify and represent the sentiments of the working class which hopes for better days and for victories which, at least, will ameliorate the anguished situation in which we find ourselves.

Traditionally, the first day of May has recalled with greater effectiveness the most salient demands of those who live on their salaries, because it is a date which gained a place in the calendar as a symbol of the workers of the entire world. In this way, homage is paid to those fearless American workers who, in the memorable strike of May 1, 1886, gave their lives so that their companions would see in this act a dignified and indeed extraordinary example of inconformity with oppressive living conditions and very poor and unjust working conditions.

The Brazilian workers in this way continued an honorable tradition of struggle for those legal measures which would translate into rights the sum of the duties imposed upon them, seeking to establish in this way the equilibrium between capital and labor, which are equivalent forces and which should therefore maintain conditions of equality for their survival and development.

It must be affirmed, however, that along the lines of that objective the forces of labor are far from achieving equality with the power of capital, as the worker has unfortunately been the ideal and customary target of that series of circumstances that has led the country to situations of undeniable danger.

The problem of the cost of living assumes more alarming proportions every day, stifling millions of persons who depend for their survival only on their salaries. Food prices are steadily going up, devaluating salaries and impoverishing the workers. It must be accepted as true the fact that wage readjustments are an effect and not a cause of inflation, generally caused by the limitless greediness of economic power which by denying bread to the humble home of workers, above all goes against the Christian principles of our people and helps to expand the climate of revolt and is propicious to the ones who need those conditions to subvert our regime and outrage our deep love for liberty and the preachings of our Lord Jesus Christ.



extreme leftist Febus GIKOVATE, President of the Brazilian Socialist Party (PSB) in São Paulo; fellow-traveler Brazilian Labor Party (PTB) Federal Deputy José Artur de FROTA MOREIRA; and Geraldo de Souza PEREIRA, railway worker, former director of the Sorocabana Railway Workers Association, and former Point IV labor grantee. Communists present led the audience in the singing of the "International".

Prominent independent labor leader Domingos ALVARES, President of the State Federation of Metal Workers (largest in São Paulo), and one of the original organizers of the Paramount Theater rally, was present but did not take his allotted seat at the head table or participate in the proceedings. In a declaration published on May 3 by several leading São Paulo newspapers, Alvares protested the "partisan, political" (i.e. Communist) slant given an ostensibly union gathering. (See Enclosure No.2 for informal English translation.) MSD President Magaldi congratulated Alvares for the latter's protest in a letter which was also published by local press. (See Enclosure No. 3 for informal English translation.)

Several important São Paulo newspapers commented favorably on the fact that this was the first time in recent years that democratic labor elements beat the Communists at their own game by organizing an anti-Communist May Day mass rally which dwarfed a competing Communist meeting.

However, outside the city of São Paulo, the Communists were more successful. In Santos the Communist-dominated Forum Sindical de Debates (City Labor Council) organized a public rally along current Communist lines. The Communist-controlled Plenário Regional Sindical (Regional Labor Council) also succeeded in dominating a May Day rally in Campinas. In addition, Communist labor leaders in the ABC industrial triangle played a major role in the May Day celebrations in that area.

Daniel M. Braddock
Minister Consul General

Enclosures:

1. Translation of Speech by Sr. Antonio Pereira Magaldi
2. Translation of Communiqué by Sr. Domingos Alvares
3. Translation of Reply by Sr. Antonio Pereira Magaldi

0945

housing, enactment of family bonus legislation and unionization of agricultural workers; Cardinal-Archbishop of São Paulo Dom Carlos Carmelo de Vasconcelos MOTA, who stressed the necessity of carrying out in Brazil the recommendations for social reforms contained in the Papal Encyclical "Mater et Magistra", and announced the opening of a two week "Mater et Magistra" campaign in celebration of the first aniversary of the Encyclical; MSD President Antonio Pereira MAGALDI, who outlined the problems facing Brazilian workers, described the MSD's program, praised the Alliance for Progress, and lauded President Goulart for the success of his visit to the United States (see Enclosure No. 1 for informal translation); State Federation of Rural Workers President José ROTTA, who emphasized the problems of agricultural workers. Copies of the ORIT May Day manifesto were widely distributed among the participants. (The Reporting Officer assumes that the Department has received copies of this manifesto from other sources and is therefore not enclosing a copy.) An intermittent drizzle did not seem to discourage the audience. However the rally organizers claimed that attendance at the Praça da Sé would have been considerably greater if it had not been for a football match at noon on May Day offered by the São Paulo employer-controlled Industrial Social Service (Serviço Social da Industria -SESI) with free admission for the public.

Among the prominent São Paulo labor leaders, in addition to Antonio Pereira Magaldi and José Rotta already mentioned, in attendance at the above rally were: Dacyr GATTO, Luiz MENOSSI, Antonio Navas MARTINS and Olavo PREVIATTI, respectively Presidents of the São Paulo State Federations of Clothing Workers, Construction Workers, Public Utility Workers and Paper Workers; Lourival Portal da SILVA, Silvio VASCONCELOS and Oswaldo PERES, respectively Presidents of the São Paulo Local Unions of Oil Refinery and Filling Station Employees, Commerce Workers, and Telegraph Workers; and Frei CELSO, Ecclesiastic Advisor of the São Paulo State Federation of Catholic Worker Circles.

A second May Day commemoration was held in the Paramount Theater, about four blocks from and at the same time as the Praça da Sé rally described above. Supposedly organized by the five Brazilian National Trade Union Confederations, virtually all prominent São Paulo Communist labor leaders were present. Attendance was estimated at about 1,000 persons, mostly workers and union leaders. Large banners across the theater stage said "Long Live the Unity of the Workers in the Struggle for National Liberation" and "Long Live the Victorious Alliance of City and Rural Workers". Principal speakers were Communist leader Luiz Carlos PRESTES; Communist Luiz Tenorio de LIMA and Rubens VASCONCELOS, respectively Presidents of the São Paulo State Federations of Food Workers and Bank Workers; Dante PELACANI, Vice-President of the National Confederation of Industrial Workers and Director-General of the Labor Ministry Department of Social Welfare;



AIR POUCH — UNCLASSIFIED

HANDLING INDICATOR

FOREIGN SERVICE DESPATCH

For Department Use Only
732, 00 May Day
MAY 25 1962
5-24-62

FROM : Amcongen, São Paulo, Brazil — 280 NO.

TO : THE DEPARTMENT OF STATE, WASHINGTON. — May 24, 1962 DATE

REF :

For Dept. Use Only	ACTION	INFO	DEP	RM/R	REP	AF	ARA	S/MR	FE	NEA	CU	INR	E	P	IO	
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	REC'D 5-30			AIR	ARMY	CIA	NAVY	OSD	OCB	USIA						
						16				8						

S/IC ICA

DEPARTMENT OF STATE
BUREAU OF
INTER-AMERICAN AFFAIRS
MAY 31 1962

SUBJECT: May Day 1962 in São Paulo

file no action
EST/E EA
6-6-62

Summary

For the first time in recent São Paulo history, anti-Communist labor forces successfully organized an independent May Day mass rally which far outshone a competing obviously Communist-controlled meeting. However, the Communists dominated May Day celebrations in Santos and in industrial centers of the interior of the State.

The Democratic Union Movement (Movimento Sindical Democrático - MSD), the São Paulo State Federations of Catholic Worker Circles and Rural Workers Associations, the São Paulo ORIT office and the Catholic Church joined forces in a May Day mass rally. The rally was preceded by considerable newspaper, radio and sound-truck publicity, featuring declarations by various MSD leaders, São Paulo ORIT Representative Jorge SIERRA, Church dignataries, and other organizers of the rally.

The rally itself was held early May Day morning before the Cathedral in the central plaza known as the Praça da Sé. An estimated 10,000 persons, including workers' families, attended. Many banners were in evidence, some supporting Catholic social doctrine and others containing phrases such as "Bread, Peace and Liberty", and "Liberty for Cuban Workers". The principal speakers included the following: Vice-Governor General Porphirio da PAZ, who greeted the workers on behalf of bedridden Governor CARVALHO PINTO; Labor Minister André Franco MONTORO, who described progress to date in the field of workers

JLiebof:vsgs — UNCLASSIFIED

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6 2 53 PM '62

FORM 6-61 FS-439 GPO 912596

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NAME OF OFFICER & OFFICE SYMBOL	DATE OF ACTION	DIRECTIONS TO RM/R

0943

THE PRESIDENT

In order properly to assess the President's May Day remarks, it is necessary to consider them in the light of recent political events. As the Embassy has frequently pointed out, the dominant development of recent months has been the growth of President Goulart's personal prestige and power, which, following his visit to the United States, reached such heights as to make him the undisputed arbitor of Brazilian politics. Necessarily, this trend was paralleled, and indeed made possible, by a rapprochement between the President and the Centrist and Conservative circles in Brazilian life and a consequent "pacification" of the previously turbulent--and sharply dichotomized--Brazilian political scene. Though other factors played a part in these developments, chief credit for their realization must go to President Goulart.

But just as he needed wide (and especially conservative) support in order to stabilize his regime, Goulart most assuredly sees a continuation of that support as a mixed blessing in the forthcoming election campaign. Since his return from the United States, Goulart has made no secret of his fear that he might become "compromised" in the eyes of the electorate by too close an identification with the conservative elements in Brazilian politics and his consequent determination to take steps to assure the continued adhesion of his "populist" electoral base. Considering his political history, the President would probably have felt constrained to follow such a course even in normal circumstances in order to maintain what he apparently conceives to be a necessary balance between his original supporters and those new areas of support which he has been able to win over by his moderation and political skill in recent months. 1962 is not normal, however; it is an election year, and Goulart has never made any secret of his intention to further the electoral interests of his party, the PTB, at the polls this year. The resultant compulsion to make a propitiating gesture toward the laborite electorate which has so long been his special preserve was therefore overwhelming. It had been rumored for some time that the President would utilize the May Day address, which he has for several years past delivered to the workers at the government-owned steel mill of Volta Redonda, for this purpose.

THE MAY DAY SPEECH

Significantly, the President's May Day oration was, in tone

0942

AIR POUCH — CONFIDENTIAL
(HANDLING INDICATOR)

FOREIGN SERVICE DISPATCH

For Department Use Only
1. 2.11/5-1662
XR 732.00 MAY DAY

FROM : Amembassy BRASILIA Office — 907 (NO.)

TO : THE DEPARTMENT OF STATE, WASHINGTON. — May 16, 1962 (DATE)

REF :

28 For Dept. Use Only	ACTION	ARA-4	INFO	DEPT	RM/R 2	REP	AF	ARA	EUR	FE	NEA	CU	INR 5	E	P 1	IO	ICA
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	REC'D 5/22				AIR 3	ARMY 5	CIA 10	NAVY 3	OSD 3	OCB	USIA 8	NSC 3					

SUBJECT: President Goulart's May Day Proposal for Constitutional Reform

Summary

On May Day, President Goulart proposed the next congress be granted constituent powers to enable it to enact such "basic" measures as agrarian, tax, banking and electoral reform, in addition to "reviewing" the present parliamentary form of government. The timing, setting and context of the President's remarks--together with the virtually insuperable difficulties in effecting his proposal--all suggest that the President, while still doubtless seeking reform, was addressing himself more to the Brazilian electorate (with a view to strengthening the electoral possibilities of his party, the PTB) than to any serious attempt (for the present) at basic reform. The Congress has reacted sharply to the President's imputation of exclusive guilt for failure to act in the field of reforms--with the result that chances of congressional passage of Goulart's proposals are generally considered dim. Too, the President has again come under sharp attack by the conservative press and politicians, who apparently tacitly agree with the President's assumption that sufficient stability has been achieved in recent months to permit politics as usual. Thus, though Goulart may have scored an electoral point off his opponents, he has, by his obviously partisan attitude, not improved the chances of the reforms which he claims to favor.

- o -

HAQuinn:jw (REPORTER) — CONFIDENTIAL

FORM 6-61 FS-439 GPO 912526

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ACTION ASSIGNED TO	ACTION TAKEN	
NAME OF OFFICER & OFFICE SYMBOL	DATE OF ACTION	DIRECTIONS TO RM/R

0941

CONFIDENTIAL

were based upon his position that no representatives of any political party should be invited or permitted to speak. Discounting the inclusion and activities of such people as Maria Segovia, who is at one time a Communist and a labor leader, the proceedings clearly violated the advance agreements mentioned by Riani and whose word the Attaché is inclined to accept. Possibly what happened was that the Master of Ceremonies, Mr. Benedito Cerqueira, long-time President of the metal workers' union of Rio, member of the WFTU General Council and close Commie associate (though he denies being a member) betrayed Riani and permitted Prestes to speak. However, it is also conceivable that the usual Brazilian laxness in controlling meetings combined with clear Communist plans to dominate the parades with placards and the meeting with Prestes and was simply not resisted by Cerqueira, Pelacani, or Riani. Had the leaders of the democratic-led Confederations been present, it is difficult to know whether or not they would have walked out or protested at the ceremony itself; their past actions are not sure guides on this point. Magaldi or Maciel, or a few others, would have left had they been present and probably would have led their weaker brothers.

The Minister of Labor appeared on the scene, apparently as Mr. Prestes was speaking. He had previously attended the democratic (not the Communist) sponsored May Day gathering in São Paulo and the May Day gathering at Volta Redonda where President Goulart had spoken, and this was to be his third appearance. In fact, he arrived with Mr. Riani who had also been at Volta Redonda (but not in São Paulo). When the Minister of Labor was able to notice the character of the meeting he quickly withdrew and did not speak, though his presence had already been announced. Interestingly enough, his brother and assistant has consistently denied to the author that the Minister was present at the Movieland ceremony.

Mr. Jose Talerico, former First Alternate PTB Deputy from the former federal district (now the state of Guanabara) to the National Congress, has told the author that he informed President Goulart about the fact that Prestes made such statements and that the President was booed by the Communists when his name was mentioned. He added, however, that Mr. Gilberto Crockatt da Sa managed to smooth things over between the President and the Communists; to what degree these statements are accurate is as yet unknown. Certainly, if the hoped for break in close relations between the President and Communist labor leaders is to occur the statements of Prestes and the action of the Communists at the May Day celebration should play some role. By and large, however, the incident is not believed to be enough by itself to lead to a break.

APPROVED BY:

Niles Bond
Deputy Chief of Mission

For the Ambassador:

John T. Fishburn
Labor Attaché

DISTRIBUTION: POL I, II, Brasilia, S.P., Labor, CF

CONFIDENTIAL

0940

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Confederation are considerably weaker than the CNTC, they followed the latter out of the joint activities as easily and as rapidly as they followed it in.

The May Day activities in Rio were limited to several CNTI sponsored parades from different starting points, which then assembled in Movieland square for the oratory. (The democratic labor leaders limited themselves to planning to insert pro-democratic and pro-Alliance for Progress signs in some of the CNTI-led marches, none of which were in evidence--as expected.) When the marchers assembled in Movieland square, it was apparent that the Communists had dominated the preparations. Probably more than half of all the signs called for the legalization of the Communist Party and a good share of the others were for obvious Communist objectives, including friendship with Cuba. The speeches were also dominated by Communists and their friends. The first speaker was the president of the Communist-dominated UNE (National Students Union). The second was Dante Pelacani, Vice-President of the CNTI, who made a politically innocuous speech on labor and social security. The third speaker was Maria Segovia, Communist oriented secretary of the tailors' union. Miss Segovia supported Cuba and other Russian international objectives and panned the U.S. Miss Segovia was followed by Luis Carlos Prestes, Brazil's principal Communist leader, who made his usual speech with anti-American statements. He also said that the Communists, leading the workers, placed President Goulart in power, because "we have confidence in him." "We did not make him President in order to sign infamous contracts with the Americans, but rather to attend to our needs, to the needs of the workers." Significantly, Mr. Prestes' reference to President Goulart called for booing from the audience on as large a scale as did his more clearly derogatory references to the U.S. Mr. Prestes was followed by a few additional speakers, including Clodsmidt Riani, President of the CNTI, who arrived late and who made a few relatively non-controversial remarks.

The crowd gathered in Movieland square included approximately 5,000 persons as nearly as could be determined by a count by the Labor Attaché. Other calculations ran from 2,000 by another Embassy officer to 15,000 mentioned by Ultima Hora. The enthusiasm of the crowd, which was adequate for the purpose, was limited to those near the speakers' stand. As the Labor Attaché circulated among the outskirts of the crowd, he noticed almost no signs of enthusiasm among the people who were listeners simply because they were there and would have been there in any event. The loud speaker system functioned perfectly and the speeches were heard clearly in all nearby sections of the square.

It might be thought that the withdrawal of the democratic confederations led naturally to the communist domination of the celebration. However, this was not necessarily true and CNTI President Riani has informed the Labor Attaché that all advance preparations within his organization

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PRIORITY

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DO NOT TYPE IN THIS SPACE
732.00 MAY DAY
5-1162

FOREIGN SERVICE DESPATCH

FROM : Amembassy RIO DE JANEIRO

887
DESP. NO.

TO : THE DEPARTMENT OF STATE, WASHINGTON.

May 11, 1962
DATE

REF :

	ACTION	DEPT.
22 For Dept. Use Only	ARA-4	RMR-1 REP-1 INR-5
	REC'D 5/14	INFO OTHER LAB-6 AIR-3 ARMY-5 CIA-10 NAVY-3 OSD-3 USIA-8 NSA-3

MAY 15 1962

SUBJECT: May Day in Rio de Janeiro, 1962

As reported by the Embassy, the five confederations of labor at one time agreed upon a joint May Day program to be held in Rio de Janeiro, as well as upon the joint holding of a "Third" National Labor Congress to be held during this year (Weeka No. 14, April 10). However, as subsequently reported, the three democratically led Confederations of Workers in Commerce; Land Transport; and Maritime, River and Air Transport, withdrew from both of these scheduled joint activities at the insistance of the more vigorous democratic labor leaders of Brazil--notably, Mr. Antonio Pereira Magaldi, President of the São Paulo Federation of Commercial Workers and Second Vice President of the CNTC (National Confederation of Commercial Workers), and Mr. Floriano Maciel, President of the chemical workers' union of Rio de Janeiro and President of the Democratic Labor Resistance in the same area.

Mr. Angelo Parmigiani, President of the CNTC and until his illness the leader of the democratic confederations, accepted the joint activities mentioned above, which were proposed by the CNTI (National Confederation of Industrial Workers) because he felt that with the U.S. courting President Goulart the Brazilian democratic labor movement could no longer afford an independent position and because he felt that the confederations could, in any event, withdraw from the joint activities if the dangers became too great. While Magaldi, Maciel and the other more forceful leaders of the democratic sector have demonstrated flexibility in being willing to change their former opposition to President Goulart should the latter wish to make the change himself and abstain from his previous favoritism to the Communists, they also have felt that it was too dangerous to begin unified activities with the CNTI until the leaders of the CNTI should show themselves less favorably inclined toward Communism or should be replaced by new leaders of anti-Communist character. As a consequence, Mr. Magaldi took the initiative within the CNTC in raising the issue and President Parmigiani lost a vote of confidence on it. The result was the withdrawal of the CNTC from both of the scheduled joint activities mentioned above. Since the Land Transport Workers' Confederation and the Maritime, River and Air Transport Workers

LABOR:JTFishburn:ss
REPORTER

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ACTION ASSIGNED TO	ACTION TAKEN
NAME OF OFFICER & OFFICE SYMBOL	DATE OF ACTION
DIRECTIONS TO RM/R	

DEPARTMENT OF STATE
BUREAU OF
INTER-AMERICAN AFFAIRS
MAY 17 1962
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out the necessities of the laborers adhering to and supporting socialism.

COMMENT: The crowd, although collectively reeking of "cachaça" (local "white lightning"), was orderly. The speeches were listened to attentively if not enthusiastically while they waited for the after-rally show of samba bands and dancers. The only visual propaganda in evidence were "grateful" pro-Cid Sampaio banners. Several leading communists occupied conspicious places of honor on the speakers rostrum.

Ernest S. Guaderrama
American Consul

2 cc: American Embassy, Rio de Janeiro.

0937

AIR POUCH
PRIORITY

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(Security Classification)

DO NOT TYPE IN THIS SPACE
732.00-May Day/5-761
MAY 12 1961

FOREIGN SERVICE DESPATCH

FROM : Amconsulate, RECIFE, BRAZIL
TO : THE DEPARTMENT OF STATE
REF : ----

DEPARTMENT OF STATE
BUREAU OF
INTER-AMERICAN AFFAIRS
MAY 24 1961

NO. DESP. NO.
May 7, 1961.
DATE

For Dept. Use Only	ACTION	DEPT.
	REC'D 5/20	INFO ARA-4 OTHER ARMA-2 INR-7 REP-1 P-3 CIA-10 USIA-10 LAB-6 Navy-4 NSA-4

SUBJECT: MAY DAY IN RECIFE.

With Francisco Julião and other assorted politicians winging their way belatedly to Cuba, the May Day festivities in Recife were quiet and orderly. Activities, including parades, football games and massive downtown rally, were carefully planned by State authorities in order to diminish the possibilities of "spontaneous" disturbances. Heavy intermittent showers also helped to dampen uncontrolled enthusiasm.

At the finale, several thousand workers gathered in the Praça Dantas Barreto to hear political leaders (Mayor Miguel Arraes, PTB State Deputy Luiz Wilson, and Governor Cid Sampaio) and labor officials (such as Labor Delegate Edson Falcão and labor leader Claudio Braga) discourse in varied and, at times, opposite ideological tangents.

Although one newspaper headlined the main points of interest of the rally as "Cuba, United States, and (SUMOC) Instruction 204", the general tone of the speeches was much less anti-American than the reporter had expected. Several of the speakers relished referring to the 1886 labor disturbances in the United States (Mc Cormick plant and Haymarket Square incidents) which were described as not only the inspiration for commemorating May Day but were also pictured (erroneously) as a cold blooded mass murder of innocent, oppressed workers.

Mayor Arraes did not refer to the United States, but he did stress the necessity of obtaining and preserving economic independence from the monopolies and the trusts. He also eulogized the late Patrice Lumumba as a martyr for the cause of liberation from colonialism. Young labor leader Claudio Braga read a union-federation approved document in which he attacked the economic reform policies of the Quadros government (Instruction 204) while in the succeeding paragraph he lauded Brazil's new foreign policy. He also belabored the United States for its insidious attack on heroic Cuba. Governor Sampaio, as a rain squall struck, defended the necessity of SUMOC Instruction 204 and other seemingly harsh economic measures "which are necessary because of the follies of the previous government." He then painted a roseate picture of the laborers' situation in the inflation-free Brazil of tomorrow. "Deputado" Wilson (PTB) spelled

732.00-MAY DAY/5-761

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[redacted]

732.00 MAY DAY/5-761

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INCOMING TELEGRAM — Department of State — PERMANENT RECORD COPY

54-52 — CONFIDENTIAL

Action ARA
Info SS SR G SP H SAL CAP E AID P USIA NSC INR CIA NSA OSD ARMY NAVY AIR TRSY RMR

Control: 20822
Rec'd: JANUARY 31, 1963 5:58 PM

FROM: RIO DE JANEIRO

TO: Secretary of State

NO: 1443, JANUARY 31, 7 PM

PRIORITY

ACTION DEPARTMENT 1443, INFORMATION LIMA PRIORITY 20, BRASILIA PRIORITY 62.

LIMA TEL TO DEPT 711

IN JAN 30 PRESS INTERVIEW FONMIN HERMES LIMA REPEATED EARLIER, INFORMALLY EXPRESSED BELITTLEMENT IMPORTANCE CUBA DOCUMENTS FOUND IN WRECKAGE OF VARIG AIRCRAFT WHICH CRASHED NEAR LIMA, ATTRIBUTING PUBLICITY GIVEN DOCUMENTS TO "ANTI-NATIONALIST CAMPAIGN DEPICT GOB AS IDEOLOGICALLY SUSPECT AND INFILTRATED BY COMMUNIST TENDENCIES" IN ORDER "DISTURB RELATIONS WITH OTHER COUNTRIES, ESPECIALLY US." "IT NOT FOR FONOFF TO ASCERTAIN AUTHENTICITY DOCUMENTS," LIMA SAID WITH APPARENT INTENT RAISE DOUBTS. NOTED NO BODIES FOUND INTACT IN WRECKAGE AND WONDERED HOW DOCUMENTS INTACT. LIMA POINTED OUT DOCUMENTS DID NOT MENTION ANY "PERSONS IMPORTANT IN NATINAL SECTOR," WHICH STATEMENT, UNCHARITABLY VIEWED, PROVOKES WONDER WHETHER STATEMENT MADE IN RELIEF.

(4) LIMA DEFENDED FONOFF ACTIONS AND POLICY ON CONDITION REFUGEES IN HABANA EMBASSY, OTHER MAIN TOPIC INTERVIEW. EMBASSY HAD "RENDERED ENORMOUS SERVICES TO REFUGEES," HE SAID, AND HAD OBTAINED TOTAL 600 SAFE CONDUCTS FROM GOC. HE EXPRESSED GOB INTENTION "CONVERSE" WITH GOC IN ORDER RESOLVE PROBLEM REMAINING REFUGEES.

RESPONDING TO QUESTION ON CURRENT VISIT INF TEAM, LIMA TERMED IT "ROUTINE" AND EXPRESSED HOPES FOR "IMPROVED UNDERSTANDING IN CONSIDERATION MEASURES TAKEN BY GOB TO NORMALIZE NATION'S FINANCIAL SITUATION."

GORDON

TRT/18

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NAME OF OFFICER & OFFICE SYMBOL MR. QUINN	DATE OF ACTION 2/6/63	

GPO 930 500

Circulate To - Cuba Co-ordinator OFFICE FOR INFO - THEN TO RM/R

0934

WITHDRAWAL NOTICE

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0933

had acted with decision and force. Cuba lost many friends in Brazil and all its influence. Cuba was now totally isolated, and would soon collapse of its own weight, without anyone being able to say that the United States had raised a finger against Castro.

Referring to President Kennedy's proposed visit to Brazil, Senator Moura Andrade said that it was well that it had been postponed, particularly because now President Kennedy had won so much prestige by his handling of the Cuban crisis that his visit would be in the nature of a triumphal progress through Brazil.

CDK
CDKeyser

0932

predicted that with the restoration of presidentialism, it would be possible for Brazil to settle down to the solution of some of its problems.

Senator Moura Andrade then spoke of Latin America's and Africa's position in the world, observing that the axis of civilization in recent times had run between Europe and North America, so that Latin America and Africa had been left out of things entirely, much like small towns away from a railroad. Latin Americans and Africans, in order to sell their projects or to get anywhere, had had to go by buggy or horseback to the European and North American railroad stations. Times are changing, and Latin America and Africa are now having spur lines built out to them.

Turning to the policies of the United States, Senator Moura Andrade commented that no nation had been more generous, and yet it was clear that there were many Brazilians and Latin Americans who were not friends of the United States. He said that, to take one example, the United States had done much in the field of health for Brazil. He had never seen British, French, or Germans troubling themselves about the health of Brazilians, and he found this genuine concern on the part of Americans very impressive. Moreover, it was not a recent development, but extended back over many years, even decades; he cited the Rockefeller Foundation's successful efforts to wipe out yellow fever, and noted that the university of which he was a graduate (the Universidade de São Paulo) had benefited greatly from Rockefeller generosity.

The United States, he continued, had adopted a really magnificent attitude after World War II, creating the Marshall Plan and helping their former enemies to get back on their feet, helping the Italian and Germans to become competitive with the United States.

In view of this record of generosity on the part of the United States, he asked rhetorically, why was the United States not better liked? He said that in his opinion, it was because our efforts were not better known, because we did so much so quietly. The Russians bought 50,000 sacks of coffee and the President of the National Coffee Institute was overwhelmed with praise, but no one commented on the fact that the United States bought millions of sacks year in and year out. Moreover, the United States had sought to help Brazil by assisting in international price stabilization. The Senator admitted that there is also, perhaps, the natural jealousy of the rich on the part of the poor.

Turning to the Cuban crisis, he said that this had been perfectly handled by the United States. He said that Brazilians had not at first known what to make of President Kennedy, since he seemed too young and immature to handle the Presidency of the United States, but that he had proven himself in the Cuban crisis. President Kennedy had carefully thought out the problem, and then

0931

MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION

January 15, 1963

PARTICIPANTS: Senator Auro Soares de Moura Andrade (PSD, São Paulo), President of the Brasilian Senate

C. Dirck Keyser, Second Secretary in Charge, Brasilia

Howard E. Shetterly, Public Affairs Attaché, Brasilia

John A. Brettell, Attaché for Cultural Affairs, Brasilia

José Augusto Costa, Information Assistant, USIS, Brasilia

PLACE: Office of the President of the Senate, Brasilia.

SUBJECT: Brazilian National Politics and Brazilian-American Relations

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Messrs. Keyser, Shetterly, Brettell and Costa called on Senator Moura Andrade to record a brief message from him to be broadcast on the first Relay satelite radio link between Brazil and the United States. Senator Moura Andrade had prepared a short message in English which was recorded, after which he invited his guests to sit down and have a soft drink. After commenting on the stupendous technical and scientific achievement represented by the Relay satelite, Moura Andrade launched into a discussion of Brazilian politics and United States relations with Brazil and Latin America.

Speaking of Brazilian politics, he noted that life in Congress was busy these days (a special session had just opened earlier in the afternoon), since a way had to be found to put into effect the results of the January 6 referendum (which had resulted in a vote of disapproval of the 1961 amendment to the Brazilian Constitution replacing presidentialism with parliamentarism). He thought that a way of nullifying the amendment would be found during the special session, which would end on January 31. A way had to be found, since the parliamentarist system had proven unworkable in Brazil.

Brazil had been living in a continual state of crisis since August, 1961, and many bad policies, such as the profit-remittance bill, had been adopted in the heat of events. Many of these policies were mutually contradictory, and there seemed to be no continuity in Brazilian policies, either domestic or foreign. He



ACTION		
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LABOR
BELEM
B. HORIZONTE
CURITIBA
PORTO ALEGRE
RECIFE
SANTOS
SALVADOR
SAO PAULO(2)
CF(3)

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

AIRGRAM

~~XR PSR-2 45~~
~~XR PSR-4 Kennedy~~
732.00/1-3063
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A-872 NO. — OFFICIAL USE ONLY — AIR POUCH HANDLING INDICATOR

XR 911.11-KE
1963 FEB 9 AM 9 17

TO : Department of State
DEPARTMENT OF STATE BUREAU OF INTER-AMERICAN AFFAIRS FEB 11 1963

RM/AN ANALYSIS & DISTRIBUTION BRANCH

FROM : Amembassy, Brasilia Office DATE: January 30, 1963

SUBJECT : President of Brazilian Senate Predicts that Kennedy Visit Will Be Triumphal Progress.

REF :

Info - no action
ARA/E:ST:IS
R.J. Burton 2/13/63

There is enclosed a memorandum of a conversation with Senator Auro Soares de Moura Andrade (PSD, São Paulo), president of the Brazilian Senate, in which he praised United States policies.

Senator Moura Andrade said that he thought that the United States' handling of the Cuban crisis last October had been extremely sound and had had beneficial effects on the United States' relations with Latin America. He observed that it was well that President Kennedy's visit had been postponed, because when it comes now, it will be in the nature of a triumphal progress through Brazil.

Moura Andrade felt that the United States do not receive full credit for their many acts of assistance to Brazil, because so many of them are done quietly, without fanfare.

For the Ambassador:

John Keppel
Counselor of Embassy
for Political Affairs

FILED
FEB 14 1963

Distribution: All consulates in Brazil, Amb., DCM, Service Attachés, USIS, Econ (2), POL II, Labor, CF (3), POL (5), Brasilia (5).

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Drafted by: POL: CDKeyser
Contents and Classification Approved by: POL: JKeppel
Clearances:

284

0929

2. New Telephone System Not Working

Recife's newly overhauled telephone system, inaugurated two weeks ago, is sputtering along its chaotic way. The first week of operation was less than inspiring and evoked wry and knowing smiles from long time residents. Old lines are out and in many instances new ones will not be installed until March. The numbering system too continues to function poorly. So, after the fanfare, Recife residents are back to communication by messenger. (OFFICIAL USE ONLY)

Dr. Eugene Delgado-Arias
American Consul General

CONTRIBUTORS:

LDunlay
WSSmith

0928

3. Sampaio's Rush Continues

Governor CID SAMPAIO's frantic rush to make a lasting impression on Pernambuco voters continued and even increased in tempo this week. From somewhere Sampaio located more houses and more plots of land to hand out, more schools to inaugurate, additional buildings to dedicate. He issued a long list of promotions of friends and supporters in the civil service and the military police and awarded the Medal of Pernambuco to almost every worker in the Governor's Palace. Finally, Sampaio opened up the State payroll to hundreds of friends and allies, or relatives of friends and allies, by signing them to one year contracts with the State Government for such sinecures as legal advisor, juridical assistant, assistant elevator operator, substitute accountant, etc. Striving further to perpetuate his name and record, Sampaio's assistants worked night and day to complete a book and documentary films on Sampaio's four years as Governor. The book and the films are to be printed at the expense of the taxpayer. (LIMITED OFFICIAL USE)

4. Changes in Military Commands

1st Engineering Group - General JOSE LINDENBERG transferred command of the 1st Engineers this week to General AUGUSTO MATTA.

10th Military Region - General ALMERICO DE CASTRO NEVES assumed command of the 10th Region this week from General NICOLAU FICO who has been transferred to the 1st Military Region. (UNCLASSIFIED)

3rd Naval District - Although Admiral AUGUSTO ROQUE DIAS FERNANDEZ has been named Chief of Naval Personnel and will not be transferred here now, Admiral ARNOLDO TOSCANO informed the Consulate General this week that he will still surrender command of the 3rd Naval District in March. Admiral Toscano stated that his successor had not been named yet. (OFFICIAL USE ONLY)

ECONOMIC

1. Arraes to Continue COPERBO

COPERBO became somewhat of a political football this week, with Governor Sampaio making still another well publicized visit to the construction site and Arraes seemingly reversing his former position by declaring that his administration will carry on with the COPERBO project. He gave as his reasons for doing so the fact that so much money had already been spent on the project that it would now be difficult to halt in midstride. Moreover, he pointed out, irrevocable letters of credit had been given for the importation of heavy machinery and must now be honored. In essence, Arraes declared that he would make the best of a bad bargaim, try to patch up the holes left by the Sampaio administration, and "salvage something for the people." (OFFICIAL USE ONLY)

0927

plea of inability to pay the extra month's wages until the Banco do Brasil furnishes the necessary funds. The Banco do Brasil agreed some weeks ago to finance the payment of the 13th month salary to agricultural workers, as it has done for industry and commerce in urban areas, but reportedly has been slow to come up with the funds. FRANCISCO FALCÃO, representing the Cooperative of Sugar Millers and the Association of Cane Suppliers, traveled to Rio this week to ask the Banco do Brasil to furnish the funds immediately, but upon his return expressed doubt the Banco would do so. (UNCLASSIFIED)

COMMENT: As reported previously, strikes by peasants and other rural workers are likely to increase in frequency in the near future. Unfortunately, when elements of both the rural labor unions and the Ligas Camponesas are involved, as they are in the present situation, the public tends to see no difference between the two organizations and to consider both to be either Communist-inspired and politically motivated or democratic in nature and sincerely attempting to alleviate the problems of the peasantry. (OFFICIAL USE ONLY)

2. Vice Governor-elect Paulo Guerra Cheered for São Paulo Speech

Vice Governor-elect PAULO GUERRA was widely applauded for his blunt speech this week at the São Paulo Conference on the Integration of the Northeast. According to press reports, Guerra shocked the entire audience by challenging the unanimous opinion of preceding speakers who had described in rosy terms the progress being made toward the "redemption" of the area. He asserted that all of the chronic problems of the Northeast continue to exist and that little is being done to solve any of them. Of the Alliance for Progress efforts in the area Guerra was quoted as having expressed a lack of faith. Reiterating the oldest and most popular theme in Northeastern politics, Guerra stated that what the Northeast needs is not charity but justice.

This last-mentioned point was the one that brought most kudos from local commentators. All local newspapers praised Guerra's courage and forthrightness in "debunking the myth that the Northeast is on the road to redemption" and in stating frankly that at the root of the Northeast's misery is the "injustice it traditionally suffers" in its relations with the Federal Government and other areas of the Union. The State Assembly spent half a day listening to different assemblymen identify themselves with Guerra's declarations and the Municipal Council did the same, while various and sundry other politicians made gratiutous statements of support of Guerra. (UNCLASSIFIED)

0926

CONFIDENTIAL/ACTION

ARA-4 (25)

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INT	LAB 6	TAR
TR	XMB	AIR 4
ARMY 5	CIA 15	NAVY 5
OSD 12	USIA 8	NSA 3

DEPT. PASS
BELEM
PORTO ALEGRE
CURITIBA
BELO HORIZONTE

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

AIRGRAM

RM/R 732.00/1-3063

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A-72 NO. — LIMITED OFFICIAL USE — HANDLING INDICATOR

TO : DEPARTMENT OF STATE 1963 FEB 6 PM 2 36

INFO: RIO DE JANEIRO, BRASILIA, SÃO PAULO

RPAM ANALYSIS & DISTRIBUTION BRANCH

DEPARTMENT OF STATE BUREAU OF INTER-AMERICAN AFFAIRS FEB 7 1963

FROM : Amconsul RECIFE DATE: January 30, 1963

SUBJECT : Weekly Summary No. 31

REF : BELEM-1
PORTO ALEGRE-1
CURITIBA-1
BELO HORIZONTE-1

file n/1/63 RPR L.

TABLE OF CONTENTS

POLITICAL

1. Rural Labor Unions Threaten Strike
2. Vice-Governor-Elect Paulo Guerra Cheered for São Paulo Speech
3. Sampaio's Rush Continues
4. Changes in Military Commands

ECONOMIC

1. Arraes to Continue COPERBO
2. New Telephone System Not Working

FILED FEB 19 1963

POLITICAL

1. Rural Labor Unions Threaten Strike

Organized agricultural workers in several areas of Pernambuco's sugar zone threatened this week to go on strike unless they received payment of the 13th month salary by January 31. Reports reaching Recife indicated that rural unions and/or local centers of the Ligas Camponesas in Jaboatão, Vitoria de Santo Antão, Escada, and several other municipalities have adopted an intransigent position in response to the sugar industry's

FORM 4-62 DS-323

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Drafted by: See last page/ag

Contents and Classification Approved by:

Clearances:

0925

c. The PTB is sparing no efforts to make Governor Brizola's departure from office a memorable one. The local press has been flooded with paid appeals for a large turnout for an homenagem in front of Piratini Palace on January 31; reports have been circulated that his farewell address will be one of national significance, and the organizers of the homenagem reportedly plan to have Brizola carried through the streets of the city on the shoulders of his admirers when he makes his final exit from Piratini Palace.

6. Economic Notes

a. Among the more direct results of the recent increase in gasoline prices were a 50 percent increase in inter-city bus fares, a 20 percent increase in city bus fares, and a hike in taxis rates of about 30 percent.

b. The Japanese firm "ITACHI" recently awarded a DCT bid for the instalation of 12,000 telephones here, has signed an agreement with the State government to install a telephone equipment factory here. The State has agreed to grant 100,000 square meters of land and a 10 year tax holiday.

7. Miscellaneous

At a recent general meeting the political reporters of RGS newspapers took a jaundiced look at the record of the 1962 Legislative Assembly and decided not to name a "best deputy of 1962". This is probably just as well for the incumbents, since the deputy so honored in 1961 failed in his bid for reelection.

Thomas J. Duffield
American Consul

cc.: Consular Affairs, Rio
Political Section, Rio
Political Section, Brasília
ARA/EST/Brasil, Washington
INR/RAR/P, Washington

Department: pass to all posts in Brazil

0924

Even with the addition of the PL's 6 votes it can be seen from the above that the ADP cannot muster enough votes to organize the Legislative Assembly. And, with the PL insisting upon the election to the Presidency of the Assembly of Paulo Brossard, who is completely unacceptable to Meneghetti, the ADP may be left with only 21 votes on election day. Prospects for the PTB appear to be better. ARS deputy, Marino dos Santos, is a natural ally of the PTB and the reported price of MTR cooperation--election of its Candido Norberto as president of the Assembly--should not be too high for PTB. Of course, the MTR (as apparently is the case with PL and the ADP) may raise the ante too high for PTB. In that case the Assembly could be organized by an office-splitting agreement between the ADP and the PTB.

Comment: Although the President of the Assembly votes only to break a tie, the election for this position becomes more than usually significant in an Assembly so constituted as to make legislative deadlocks not only possible but probable. Then too, it is the President of the Assembly who acts as Governor of the State during that executive's absence.

4. Shocking Conditions in State Penitentiary Revealed by Prisoners' Hunger Strike

On January 23, the convicts at the Rio Grande do Sul State Penitentiary in the Partenon area of Pôrto Alegre went on a hunger strike to dramatize their request that the new administration appoint lawyers to the posts of Director of Penal Establishments and of warden of the penitentiary itself, rather than members of the state security force, the Brigada Militar. While the strike itself was of short duration, the convicts were able to bring to the attention of the public horrible conditions prevailing in the institution, including but not confined to: lack of sanitation, lack of water, failure to separate tubercular, leprous, insane and dying prisoners from the body of the prison population, and brutal acts perpetrated on the convicts by regular guards and members of the Brigada Militar. The penitentiary was built under Governor-elect Meneghetti's previous administration, and was at that time intended to be a "model" penal establishment. The strike was denounced by supporters of Governor Brizola as a political ploy.

5. Political Notes

a. The almost certain nomination of PTB State leader João Caruso as head of SUPRA (Superintendência de Planejamento da Reforma Agrária) has set the stage for a struggle between PTB deputies Wilson Vargas and Sereno Chaise for PTB Legislative Assembly leadership. Caruso will be replaced in the Assembly by PTB first alternate, Ludovino Fanton.

b. The Legislative Assembly has shortened its traditional summer recess by about five weeks. In the past the Assembly has met on January 31 and adjourned on February 1 until April 21. Henceforth it will adjourn on February 1 until March 15 and take a 30-day recess during July.

0923

bring about this transformation by normal and peaceful means. However, if these conventional means should fail, it is then our right to seek our liberation by other means. And it is those means, from that time onward, which will be the normal ones. Conventional means will then fall into disuse, since it will have been proven that it is through them that the country has tied down its people in suffering and in poverty."

2. Governor-Elect Meneghetti Has Cordial Interview with Jango

Returning to Pôrto Alegre on January 28 from a visit to Brasília, RGS Governor-elect Ildo Meneghetti expressed his satisfaction with the conversation he had held with President Goulart, during which he and the President found that they held "perfectly identical views" with regard to the future of Rio Grande do Sul." I expect that the legitimate demands of Rio Grande do Sul will be met", he stated, "so that it may continue its development in agriculture, power, transportation and production." He added that, just as he expected the federal government to lend its support to RGS, that government, in turn, would receive the support of the Gaúcho Executive. Mr. Meneghetti was accompanied on his trip to Brasília by the designated chiefs of his civilian and military households. He carried "3 kilos" of documents with him in a briefcase bought especially for the occasion. The new Governor confirmed that he had also held a conversation in Rio with São Paulo Governor-elect Ademar de Barros, but added: "we discussed administrative matters only".

3. Organization of the Legislative Assembly

Activities in the smoke-filled rooms increased last week as the two major political factions groped for a workable coalition which would enable one of them to elect the slate of officers which will govern the 55-member Legislative Assembly. With the organization of the house scheduled for January 31, the 4-member group of MTR deputies and the lone ARS (Communist) deputy appeared to hold the balance of power between Governor-elect Ildo Meneghetti's ADP and the opposition PTB. The membership of the Assembly will be as follows:

ADP(	PSD-Partido Social Democrático	11
	PDC-Partido Democrata Cristão	4
	UDN-União Democrática Nacional	3
	PRP-Partido de Representação Popular.....	3
	Total	21
	PL -Partido Libertador	6
	PTB-Partido Trabalhista Brasileiro	23
	MTR-Movimento Trabalhista Renovador	4
	ARS-Aliança Republicana Socialista	1
		55

0922

CHARGE TO ARA-4

RM/R	REP	AF
1		
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ARMY 5	CIA 10	NAVY 5
OSD 12	USIA 8	NSA 3
		JUS 1

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

AIRGRAM

22

732.00/1-2963
~~POL 2-2 BRAZIL~~

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A-36 RO. OFFICIAL USE ONLY HANDLING INDICATOR

1963 FEB 4 PM 1 05

TO : DEPARTMENT OF STATE

RIO DE JANEIRO-1 RECIFE-1
BELEM-1 SALVADOR-1
BELO HORIZONTE-1 SANTOS-1
CURITIBA-1 SAO PAULO-1

RECEIVED DEPARTMENT OF STATE
ANALYSIS & DISTRIBUTION BRANCH BUREAU OF INTER-AMERICAN AFFAIRS
FEB 5 1963

FROM : Amconsul Pôrto Alegre DATE: JAN 29 1963

SUBJECT : PÔRTO ALEGRE WEEKLY SUMMARY Nº 41

REF :

1. "Soldier of the People" Brizola Sees 1963 as Year of Revolution in Brazil
2. Governor-Elect Meneghetti Has Cordial Interview With Jango
3. Organization of the Legislative Assembly
4. Shocking Conditions in State Penitentiary Revealed by Prisoners' Hunger Strike
5. Political Notes
6. Economic Notes
7. Miscellaneous

Subj
No action
ARA/LEST/KB
2/9/63
RJ Dunton

1. "Soldier of the People" Brizola Sees 1963 as Year of Revolution in Brazil

In a speech given on January 24 before participants in a national radio congress, Governor Brizola stated that he had "turned down" an opportunity to take part in the new Federal government, as he considered himself merely a soldier of the people, and duty-bound to fight, on behalf of the people, to bring an end to the unfair social system which is strangling the country (ordem jurídica iníqua e injusta que está sufocando o Brazil). "I will be in the Chamber, observing everything, and I shall take with me a microphone to explain to the Brazilian people just what is taking place there." He added that in his mind, 1963 should be the year of revolution in Brazil, a revolution which would free the country from exploitation, poverty, and underdevelopment. He concluded his remarks in emphatic tones: "It is our duty to attempt to

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FORM DS-323 4-62

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Drafted by: WDMcLain/TWDuffield:zms

Contents and Classification Approved by:

Clearances:

0921

75

INCOMING TELEGRAM *Department of State* ACTION COPY — PERMANENT RECORD COPY

36 M

CONFIDENTIAL

COPIES RECEIVED
NUMBERED
Control: 17145
Rec'd: January 26, 1963
1:51 p.m.

INFO
RM/R FILES

Action
ARA

Info
SS
G
RMR

FROM: Rio de Janeiro

TO: Secretary of State

NO: 1415, January 26, 2 p.m.

PRIORITY

DEPTEL 1452

I disagree view expressed reference telegram, continuing believe our strategy here would be assisted by proposed message. Attendant publicity would be object of exercise, rather than regrettable by-product. On the other hand, if reference telegram reflects considered view at high level, I do not consider matter transcendental importance warranting indefinite discussion between us. Should be done by Monday or not at all.

GORDON

(2) SW
Note: Mr. Randolph (ARA) notified 1-26-63. CWO-M.

RIO DE JANEIRO 1415 732.00/1-2663


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NAME OF OFFICER & OFFICE SYMBOL: JKwilleman ARA/E ST	DATE OF ACTION: 1/28/63
	DIRECTIONS TO RM/R: Jde

GPO 930 500

0920



0919

interfere with the Plan. A Gazeta railed against the Furtado plan, calling it a method for increasing Goulart's government revenues at the expense of the people.

A Gazeta and O Estado got together on another subject, however: the Communist internal threat. Both saw Brazil's situation as made to order for Communist agitation, and called for urgent measures to improve living conditions. O Estado warned that communism in Brazil is gaining strength through Goulart-influenced labor unions, saw the President as knowingly maneuvering toward the replacement of democracy.

President Kennedy's State of the Union Message received wide and hearty reaction. Comments: American policy is wise because it is based on democratic liberalism; Kennedy is right in emphasizing the need for Latin American nations to help themselves rather than looking completely to the Alliance for Progress.

Daniel M. Braddock
Minister Consul General

Contributors: D. C. Proper
J. Mason

Distribution: INS/RAR, AmConGen Recife, AmConsulates Belem, Belo Horizonte, Curitiba, Porto Alegre, Salvador, Santos.

0918

beginning. The Governor-elect's selection of State cabinet members, however, is an excruciating process. There is hardly a cabinet post which does not have a half-dozen "sure bets" for Secretary, depending on which authority one chooses to believe. Most of the rumors, counter-rumors, and stabs in the back are clearly the work of the perspiring pretenders. Adhemar is visibly annoyed by all this, and when politicking annoys Adhemar, it must be bad. He promises that his choices -- due this week -- will not be affected by the maneuvers. (LIMITED OFFICIAL USE)

Comment: The new cabinet should be of great interest in demonstrating the firmness of Barros' intentions to turn over a new leaf. (LIMITED OFFICIAL USE)

3. Engineers blast regime.

São Paulo engineers -- an influential class -- have released two manifestos violently critical of the central government. Example: "The origins of this dire contingency /the general insecurity/ are in the total misgovernment of the Brazilian Nation, fruit of the incapacity demonstrated, in a shocking manner, by the men who hold the reins of power." (UNCLASSIFIED)

Comment: Another sign that, despite the recent pro-presidentialist vote, crucial São Paulo circles are as w a ry as ever of President Goulart. (LIMITED OFFICIAL USE)

PSYCHOLOGICAL

1. Local press reaction.

São Paulo newspaper commentators continued to examine the results and significances of the people's massive rejection of parliamentarism in the recent plebiscite. Most saw the return to presidentialism as a protest against do-nothing government, a call for basic reform, and Goulart's chance to get Brazil back on the track. Influential O Estado de S. Paulo scorned the widespread interpretation of the vote as a personal endorsement of Goulart: "The people said no to disorder, no to a policy that has as its symbol the President of the Republic."

Minister Celso Furtado's Three Year Enonomic Plan continued to receive extensive analysis, with opinions varying even within the same paper from day to day and writer to writer. A Hora and O Estado agreed that the Plan was generally good but would only be as successful as its administration. O Estado applauded the Plan's potential effect on run-away inflation and the beginnings already made in eliminating several subsidies. The Brazilian people must make more sacrifices to pay for the errors of the past, said O Estado, and must avoid strikes which will

0917

Alliance's success, but opined that "It is in precisely the present economic and financial situation that the use of the resources of the Alliance for Progress is most necessary." His vague expressions on Cuba and relations with the USSR seemed to toe the official Brazilian line.

Carvalho Pinto approved of the new Three Year Plan in general terms but mildly criticized its incompleteness. He stressed the need for rapid, determined execution of it. A member of his staff reports that this public position is considerably milder than the Governor's private opinion, which is that the Plan is "infantile." (LIMITED OFFICIAL USE)

Comment: To the Consulate General and most other observers, it has seemed unlikely that Carvalho Pinto would accept the Finance Ministry on any terms which Goulart would grant except under really catastrophic economic conditions. But the Governor's continued interest in the job seems established, making it possible that he will reduce his demands. His speech evidenced a real desire to get along with the Government on such secondary -- to him -- matters as foreign relations. His low opinion of Celso FURTADO's Three Year Plan may be due partly to pique, since Carvalho Pinto is the most demonstrably successful planner in Brazil. His evident reluctance to leave public life is a factor which deserves watching. (LIMITED OFFICIAL USE)

2. Adhemar maneuvering.

Governor-elect Adhemar de BARROS' relations with President Goulart still seem very much open to bargaining. Adhemar appears to want: (A) to share the political fruits of government by sharing in the cabinet, probably to the tune of one Ministry -- such as Industry and Commerce -- for the State of São Paulo and one other for his party; (B) to exercise a continuing influence upon Goulart, especially in the direction of conservatism and moderation. Adhemar's best trumps: (A) the State of São Paulo, with its obvious economic and political importance; (B) a possible pressure-group of Governors. Adhemar's "Brazilian Alliance for Progress," if it works, would be an argument for the Northeastern Governors to cooperate in the Governor's lobby. But in the "Brazilian Aliança" as in the rest of his plans -- most of which are distinctly nation-wide in scope -- Adhemar would find it useful to have at least the acquiescence of the President. The bargaining, therefore, is very likely to continue despite Adhemar's outspoken opposition to Goulart's leftist leanings.

In State-level politics, Adhemar's trumps are higher. His band wagon creaks under the load of masses of new passengers. There is little doubt that he will be able to get together a working majority in the Legislative Assembly, at least in the

0916

ORIGIN/ACTION		
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ARMY 5	CIA 10	NAVY 5
OSD 12	USIA 8	NSA 3

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

AIRGRAM

732.00/1-2563

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A-224 NO. — LIMITED OFFICIAL USE — HANDLING INDICATOR

TO : DEPARTMENT OF STATE 1963 JAN 28 AM 11 21 DEPARTMENT OF STATE BUREAU OF INTER-AMERICAN AFFAIRS

INFO : BRASILIA, RIO DE JANEIRO RM/AN ANALYSIS & DISTRIBUTION BRANCH JAN 29 1963

FROM : AmConGen, SÃO PAULO DATE: January 25, 1963

SUBJECT : Weekly Summary No. 56

REF :

TABLE OF CONTENTS

POLITICAL 1. What next for Carvalho Pinto?
2. Adhemar maneuvering.
3. Engineers blast regime.

PSYCHOLOGICAL 1. Local press reaction.

file no action ARA/E 5/1/63 R J Coulam 2/19/63

POLITICAL

1. What next for CARVALHO PINTO?

In a major "wrap-up" speech on January 16 (São Paulo A-222of January 23), outgoing Governor Carvalho Pinto left the door ajar for an invitation to the Finance Ministry. But he made it clear that he would need sweeping powers, referring even to the need of a say in foreign policy and labor affairs. A member of the Governor's staff confirms that the Finance Ministry might be on the agenda of a confidential talk to be held between Carvalho Pinto and GOULART January 21. The staff, however, does not think it likely that Goulart at this date would grant the authority which Carvalho Pinto would need.

Asked about the Alliance for Progress, the Governor suggested that it should be "less a welfare activity, less paternalistic...." He admitted Brazilian responsibility for creating the conditions necessary to the

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Drafted by: See last page/el 1/24/63 — Contents and Classification Approved by:

Clearances:

0915

CONFIDENTIAL

-2- 1409, January 25, 6 p.m., from Rio de Janeiro

anteparliamentarism.

According ULTIMA HORA January 25, Goulart personally directed drafting of statement on US aid recently issued by Brazilian Embassy Washington.

January 24 CNTI President Riani denounced attacks on Petrobras and Francisco Mangabeira saying workers would defend "nationalist character of that gigantic state enterprise." Dias Carneiro reportedly being held on as SUMOC director.

GORDON

DLW

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INCOMING TELEGRAM *Department of State*

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Control: 16735
Rec'd: January 25, 1963
10:29 p.m.

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RMR

FROM: Rio de Janeiro

TO: Secretary of State

NO: 1409, January 25, 6 p.m.

PRIORITY

Following from Brasilia:

Amaral Peixoto did not take office with other Cabinet nominees stating he wants to consult PSD parliamentary group early next week. His hesitations probably attributable to one or more following factors. Goulart gave two Cabinet posts to PSD not five as he reportedly had promised before plebiscite, withdrawing Foreign Ministry from Renato Archer at last minute. Goulart apparently developed reserve about PSD proposed administrative reform bill, execution of which Peixoto was to oversee.

Distribution of sub-Cabinet positions not yet official nor apparently in some cases made. No announcements yet on Bank of Brazil or BNDE with retention of incumbent likely in first place and unlikely in second. Under Bank of Brazil Carteira de Redescontes apparently being given Hugo de Faria and Cacez to Miguel Osorio de Almeida.

(3) We understand few if any changes being made in staff President's military household. Sub-Chefe for Naval Affairs getting routine transfer to Tokyo as Naval Attache. Luis Arraujo apparently leaving first sub-Chefe of Civil Household. Raul Ryff reportedly being replaced as President's press secretary by Luiz Alberto Bahia (national editor of VISAO magazine). Incidentally, former Prime Minister's office in Planalto and residence (Ipe) are, we understand, being taken by Evandro Lins, new Chief of Casa Civil, disposition which was apparently status quo /anteparliamentarism

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NAME OF OFFICER & OFFICE SYMBOL	DATE OF ACTION		TO RM/R
R J Buster	2/19/63		file

GPO 930 500

RIO DE JANEIRO - 1409

732.00/1-2563

RM 7315

0913

OFFICIAL USE ONLY Salvador A-59

3

Shipping:

The Brazilian ship Lucio Meira, recently built by the Emaq shipyard in Rio de Janeiro for the Companhia Navegacao Bahiana, a mixed State Government and private company, arrived with appropriate ceremony at this port on January 22nd. The ship has space for 1,200 tons of cargo and 50 cabins for passengers, and will operate on the Araçaju-Salvador-Ilheus-Rio de Janeiro line.

/s/ Harold M. Midkiff
Harold M. Midkiff
American Consul

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0912

Salvador A-59

the prospect of obtaining a federal loan to cover extra expenses stemming from revised salary schedules.

Comment: While the Governor's trip reportedly was undertaken "to attend to state affairs", it is apparent that he is also deeply involved in UDN party politics and in attending to his future activities, which, he affirms, will not be political.

New Municipal Officers: The Mayor and aldermen for Salvador will receive their "diplomas" (certificates of election) this evening instead of January 23 as previously announced. It is expected that the transfer of office will not take place until April 7 when the newly elected State officials will assume their posts.

ECONOMIC:

Rising prices in a vast number of consumer goods were most noticeably led by gasoline, as reported last week, and cooking gas. The resulting prices, by the current free (parallel) exchange rate of about 800 cruzeiros to the dollar, however, still leave the consumer paying only about the equivalent of 18 cents a gallon for regular gasoline and approximately twice that for high test. The rise has touched off the most vociferous public protest of any within the past year. Reflecting the general trend, the local Leste Brasileiro railway, owned by the Federal Government, received instructions from the Ministry of Transportation to make studies to determine whether to initiate a price increase of up to 50% in passenger fares. Additionally, Salvador port warehousing and stevedoring charges increased 40% during the week.

Comment: Higher costs of gasoline and port services will affect very many consumer items, of course.

LABOR:

Workers at the local Cimento Aratu plant, American owned and run, which has had a long history of peaceful labor relations, have been out on strike since January 19. The principal real demand of the union is to eliminate outside contracting for a number of tasks, although a raise in salaries by 78% retroactive to last September 1, which was in reality already agreed to, was thrown up as an apparent smokescreen. There are apparently no political implications involved. Cimento Aratu is almost the sole supplier to the states of Bahia and Sergipe, so a prolonged strike would have serious repercussions on all types of construction in this Consular District.



ORIGIN/ACTION

ARA 4

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NEA	CU	INR 5
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	FBO	AID 12
AGR	COM 10	FRB 3
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TR 2	XMB	AIR 4
ARMY 5	CIA 10	NAVY 5
OSD 12	USIA 8	NSA 3
	FMC 2	

Note no action taken as of Section 2/9/63

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

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TO : DEPARTMENT OF STATE

1963 FEB 1 PM 3 39

DEPARTMENT OF STATE BUREAU OF INTER-AMERICAN AFFAIRS FEB 4 1963

INFO: Amembassy, Rio and Brasilia

Recfe-1

RM/AN ANALYSIS & DISTRIBUTION BRANCH

FROM : American Consulate, Salvador DATE: January 25, 1963

SUBJECT: Weekly Summary, Salvador

REF :

POLITICAL:

Governor-elect Lomanto's frenetic action in returning to Brazil on the day he arrived in New York (January 22) has been the subject of considerable local speculation. The press, kindly, has not played up the event so far. However, one of the local radio stations with leftist, anti-Lomanto leanings carried a severely critical statement this morning ridiculing him.

Comment: Lomanto has shown himself in a bad light by hopping back to Brazil and being ineffective in what is fairly well known to have been his effort to oppose or at least offset Antonio Balbino's influence in the national government. It is apparent that he has prejudiced his standing in national affairs, and his effort to gain prestige before embarking on his administration has had a severe set-back. This lends even greater importance to his visit to the United States and elsewhere. While his erratic movements have not made it any easier to be well received, he will need to capitalize on his contacts abroad, and it is hoped a good program can still be worked out for him.

Governor Juracy Magalhães, who has been in Rio de Janeiro for the past few days, is reported optimistic over

DEPARTMENT Please pass to Recife.

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Drafted by: HMMidkiff:WHBMatthews:la

Contents and Classification Approved by:

Clearances:

0910

it were not for the fact that Brazilians don't like to fight. The people have become disillusioned with J. Magalhães, who seems to have abandoned interest in governing. They place great hope in Lomanto and he must be able to show something positive within the first six months of office or he will lose their good will and the task of administration will become that much more difficult. This is going to be very difficult to do. Lomanto is counting on some indication of support from the United States, as well as on help from the Federal Government.

SUDENE:

Lelivaldo said he had counselled Lomanto not to go to Recife to present his plan to SUDENE because that organization is suspect. It has shown leftist tendencies and has lost prestige with the governors of the Northeast, except for Arraes. If Lomanto were to go to it, this would tend to lend it importance. The Governor-elect went over SUDENE's head to Goulart and, de Brito believes, he got some sort of assurance of support from the President for the projects.

MINISTERIAL APPOINTMENTS AND BAHIA:

Lomanto might well have returned from the United States on arriving in New York (we know at this writing that he did return) because of his interest in influencing the selection of Goulart's cabinet. Lomanto does not object to Balbino's inclusion, but he feels a representative of the winning coalition in the state should also represent Bahia if Balbino is given a post. After all, Bahia is the only influential state where the PTB got the Governorship, de Brito said. Asked about the newspaper stories that Manoel Novais is being pushed for a Ministerial post by Lomanto, de Brito acknowledged that he had seen these and did not confirm nor deny them, although in the end he said he doubted that Novais would get a cabinet post.

Harold M. Midkiff
American Consul

0909

ORIGIN/ACTION		
ARA-4		
RM/R 1	REP	AF
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OSD 12	USIA 8	NSA 3

Chile
no action
ARA/E 2/13
2/19/63
WJ Buston

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

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DRAFTING INDICATOR

TO : DEPARTMENT OF STATE 1963 FEB 1 PM 3 39

DEPARTMENT OF STATE BUREAU OF INTER-AMERICAN AFFAIRS FEB 4 1963

INFO: Amembassy, Rio and Brasilia
Amcongen, Recife

RM/AN ANALYSIS & DISTRIBUTION BRANCH

FROM : American Consulate, Salvador DATE: January 24, 1963

SUBJECT : Conversation with Lelivaldo de Brito, Brother-in-law of Governor-elect Antonio Lomanto Junior

REF :

On January 23, 1963, I had a conversation with Lelivaldo de Brito, whose sister is married to Governor-elect Antonio Lomanto Junior. Mr. de Brito appears to be in his late thirties. He has a rather slight build, is very well groomed and has fine, attractive features. His manner is correct but courteous and pleasant. He is one of Lomanto's most trusted associates. He campaigned very actively for Lomanto. His usual occupation is that of managing the estates and enterprises left to his mother, two sisters and himself by the untimely death of his father in 1955. He is also involved in the administration of the Jequie radio station and the telephone company.

Aside from giving biographic data on his sister, which is the subject of a separate communication, Mr. de Brito referred to several subjects believed to be of general interest.

FINANCES:

He considers the financial condition of the state disastrous. Administrative costs run to something like 24 billion cruzeiros while State revenues amount only to about 15 billion. (The balance, and any operating capital, has to come from federal sources and/or loans). Bahia exports her principal products (cacau, tobacco) on the basis of 400 plus cruzeiros to the dollar, and buys imports on the basis of nearly 1000 cruzeiros to the dollar. The Federal Government pockets the difference. This sort of thing leads to sectionalism, he said, which could have erupted into separatism if

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Drafted by: HMMidkiff:la

Contents and Classification Approved by:

Clearances:

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35 ships crammed into the harbor, and 13 waiting outside for space. Several vessels were diverted to southern ports in order to avoid the long and costly wait for berthing facilities in Recife.

Meanwhile, in other labor developments during the week, telegraph workers walked off the job, but were back again within four hours. And the projected bank strike was avoided altogether. As of this writing, therefore, the various striking maritime unions are the only labor sectors involved in work stoppages. (UNCLASSIFIED)

2. New Telephone System

Recife's brand new telephone system was inaugurated this week. New exchanges, lines and some 25,000 new instruments have been installed. The first few days of the "new regime" have seen complete chaos, with the old lines cut off, the new ones still not fully connected, and no one knowing anyone else's number on the new circuits even if they did work. Hopefully, however, the kinks will be smoothed out within a few weeks and Recife will have, for the first time in its history, a reasonably adequate telephone system---though 30,000 phones for a city of 850,000 is still precious little. (UNCLASSIFIED)

PSYCHOLOGICAL

The seventy percent increase in the price of gasoline created more of an editorial reaction in this area than any recent issue, local or international. And it became linked with the recent mandate for return to presidentialism.

Jornal do Commercio editorialized, "If Presidentialism begins by the increase in the price of fuels, it cannot be said that it begins well." SOCRATES TIMES DE CARVALHO in his column in Diario da Noite wryly observes, "Seventy percent increase in the price of gasoline---here is the present that the People merit a week after having assisted in the plebiscite to end 'parliamentarianism'!" Even a column such as "Indiscreet Window" which usually deals with the entertainment world commences with the comment that "The increase in the price of gasoline probably is going to create still more problems than those which already exist in a land so discredited as the Northeast is."

Lowell C. Kilday
American Vice Consul

Contributors:

LCKilday
WSSmith
CTucker

0907

will be able to recapture this important political position and restore somewhat the prestige and influence they lost in October's gubernatorial election. (OFFICIAL USE ONLY)

3. Djalma Maranhão Attacks SUDENE

DJALMA MARANHÃO, leftist-nationalist Mayor of Natal, publicly accused SUDENE this week of "speaking the language of the left but adopting positions of the right." Complaining that SUDENE had yet to give the slightest collaboration to his administration in its many requests for aid, Maranhão implied that SUDENE was deliberately aiding his political opponents. (UNCLASSIFIED)

COMMENT: It would be a healthy development if more of the ultra leftist-nationalists began to find fault with SUDENE. (LIMITED OFFICIAL USE)

4. A Blazing Finish for Governor Sampaio

Governor CID SAMPAIO's term of office expires on January 31, 1963. That fact is clear, though one would not perceive it watching Sampaio in action this last month. Sampaio, all of a sudden, has started to act like a candidate for re-election, doing all of the things he should have done during last year's gubernatorial campaign.

At least three times a week, Sampaio or his wife is honored by one or another of the local business, industial, civic or charitable groups, something which they both seemed to avoid before. He loses no opportunity to make contact with the public, and seems to spend most of his time inaugurating new schools, distributing houses in the low-cost public housing project, passing out land titles in state colonization projects, etc. Had Sampaio carried on in this manner during the gubernatorial campaign and before, the results of October's elections could have been different. (OFFICIAL USE ONLY)

COMMENT: Clearly, Sampaio wishes to preserve his position of state political leadership, and his last minute antics are designed to impress upon the electorate the accomplishments of his administration. Following the expiration of his term of office, the Consulate General has been informed, Sampaio and his closest political associates intend to organize an "opposition center" to lead the attack on Miguel Arraes in preparation for the Recife mayoralty contest and subsequent political battles. As Governor, Sampaio was unable to hold together Pernambuco's several moderate-conservative factions and even came close to losing the support of his own party, the UDN. It is doubtful, then, that he will be able to command the moderate-conservatives now regardless of the final impression he leaves with the public by his wholesale distribution of lots and houses. (LIMITED OFFICIAL USE)

ECONOMIC

1. Maritime Strike

Harbor congestion continued to worsen as the nation-wide maritime strike drug into its fourth week. The port of Recife's heaviest day this week saw

0906

The Public Safety Advisor to the state police was informed that Camara, following his arrest, had boasted the possession of sizeable quantities of Czech-manufactured modern armaments, including machine guns, automatic rifles, and explosives. Camara stated that the Ligas Camponesas were now using these arms in training but that the day would arrive soon when they would employ them to obtain "social justice." He indicated that agitation would increase after Governor-elect MIGUEL ARRAES takes office because the Ligas wanted to see if Arraes would carry out this campaign pledges.

Earlier in the week, Camara received a splash of publicity when he announced that he would soon form Ligas Urbanas as a city counterpart to the Ligas Camponesas. The Ligas Urbanas, he stated, would organize Recife's slum dwellers to seek collectively an improvement in their standard of living. (CONFIDENTIAL)

COMMENT: Camara's sanity is questionable. Though not necessarily completely false, his statements to the police and the press are designed to gain publicity and a reputation for himself and not to reveal the plans or logistics of the Ligas Camponesas. Camara, himself, it might be added, would seem to be dangerous only as an agitator and fomenter of discontent but not as a revolutionary leader.

The formation of Ligas Urbanas would do much to heighten tension in and around Recife. Given the proper leadership, such organizations could prove to be much more of a threat to the peace and order of the Northeast than the Ligas Camponesas. Even if Camara is not prosecuted and is released from arrest, as seems likely, it is doubtful that he could effectively lead the urban masses, which are somewhat more sophisticated than their rustic brethren. (CONFIDENTIAL)

2. Recife Mayoralty Race Beginning

Although the election will be held only in August, jockeying for position in the Recife mayoralty campaign has already started in earnest. As was the case in last year's gubernatorial campaign, various factions have started early to bargain in favor of their favorite candidates and one or two independents are attempting to muster widespread popular support. Possible candidates at this point include: former Mayor and outgoing Vice Governor PELOPIDAS SILVEIRA, Acting Mayor and newly-elected Federal Deputy ARTUR LIMA CAVALCANTI, Railway Administrator ALMIR BRAGA, Federal Deputy and IAPI (Industrial Workers Pension and Retirement Institute) President WALDEMAR LUIZ ALVES, Olinda Mayor BARRETO GUIMARAES, President of the Bar Association JOSE CAVALCANTI NEVES, and former Secretary of Finance PAULO MACIEL. (UNCLASSIFIED)

COMMENT: There appears to be a good chance that Recife's leftists will divide over the question of who should run for Mayor. Former Mayor Pelopidas Silveira, a politician of great popular strength in Recife, is known to want very badly to run, but it is not likely that Governor-elect Miguel Arraes will support him. If more than one leftist campaigns for the office, it is highly possible that the moderate-conservatives

0905

ORIGIN/ACTION

ARA-4

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INT	LAB	TAR
TR	ZMB	AIR 4
ARMY 5	CIA 15	NAVY 5
OSD 12	USIA 8	NSA 3

DEPT. PASS

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CURITIBA
BELO HORIZONTE

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2/4/63
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DEPARTMENT OF STATE

AIRGRAM

732.00/1-2463

FOR RM USE ONLY

A-69 (NO.) CONFIDENTIAL (HANDLING INDICATOR)

1963 JAN 30 PM 1 38

TO : DEPARTMENT OF STATE

INFO: RIO DE JANEIRO, BRASILIA, SÃO PAULO
Belem-1
Porto-Alegre-1
Curitiba-1

ANALYSIS & DISTRIBUTION BRANCH

FROM : Amconsul RECIFE
Belo Horizonte-1

DEPARTMENT OF STATE BUREAU OF INTER-AMERICAN AFFAIRS JAN 30 1963

DATE: January 24, 1963

SUBJECT: Weekly Summary No. 30

REF :

FILED FEB 4 1963

TABLE OF CONTENTS

POLITICAL

1. Ligas Agitator Arrested
2. Recife Mayoralty Race Beginning
3. Djalma Maranhão Attacks SUDENE
4. A Blazing Finish for Governor Sampaio

ECONOMIC

1. Maritime Strike
2. New Telephone System

PSYCHOLOGICAL

POLITICAL

1. Ligas Agitator Arrested

JOEL ARRUDA CAMARA, youthful Ligas Camponesas agitator, was again arrested this week and charged with violation of the National Safety Act. Camara had been arrested by the Army earlier this year for having led a peasant "invasion" in Bom Jardin, Pernambuco, (See Weekly Summaries Nos. 7 and 9) but was released after a short confinement. This week Camara was arrested for having led recent peasant "invasions" or otherwise "incited against the Government" in Tambe, Pedras de Foga, Condado and Escada.

FORM DS-323 4-62

CONFIDENTIAL

FOR DEPT. USE ONLY ☒ In ☐ Out

Drafted by: See last page/ag

Contents and Classification Approved by:

Clearances:

0904



Tal aos 32 minutos do segundo tempo, no lance de cobrança do Vasco no Pentagonal do México. Rele, que substituiu Maranhão aos 12 minutos da segunda fase, trouxe passes com Jobard e depois cabeceia para Vevé, que também entrara no lugar de Vicentinho. Vevé cabeceou para a area e Sanfoninha, de meia bicicleta, ativou como se vê na foto



O lance do fecho da vitória, sinto de três da area, quando o bate Jó lucia passando por Camacho, brasileiro do Atlético, Aparecem Lemos e Sanfoninha, à direita, quase encobertos pelo trave Vicente e Portugal. A entrada de Zezé leva vigia a equipe, que não contava com Alexandre nessa hora bolo, talvez decido o ultimato



Foram grandes as comemorações pela conquista do "goal" em especial pelo quarteto que colaborou para a vitória. Na foto, o dia de fabulhão abraça-se Zézé e Sobarzi, enquanto Sanfoninha e Vevé, respectivamente autor do tento e da prova final, correm, ao mesmo tempo em que Jobard vem para os abraços. Atrás, o zagueiro Cabeça e o canadense Rumsby que corre para abraçar Sant



Na segunda fase, Jorge Vieira acertou com a estréia de Rele e Vevé, mas Isaías Trelles, técnico da América e da seleção mexicana, levou arrudiamente de campo Del Aguila e Martel. No flagrante aparece o "acrobatismo" de Jose Del Aguila, considerado o melhor atacante depois de Garrincha, tentando passar por Rumsby. Coruael e Bolsonaldo a que não consegue



Zagueiro, apontado como o melhor brasileiro dos que atuam em grandes mexicanos, Jose Costa Travolho é defesa do Vasco. Na fotografia está passando por Joel, que cabeceou seus pés, parece nem começar falta ao ataque na area



Defesa de Ita, elogiado pela imprensa mexicana como arqueiro do excepcionais qualidades, destacando, de sorte, uma irresistida de Matia, da America. Joel tambem agarrou um fute recebido por penalti na Pan-Americana

VITÓRIAS DOS BRASILEIROS

GUAYAQUIL, 17 (AP — O GLOBO) — Quarenta e cinco mil torcedores assistiram ao encontro de Barcelona, time-campeão do Equador, e do Botafogo do Rio. Na direção de jogo estêve o juiz peruano Arturo Yamasaki, cuja tal o árbitro de Brasil x Chile na Taça do Mundo do Chile. As equipes estavam assim formadas: BOTAFOGO — Manga, Joel, Jadir, Nilton Santos e Rildo; Mirlon e Gérson; Garrincha, Quarentinha, Amarildo e Zagalo. BARCELONA — Anselmo, Guifarro, Lozano, Juir (substituiu em alguns atos Reina, com o apelido de Vermelhol e Muñoz; Beltran e Zambrano; Rabaza, Quiroguini, Iris (substituiu que também supra no Hungri) e Cassetti. Na primeira fase o Botafogo marcou três tentos, todos por Quarentinha, aos 9 minutos, centro de Zagalo; Amarildo, aos 12, de cabeça de Garrincha; e de Garrincha, aos 28, numa jogada uma falta fora da area. Na segunda fase, aos 4 minutos, Garrincha, novamente cobrando falta fora da area, fêz o quarto tento, colocando o Amarildo em condições de cabecear o centro, que 12 minutos depois, de driblar três adversários, Garrincha fêz a grande figura do esquadrão brasileiro. O Botafogo jogará amanhã, em Cali, contra o Deportivo.

São Paulo 3 x Cristel 1

LIMA, 17 (AP — O GLOBO) — Foi fácil para o São Paulo o encontro de estréia na temporada no estádio, ao ganhar do Sporting Cristal, vice-campeão que é daquela cidade peruana, pelo placar de três tentos de Dill, pois novamente de Pel. Os quatro formaram assim: SÃO PAULO — Gilberto, De Sordi, Bellini, Aurantes e Ribeiro; Sérgio e Lido; Pagalino, Dill, Prado e Arnaldo. SPORTING CRISTAL — Parraga, Campos, De la Torre e Elias; Neri e Fritz; Del Castilla, Lobaton, Gallardo, Alabajar e Pardo. Na primeira fase, aos 25 minutos, Paulinho abriu o marcador. Na segunda final, aos 4 minutos, Prado completou o excelente lance de passe de Dill. O terceiro Parraga saiu do arco e Prado atirou para marcar. Aos 11 minutos Bellini fêz "penalty" em Gallardo, que cobrou e fêz o terceiro. Gilberto sofreu o segundo tento. Saindo melhor e mantendo a vantagem no terceiro tento, ludiando a bola na maior superior e entrando no arco. Sábado ainda nesta capital, o São Paulo defrontará o campeão Alianza, que tem como técnico Isaías de Alencar.

Vasas, Líder

GUADALAJARA, 17 (AP — O GLOBO) — O Vasas de Hungria derrotou hoje o Nacional, na disputa do Torneio Argentino, com dois pontos conseguidos na primeira fase, pois bilionários do Brasileiro e Nacional e Nacional, e do Boca, com 6. Com a vitória o Vasas assumiu a liderança do pentagonal com 4 pontos ganhos e melhor goleio, seguido de Palmeiras com 3 pontos e 1 perdido, ficando em última posição o Nacional, que não conseguiu ainda mais agora que ficou também com Celio, chegado segunda-feira a Manila, que deverá estar aqui até a hora do jogo.

Luís Inácio Nocauteado!

MONTEVIDEU, 17 (AP — O GLOBO) — O argentino Andrés Selpa, de 24 anos, venceu o brasileiro Luis Inácio (Luisão), de 77 quilos, por nocaute técnico no sétimo assalto.

ELIMINADO O TOTTENHAM

LONDRES, 17 (AP — O GLOBO) — O Tottenham Hotspur venceu por dois anos do Task da Inglaterra, foi derrotado e eliminado pelo Burnley por 3x0, numa peleja com campo coberto por neve.

Prêmios

Além da classificação já creditada de 25 dólares pelo Jogo sobre o Apoelica, nortenos fizeram os possuem dentro a Sudamericano, o autor do tento da vitoria, Ganhou uma casa com este, mantenha luminosa. Cinquenta em pó, gloco, doces em lata e outras variedades. Naturalmente foi grande a concorrência para a divisão de prêmio...

Os Campeões

Este é a serie pentanonal da cidade do México e os vencedores dos quatro anteriores foram os seguintes:

II — Guadalajara, com a participação de Tolosa, Zacatepec, Botafogo e River.

III — Santos, com os seguintes adversários: Guadalajara, Italia, América (do Rio) e Leon.

IIII — Tolosa, tendo como concorrentes Guadalajara, América (méxico), Flamengo e San Lorenzo (Argentina).


IV) — Guadalajara, disputando com Santos, Oco, Atenca e Independiente (Argentina).

V — Guadalajara, contra Botafogo, Upsel, Tolosa e Atlantic.

Não Gostaram os Mexicanos

Extraoficialmente, os círculos esportivos mexicanos ficaram contrariadíssimos com a notícia de que a candidatura da Argentina para sede da Copa do Mundo de 1970 não foi retirada na reunião da FIFA no Cairo, o representante da CBD, Luis Mariani, que também é membro do Comitê Executivo da entidade mundial. Os jornais ontem. Funcionaram que não poderiam esperar tal gesto de amigos.

A ESTRÉIA DO BONSUCESSO NA GUATEMALA



Nilton, o capitão do Bonsucesso, à direita, acompanha a luta Pablo Tobin, que lança a moeda para escolha de rumos, ao juiz de estrêla do Bonsucesso, Domingos Milton, na Guatemala, contra o Municipal. Nesse encontro de 1ª, cabendo ao ponteiro rubro-anil Roberto fazer o tento das hostilidades, aumentando para 2 o número de seus feitos no exterior



O Municipal, que é o terceiro colocado do certame profissional, foi adversário valente. Na foto aparece Cláudio fazendo uma defesa, enquanto Nilton e Severiano estão a entrada de um contrário. Dia 20 o Bonsucesso joga em El Salvador e a seguir disputará um quadrangular em Vera Cruz, no México, o primeiro que será realizado naquela cidade

OITI 3 x COLÉGIO 1

NA PARTIDA inicial da rodada de domingo, o fútil derrotou ontem, à noite, no campo do Andaraí, o Colégio por 3x1. No primeiro tempo venceu o perdedor por 2x0, tento de Vavá. No segundo final Colégio Celso da Cunha Reis) e a renda foi de Cr$ 39.550,00. O segundo jogo, de Colégio, foi negativo no segundo tempo. Os quadros formaram assim: OITI — Ruberto, Ricardo, Adelmar e Jesus; Odir e Ivanzir; Ronaldo, Sabará, Lemel, Lecival e Gelson (Carlos) COLÉGIO — Jaime, Ubiratan e Diogo; Ricardo, Luiz (Salvador) e Adelmo; Jesus, Wilton, Vera, Célio e Tião.

ANTECIPAÇÃO — Na segunda rodada há um jogo interessante, o que reunirá as equipes dos ilustradores Atlas e do Bonsucesso, que realizarão sábado à tarde no campo do Manguinhos.

Coutinho & Pelé

Pele desbaratou o sistema defensivo carioca ter mantido perfeita harmonia de jogo, o do jogo. Mas foi o seu pa mínimo o superioridade sa em, nos 45 minutos da arti. O primeiro aos 9 minutos, se de uma "corner" por Dorval que centrou da linha de fun. Pescou livre no pequeno da dribles Tarzines, Zezeremar sabrin. Pelé, o 4.º, aos 40m. teou na linha de fundo.

Final Tranqüile

Para a etapa final o Santos ou no "olé", pondo insistindo mas sempre sem grandes ameaças para aproveitar o momento e mostrar um futebol em que Gilmar fora de meio, consegu pena sentida. Deve-se citar deu pelo menos três "pegas"

Movimento Técnico

Jogo: Malhia x Esporte Clube final pela Taça Brasil, ontem de Cr$ 671.650,00. 1.º tempo: Santos, 4x0. 2.º Final: Santos, 4x0. Juiz: Armando Marques. SANTOS — Gilmar, Hélio e Mendonça; Dorval, Coutinho ESPORTE — Dirceu, Rei dear e Botequim; Lucas, Dj

CARIOCA

FOI bom o treino dos cari Sul, placar ampliado na (Gema substituto com o rend não poderia mesmo agüenta rem a concentração e hoje o técnico, quando Pelé e Mauro

Movimento Técnico

Jogo-treino — Seleção C ICF x Portuguesa.

Local — Estádio de Gener. Severino, ontem à noite.

Preliminar — Carioca, 3 Flamengo 0.

Renda — Cr$ 282.430,00.

Juiz — Nivaldo Santos, to do com auxiliares Marco Vinicio e Cesar Nascimbu.

1.º tempo: Seleção carioca Jadir, "goal" de Carrelo, aos minutos, e Gérson (2), aos e 28 minutos.

Final — Seleção, fut. tem de Nélson, aos 18 minutos, 2 Jo aos 17 e Fagundes aos 22 i nutos, sabendo a Paula "goal" de honra dos fregu aos 45 minutos.

Quadros: SELEÇÃO DA P — Castilho; Jair Marinho e Jose; Murilo, aos 20 minuto Zezinho (depois, Haroldo, aos 28 minutos; Luis Carlos (depois Jordan aos 38 minutos); Gerson (Nélson, no tempo) e Carlinhos; Orv (José), no fase recolocando Henrique Negrão, Fidgueira, 2.ª período. Dida (depois, G com ao meio da 2.ª fase posteriormente, Henrique, a 26 minutos e Nilo (depo

DERROTADA EM SOROCAB/ A SELEÇÃO BANDEIRANTE

SOROCABA, 17 (Especial para O GLOBO) — A seleção Juniores, catarinense-fracassou. Foi vencida pelo São Bento, disputando a quarta de oitocentos mil expectadores. Na primeira fase a seleção, com Seito de Davi aos 42 minutos, em cobrança de escanteio, mas no período final o placar passou para o São Bento, com Gato tentos de Pedro, aos 39 e aos 41 minutos. Os juniores da "Seleção" pareciam inteiramente perdidos. Logo foram da equipe local, que atuou descontraidamente. Os times foram assim: SELEÇÃO — Pilla; Ferrari, Preto, Dinho e Zé Carlos; Lisi e Lima; Batista, Raul, Tarcisio Pinto (Bi) e Sabino; SÃO BENTO — Victor (Cori, pois o titular continuou machucado); Joelino, Jailão, Airilo e Salvador; Nestor Paulinho; Atanasinho, Cabral, Pedro, Raimundo e Parana.

COUTINHO FÊZ TODOS NA GOLEADA DE ONTEM



Defesa de Birro, num arremesso de Tito, realizado à


SÃO PAULO, 17 (O GLOBO) — O Santos, campeão do III Tu Paranaense, o esporte Clube Recife, por 6x0, classificou Taça do IV Taça Brasil, o Botafogo, O bicampeão normanhar Cino sábado, em Recife, quando empatou por 1x1, depois de quase quinze todo o jogo. O Santos, por isso, veraneou da em todas as suas linhas, em destaque o quarteto ofensivo, co

ENCLOSURE:
"Rio A-840 ARA

20608

MANIFESTO DE ENGENHEIROS DE SÃO PAULO À NAÇÃO

LISTA DE ADESÕES



CONFIDENTIAL

Also on January 17 respected Estado de Sao Paulo in effect repeated an earlier call for a centrist military coup (Weeka 45, December 11, 1962)--or asked at least that the possibility be kept open. "The non-participation of a soldier in the political life of the nation is only called for up to the moment in which his silence..becomes a kind of complicity with those who...are disposed to exceed the limits /of/ the Constitution...The insidious intentions of the President...and those who accompany him...shine through all their acts and make a reaction inevitable, even from the Army and the Navy". Pin-pointing its concern, Estado stated flatly: "With the departure of General Kruel from the War Ministry the days of /democratic government/ would be numbered".

With a prompt return to presidentialism now seemingly assured, the next days will be highly significant, especially as Goulart names his new cabinet. Political leaders seem remarkably willing to go along with Goulart's wishes (though a common interpretation of their cooperation has it that they are merely stuffing into his hands the rope with which they hope he will hang himself). The reported statements and pronouncements are evidence that there are those who retain deepseated suspicions of Goulart's ultimate intentions. If these suspicions are well-founded the engineers' signed manifesto took courage, for an autocratic regime would certainly exact reprisals; on the other hand, their public endorsement of the manifesto may be a measure of their basic optimism.

For the Ambassador:

Charles C. Carson

Charles C. Carson
Second Secretary

Enclosure:
1. Clippings

Encl. detached

CONFIDENTIAL

0901

ACTION
ARA-4

RM/R	REP	AF
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ARMY 5	CIA 10	NAVY 5
OSD 12	USIA 8	NSA 3

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R J Barston

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

AIRGRAM

732.00/1-2363

FOR RM USE ONLY

A-840 — CONFIDENTIAL

NO. — HANDLING INDICATOR

TO : SecState WASHINGTON

DEPARTMENT OF STATE 1963 JAN 28 PM 12 40
BUREAU OF INTER-AMERICAN AFFAIRS JAN 29 1963
RM/AN ANALYSIS & DISTRIBUTION BRANCH

FROM : AmEmbassy RIO DE JANEIRO

DATE: January 23, 1963

SUBJECT : Political Events Stir Alarm

REF :

Though the several political parties hastened to accede to President Goulart's pressures to anticipate the return to presidentialism in the wake of the January 6 plebiscite, cries of alarm over the direction events were taking continued to be raised. Prophets of doom have never been conspicuous for their absence or silence since Goulart took office, but it is worth noting that they continue to speak up even in the present atmosphere of what some might take to be an "era of good feeling".

O Globo published January 17 a paid announcement entitled "Manifesto of Sao Paulo Engineers to the Nation". The declaration, to which over 500 names were appended, purported to sound an alarm against "the spectre of subversion" threatening the country in face of "regrettable acquiescence" on the part of "the groups most responsible for the survival of the nation". The document scored abuses which it identified as: favoritism; indiscipline; demagogy; corruption; "anti-Western nationalism"; statism; inhibitions on private initiative; Communist infiltration; Brazilian foreign policy toward the United States. The engineers called on Brazilians to unite and "close the door to the betrayers of the nation", concluding with the following statement: "This is the word of alert and exhortation to the struggle that a group of Sao Paulo engineers, breaking their habitual reserve, hurls to the four corners of the nation in an appeal for unity among Brazilians who, with them, see and feel that the homeland is in danger." (Clippings attached.)

Conservative, oppositionist O Globo carried a related front-page editorial on the same day of the appearance of the engineers' manifesto. The paper condemned as causing "the greatest consternation" the homage rendered 1st Army Commander Osvino Ferreira Alves by Clodsmith Riani, CNTI President, who in a public statement characterized the labor unions as constituting "another Army" (Weeka 4).

FILED
FEB 27 1963

FORM DS-323 4-62 — CONFIDENTIAL — FOR DEPT. USE ONLY ☒ In ☐ Out

Drafted by: POL:FMigliotta:pm

Contents and Classification Approved by: DCM - Minister Bond

Clearances: POL:JKeppel (Substance)

0900

of President Goulart as Governor Carlos Lacerda. Governor Magalhães Pinto's efforts to build up State armed forces as compared with Federal forces may stem in large part from feare that his own political maneuvers will bring him into open conflict with the Goulart Administration and will provoke President Goulart into some kind of reprisal involving, let us say, transfers and deployment of personnel in patronage and security positions in the State. Bad as the economic problem is, there is no significant indication that the situation is so changed that public order cannot be maintained with presently available resources.

To express this view is not to say that the Governor is not concerned about dishonesty in the Goulart Administration and the possibility of dictatorial rule. What makes the Governor's motives somewhat suspect is that these actual wrongdoings or potential evils are not new. It is to be wondered at that the Governor takes notice of them only now. A few short months ago the Governor was telling the reporting officer that he wanted to go to the United States to see President Kennedy principally to clear the atmosphere between President Kennedy and President Goulart which was being poisoned by such people as Governor Lacerda.

Edmund A. da Silveira

Edmund A. da Silveira,
American Consul

4

0899

on the following day, January 22, to look at Military Police plans, prepared to meet the kind of situation the Governor and that Organization's commander had in mind. Mr. Baca's opinion after seeing the plans was that they were nothing more than what any good commander should always have ready for an emergency.

The other conversation bearing on the subject of this report took place Sunday evening, January 20, when the Governor's press officer, Dr. Milton Fernandes, and his wife paid a social call on the reporting officer and his wife. In the course of the evening's conversation, Dr. Milton Fernandes told the writer, "in confidence," that the Governor had lost all confidence in President Goulart's ability to conduct an honest and efficient administration. The Governor, Dr. Fernandes said, suspected President Goulart's motives and feared that he would lead the country into chaos. One of the factors that had apparently incensed the Governor against the President was the corruption he permitted in the Federal Administration in circles close to him. As a concrete example of this corruption, the Governor said that he had been told by the president of the Bank of Brazil in Rio that President Goulart's private secretary had received a Cr$ 250 million commission (Cr$ 800.00 equals approximately US$1.00 at the free rate of exchange) out of a Bank of Brazil loan of two billion cruzeiros to the Matarazzo enterprises. Upon being confronted with this report by the Governor himself, the President had denied the veracity of the story, and the Governor had replied that he had no reason to doubt the report. Dr. Milton Fernandes also confided that the Governor had definitely decided to run for the Presidency in 1965 and that Governor-elect of São Paulo, Adhemar de Barros, had told Governor Magalhães Pinto that he would not be a Presidential candidate.

Dr. Milton Fernandes clearly wanted to leave the impression that Governor Magalhães Pinto would be a strong candidate for the Presidency and wanted to dissociate himself from President Goulart. It is interesting to note also that these two conversations followed immediately on the Governor's return from a visit to Rio where he had conferred with Governor Carlos Lacerda, of the National Democratic Union (UDN), UDN national president Herbert Levy, President Goulart, and other highly placed political figures. Another interesting item was the news in a reputable local daily, O Diario of January 22, that President Goulart had flown to Belo Horizonte and conferred at length with the Governor at his home last Sunday, January 20. The news was given as having come from a reliable source and with such details as the hour of arrival at the airport. The paper also printed, immediately after this news item and without comment, Dr. Milton Fernandes' denial of President Goulart's visit.

All evidence available seems to indicate that the Governor has reached the conclusion that he cannot as of the moment count on President Goulart for purposes of gaining national ascendancy. Hence the Governor's attempts to shift gears and seek a rapprochement with the UDN and such notorious opponents

0898

dependence on the Central Government as a means to accomplish his ends. Col. Oliveira said that both he and the Governor were agreed on this assessment of the situation and added by way of reinforcing these views that the Farm Workers Leagues in the region of Montes Claros in the northern part of Minas Gerais had been stepping up their subversive activities.

Among the measures already taken or to be taken to meet the situation, and in anticipation of unrest, Col. Oliveira mentioned: 1) that as of January 22 he was ordering the Military Police to step up its military training and physical fitness program and to deemphasize the police functions in order to concentrate on military preparedness; 2) he was convening in Belo Horizonte all battalion commanders, stationed throughout the State, for a briefing of the situation; 3) the Governor had informed the heads of other State police forces and determined that they be placed under the Military Police in the event of an emergency; 4) the Governor was ready to deploy Military Police forces along the borders of the State to seal off the State against possible armed intervention from the outside; and 5) he was assigning 70 officers to the intelligence section of the Military Police to keep track of President Goulart's spies who are all over the State.

Col. Oliveira also informed Mr. Baca that the Governor had recently met with Guanabara's Governor Lacerda in Rio and both had reached an agreement to resist President Goulart's tactics to aggravate the political and economic situation. Col. Oliveira added that three other State Governors were in accord with Governor Magalhães Pinto, Governor-elect of São Paulo and Bahia and the Governor of Goiás.(1)

Mr. Baca suggested that the nature of the request posed a delicate problem in the relations between the United States and Brazil. By way of reply, Col. Oliveira said that he was aware of the problem but indicated that the Army was divided in its loyalties and that if the military equipment were given to the Army, some of that equipment might be used to serve President Goulart's nefarious ends. In order to put the request in specific terms, the Governor had asked Col. Oliveira to try to establish direct contact with Col. Vernon A. Walters, the U.S. Army Attache at the Embassy in Rio. Mr. Baca said that he did not know whether he could put Col. Oliveira in touch with the U.S. Army Attache, that he would inform his office in Rio concerning this matter.

At Col. Oliveira's request, Mr. Baca agreed to go to Col. Oliveira's office

(1) The known political views of the Governor of Goiás would point to disagreement rather than agreement with Governor Magalhães Pinto's present thinking. Considering the lengthy nature of the conversation and the fact that no notes were taken, perhaps not Goiás but some other State was named.

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DRAFTING/ACTION		
ARA-4		
RM/R 1	REP	AF
ARA	EUR	FE
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G 1	S/S 27	S/P
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INT	LAB	TAR
TR	XMB	AIR 4
ARMY 5	CIA 10	NAVY 5
OSD 12	USIA	NSA 3

File - Rm/R
2/26/63
L. J. Bustos
Mc Carton

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20

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

AIRGRAM

732.00/1-2363
XR 732.11
XR 732.111
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A-34 NO. | SECRET | HANDLING INDICATOR

TO : DEPARTMENT OF STATE

This document consists of 4 pages

INFO : Rio de Janeiro, Brasilia

DEPARTMENT OF STATE 1 of 7 copies, Series A
BUREAU OF
INTER-AMERICAN AFFAIRS
JAN 31 1963
COPY NO. 1 SERIES A

FROM : AMCONSUL, Belo Horizonte DATE: January 23, 1963

SUBJECT : NEW DEVELOPMENTS IN THE RELATIONS BETWEEN GOVERNOR MAGALHÃES PINTO AND PRESIDENT GOULART.

REF : -

ANALYSIS BRANCH 1963 JAN 31 PM 12:15

Recent conversations between two State Government officials and two USAID and American Consulate officers have produced additional evidence that a parting of ways between Governor Magalhães Pinto and President Goulart has already taken place (see Consulate's A-30, dated December 26, 1962). An important element in these conversations, with obvious implications for United States-Brazil relations, was a request by an authorized representative of the Governor for substantial military assistance from the U.S. Government direct to the State Military Police.

The second of two conversations, in which the request for military equipment was made, took place Monday night, January 21, when Colonel Geraldo de Oliveira, commanding officer of the State Military Police, called on Mr. Ray Baca, USAID Public Safety Advisor in Belo Horizonte, at his home. Col. Oliveira said that he had been talking with the Governor for four hours and had the Governor's consent to talk with Mr. Baca about getting riot and communications equipment and arms and ammunition from the United States for the Military Police under his command.

The reason Col. Oliveira gave for the request was the explosive political and economic situation in Minas Gerais, a situation that was being aggravated by President Goulart's tactics of building up popular frustration to a point where Federal Government intervention and dissolution of the State Government might be justified. According to Col. Oliveira, the Governor was convinced that President Goulart was bent on gaining dictatorial power over the country and placing it under a socialist regime. Accordingly, the Governor expected President Goulart, on assuming full Presidential powers, to dismiss the National Congress and then begin strangling the State Governments, using the States' financial

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FORM DS-323

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Clearances:		

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INCOMING TELEGRAM

Department of State

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34-M

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Action ARA

Control: 14671

Rec'd: January 23, 1963 2:52 p.m.

Info

CAP
P
USIA
NSC
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CIA
NSA
OSD
ARMY
NAVY
AIR
RMR

FROM: Brasilia

TO: Secretary of State

NO: 33, January 23

PRIORITY

ACTION DEPARTMENT 33, INFORMATION RIO DE JANEIRO 146

In second of two votes, Chamber of Deputies confirmed at 11:42 p.m. January 22 by 259 to 8 with one abstention its earlier approval of senate draft constitutional amendment revoking Parliamentarist system. New amendment will be proclaimed in joint session of Congress called for January 23 at 6 p.m. Present cabinet's mandate will expire with proclamation of amendment, and it is understood that new cabinet will be announced at that time.

KEPPEL

WFG

BRASILIA-33

732.00/1-2363

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MAR 15 1963

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NAME OF OFFICER & OFFICE SYMBOL	R.J. Buston	DATE OF ACTION	1/27/63	DIRECTIONS TO RM/R

GPO 930 800

0895

military order to use troops to stop the contraband of rice.

The Department and Embassy will be kept informed of any developments.

Arthur W. Feldman
American Consul

Copies to: Mr. Henderson, Rio de Janeiro
Brazil Desk, Washington, DC

FORM FS-439a
11-61

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OSD	USIA	NSA
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DEPARTMENT OF STATE

AIRGRAM

432.0083/1-2363
XR 732.00

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A-51 NO. | CONFIDENTIAL | AIR PRIORITY HANDLING INDICATOR

1963 JAN 25 AM 9 12

TO : SecState, Washington, DC

INFO : RIO de Janeiro

DISTRIBUTION

FROM : AmConsul, Curitiba DATE: January 23, 1963

SUBJECT : Newspaper Report Army is Seeking to Stop Arms Smuggling

REF :

Newspapers in Santa Caterina and Parana have recently printed reports to the effect that the army is attempting to stop the smuggling of arms from one state to another. Road blocks have reportedly been established to search vehicles for arms.

The Consul on a recent trip to União da Vitoria on the Parana-Santa Catarina border, noticed that the bridge leading to the city from Parana was manned by about twelve armed soldiers who were stopping vehicles entering and leaving the city. The local people stated that this control was to catch smugglers of arms.

The Consul discussed this with Parana authorities in military and police circles and was assured that these road blocks were only established to prevent the illegal movement of rice from state to state and that arms smuggling was not involved. The troops are allegedly stationed near fiscal control stations to help enforce the determination of Parana, for one, to prevent rice from being smuggled out of or into the state. Col. Conti Parana Secretary of Public Safety, stated that there is always some smuggling of arms but it is an insignificant amount and hardly worth any intensive efforts to stop it. He stated that after World War II, many of the Brazilian troops brought back U.S. carbines, etc., and that these are still being used. He found no evidence in Parana of any influx of illegal arms. He stated that he saw the military

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Such message might be along following lines:

BEGIN QUOTE: With official restoration of presidential system by Brazilian Congress, pursuant to will of Brazilian people as expressed in plebiscite of January 6, I wish to convey my personal good wishes to you and to express hope that your government, moving forward within framework of Brazil's democratic processes, will be successful in translating into reality hopes and aspirations of Brazilian people. END QUOTE.

To Campos and President Goulart you might wish orally to explain our reluctance to intervene in plebiscite in any way, even after the fact. It might then be appropriate to indicate our satisfaction that issue resolved, and period of political crisis brought to end without doing violence to democratic processes. You might wish further to convey our hope that anticipations expressed by them would be realized, namely that outcome of plebiscite would enable President Goulart better to organize his government and program to cope with difficult economic and social problems which Brazil is facing.

Would appreciate your views and suggestions on above.

END.

RUSK

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Department of State

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ACTION: Amembassy RIO DE JANEIRO NIACT 1437

FOR ATTENTION OF AMBASSADOR GORDON BY OPENING OF BUSINESS THURSDAY.

Ref: Embtel 1377.

Since we have consistently viewed issue of presidentialism vs parliamentarianism in Brazil as an internal Brazilian political problem, we do not feel it desirable for President to extend to Goulart congratulations over outcome of plebiscite or even over disposition of constitutional issue. However such a Presidential message phrased, could be construed as relating to a Goulart victory. Some Brazilians would assert that crisis was due more to Goulart's contrivings than to inherent difficulties in system of government, that there may be other crises generated in future by Goulart and phrased in context of obstructions to effective exercise of presidential powers (similar to those emanating from Quadros in connection with his resignation from presidency). In this light, seems best to avoid this issue.

We believe that it might be appropriate however for President to send simple message of good wishes to Goulart, once repeal of Ato Adicional is official, and new government is designated under new constitutional system. We would not ourselves plan give publicity for such a message here but would not object if Goulart should wish publicize or release contents in Brazil.


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Rec'd: JANUARY 22, 1963
10:51 PM

ACTION: EUB
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Rio 1377 GPB RS

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FROM: RIO DE JANEIRO

TO: Secretary of State

NO: 1377, JANUARY 22, MIDNIGHT

NIACT

CAMPOS MENTIONED TO ME LAST WEEK SOME DISAPPOINTMENT EXPRESSED BY GOULART THAT WE HAD MADE NO OFFICIAL RECOGNITION OF PLEBISCITE AS FORWARD STEP IN MAINTENANCE OF DEMOCRATIC INSTITUTIONS IN BRAZIL. I TOLD HIM SUNDAY I FELT THAT WOULD HAVE BEEN PREMATURE, CONSIDERING DUBIOUS CONSTITUTIONALITY OF PLEBISCITE LAW AND WAY IN WHICH GOVERNMENT FUNDS WERE USED IN PROPAGANDIZING FOR VOTE. WITH CONGRESS ABOUT TO COMPLETE FORMAL ACTION RESTORING 1946 CONSTITUTION, HOWEVER, I CAN SEE SOME BENEFIT IN CAREFULLY WORDED STATEMENT. I SUGGEST FOLLOWING TEXT, TO BE DISPATCHED PROMPTLY ON LEGAL RESTORATION FULL PRESIDENTIAL POWERS.

BEGIN TEXT. THE SUCCESS OF YOUR GREAT NATION IN HAVING RESOLVED THE CONSTITUTIONAL ISSUES WHICH HAVE CONFRONTED IT DURING THE PAST YEAR, WITHOUT A BREAK IN THE CONTINUITY OF DEMOCRATIC PROCEDURES, CONSTITUTES RENEWED EVIDENCE OF THE GENIUS OF THE BRAZILIAN PEOPLE FOR PEACEFUL DEMOCRATIC POLITICAL EVOLUTION. WITH THESE CONSTITUTIONAL QUESTIONS SETTLED, I WISH YOU ALL SUCCESS IN CONFRONTING THE PROBLEMS BEFORE YOU SO THAT BRAZIL MAY MAKE AN EVER GREATER CONTRIBUTION TO THE ACHIEVEMENT OF MATERIAL AND SPIRITUAL PROGRESS IN FREEDOM, AND THUS CONTRIBUTE TO THE PEACE AND PROSPERITY OF THIS HEMISPHERE AND OF THE ENTIRE WORLD. END TEXT

GORDON

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NAME OF OFFICER & OFFICE SYMBOL: Horton R.J. Burton	DATE OF ACTION: 1/31/63	

GPO 930 806

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Development, a position presently held by Leocádio Antunes, who is also from RGS. It is pointed out that he recently held a long conversation with President Goulart, during the latter's visit to this city. Other papers had previously speculated that Michaelsen would be given the portfolio of Minister of Finance in the new Federal government.

7. Military

The appointment is announced of General Mario Pope de Figueiredo to command the 3rd Infantry Division, stationed in Santa Maria. The general is described as having been the head of the Directorate of Roads and Communications. His predecessor in command of the division, General Olimpio Mourão Filho, was appointed commander of the 2nd Military Region in Sao Paulo. General Justino Alves Bastos, former Brazilian Ambassador to Paraguay, was selected to head the 6th Infantry Division in Pôrto Alegre.

8. High Soviet Official Visits Pôrto Alegre

Afternoon papers of the 22nd report the presence here of Mikhail Stelmach, described as vice president of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR, a Lenin prizewinner in literature and a delegate from the Ukraine. It is announced that he has recently been visiting Chile and Argentina, gathering impressions as a writer on the "human aspect" of the Latin-American peoples, and that he has shown particular interest in agricultural and livestock-raising activities in this area. In spite of his prominence, he has been staying in a modest room of the Preto Hotel... . He was welcomed to Pôrto Alegre by the Soviet journalist Vitaly Kobish, correspondent for Izvestia and representative of Radio Moscow, and by Colonel Jocelin Brasil. The latter will accompany him on his onward flight to Rio.

Thomas J. Duffield
American Consul

cc.: Consular Affairs, Rio
Political Section, Rio
Political Section, Brasília
ARA/EST/Brazil, Washington
INR/RAR/P, Washington

Department: pass to all posts in Brazil

Following his break with the PL, Governor-elect Meneghetti made new appointments to the positions in his cabinet which were to have gone, respectively, to Otávio Omar Cardoso and Coelho de Souza, both of that party. General Joaquim Luis Amaro da Silveira (UDN), who served in 1930 as aide to Vargas, subsequently headed the Political Police (DOPS) in Rio and also in Pôrto Alegre and has also been mayor of Livramento, has accepted the post of Secretary of Security. The portfolio of Interior and Justice goes to Deputy Fernando Gay da Fonseca (PDC), who is vice-president of the National Directorate of his party.

3. Plebiscite

Final results of the January 6 plebiscite in RGS were as follows:

Não	785,222
Sim	328,872
Blank ballots	62,136
Void ballots	46,004
Total votes	1,222,234
Total registered voters	1,560,209
Abstention rate	21,67%

Comment: The RGS mandate for the return to presidentialism apparently lagged well behind that of Brazil as a whole.

4. Phone Rate Increases

The State Government last week authorized an overall increase in CRT (Companhia Riograndense de Telecomunicações) rates, of 48.12 percent, effective January 1. In the official announcement of the rate increase, the recently granted higher salaries for telephone employees were named as justification.

5. Federal Control of RGS Agricultural Reform?

Última Hora last week reported that IGRA (Instituto Gaúcho de Reforma Agrária) would be placed under the supervision of the Federal agency SUPRA (Superintendência de Planejamento da Reforma Agrária), with PTB party leader João Caruso to become head of either the State or of national body.

Comment: Such action could have embarrassing political implications for Meneghetti (who is unlikely to emulate Governor Brizola's flamboyant land reform policies) by removing from his direct control the leadership of the State "sem terra" problem.

6. Federal Position for Michaelsen?

Egydio Michaelsen, unsuccessful PTB candidate for governor of Rio Grande do Sul in the recent elections, has been reported by the local press as an almost certain choice for director of the National Bank for Economic

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PRE-ACTION		
ARA-4		
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ARMY 5	CIA 10	NAVY 5
OSD 12	USIA 8	NSA 3

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no action
AWA/ESTES
WJ Barlow
2/9/63

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

AIRGRAM

732.00/1-2263

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DEPARTMENT OF STATE
BUREAU OF
INTER-AMERICAN AFFAIRS
1963 JAN 27 PM
RM/AN
ANALYSIS & DISTRIBUTION
BRANCH

TO : DEPARTMENT OF STATE
RIO DE JANEIRO-3 SALVADOR-1
BELEM-1 SANTOS-1
BELO HORIZONTE-1 SAO PAULO-1
CURITIBA-1
RECIFE-1

FROM : Amconsul PÔRTO ALEGRE DATE: JAN 22 1963

SUBJECT : PÔRTO ALEGRE WEEKLY SUMMARY Nº 40

REF :

1. The PL Versus Meneghetti
2. Governor-elect Appoints Secretaries of Security and of Interior and Justice
3. Plebiscite
4. Phone Rate Increases
5. Federal Control of RGS Agricultural Reform?
6. Federal Position for Michaelsen?
7. Military
8. High Soviet Official Visits Pôrto Alegre

1. The PL Versus Meneghetti

As an aftermath of the Partido Libertador's official break with the State Governor-elect, Engineer Ildo Meneghetti made what he obviously hoped would be the final statements upon the actions of the departing PL. He pointed out that the PL could hardly claim it had been excluded from his government, since he had offered them the first two secretariats the party had ever had the opportunity to fill. Meneghetti also said that apparently the PL took a position that he had the right to chose his own cabinet, but only when the PL approved of his choices. Spokesmen of the PL responded to Meneghetti by indulging in a spate of name-calling which bodes ill for any future rapprochement. In the meantime, the PL, in spite of its announced decision to remain within the ranks of the ADP, is boycotting the latter's meetings and casting about for any palatable alliance with parties outside of the ADP.

2. Governor-elect Appoints Secretaries of Security and of Interior and Justice.

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Drafted by: WDMcLain/TJDuffield:zms
Contents and Classification Approved by:
Clearances:

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reason would be to persuade anyone who might be listening that the UDN enjoys more unity and cohesiveness than it does, though only the ill-informed would be convinced. He might also have been inviting Magalhaes Pinto to come on home.

For a brief period Magalhaes Pinto did seem to be drawing away from Goulart. In a December 6 meeting with Goulart, the Minas Governor was reported to have spoken sharply to the President about the need for qualified people in the post-plebiscite cabinet, whose composition even then was being feverishly speculated on; presumably he was unimpressed by the names he had heard were being considered. On January 7 a manifesto subscribed to by the Minas Gerais branches of the UDN, PTB, PR, and PSP was officially presented to Magalhaes Pinto which, repelling "extremisms of the left and of the right", was interpreted at first as: (1) having grown out of a Magalhaes Pinto initiative; and (2) being intended to warn Goulart to observe the legal niceties in his maneuverings to regain full presidential powers post-haste.

As this is written, the mineiro Governor would appear to have reversed ground toward the President again, for he has enlisted himself among the many favoring a prompt return to the 1946 Constitution. But at the same time the press is talking of a Herbert Levy attempt to arrange a rapprochement between Carlos Lacerda and Magalhaes Pinto, (/) presumably in order to close the breaches in the UDN so that the party can offer a solider front in opposition to the fortified President in the new Congress.

In short, then, Magalhaes Pinto can go in either direction. Or it might be more accurate to say in any direction, recalling his flirtation with Janio Quadros when the ex-President returned to Brazil after his resignation to try to pick up his political career again. Just what tack Magalhaes Pinto will take will depend on which seems most profitable to him. And that could be any.

(/) The meeting has occurred, but no reports on it have become available.

For the Ambassador:

John Keppel
Counselor for Political Affairs

CONFIDENTIAL

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ORIGIN/ACTION

RM/R	REP	AF
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ARMY 5	CIA 10	NAVY 5
OSD 12	USIA 8	NSA 3
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A-827 NO. | CONFIDENTIAL HANDLING INDICATOR

TO : SecState WASHINGTON

1963 JAN 23 PM 2 01

DEPARTMENT OF STATE
BUREAU OF
INTER-AMERICAN AFFAIRS
JAN 24 1963
RM/AN
ANALYSIS & DISTRIBUTION BRANCH

FROM :AmEmbassy RIO DE JANEIRO DATE: January 21, 1963

SUBJECT :Political Position of Governor Magalhaes Pinto

REF :CA-5121 November 8, 1962 - ARA

The Embassy doubts that Herbert Levy made the statement quite as reported by FBIS, judging by the Department's summary. Levy does, of course, see the UDN's role at present as one of opposition, but it seems highly unlikely he would have waited until October (perhaps November?--the Department gives no date for the supposed statement) to declare his opposition to a Council of Ministers formed in September. Levy's opposition is to the administration in general, and he particularly opposed its efforts to anticipate the return to presidentialism (though as this is written he has relented to the extent of promising to cooperate in legal measures to implement the plebiscite results).

That Levy might explain Magalhaes Pinto's relationship with Goulart in the terms reported is, on the other hand, perfectly credible, if not very convincing. In the case of Carlos Lacerda, for example, also of the UDN, a governor's "dependence on the Federal government" would not appear to make contacts with the President of the Republic "obligatory". This is not to say, however, that Magalhaes Pinto did not have a special problem with respect to the Federal government under parliamentarianism, a problem that he attempted to solve by cultivating Joao Goulart. That problem was Tancredo Neves, his political rival whom he defeated in the 1960 Minas Gerais gubernatorial race, and who, as President of the Council of Ministers in Goulart's parliamentary government, might have been expected to see to it that Minas' share of Federal revenue re-distributed to the states was cut to the bone. In addition, Magalhaes Pinto has known presidential aspirations. Undoubtedly he has also sought prominence and influence through his readiness to cooperate with the PTB President in order to get a leg up on other possible UDN candidates for the 1965 presidential nomination.

Why would Levy have made the statement about Magalhaes Pinto? One

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Drafted by: POL:PMicelotta:pm

Contents and Classification Approved by: DCM - Minister Bond

Clearances: POL:JKeppel

0884

lost prestige during the parliamentary experiment and its attendant crises. Another factor is the fact that the Presidency is in the hands of the PTB, with all the leverage that this implies for providing material incentives for dissatisfied pessedistas and udenistas to move under the umbrella of the FPN; provided, of course, that the Grupo Compacto of the PTB continues to regard the FPN as a suitable front. The Rio meeting indicates that it does.

For the Ambassador:

John Keppel
Counselor of Embassy
for Political Affairs

DISTRIBUTION: All consulates in Brazil; Amb, DCM, Service Attachés, USIS, Econ (2), POL II, Labor, CF (3), POL I (5), Brasilia (5).

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The manifesto issued was summarized as follows, with a more complete statement promised for early February.

1. The plebiscite was a demonstration of political maturity, the implementation of which cannot be delayed.

2. Whatever the form chosen to implement the popular mandate, the importance of constitutional reform must be stressed, enabling the Congress and the President to carry out basic reforms, which must leave the domain of mere intentions.

3. The plebiscite was a demonstration of confidence in President João Goulart but, as a corallary, it brings to the President the responsibility of the governmental task of finding, without delay, an energetic solution to emergency cases and of heeding the aspirations of the people.

4. The government which is about to be constituted from among representatives of diverse parties cannot be an expression of a new attempt at conciliation with contradictory tendencies, but must interpret the choice, made clear by the plebiscite, in favor of a policy corresponding to the sentiment of the people.

5. The independent foreign policy must be maintained and supported by an internal policy oriented toward the same objectives, with no other concern except the rights and interests of Brazil.

6. The wealth of the country must be utilized to improve the standard of living of the people.

7. The popular will must be respected, against those maneuvers intended to sacrifice legally-elected candidates, which would totally distort the meaning of the electoral manifestation.

Neiva Moreira, Secretary General of the FPN wrote of this manifesto in O Seminario of January 17 "the Front, composed of diverse currents, although bound by the common link of nationalism, naturally reflects in its documents, particularly at this time, a less radical tendency than we would like to see."

Although the Embassy as yet has been unable to thoroughly dissect the newly-elected Chamber of Deputies, it is evident that its essentially centrist-conservative nature has not greatly changed, despite the increase in the PTB's representation from 20.2% of the old Chamber to about 25% of the new.

However, this trend, when considered with other factors, makes the FPN's future outlook not altogether dark. One factor is the continued ideological stagnation of the UDN and PSD. Both parties

0882

San Tiago DANTAS	Federal Deputy	PTB Minas;	3,[1] re-elected
Bento GONCALVES	Federal Deputy	PSP Minas;	3, re-elected
Sergio MAGALHAES	Federal Deputy	PTB Guanabara;	2, re-elected
Fernando SANTANA	Federal Deputy	PSB Bahia;	1, re-elected
Bocayuna CUNHA	Federal Deputy	PTB Rio;	2, re-elected
Ferro COSTA	Federal Deputy	UDN Para;	3, re-elected
Adhail BARRETTO	Federal Deputy	UDN Ceara;	3, re-elected
Neiva MOREIRA	Federal Deputy	PSP Maranhão;	2, re-elected
Barbosa LIMA Sobrinho	Federal Deputy	PSB Pernambuco;	3, not re-elected
José JOFFILY	Federal Deputy	PSB Paraiba;	2, not re-elected
Celso BRANT	Federal Deputy	PR Minas;	1, not re-elected
Chagas RODRIGUES	Federal Deputy	PTB Piaui;	3 re-elected
Marco Antonio COELHO	Newly elected Deputy	PTB Guanabara;	1
Seixas DORIA	Governor-elect	UDN Sergipe	3

There were other, lesser lights whose names were not published. The timing of the meetings was not propitious for good attendance; the special session of Congress convened in Brasilia on January 15 probably caused some normal attendees to be absent. (FPN membership in the Fourth Congress was about 100, of which perhaps 50 could be considered hard-core.) Deputies Almino AFONSO (PTB, Amazonas;) and José APARECIDO de Oliveira (UDN, Minas; 2; newly-elected) sent messages regretting their absence and assuring the group of their membership in the FPN.

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1 - See Embassy Despatch 891, May 14, 1962.

0881

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

AIRGRAM

732.00/1-2163

FOR RM USE ONLY

A-825 NO. | CONFIDENTIAL | AIR POUCH HANDLING INDICATOR

TO : Department of State 1963 JAN 25 AM 7 39

DEPARTMENT OF STATE BUREAU OF INTER-AMERICAN AFFAIRS JAN 25 1963 RM/AN ANALYSIS & DISTRIBUTION BRANCH

FROM : Amembassy, Brasilia Office DATE: January 21, 1963

SUBJECT : Frente Parlamentar Nacionalista Urges Goulart Not to Conciliate with Center

REF :

DEPARTMENT OF STATE BUREAU OF INTER-AMERICAN AFFAIRS JAN 25 1963

ACTION		
ARA-4		
RM/R 1	REP	AF
ARA	EUR	FE
NEA	CU	INR 5
E	P	IO
L	FBO	AID
AGR	COM	FRD
INT	LAB	TAR
TR	XMB	AIR 4
ARMY 5	CIA 10	NAVY 5
OSD 5	USIA 8	NSA 3

File no action
AA/LAB
R J Burton
2/19/63

Summary

The Frente Parlamentar Nacionalista (FPN) held preliminary meetings in Rio de Janeiro January 12-14 and published a 7-point manifesto which (1) urged President Goulart that his new Cabinet should not reflect any attempt at conciliation across the political spectrum ("conciliação de tendências contraditorias"); (2) tried to establish a common denominator which could attract a large following to the nationalist banner in the next Congress. The FPN is important and dangerous because of the slow but steady ideological deterioration of two of the three major parties (the PSD and UDN), while the PTB, the party with the greatest (although by no means uniform) ideological consistency, continues to grow, having displaced the UDN as the second party in the Chamber of Deputies. The FPN thus offers a possible "umbrella" for an ideological re-grouping within the Congress which would significantly alter its present centrist-conservative nature. The danger lies in the fact that the nationalism of the FPN is apt to find its expression in anti-Americanism rather than in genuine legislative achievement.

§§§§§§§§§§§§§§§§§§§§§§

A small group of the FPN met in Rio de Janeiro January 12-14, using as their headquarters the office of San Tiago Dantas and the Palacio Tiradentes. Those in attendance whose names were listed in newspaper accounts were:

FILED FEB 19 1963

FORM 4-62 DS-323 CONFIDENTIAL FOR DEPT. USE ONLY In Out

Drafted by: POL:HWeiner | Contents and Classification Approved by: POL: CDKeyser

Clearances:

0880

Comment: Doria is to assume office on January 31. After that, while he can still blame the past administration for leaving no money in the till, he will have to contend with the Legislative Assembly, which Machado blames for passing measures carrying expense burdens without providing for revenues.

Bahian Financial Troubles: The State Government of Bahia has reported that its income is increasingly insufficient to pay public employees, and that it is therefore applying for a Federal loan for this purpose. Despite this situation, a recent bill authorizing the hiring of doubtfully needed additional employees was signed amidst newspaper criticism by the governor. Happily, a similar but even more flagrant bill sank under mounting criticism in the municipal chamber of Salvador.

Comment: Political hirings by lame duck administrations are, of course, a fact of Brazilian public life, and are not exactly unknown elsewhere.

ECONOMIC:

New lead refinery: A working group charged with selecting the site of a Petrobras "tetra-ethyl" lead refinery in the Salvador bay area has decided to locate the plant in Santo Amaro, at the northern end of the bay. Work on the plant is expected to begin soon.

Cocoa shippers' troubles continue: Shippers are afraid that their contracts for the sale of cocoa presently stocked at the port of Ilheus will shortly be cancelled. Because of the high stevedore charges previously reported in our weekly summaries, foreign vessels no longer load cargo at the port of Ilheus. Brazilian government-owned national vessels will, however, still accept cargo from there. However, the four week old national maritime strike has almost called a halt to shipping by this source even though some ships are being operated by Brazilian naval crews. Since the time of delivery specified in many of the contracts was the end of December, the Bahia Cocoa Trade Commission has addressed telegrams to President Goulart and the Ministers of Finance and Transportation requesting that urgent relief measures be taken.

New carbon black plant: The press announced the grant of a two million dollar credit to the Companhia de Carbonos Coloidais for the construction of a carbon black plant in the Salvador area.

Gasoline Prices: The 70% rise in the price of regular gasoline and 150% rise in high test gasoline which went into effect during the week has brought a general howl of consternation.

Comment: While a price increase had been expected, the size of the jump took consumers by surprise and has caused considerable speculation over the implications of this measure on the general cost of living.

Harold M. Midkiff
American Consul

0879

ORIGIN/ACTION

RM/R 1	REP	AF
ARA	CUR	FE
NEA	CU	INR 5
E 4	P	ID
	FBO	AID 12
AGR 10	COM 10	FRB
INT 7	LAB	TAR
FR	XMB CAA	AIR 4
ARMY 5	[illegible] 15	NAVY 3
OSD 12	USIA 8	NSA 3

Note
no action
ARA/E 5/16
W J Burton
2/19/63

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

AIRGRAM

732.00/1-1863
732.00

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NO.

OFFICIAL USE ONLY

HANDLING INDICATOR

TO : DEPARTMENT OF STATE 1963 JAN 25 AM 7 24

INFO: Amembassy, Rio and Brasilia
DEPARTMENT OF STATE RM/AN
BUREAU OF ANALYSIS & DISTRIBUTION
INTER-AMERICAN AFFAIRS BRANCH
JAN 25 1963

FROM : American Consulate, Salvador DATE: January 18, 1963

SUBJECT : Weekly Summary, Salvador

REF :

POLITICAL:

Elections: Although the Governor, federal senators and deputies elected on October 7, 1962, received their "diplomas" on January 10 (see weekly review of January 11, 1963) the Mayor of Bahia and municipal aldermen were not officially declared elected until January 16 and will receive their "diplomas" on January 23. Irregularities in some voting districts delayed the announcement of the election of municipal representatives.

Comment: Had it not been for the pressure exerted by Governor-elect Lomanto to have his "diploma" prior to his trip, it is possible that certification of all elected officers would have been held up until now.

Ministerial Post for Bahian: Rumors are spreading that Manoel Cavalcanti de Novais (PR) is being pushed by Governor-elect Lomanto as a candidate for the Ministry of Agriculture.

Comment: Novais accompanied Lomanto to Brasilia in a dawn flight on January 11 for a conference with Goulart. He is a patronage politician of considerable influence and may well have come to an agreement with the Governor-elect to be sponsored as the PR representative in the Cabinet.

The Plebiscite: The count in Bahia as of January 16 stood at:

Yes: 35,156 No: 444,890

Sergipe: The political temperature in Sergipe is rising as a result of denouncements by Governor-elect Seixas Doria of financial irresponsibility on the part of Acting Governor Dionisio Aranjo Machado.

FEB 11 1963

FORM DS-323 4-62

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Drafted by: HMMidkiff:WHBMatthews:la

Contents and Classification Approved by:

Clearances:

DEPARTMENT PLEASE PASS TO RECIFE.

0878

ТЕКСТИЛЬНИЙ ВЕЛЕТЕНЬ ПОЛІССЯ

Закінчення. Початок на 1 стор.

в цехах споруджено скляний дах із спеціальних плит з подвійним склом. З середини плит вмазували повітря і завдяки цьому взимку вони не замерзатимуть.

До комбінату підведено лінію залізниці, прокладено асфальтовані шосе, споруджується трамвайна лінія. Все це добре видно згори. Вражають з висоти—башти кранів. Їх доделяють на будівлі. Поряд з працюючими цехами зводяться нові, споруджуються склади, гаражі, різні підсобні приміщення.

КІНОПОГЛЯД КОМБІНАТУ

— Найкраще ви познайомитесь з історією нашого комбінату, коли подивитесь фільм, який знімає наш власний оператор, — говорить директор.

Оператором виявився Станіслав Данилович Козловський, старший інструктор комбінату. У вільні години він не розлучається з любительською камерою. Його фільм має помилки, але не має кінця — адже історія комбінату лише починається.

...Гасне світло. На екрані — геодезисти. Вони першими прийшли на територію комбінату, визначили, де саме стоятимуть цехи. Ідуть, ідуть та інші приміщення. Потім за діло взялися екскаваторники і бульдозеристи, з'являються будівельні майданчики, кипіння фундаменти. І от вже почали рости сині цехів, прибули перші верстати. Ми бачимо радісні обличчя тих, коли почали сходити з верстатів перші метри тканин, разом з текстильниками проходимо вперше вулицями міста. Про все, що зняв Козловський, не розповісти — матеріалу дуже багато.

КЛІМАТ ЦЕХУ

Фільм фільмом, але хочеться більше познайомитись з виробництвом, познайомитись з людьми. І от ми в ткацькому цеху. Тут все в русі: технічних тканин. Шумлять найновіші прядильні і тканьські верстати. З початку року тут виготовлено вже понад три мільйони метрів тканин. В цьому цеху вже вміють мінки.

В усіх цехах — чисто, світле повітря. На комбінаті споруджено справжню фабрику штучного клімату з потужними холодильними установками, кондиціонерами. Витягні пристрої, які встановлені над кожним верстатом, очищують весь час. Натомість в цехи подається певної температури чисте повітря.

Біля одного з верстатів я побачив дівчину, обличчя якої здалося знайомим. Згадав, що бачив її в любительському фільмі. Але там вона разом з іншими дівчатами штукатурила стіни, а зараз сама обслуговує кільки верстатів.

— Так, ви не помилились, — підтвердила Софія Бубон. — Нам вічкотворитель наш сама нашу бригаду штукатурив. А потім мене послали вчитись в Орші, освоювати професію прядильниці. Більшість наших прядильниць і ткалі теж починали працю ще на будівництві комбінату. А тепер інших вже вчить ткацькій справі. У мене теж є учениця — випускниця середньої школи Валя Степаненко. Розумна, миленька, скоро мене наздожене.

МАЙБУТНЄ «ПОЛІСЬКОГО ШОВКУ»

«Поліським шовком» називають льон текстильний. 23 мільйони метрів лляних тканин випускатиме комбінат після завершення будівництва. 38 тисяч прядильних веретен і 1308 ткацьких верстатів працюватиме на комбінаті. Крім бязевих, мішкозяних текстильників Жилчомкомбіната виготовлятимуть лляне полотно, скатерки, платтяні тканини. До кінця року стане до ладу перша черга корпусу побутових тканин. Щоб забезпечити випуск такої продукції, на території комбінату споруджується власна електростанція, водоочисні споруди, котельня.

Поблизу від комбінату споруджується асфальтовано текстильників з широкими зеленими вулицями, затишними, світлими будинками. В цьому будуть дві шестидесятирічки, школа фабрично-заводського навчання, яка готуватиме спеціалістів для комбінату, кінотеатри, бібліотека, дитячі садки, ясла. На березі штучного озера буде обладнано водну станцію. Ні, ми вже жартували, трамвай зв'яже селище з містом.

Комбінат будується. Комбінат вже дає продукцію. У найбільшого в Європі текстильного велетня — велике майбутнє.

Ю. ПОЛІЩУК,
наш кореспондент.
м. Житомир.

ЗЕЛЕНІЮТЬ НА КРОКВАХ ЯЛИНКИ

Здавна на Україні існує такий хороший звичай: коли закінчується спорудження нового будинку, на його кроквах прикріплюють прикрашену зілку кілинки. В селі Волосе Сколівського району на Львівщині такі ялинки з'являються досить часто. Лише за останні три роки жителями села заселено понад 250 нових житлових будинків.

— Відрадний в те, — розповідає голова сільської Ради Микола Майстренко, — що наші люди будують добротні будинки. В селі тепер не знайдеш хатньої кілки під стріхою, а всі під залізом, черепицею, шифером.

Незабаром десятки сімей святкуватимуть новосілля. Передодні цього радісної пори — ізбові радники Микола Вікторишин та Микола Лупуляк, вчителька місцевої школи Дарія Цимра, тракторист Степан Гриб і ще 36 жителів Верхнього Синьководського.



Новий готель «Україна» в Кіровограді. Фото А. Васильченка.

Як же нам живеться?

Побувати на південному березі Криму — як не мандрівка в рай?

Уряд Радянського Союзу не шкодує коштів на оздоровлення трудящих, а особливо, дітей. Крім славнозвісного Артеку, на узбережжі Чорного моря створені десятки піонерських таборів, де щороку проводять свої канікули тисячі хлоп'ячих і дівочих.

Цього літа Білогірський район народної освіти Кримської області виділив мені дві путівки — для дочки Наді і сина Юрка. Треба було бачити їх щасливі очі, коли їхали до Сімферополя, вирішили побути кілька днів у цьому місті — відвідати театри, цирк, побувати в парках, на Сімферопольському морі (так називають затишний водний басейн поблизу цього міста). Адже нам нічого було поспішати — я мав відпустку (а, як відомо, учительська відпустка чимала — 64 дні).

Минає весь день ми блукали по місту. Яке воно гарне! Коли глянеш на нього з підвищення, видаються в очі новобудови. Ген там простягнулася широка, рівна вулиця імені Гагаріна. Ще недавно її не було. Багатоповерхові житлові будинки, школи, магазини, кінотеатри виросли за останні роки на тому місці, де раніше був пустир.

Від автовокзалу до центру міста ідемо тролейбусом. Треба долати — прекрасним тролейбусом: світлим, просторим, з фіранками на вікнах. Але нашу увагу привертає річ, яка, здається, зовсім не призначена для прикраси. Це — табличка: «Тролейбус працює без кондуктора». Як приємно і радісно дивитись, коли люди платять до каси, кидають гроші, відривають квиток. І ніхто їх не контролює, не перевіряє.

Сходимо на одній з найголовніших вулиць — імені Карла Маркса. Починається вона з тригоповерхового універсального магазину. Важко придумати назву якої-небудь речі, що її немає в цьому магазині. Тут, як і завжди, людно.

За кілька кроків від універмагу — виходимо, на нашу думку, найкращий сквер, якими такий багатий Сімферополь. В центрі скверу на бетонному підвищенні — великий танк. Справжній бойовий танк з слідами від воронок, куль та осколків. На цьому молодий командир — танкіст Микола Ткачов 15 квітня 1944 року першим увірвався в Сімферополь, переслідуючи гітлерівських фашистів. Дивлячись на цього свідка Великої Вітчизняної війни, мимоволі пригадуєш те страшне лихоліття, яке принесли гітлерівські полчища на нашу землю. А коли дивишся на веселих дітлахів, на життєрадісну молодь, на старших чоловіків і жінок, які спокійно відпочивають у цьому сквері, думаєш: невже вже ієнують маніяки, які збираються знову розв'язати нову світову війну?!

Вулиця імені Карла Маркса переходить у вулицю Льва Толстого. Звідси, що цей великий письменник перебував у Криму, завітаємо на неї, сподіваємось зустріти якусь згадку про нього. Довго не доведеться йти. На невеликому триповерховому будинку, з рівномірними вікнами і вікнами, — меморіальна дошка: «Тут у 1844 — 1845 рр. жив і працював Л. М. Толстой».

Пригадую, що в Сімферополі жили або перебували О. С. Пушкін, О. С. Грибоєдов, В. О. Жуковський та інші. Але вже пізно. Треба думати про ночівлю.

Ходити далеко не довелось, бо саме в цьому районі розташований готель-велетень «Україна». Оглядаючи цю велику триповерхову споруду, я сказав дружині: «І навіщо такий великий готель? Адже Сімферополь — не Москва».

Але скоро виявилось, що мої побоювання даремні. Зайшовши у вестибюль готелю, я побачив вивіску: «Сьогодні місць немає».

Довелось шукати іншого. Зайшли у «Південний». Черговий адміністратор нас у номер. Ціна виявилась, що я недавно приїхав до Радянського Союзу, із зацікавленістю спитала:

— І як вам вам жилося? Де ліпше? У нас, чи за кордоном?

Я відповів трафаретною фразою: «У нашої всього добре, але дома ліпше».

Але трохи пізніше, влаштувавшись у світлій, добре меблюваній кімнаті з балконом на вулицю, я сказав дружині: «Ну, Віро, як же нам залишається? Замість відповіді, вона ласкаво посміхнулася і відкрила двері на балкон: «Давай поцілуємось.

Правду кажучи, за 5 років після повернення з Бразілії, нам трохи набувся те, що довелось пережити в далекій чужій країні. Праця, виховання дітей, відпочинок — усе це являється таким звичайним. Але тиждень тому по готелю відчинялися сьогодні, спокушаючи сяйвом теперішня становища.

Заходило сонце. Ми з дружиною дивились туди. І якось обоє разом посміхнулися на годинники. Скоро дев'ять.

— У Бразілії зараз пізня година, — сказала я. — Тепер так зимо, ідуть дощі.

І в уяві виникло місто Сан Паулу, Вона передмістя — Віла Проспероідале. На вулиці Фортуна — невеличкий дерев'яний барак. Там тепер, очевидно, повіз, і з хати не можна вийти, не розвуглившись і не піднявши холош. Від навколишніх фабрик і заводів сиплеться їдкий дим. Ген з хімічного заводу «Кімбразіл» ріжуть очі, виникають сльози. Там живуть колишні мої сусіди земляки — брати Гриньох і Іван Коломійці, Володимир Назарко, Бекеш, Падалко, Маківку, Вузина та інші.

Прагадався останній день перед виїздом. Вузина говорить мені: «Можу поручитись власною головою, що тебе там повісять».

І ось я сиджу на балконі готелю «Південний».

На місто опускається вечір. Загораються вулиці вогні і реклами.

— Сиди, Віро, тут і милуйся цим чудовим вечором. А я піду в кімнату і напишу те, що в серця переживаю.

Так з'явилися ці статтяі.

Багато українців у Південній Америці знають мене або особисто, або заочно — як колишнього видавця і редактора української газети «Промінь». Думаю, що всім їм цікаво буде знати, як же нам живеться на рідній Батьківщині.

Тимофій БЕЗДІТНИЙ.

ДАРИ «ЗОЛОТОЇ ДОЛИНИ»

Родючі землі в заплавах рік Трубіж та Ірпінь під Києвом справедливо називають «Золотою долиною». Близько 19 тисяч гектарів угідь, жалких кілька років тому щовесни перетворювалося в непрохідні болота, тепер дають високі, незалежні від кримих природи врожаї.

По 500 центнерів капусти, 410 центнерів моркви, 300 центнерів городніх буряків збирали з кожного гектара трудівники радгоспу імені Черняховського. Раніше вважали, що новоосвоєні землі не дадуть доброго врожаю помідорів, огірків. Овочівники радгоспу імені Шевченка спростували ці твердження. Посадивши вперше в цьому році помідори, вони зняли їх по 180 центнерів з гектара.

Тепер у господарствах в розпалі збирання багатого врожаю картоплі, капусти, столової моркви та буряків. Тільки з новоосвоєних земель спеціалізовані київські радгоспи щодня відправляють трудящим Києва майже 200 тонн різних овочів і картоплі.

ТАЛАНОВИТІ МУЗИКАНТИ

Великий будинок з колонами стоїть в самому центрі Одеси. Тут знаходиться дитяча музична школа імені професора Столярського. Вона відома далеко за межами Радянського Союзу. І не дивно, що туристи — українці із Сполучених Штатів Америки і Канади в Сполучених Штатах відвідують цей учбовий заклад.

Незабаром школа відзначатиме тридцятиріччя свого існування. За ці роки її звичайна тисячна музично-обдарованих дітей. Школа вишпається своїми вихованцями, і в першу чергу визначними скрипалем сучасності, народним артистом СРСР, лауреатом Ленінської премії Давидом Ойстрахом, талановитим піаністом, народним артистом СРСР, лауреатом Ленінської премії Емілем Гілельсом. Серед вихованців школи працюють нині на викладацькій роботі в різних учбових закладах країни.

У школі є великий концертний зал на 400 місць, велика музична бібліотека, майже десяток класів для спеціальних занять. Понад 600 дітей з різних міст і сіл України навчаються тут на фортепіано, скрипці, віолончелі, народних та духових інструментах. Навчання безплатне, більше того, значна частина учнів одержує державну стипендію. При школі створений інтернат. Це два нових чудово обладнаних будинки, де живе понад двісті дітей-колгоспників з усіх областей України.

Ось що розповідає Женя Мазаренко:

— Я приїхав до Одеси з Сумської області, де мої батьки працюють у колгоспі. Живу я зі своїм товаришем Васильом Гороленком, який приїхав з села на Донеччині. Ми вчимося грати на скрипці і одночасно дістаємо загальну освіту. Для нас створені чудові умови для плодотворного навчання. Так, наприклад, ми перебуваємо на повному пансіоні, одержуємо підручники, зошити, взагалі все, що потрібно. Живемо ми, дружно і згуртовано, завжди відчуваємо велику турботу і увагу з боку вихователів і учителів.

Валя Судзиловська, Коля Шиманенко, Женя Єрмаков та багато інших здібних дітей української хліборобів прагнуть добре вчитися. Недавно молоді музиканти, що живуть у гуртожитку, дали відкритий концерт, який пройшов з великим успіхом.

В цьому році деякі випускники музичної школи вітримали важкий конкурс і їх прийнято до Одеської консерваторії.

...Дні колгоспників мають ці можливості набути музичну освіту. Педагоги школи імені Столярського щорічно об'їжджають десятки районів України, прослуховують тисячі дітей і відбирають для навчання найбільш обдарованих.

С. ГАЛИЦЬКИЙ.

НА ФОТО: в інтернаті школи (зліва направо) Євген **ТАРАНСЕНКО**, Петро **ТКАЧЕНКО** та Євген **КАШПЕРУК** розучують музичний твір.



РАДІО

ДО УВАГИ РАДІОСЛУХАЧІВ.

ПОВІДОМЛЯЄМО ВАС, ШАНОВНІ ДРУЗІ, ЩО З 15 ЖОВТНЯ ПЕРЕДАЧА ТОВАРИСТВА КУЛЬТУРНИХ ЗВ'ЯЗКІВ З УКРАЇНЦЯМИ ЗА КОРДОНОМ «БРАТАМ ДАЛЕКИМ, РІДНИМ» ТРАНСЛЮВАТИМЕТЬСЯ ЗА НОВИМ РОЗКЛАДОМ РАДІОХВИЛЬ.

НА УКРАЇНИ ЄВРОПИ:

Вдень з 4 год. 30 хв. за Грінвічем, а 5 год. 30 хв. за середньоєвропейським часом на хвилях 25,16 метра, 41,04 метра і 49,83 метра.

Увечері з 7 год. 30 хв. за Грінвічем, а 8 год. 30 хв. за середньоєвропейським часом на хвилі 49,83 метра.

НА УКРАЇНИ АМЕРИКИ:

Увечері з 10 год. за східним стандартним часом на хвилях 41,04 метра, 41,15 метра, 41,21 метра, 41,64 метра і 41,81 метра.

Вночі о 12 год. за східним стандартним часом на хвилях 41,04 метра, 41,21 метра і 41,64 метра.

Слухайте наші радіопередачі щоденно! Враження і побажання просимо надсилати на адресу Товариства культурних зв'язків з українцями за кордоном.

РЕДАКЦІЙНА КОЛЕГІЯ.

Адреса редакції і Товариства культурних зв'язків з українцями за кордоном:
Українська РСР, Київ, вул. Січневого повстання, 26.

Надруковано в друкарні «Радянська Україна», м. Київ.



Вісті з України

Видання Товариства культурних зв'язків з українцями за кордоном

Рік видання другий. | № 78 (180). Жовтень 1962 р. | Ціна 1 коп.

УКРАЇНА БУДУЄТЬСЯ

ТЕКСТИЛЬНИЙ ВЕЛЕТЕНЬ ПОЛІССЯ

МАРШРУТ № 9

Цей автобусний маршрут з'явився в Житомирі кілька років тому. Він зв'язав центр міста з околицею, де знаходяться пізнаткі корпуси найбільшого у Європі льонокомбінату. Тоді пасажирами автобусів були будівельники всіх спеціальностей — муляри, монтажники, штукатури, теслярі, сантехніки. Вони й тепер збираються зранку на зупинках, очікуючи машин. Але нині будівельники не єдині пасажири в автобусах. Разом з ними місця займають полотнярі, прядильниці, ткалі, шовеї. У жовтні минулого року комбінат видав перші сотні метрів бревенту, і відтоді з конвеєрів місяцем зростає випуск продукції. На сьогоднішній день в цехах працює шість тисяч верстатів і більша єдина тканинних верстатів. Їх і обслуговують нові пасажири автобусів дев'ятого маршруту.

З НАЙВИЩОЇ ТОЧКИ

Поки що найвищою спорудою на території льонокомбінату є водонапірна башта. «Поки що» тому, що висота споруджуваної труби котельної дорівнюватиме сорока шести метрам. Разом з ректором комбінату Сергієм Олексійовичем Тепляшовим піднімаємось на вершечину. Він — доцент текстильних, багато років працював на льонокомбінатах Росії та Білорусії, а ще вже два роки, як приїхав до Житомира, щоб допомогти українським текстильникам в будівництві комбінату й залагодженій роботі продукції.

З верхньої площадки бешти вся територія комбінату, як на долоні. Видно, як неподалік знімається серед скелястих берегів Тетерів.

— Там буде озеро, — показує Сергій Олексійович. — Ми в тому місці греблю перегородить Тетерів і утворить ся водосховище у півтора мільйона кубометрів води. Коли наш комбінат працюватиме на повну потужність, нам потрібно буде щодня 17 тисяч кубометрів води. Штучне озеро забезпечить нас нею повністю.

Прямо у відкриті вікна, немов застилаючи землі, вибрасують на сонці сизі дими. Корпуси комбінату настільки великі, що накрити їх одним дахом неможливо. Тому над кожною лінією верстатів


Закінчення на 4 стор.



Багато української молоді навчається в середніх спеціальних та вищих учбових закладах республіки.

Ось і ці дівчата, яких ви бачите на фоні в хімічній лабораторії вузу, Анатолій СЕВРЮК та Тамара ЧЕРЕПКОВА — студенти III курсу природничого факультету Черкаського педагогічного інституту.

Фото А. Васильченка.





ВЕЛИКА ГОРДІСТЬ УКРАЇНИ

ДНІПРЕЛЬСТАН. Слово це означає справжню романтику боротьби за втілення в життя великого ленінського плану ГОЕЛРО, виписане трудом українського народу та інших братніх народів нашої країни в одну з кращих сторінок історії Радянської Батьківщини.

30 електростанцій намічалось побудувати за планом ГОЕЛРО. З них 9 гідростанцій. А серед останніх — найпершу, найпотужнішу в Європі — Дніпровську. Нелегко було тоді здійснити це завдання. Не такою, як нині, була у нас тоді будівельна техніка, та й досвіду і знань було менше. Зате була тверда віра в перемогу, віра в могутні сили вільного народу.

І ось в один з весняних днів 1927 року на високій символічній назві скелі «Любов» піднявся прапор з написом: «Дніпробуд розпочато!». Нагадаємо деякі цифри робіт. Треба було спорудити 760-метрову бетонну греблю й цим підняти на 37,5 метра рівень води, добрати мільйони кубометрів землі, граніту і скали і осипу, вилити 1.180 тисяч кубометрів бетону, встановити 38.500 тонн металоконструкцій, підвести залізницю і ін.

30 років з дня пуску Дніпровської гідроелектростанції імені В. І. Леніна

А великі завдання народжують велику енергію. Тут, на берегах стародавнього Дніпра постав ансамбль світової краси. Напровесні 1932 року перед весняною повінню була закрита гребінка греблі — бетон укладений до запроектованого рівня. Разом з цим піднявся і Дніпро. Тут, де дніпрові по великому схилу, долаючи пороги, з грохотом і шумом вирвалися дніпровські води, створилося судноходний плюс.

Пуск першої машини і подача першого струму відбулися 1 травня 1932 року.

Це було великим святом і для трудящих західноукраїнських земель, які тоді томилися під капіталістичним гнітом. Газета «Сільробітник», наприклад, з гордістю писала напередодні пуску першого агрегату Дніпрогесу: «Вся буржуазна преса... висуспільства на всі лади, що Дніпровського стану ніколи не буде... Тим часом факти — це тверда річ... «Утопія», «фантазія» почала здійснюватись».

10 жовтня 1932 року була здобута повна технічна перемога. Дніпровська гідроелектростанція імені Вол. І. Леніна дала струм потужним шахтам Донбасу і заводам рудним Криворіжжя, підприємствам Дніпропетровська і Нікополя. З допомогою електрики стали придніпровські колгоспи молотити хліб, зрошувати посушливі землі, електрифікувати майбутнє радянських людей...

Та технічна історія нашого Дніпрельстану — лише один бік справи. Це історія великої політичної перемоги робітничого класу Радянського Союзу, який на дії довів капіталістичному світу непереможну силу радянського суспільства.

Швидке відродження Дніпрельстану після винищення фашистських загарбників у значній мірі й пояснюється тим, що у нас були досвідчені кадри, спеціалісти-будівельники. З березня 1947 року о 21 годині 15 хвилин Дніпрогес — велика гордість України — знову став до ладу. Він є набагато потужнішим, ніж був у довоєнний час. Але тепер він уже не один. На Дніпрі збудовані ще дві гідроелектростанції — Каховська і Кременчуцька. Споруджуються Київська і Дніпродзержинська. Буде здійснено будівництво Київської гідроелектростанції.

Нині в електричному сяйві міста і села нашої неосяжної країни, кожний її куточок.

І вражди, осліплячи серцевий шлях електрифікації, ми і нащадки наші з гордістю пригадуватимуть чудове творіння, дітище нашого народу — Дніпрогес.

П. СТЕПЧУК.

* * *

НА ФОТО: гребля Дніпровської гідроелектростанції імені В. І. Леніна.

Фото А. Васильченка.

АЖУРНІ ГІГАНТИ НА ДНІПРІ

В Київській гавані не стихає гуркіт лебідок-лісонарізів, високі далеко видно вогні електрозварювання. Тут почалось будівництво великого моста, який зв'яже місто з Рибальським півостровом, де споруджується новий житловий масив.

Конструкцію моста розробили спеціалісти київського інституту «Укрпроектсталконструкція». Вся проблема частково полягає на вантах — пучках канатів з високоміцної сталі. А вони, в свою чергу, будуть прикріплені до двох потужних пілонів. Це дасть змогу зробити судноплавний проліт завширшки майже 150 метрів.

Вантовому мосту не будуть страшні ні дим, ні сніг. Він споруджується тільки з залізобетонних конструкцій. Завдяки цьому буде міцним, довговічним, зможе витримати велике навантаження.

Новий старовні площадки, тягнулись до середини Дніпра естакади другого моста, який споруджується нижче по течії. Його будівництво викликане необхідністю перекинути вітку метро на лівий берег, в індустріальну Дарницю. Проектувальники — київський київського філіалу державного інституту «Союздорпроект» — подбали і про пішоходів, і про автотранспорт. Передбачено трасу двостороннього автомобільного і пішохідного руху. А це зумовило особливу конструкцію моста. Біля берегів він складається в двох ярусів, які потім над судноплавною частиною ріки зіллються в один.

Конструкції споруди виготовляються із зібрано попередньо напружуваного залізобетону. Тут застосовано прогресивні типи основ опор, які виключили складні і дорогі роботи в кесонами.

Мине короткий час, і ажурні гіганти з'єднають два береги лівобережного Дніпра. Разом з ними збудованими судново-авіарним мостом імені Є. О. Патона і вигнутим Парковим вони становитимуть єдиний архітектурний ансамбль.

Ростуть села

Все більше нових, красивих хат повявляється в селах Орлява і Погар, Сюмського району. Тільки за останні три роки жителі цих сіл спорудили понад п'ятдесят добротних, критих шифером і черепицею будинків. Усе частіше сім'ї робітників радгоспу справляють новосілля. Так, недавно в нові будинки переселились Е. Котик, І. Головчак, О. Миговин, В. Кравченський. А незабаром села прикрасяться ще цілою новими хатами. Їх закінчують будувати робітники М. Митович, Д. Орешин, М. Щербінович.

Поряд з житловим будівництвом у радгоспі ведеться, й господарське.

М. ІВАНИКОВИЧ.

Львівська область.

Ударна будова

КРАМАТОРСЬК. Що на одному металургійному заводі Донбасу — Краматорському імені Куйбишева — розпочато будівництво нової домни. Колектив тресту «Донмашбуд» та інших будівельних організацій вирішили спорудити домну ударними темпами. Першими на майданчик вийшли екскаваторники. Вони мають виконати великий обсяг земляних робіт, значну частину яких передбачено провести підривним способом.

НА ПРОМИСЕЛ КИТІВ

ОДЕСА. З Одеського порту в Антарктику вийшла китобійна флотилія «Радянська Україна». Її повів учасник шістнадцяти походів у південнополярні моря капітан-директор Герой Соціалістичної Праці О. М. Солянік.

Вперше в район гадячого промислу заздалегідь вийшли судна-розвідники. Вони встановлять місце найбільшого скупчення китових стад.

В цьому, як і в минулому сезоні, крім «Радянської України», добувати китів в Антарктиці провадитимуть також флотилії «Советская Россия», «Юрий Долгорукий» і «Слава».

ПО РАДЯНСЬКОМУ СОЮЗУ

ЩОДНЯ — ЕШЕЛОН РИБИ

Рибалки Камчатського півострова виловили 2 мільйони 864 тисячі центнерів оселедців, лосося та іншої риби. Перевиконано план випуску консервів.

Майже двісті суден — траулерів, сейнерів, плавбаз значно витерпали річні завдання. Щодня метрик одержує з півострова майже ешелон риби.

ВИСОКОТОЧНИЙ ВЕРСТАТ

З точністю до трьох мікронів можна обробляти деталі на новому різьбошліфувальному агрегаті, який створено на московському заводі координатно-розточувальних верстатів. Випуском такого типу машин розв'язується дуже важлива проблема виготовлення високоточних ходових гвинтів для різних галузей промисловості.

ЕЛЕКТРОЗАЛІЗНИЦЯ ЧЕРЕЗ ГРЕБЛЮ

Закінчено спорудження контактної сітки на дільниці нової електрифікованої залізниці Куйбишева — станція Ставгя довжиною понад сто кілометрів.

Залізниця проходить через греблю Вольжої ГЕС імені В. І. Леніна. По ній підуть електропоїзди.

ВАЖЛИВА ВІХА В ІСТОРІЇ ВІРМЕНІЇ

Сторічною Зейтунського повстання, яке стало важливою вітою в історії вірменського народу, приурочено сесію Академії наук Вірменії, що відкрилась в Єревані. З доповіддю «Героїчна битва Зейтуна 1862 року» виступив академік АН Вірменії М. Нерсісян.

СТАРОДАВНІЙ ВАХШ ПІДКОРЕНО

7 жовтня о третій годині дня у Таджикистані потужний вибух обрушив в ріку Ваш тисячі кубометрів скальної породи, бетонних брил. Так було завершено перекриття стародавнього русла Вахшу. Біля берега якого спорудженого найпотужнішу в Середній Азії ГЕС.

З нагоди перекриття Вахшу відбувся багатолюдний мітинг.

ЗАХІДНОСИБІРСЬКА ДОМНА


На новому Західносибірському металургійному заводі, який споруджується біля Новокузнецька, почався монтаж першої доменної печі.

Нова домна —, «Сибірячка» буде рідною сестрою новотульських, липецьких та інших надпотужних домен, збудованих за останні роки.

П'ЯТЬ ПРИБАЛТІЙСЬКИХ МІЛЬЯРДІВ

Сім діючих турбогенераторів Прибалтійської ДРЕС — найбільшої на північному заході країни — завершили вироблення п'ятого мільярда кіловат-годин електроенергії.

По високовольтних лініях електропередачі станція щодня дає в єдину систему Північного Заходу понад десять мільйонів кіловат-годин електричної енергії — найдешевшої в Естонії.



ПРОВОКАТОРИ НА ЗАХОДІ ПРОДОВЖУЮТЬ ДІЯТИ

Система провокацій й використання найманців-провокаторів, злочинопорушників й лжесвідків з метою створення ситуації для реакційних кіл Заходу невірної тривожної думки є одним з головних засобів діяльності розвідок імперіалістичних держав й буржуазного суду.

Методами фальсифікації судових процесів широко користувались прибічники фашистської партії в Німеччині 1933—1945 рр. У 1933 р. фашисти організували лейпцізькі судилища, на лясу обвинувачення комуністів у підпалі будинку німецького парламенту.

Потім було грунтовно доведено, що рейхстаг підпалили самі фашисти з метою розгрому Комуністичної партії Німеччини.

Харві Матусоу — колишній репетар й лжесвідок з справі керівників Комуністичної партії США — у свідомій широко відомій нині «Лівесайдзі», виданої в США в 1955 році, незважаючи на цькування з боку американських офіційних властей й вигрозу судової розправи, розповів усьому світові про всю механіку жорстоких судових провокацій і про справжню мету цих напівнуну сфабрикованих «процесів».

Реакційні елементи імперіалістичних держав намагаються все, щоб очорнити радянський народ, представити в перекрученому вигляді політику і діяльність Радянської держави.

З цією метою вони вдаються до всіляких провокацій, брехні і обману, до різних інсценувань та інших брудних методів злісних нападів на Радянський Союз.

Без перебільшення можна сказати, що цільна переносить в цьому напрямку українським буржуазним націоналістам. Вони будь-що намагаються втримати по цільну перпостать, запопадливо стежачи за тим, щоб кто-небудь з їхніх «політичних» воріхів не перескрипив їх.

В брошурі «Терор на службі 3-й ОУН», виданій Товариством культурних зв'язків з українцями за кордоном, та статтях, надрукованих в газеті «Вісті з України», наведені численні факти про те, як бандерівські інсінюатори за завданням свого провідника встановили тісні контакти з агентурними розвідувальними службами США, Англії, ФРН та Італії. Один з цих багатьох контактів організований у Франкфурті-на-Майні підручним Бандери— Миколою Климишиним з американським розвідником Біллем. Цьому за'язку Бандера з часом надав найсерйознішого значення і став добиватись того, щоб контакт з Біллем був знищений та розширений. Бандері особливо імпонувало те, що Білль відзначався як своєю наполегливістю, так і досить примітивністю агресивністю при організації різного роду вбивств, провокацій, фальшивок і т. п. На відміну від інших американських розвідників, Білль вирішував їх досить швидко — і конкретно так, як цього вимагали Бандерівці. Він не зв'язував їхньої злочинної ініціативи і чисто підшукував, як краще здійснити той чи інший злочин. Більше того, Білль був самою щедрою особою в американській розвідці, з якими бандерівцям доводилось мати справу. Він ніколи не рахувався з витратами на здійснення своїх планів, а тим більше ніколи не скупився на винагородну винокаяків цих планів. Білль платив завжди багато і завжди тим, що зараз необхідно було Бандері та його бандерівцям: документи, автомашини, зброя і т. п.

В самому розвалі співробітництва між бандерівцями та Біллем в 1947 р. радянські окупаційні власті в Німеччині висловили протест американському командуванню з приводу безжалісного розгрому антирадянської діяльності злочинних груп в американській окупаційній зоні. В числі цих злочинних груп були названі ОУН-бандерівці і т. зв. Антибільшовицький блок народів (АБН).

Опинившись у незручному становищі і позбавлені можливості представити хоч-небудь заперечення з цього приводу, американські власті змушені були обіцяти, що вони вживуть всіх заходів для того, щоб покінчити з антирадянською діяльністю «протизонних» Радянського Союзу в американській зоні окупації Німеччини та надалі не допускати такого становища, щоб злочинні елементи могли б безкарно проводити підривну роботу проти союзників.

В зв'язку з цим на чолі начальників американських розвідувальних служб були розроблені заходи, які мали на меті офарбірувати доказа, за допомогою яких можна було перекинути радянські власті в тому, що американці рішуче припинили антирадянську діяльність націоналістів і покарали їх. Заходи розраховували підготувати таким чином, щоб надати їм антирадянської спрямованості і розвинути навколо них антирадянську кампанію.

Розробити і здійснити ці заходи американське військове командування доручило розвідницу Біллю 1 шефу американської військової жандармерії, які через кілька дня представили на затвердження в деталях розроблений план провокації. Головна роль у цій провокації відводилася ОУН-АБН, які старанно брались за будь-яку брудну справу і тому не виглядали у американців кінних сумнівів. До того часу бандерівські витязюки вже встигли виконати кільна доручень Білля по ескалації у усуненню небажаних американцям осіб. Білль був задоволений їх роботою.

Американські режисери задуманої провокації почали діяти. В зв'язку з тим, що перший агент американської розвідки Микола Климишин на той час був відсутній, Білль вирішив до себе на зустріч старого гітлерівського шпигуна Юрія Шевченка (зараз мешкає в Нью-Йорку) разом з Мироном Матвієйком, яких попередньо ра по вимогу радянського військового командування.

«Зрозуміло, — казав Білль, — ми далеві від думки ліквідувати ОУН, або АБН, а також від того, щоб учудомити їх інтереси. Навпаки, ми хочемо, щоб ті організації працювали ще краще і цілеспрямовано, ми хочемо створити їм рекламу, щоб переверзії до них уваги «вільного світу».

На запитання Лопатинського, як думає це зробити американська сторона, Білль виклав такий план:

Стай-ся надасть ОУН-АБН приміщення, передасть у їхнє розпорядження одну з друкарень з українськими шрифтами, яка є в її розпорядженні, забезпечить їх папером, фарбою та іншими необхідними технічними засобами для організації друкованого органу і виданням антирадянської пролагандистської літератури.

ОУН-АБН, в свою чергу, мають потурбуватися про те, щоб підібрати із свого середовища підходящу людину, яка б змогла виконувати роль керівника цієї друкарні. Ця людина, заявив Білль, повинна бути цілковито відлюдна.

В порядку підготовки до цієї акції в друкарні повинно було надрукованою якомога більше «нелегальної» літератури, — листівок, брошур та видань антирадянських документів. В ній необхідно посередині помістити рукописів і видань бандерівських кореспондентів з різних країн.

«Коли все це буде готове, — сказав Білль, — ми зададіслідь обумовлений час американцями і ОУН-АБН час американська військова жандармерія «вимітеться що «нелегальну» друкарню, зробить в ній ретельний обшук, включить усі технічні засоби, заготовлену літературу, папір, фарби, а також «заарештує» одного з керівників цієї друкарні, який буде відданий під «суд».

«Арешт» керівника друкарні, обшук приміщення будуть фіксуватися кореспондентами газет, радіо і кіно. Тому, від дані Білль, треба підготувати все найретельніше, відпрацювати кожну деталь, яку змогли б відхопити ті з присутніх для нас кореспондентів преси, радіо і кінохроніки.

«Судовий розгляд» в зв'язку з виявленням цієї друкарні, продовжувати Білль, ми також постараємось організувати так, щоб про його хід дізналось якнайбільше людей. Користь з цього буде величезна як стільки для нас, американців, скільки для всіх, кого цікавить антирадянська пропаганда. Американці також чимало матимуть можливість довідатись, що вони мають організовану обов'язку, виконали вимогу радянських окупаційних властей

ПРОВОКАТОРИ НА ЗАХОДІ ПРОДОВЖУЮТЬ ДІЯТИ

Закінчення Починок на 4 стор.

Щти по цьому пляху — означало б сказати правду, хто і за що подарував бандерівцям радіостанцію, хто її монтував і маскував, хто дав дозвіл розташувати її на території Бельгії і вести антирадянські радіопередачі проти країни, з якою Бельгія підтримує дипломатичні відносини. А все це ми вже не входило в розрахунки бельгійських судових властей. Їм необхідно було обґрунтувати звести наклеп на радянський народ. Радянську державу. І вони із шкіри пнулися, аби перетворити цей «процес» на трибуну для антирадянського балагану.

Зробили свою справу і підлупні пружини в особі бельгійських чиновників — прямих виконавців порушення бельгійських законів... І прокурори — цей страховик бельгійської законності — відмовився від звинувачення... Але свідомість на людний голос заговорив адвокат — Поризис — депутат бельгійського парламенту від соціал-християнської партії і Хоен — керівник соціалістичної партії в окрузі Верв'є. І католик Поризис і соціаліст Хоен, зовсім нарочись, реклямували «тяжку» місію ОУН-АБН, вола-ли про допомогу цим прозахідніпим групам, з своїх «підзахисних» змальовували як найвеличніших мучеників, котрі стали невинними жертвами судової помилки. Вони свідчили від суду ся ім'я справи, котру анонсували підсудні», змінести антирадянський напрт.

Як і треба було чекати, обвинувачених засудили до одного місяця тюремного ув'язнення, причому Колишнку і Романку зарахували час перебування під слідством, строк відбутся покарання Мульжевичу — відняли на 2 роки. Обвинуваченим негайно затягнули в тюрми, їх потисснули міцно руки, недовгочно потиснувши — продовжуйте в тому ж дусі. Інакше не могло й бути. Хіба ж може господар суперо покарати свого власного собцу, коли він вірою й правдою служив йому і виконував всі його настанови? Ніколи! По-мейнній мірі його нарнють символічно.

Так було, так є і так буде у буржуазному правосуді. Справедливість в імперіалістичних державах дрімає, коли йдеться про провокаторів, ліквідаторів, фальсифікаторів та їм подібних.

Тим часом, поки особинуаченість пе перебували на державних харчах і під час самого судового розгляду бандерівські шахрії гарячково посилювали виконати якомога більше брудної роботи в еміграції, використовуючи цей провокаційний процес.

Так закінчився чергова англо-бельгійсько - бандерівська провокація, яка широко висвітлювалася у бандерівській пресі. За неї почали з'являтися вищі все з тими ж антирадянськими пілляни і з метою одержання додаткових коштів для свого безтурботного, сутого життя від розвідок імперіалістичних країн, а також від обдурених українських емігрантів.

Розвідки США, Англії, ФРН та інших імперіалістичних держав широко використовують запорожці української націоналіст и ч н і центри, надаючи їм повну свободу в провокаційній антирадянській діяльно с т і. більше того, сприяючи чи що їх діяльність проти Радянського Союзу.

У цій статті коротко висвітлено дні цієнно вілові в емігрантських колах провокації бандерівців. Кількість їх лічиться багатьма десятками. Всі ці провокації неминуче зайнчувалися провалом. Розпочата розвідкою ФРП провокація з Карсеруе, що за своєю задзетером ян дні мрамві води схожа на згадані в статті і в якій виступають у головній ролі ті ж бандерівці, приречена також на ганебний провал.

М. МАКСИМЕНКО.



Люднс в читальних залах обласної бібліотеки ім. м. Вінниці. Тут можна зустріти і молодого виробничника, що вчиться після роботи, і свого ветерана праці, і допитливих студентів навчальних закладів. До їх послуг в обласній бібліотеці великий книжковий фонд з різних галузей знань, а також великий вибір творів художньої літератури.

Фото А. Васильєнка.

30 РОКІВ НА САМОДІЯЛЬНІЙ СЦЕНІ

ХРИСТИНІВКА, Черкаської області. Районний театр народної творчості показав свою нову прем'єру — спектакль «У вишневому саду» Ц. Солодаря. Тепло прийняли глядачі виконавці ролі Дуняшки — механіка-зв'язківця станції Христинівка В. М. Сілка. Це був ювілейний спектакль артиста-любитель. 30 років тому він приїхав на сцену самодіяльного театру. З того часу зіграв безліч ролей: Андрія в опері «Запорожець за Дунаєм» С. Гулака-Артемовського, Петра в опері «Наталка-Полтавка» М. Лисенка, Платона Кречета в однойменній п'єсі О. Корнійчука та ін. Як виконавець і режисер В. М. Сілко нагороджений дипломом першого ступеня на обласних оглядах художньої самодіяльності.

ГОСПОДАРІ БІЛОГО ЧЕРЕМОША

Поблизу самої гаті розмістилися дарабн. Їх тут безліч — кілька десятків. На них метушаться люди: одні сверлять дірки в стовбурах дерев. Інші засклюють шпори. Тільки за тальбою, і дарнвся — дарабя готова. Ідуть останні приготування до їх спуску на воду.

Біля однієї дарабн Дмитро Черленнк та Юрій Федорчнк нінчають в'язати, вірніше збивати останню, одинадцяту тальбу. Тут же й члени бригади — Іван Крильчук, Федір Морозов та Юрій Панасюнак.

...Вечорів. На землю лягає густий туман. Вже по-осінньому холодно. Люди поспішають в гуртожнток — відпочити після трудового дня. А завтра рано їм снцем — в дорогу...

Якщо ви були в Пробійпній 5—6 років тому, то тепер не впізнаєте цього села. Серед недавно побудованих добротних будинків виділяється двоповерховий гуртожнток для робітників Бібрунецької сплавбазнщ. Їдальня, магазин. В очі впадають спнетнчні лінії електропередач. Старші люди говорять, що колись тут і жптн не можна було проїхати — лише дрючнчій, дикий ліс. А тепер сюди хороша дорога, по якій мчать у різні боки автомашини, в село вже під саму положну ходить щодня автобус.

Багато перемнкод створила природа на всьому протязі Білого Черемоша. Та чергмч завжди готовий до них — пильно вдивлнться вперед, стежить за прнмхлнною рікою.

...П'ята годнна ранку. З гаті, цього великого гірського озера-водойнпця, пускають воду. З шумом набігає вона, зволікаючи дарабн, вирівнюючи дрібними бризками людей, що стоять поблизу. Міцні троси держать дарабн, не дозволяють їм пуститнсь самостійно, без людей в подорож. Через півгодини на передні тальби до керма стали чергмнпті — смілнві, думні, завзяті. Лунає команда. Троси одночасно перерубані. Пнячн воду, шнндко вчнть дарабя, обминаючи великі камені, вужем звпваючнсь у крутих вигнках ріки.

Надійшла черга рубати троси і одним знайомим. Одна дарабя, а за нею й друга, набирнючи швндкість, рушили з місця. З другої від керма махає рукою Дмитро Черленнк і щось кричить. За шумом води можна лише розібрати:

— ...До зустрічі весною!

В. ГОРУК.

с. Пробійпнна, Станіславської області.

ВІСІМНАДЦЯТЬ ДРУЗІВ

—ЗАРАЗ я заканчую портрет старого вчителя, корінного жителя Миколаєва Олександра Олексндровича Заіпкпна.

Вчитель... Це велнке слово. Я багато думаю про образ, стоячи біля глини і не наважуюся взяти її, почати працювати. А потім прийшов ранок, коли я чітко уявив його— сива голова, мудрі очі, високе чоло. В куточках вуст— ледь помітна посмішка, що зігріває серця кожного, до кого звернена. Так «народився» мій вчитель. Перші спроби у глині були на мій погляд вдалими, і я почав працювати у дереві.

Мені дуже подобається цей матеріал. Його використовують скульптори усіх народів спокопвіку. Бо дерево дає можливість для широких узагальнень, говорить Олег Панасюнак Здпковський, відомий на Україні скульптор, голова Товариства миколаївських художників.

Цікава доля цієї людини. Він походить з справжньої «мистецької» родини. Батько Панас Гнатович співав у хорі багатьох деревлюційних театрів. Жилось сутужно, але не дивлячись на такий матеріальний умовнн дітям зимлку прнщеплювалась любов до живопнсу, снени. Це й обумовплювало їх життєві шляхи. Найстарший брат Олександр Панасовнч Здпковський — нині режисер Донецького театру опери та балету, народний артист УРСР, середній — Христофон Панасовнч — художній керівник Черкаської філармонії, сестра Єлизавета Панасівна — співачка. А Олег Панасовнч вже 20 років захоплюється скульптурою. Він учасник багатьох республіканських та всесоюзних виставок. Роботи О. Здпковського увійшли до скарбниць багатьох музеїв України.

Довгий час Олег Панасовнч жив на Закарпатті. Вспи серцем полюбив пін талаковитих, гостинних, щедрих душею людей цього краю. Одна з останніх робіт скульптора присвячена народному герою Буковини Лук'яну Кобилиці. Багато часу віддав митець роботі над цим твором. Подорожував по Чернівецькій області, розпитував людей, відшукував старовинні вишнвкн, різьбу по дереву, слухав старовинні легенди. Це і дало можливість створити твори класнків української літератури.

І ось перед нпмн Лук'ян Кобилиця, борець за народну волю. Ексцентричний коворот могутнього торса, широкий розліт брів, орлиний погляд.

Скульптуру швндко закінчено, а митці вже заповнили інший образ — миколаївський робітник Іван Чигирин. Він теж боровся за те, щоб щастя прийшло в кожний дім нашої землі і загнуло від рук варських сатрапів. Народ зам'ятає цю людину, імена Івана Чигирина названо одну з центральних магістралей Миколаєва.

Олег Панасовнч розповідає про те, що миколаївське Товариство художників утворилось 10 років тому. До цього увійшли митці старшого покоління і зовсім нні художники, які недавно закінчили вищі учбові заклади. Багато роботи, пнкавої, різноманітної. Миколаївські художники — великі патріоти рідного краю. Вони оспівують його чудових людей і дарують свої полотна заводам, фабрнкам, школам. Мистецтво — людям — благородний заклнк. Вони перетворюють його в життя.

Кілька років тому до митців звернулись колгоспники з району Новий Буг з проханням допомогти місцевим авторам організувати в селі художню студію. А потім хтось з молодих ентузіастів запропонував створнтн в Новому Бузі карткну галереї. Зробимо друзям хороший подарунок. Кожний митець відібрав для цього полотна колгоспннкам свої кращі твори.

«Друзі» і взаємодопомога» — такий девіз миколаївських митців.

Майстерність художників зростає в дружніх обговореннях, в порадах, зауваженнях і доброзичливих.

З. АРТЕМЕНКО.

Поділля промислове

Може, колись ти жив або бував в цьому краї, земляче, і пам'ятаєш його безкраї поля, позначовані на мапсньі клаптики, що нагадували латкй на одягі жебрака. Сонцн-подолянн рясно зрошували цю землю своїм потом, своїм трудом, працюючи на рідній, але не своїй землі. Багато хліборобів були позбавлені і цієї можливості, вони змушені були в пошуках хлібу і долі залишити Батьківщину.

Поділля... Таким було воно колись. Край соки і дерев'яного плуга. Край, в якому, власне, не було ніякої промисловості.

Всі чавунолнварні і механічні заводи і майстерні, що працювали тут ніколи тому, виробляли в основному сільськогосподарський інвентар. На всіх цих підприємствах налічувалось лише близько тисячі робітників. Мізерною була і їх продукція. Так, одна кінна сівалка на Поділлі припадала тоді на 14 тисяч гектарів земні!

А якою справді лід'ємною була праця робітників на старих цукроварнях, наприклад, на Городоцькому, де цукор з виварних апаратів переносили у сушильне відділення на плечах і просушували його за допомогою лопат і граблів.

Це було колись. А сьогодні Поділля — це край, в якому працюють сотні нових підприємств, оснащених за останнім словом нічнаяної техніки. Область, яку завжди вважали часто сільськогосподарською, в кожний рокоим помножує свою промнслову потужність.

З подільською марюою тепер входить в життя термопласт-автомати, силові трансформатори, електроприлади, верстати, різні досконалі механізми і багато іншого.

Семирічна зялнзна глибокі сліди на карті Хмельницької області. Її могутня хода позначена появою асфальто-бетонних заводів у Кам'янець-Подільському і Хмельницькому, нових цехів трансформаторного заводу в обласному центрі, інструментального заводу в Городку, машинобудівного — в Красилові, електромеханічних заводів, що прийшли на зміну невеликим майстернях — у Дунаївцях і Кам'янець-Подільському, трикотажний фабрнці в Хмельницькому, нових цукрових заводів — тоцне, відкрито сотні нових нлнпів, майстерень, цехів.

Ніде будівництво житлового краю. Поділля являє собою суцільний будівельний майданчик. Споруджуються нові заводи, фабрики, сільські будівлі, житлові будинки, школи, лікарні, клуби — всього і не перелічнть. І кожний будовнй потрібні матеріали. Де їх взяти? Колись їх завозили з інших областей. Тепер на Поділлі є свої добрі розвинена промнсловість будівельних матеріалів. Заводи Хмельницької області виробляють стінові матеріали, цеглу, черепицю, азбестоцемент. Не було тут раніше і підприємства, що виробляли б керамічні труби. Тепер вони є. У виробництві будівельних матеріалів досягнуто значних успіхів і заноснлося реконструкції дівчих підприємств. Хмельницький цегельний завод дав торік 43 мільйони штук умовної цегли і 627 тисяч штук черепиці. Втрое збільшує випуск продукції Шепетівський завод, зросли потужності Чорноострівського, Ізяславського, Деражнянського, Гриців'ського заводів.

Все це обумовлено великнмн розмахи будівництва Поділля. За останні три-чотири роки в Хмельницькій області здано в експлуатацію 164 тисячі квадратних метрів житла. За цією цифрою — цілнлі осемнадцять тисяч подолян, нові жнлокві квартали Хмельницького, нові будинки Кам'янець-Подільського, Шепетівки, Славути... Додайте ще 370 тисяч квадратних метрів житла, споруджеиого індивідуальними забудовниками в містах і робітничих селищах за рахунок власних заощаджень і держаного кредиту. Додайте 37 тисяч будинків, в яких справили новосілля сім'ї селян. Хіба за всю свою історію знало Поділля такий розмах будівництва? Такі факти наших днів, так конкретно втілюється в життя турбота радянського уряду про людину.

Промнслнки легкої промисловості області виробляють багато взуття, тканин, трикотажних виробів, хорошої меблі, виробів з пластичних мас тощо. Якщо б ви колнсь порівняли, як зріс випуск виробів з пластичних мас, то зробити це неможливо. Причина проста: пластмаси на Поділлі не вироблялися і в недавньому минулому — вони дітнще цієї семирічки.

Випуск продукції заводів і фабрик легкої промисловості з кожним роком значно збільшується. Цікавий факт: текстильні фабрики Поділля збільшили випуск тканин порівняно з 1957 роком на 1400 тисяч метрів. Щоб реально уявити цю цифру, додамо, що на рушник тільки цього збільшення можна виготовити понад 520 тисяч костюмів.

У харчовій промисловості краю, де значне місце посідає виробництво консервів, макаронних, кондитерських виробів тощо, завжди провідною була цукрова промисловість. Тепер вона залишається і тепер. Але вона значно розширилась. І рнад швндко поповнюються. Нещодавно, наприклад, став до ладу Кам'янець-Подільський цукрозавод, здатний переробляти 25 тисяч центнерів буряків на добу. Докорінно реконструйовані Волочнський, Городоцький, Нарнвецький та інші заводи. Широку Поділля і більше дугу. За рівнем виробництва цього цінного продукту вже тепер виконується завдання 1965 року, який є останнім роком семирічки.

Великі радісні зміни стались за роки Радянської влади на Поділлі. Тим українцям, які в дале лнхолітя залишили свій край, важко було б тепер пізнати його. Ще величнішс завтра Поділля, яке життєдайним струмком влялося в повноводну ріку трудового звершень Радянської Батьківщини!

О. ТИМОШЕНКО.

Лист за океан

НАШІ ГАРАЗДИ І МРІЇ

ДОРОГІ знайомі і незнайомі земляки!

До нас, хто сидів на чужині, звертаюсь я з правдою про Радянський Союз і рідну Україну, про моє життя в ній.

Двадцять дев'ять років виповів я за морем-океаном, в Аргентині, і разом з татом і мамою змінив плекав надію повернутися на землю, що одному в світі звали ми своєю. Великою родиною на пароплаві з'їхали ми з тергіторіальні води, й одразу відчули теплу руку Батьківщини.

Нам надали громадянство, безплатний проїзд в Чернівці, куди й одержав наказ на кожну роботу. Чернівці розбудовувались гарно, і швидкої оселились у комфортабельній квартирі на три кімнати.

І що остаточно розчулило мене (не хто ні я ім. цим добрим людям, що зробили для них?) — це турбота про старенькому маму. Виділили для неї садочок, город. Зелені, квіти пожвавили мою не гриках. Остогид ні Буенос-Айрес, вимучили тяжкі болі і вороги. «Нехай же відпочине на старості», — сказала господа, підносячи хороший дарунок.

З першого ж дня, коли став до роботи, працюю за фахом. Я техніх-технолог. Моя жінка, жінка моя, влаштувалась у текстильному цеху, а недавно в дочку Лідю до вертата поставили. Дні тягнуться до вступу, все книжки читав. Хоч сам за віком бернеш! Та я і не від того.

Непомітно повернулося літа сім'я після відпочинку на мальовничій дільниці у Ковелі. Дітвора набралась во садках родичів, щоки з усіх румяні. Зібрались там з старими знайомими по мандрах, поговорили любо. І всі здоровілі. І ім на Україні добре.

Серця до серця припали ми з народом рідної землі. Пішов я щастя не тільки домашнього затишку і злагоди, а й найпаще щастя — довласті власних рук до будови помудніму. Спершу справився, щоб надивити за гостинність, ласку друзів. Потому задумувати став. Хіба добилось мої хороші товарищі за океаном самої розбудови, такого морального піднесення? Побачив, що дбає про загальний розквіт народна влада, спрямовує людей Комуністична партія.

Спорудили ми новий корпус на території текстильного комбінату — добру жакардову фабрику. Свої поставили устаткування. Бригаду я згуртував просто з молодечим запалом. Вийшла вона з кращі. Двічі завішла вороді дільниці, бо мої руки потрібні були за новим, не освоєним ще процесах. Робітничий колектив поважає мене, я його.

Готуємось до значної для нас події. Скоро минає ярина рік з дня пуску жакардового корпусу. Відзначимо, як гідно. Мрію з нашим колективом добитись, щоб вироби йшли тільки зайнятої якості.

До мрій і сподівань моїх приєднуються дружина Марина, діти, мішачки наш Сергійко, що вже грамоти знає, сестра і мама.

Якнь ДАЦІЙ.

Чернівці.



ЧЕРКАСИ. Вулиця імені Т. Г. Шевченка.
Фото А. Васильєвська.

НАЙКРАЩИЙ ДАРУНОК

Коли мені доводиться зустрічатися з представниками інших країн, я завжди запитую: що найбільше вражає їх у нашому житті. І ви знаєте, майже всі вони відповідають: жадоба до знань і любов до книги.

Це дуже мірно. Я особисто (не я хіба тільки я?) вважаю книгу — найкращим подарунком на свято, на день народження, на відзначення якогось цікавого тепло. Тому-то дуже зрадів я, коли дізнався, що Держане видавництво художньої літератури УРСР почало видавати спеціальні подарункові видання кращих творів сучасної і класичної літератури. Це дуже гарні, красиво і з любов'ю оформлені книги з яскравими ілюстраціями кращих художників, з веселими, із смаком зробленими обкладинками. Ось одна з улюблених книжок нашого читача — «Вершинин» Юрія Яновського, ось «Вайки» Євгена Гребінки, а ось...

Ви, звичайно ж, любите Нечуя-Левицького? Та й хіба можна його не любити. Та серед багатьох його творів є один — найбільш досконалий і яскравий, — це повість «Найдешева сім'я». Сміялися б не читали ви її, завжди з насолодою перечитуватимете сповнені іскрометного гумору сторінки. Пам'ятаєте оцю розмову двох братів:

«...— Карпе!, — промовив Лаврін, — а кого ти будеш оце сватать? Адже ж оце перед Семеном тебе батько, вздумав, оженить.

— Посватаю, кого трапиться, — знехотя обізвався Карпо.

— Сватай, Карпе, Палажку, — сказав Лаврін. — ...В Палажки брови, як шнурочки: моргне, ніби поглядом скипне. Одна брова варта волами другій брові й цінн нема. А що вже гарна! Як намальована!



— Коли в Палажки очі дитрішуються, як у жаби, а стан гривий, як у баби.

— І вже доладна! Ходить так легенько, наче в ступі горох товче, а як говорить, то носом свистить.

— То святай Вівдю. Чим же Вівдя негарна? Говорить тоненько, мов синичка грає, а тихо, як ягнята.

— Теха, як телиця. Я люблю, щоб дівчина була трохи бриклива, щоб мала серце в вершки, — сказав Карпо.

— То бери Химку. Ця не брикне, то й перекинеться, — сказав Лаврін.

— Коли в Химки очі, як у сови, а сміх іржатим лосем чує, як у жеді млинці печуть. А як ходить, то ногами решетом горох точить, тані випрутаєш виробляє.

...Хлопці трохи помовчали, але перегодя знов почали балакати...

— Карпе! — тихо почав Лаврін, дуже охочий до гарних дівчат. — Скажи-бо, кого ти будеш сватать?

— Ай Оленись од мене, — тихо промовив Карпо.

— Сватай Олену Головінину. Оленя кругла, як цибулька, позовида, як повний місяць: в неї щоки, мов яблука, зуби, як біла ріпа, коса, як пранки, сама дівка здорова. Як тур: як іде, то під ною аж земля стугонить.

— Гарна... мордою хоч пацюки бий; сама товста, як бідна, а шия хоч обіда рви...

— Але ж ти й вередливий! То сватай Хотину Корчовіпку, — сказав Лаврін і засміявся.

— Ти ти здурів? Хотина як загляне в вікно, то на вікно три дні собаки брешуть, а на виду у неї мовче чорт сім кіп гороху заполотав...»

Я тримаю в руках цю книжку, з обкладинки якої дивляться на мене очі її героїв — Найдаша і Кайдашки, Карпа і Лаврінa, Мотрі і Мелашки. Який-то гарний подарунок!

Я не стану називати вам інших книжок — подарункових видань, бо хочу розповісти про другу серію, що її видає те ж саме видавництво художньої літератури. Це «Систематизація зкладінка кращих творів довоєнної літератури».

Скільки улюблених імен серед авторів мають, що вже війнули чи незабаром найдуть в цій серії. Євген Гребінка (п'ять титанів), Панас Мирний (5 томів), Карпенко-Карий (3 томи), Юрій Федькович (двотомник). До 100-річчя з дня народження Ольги Кобилянської в цій же серії виходить збірник її творів у 5 томах. Вже підписано до друку збірники «Української народної приказки». В цій серії з'являються імена Євгенії Ярошинської, Степана Руданського, Тимофія Бордуляка, Стефана Ковалівa, Уляни Кравченко, Дніпрової Чайки та багато, багато інших.

Як бачите, урожайний цей рік у нас не лише на жито-пшеницю, а й на чудові книжки.

Панас КНИГОЛЮБЕНКО.

БАГАТСТВА СТАРОГО ЗАМГЛАЮ

РІПКИ, Чернігівської області. Болота, густі зарості... Такий вигляд ще недавно мав Замглай. Тепер на болоті сюють електричні вогні, далеко чути гуркіт машин, що розробляють осушені масиви.

Запаси торфу тут сказовлять 40 мільйонів кубометрів. Це — найбагатше родовище на Україні. Основну частину фрезерної торф'яної маси перероблює брикетний завод. Проектну потужність його першої черги перекрито в півтора раз. Розгортуються будівництво другої черги заводу, після закінчення якої підприємство випускатиме на рік 120 тисяч тонн брикетів.

НАВЧАННЯ В НАРОДНИХ УНІВЕРСИТЕТАХ

ЛЬВІВ. Почався новий навчальний рік в 24-х народних університетах культури і технічного прогресу Львова.

Вперше прийняли своїх слухачів університети музичної культури на базі Львівської консерваторії, політичної освіти, багатогалузевий — при сервній школі № 56. Не підприємствах та в інститутах відкрилися нові філіали та факультети народних університетів.

«ХАЙ ДІТИ РАДІЮТЬ»

Івану Григоровичу Алексійченку 65 років. Вінки ж 30 з них він прослужив у Радянській Армії. Тепер відполковник Алексійченко вже на заслуженому відпочинку. Разом із своєю дружиною Ганною Андріївною він виростив на пустирі біля будинку великий сад. В ньому — яблуні 1 груші, сливи і вишні, абрикоси, виноград. Високі бронзові фруктів збирають працьовиті господарі. Для двох чоловік, звичайно, не треба стільки плодів. Подружжя Алексійченки безплатно віддають фрукти своїм сусідам — дитячим яслам. «Хай діти радіють, — каже Алексійченко, — хай для них завжди цвітуть і плодоносять наші сади». В цьому році Іван Григорович уже передав яслам близько півтонни фруктів.

М. ЧОРНИЙ.

м. Вінниця.

У 58 КРАЇН СВІТУ

У 58 країн світу експортують свою продукцію підприємства Одеського економічного району. У Данію, Голландію і Аргентину надсилаються різні прилади і апаратура. Точні верстати, пересувну кіноапаратуру охоче купує Австрія, радіально-свердлильні верстати — Франція й Італія. Така популярність одеських виробів пояснюється їх високою якістю.

Цього року з'явились нові споживачі — у Японії, Австралії, ФРН, Англії, Канаді і Бразилії. Багато устаткування виготовляється для підприємств, споруджуваних за рубежом при технічній допомозі СРСР. Шістнадцять заводів міста відправляють машини, верстати, холодильне устаткування, підйомні крани та іншу продукцію до Індії. Найрізноманітніша продукція промислових підприємств надходить до Індонезії, Цейлону, Ефіопії, Бірми, Гани, Гвінеї. Успішно розвиваються торговельні стосунки з Кубою. Туди морськими шляхами надходять хімічні установки для різання металу, фрезерувальні і токарні верстати, буд'вельні механізми.

З кожним місяцем збільшується кількість країн, куди відвантажується продукція з марки «Зроблено в Одесі».

Продукція одеських підприємств експонується на 19 міжнародних ярмарках і виставках.


С. ГАЛИЦЬКИЙ.

ДЛЯ МАЛЯТ

Погоня гарно удалась









Замість метелика — карась!

ДОЩ НА ЗАМОВЛЕННЯ

Уявіть собі місто комуністичного завтра. Струмкі будівлі з скла, металу і пластмас, широкі зелені бульвари, казкові шпилясті фонтани. Завжди сейчас і чисте тут повітря — промислові підприємства розташовані за містом, а дим заводських труб вловлюють і розсіюють механізми. Все продумано, все передбачено.

А що як дощ? Нехай він затримають свято, коли тисячі трудівників нового міста вийдуть, наприклад, на вулиці зустріти космонавтів, що повернулися з Марса, або просто збереться на стадіоні кодинність футбольний матч улюблених команд? Зійсно, ні! Якщо й насунуть грозові хмари, то з них щедро ллються дощі над землями навколишніх колгоспів, не рівноділи до міста. І все це зробить людина, яка навчилась керувати погодою.

— Уже тепер ми маємо можливість значно збільшити кількість ясних сонячних днів над Києвом, — розповідає кандидат географічних наук Г. В. Приходько, який очолює Український науково-дослідний гідрометеорологічний інститут. — Одні літак, кілька сот кілограмів аргентиодату, і над нашим містом буде прибрано на десять сонячних днів зайвику більше.

...Буйно колоситься озима пшениця, щедро обіцяє вона відплатити хліборобові за його працю. Але для цього потрібний дощ. Ось і хмари з'явились. Плинуть вони над висушеною гарячим сонцем землею. Ти багато старожилів знають: не пропустить ці хмари довголадної вологи.

Та ось літак, що піднявся в повітря, починає, мов дбайливий хлібороб, з краю в край бороздити хмари, розсіюючи реагенти. З-за хмар долітає розмірений гуркіт його потужних двигунів. І раптом місцю забарабанив по землі тонкий літній дощ.

Таку картину спостерігали в цьому році багато жителів південних областей України. Тисячі вільотів з своєї південної експериментальної бази зробили пілоти разом з учними і спеціалістами Українського науково-дослідного гідрометеорологічного інституту. Зараз уже можна говорити про перші відбадьорливі результати досліду. За допомогою реагентів в окремі місяці можна прибільшити кількість опадів у різних районах. Ще кращого ефекту досягнуто в гірських умовах, де кількість викликаних опадів доведено до десяти — п'ятнадцяти процентів.

Мине кілька років, і «дощ на замовлення» стане звичайною справою.

Л. К ЗИРЕНКО.

РАДІО

БРАТАМ ДАЛЕКИМ, РІДНИМ

Щоденні

передачі Товариства культурних зв'язків з українцями за кордоном.

На країни Європи

Вдень — час — 4 год. 30 хв. за Гріньвічем, 5 год. 30 хв. за середньоєвропейським часом. Хвилі — 19,65 м, 31,17 м, 41,96 м. Увечері — час — 7 год. 30 хв. за Гріньвічем, 8 год. 30 хв. за середньоєвропейським часом. Хвилі — 31,17 м.

На країни Америки

Увечері — час 10 год. за сіднім стандартним часом. Хвилі: 25,08 м, 25,14 м, 25,54 м, 30,82 м, 31,04 м.

Вночі — час — 12 год. за східним стандартним часом. Хвилі — 25,14 м, 25,54 м, 30,82 м.

Слухайте наші радіопередачі. Враженнях і побажання просимо надсилати на адресу Товариства культурних зв'язків з українцями за кордоном.

РЕДАКЦІЙНА КОЛЕГІЯ.

Адреса редакції і Товариства культурних зв'язків з українцями за кордоном:
Українська РСР, Київ, вул. Січневого повстання, 26.

Надруковано в друкарні «Радянська Україна», м. Київ.

КИЇВ МУЗИЧНИЙ

Почався новий музичний сезон у Київській державній філармонії. Він відкрився концертом з творів основоположника української класичної музики М. В. Лисенка, 120-річчя з дня народження якого широко відзначається на Україні. В концерті взяли участь Державний симфонічний оркестр УРСР, Державна заслужена академічна капела УРСР «Думка», соліст Київського оперного театру і філармонії.

В цьому сезоні перебувається багато цікавих концертів, виступів видатних радянських музикантів. Познайомить на виступах Святослав Ріхтер, Давид Ойстрах, Мелоді Кліберн, Жак Фієлер, Зара Долуханова відбудуться виступи симфонічного оркестру румунського радіо, хору під керуванням Р. Шоу з США, інших музичних колективів і солістів зарубіжних країн. У планах філармонії — історичні симфонічні концерти композиторів Д. Шостаковича, А. Хачатуряна, А. Штогаренка, Т. Хренікова, К. Караєва, концерти вітчизняної і зарубіжної класики, вечори вокалу, фортепіанної та інструментальної музики. Для робітників підприємств і працівників сільського господарства буде організовано концерти лауреатів всесоюзних і міжнародних конкурсів, виступи висококласних народних хорів.

Мелодії народних пісень, симфонічних, інструментальних творів лунатимуть у залах міських парків і палаців культури Києва. Тут виступатимуть виконавці Київської державної консерваторії імені П. І. Чайковського.

САМОХІДНИЙ ДИЗЕЛЬЕЛЕКТРИЧНИЙ КРАН

ОДЕСА. Експериментальний зразок дизельелектричного крана «К-651» виготовлено на заводі важкого краєбудування за проектом групи інженерів підприємства. Кран, що має велику вантажомісткість, буде використано при монтажі доменних і мартенівських печей, потужного устаткування на підприємствах хімічної та інших галузей промисловості.



ГЕЙ, НА ВИСОКІЙ ПОЛОНИНІ

Там, де річка Шибінка впадає в Черемош, починається шлях на полонини. Прорізаючи лісові масиви, круто вигнуті по крутих узбічках сопок, дороги йдуть в гори. Чим вище, тим ширшими стають проміжки: величні долини Черемоша, луги і пасовиська Чорногір'я. Обабіч дороги — кущі малини та смерини. Дивно-до червоніють гроно горобини.

Високо в горах на всередній полонинін хазяйнують тваринники артілі імені Івана Франка Жаб'ївського району на чолі із знатним чабаном Юрком Григоровичем Вангрином.

Артіль збудувала для тваринників добротні приміщення — неподалік від корівників, теляткника і свинарника — молочарні, гуртожитки, їдальні. А навколо — вікові ліси. Вгорі, над якими повсюдно височить вершина Попіван. Більшість тваринників на полонині — молодь, про яку завідуючий полониною Василь Іванович Слежук каже, що здатна вона і на трудові подвиги і на відчайдушні веселощі.

Багата сільськогосподарська артіль імені Івана Франка. Тільки орної землі в ній 330 гектарів, 3863 гектари сінокосів і 2874 полонини та пасовиськ.

На всередній полонині випасають 200 голів великої рогатої худоби, 85 телят і 58 свиней. Щодня тут переробляється до 1000 літрів молока.

Полонинне господарство обслуговує невеликий, але дружний колектив. Вже 30 років чабанує Юрко Григорович Вангрин, чималий досвід у завідуючого полониною Василя Івановича Слежука. Не раз нагороджувались премією і цінними подарунками молоді доярки Катерина Бельмега, Василина Гаврищук, Катерина Шкіряк, Марія Мирончук та інші. Добра слава лунає по області і про теляткницю Ганну Шкіряк.

Вечорами після роботи господарі полонини збираються біля радіоприймача. Приходять доярка Катерина Дмитро Жиголяк, завідуючий молочарнею Федір Семахюк, куховарка Олена Фарколяк. Розмови йдуть про космонавтів, і про революційну Кубу, і про майбутнє артілі. А потім хтось стиха заспіває. Пісню підхоплюють всі, і лунається вона — широка і вільна — над верхівками смерек, і несе її луна далеко в гори.

Тамна ніч огортає полонину. Спить після трудового дня її господарі. Лише стихи шелестять смереки.

П. ШАРНЕВСЬКИЙ.





На фото: в долині Чорного Черемоша (праворуч). Завідуючий полониною Василь СЛЕЖУК (зліва). Господині полонини (зліва направо): доярки Марія КИКИНЧУК і Василина ІВАНЧУК, куховарка Олена ФЕРКОЛЯК, теляткиця Ганна ШКІРЯК, доярки Катерина БЕЛЬМЕГА та Василина ГАВРИЩУК (внизу).

Фото С. Назаренка.

П'ЯТИРІЧЧЯ КОСМІЧНОЇ ЕРИ

(Закінчення.

Початок на 1 стор.)

Варто нагадати висловлювання англійського професора Б. Ловелла, директора радіотехнічної станції «Джодрелл бенк». В дні першого сергіївського тріумфу радянської науки він сказав журналістам:

— Радянські люди несильми пішли вперед у ракетній техніці, що перспектива Америки випередити їх у цій галузі в найближче десятиріччя тепер відпала. Я не був би здивований, коли б через рік радянський космонавт пролетів по орбіті, розташований близько від Місяця, і повернувся на Землю...

Радянський уряд не раз пропонував урядам зарубіжних держав і, зокрема, США об'єднати зусилля у вивченні Всесвіту. Це внесло б народам усіх країн менше перечитиметься національних конфліктів, більше буде зроблено наукових відкриттів, швидше вони зможуть бути реалізовані. Та, на жаль, радянські пропозиції не знаходять необхідної практичної підтримки у урядів капіталістичних країн.

* * *

Людство вступає в друге п'ятиріччя космічної ери. І немає сумніву, що за ці п'ять років Радянська країна дасть світові нових героїв — переможців космосу.

Коли дописались ці рядки, в небо піднявся новий штучний супутник Землі — «Космос-9». Штурм космосу радянською наукою триває.

А. РОМАНОВ,
оглядач ТАРС.

ЯСКРАВІ СТОРІНКИ

У СТОЛИЦІ республіки нині працює багато майстрів хронікально-документальної та науково-популярної кінематографії. Новозавітом на екранах Радянського Союзу демонструватимуться їх нові картини.

«Невідомому солдату»... — так називається фільм, створений за сценарієм В. Некрасова. Це розповідь про минуле і сучасне. Про людей, які воювали. Про живих і про тих, хто не дожив до Перемоги. Присвячується вона Невідомому радянському солдату, який віддав своє життя за те, щоб людство не знало війн.

Спливають роки і минуло відтоді, як відгримів останній постріл найстрашнішої в історії людства війни. Вирослі нові покоління, котре не знало її стріляє, не чуло свисту бомб, не бачило блокади і концтаборів.

...Визвіл фашистського концтабору, вчитель Микола Самоненко. Командир відділення човаа Володимир Іванов, визволяли Георгій Артюхов. Всі вони чули, знали, бачили... Але мертві мовчать.

А той, хто залишився жити, не може мовчати. Штурмовики, фашинні походи на нулях — не може було. І все починається спочатку — гонка озброєнь, збіговська реваншистів у Західній Німеччині. Ту пята — третя світова війна. Ось чому мовчати сьогодні — значить зрадити нім'ять тих, хто загинув, допомогти злісенним злочину. І жині бороться.

Багатьох героїв пам'ятає війна. Але не всі імена нам відомі. Ми не знаємо твого імені, Невідомий радянський солдате... Але люди пімоли не забудуть того, хто віддав своє життя, щоб продовжувалось наше.

...Місто в степах. Придніпров'я — Кривий Ріг. І назва ця, і вся історія його вивищені за гаибокої давнини. Та справжня велич прийшла до міста в наші дні. Трудовим буднам одного з великих промислових центрів нашої країни — Кривбасу, останнім годинам спорудження найтужавішої доменної печі присвячено кінорепортаж режисера Я. Авдакова та оператора О. Ковальчука «Ми — будівники».

Фільм «Чарівник зеленого світу» (сценарій В. Вершакова, режисер П. Зіпов'як, оператор В. Преображенський) присвячено радянським вченим — мікробіологам і фізіологам.

Схвильно зустріне глядач фільм «Краса землі рідної» (сценарій Г. Лимонова, режисер Л. Остерська, оператори Н. Шпрмен, Л. Рамстад). Адже картина розповідає про чудову природу України, зосереджує питання охорони лісових, водних та рибних резервів республіки.

І. САВЧЕНКО.

БРИГАДА ДРУЖНИХ

Наша читачка А. Донченко з Англії надіслала до редакції листа, в якому просить розповісти про розвиток нових суспільних відносин у нашій республіці, про життя бригад, яким за відмінні трудові успіхи, за дружбу і взаємодопомогу присвоєно звання бригад комуністичної праці. У відповідь на лист А. Донченко ми вміщуємо цю статтю.

МИ ПОЗНАЙОМИЛИСЯ саме того дня, коли для них хлопців починалося нове життя. То був день створення молодіжної бригади. Вежам якої зобов'язувалися жити і працювати по-комуністичному.

Пригадується чимало цікавих випадків. І як знаєш, з чого саме почати розповідь. Хіба що з історії появи ні в цеху Володимира Масленка...

Його помічник відразу, тільки-но він зачинив за собою двері. У повному русі гостя відчувалася енергія, сила, а в м'яких рисах обличчя — душевне тепло, що його так і вимальовували карі очі. Зайда синього матроського бушлата видніли сміхуя тільняжка, який щільно облягав широкі груди. На ретельно випрасуваних брюках — безлогляні стрілки, на носках черевиків виграли сонячні зайчики.

Як пізніше розповідав Володимир, слово «цех» завжди викликало у нього асоціацію з великим, світлим приміщенням, де в суворому порядку, наче іграшкові, стоять верстати. Навпаки — затишно, чисто, море сонця, все библиське свіжою фарбою.

А тут, у ливарному, його зустріли гамір, гуркіт. До серця підкралась сумніва: чи не помилився, як то кажуть, головою? А, може, попроситися в інший цех?

...Володимир поприймував у унивному цеху до групи людей, які чаклували біля ненасть деталей.

— Де мені знайти майстра Чепуренка? — запитав у кремезного чоловіка.

— Тут... Тільки почекати доведеться. Цінов кудись, — відповів хлопець. — Чи не до нас, буває, по роботу? Мабуть, з фронту?

Інші робітники підійшли ближче до новачка.

— Так що, до нас? — не втиває кремезний.

— До майстра Чепуренка, на формовку.

— Значить, до нас. Будемо знайомі! — Олег Танчій.

Володимир Масленко.

— Ім'я хороше і прізвище нічого собі... Як після флоту громадяна? — спитав, хукаво примружившись. Танчій.

— Не спарнусь.

— Зачекай, а спеціальність у тебе є? Чи учився?

— Ну, звичайно ж...

— По секрету скажу тобі — дурень ти! — Олег кивнув на зминув на хлопця. — Ці бракує тобі вищих спеціальностей, щоб — чистота, тихе життя. А тут що? Пил, бруд, спекота в масляних пілмах, гуркіт. До того ж, у цінах до формувальників душа не дежить.

Володимир зітхнув, не знаючи, що й відповісти. Стояв, опустивши голову. А Олег по-змовницьки підмигнув товаришам, все ширше посміхаючись.

Такі-то воно справи! — кинув. — Ну, то нічого, трималісь! А тепер ідіть до майстра. Ось він.

* * *

...Того вечора Олег довго розповідав про те, якою умілою майбутню бригаду, люди культурні, з серцем, працьовиті, дружні. Ну, словом, як ніи комуністи!

— А хто ж не працюватиме з нами? — запитав Володимир.

— Іван Логвиненко... Талановий хлопець! Та ти його знаєш, він, хоч і тихий, а мішь в ньому — як у кремені!

Розпрощавшись, хлопці розійшлися. Володимир тепер з якоюсь ніжністю думав про Олега, який очолив тихе нове побратимство. Хотілося більше знати про свого бригадира.

А життя в цього хлопця з далекого чернігівського села склалося так: не повернувся з війни батько, помелла мати. Закінчивши сім класів у рідному селі, Олег подався до Києва. Вступив на відповідне, а потім у військове училище. Після демобілізації молодий офіцер поїхав у Харків. Тут і почався його трудовий шлях.

Індустріальне місто вибрав для себе хлопця не випадково. Хотілося випробувати сили на виробництві. Одне із знайомих не радив цього робити, мовляв, пекло буде...

— А її я не обіцяю собі пілжу легкого, — була відповідь.

У цеху не відразу в Олега сперлось діло. Завзя не може без пригод зігнати. Цими незгарбами були пігли, як «сюрпризи» першу деталь... Тепер все не позаду. Він — бригадир. Треба згуртувати хлопців, вселіяти в них сповні справи. Сірих буднів Олег не вигнав. Кожен день — щось нове, нонява зміна починає стати радісним святом!

Так народилася ця бригада. Крім Олега і Володимира, до неї увійшли старший бригадир Іван Сич, повний Іван Логвиненко, весельчак на прізвисько Федір Лупіне, довгих юний Анатолій Шило, переслужені друзі Іван Хоменко і Володимир Гопта...

Важлива робота у хлопців. Доручено їм відливати вали, які ще недавно вирабляли молотами. Вірніше, не відливати, а готувати форми. Ну, а форма в таких випадках — половина успіху. Якою буде вона, таким буде й вал.

Нолівали форми спочатку вручну, трамбовкою, це забирало багато часу. Та ось у цеху з'явилася нова машина — пескомет. Нони очікували вередливий механізм, всього три чверті року за зміну сформували, забили опоки, а потім...

Ні, пойдем, — втрутився Володимир Масленко. Дуже цікаво, як мати чоиас! Біжи в душову і мерщій вже сюди! Ми за тебе справимося.

Іншим разом були на нівмику — вводили будинок Володимиру. Потім Олег ходив в політехнічний інститут, просив, щоб студенти допомогли членам бригади готуватись до вступу в інститут...

Вечорами друзів можна побачити в театрі, концертному залі, на хокейних матчах Палаців культури Харкова або у когось вдома, за чашкою чаю.

Так живуть люди цієї бригади...

О. ЗЛОДІЮШКО.
м. Харків.

Вісті з України

1962 р. Жовтень. 3 стор.

МОЛОДІЮТЬ БЕРЕГИ ДНІПРОВІ

Разючі зміни сталися на Дніпрі. Що більше помолодів Славутич. Повноводним морем, яке створили радянські люди, розлився Дніпро на багато кілометрів.

...Адамівка. Раніше це було звичайне село Чигиринського району. А тепер Адамівка — великий порт морського типу. Тут численні гідроспоруди, сюди до гранітних причалів підходять пароплави, доставляючи вантажі для народного господарства.

Поблизу Чигирина найширше розливається Дніпро. Ідеш кліпку пароплавом — берегів не видно. Широчінь до 60 кілометрів! На думку спадають слова великого Кобзаря України Тараса Шевченка:

...Дніпро ген-ген собі
розкинувсь,
Сяє батько та горить.

А за його берегах коні села Боровиця, Тіньки, Рацепо... Перенесені із зони затоплення на нові місця, ці села тепер невпізнанні. Рівні, як струни на бандурі, вулиці, забудовані кварталами сяючих і просторих житлових колгоспних хліборобів, нові двоповерхові школи й будинки культури, магазини й ательє — таке обличчя нових сіл.

І всі вони утонають в садах. Чигиринські хлібороби вілають надежне садам. У колгоспах району їх вже більше двох тисяч гектарів. А зараз трудівники артілей «Україна», «Дружба» посадили ще по 150—160 гектарів фруктових дерев, закладки на приморських схилах виноградники.

Сади в кожному дворі хліборобів нових сіл. Вони вважають їх окрасою життя. Тепер вже колгоспники не вирізають на присадибних ділянках жито чи пшеницю. В цьому нема потреби — адже на колгоспних полях, добре обробленими механізмами, родять багаті врожаї. Торік, наприклад, зеленій збір зерна в колгоспах району був втрое більший, ніж у 1957 році. Багато золотистого зерна дали на трудоземі колгоспниками, тому вони й садять на присадибних ділянках фруктові дерева, закладають квітники.

...Від Чигирина цілих дніпровськими берегами лежать до Черкас. І всюди — нові села. Ось надморські Лєськи, а далі — Змагайлівка бовванів на горі, де ще кілька років тому на роздолі гуляв степовий вітер. А тепер тут понад 1250 нових будинків хліборобів, критих шифером і залізом. На дахах височать телевізійні антени, в центрі села красень — Палац культури, поза двоповерхова середня школа, чудові дитячі ясла. Тепер у змагайлівців нові плани: прикрасити своє село широкоекранним кінотеатром, ательє, ресторанном, асфальтованими тротуарами.

...А от і Черкаси — обласний центр на березі Дніпровського моря. Через реконструйований загальний міст мчать комфортабельні автобуси. Завершуються спорудження великого механізованого порту і річкового вокзалу.

Йде підготовка до будівництва Канівської гідроелектростанції — шостої на Дніпрі. Вже визначено місце створення середні гідростанції, затверджено її проект. Незабаром почнеться будівництво широкоекранного кінотеатру, стадіону, нової автобусної станції й річкового вокзалу.

Йде підготовка до будівництва Канівської гідроелектростанції — шостої на Дніпрі. Вже визначено місце створення середні гідростанції, затверджено її проект. Незабаром почнеться спорудження середнього гідробудівників.

Мине певний час, і тут, на Дніпрі, високо в небо стрімкатимуть стріли кранів, зеленіватися в роботу потужні земснаряди.

...А потім з краю в край розіллється нове Канівське море на Славутичі. На його мелководдях берегах також розкинуться нові села, мальовничі, мов писанки. І житимуть вільні щасливі нащадки великого Кобзаря.

С. ЛУГОВЕНКО.



Хліборобів Рівненщини добре знають Івана Архіповича Гладчука та його дружину Антоніну Федорівну з артілі «Ленінський шлях» Демидівського району. Іван Архипович працює бригадиром комплексної бригади, а Антоніна Федорівна очолює ланку. Протягом багатьох років вона одержують високі врожаї. В цьому році бригада зібрала по 21 центнеру зернових з гектара без кукурудзи, по 140 центнерів картоплі і по 800 центнерів цукрових буряків.

Антоніна Федорівна Гладчук — депутат Верховної Ради СРСР.

На фото: подружжя Іван Архипович та Антоніна Федорівна ГЛАДЧУКИ.

Фото О. Платонова.

НА ВИСТАВЦІ ПЕРЕДОВОГО ДОСВІДУ

ТВОРІННЯ РУК ЛЮДСЬКИХ

(Початок на 1-й стор.)

Нашу увагу привернули машини, автоматизації заводом «Поліграфмаш». Ми з інтересом розглядаємо світлокопіювальний, електронно-граверувальний автомати.

— Кільна сот таких машин уже працюють в містах і селах Радянського Союзу, — додає до побаченого нами екскурсовод.

Ідемо павільйоном, і перед нами — все нові й нові експонати, що сидчать про величезні трудові досягнення. Ми бачимо дюжу модель преса з програмним управлінням, гідравлічні редуктори, звукомонтажний стіл і потужний універсальний стаціонарний широкоекранний кінопроектор, низькотемпературну холодильну машину, дюжу модель тепловимірювального автомата з програмним управлінням, ознайомлюємося з матеріалами про застосування ультразвуку на підприємствах радянського. Все перелічити — не вистачить, бо між нами вже на території відділу «Енергетика». Власне, це стенд, на якому — рельєфна карта електрифікації Одеського економічного району. Ось один з найбільших в складу єдиної енергосистеми європейської частини Радянського Союзу.

І ось ми потрапили туди, до представлена харчова промисловість. Біля входу — експонати Ізмаїльського консервного комбінату. Це молоде підприємство, йому лише сім років. У перший рік свого існування комбінат випустив 5 мільйонів 400 тисяч банок консервів, а торік — 74 мільйони.

Багато цікавого розповідають експонати й інших підприємств радянського. Основне враження, яке залишається у нас — все для людини, для її блага, все для того, щоб забезпечити найвищий значений рівень радянських людей порівняно з будь-якою країною капіталізму.

При вході до розділу «Легка промисловість» нас зачарувало велике фотоекспонування, на якій показаний один з найкрасивіших і найбільш-вічних куточків Одеси — Приморський бульвар. А вміщений зверху напис «Дім тебе, радянська людино!» ніби доповнює фотоекспозицію.

Важко перелічити всі зразки моделей, які представили на виставку підприємства легкої промисловості.

Ми підходимо до експоната швейного об'єднання імені Водовозова.

— З усіх кінців нашої Батьківщини, а також з-за кордону, — розповідає екскурсовод, — ідуть гості до одеських швейників, щоб ознайомитися їх передовій досвід.

Перед нами — макет цеху по виготовленню жіночих пальт. Весь виробничий процес здійснюється на потокових конвеєрних лініях. Тут виробництво багатосекційні, багатофасонні потокові лінії. Навіть у фарбничій лабораторії, де створюються досліді партії одягу нових моделей, також організована потокова лінія.

Потокові конвеєрні лінії працюють за раніше невідомих виробничим циклом.

Розділом «Легка промисловість» знайомиться наше знайомство з головним павільйоном виставки. Ми вже збиралися залишити зал, коли раптом почули приємну мелодію. Посилили на джерелі звуків. Виявляється там демонструються нові зразки швейних і трикотажних виробів, взуття і галантерої. Їх створили одеські модельєри й художники. Пальта, плаття, костюми, сорочки, кофточки і светри, туфлі — все то, що прикрашає наше життя і потрібно, побачили ми при демонстрації виробів.

Ми приємно вражені — в теплого сонячного краю, яким є Одеса, рантом потрапляємо до суворої Антарктиди. Це павільйон, де представлений розділ виставки «Антарктичні китобійні флотилії».

Перед входом до павільйону лежать адміралтейські якорі, занті з суден-мисливців. Поряд з якорями — гарпуни тягнуть.

Заходимо до приміщення. В центрі — напівмуляж китобійного судна, довжиною 28 метрів. Матеріали розділу розміщені так, щоб можна було ознайомитись з подробиннями на кита, процесами розбирання і обробки їх. Перед нами — деякі зразки інструментів, якими користуються китобої. А поряд — напівобємний макет китобази «Советская Украина» і портрети тих, хто прине славу радянському китобійному промислу, кільканадцять підряд завеєвірочих вітчизну світової першості по здобуванню кита.

Виставка продовжується на відкритому майданчику. Тут ми знайомимося з великою кількістю різноманітних сільськогосподарських знарядь, продукцією Одеського автозаводського заводу.

...З великою гордістю за своїх друзів-одеситів залишаємо виставку економічного району. Багато досягнуто. А плани ще величезні, ще перспективніші. Уявляємо собі, які експонати привезуть одесити на Всесоюзну виставку передового досвіду в народному господарстві через кільканадцять років.

К. ДМИТРЕНКО.

НАЙГЛИБША В КРАЇНІ

ДОНЕЦЬК. На західній околиці міста розпочалися роботи ще на одній будові гігантської шахти «Петрівська-Глибока» — найглибшій у країні. Її ідеальної вертикальним стовбуром-колодязі поперечником діаметра пробивають землю до відмітки 1200 метрів нижче поверхні. На своєму шляху вони перетнуть до п'ятнадцяти пластів цінного вугілля для коксування. Ця шахта буде і однією з найпотужніших шахт у басейні. За проектом вона забезпечить видачу 1800 тисяч тонн високоякісного палива на рік.

«Петрівська-Глибока» — одна з 22 шахт, які широко закладені в Донецькому басейні на ріки гігантської, що залишились. Подібно до цієї, вони будуть підприємствами-гігантами і призначаються для видобування переважно вугілля для чорної металургії.

В ПАЛАЦІ ЮНИХ

По вулиці Леніна міста Кіровограда серед красивих дерев розташувався красивий двоповерховий будинок. Це — палац юних.

Минуло 25 років відтоді, як вперше розкрив він свої двері для кіровоградської дітвори.

В просторих, світлих залах палацу, в його численних кімнатах, майстернях, лабораторіях — все, що може зацікавити до душі юному мрійнику і винахідникові. Захоплює мистецтво? Будь ласка, тільки комірчуй, що більше гуртків до серця: оркестр народних інструментів чи ансамбль бандуристів, ансамбль пісні шкільної пісні і танцю чи кімнати бандуристів? Якщо дитина віддає перевагу хоровому мистецтву, в палаці широкий простір пісні. Тут працюють три хори: хлопчиків, дівчаток і старшокласників.

Людмила Михайлівна Шведь вже двадцять років керує хором. Вона над усе любить широкі, як простір, українські пісні і виконує їх, мов той соловейко.

Ганна Василівна Козир не поступається в любові до народної пісні, тільки з істотним доповненням — в супроводі бандур. Сама бандуристка, викладає українські казки. Ганна Василівна передає свою вміння володіти інструментом дітям. Хлопчики і дівчатка полюбили цей старовинний український інструмент і з великим бажанням вчаться мистецтву грати на ньому. Керівниця бандуристів пальму користується успіхом не лише в місті, а й за його межами.

Гордиться своїми вихованцями і драматичний гурток палацу.

Для тих, хто захоплюється мистецтвом, в палаці є чудова майстерня. Тут займаються десятки піонерів. Ними керує художниця Юлія Прокоріївна Петрашевська. Час від часу влаштовуються в палаці виставки робіт юних художників. А маленькі пов'язаслання Гаванди Горбунець вже двічі перестрічали кордони нашої країни. Одна робота здобувала на міжнародній виставці дитячого малюнка в Індії і одержала добру оцінку, друга — композиція до вірша Т. Г. Шевченка — в Канаді на виставці, присвяченій шевченківським дням.

Ті, хто захоплюються технікою, беруть участь у гуртках юних техніків, автомобільному, авіамодельному. Є да розвивати вміння, кмітливість, творчу думку.

Нічого не забуто. Є гуртки і для юних натуралістів, літераторів, хіміків, фізиків, кіномеханіків, різьбя по дереву. Всього 28 найрізноманітніших гуртків працюють в палаці, охоплюючи тисячі допитливих і завзятих школярів Кіровограда.

Гуртківці часто виїжджають в гості до сільських піонерів, з якими встановили справжню дружбу. Вони побували в гостях у школярів Бобрівця, Рівного, Олександрії.

З друзями йде щире листування, обмін думками, цікавими новинками. Пошта приносить конверти, які пройшли не одну тисячу кілометрів. На них написано коротко: «Міжнародній». Такі листи йдуть в Кіровоград з Китаю, Чехословаччини, Болгарії, Польщі, Румунії...

Будинок на вулиці Леніна не готує ні інженерів, ні спеціалістів, ні художників. Не в цьому його завдання. Важливо, щоб ті, хто приходить в палац мрійниками, якими з нього людьми, що знають собі цілях. Людьми допитливими, кмітливими, цікавими, такими, що гаряче люблять творчу працю.

Минуть роки. Постарішіть його перші вихованці. Дорослими стануть ті, хто навчається в його стінах тепер. Але на зміну їм прийдуть нові покоління. І палац юності буде завжди юним.

В. МОНАСТИРСЬКА.
м. Кіровоград.

Особливою майстерністю в гуртку бандуристів Кіровоградського палацу піонерів відзначаються Оленки Тарасова, Льови Сотник, Володя Пузенка.

На фото: Оленка ТАРАСОВА виконує українську народну пісню «Тихо вода річкою».

Фото Л. Болотіна.



Автор книги—заслужений металург республіки

ЗАПОРІЖЖЯ. На полицях книгозбірні металургів міста з'явилась нова, в кольоровій обкладинці книжка. Її назва — «КИПО-0,08» — зрозуміла не кожному. Для кого це — знають металург, особливо домницьки, які щоденно живуть цю книжку.

Автор «КИПО-0,08» — заслужений металург Української РСР інженер «Запоріжсталі» С. Т. Тарасов. Книга його стала практичним посібником для домницького заводу, її вивчають студенти інституту, технікумів, учні ремісничих училищ.

«КИПО» — це коефіцієнт використання корисного об'єму печі, основний показник роботи домни. Чим більший він, тим більше чавуну одержує з кожного кубометра атмосфер. В США, Англії, Франції, сталів він дорівнював 0,7-0,8. В доменному цеху «Запоріжсталі» це кращого показника — 0,66. Тепер ґх досяг вирівнюють у себе металурги багатьох заводів Придніпров'я і Донбасу.

Вісті з України
2 стор. Жовтень. 1962 р.

Вісті з України

Видання Товариства культурних зв'язків з українцями за кордоном

Рік видання другий | № 75 (177). Жовтень 1962 р. | Ціна 1 коп.

П'ЯТИРІЧЧЯ КОСМІЧНОЇ ЕРИ

«4 ЖОВТНЯ 1957 року». Ця велика дата відома всьому людству. П'ять років тому в радянського космодрому піднявся в небо перший у світі штучний супутник Землі. Його появі протягом 92 діб було чути на всіх континентах. Вони сповістили людям про нову космічну еру. Початок їй поклали вчені Радянської країни, радянськими людьми, які будують небачене в історії людського суспільство.

У ті знамениті дні, коли супутник-первенець вперше робив свій тріумфальний політ навколо нашої планети, гучні голоси, особливо в США, галасували: «Ми наздожнемо! Ми випередимо!». Але сказати одне, а зробити — інше. Адже йдеться не про змагання рисистих коней, яких можна виростити за два-три роки. Щоб відняти супутник на висоту порядку 250 кілометрів, потрібен не тільки час, але, насамперед, люди, люди, здатні за короткий строк створити необхідну матеріально-технічну базу, розробити стрункову наукову програму освоєння навколоземного простору. Треба було створити ракети, супутники, космічні кораблі, вдатні зібрати в космосі наукові дані, передавати їх на Землю, а коли треба — і самі повертатися на рідну планету. «Соціалізм і комунізм — ось той надійний космодром, в якого людство штурмує і штурмуватиме простори Всесвіту». *говорив М. С. Хрущов.

Світову наукову громадськість у радянських експериментах насамперед вразила планомірність досліджень, глибока наукова продуманість кожного дальнього кроку в космос. Вражала в очі вага супутників, яка з кожною новою розвідкою небесних далей швидко зростала. Всі пам'ятають, що перший вітчизняний супутник важив 83,6 кілограма. На ті часи, і порівняно з першим американським, який важив у шість раз менше від нашого, він був просто велетенським. До того ж «американець» полетів утроє нижче від нашого. Вага другого вітчизняного супутника досягла 508,3 кілограма, а першого корабля, що піднявся в небо 15 травня 1960 року, — 4 тонн 540 кілограмів, тобто в 50 з лишком раз більше, ніж той, що поклав початок орбітальним польотам.

Це значить, що вітчизняні вчені, конструктори, робітники зуміли побудувати нові ракетоносії, здатні під силу виносити на орбіту Землі майже п'ятитонні наукові лабораторії. Потужність двигунів можної з ракет, які підняли в небо перших космонавтів Юрія Гагаріна і Германа Титова, становила близько 20 мільйонів кінських сил. Сполучені Штати не мають таких могутніх ракет. Це стримувало, та ще, мабуть, і стримує політи в космос американських кораблів, в яких астронавти могли б більше жити і працювати. Тим часом «бойові найманці» командирів «Востока-3» і «Востока-4» Андріяна Ніколаєва і Павла Поповича, які здійснили вперше в світі груповий політ, були такі простори, що космонавти «виходили» в кріозал, робили «прогулянки» по кілька.

Факт потужності радянських ракет уперше від інших оцінив відомий американський спеціаліст в галузі ракетної техніки Вернер фон Браун. Він говорив у свій час, що «початок жовтня 1957 року був поворотним пунктом в нашій долі і в долі інших країн — великих і малих. Я вважаю, що нам слід було б підготуватися до того, що Радянський Союз ще не раз буде першим у цій новій галузі астронавтики. Ми (США) відстали і ми не зможемо надолужити за день або за два, оскільки великі технічні проекти, природно, потребують часу».

Президент США Джон Кеннеді теж змушений був визнати, що Сполучені Штати набагато відстають від Радянського Союзу.

В день запуску корабля «Восток-3» Головний конструктор, відповідаючи на запитання журналістів з приводу перспектив вивчення космічних далей, сказав: «Місяць, безумовно, стане в майбутньому об'єктом наукових досліджень наших космонавтів».

Інтерес до Місяця все зростає. Міжпланетна космічна станція 4 жовтня 1959 року, рівно через два роки після першого супутника, облітаючи Місяць, протягом 40 хвилин передавала на Землю зображення зворотного боку планети. Через кілька років американці безуспішно намагалися повторити радянське досягнення.

Кінозйомку Місяця вели Герман Титов, Андріян Ніколаєв і Павло Попович. Їх фотографії, а також знімки, зроблені міжпланетною станцією, дали змогу вітчизняним спеціалістам створити не тільки докладну карту місячної поверхні, але й перший у світі глобус Місяця.

(Закінчення на 3 стор.)



Ю. ГАГАРІН, 12 квітня 1961 р. «Восток-1».



Г. ТИТОВ, 6 серпня 1961 р. «Восток-2».



А. НІКОЛАЄВ, 11 серпня 1962 р. «Восток-3».



П. ПОПОВИЧ, 12 серпня 1962 р. «Восток-4».

Читайте в номері:

- Радянські люди відзначають п'ятиріччя запуску першого в світі штучного супутника Землі.
- *Показує Одеський раднаргосп*
- Фотонарис про життя на полонинах.
- Відповідь на запитання нашої читачки з Англії А. ДОНЧЕНКО.
- Лист за океан Я. ДАЦІЯ.

КАЛУСЬКА СТАЛЬ

Калуські центральні ремонтно-механічні майстерні перетворюються на справжній завод. Вирогтують нові цехи і розширюються діючі. Скоро все більше й більше підходить нових замовлень від нафтовиків і лісорубів за ремонт складного устаткування.

Наприкінці вересня у майстерних випробувано нову високочастотну сталеплавильну установку. Продуктивність її — 150 кілограмів сталі за 75 хвилин. В цій установці можна виплавляти різну за хімічними властивостями сталь. В печі добре плавляться чавун та кольорові метали.

Сталеплавильну установку випробувано спільними робітниць та інженерно-технічних працівників майстерень. На її монтажі та випробуванні багато старань доклали лиарник Семен Ніць, електрики Михайло Василь та Микола Петрів.

Головний інженер Василь Данилович Корпан розповідає:

— На базі енергії установки проводитиметься термічна обробка запасних частин бурового та видобувного струмом високої частоти.

В ливарному цеху встановлено витяжну вентиляцію, кран-балку для механізації трудомістких процесів — таких, як заливка форм та вивезення литва з цеху.

М. НЕЧИПОРЕНКО.
Станіславська область.

МІЖНАРОДНИЙ СЕМІНАР ПО ОХОРОНІ ЗДОРОВ'Я

ПОЛТАВА. Тут почав роботу об'єднаний пересувний семінар Всесвітньої організації охорони здоров'я. В ньому беруть участь представники 23 країн Східного Середземномор'я і Африки. В програмі семінару — питання громадської охорони здоров'я, боротьби з інфекційними хворобами та організації лабораторної служби.

Зарубіжні медики ознайомляться також з роботою міських та сільських лікувальних і санітарно-профілактичних закладів області.

ПОТУЖНА МАРГАНЦЕВА ШАХТА

МАРГАНЕЦЬ. Дніпропетровської області. Технічна рада тресту «Нікополь-Марганець» затвердила проект найпотужнішої в світі марганцевої шахти. Її намічено збудувати в заплаві частині басейну, де зосередилося може багато родовищ. Вона дозволить широкому загалу цінної металургійної сировини, скільки видобуватиметься зараз у 5 діючих великих шахтах. У виїзах цього високомеханізованого підземного підприємства для вийняття рудних покладів буде застосовано прокучої шахтної комплексів, що складаються з гірничих комбайнів, транспортерних систем, гідравлічного металевого кріплення.

«ЗАВОД» У ВИБОЇ

Нову «вишукувану» машину, що полегшує працю гірників, набагато підвищує її продуктивність, одержать незабаром вуглярі Кадіївки. Харківські спеціалісти розробили проект нового самохідного комбайна. Цей агрегат вагою близько 250 тонн зможе не тільки видобувати крейду, але й тут же у ній переробляти її на реєнту сировину, перекачувати трубопроводом у спеціальні сховища або безпосередньо до виконавчих ланок для одержання клінкеру.

Для обслуговування незвичайного комбайна досить лише робітників. Оригінальна машина виробляти понад 350 кубометрів сировинної маси на годину.

Застосування таких комбайнів знизить також велику кількість автомобілів-самоскидів, залізничних вагонів та великовантажних транспортерів, використовуваних для перевезення сировини. Не треба буде споруджувати цементних прамідець для дробарок та змішувачів.

Машини, які випускає Київський мотоциклетний завод, користуються великим попитом. З кожним роком їх все більше сходить з конвейєра підприємства.

На фото: один з кращих слюсарів - складальників заводу Борис ЗАРУДНИЙ.

Фото А. Васильченка

НА ВИСТАВЦІ ПЕРЕДОВОГО ДОСВІДУ

РЕПОРТАЖ

ТВОРІННЯ РУК ЛЮДСЬКИХ

ІТАК, ми — на Виставці передового досвіду в народному господарстві Української РСР. Сюди нас привело бажання ознайомитися з павільйонами Одеського раднаргоспу, який нині демонструє успіхи трудящих економічного району.

Перестуаємо поріг головного павільйону і потрапляємо ніби на берег моря — хвилі з кінополотна бовторовано перекочуються, пінячись підбиваються до нас і знову відкочуються. Впізнаємо Одеську набережну.


Та не тільки морем славиться Одещина. В цьому ми швидко переконалися, коли вийшли до відділу машинобудування. Пояснення ведо екскурсовод.

— Машинобудування, — говорить він, — провідна галузь промисловості Одеського раднаргоспу. Його надзвичайно буркливо розвивається. За п'ять років існування раднаргоспу хімічне машинобудування зросло майже в чотири рази. Більше ніж удвоє зріс обсяг виробництва сільськогосподарських машин, підйомно-транспортних кранів на пневматичному ходу.

З цікавістю зупиняємось біля верстатів з заводською маркою «ЗРБ».

— Вражає уявити собі механічний цех будь-якого підприємства, — говорить екскурсовод, — без радіально-свердлильних верстатів, які випускає колектив прославленого Одеського заводу. Неревари цих верстатів полягають в тому, що ними можна обробляти великогабаритні деталі на місці, без спеціальної установки. Та особливо знаменитий завод радіально-свердлильних верстатів своїми алмазно-розточними верстатами. Деякі з них оснащені програмним управлінням. Такі верстати випускають лічені фірми світу.

(Закінчення на 2 стор.)



ЛИСТ ВІД БРАТА

Кир'ян Миколайович Ніколайчук сказав, що йому прочитаємо листок від брата з Канади... Минулої війни загинув теплий вечір вдень минув проходив... Ну, дослів... дядькуня. Дмитрове лихо стрівало серце. Читав [illegible]

«Дорогий брате Кир'яне і брати Дімка! З вами ще є так. Ми то знаємо, то встанемо... не лише не доводиться. З кожним роком ідемо до ліпшого. Позаті вдалі, і все змінюється. А фермерські продукти все дешевшають, а на ані так і нема ринку збуту. Машинерії так і шкі вгору, що хоч півсвіта уже свій майток, то ще не стане не купити лиш один самоскід комбайн. Бо він коштує 12 тисяч доларів. І так зі всіма речами. Одяг, покарм і т. ін. Лиш живий будь і у бога смерті просі.

Цього року велика засуха забрала усе до решти... А вони пишуть і говорять, що фермер найбільше, тепер заробляє, тоді як нема уже що й продати. Але затє вони на фермерським справді добре заробляють. Поставили на всю пожину, яку зібрали, на весну шину й кажуть, що то фермер заробляє. Хитрі собі спекуляція, нема що казати...

Кир'яну Миколайовичу згадливості, як у пошуках кращої долі він з сім'єю час зупинив Станіславщину, сподіваючись знайти щастя за бідним. Дотепер довелося мукати. Минули роки, а щастя все не приходило.

У 1930 році він залишає Канаду і йде до Радянської України, якої не знав і не бачив ніколи. Розум і серце підказували, що тільки тут можна знайти волю і братерство, стати рівним серед рівних і вдалі збудувати...

Приїхав він на Дніпропетровщину. Оселився в селі Тихий Став Широківського району. Високі тополі, верби над ставком, кадаки, бджоли повсюдне те, про що так мріялось там на чужині. Плюнь правду не у колгосп. Роботи прийняв до душі, бо ж, працюючи на себе, а не на багатія. А головне — люди. Хороші, свої рідні. Кожен добрий друг і товариш. Як що треба — допоможуть і порадою, і ділом...

Зрозуміло, не завжди все ідеально гладко. Адже колгосп тільки-но став на ноги. А потім гітлерівська нуга принесла багато горя. Фашистські загарбники зруйнували господарство, важко було будувати все заново. Та що це казать, життя прожити — не поле перейти.

Тепер колгоспники живуть заможно, широкі громадські ділянки розширюються на сотні гектарів. До того ж у кожного є своя хата, садиба, а головне — не треба боятися, що буде завтрашній день.

Великі блага створені для трудівників колгоспного села. І про все не докладно писав у своїх листах Кир'ян Миколайчук братові в Канаду.

Розповідав і про себе, що одержує пенсію, має свою домівку, садок, город — старість його забезпечена.

Та Дмитрові не ширилося. Захотілося самому побачити те, про що йдеться у листах. І от він зібрав гроші і виїхав у туристську поїздку до Радянського Союзу. Передусім побував на Україні. На кожному кроці переконувався, що у братових листах — чистісінька правда. Ось що написав Кир'ян Миколайчуку Дмитро Миколайович про свої враження по відїзді рідної Станіславщини:

«...Досить гарно мене зустріли не лише свої, але й чужі, бо всі добре пам'ятають мене. 10 днів на селі зійшло, як 10 хвилин. Важко було розлучатись, коли їхав назад.

У селі три частини нових будинків. Всі криті по-новому — бляхою або черепицею. Є кооперативні, вілли і сайдинки, школа, будинок культури, лікарня. В кожній хаті — електрика, радіо. Колгоспні стайні, усі з бетону, вкриті черепицею, мають своїми своєю цегельню. Приємно було дивитись, що вже немає більше музейних комірчин, а є лише одни широкий колгоспний зал, що надають трудящим, а не різним пузатому панові...

Кир'ян Миколайович підтвердився від думок. Дехто далеко співали хлопці і дівчата, йдучи до клубу. Легкокрила українська пісня стрепенулась над ставком, линула до чорних полів і десь там, вдалині, зникала... А він усе сидів і думав.

Декілька разів починав писати відповідь, але сяючий перо, не скорялося. Мабуть, хилювання заважало писати. Відкидавши перо, вирішив дописати завтра. І все думав: «Що ж буде далі з братом?» Вочі звикли капіталістичного світу він добре знає, бо звідчув їх на власній спині.

В. ПРОКОПЕНКО.



ДЖЕРЕЛО ЩАСТЯ

Земляки, які живуть на чужині, прислухайтесь...

Мене бласкте плакали, свої напутні,
М'якш постелі — тряска молодих,
А бубна вдля, зрівняна на крила,
Промінням сонця в душу заглядає.
І, схиляючийся почуття до саду,
Перелітав в безмежну вись...
Кленовий гай замріяно в воду,
Моя кучерявий хлопець,
задивились.
В гаю схований домик дорогий,
Могучих пташині голоси
Подушили —
І чуєте в тебе в'яне
Від чарівної рідної краси.
Старай мовик привезуй на пароді
Насамперед, всміхнись тайком.
Як тішуся з роботи,
По дорозі
Дівчата-пісню стелять
пишником.
О краю мій — Радянська
Україно!—
Ти щастя моє вічне
джерело.
Безмежне, як високе небо і
сине
Над синім гаєм, де моє
село.

Іван ГНАТЮК.

НА СТИПЕНДІЇ АРТІЛІ

Раїса Новосад після закінчення середньої школи працювала в колгоспі імені Героя Радянського Союзу Москаленка Новобузького району, Миколаївської області. Добре працювала. Правління артілі рекомендувало її на навчання до Херсонського сільськогосподарського інституту. Призначили стипендію від колгоспу. Тепер Раїса вже на другому курсі.

Вирішили підготувати і лікаря з свого середовища. Любу Самійленко послали вчитися до Одеського медичного інституту. І ій громада виплачує стипендію. Люба вже вчиться на третьому курсі.

Коли дівчата в дні канікул приїздять додому, охоче допомагають односельчанам у господарських справах.



На цьому фото ви бачите куточок столиці Радянської України: вгорі ліворуч висотний Житній палац, в центрі — новий красивий будинок Київської консерваторії, і вгорі — квіти, що стали невід'ємною окрасою південного українського міста.

Фото А. Васильєнка.

КАРТИНКИ З НАТУРИ

ОПЕРАЦІЙНА НА КОЛЕСАХ

— Швидка допомога?.. З сусідою дуже погано, третій приступ апендициту...

«Навряд чи встигнемо, — подумав черговий лікар. — Треба висилати операційну».

У селі Рясному, Івано-Франківського району, просто в машині було проведено операцію, а потім хвору доставили в лікарню.

Що ж це за операційна на колесах?

Нещодавно Львівська міська станція медичної допомоги одержала новий пристосований апарат. Лікарі вирішили встановити її на автомашині. Тут є прилади для подачі кисню, переливання крові, досконале пристосування для штучного дихання. З того часу операційна на колесах врятувала життя багатьом хворим.

РАДІО

БРАТАМ ДАЛЕКИМ, РІДНИМ

Щонеділі

передачі Товариства культурних зв'язків з українцями за кордоном.

На країни Європи

Відень — час — 4 год. 30 хв. за Гріньвічем, 5 год. 30 хв. за середньоєвропейським часом; Хвилі — 19,65 м, 31,12 м і 41,96 м. Увечері о 20 год. — 7 год. 30 хв. за Гріньвічем, 8 год. 30 хв. за середньоєвропейським часом. Хвилі — 31,17 м.

На країні Америки

Увечері — час 10 год. за східним стандартним часом. Хвилі: 25,08 м., 28,14 м., 25,54 м., 30,82 м, 31,04 м.

Вночі — час — 12 год. за східним стандартним часом. Хвилі — 25,14 м, 25,54 м, 30,82 м.

Слухайте наші радіопередачі. Враження і побажання просимо надсилати на адресу Товариства культурних зв'язків з українцями за кордоном.

РЕДАКЦІЙНА КОЛЕГІЯ.

Адреса редакції Товариства культурних зв'язків з українцями за кордоном: Українська РСР, Київ, вул. Січневого повстання, 26.

Надруковано в друкарні «Радянська Україна», м. Київ.

НА МІЖНАРОДНІ ТЕМИ

В цьому велич Франції?

Громадськість європейських країн, громадськість Франції стурбована. Вона стурбована зовнішньополітичними кроками правителів Франції, які як ніхто не сприяють міжнародній напруженості.

Останнім часом основну енергію у зовнішньополітичній галузі Франція витрачає на те, щоб завоювати довір'я і дружбу Бонна. Про це красномовно свідчить пропагандистська кампанія, що супроводжувала недавній візит міністрами вільна раз розв'язування загарбницької війни в Європі, нападаючи на Францію, що французький народ в цих війнах пролив немало крові, зазнавав за незалежність Франції життям своїх синів.

Офіційний Париж заявляє, що франко-західнонімецьке «примирення» має позитивне значення. Безумовно, громадськість може лише вітати зміцнення дружби між французами і німцями. Європейські народи будь-що лише вдячні уряду Франції, якщо він діючи у дусі Потсдамської угоди і використовуючи свої зв'язки з урядом Аденауера, добився мирного і демократичного розвитку Німеччини і перш за все ліквідації залишків другої світової війни. Проте французькі правителі ноші, йдучи на зближення з Бонном, мають за мету не інтереси миру і європейської безпеки, а зовсім інше.

Фактично йдеться, про дружбу Франції не з німецьким народом, а з німецькими боєвого «райха». Візит французького президента в Бонн, як і недавній візит Аденауера по Франції, знаменує собою як ніби не початок дружби двох народів, а лише примирення правлячих кіл Франції з такою ж кліками по досвіду другої світової війни.

Ніби виступаючи з театральними ефектними заявами про зміцнення «солідарності» між Парижем і Бонном Бонном супровождуються заявами про «французькість Саарозуру». Так де Голль заявив, що як Франції, так і Федеративній Республіці Німеччині відкрито «загрожує разом безпосередня небезпека з боку Радянського Союзу». Отже, ніби французькі і західнонімецькі правлячі кола не тільки не приховують ворожу Радянському Союзові спрямованість свого блоку, але, навпаки, всіляко її підкреслюють. Чого варта лише остання заява де Голля про необхідність організації Європи «від Атлантики до Уралу». Хто не знає, що за цією назвою ховається таємну мрію деяких людей, грунтуючи місця і села європейських країн, в тому числі і Франції.

Подібні заяви не можуть відповідати інтересам зміцнення миру в Європі. Під час своїх зустрічей і розмов президент де Голль і канцлер Аденауер не займалися питаннями мирного врегулювання німецької проблеми, не було й згадки про проблему загального і повного роззброєння, ліквідації ядерної зброї, заборони її випробувань. Звіт німецьких мовах, «права на самовизначення усьому «Німецькому народові». Кому, зараз не ясно, що за формулою «самовизначення» приховується старий план Бонна, спрямований на анексію території Демократичної Республіки і насильний перегляд кордонів у Європі, які склалися в результаті другої світової війни. Не випадково візит де Голля, безпосередньо після виступу посланця реваншистських пристрастей у ФРН, Федерального міністра генерала Оберлендера, зустрічей реваншистів з делегаціями німецьких територій, належних Радянському Союзові.

ТРОЯНДИ

Дівчинка народилася сліпою. Вона не бачила синього неба, квітів, обличч рідних і гадала, — так і треба... Подруги брали її з собою на прогулянки, розповідали про все, що діється навкруги. Одного весняного дня вони пішли до колгоспного саду. Орібластими зайчиками вигравало на листі дерев сонце, повітря, п'янило солодким ароматом квітучих яблунь.

— Щастю, так зараз літо? — чомусь спитала Віра.

— А яке нове, літо?..

— Що... Віруся, розумієш... ласкаве, як море, — і задивилась на небо.

Віра тонко відчула до неї болю і самотності. Хлопці-дівчата грались, а вона — вона, вона... Вона була сама. Вона була сама. Вона була сама.

— Ось таке літо, — урочисто передала Вірі бузок калюж.

Віра взяла трошки і стала їх нюхати. Вона відчувала у них обличчя таке, що було видно лише косички, пов'язані білими стрічками.

— О, тепер я розумію, яке воно літо, — враження Віра. — А скажи, чи я зможу побачити троянди?

Ліда міцно обняла подругу.

— Обов'язково, рідна...

Минуло чимало часу, та місцеві лікарі поки що нічого не обіцяли.

— Хвороба очей ваших доньки дуже ускладнена, — казали вони батькам Віри. — Можливо, пробною операцію, але це зарад, коли дівчинка підросте.

Вірі сповнилося сім років. Треба було вчитися. І вона разом з рідними поїхала до Харкова, де її прийняли в спеціальну школу.

Розклад занять тут мало чим відрізняється від звичайного шкільного. Засобами зорову для сліпих діти вивчали ті ж дисципліни, що й школярі звичайних шкіл. Так само набували вони навички праці, співали й танцювали в гуртках художньої самодіяльності, займалися спортом. Викладачі і вихователі робили все, щоб час для цих дітей був заповнений захоплюючими справами. І все ж кожний з нетерпінням чекав того щасливого дня, коли лікарі повернуть йому зір.

І цей день настав. Шефи школи — лікарі Українського інституту очних хвороб відкривали перед цими дітьми справжній чудовий світ. Настав цей день і для Віри.

Під час чергового обходу дітей начальник дитячого відділення інституту Таїсія Олексіївна Прадун повідомила, що день сама робітниця Віра операцію.

...П'ятий день лежала Віра в палаті з широкою білою пов'язкою на очах.

Чи буде вона бачити? Це хвилювало всіх — і лікаря, і сестер, і рідних, і учителів, і подруг Віри.

Коли Віра гуляла в клініці інституту, було холодно, за зімкнутими гуділи сердиті вітри. І сама його рознюхали, коли лічильці малі пташки в'язку з очей, з-за хмар вперше визирнуло сонце, стало тепліше.

Перехожі, проходячи повз вікно, помічають пов'язку. Дівчинка бачить перед собою зіжку в білому халаті й величним добрим обличчя. Вона знає, як мати, гладить рукою її шовкові коси. Так ось яка вона, Галина Олексіївна, перша побачена Вірою людина!

На все життя запам'ятає дівчинка це обличчя, і вдячність матері, вчителів і подруг.

— А тепер, Віронько, подивись-но сюди, на підвіконня. Бачиш червоні квіти? Це троянди...

Ніжно заворожено дивилась Віра на чудесні квіти.

— Так ось яке воно, літо! — пролунав тихо.

М. НЕСВІТЕНКО.



АТАЧА

Тут, на Херсонщині, Марія Пригара-кого району на Вишнівці відго-

Довучеся тепер 7125 тварин. Дбайливо доглядають за ними молоді свинарки (зліва направо) Ганна БАРАБОЛЯ, Ліда ПЕТРОВА та Ганна ПІДЛУБНА.

Фото Ю. Желтяка.

ЧУДОВИЙ ПОДАРУНОК

...Все тут дивовижне — чудова архітектура, красива, сповнена затишку дитячі робочі кімнати.

Села Тарасівка, назване ім'я великого Кобзаря. Любовно шанують тут пам'ять Тараса Григоровича Шевченка.

За роки радянської влади село змінилось. Вулиці прикрасились новими будинками. Щоранку діти біжать у світлу приємну школу. У сільському читальні є багато книг про Україну.

Все це дуже подобалось Ользі Кущій. Вона захотіла жити в цьому селі.

...Приїхала дівчина в Тарасівку, коли зацвіли сади. Ніжний аромат квітів п'янив. Ольга Кущій з хвилюванням ступила на землю, де їй доведеться працювати.

Її зустрів голова колгоспу Василь Романович Федорінчук. Він розповів Ользі про життя колгоспників, про їхні турботи і радощі.

Ольга Кущій була вражена. Вона ніколи не думала, що в селі можна так гарно жити.

Дівчина оселилась у затишній кімнаті. Тут було все, що потрібно для відпочинку: книжки, радіоприймач, телевізор.

Ольга Кущій швидко освоїлась на новому місці. Вона полюбила своїх вихованців, з якими проводила багато часу в школі, на екскурсіях, на прогулянках.

Ольга Кущій була дуже вдячна своїм вихованцям за їхню любов. І вирішила зробити їм подарунок.

Вона написала листа своїм колишнім учителям, товаришам по роботі, в якому розповіла про своє життя в Тарасівці, про свої враження. Ольга Кущій попросила надіслати їй фотографії, на яких зображені її вихованці.

Невдовзі вона одержала багато фотографій. Ольга Кущій зробила з них альбом і назвала його «Наші діти».

Ольга Кущій подарувала альбом своїм вихованцям. Вони були дуже раді цьому подарунку.

Ольга Кущій і її вихованці часто переглядають альбом. Вони згадують, як було весело, коли робили фотографії, як було цікаво, коли їх оформляли.

Ольга Кущій і її вихованці часто переглядають альбом. Вони згадують, як було весело, коли робили фотографії, як було цікаво, коли їх оформляли.

Ю. ЖЕЛТЯК.

Унікальне вугілля

Львів. Понад сімдесят п'ять мільйонів тонн сапропелітового вугілля є в надрах Львівсько-Волинського вугільного басейну. Вісьдесят тисяч тонн цінної палива видобуто з цих надр.

Учені-хіміки та економісти Львова розробили методику комплексного використання цінної сировини. Зокрема, пропонується піддати вугілля термічній обробці з метою одержання дефіцитних хімічних продуктів.

НАВЧАННЯ І ПРАЦЯ ПОРУЧ ІДУТЬ

Великий учбово-виробничий цех для підлітків імені збудували робітники заводського двору «Арсенал» імені В. І. Леніна. Він оснащений сучасними верстатами, новими комплексними інструментами. Тут — токарні, фрезерні, свердлильна і слюсарна ділянки, три класи для теоретичних занять. Керують виробничим навчанням майстер А. Бірайник, А. Єлмаков та інші. Щодня після занять учні найбільшого заводського виробничого об'єднання робітниками спеціальностей.

В цьому навчальному цеху виробниче навчання в школах України значно розширюється. Понад 600 тисяч учнів старших класів засвоюють основи виробничих професій в 155 спеціальностей. Для цього на підприємствах республіки створено понад 150 учбово-виробничих цехів і ділянок. Спеціальної цехів завідено для випускників шкіл на Харківському тракторному заводі, автобусному у Львові, Запорізькому виробничому комбінаті...

В цехах, де тренуються учні, вони виконують замовлення, що дають економію понад 300 тисяч карбованців.

Лісоруби на відпочинку

Добре трудяться робітники Путильського лісокомбінату. І тому й заслужений відпочинок користуються. Кращий серед майстерної ділянці Дмитро Пазюк. Кілька років тому був на одному з кавказьких курортів, теслар Петро Возний — у Лунці-Водиці, ветеринарах Оскар Кушнірук — у зрошуваці Кам'янці-Подільському.

Чимало робітників провели свого відпустку у будинках відпочинку та в туристських мандрівках по мальовничих краєвидах.

М. КНИШ.

ЩЕ ОДНА НАРОДНА КНИГАРНЯ

На одному з приміщень центральної вулиці Заставки з'явилась об'ява, яка привертала увагу перехожих: «Народний книгарський магазин». Прийшло сюди четверо молодих працівників: Дмитро Пазюк — завідуючий, три продавці — Оля Осінська, Марія Гушенко, Марія Пазюк.

На базі книготоргу відібрали на 900 карбованців літератури.

Книгарня працює на громадських засадах.

— Треба подбати про працю і відпочинок нашого механізму. Щоб відвідувачі, побувавши в нас, неодмінно знайшли собі щось до душі, говорила Марія Гушенко.

Квартирно обладнавши свої ставки політичної та сільськогосподарської літератури. Відкрили магазин увечері під час 6-ої до 10-ої години.

Привітно сюди зайти покупцеві. Зустрічають його привітною розмовою, рекомендують ну що придбати книгу.

У Чернівцях юні розповсюджують літератури провели книжковий базар. З ціх заставки «Таланів багато пробували їх свої вподобання, зацікавлення книжки.

Зараз у механізмі, вже цім продавці. Прийшли Зарина Горошкевич, Надія Сапіна, Катерина Луганка. Тому кожному з них доводиться працювати лише один день на тиждень.

І робають вони це вільно, із задоволенням.

М. СТЕПОВА.

Чернівецька обл.

Рідна земля

Закінчення. Початок на 3 стор.

КАНАДО, КАНАДО, БАГАТА КРАЇНО

Ой Канадо,
Канадочко,
Яка ти є мила,
Не обмила молодих
Горем сльозами.

(Теодор Федик, канадський поєт).

Не більше, ніж кілька років, як хлібом і сіллю зустріла нас Канада, — згадує Олексій Романович. — Кращі луги, як-не-кажуть, нам, тремтіли, коли у пам'ятній Навріщи, що взяв нас на роботу, випадуть нас — дванадцять молоді — до одного фермера, де корчувати. Каторжна робота. За два місяці заробили по сто доларів. Ні вам ширя, ні дуже-не-багата... А заробіток — ні як напишеш. Пам'ятаю ми на все. І розбереться, що куди — шукати свої, дзвонити, дзвонити...

Від ферми до ферми, від міста до міста змінив молодий чоловік. Минуло два роки. А вона гуля, вона Канада, стогнала тисячолюдським стогоном знедолених, таких і голодних.

— Роботи!.. Хліба!..

Немов страшний сон, пригадується Олексієві через 35 років. Ледве-ледве дотягнув до Ванкувера, потім і Вікторії. Поїхали в табори. Ліс та болота, ні невільників. Важка робота, знедолені харчі і двадцять центів за день... Ех, та що казати... Знаючи про те добро, тієї «свободи» за границею не дали чікувати. Дванадцять років перебивався з хліба на воду, без постійної роботи, без притулку...

І ми, сидячи в світлій, чисто прибраній кімнаті, Катерина Федорівна на кухні готує обід і прислухається до нашої розмови.

— Ой, у сорокового року, — продовжує Олексій Романович, здавшись цигарку, — мені таки повезло. Найнявся до одної вдови, та так і залишився в неї на то-найвлаштом, де то господарем...

— Та що там відмовляться, — вставляє з кухні Катерина Федорівна. — Кінці-кінці — оженився!..

— Звичай таке... — тужливо дуплом господар. — Так було. Хоч і на своє господарство, по-своєму-вели, та ніяк стало краще. Не гірше було думати, да б заробив ще... канібудь, щоб до хліба. Але серце болить за рідну землю, за Батурино з сином — де вона, як-сам? Щоб Хоч хто розповів, яка-сяка, добре-погано, дізнаєшся...

ПОВІЗ, ВІТРЕ, ПІСНЮ НА ВКРАЇНУ

Ой прилети,
Зозулечко,
До мене в гостину.
І принеси мені звістку,
За мою родину.

(Теодор Федик).

Серце зрок-не облягло, боліло, стогнало. Надходили звістки: одна одної сумніша. Орда одної страшніша — фашисти окупували Львів... Ніжин... Харків... Донбас... вже йшли до Волги...

Де-не-де Катерина, як-не-як, любо-дружина-незичка!

Але Україна, як-не-кажи-сен, жила, боролася, і вірилося, що вона буде Україною. Ніхто-ці-ці-ці

МАРКО ЧЕРЕМШИНА ПРО ВАСИЛЯ СТЕФАНИКА

Закінчення. Початок на 4 стор.

...овінки, а від змісту, ідеї, внутрішнього вогню поетичних дум — селянського холодка.

30-літній ювілей літературної діяльності Василя Стефаника було відзначено у Львові ще 28 грудня 1928 року. М. Черемшина відкрив ювілейний вечір словом «Добрий вечір, пане-брате». «Серед маю-весни, як комірки горбами розгойдали свої зелені хліба і напроти сонця їх випрали, а зозуля дурила мужиків щастям — урожаєм, — прийшов він на мужицький сміт на ниві, яку дяди (батько) орали, а мати від межі відсипували.

Сяйнська рілля вхопила його першенький плач і сховала під скиби, аби тим підлічити, та й пік, та й колосити газдин на пожитки.

Дяди скочив у яр до керниці і три добових студеної води випив на радість.

Мати хустку з голови здійняли і дитину обвили та квітчастим обгорнули...»

Минув час, і послали його в школу, аби учився чито сидіти, та й тихо ходити, та й чимо говорити і головку хилити...»

З юних років розширювався світогляд селянського сина. В його свідомість дедалі більше входили муки горя і біль селян. Цікавив про це він у своїх творах розповідь.

Після закінчення початкової школи у селі Русові батьки відвезли Стефаника до міста на науку. Михайли йому, «з міста у село більше не вертати...»

У високих поетичних акордах Черемшина говорить далі:

«Та почули тото зелені поля і хати біленькі і післали до нього тугу із дружками, щоби його завернули.

Туга його з ніг валила, але не завернула.

Тоді послали за ним села свою радісну красненьку.

Краса його тішеслила, але не завернула.

Тоді побудує села та ґрунти сноги, любов і до нього розіслали.

Він притулив любов до серця, але не вернувся.

Тоді послали дітей, села свій біль списнений.

Він той біль спер у своїй серці і ще не вертався.

І тоді послали за ним усі села свою розпуку чорну.

А розпуку взяла його за ручку, як малу дитину, і у села завернула».

ЛИПА ТАРАСА

Запитайте про неї старого чи малого в Седневі — і вам покажуть стежку, що веде в глибоку яругу. Седнівський парк — окраса київського містечка поблизу Чернігова. Від здавна мільйони тонн туристів, художників, всіх шанувальників генія безсмертного Кобзаря.

Липа Тараса — живий сучасник поета. Сучасник і ліричний друг. Меморіальна табличка від дирекції парку розташована біля стежки — «Тут з 1846—47 років Т. Г. Шевченко написав поему «Сон» («Відьма»). Могутні крони — патріарха седнівської флори — нависли поета за геніальні творіння.

Скільки їй років?

Місцеві старожили твердять, що як Тарасовій липі уже перевалило за три сотні, їхні добавляють років. Та з усіх єдине правильне: зберегти чудову рослину, гордість Седнева. Нещодавно, тарховітя липи було вражено страшною хворобою — пожовкло. Птахи, видно, мешканці занесли її. На гіллі утворилися небачені нарости — симптоми відмирання.


Першими на сполох вдарили школярі Седнівської школи — юні активісти гуртка Товариства по охороні природи на чолі з вчителькою біології. Одарюк Миколаївною Сегалівіт. З Чернігова, з інших міст України термінове прибули кваліфіковані спеціалісти, щоб спільними зусиллями подарити небожику. Було розроблено і вжито ряд заходів.

Лину врятовано.

Знову шумить листям, неначе вона про свою історію краю Седнівського. Кобзар тостолов тут в Андрія та Ілії Лизогубів. Тепер в цьому будинку з'явиться невеликий музей. І крона липи — патріарха седнівської флори — нависли поета за геніальні творіння.

Зірая у Седнівському парку розгорнулися роботи по реконструкції: насаджують дерева, облаштують алеї. Тарасові липи, стягують металевими обручами обважнілі стовбури. В планах селищної Ради депутати трудящих, в обласному відділенні Товариства по охороні природи намічено відновити загальний ансамбль парку часів Тараса. Це буде гідна шана безсмертному Кобзареві.

В. САВЧЕНКО.



Житомирська область. В колгоспі «Україна» Житомирського району йде заготівля кормів. Тут разом з кукурудзою силосують бадилля картоплі, бобів і гороху. Вже засилосовано понад 4000 тонн зеленої маси.

НА ФОТО: силосування кормів в колгоспі «Україна».

Фото П. Бойка.

Побутові майстерні на селі

ЛЬВІВ. Близько двохсот нових майстерень побутового обслуговування відкрито в селах області з початку цього року. В Стрийському, Жидачівському, Добромильському та інших районах з'явились ательє пошиття одягу і взуття, майстерні по ремонту мебліз та металовиробів. Тут діятимуть сільськогосподарські «Перехрестя». Старосамбірського району, охоче користуються послугами свого побутового комбінату. Столярна майстерня на самоплавній колесовиці уже виготовила понад сто дитячих меблів, шаф, столів.

У відділенні села, на фермі, в польові стани виїздить трицять пересувних майстерень. Закріплених і майстри приймають там замовлення від колгоспників на пошиття одягу і взуття, ремонтують радіоприймачі, телевізори, провадять хімічну чистку одягу.

До міцця року в селах буде додатково відкрито сто п'ятдесят побутових майстерень. Кожний колгосп Львівщини матиме побутове підприємство.

КОЛГОСПНІ АСПІРАНТИ

Доповідача — робочий день Богдана Воєводи, вірянка колгоспу імені Горького Сокальського району на Львівщині, починався на бригадному полі, а закінчив лабораторія.

А нині молодий аспірант здобуває результати своїх дослідницьких спостережень, вони стали основою майбутньої дисертації вченого-агронома.

І інший аспірант-агроном Ярославського державного сільськогосподарського інституту — голова колгоспу імені Карла Маркса Нестерівського району Михайло Баранов.

«КИЇВСЬКА СОНАТА»

В павільйоні Київської студії імені О. П. Довженка збудовані величезні руїни вулиць Києва 1943 року. Цього місяця останніх сцен короткометражного фільму «Київська соната». Він, уперше в кінематографі «Вогнем, гартовань», що силетизмається з 3-х самостійних новел.

Перша з'ний, «Пианіно», поставлена за однойменним оповіданням Андрія Головка, воєнкорешок подій бурмарного 1918 року. Друга — «Київська соната» Юрія Яновського розповість про один із епізодів Вітчизняної війни. І нарешті «Калітки не запізнюються» М. Зарудного, присвячена мирному, щасливому життю наших дітей сьогодні...

Ця збірка — фільми молодих — перша самостійна робота режисерів ...М. Сергєєва («Пианіно»), Н. Шавченко («Калітки не запізнюються»), «Київська соната» — друга постановки режисерів Антона Тимошенка.

Роль старшого хлопчика Феліксе зимінує в «Київській сонаті» Павлик Борисюк, учень 3 класу однієї із московських шкіл. Гладачі добре пам'ятають його Іванка у фільмі «Доля людини». Павлик знімався також у картинах «Анчутка», «Порыв побачення», «Зорі неозорі».

Скомірний нинні Сашко Харчиков, виконавець ролі Вілена, знімається в кіно вперше.

Хотинські новини

Для дітей

У центрі міського парку Хотина на Буковині виріс красивий двоповерховий дитячий садок. — новий дитячий садок на 135 місць. Затягнулись просторим і затишним дитсадом на 100 місць і село Ширівці. У нових закладах добре обладнані спальні кімнати, ігрові приміщення для ігор.

До послуг населення

Продовольчий магазин сільпо обслуговування відкрився в с. Недобоївцях. Розширюється й торговельна сітка райцентру. Тут почав торгівлю магазин господарів і будівельних матеріалів. Відкрито прокатний пункт предметів домашнього і культурного ужитку.

І. ГРИЦАНЧУК.

НАРИС

РІДНА ЗЕМЛЯ

«ВЕЗИ, КОНИКУ!»

На широкополі плантації буйноцвітої кукурудзи, на виноградниках і садах, на пригорщених лісосмугах сідає тихий осінній вечір. Земля, наповнена щедрою сонячною силою, розпростерлась широко, могутні труди, жадібно здихає віжму, а віжму нездрою проходу. То тут, то там затихає строєнт комбайнів, лиша деяке ще чуги розмірену трудову пісню трактора. та автомашин — це наводять останні лонки зібраної на силос кукурудзи.

Йогло ні куші-і серці в Олексія Романовича Стяшка. Мирно вороне щось весело і радісне надіймій, безмежний, друг, перевірений в пожежнішому труді краєзнь «Беларусь», садоро підстрибуючи на пружних колесах. Багатий зронай в цьому році! Є що возити.

— Тож, нехи, кониску, везе, вороний, — промовляє трактористу до свого сталевого друга. — Три-тонни — не тягар. Не чуже ж і не чужим людям — своє, собі везеш. Свої!..

І в серці хліборобів народжується пісня.

ЗЕМЛЯ І СЛЬОЗИ

Була у мене колиска
Рідна, та не своя!
І сльози...

(Ілля Мицкевич, польський поет).

Народився Олексій Романович в 1908 році в селі Махнівці колишнього Рава-Руського повіту на Львівщині. Як в ранковому густому тумані, як в похмурій осінній вечірній імлі, бачить своє нерадісне, злиденне сирітське дитинство. І сніданок сутяг, пам'ять, — пригадується одне і те ж.

Земля. Хліб та пересльози. Гірні, нестішні, смутні, мовчазні...

А навколо цілій весни, зеленіші поля, пишніші сади і гаї. Та все чуже, та все не своє. Рясніють у гіллі плоди, цілуються зерном жита — та все не радість глитаєм.

...А мужинові-хліборобові залишалось одне: мати, знищувати права на належному йому клаптику, гірка найомна доля на чужій землі, одвічне поневіряння за мізерний гріш, голод, холод, сльози... І мати, мамі, безконечні думи про землю.

...У сльозах, зажурена, бліда, ледь-ледь пригадується мати...

Мати! Матінко рідна! Не знала, та не забуте. Скільки ночей та безсонних прекрмала над убогою колискою свого безталанного сина. Скільки молитов та зітхань своєю невеличкою, змученою губою. Скільки відмірила сліз святих і залемучуючи в розпуці у горі своєї тяжкої, безрадісної, у мозолях рук, і сліз не злала, щоб послали йому, сиротині своєму, щастя-долю хлібороба! Радість і щастя на своїй, не чужій, не панській землі... Не вистачало лише кохання. Так і померла, задморозки-забрала, важкою найтяжчою працею.

А йому Бугов тоді хлоп'ятам було. Він ходив усяк. Хоч літо хліб! І молодих, горщих і наш. Хлопому дядькові того, що дяковий тяжкі злодіяння на всій землі, було важке пряко, а рушка глитала, дяк-чи-вроді, матусіньки і дотепер терпіла-мучиться, ще й сьогодні мерщи, дивлюсь. Ой як добрячих слізках уже не бобилась. Залотом тут, у Бугові, в Галичині, на Україні, на Волині, на Поділлі, на Буковині, на Закарпатті, на Кубані, на Дону, на Уралі, на Сибіру, на Алтаї, на Далекому Сході, на Півночі, на Півдні, на Заході, на Сході

Вісті з України

Видання Товариства культурних зв'язків з українцями за кордоном

Рік видання другий. | № 74 (176). Жовтень 1962 р. | Ціна 1 коп.

СПІВЦЕВІ УКРАЇНИ — НАРОДНИЙ УКЛІН

Останню неділю вересня по праву можна назвати лисенківською.

В цей день відбувся відкриття нового концертного сезону в Колонному залі Київської державної філармонії, якому по відзнаку 120-річчя з дня народження і 50-річчя з дня смерті великого українського композитора М. В. Лисенка Рада Міністрів Української РСР присвоїла ім'я Миколи Віталійовича.

Схильовану промову перед початком концерту-виголосив учень Лисенка, народний артист СРСР, академік Академії наук УРСР Лейко Миколайович Ревуцький. Весь вечір в Колонному залі лунали безсмертні твори основоположника української музичної культури. Їх виконували державний симфонічний оркестр УРСР, заслужена академічна капела «Думка», народні артисти Радянського Союзу Елізавета Чавдар і Михайло Гришко, заслужена артистка республіки Галина Шолпіна та чимало інших провідних митців України.

Велелюдно і піднесено було в цей вечірній час у Києві, Полтаві, навколишніх районах і сіл. Поспішали колгоспники, робітники, студенти, композитори, музикознавці, письменники, артисти, гості з Росії, Білорусії, Молдавії та інших братніх радянських республік.

Свято зберігають пам'ять про свого славного земляка колгоспні Гриньки. В центрі села вшанують пам'ятник Миколі Віталійовичу Лисенку. Скульптурний портрет для нього створили місцеві юнаки М. Рева і П. Полезяра — вихованці полтавської художньої школи. Є в селі "Кімната-музей великого композитора. Ім'я М. В. Лисенка носитиме колгоспний Будинок культури, що споруджується зараз у Гриньках.

А сьогодні тут велике свято — відкриття меморіальної дошки на її будинку, де розміщені кімната-музей композитора.

На площі — сотні людей. Починається урочистий мітинг. Його відкриває заступник голови обласного Лисенківського комітету, народний артист СРСР Георгій Майборода.

Один за одним на трибуну піднімаються представники братніх радянських народів.

— Ваш знаменитий земляк,— звертається до присутніх відомий російський композитор М. Чулакі, — жив і мислив думами працьовитого, талановитого народу, творив для нього. Через творчість М. В. Лисенка братній російський народ зазнавав про думи і сподівання українського народу, його благородну душу і палке серце.

Виступає голова Спілки композиторів Білорусії, народний артист СРСР Є. Тікоцький:

— У нас, у Радянській Білорусії, — говорить він, — гаряче шанують М. В. Лисенка. Його пісні, його твори знають і люблять в усіх містах і селах.

Слово одержує заступник голови Спілки композиторів Молдавії В. Загорський. І знову лунають слова про всенародне визнання геніальної творчості великого музиканта України.

Затамувавши подих, слухають присутні виступ друга Андрія Малишка. Він говорить:

— Кожна епоха і кожний народ підносять на вершину культури найгеніальніших своїх синів і дочок. Український народ-співець на одній своїй літературній сторінці слави великого Тараса Григоровича Шевченка, а на одній з нотних сторінок культури — Миколу Віталійовича Лисенка.

Потім з яскравими промовами виступають заслужений діяч мистецтв УРСР композитор А. Кос-Анатольський, учениця музичної школи Наталка Фенчук, син Миколи Віталійовича — Остап Миколайович Лисенко.

Про нове, радісне і заможне життя земляки композитора добре говорила у своєму виступі голова місцевої сільської подарської артілі В. Донець.

Після покладення вінків до пам'ятника композиторові відбувся великий концерт. Виступали митці із столиці Радянської України, місцеві учасники колективів художньої самодіяльності. Над селом — батьківщиною Лисенка лунали його безсмертні твори.


Лисенківське свято продовжувалося до пізньої ночі в просторому Будинку культури художнього Веселоподільського цукрового заводу. Тут відбулася вільна зустріч Президії Спілки композиторів України, присвячена пам'яті славного сина української землі. У своїх виступах Георгій Майборода і Андрій Малишко розповіли, що за рішенням Центрального Комітету Комуністичної партії України та Ради Міністрів УРСР вищого року на Україні широко відзначатимуться дві такі дати — 120-річчя з дня народження і 50-річчя з дня смерті М. В. Лисенка.

Після засідання на сцені музичного Палацу культури почався великий концерт за участю симфонічного оркестру Українського радіо і телебачення, Хорової капели Полтавської філармонії, артистів столичного театру опери та балету імені Т. Г. Шевченка, державної філармонії, оперної студії Київської консерваторії.

Неминущі лисенківські мелодії знову й знову радували серце людей, у яких нашійно зберігається пам'ять про великого співця землі української.

Я. ДАНИЛЕНКО.

* * *



На фото: пам'ятник М. В. Лисенкові в с. Гриньки на Полтавщині (вгорі).

Мітинг на Батьківщині великого композитора (вниз).

Фото З. Газани та А. Хмари.

ЧИ ЗНАЄТЕ ВИ КУЛЬТУРУ СВОГО НАРОДУ?

МАРКО ЧЕРЕМШИНА ПРО ВАСИЛЯ СТЕФАНИКА

Якось учень п'ятого класу Коломийської гімназії Василь Стефаник зустрів в передодні якогось гуцульського свята Марка Черемшину. Він був другом батька Василя Семаніка. Хлопчик розповів Стефанику, що любив панічки, який називав його «хлопом», і хоче тепер писати з гімназії. Василь Стефанович разом з Лесем Мартовичем забрали хлопчика до себе на квартиру і умовили, щоб не боявся і нікуди не їхав. Відтоді вони, як старші учні-товариші, заопікували малого гуцулика. Так почалося їхнє товариство, яке згодом переросло в дружбу.

Щедро проминули літа. В. Стефанику пощастило вчитися до Кракова, Іван Семаник — до Відня.

Зустрілися вони аж у 1912 році, коли за намовою Василя Стефаника Іван Семаник — тепер вже письменник, відомий під літературним ім'ям Марка Черемшини — відкрив адвокатську канцелярію в місті Снятині (на Галичині).

Тут і почалася спільна праця обох письменників-друзів. Спільна громадська діяльність збагачувала їх все більше й більше. Дружба міцніла, надавала їм нових сил для праці в обороні тих, кого споводнику пригнічені і не вважали за людей.

Часто друзі заходили до корчми в Снятині, куди в ярмаркові дні сходилися батяри. Сідали у задушливій від диму атмосфері перед'ідали сир, окорок, пили горілку. Письменники сиділи при столику посеред кімнати, спочивши хмарою диму. Саме в цій корчмі вони могли читати найцікавішу книгу — книгу, автором якої був селянин. За чаркою розповідав фірер про свої турботи, про свою журу, на потилиці його сиділи, щоб хоч на деякий час забути про все, що мучило, гнітило душу... Обидва поділяли уважно прислухалися до цих балачок, які давали їм чимало тем для нових творів.

У 1926 році вся прогресивна громадськість Галичини святкувалася відзначити 30-річчя літературної праці Василя Стефаника. Велику роботу по підготовці до ювілею розгорнув Марко Черемшина. Він листувався, порушуючи це питання, з багатьма письменниками, виданнями та літературними товариствами Західної України. Ще до цього письменник мав тісні зв'язки з видавництвами Радянської України. В своїх листах Черемшина, пригадуючи їм про організацію матеріальної допомоги В. Стефанику. А у квітні 1926 року в листі до видавництва «Книгоспілка» повідомляв, що 8 травня у Львові має відбутися «Літературний вечір з честь товариша Василя Стефаника. В цьому вечорі беруть участь майже всі письменники Галичини, а також і з України. Ціллю того вечора є зібрати деяку суму для Стефаника, та не відбувся ні в цей час, ні в наступному місяці. Але М. Черемшина, не втрачав надії. Він продовжував листуватися з різними письменниками, що особами, які робили багато заходів, щоб гідно відзначити ювілей. Автора "Синьої книжечки" володіла селянська дума. Насамперед Марко Черемшина заявся широко популяризувати ім'я В. Стефаника в пресі. З цією метою він написав присвячені йому твори.

У «Ділі» «Шляхом» М. Черемшина писав:

Та що Василь за господар?
Де його достаток?
Нема жінки на кужелю,
нема на подвірку!
Співа весну, співає літо
І під осінь співає —
За мужицьку дяку долю
світ сміх коротає...

У цих рядках вірша — уся письменницька діяльність Стефаника. Його безкорисливе служіння своєму народові.

Ще за кілька тижнів до ювілею Черемшина знову нагадував деякими особливо про тяжкі матеріальні умови свого друга.

Матеріальна допомога прийшла від уряду Радянської України, що прислав Стефаникові гроші, яку він отримував протягом кількох років. Пізніше за його утруднень через заходи польського уряду, а згодом були зовсім заборонені.

Для Марка Черемшини Василь Стефаник був не просто «поетом мужицької розкуші», як він його називав, але письменником, що майнов з народу і, здобувши освіту, не відмежувався від селянського серцем і душею, праці до нього, віддав йому всі свої сили, всі сподівання, переживання народові, горе, як своє власне.

У листі до М. Рудницького (1926 р.) М. Черемшина писав: «Я і справді добачаю в ньому поета розпуки. Всі його типи — чи або безнадійно хворі, або безнадійно вбогі, або безнадійно п'яні, або безнадійно старі, або безнадійно спраглі (зробки), або прямо безнадійно нещасливі. Всім його типам розпуки дає зізнання, і вони не спромогні висказати нікого, що відчувають, а ті їх недовідчують і, в горлі застигші слова врості над ними чорні, мов хмарою і стиснуть їм за того всі його типи до себе душе сходу і майже повторяються та й цей того можна річ хоштує його багато душевного болю і для того він продукує тільки тоді, коли той біль заболіючи, проспускається і розливається».

Тут у короткому стислому висновкові М. Черемшина відмічає основні прикмети творчості Василя Стефаника і проникливо розкрив психологічну основу його поезії. Він пристрасно знав усе, що писав і Василь Стефанік, а вимучившись гнітюче розумом і серцем у світ його перших, болючих дум — і — образів. Написав свої твори «Його хрест», «Добрий вечір, пане брате», та «Стефаникові мужики».

Це не звичайні художні твори, а також не критичні нариси. Це ніби живі, які все своє життя прожили народові, пронесли невтомно для нього, була його заслиненою, митцем, яка розумів душу нещасливого селянина. В внутрішній біль, чуття й гіркий крик. Марко Черемшина написав свої етюди на основі новел В. Стефаника, старанно занотовуючись виписками (виписками, цитатами. — І. К.) із Стефаникових творів». Сам Черемшина зазначив це в одному з листів. Але запомнення йде не від великих

Закінчення на 2-ому стор.

В ГОСТЯХ У ВОЛИНЯН

Мистецтво зближує, рідніть людські серця. І хочеться вірити по-вінки творчої наснаги, палкими почуттям дружби.

Міцна і щира дружба з'єднує трудящих Брестської області Білоруської РСР та трудящих Волині. Гостинно зустрічали нещодавно в братній Білорусії учасників художньої самодіяльності Волині, які завітали сюди з творчим звітом.

І ось волиняни приїхали на свої землі, друзі-білоруси — учасників художньої самодіяльності Брестської області. В перший же день приїзду гостей в Луцькому міському будинку культури, зустрілися обласного центру відбувся концерт — ознайомились з мистецтвом і культурою білоруського народу.

На закінчення концерту гостям з братньої Білорусії господарі віднесли букети квітів, подарунки. Протягом кількаденного перебування на Волині білоруські митці виступали з концертами перед робітниками Ковеля, Нововолинська.

О. ОШУКЕВИЧ,
м. Луцьк
Волинської області.

1900 and they have managed to imbue their children and grandchildren born here with a love for Ukrainian folklore and traditions. The Ukrainians are mostly engaged in agriculture and only a few belong to the professional classes. The various societies which they have formed regularly have folkloric festivals, even travelling long distances to participate in them. Last week two bus-loads drove about five hours from Curitiba to participate in a two-day festival in União da Vitoria, a city on the Santa Caterina-Parana border.

Other issues given the Reporting Officer by the priests are enclosed as of possible interest to the Department. The issue having the article reported on above has been marked with a red cross.

The priests use the information printed in these publications to attack the USSR and to expose the "lies" contained therein. They are reportedly doing an effective job in this area.

Arthur W. Feldman
American Consul

Enclosure: Three copies of "Ukrainian News"

Copies to: Mr. Henderson, Consul General
Mr. Ware, Deputy Director, USIS
Brazil Desk, Washington, DC

0865

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

AIRGRAM

732.00/1-1863

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RM/R 1	REP	AF
ARA	EUR	FE
NEA	CU	INR 5
C	P 1	IO 2
L	FBO	AID
ASR	COM	FRB
INT	LAB	TAR
TR	XMB	AIR 4
ARMY 5	CIA 10	NAVY 5
OSD 12	USIA 8.	NSA 3

A-49 CONFIDENTIAL AIR PRIORITY

NO. HANDLING INDICATOR

TO : SecState, Washington, DC

INFO : AmEmbassy, Rio de Janeiro

DEPARTMENT OF STATE BUREAU OF INTER-AMERICAN AFFAIRS JAN 28 1963 ANALYSIS BRANCH DISTRIBUTION

FROM : AmConsul, Curitiba DATE: January 18, 1963

SUBJECT : U.S. Accused of Using Ukrainians in Anti-USSR Activities

REF :

The newspaper "Ukrainian News", which is printed in East Germany and which is circulated among Ukrainians, has in the attached issue devoted over one fourth of the space to attacking the United States and other democracies for attempting to distort the news about the USSR and to use Ukrainians as tools in espionage and anti-USSR activities.

The article claims that, among other things, the U.S. spy Bilk was in contact with Ukrainians such as Nicola Klymychyn and followers of Estevao Bandera to embarrass the USSR and that in 1947 the Soviet authorities in the Soviet German Zone protested against these activities in the American Occupation Zone of Germany.

This newspaper is regularly sent to an address in Curitiba at which a group of Ukrainians friendly to the Soviets once lived. This address is now occupied by Ukrainian priests of the Roman Catholic Church who are and have been in close contact with the Reporting Officer and have been keeping him informed of Soviet efforts to make friends and influence people among the Ukrainians living in Brazil.

These priests report that to date the Soviets have had little if any success in making converts among their people, who number about 220,000 in Brazil, of which about 200,000 live in Parana.

The Ukrainians have settled in Brazil since early

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FORM DS-323 4-62

Drafted by: AWFeldman:grt

Contents and Classification Approved by:

Clearances:

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File no action ARA/EST/G 2/19/63 RJ Bustard

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INCOMING TELEGRAM *Department of State*

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40-48

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Action
ARA

Control: 11818
Rec'd: JANUARY 18, 1963
9:26 PM

Info
SS
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USIA
INR
CIA
NSA
OSD
ARMY
NAVY
AIR
RMR

FROM: RIO DE JANEIRO

TO: Secretary of State

NO: 1358, JANUARY 18

SENATE JANUARY 17 APPROVED BY VOTE OF FORTY-TWO TO ZERO PROPOSED CONSTITUTIONAL AMENDMENT REVOKING ATO ADICIONAL. AMENDMENT ALSO REVISES ARTICLE 79 CONSTITUTION TO ESTABLISH PRESIDENT OF SENATE AS NEXT IN LINE OF SUCCESSION TO PRESIDENCY AFTER PRESIDENT CHAMBER OF DEPUTIES. AMENDMENT EXPECTED TO BE ACTED UPON IN CHAMBER ON 22ND OR 23RD. GREATEST OBSTACLE TO PASSAGE AMENDMENT IN CHAMBER WILL BE DIFFICULTY IN ASSEMBLING TWO-THIRDS MAJORITY (218). MAXIMUM NUMBER PRESENT THIS WEEK UNDER 150.

PSD CHAMBER LEADER MARTIN RODRIGUES YESTERDAY SENT TELEGRAM ALL PSD DEPUTIES URGING ATTENDANCE. IN CHAMBER YESTERDAY OLIVEIRA BRITO (PSD BAHIA) PRESENTED DRAFT LEI COMPLEMENTARY (REQUIRING ONLY ABSOLUTE MAJORITY FOR PASSAGE) WHICH WOULD EMPOWER GOULART UPON OFFICIAL ANNOUNCEMENT PLEBISCITE RESULTS TO FORM CABINET IN ACCORDANCE WITH 1946 CONSTITUTION AND "EXERCISE POWERS WHICH CONSTITUTION CONFERS UPON HIM".

GORDON

FB

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732.00/1-1863

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Action ARA
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Control: 11593
Rec'd: JANUARY 18, 1963, 6 37Q
4:21 PM

ACTION: EXTDIS
INFO:
RM/R FILES

FROM: RIO DE JANEIRO

TO: Secretary of State

NO: 1351, JANUARY 18, 5 PM

PRIORITY

DEPTEL 1405 -Y

LATEST AVAILABLE UNOFFICIAL FIGURES AND EMBASSY COMMENTS APPEAR JOINT WEEKA 3 JANUARY 15. SUPREME ELECTORAL COURT EXPECTED PROCLAIM OFFICIAL RESULTS AROUND JANUARY 22. CURRENT ESTIMATES ARE OVER TEN MILLION "NO" VOTES TO SOME TWO MILLION "YES" VOTES SIGNIFYING ABSTENTIONS AND VOIDED VOTES COMBINED AT THIRTY PER CENT. GOULARTIST FORCES INTERPRETING VOTE AS GREATEST PRESIDENTIAL MANDATE BRAZILIAN HISTORY, POINTING OUT QUADROS VOTE WHICH HAD BROKEN ALL RECORDS WAS FIVE AND HALF MILLION. WHILE OPPOSITION ARGUING VOTES NOT FOR GOULART BUT AGAINST PARLIAMENTARIANISM, POLITICAL LEADERS OBVIOUSLY IMPRESSED BY DEMONSTRATION POPULAR INTEREST BY UNEXPECTEDLY LOW RATE ABSTENTION AND HASTENING BRING ABOUT RETURN PRESIDENTIALISM. ALMOST ALL PARTIES HAVE PLEDGED SUPPORT FOR SOME FORM CONGRESSIONAL ACTION EFFECTIVELY VOIDING SEPTEMBER 1961 AMENDMENT AND SENATE HAS ALREADY PASSED AMENDMENT NULLIFYING ATO ADICIONAL (REPORTED SEPARATELY).

GORDON

KEA:22

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FILED JAN 18 1963

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43 Action
ARA Info
SS
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USIA
NSC
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CIA
NSA
OSD
ARMY
NAVY
AIR
RMR

COPIES REC'D ARA

Control: 11834
Rec'd: ~~January 18, 1963~~ 9:40 p.m.

FROM: Rio de Janeiro

TO: Secretary of State

NO: 1359, January 18, 7 p.m.

ACTION: ESTB
INFO:
RM/R FILES

EMBASSY TELEGRAM 1358

ADMINISTRATION MOUTHPIECE ULTIMA HORA JANUARY 18 REPORTED SENATE PASSAGE AMENDMENT REVOKING ATO ADICIONAL UNDER FRONT-PAGE HEADLINE READING "CONGRESS REACTS AGAINST GORILLAS (COUP-DISPOSED REACTIONARIES)" AND PUBLISHED SHRILL DENUNCIATION ALLEGED RIGHTIST PLOT VITIATE WHILE RESTORING PRESIDENTIAL POWERS. MAIN TARGET UDN DEPUTY CAPANEMA, WHO RECENTLY AUTHORED VIRTUALLY IGNORED DRAFT AMENDMENT WHICH IN PART ENVISIONED RESTRAINTS ON PRESIDENTIAL POWERS ONLY AFTER EXPIRATION PRESENT TERM. UH ATTACK PUZZLING IN VIEW NOT ONLY OF INAPPLICABILITY CAPANEMA DRAFT TO PRESENT ADMINISTRATION BUT ALMOST TOTAL CONGRESSIONAL COOPERATION WITH ADMINISTRATION THUS FAR SINCE PLEBISCITE IN EFFORTS ANTICIPATE REINSTATEMENT PRESIDENTIALISM. ATTACK MAY BE SYMPTOMATIC HOWEVER GOULART FEARS NOT ACHIEVING CHAMBER QUORUM FOR APPROVAL SENATE AMENDMENT OR EVEN SIMPLE LEGISLATION WHICH ALTERNATE PROPOSAL FOR ENDING PARLIAMENTARY EXPERIMENT THROUGH EXPEDIENT AMENDMENT CAPANEMA-VALADARES LAW, AND DESIGNED PRESSURE DEPUTIES ATTEND SESSION LEST THEY BE TARRED WITH GOLPISTA BRUSH.

GORDON

HC

RIO DE JANEIRO-1539 732.00/1-1863

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
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ACTION ASSIGNED TO: ARA/ESTB	ACTION TAKEN		
NAME OF OFFICER & OFFICE SYMBOL: R.Rhodes ESTB	DATE OF ACTION: 2/11/63	DIRECTIONS TO RM/R: file	

GPO 930 800

0861



Department of State

Classification

ACTION: Embassy Rio de Janeiro PRIORITY 1405

Would appreciate latest information plebiscite results
Time
and any further comments you may have this high level interest
here. END

RUSK

Classification

Party	Outgoing Chamber	Percentage of Bench	New Chamber	Percentage of Bench
PSD	3	43	2	25
PTB	2	29	2	25
UDN	1	14	1	12.5
PRP	1	14	1	12.5
PTN	0	--	2	25
	7		8	

Comment: The PSD hold on the state's delegation to the Federal Chamber was loosened. The 2 PTN victors ran on the PSD slate by invitation of the latter party and they finished ahead of several supposedly-strong PSD candidates.

For the Ambassador:

John Keppel
Counselor of Embassy
for Political Affairs

DISTRIBUTION: All consulates in Brazil; Amb, DCM, Service Attachés, USIS, Econ (2), POL II, Labor, CF-Rio (3), POL-Rio (5), Brasilia (5).

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

AIRGRAM

732.00/1-1663

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A-809 — CONFIDENTIAL — AIR POUCH

NO.

TO : Department of State 1963 JAN 18 AM 9 40

DEPARTMENT OF STATE
BUREAU OF
INTER-AMERICAN AFFAIRS
JAN 18 1963
RM/AN
ANALYSIS & DISTRIBUTION
BRANCH

FROM : Amembassy, Brasilia Office DATE: January 16. 1963

SUBJECT: Chamber of Deputies: Official Results in Espirito Santo

REF :

Name	Vote	Party	Returned Incumbent	Ideological Classification
João Calmon	33,886	PSD	No	6
Dirceu Cardoso	18,811	PSD	Yes	5
Floriano Lopes Rubim	15,415	PTN	No	5
Raimundo de Andrade	10,669	PTN	No	5
Oswaldo Zanello	29,412	PRP	Yes	5
Antonio Gil Veloso	16,953	UDN	No	5
Argilano Dario	16,943	PTB	No	--
Ramon de Oliveira Neto	16,568	PTB	Yes	2

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FILE

JAN 25 1963

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OMI

FORM DS-323 4-62

Drafted by: POL: HWeitzel/jhm

Classification Approved by: POL: CDKeyser

Clearances:

ORIGIN/ACTION → ARA-4

RM/R	REP	AF
1		
ARA	EUR	FE
NEA	CU	INR 5
E	P	IO 1
L	FSO	AID
AGR	COM	FRB
INT	LAB	TAR
TR	XMB	AIR
ARMY	CIA 10	NAVY
OSD	USIA 8	NSA 3

File
RM/R
1/25/63
R J Burton
No action



CONFIDENTIAL

off last week at approximately 6,000 feet. The second well drilled in Pernambuco during the past year, it was, like the first, a dry hole. (UNCLASSIFIED)

4. Possible German Assistance to Pernambuco Co-operatives

Officers of the German Consulate in Recife this week met with various leaders of the Union of Co-operatives of Pernambuco to discuss possible assistance on the part of the West German Government. Such assistance, according to the Economic Officer at the German Consulate, would consist mostly of study grants in Germany, technical assistance, possible establishment of several technical training centers, and possibly some financial help. (UNCLASSIFIED)

COMMENT: The German offer of help to the co-operatives is on a very small scale and is significant only as an indication that the Germans are still thinking in terms of assistance of some sort to the Northeast. Another field in which German assistance might be forthcoming is rural syndicalism. Pernambuco rural labor union leaders told the Consulate General this week that they anticipated such assistance in the near future.

Lowell C. Kilday
American Vice Consul

CONTRIBUTORS:

LCKilday
WSSmith

CONFIDENTIAL

0857

beginning of the end of any working relationship between Arraes and Guerra. (UNCLASSIFIED)

COMMENT: Whether or not all of these choices are final it is of interest to note all persons mentioned to date to serve in the Arraes' secretariat are considered locally to belong to the extreme Left. Falcão and Guerra are members of the PCB, Coelho is a fellow-traveler, and Simoes, Lima Filho, and Sergio Murilo formed part of a far Left bloc in the last State legislature. A secretariat composed of persons of such a political orientation is only one more indication that Arraes has no intention of running Pernambuco in a moderate conciliatory manner. (CONFIDENTIAL)

ECONOMIC

1. Strikes

The port of Recife was jammed this week, with some 34 ships inside the harbor and 7 waiting outside on the peak day. A result of the nationwide maritime strike, port congestion promises to worsen during the next few days as the strike continues and more foreign flags vessels arrive. Meanwhile, transportation has been hampered further by a 24 hour area wide railway strike. Telegraph workers and bank employees are also on the verge of a walkout. (OFFICIAL USE ONLY)

2. Gasoline Shortages

A Meridional despatch from Rio appearing in the Recife press on January 9 quoted the President of the National Petroleum Council (CNP) as stating that there was no shortage of gasoline in the Northeast. The temporary shortage which had occurred the week before, he said, had been alleviated by expeditious measures taken by the CNP and Petrobras. (OFFICIAL USE ONLY)

COMMENT: On the same day these comments appeared in the press Recife was on short rations. Consulate General personnel traveling to João Pessoa two days later confirmed reports that Paraiba was virtually without fuel stocks. Reports from other points too indicated that in spite of the CNP President's assessment of the situation from Rio, shortages existed throughout the Northeast. (LIMITED OFFICIAL USE)

3. Petrobras Brings In Another Dry Hole

Petrobras' exploratory well in the sertão near Ibimirim was capped



on him and asked about the general working relationship between USAID and SUDENE. Furtado said he had told Arraes that such relations were very good and would get better. President GOULART, Furtado went on, wanted to make a concerted effort towards cordial relations and mutual understanding. This coincided with his own feelings, Furtado added, and concluded by saying that he was making various administrative and personnel changes designed to facilitate co-operation between the two agencies.

3.) Another high ranking SUDENE official, in a luncheon conversation on January 11, told an officer of the Consulate General that the word was out in SUDENE to make every effort to streamline USAID-SUDENE co-operation. He also mentioned the fact that Furtado had had "a very friendly discussion with Byrnes." Such open exchanges boded well for an improved atmosphere, he said, and pointed out how favorably this contrasted from the situation only two months ago when SUDENE had almost reached the conclusion that it would be better to "go it alone." (CONFIDENTIAL)

COMMENT: Tremendous obstacles still lie in the path of Alliance for Progress in the Northeast. Too, SUDENE's more accommodating posture is probably inspired largely by pragmatic considerations. Nonetheless, the fact that a friendlier atmosphere more propitious to a joint effort does exist is encouraging in itself. It is to be hoped that it will prove a continuing trend. (CONFIDENTIAL)

3. Arraes Secretariat Taking Shape

Although no public announcements have been made yet, the unanimity of press reports on the subject indicates that the secretariat of Governor-elect Arraes is now taking shape. While one or two spots apparently remain to be filled, and not all nominees are expected to accept, it is regarded as something of an open secret that Arraes will have these men in these positions:

Secretary of Agriculture -	PADRE MANDERLEY SIMOES
Secretary of Health -	State Deputy FERREIRA LIMA FILHO
Secretary of Administration -	State Deputy SERGIO MURILO
Secretary of Finance -	JOÃO GUERRA
Secretary of Labor -	ALUIZIO FALCÃO
Private Secretary -	ALEXANDRINO ROCHA or FERNANDO COELHO
Secretary of Education -	ANITA PAES BARRETO or GERMANO COELHO or PAULO FREIRE

It was also reported in the press this week that Arraes had decided to select Colonel CARLOS DONATO FERREIRA MACHADO to fill the important position of Secretary of Public Safety. Subsequently, it was said that Arraes had changed his decision to select Donato upon the receipt of a letter from Vice Governor-elect PAULO GUERRA (President of the State PSD) condemning Donato and hinting that the choice of Donato would mark the

0855

died subsequently.

A few days later, peasants "invaded" properties near Tambe, Pernambuco, and several other peasant "invasions" in Paraiba and Pernambuco were also reported. These incidents followed by a week a rural labor union strike (See Weekly Summary No. 33) and other peasant-landowner squabbles. (UNCLASSIFIED)

COMMENT: There is little question that peasants in the Northeast, especially Pernambuco and Paraiba, are becoming increasingly restive. Landowners, no less intransigent than before with respect to peasant demands for a redress of grievances, are becoming correspondingly more nervous and concerned over their personal safety and the safety of their property. Leaders of both the rural labor union movement and the Ligas Camponesas, on the other hand, apparently plan to increase their agitation within the next few months. One may expect therefore that this mixture of restiveness, intransigence, nervousness, and agitation will produce some violence.

To say that the incidence of violence may be on the upswing in the rural Northeast, however, is not to say that the Northeast is about to experience a mass peasant uprising or a widespread guerrilla-type war. Although most of the elements for such a generalized socio-political upheaval are here it is doubtful that the Ligas Camponesas now have the organizational capacity to withstand a serious military effort to deal them out of existence. The military seems reluctant to exercise its force against the Ligas now but would not likely retain such inhibitions in the face of a widespread violent revolt. (CONFIDENTIAL)

2. SUDENE-USAID Relations Improve

There were several indications during the past week of a marked improvement in SUDENE-USAID relations.

1.) In his end of the year report to the SUDENE Deliberative Council on January 9, CELSO FURTADO went out of his way to describe in laudatory terms the contributions made by Alliance for Progress in the overall Northeastern development effort.

2.) Following the meeting of the Deliberative Council, Celso Furtado and Acting AID/NE Director BYRNES had a most cordial exchange of views. Furtado confided that Governor-elect MIGUEL ARRAES had called

0854

ORIGIN/ACTION

ARA-4

RM/R	REP	AF
1		
ARA	EUR	FE
NEA	CU	INR 5
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AGR	COM	FRB
INT	LAB	TAR
TR	RMB	AIR 4
ARMY 5	CIA 15	NAVY 5
OSD 12	USIA 8	NSA 3
	NSC 2	

DEPT. PASS
BELEM
PORTO ALEGRE
CURITIBA
BELO HORIZONTE

Fole
RM/R
1/25/63
RJBarton
Macton

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DEPARTMENT OF STATE

AIRGRAM

732.00/1-1663

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A-68 (NO.) CONFIDENTIAL (HANDLING INDICATOR)

1963 JAN 21 AM 8-33

TO : DEPARTMENT OF STATE

INFO: RIO DE JANEIRO, BRASILIA, SÃO PAULO

RM/AN ANALYSIS & DISTRIBUTION BRANCH

Belem-1
Porto Alegre-1
Curitiba-1
Belo Horizonte-1

FROM : Amconsul RECIFE

DATE: January 16, 1963

SUBJECT : Weekly Summary No. 29

REF :

DEPARTMENT OF STATE
BUREAU OF
INTER-AMERICAN AFFAIRS
JAN 21 1963

TABLE OF CONTENTS

POLITICAL

1. Violence Flares in Peasant Clash with Landowner
2. SUDENE-USAID Relations Improve
3. Arraes Secretariat Taking Shape

ECONOMIC

1. Strikes
2. Gasoline Shortages
3. Petrobras Brings in Another Dry Hole
4. Possible German Assistance to Pernambuco Co-operatives

POLITICAL

1. Violence Flares in Peasant Clash with Landowner

Violence broke out again in rural Pernambuco this week, this time in a dispute over payment to peasant workers of the 13th month salary. Reports conflict, but it seems that workers of the sugar estate of Federal Deputy JOSE LOPES DE SIQUEIRA SANTOS, bearing weapons, approached Lopes and members of his staff demanding immediate payment of the extra salary. Who fired the first shot is not clear --- Lopes says the peasants and they say Lopes --- but when the smoke cleared, four men lay dead while several others were seriously wounded. Two

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FORM DS-323 4-62

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Drafted by: See last page/ag

Contents and Classification Approved by:

Clearances:

0853

8. Communists circulating petitions against Kennedy visit.

Communist union leaders in Santos and São Paulo have been collecting signatures on petitions addressed to President Goulart asking that President Kennedy not be permitted to visit Brazil. The petitions reportedly repeat the customary accusations of "American imperialism," and link Kennedy with the "anti-Brazilian" policies of the International Monetary Fund. (OFFICIAL USE ONLY)

Comment: If the Communists are successful in obtaining sizable numbers of signatures and if President Kennedy's long-awaited visit does not materialize, the Communists will probably try to claim credit for a major victory. (OFFICIAL USE ONLY)

PSYCHOLOGICAL

1. Local press reaction

São Paulo editorialists this week concentrated on last Sunday's plebiscite, with general agreement that the results were a personal victory for the President as well as for presidentialism. Commentators noted the heavy role in the plebiscite's outcome played by Goulart's skillful use of propaganda. Correio Paulistano, A Hora, and leftist/nationalist Ultima Hora were pleased with the new situation; most other papers including influential O Estado de S. Paulo ranged in attitude from "Now it's time for Jango to use his new tools on the nation's problems" to O Estado's gloomy prognostication of a Goulart-led march toward dictatorship and a new edition of Vargas' Estado Novo."

Goulart and Brazilian/U.S. policy also occupied several writers, most notably in O Estado. The danger to democracy of a newly-powerful Goulart must be recognized, said O Estado; his use of the nation's money to win the Brazilian worker is insidious. Furthermore, his foreign policy is disgraceful, said O Estado's man: threatening the U.S. with the possibility of becoming a new base for Moscow's politics -- and at the same time extending a humble hand to beg millions of dollars in assistance.

Several papers warned that Cuba is exporting Khrushchev-directed subversion throughout the hemisphere. Diário de São Paulo and O Estado called for U.S./OAS action against Fidel; the former took Brazil to task for its official indifference displayed at the United Nations to the Cuban threat.

Daniel M. Braddock
Minister Consul General

Contributors: S.C. Lyon, J. Liebof, J. Mason

0852

Comment : Jânio's former supporters are reported to be largely disoriented. Judging by past performance, it seems safe to assume that they don't know what Jânio will do, and that the press reports are largely unfounded speculation, serving to keep Jânio's name in print. (OFFICIAL USE ONLY)

6. Democratic Union Movement denounces new Goulart-inspired political strike.

At a meeting on January 8 to map their 1963 program, anti-Communist Democratic Union Movement (MSD) leaders publicly denounced what they described as an attempt by President Goulart through the Workers General Command (CGT) to set off another nationwide political general strike in order to achieve full presidential powers immediately without Congressional consent. MSD leaders have informed the Labor Officer that threats of firm repressive action by Second Army Commander General Pery BEVILACQUA recently forestalled labor agitation in the Santos-Cubatão area which might have been intended as a trigger for a national general strike. (OFFICIAL USE ONLY)

7. Goulart rehashes "labor unity" theme to Communists' applause.

President Goulart seems determined to press for a united Paulista labor movement which in theory would follow his dictates but which in practice would undoubtedly further strengthen growing Communist power in the unions. The "labor unity" theme was stressed by Clodsmith RIANI, President of the National Confederation of Industrial Workers (CNTI), on a visit to São Paulo on January 10. Riani was successful in getting São Paulo labor leaders from such diverse groups as the anti-Communist Democratic Union Movement (MSD), the emerging "third force" Worker's Union Movement (UST), and the Communists to agree on a First Meeting of Industrial Workers of the State of São Paulo scheduled for February 15-17. PTB Federal Deputy (Estado do Rio) Bocayuva CUNHA on January 13 also played variations on the "labor unity" theme in a meeting with labor leaders from the MSD, UST, Communists, and the "left-wing" Catholic National Labor Front (FNT). (LIMITED OFFICIAL USE)

Comment : With Goulart firmly in control of the Federal Government and about to name a new presumably pro-Goulart Labor Minister, many non-Communist São Paulo union leaders will have great difficulty resisting massive Goulart (and Communist) pressure for a unified labor movement. While the São Paulo State Government has much less control over the labor field than has the Federal Government, an enlightened labor policy by Governor-elect Adhemar de Barros might detract from the success of the "labor unity" drive. On the other hand, an indiscriminate crackdown on all or most unions by Adhemar could very well help promote "labor unity" on Communist terms. (LIMITED OFFICIAL USE)

0851

a result of the heavy mortality among incumbent deputies in the recent elections, plus the fact that the membership of the house has increased to 115 from 92. In such a broken field, Adhemar's skill in maneuver should bear fruit, and observers predict he will succeed. (OFFICIAL USE ONLY)

4. CARVALHO PINTO criticizes Three Year Plan; chances dim for Minister of Finance.

Governor Carlos Alberto Alves de Carvalho Pinto issued a critique of the Three Year Plan recently prepared by Celso FURTADO, on which President Goulart and his supporters lay great stress (ConGen A-211, January 11, 1963). Although courteously phrased and giving due respect to the principle of planning which the Three Year Plan attempts to apply, the critique made clear that Carvalho Pinto considers the Plan merely a first approximation to what is needed. It covers large areas only in general terms and, even more important, it leaves unanswered the basic problem of how planning, budgeting, and financing shall be coordinated. He particularly criticized the agricultural section of the plan, indicating that the goals are inadequate to meet the needs of the nation. Finally, he stressed that plans are not enough -- executing them is the essential thing, and this depends on the men who are to put them into effect. (UNCLASSIFIED)

Although the pro-Goulart press seized on the good things which Carvalho Pinto had to say about the Plan, a careful reading of his remarks makes clear that he has a low opinion of it in regard to a number of essential aspects. His words are not those of a man who is willing to enter Goulart's cabinet and stake his reputation on executing the Plan as it now stands.

The São Paulo press continues to speculate concerning Carvalho Pinto's acceptance of the Ministry of Finance. However, other names are mentioned with increasing frequency, giving the impression that Carvalho Pinto's candidacy is on the wane. This is confirmed by a confidant of the Governor, who believes it unlikely that he will accept under any conditions Goulart appears willing to offer. (OFFICIAL USE ONLY)

5. Jânio may return in February.

Like a voice from the beyond came the announcement that ex-President Jânio QUADROS plans to return to Brazil, possibly in late February. There has been a small but regular dribble of press speculation as to what Jânio may do -- that he may start a new party, or depend on the parties which supported him recently for Governor, or join with the supporters of Carvalho Pinto against Adhemar, or even become a newspaper editor. (UNCLASSIFIED)

0850

Pro-Goulart forces in São Paulo were quick to hail the vote as a "massive vote of confidence in President Goulart." This is not strictly true, since the vote was essentially between two systems of government -- parliamentarism and presidentialism -- but since Goulart was closely identified with the latter, the vote has put his opponents on the defensive. (LIMITED OFFICIAL USE)

2. Adhemar bargains inconclusively with Goulart.

Governor-elect Adhemar de BARROS declared himself satisfied with the result of the referendum (although he himself had voted "yes" in favor of parliamentarism) and was quoted in the press as calling for restoration to President Goulart of his full powers immediately after the official announcement of the results of the plebiscite.

Later, after consulting with Goulart at Brasilia on January 11, Adhemar took a somewhat different line. At São Paulo on January 12, he voiced suspicion of Goulart's "hidden purposes" and indicated that he was not in accord with Goulart's pretensions. He said he would meet with representatives of his party, the Partido Social Progressista, and then might return to Brasilia to make new contact with the President. (UNCLASSIFIED)

Comment: Obviously all is not going smoothly between Goulart and Adhemar. Press reports surmise that Adhemar is holding out for one or more Ministries for the PSP. (OFFICIAL USE ONLY)

3. Adhemar maneuvers in preparation for his new government.

Adhemar maintained his reserve about announcing the makeup of his new cabinet before January 25, although indicating that he had made his selections. An informant who talked to him recently gained the impression that Adhemar's selections are really only tentative, and that he is observing the reactions to various names before committing himself. This may apply to General Lemos Barbosa ALDEVIO, who was indicated for Secretary of Security (Weekly Summary No. 54). Reactions have been so unfavorable that someone else may be selected. Various names have come to the fore for other cabinet posts, allegedly Adhemar's firm choices, only to fade from the picture and be replaced by other names.

In the meantime Adhemar continues to maneuver among the twelve parties represented in the State Legislature. His attempts to marshal a workable majority are complicated not only by the fractionation of the Legislature into many parties, but also by unusually loose party discipline. (ConGen A-118, October 31, 1962.) Furthermore, over half of the deputies are new faces, as

0849

An important new element was the strengthening of President João GOULART's position as a result of the plebiscite January 6. Although it had been expected that the vote would be against parliamentarism, it is generally conceded here that the turnout of voters in São Paulo was unexpectedly large and that this, plus the heavy vote against parliamentarism, was a feather in Goulart's cap. (LIMITED OFFICIAL USE)

Final returns for the State of São Paulo were:

"No (against parliamentarism)	2,407,090
"Yes" (for parliamentarism)	401,747
Total valid ballots	2,808,837
Void ballots	163,679
Blank ballots	65,629
Total ballots	3,038,145
Total registered voters	3,822,235
Percent casting ballots	79.5%

For comparison, the vote for Governor in October 1962 was:

Valid ballots	3,230,177
Void ballots	73,173
Blank ballots	96,346
Total ballots	3,399,696
Total registered voters	3,822,235
Percent casting ballots	86.4%

(UNCLASSIFIED)

0848

ORIGIN/ACTION

RM/R	REP	AF
1	1	
ARA	EUR	FE
NEA	CU	INR 5
E	P	IO
L	FBO	AID 12
AGR	COM	FRB
INT	LAB 6	TAR
TR	XMB	AIR 4
ARMY 5	CIA 15	NAVY 5
OSD 12	USIA 8	NSA 3
	NSC 2	

ARA-4

Tele 1/24/63 Rm/R K Baxter no action

20

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

AIRGRAM

732.00/1-1663

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A-218 NO.

LIMITED OFFICIAL USE HANDLING INDICATOR

1963 JAN 21 AM 8 33

TO : DEPARTMENT OF STATE

INFO : BRASILIA, RIO DE JANEIRO

RM/AN ANALYSIS & DISTRIBUTION BRANCH

FROM : AmConGen, SÃO PAULO

DATE: January 16, 1963

SUBJECT : Weekly Summary No. 55

REF :

DEPARTMENT OF STATE BUREAU OF INTER-AMERICAN AFFAIRS JAN 21 1963

TABLE OF CONTENTS

POLITICAL

1. Goulart supporters hail plebiscite as victory.
2. Adhemar bargains inconclusively with Goulart.
3. Adhemar maneuvers in preparation for his new government.
4. Carvalho Pinto criticizes Three Year Plan; chances dim for Minister of Finance.
5. Jânio may return in February.
6. Democratic Union Movement denounces new Goulart-inpired political strike.
7. Goulart rehashes "labor unity" theme to Communists' applause.
8. Communists circulating petitions against Kennedy visit.

PSYCHOLOGICAL 1. Local press reaction.

POLITICAL

1. Goulart supporters hail plebiscite as victory.

The political scene at São Paulo has been outwardly quiet, but behind the scenes the parties engaged in lively politicking, jockeying for position in the prospective new national and state governments.

FORM DS-323 4-62

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Drafted by: See last page/el 1/15/63

Contents and Classification Approved by:

Clearances:

0847

A-54
Salvador

There seems to be a general feeling of relief, now that the exercise is over, and many writers and persons in positions of authority in State Government have expressed the view that "now Brazil can get on with its task" and responsibility for the conduct of state affairs is placed squarely on the shoulders of the President.

Harold M. Midkiff
American Consul

0846

CONFIDENTIAL ACTION

ARA-4

RM/R	REP	AF
1		
ARA	EUR	FE
NEA	CU	INR 5
E	P	IO
L	FBO	AID
AGR	COM	FRB
INT	LAB	TAR
TR	XMB	AIR 4
ARMY 5	CIA 10	NAVY 5
OJO 13	USIA 8	NSA 3

File Rm/R
no action
R J Barton
2/4/63

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

AIRGRAM

732.00/1-1563

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A-54 NO.

UNCLASSIFIED

HANDLING INDICATOR

TO : DEPARTMENT OF STATE

1963 JAN 22 AM 8 41

INFO: AMEMBASSY, Rio and Brasilia

RM/AN ANALYSIS & DISTRIBUTION BRANCH

FROM : AMCONSULATE, SALVADOR

DATE: January 15, 1963

SUBJECT: Report of Plebiscite Vote in Bahia

REF :

As anticipated, voting on the abolition of the Parliamentary system on January 6 was conducted in an orderly fashion and with little enthusiasm here. The turnout in Salvador and in a number of the larger interior cities was reported to be fair, reaching nearly the proportion of registered voters which turned out for the October 7 elections. The weather was generally favorable for a good turnout.

As of the morning of January 14 the vote count at the Regional Electoral Tribunal was reported as follows:

SALVADOR:	Yes (Retention of Parliamentary System)	9,817
	No	113,048
In the Interior:	Yes	20,019
	No	242,290
Total for State:	Yes	29,836
	No	355,338

These figures do not take into account blank ballots nor voided ballots, which, according to some earlier reports, were running less than 1%.

Since January 6 there seems to be more enthusiasm over the plebiscite than prior to the date. Newspaper articles have expressed satisfaction over this display of democratic procedure and statements to the effect that this was a farce and a sham have not appeared since election day. Commentators have reported with pride the favorable reactions that have been published abroad regarding the plebiscite.

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FORM DS-323 4-62

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Drafted by: HMGlidkiff:la

Contents and Classification Approved by: AMB.

Clearances:

0845

pressures saying that during the campaign there was neither religious coercion or the use of professional anti-Communism. He also claimed that the costs of the "não" publicity for the plebiscite were minimal.

c. Brizola is reported to be planning to attend Governor-elect Meneghetti's inauguration here on January 31, rather than to participate in the swearing-in ceremonies for Federal Deputies at Brasilia.

d. After it was discovered that the recent pay raise law for State bureaucrats did not affect some 40,000 State contract workers, Governor Brizola extended the law to cover these workers by decree. His administration also announced that it had borrowed Cr$200 million against anticipated revenues from the Banco do Brasil to pay pending State salary costs.

4. Economic Notes

a. In a speech to a group of municipal officials last week Governor-elect Meneghetti indicated his hopes for Alliance for Progress aid, stating "with the sums we intend to obtain from the Alliance for Progress, and also with our own efforts we will have the necessary means for industrial development of this region". Meneghetti also said that he had asked the Federal Government to shorten the installation time for the Polish thermo-electric plant to be constructed here.

b. State telephone company employees who had been pressing for wage increases and certain fringe benefits agreed to accept an overall 30 percent pay raise.

c. The press reported that Romeu Scheibe (PSD State Deputy) has been named by Governor-elect Meneghetti as head of the storm-tossed IRGA (RGS Rice Institute).

d. The CRT (Companhia Riograndense de Telecomunicações) signed a contract with the Japonese Itachi Company for the installation of 12,800 additional telephones in RGS. Ten thousand sets will be installed in Porto Alegre.

Thomas J. Duffield
American Consul

cc.: Consular Affairs, Rio
Political Section, Rio
Political Section, Brasília
ARA/EST/Brazil, Washington
INR/RAR/P, Washington

Department: Pass to all posts in Brazil.

0844

Comment: Few persons believe that the PL's decision to break with Meneghetti was only (as claimed) because it was dissatisfied with the appointment of Cabral and Meneghetti's so-called "independent line". It appears more likely that PL overreached itself in an old-fashioned patronage struggle for minor jobs and lost. The PL may take consolation in the fact that when basic legislation is at stake in the next Assembly, its relative strength within the numerically weak ADP will improve.

2. New Consul Calls on Governor Brizola

Consul Duffield made his official call on Governor Leonel Brizola on January 12. The interview, which lasted approximately half an hour, was filmed in part on video tape, and subsequently broadcast by the local TV stations. The conversation, which dealt largely with Brizola's real accomplishments in the field of public education, was a cordial one. As he has done on previous occasions - including the initial courtesy call of former Consul Sharp - Brizola stated that there was no fundamental quarrel between the Brazilian and American peoples, and that he personally admired the United States as a vigorous country in which a number of interesting innovations were being attempted. Without making any direct reference to Mr. Sharp, the Governor stated that "in spite of past intrigues", the new Consul should consider himself entirely welcome in Pôrto Alegre. He emphasized that although he had little use for "businessmen", he had the greatest respect for genuine (autênticos) American public servants. The local press carried reasonably accurate references to the interview. It is not correct, however, that the Consul informed Brizola, as reported by Ultima Hora, that he was "admired in the United States for the attitude he took during the political crisis of 1961", nor that the Consul "praised the Governor for his achievements in the electrical power field".

3. Governor Brizola's Activities

a. During his customary Friday evening radio address on January 11, Governor Brizola announced that there was a possibility that he might receive an unspecified "executive post" in the new Federal Government and that if this were the case, before assuming the post, he would "explain in detail to the Gaucho people and to the Brazilians his reasons for entering the government" and his conception of how he should carry out his new duties. Ultima Hora speculates that he may be appointed to the Ministry of Mines and Power, and adds that the present Secretary of Agriculture and PTB boss of Rio Grande do Sul, João Caruso, is scheduled to head the recently created federal Superintendency of the Land Reform Plan (Superintendência do Plano de Reforma Agrária). (There is also speculation that Egidio Michaelsen, defeated PTB candidate for governor, may become President Goulart's Minister of Treasury and that Brizola's Secretary of Interior and Justice, Ajadil de Lemos, may become President Goulart's Chief of Civil Household.)

b. In a press interview devoted to the recently-held plebiscite, Brizola expressed his satisfaction that the plebiscite had been free of

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ARA-4

RM/R	REP	AF
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ARA	EUR	FE
NEA	CU	INR 5
E 4	P	IO
L	FBO	AID 12
AGR	COM	FRB
INT	LAB 6	TAR
TR	XMB	AIR 4
ARMY 5	CIA 10	NAVY 5
OSD 12	USIA 8	NSA 3

File RM/R 2/14/63 R Burton Moscicki

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

22 **AIRGRAM**

732.00/1-1563

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A-34 NO. | OFFICIAL USE ONLY | Air Pouch HANDLING INDICATOR

TO : DEPARTMENT OF STATE 1963 JAN 21 PM 5 05

RIO DE JANEIRO-1 CURITIBA-1
BELEM-1 PORTO ALEGRE-1
BELO HORIZONTE-1 RECIFE-1
SANTOS-1 SALVADOR-1
SAO PAULO-1

RM/AN ANALYSIS & DISTRIBUTION BRANCH

FROM : Amconsul PÔRTO ALEGRE DATE: JAN 15 1963

SUBJECT : PÔRTO ALEGRE WEEKLY SUMMARY No 39

REF :

DEPARTMENT OF STATE BUREAU OF INTER-AMERICAN AFFAIRS JAN 22 1963

1. PL Breaks with Meneghetti
2. New Consul Calls on Governor Brizola
3. Governor Brizola's Activities
4. Economic Notes

As anticipated, the PL (Partido Libertador) issued a formal statement this week announcing its decision not to participate in Governor-elect Meneghetti's administration. Somewhat paradoxically, the PL decided to remain in the ranks of Governor Meneghetti's coalition ADP (Aliança Democratica Popular). The PL's decision to break with Meneghetti was taken in face of the Governor-elect's firm refusal to accede to PL demands that Plinio Cabral, Chief-designate of the Civil Household, be dismissed, and that the political parties comprising the ADP have a greater voice in Meneghetti's executive decisions. The determination to remain in the ADP may have been based on the fact that the PL really has no place else to go in the next Legislative Assembly, and upon a desire to continue working with the ADP in anticipation of the November elections for mayor of Porto Alegre. As the PL has indicated that it will assume an independent position in the next Legislative Assembly, the ability of the ADP to legislate effectively in that Assembly remains in doubt. The immediate result of the PL's break with Governor-elect Meneghetti is the loss by the PL of the positions of Secretary of Interior and Justice, and of Secretary of Public Security, to which Meneghetti had named respectively PL members Coelho de Souza and Otávio Cardoso.

FORM DS-323 4-62 | OFFICIAL USE ONLY | FOR DEPT. USE ONLY In Out

Drafted by: WDMcLain/TJDuffield:zma | Contents and Classification Approved by:

Clearances:

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CONFIDENTIAL

Amaral Peixoto showed great interest in organizational changes in the Government, especially those increasing the number of Cabinet posts by subdividing the Ministries of Transport and Public Works and of Finance. He also wants to see the positions of Under Secretary maintained. (Comment: He justifies these on grounds of operational efficiency, but one cannot help supposing that the multiplication of jobs for PSD politicians is at least as important an objective in the mind of this somewhat old-fashioned professional politician.)

We had some discussion of the three-year plan of Celso Furtado, in which I indicated some of the strong and weak points which had impressed me on preliminary analysis. Amaral Peixoto indicated a moderately skeptical attitude about Furtado, especially as to his executive talents.

Amaral Peixoto had been quite well impressed by the generally moderate tone of Goulart during their interview. He felt that there was a considerable prospect of a real turn for the better in the Federal Administration. On the other hand, he said that he could not be sure that similar moderation of tone would be employed in the next conversation of the President, and he preferred to judge by actions rather than simply by expressions of intent.

I asked what would be the major fields in which President Goulart would require the cooperation of the new Congress for the carrying out of a program. Amaral Peixoto mentioned several "reform projects." These included administrative reform, reform of the tax structure, banking reform, and possibly agricultural reform. We also discussed at some length the Profits Remittance Bill. Amaral Peixoto said that there had been conflicting indications of the effects of this on foreign investors. I emphasized strongly the very detrimental effects of Article 33, which sterilizes profits beyond 10 percent. He appeared suitably impressed by this point.

Comment: In general, this conversation, while agreeable enough, confirmed my previous impressions that Amaral Peixoto, while a shrewd politician of the old school, is a man of very limited intelligence and limited horizons who cannot be expected to play a forceful role on the Brazilian political scene, either for good or for bad.

Addendum: I omitted to report above that Amaral Peixoto said he had not discussed military appointments with Goulart, but had been very concerned at various rumors of the possible promotion of General Osvino Alves to the War Ministry. He had recently received unequivocal assurances through Antônio Balbino (Goulart's Legal Adviser) that General Amaury Kruel would be retained as War Minister.

CONFIDENTIAL

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CONFIDENTIAL

MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION

DATE: January 14, 1963

SUBJECT: Discussion of Brazilian Political Situation

PLACE: American Embassy Residence

PARTICIPANTS: Ernani Amaral Peixoto, Leader of the PSD
Ambassador Lincoln Gordon

Amaral Peixoto had had a long visit with President Goulart during the weekend, discussing the questions of the implementation of the results of the plebiscite on Presidentialism and the selection of the new Cabinet. On the constitutional question, he felt that there was nothing to be gained by waiting out the 90-day period contemplated in the Capanema-Valladares Law, but that the 1946 Constitution should be restored by some form of Congressional action rather than simply by Presidential interpretation of the plebiscite in that sense. He had met on the morning of January 14 with 30 PSD Deputies, and was planning further meetings in the evening with leaders of the other parties. He favored either a further "complementary law" to remove the 90-day waiting period, or, if possible, an actual constitutional amendment. The complementary law would require an absolute majority of both Houses, and the constitutional amendment an absolute two-thirds majority. I asked whether he thought that the necessary attendance of Congressmen could be secured during the last two weeks of the dying Congress, and he replied that this could be done if the party leaders were in agreement and if the Congressmen knew that they had something to do by virtue of going to Brasilia.

With respect to the selection of the new Cabinet, Amaral Peixoto had emphasized to President Goulart that the selection of men for these positions was much more important than the revocation of the parliamentary amendment as such. He had tried to persuade Goulart that the names should be indicated, at least informally, prior to the Congressional action, in order to help inspire the Congress with the necessary confidence. (Comment: By the same token, Goulart is obviously interested in getting the authority back first so as to leave him a freer hand in the selection of men. Judging by recent experience, Goulart will win this tactical engagement.) With respect to the selection of members of the PSD, Amaral Peixoto had told Goulart that he would be happy with any of the large number of suggestions that had been considered, but emphasized that he was equally interested in the non-PSD appointments to key Cabinet positions.

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INFO/ACTION

ARA-4

RM/R 1	REP	AF
ARA	EUR	FE
NEA	CU	INR 5
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L	FBO	AID
AGR	COM	FRB
INT	LAB	TAR
TR	XMB	AIR 4
ARMY 5	CIA 10	NAVY 5
OSD 12	USIA 8	NSA 3

File 1/15/63
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R. Burton
Machen

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

AIRGRAM

732.00/1-1563

FOR RM USE ONLY

A-804 NO.

CONFIDENTIAL HANDLING INDICATOR

DEPARTMENT OF STATE
AM 9:39
OF INTER-AMERICAN AFFAIRS
JAN 18 1963
RM/ANALYSIS & DISTRIBUTION BRANCH

TO : DEPARTMENT OF STATE 1963 JAN 18

FROM : Amembassy RIO DE JANEIRO DATE: January 15, 1963

SUBJECT : Conversation with Deputy Ernani Amaral Peixoto, Leader of the PSD

REF :

The enclosed memorandum of conversation summarizes the highlights of a luncheon conversation with Amaral Peixoto at the American Embassy Residence, Rio de Janeiro, Monday, January 14, 1963.

Lincoln Gordon

Lincoln Gordon

Enclosure: Memorandum of conversation.

JAN 22 9 53 AM '63

CONFIDENTIAL

FORM DS-323 4-62

FOR DEPT. USE ONLY
Enc. In Out

Drafted by: LGordon:mls

Contents and Classification Approved by:

Clearances:

0839

CONFIDENTIAL

-2- 1323, JANUARY 14, 7 P.M. FROM: RIO DE JANEIRO

RELEASE SEEMS CONCEDE "RIGHT" OF CONGRESS DECIDE ON METHOD IMPLEMENTING PLEBISCITE RESULTS IT IN EFFECT PLACES RESPONSIBILITY ON CONGRESS FOR RESOLUTION QUESTION.

GORDON

BA

CONFIDENTIAL

0838

32

INCOMING TELEGRAM *Department of State* ACTION COPY **PERMANENT RECORD COPY**

COPIES REC'D ARA

40-43 CONFIDENTIAL NUMBERED Rio 1323

Action ARA

Control: 8222
Rec'd: JANUARY 14, 1963
10:39 P.M.

Info SS SR G SP P USIA NSC INR CIA NSA OSD ARMY NAVY AIR RMR

FROM: RIO DE JANEIRO

TO: Secretary of State

INFO: RM/R FILES

NO: 1323, JANUARY 14, 7 P.M.

ACTION DEPARTMENT 1323, POLAD CINCARIB 27.

REFERENCE: EMBASSY'S TELEGRAM 1301

AT SAME TIME VOICES, SOME OF THEM CLOSE TO GOULART, CONTINUE CALL FOR AUTOMATIC RETURN TO FULL PRESIDENTIALISM ON PROMULGATION PLEBISCITE RESULTS (SO-CALLED MANGABEIRA THESIS). CABINET NOTE RELEASED JANUARY 12 SEEMED CONCEDE RIGHT TO DETERMINE METHOD FOR IMPLEMENTING PLEBISCITE OPTION FOR PRESIDENTIALISM TO CONGRESS. TEXT OF CABINET RELEASE IN TRANSLATION AS FOLLOWS:

"PRESIDENT COUNCIL MINISTERS WAS AUTHORIZED BY COLLEAGUES, IN LAST MEETING OF COUNCIL, TAKE INITIATIVE HE CONSIDERS POLITICALLY MOST SATISFACTORY IN CONSEQUENCE RESULTS PLEBISICITE. COUNCIL'S MANDATE WILL END JANUARY 31. IN VIEW OF UNEQUIVOCAL OPTION OF ELECTORATE IT IS UP TO CONGRESS TAKE DECISION IT BELIEVES MOST CORRECT IN ORDER PROVIDE CONDITIONS FOR CONSTITUTION NEW MINISTRY. THERE CAN BE NO DOUBT THAT CONGRESS, WHOSE EFFORT OVERCOME INSTITUTIONAL CRISIS WAS FUNDAMENTAL AND DECISIVE, WILL BE ABLE IN SAME SPIRIT FIND RIGHT ROAD TOWARD FULFILLING ASPIRATIONS OF BRAZILIAN PEOPLE AS SO OVERWHELMINGLY DEMONSTRATED."

GOULART WOULD APPEAR THUS FAVOR RECOURSE OF AMENDMENT, DURING SPECIAL CONGRESSIONAL SESSION BEGINNING JANUARY 15, OF PARLAMENTARISM-VALADARES LAW AS MEANS PROMPTLY REGAINING FULL PRESIDENTIAL POWERS, PRESENT COUNCIL RELEASE BEING FORM PRESSURING CONGRESS FOR SUCH ACTION. WORTHWHILE OBSERVE THAT THOUGH COUNCIL

/RELEASE

CONFIDENTIAL

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ACTION ASSIGNED TO	ACTION TAKEN	
NAME OF OFFICER & OFFICE SYMBOL	DATE OF ACTION	DIRECTIONS TO RM/R

1

POL 32.00/1-1463

0837

Party	Outgoing Chamber	Percentage of Bench	New Chamber	Percentage of Bench
PSP	1	14	0	--
PSD	2	28	4	58
PTB	1	14	1	14
UDN	3	43	2	28
	7		7	

Comment: All parties except the UDN and PST ran a combined ticket: the "Crusade of Hope." The UDN (joined by the PST) ran the "Democratic Labor Alliance." The PSP lost its last remaining seat in the previous Chamber due to Raimundo Xavier Fernandes dropping to first suplente. Natal's Communist Mayor Djalma MaranhÃo, who was accorded a better than even chance to win a seat for the PTB if he ran for Deputy, chose to run for Senator and finished a poor fourth.

Teodorico Bezarra (PSD), a four-time federal deputy and powerful conservative figure, finished an out-of-the-money third in the senatorial election. He will be the beneficiary of an amendment to the state constitution, passed on January 12, 1963, which permits the vacated vice-governorship to be filled by an election in which the state's federal deputies are the electors. The vacancy was created by the election to the Senate on October 7 of Vice Governor Monsenhor Walfredo Gurgel (PSD).

For the Ambassador:

John Keppel
John Keppel
Counselor of Embassy
for Political Affairs

DISTRIBUTION: All consulates in Brazil; Amb, DCM, Service Attachés, USIS, Econ (2), POL II, Labor, CF-Rio (3), POL-Rio (5), Brasilia (5).

LIMDIS/ACTION

RA-4

RM/R	REP	AF
1		
ARA	EUR	FE
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INT	LAB	TAR
TR	XMB	AIR
ARMY	CIA 10	NAVY
OSD	USIA 8	NSA 3

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1/25/63
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DEPARTMENT OF STATE

AIRGRAM

732.00/1-1463

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TO : Department of State 1963 JAN 18 AM 9 40

DEPARTMENT OF STATE
BUREAU OF
INTER-AMERICAN AFFAIRS
JAN 18 1963

RM/AN
ANALYSIS & DISTRIBUTION
BRANCH

FROM : Amembassy, Brasilia Office DATE: January 14, 1963

SUBJECT : Chamber of Deputies: Official Results for Rio Grande do Norte

REF : A-914, May 22, 1962.

Name	Party	Returned Incumbent	Ideological Classification
Jeronimo Vingt Rosado Maia	UDN	No	5
Djalma Aranha Marinho	UDN	No	5
Tarcisio de Vasconcelos Maia (First Suplente)	UDN	Yes	5
Clovis Coutinho da Motta	PTB	Yes	5
Odilon Ribeiro Coutinho	PSD	No	5
Aluízio Gonçalves Bezerra	PSD	No	6
Aristeŕanes Fernandes e Silva	PSD	No	
Jesse Pinto Freire	PSD	Yes	6
Raimundo Xavier Fernandes (First Suplente)	PSP	Yes	5

CONFIDENTIAL

FILED
JAN 22 1963

FORM DS-323
4-62

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Drafted by: POL:HWGaither/jhm

Contents and Classification approved by: C.DKeyser (POL)

Clearances:

0835

Rio-Bahia highway slowly emerging from the mud: The approximately three hundred kilometers of unpaved road still remaining on the Rio-Bahia "economic lifeline of the Northeast" is now once again partially open to traffic after being closed with hundreds of trucks stranded at various points, mostly over the border in the State of Minas Gerais, because heavy rains turned the recently banked earth into a quagmire. At the height of the stoppage, troops of the State Militia were dispatched to various points to protect trucks against looting.

Course in Economic Development: A SUDENE-supported privately sponsored four-month course in economic development and public administration designed to train functionaries for positions in the SUDENE and other State, federal and municipal bodies, opened in Salvador with 38 students. We have not yet been able to evaluate its politico-economic content.

Harold M. Midkiff
American Consul

among others, may have persuaded Goulart to cancel the trip. Lomanto is beginning to contend with old pros in the major leagues and he may find the going tough unless he can reach an accomodation with them. There is little doubt that if he finds his efforts to conduct an administration of action are being circumscribed by partisan politics, he will appeal to the people. He is counting heavily on his capacity to draw popular support. Some pressure has been placed on Lomanto to cancel or at least curtail his excursion abroad. Those who are counting on him to support their interests and block the actions of opponents are particularly distressed to see him leave the country at the time when so much is happening in national and state politics.

POLITICAL-ECONOMIC:

Two Federal Parliamentary Inquiry Commissions were at work in Salvador during the week. One is investigating charges of Communism and misuse of funds in PETROBRAS, the state oil monopoly, and the other checking into familiar charges of corruption in the pork barreling SÃo Francisco Valley Commission. The Petrobras charges were essentially the same as those brought out in the recent local newspaper crusade against leftist actions of the local refinery chief and his superiors, which were reported in our Weekly Summary dated December 7, 1962 (A-39). Among the several charges made before the Inquiry group investigating the SÃo Francisco Valley Commission were that defeated (by a hair) Vice Gubernatorial candidate Rocha PIRES (a close associate of PR leader and former Valley chief Manoel NOVAIS) had illegally obtained Valley money to finance the purchase of cattle for his farms and that several local office chiefs had been relieved of their posts during pre-election weeks so that the "annual purchases of supplies" could be made by Valley politicians without interference from the functionaries.

Comment: Details of the findings will not be made public until the Commission's report to the Chamber of Deputies. From press reports it appears that some of the charges that led to the investigation are well founded.

ECONOMIC:

Ilheus authorities want speed-up on new port. Since the new stevedore charges (reported in our previous weekly summaries) in effect at Ilheus for the past several weeks make the loading of cacau prohibitively expensive there (they are three times those in effect at Salvador) cacau from the region is being trucked to Salvador and the port is approaching idleness. As the Stevedor Union's basis for demanding the unprecedentedly high charges is the danger encountered by the workers in loading ships from lighters beyond the bar, Ilheus politicians are bringing what pressure they can on the Federal government to increase the speed of the apparently lagging construction of a deep water port.

Good weather conditions foretell good harvests. The director of the Plant Production Division of the local Secretariat of Agriculture was highly optimistic this week about the prospects of a good harvest in almost all crops during the coming year because of ample rains which have been falling almost throughout the State in recent months.

ORIGIN/ACTION

PRA-5

RM/R	REP	AF
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ARA	EUR	FE
NEA	CU	INR 5
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L	FBO	AID 12
ACD 10	COM 10	FRB
INT	LAB	TAR
TR	XMB	AIR 4
ARMY 5	CIA 10	NAVY 5
OSD 12	USIA 8	NSA 3

File
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2/14/63
R J Barton
No action

59

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

AIRGRAM

732.00/1-1163
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HANDLING INDICATOR

TO : DEPARTMENT OF STATE

1963 JAN 19 AM 9 11

INFO: Amembassey, Rio
Amembassy, Brasilia

RM/AN
ANALYSIS & DISTRIBUTION
BRANCH

FROM : AMCONSULATE, SALVADOR

DATE: January 11, 1963

SUBJECT: Weekly Summary, Salvador

DEPARTMENT OF STATE
BUREAU OF
INTER-AMERICAN AFFAIRS
JAN 1 1963

REF :

POLITICAL:

The October 7, 1962 election results having been confirmed finally by the Regional Electoral Tribunal, certificates of election (diplomas) were issued to the successful candidates in a ceremony on the evening of January 10. Governor-elect Antonio Lomanto Junior flew back from Rio, where he went on January 8 for political consultations and to make arrangements for his trip to the United States on board the SS Brazil which sails January 11.

Speaking after receiving his "diploma," Lomanto stated the occasion marked the crowning point of his political career which started seventeen years ago in Jequié when he was elected alderman. He said he felt humble before the responsibilities placed on him but he was not afraid of the task and would not deceive the Bahian people who had elected him. Alluding to a previous speech by oppositionist Vieira de Melo (PSD) who said he would carry on constructive criticism of the new administration, Lomanto said he would be a Governor of all the Bahian people after April 7 when he assumes office and intends to have a peaceful and constructive government which can count on the support of all. He will not tolerate hindrances, he warned, and will denounce to the people those who attempt to block governmental action. He said he was particularly concerned with expanding production of all sectors of the economy, especially agriculture.

Comment: Lomanto is already facing political maneuvers which threaten to curtail his efforts. The failure of President Goulart to show up for the publicized visit to Jequié on January 5 no doubt hurt his standing somewhat. The real reasons for Goulart's change of mind have not yet been divulged, but there have been hints to the effect that Antonio Balbino,

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Drafted by: HMM:dkiff:la

Contents and Classification Approved by:

Clearances:

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ORIGIN/ACTION

	ARA-4	
RMR 1	REP	AF
ARA	EUR	FE
NEA	CU	INR 5
E 4	P	IO 2
L	FBO	AID 12
45 20		IGA 3
AGR	COM	FRB
INT	LAB	TAR
TR	AMB	AIR
ARMY	CIA 10	NAVY
DSD 12	USIA	NSA 3

20

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

AIRGRAM

811.0020/1-1163

XR 732.00
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A-1013
NO.

CONFIDENTIAL
HANDLING INDICATOR

TO : Department of State

INFO: Amembassy RIO DE JANEIRO

FROM : Amembassy BUENOS AIRES DATE: January 11, 1963

SUBJECT: Kubitschek Activities with Alliance for Progress

REF. :

André JORDAN, a Brazilian now in Argentina in connection with housing development, claims to have been very close to ex-President Kubitschek. He says he drafted the Kubitschek letters on Operation Pan American and worked very closely with Schmidt and other advisers of Kubitschek.

Jordán has just been in Rio de Janeiro and says that Kubitschek intends to prepare his report on the Alliance for Progress just as fast as he can, probably by the end of January, and then move out of the picture. Jordán tried to convince Kubitschek that he should come up with a lofty and highly impartial report and that such action would redound in Kubitschek's political favor and help him in his campaign to become President of Brazil again. Kubitschek, according to Jordán, did not agree. He felt that because of differences between the United States and Brazil at the present time that he would be criticized if he gave too much support to the Alliance for Progress, and that his designation as one of the superwisemen could be a millstone around his political neck. Kubitschek therefore, according to Jordán, will take himself out of the picture just as soon as possible. He says that there is to be a meeting on January 20 with Lleras Camargo in the hopes of reaching agreement on the report.

While the foregoing may be either well known to Embassy Rio or may be nothing but a figment of Jordán's imagination, it is submitted as of possible interest. It is requested that the source be protected.

McCLINTOCK

Copy to:
ARA/EST/A - Mr. Lancaster

FORM 4-63 DS-323

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Drafted by: DCM:HAHoyt:jml January 8, 1963

Contents and Classification Approved by: Ambassador McClintock

Clearances: Hall

A

0831

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On the eve of the plebiscite, leaflets were strewn about the city of Recife and environs. All had "Nao" as the theme. One hauled out the chief whipping boy, the United States. "Vote against the interference of the United States in our government" it brayed.

Lowell C. Kilday

Lowell C. Kilday
American Vice Consul

Contributors:

LCKilday
WSSmith
CTucker

0829

Brigadier General ARNALDO AUGUSTO DE MOTTA has been designated to replace General Lindenberg. (UNCLASSIFIED)

ECONOMIC

1. Maritime Strike Aggravates Gasoline Shortage

The Northeast continued to suffer the effects of the two week old maritime strike, as did the rest of the country. Striking maritime workers were this week joined in the Recife area by the local pilots association, and there have been some indications that the local stevedores and port workers unions may also soon walk out. So far, the most visible effect of the strike is to be seen in the worsening of an area-wide gasoline shortage. Reports from Paraiba, Rio Grande do Norte and Ceara indicate a serious depletion of fuel stocks. Pernambuco and Alagoas are affected, but less drastically. Two consular officers traveling through the interior of the latter two states last week reported little difficulty in finding at least enough gasoline to get to the next town, and truck traffic was moving normally. (UNCLASSIFIED)

2. Russian Wheat Shipment

A third shipment of Russian wheat is now being offloaded in Recife. This latest consignment consists of 10,465 metric tons and was carried by the U. S.-owned Panamanian flag vessel "S.S. South River". (OFFICIAL USE ONLY)

3. Dredging Operations to Cease

Local port authorities this week announced the suspension of dredging operations in Recife's harbor due to the failure of the National Department of Harbors, Rivers and Canals to conclude a new contract with the dredging company. Recife's port facilities are congested at best. Along some wharves the water is too shallow for larger vessels, and even with the dredge at work the harbor was silting badly. Unless operations are resumed quickly the harbor's effectiveness will be greatly reduced. (OFFICIAL USE ONLY)

PSYCHOLOGICAL

Contrary to FRANCISCO JULIAO's plea, the local editorial opinions all favored a vote of "Nao" in the plebiscite held January 6. Reasons advanced for such a vote ranged all over the spectrum of the rational and the irrational. "It was an error to institute Parliamentarianism without consulting the People...Such system was a fiction." Thus did Jornal do Commercio exhort its readers to vote "No to Parliamentarianism".



as anticipated. Null and blank votes together fell just short of 10% of the total number of votes cast.

Results of the voting in Recife, given below in round numbers, provide a fair illustration of how the Northeast felt about parliamentary government.

NO	YES	NULL AND BLANK	ABSTAINED
130,000	9,000	16,000	98,000

Comment: By local press standards, one of the most notable features of the plebiscite voting was the high number of votes declared null. Votes were nullified for a number of reasons but primarily because the voters ignored the ballot's question and used the ballot instead to express their feelings about the present government and its leaders. A great number of obscenities were reported. One voter, apparently not given to profanity, recorded a simple: Goulart, Nao; Maria Teresa, , Sim. (OFFICIAL USE ONLY)

2. First Strike of Rural Labor Unions

The first strike involving one of Pernambuco's rural labor unions, was called this week in the vicinity of Vitoria de Santo Antão, Pernambuco with the purpose of forcing a landowner to sell his property to his workers. Although violence threatened to break out during the first few hours of the strike, the strike leaders (primarily Padre PAULO CRESPO) the landowner, and state police made a concerted effort to keep peace, and after three days the issue was resolved by compromise.

There have been several other peasant-landowner disputes in the same general area within the past few weeks involving elements of both the rural labor unions and the Ligas Camponesas. One landowner, according to the press, has received notice from JOEL ARRUDA CAMARA of Ligas Camponesas fame (See Weekly Summaries Nos. 7 and 9) that his properties are to be invaded within the near future.

Comment: Rural labor union strikes may now be expected to increase; Padre Crespo and the peasants he has organized have few other means of seeking a redress of grievances. It is known that Padre Crespo will do everything possible to keep strikes peaceful in nature but if tension rises high enough some violence would seem to be unavoidable. (UNCLASSIFIED)

3. Changes in Military Commands

It was announced this week that Brigadier General JOSE SENIAL MONTEIRO LINDENBERG, Commander of the 1st Engineer Group, has been relieved of his command and will take up new duties with the Army General Staff



ORIGIN ACTION

59

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

AIRGRAM

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65 NO. — OFFICIAL USE ONLY — HANDLING INDICATOR

1963 JAN 19 AM 9 11
DEPARTMENT OF STATE
BUREAU OF
INTER-AMERICAN AFFAIRS
JAN 21 1963

TO : DEPARTMENT OF STATE

INFO: RIO DE JANEIRO, SÃO PAULO, BRASILIA
ANALYSIS & DISTRIBUTION BRANCH

FROM : Amconsul RECIFE

DATE: January 10, 1963

SUBJECT : Weekly Summary No. 28

REF :

TABLE OF CONTENTS

POLITICAL

1. Northeast Votes No in Plebiscite
2. First Strike of Rural Labor Unions
3. Changes in Military Commands

ECONOMIC

1. Maritime Strike Aggravates Gasoline Shortage
2. Russian Wheat Shipment
3. Dredging Operations to Cease

PSYCHOLOGICAL

POLITICAL

1. Northeast Votes No in Plebiscite

In accordance with all predictions the Northeast joined with the rest of Brazil on January 6 to vote a resounding disapproval of the Ato Adicional and the parliamentary system. Initial results of the plebiscite voting showed a "No" vote preponderance of ten to one and final results only increased the "No" majority. Total abstention was high --- between 35% and 55% in most cities --- but not as high

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FEB 4 1963

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Contents and Classification Approved by:

Clearances: See last page/eg

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PORTO ALEGRE
CURITIBA
BELO HORIZONTE
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2/4/63
No action
R Barton

Curitiba - 1
Belo Horizonte - 1
Belem - 1
Porto Alegre - 1

0826

CONFIDENTIAL

-2- 1301, JANUARY 10, 7 PM, FROM RIO DE JANEIRO

OF PROPOSALS THEMSELVES BUT ADMONISHED GOVERNMENT STAY LEGAL AND IF NOTHING AVAILED, SIT OUT THE 90 DAYS.

MEANWHILE SEVERAL REPORTS OF IMPENDING STRIKES (DATES NOT SET) APPEARED AND ONE OF POSSIBLE NEW RIO STATE RIOTS, RE-CALLING PRESSURES APPLIED LAST JULY IN SUPPORT SAN TIAGO DANTAS NOMINATION AS PREMIER. GOULART PRESERVING SILENCE OF SWEET REASONABLENESS, THUS GIVING IMPRESSION INITIATIVES LIE ELSEWHERE. WHETHER THIS IMPRESSION REFLECTS FACT OR IS MERE CALCULATION NOT KNOWN.

GORDON

BAP

NOTE: Mr. McIntyre (ARA) informed 1/13/FMH

CONFIDENTIAL

0825

15

INCOMING TELEGRAM *Department of State*

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Control: 7199
Rec'd: JANUARY 12, 1963
11:19 AM

FROM: RIO DE JANEIRO

TO: Secretary of State

NO: 1301, JANUARY 10, 7 PM

PRIORITY

ACTION DEPARTMENT 1301, INFORMATION POLAD CINCARIB 24.

NUMEROUS PROPOSALS FOR RESUMPTION FULL PRESIDENTIAL POWERS PRIOR TO CONGRESSIONAL ACTION UNDER CAPANEMA-VALADARES LAW BEING ADVANCED IN WAKE PRO-PRESIDENTIAL VOTE IN SUNDAY PLEBISCITE. ONE PROPOSAL ENVISIONS COURT ACTION ON CASE WHICH WOULD BE PRESENTED EITHER ELECTORAL OR SUPREME COURT. ANOTHER PROPOSAL ADVANCED BY PREMIER HERMES LIMA WHO IN JANUARY 9 PRESS CONFERENCE STATED "GOVERNMENT SHOULD ORGANIZE ITSELF ALONG PRESIDENTIAL LINES UPON PLEBISCITE RESULTS BEING OFFICIALLY PROCLAIMED", SUCH ACTION NOT PREJUDICING CONGRESSIONAL RIGHT MODIFY SYSTEM IN ENSUING 90 DAYS IN ACCORD CAPANEMA-VALADARES LAW. PTB "GRUPO COMPACTO" PUSHING ALTERNATE SOLUTION BY WHICH NEW LEGISLATION WOULD REPLACE CAPANEMA-VALADARES PROVISION FOR CONGRESSIONAL REVISION WITHIN 90 DAYS BY ONE PROVIDING FOR IMMEDIATE RETURN TO 1946 CONSTITUTION.

(1) MUCH OF NATIONAL PRESS HAS REACTED THESE PROPOSALS. ONLY JORNAL DO BRASIL FULLY APPROVED, SAYING "SOLUTION IS INSTITUTION PRESIDENTIALIST GOVERNMENT FROM MOMENT IN WHICH ELECTORAL COURT PROCLAIMS PLEBISCITE RESULTS", THOUGH ULTIMA HORA NOT YET HEARD FROM. DIARIO DE NOTICIAS WARNED ANY ACTION WHICH BY-PASSED CONGRESS WOULD BE COUP. JORNAL DO COMMERCIO AGREED: "THIS PLOT HAS NAME: COUP." CORREIO DA MANHA, ONLY PAPER TO HINT SO FAR THAT VOTE COUNT MAY HAVE BEEN FRAUDULENT, SAID ONLY CONGRESS HAD RIGHT "TO ELABORATE, WITHIN 90 DAYS, NEW PRE-SIDENTIALISM". FOLHA DE SAO PAULO FOUND PROPOSALS (ATTRIBUTING THEM TO GOULART) "TO GUARANTEE PRESIDENTIAL POWERS, LEGITIMATE AND DEFENSIBLE". O GLOBO SURPRISINGLY DID NOT OBJECT TO ANY

RIO DE JANEIRO-1301 7/10/63

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0824

guaranteeing the purchase of specified numbers of copies. (Minister Braddock mentioned that an expanded USIS book publication program was under consideration.) Might there not be an opportunity for mutually helpful cooperation here?, Dr. Ayres asked. A current book production project of IPES at the moment is a work on "Liberty" by the Brazilian legal expert Miguel Reali.

Reaction to Robert Kennedy's meeting with Presient Goulart: Robert Kennedy's meeting with President Goulart went practically unnoticed among the people as a whole, whose attention is concentrated almost entirely on their problems of daily living. In the São Paulo business community the comment was altogether favorable. In some quarters of government there was resentment.

Celso Furtado's Three Year Economic Plan is pure window-dressing to meet the repeated criticism from the IMF and the U. S. Government that Brazil has no plan. The Goulart Government has no thought of putting the plan into effect.

DMBraddock/mec



MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION

DATE: January 8, 1963

PLACE: Jockey Club Restaurant, São Paulo

SUBJECT: Various Subjects

PARTICIPANTS: Dr. Paulo Ayres Filho, Brazilian banker and industrialist and one of top executives of Instituto de Pesquizas Economicas e Sociais (IPES).
Minister Braddock.

Copies to: Amembassy Rio (2 cc)
ARA (1 cc)
INR (1 CC)
Central files (2 cc)

The following are views express by Dr. Ayres on various matters introduced by Minister Braddock during luncheon.

IPES: IPES is still most active. The participation of American firms has "stabilized"; no new ones have recently adhered but those already contributing to IPES projects are maintaining their support. Main IPES programs: 1) Press. IPES has strengthened the democratic, free enterprise orientation of O Estado de São Paulo, Diario de São Paulo and Diario da Noite, and A Gazeta; it is having a little trouble with the new management of the Folhas. It is also working on a number of the leading columinists to good effect. Why do the American wire services transmit so much news about Red China and the Soviet Union?; this news should be played down, 2) Students. IPES is doing successful orientation work among students, as a result of which democratic students have won some important elections. IPES expects some Communist upsets in the next UNE elections. It could accomplish much more if it had more money for the purpose. The student tide could definitely be turned if the United States would offer travel grants to Brazilian students in numbers comparable to those offered by the Russians. 3) Labor. Democratic labor training is continuing, with the utilization of various instrumentalities, notably SEI. The democratic labor movement, however, still sadly lacks strong leadership. 4) Military Officers. Five generals are already associated with IPES, and are helping spread democratic ideas among members of the military services. These officers are arranging cocktails in their homes where younger officers are being brought into contact with members of IPES. IPES, moreover, is looking up and helping military officers newly assigned to the São Paulo area. 5) Other activities. Orientation work among cultural groups through an organization called Convivio; and promotion of the publication of selected democratic books by



U.S. Relations with Brazil: The firm line conveyed by Robert Kennedy was excellent, but we appeared to be withdrawing from it, if this morning's papers' story of a new short term $30 million U.S. loan to Brazil was accurate. Mr. Richards was shocked at this development.

DMBraddock/mec

0821

CONFIDENTIAL

MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION

DATE: January 8, 1963

PLACE: Office of Minister Consul General Braddock

SUBJECT: Various Subjects

PARTICIPANTS: John S. Richards, Pres. of American Chamber of Commerce in Brazil (São Paulo) and representative in Brazil of R. C. A. Minister Braddock.

Copies to: Amembassy Rio (2 cc)
ARA (1cc)
INR (1 cc)
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Minister Braddock took the initiative for arranging the meeting. In reply to various subjects raised by him, Mr. Richards expressed the following views:

Cooperation between the American Chamber and the Federação de Industrias do Estado de São Paulo: A luncheon meeting had been held between the top executives of the two organizations, as a result of which the Chamber had indicated three Americans, Mr. Paul Albright (Squibb), Mr. William Kelleher (Sears), and Mr. Richards (RCA) for positions as FIESP Directors offered by Mr. Raphael Noschese, President of FIESP. Closer ties were being sought.

Political Situation: Goulart would attempt to strengthen his position during January, before the new Congress met and the new State Governors took office. There was a very large number of Brazilians, including practically all the São Paulo business community, who were surfeited with Goulart and would like to see him deposed. They were not yet united among themselves. Moreover, any attempt at a coup would be inopportune pending the election of the President of the new Chamber of Deputies, who alone could be regarded as the legitimate successor to the President in the absence of a Vice President. The opposition was therefore concentrating now on getting a sound conservative elected as head of the Chamber. If the President made any drastic move in the direction of imposing an extremist left government on the country, or if the economy began to fall apart, a rightist coup, spearheaded by the military, might well take place. Mr. Richards thought this probably the best solution as he considered Goulart hopeless.

Celso Furtado's Three Year Plan: The objectives of the plan were not bad, but the plan was "window dressing" for our benefit, as the Government had neither the intention nor the capability of carrying it out.

CONFIDENTIAL



ORIGIN/ACTION: ARA-4

RM/R	REP	AF
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INT	LAB	TAR
TR	XMB	AIR
ARMY	CIA 10	NAVY
DSD	USIA	NSA 3

2m/R-file
2/4/63
R Barton
No action

(25)

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

AIRGRAM

732.00/1-963
XR-832.00

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A-209 NO. | CONFIDENTIAL | AIR POUCH HANDLING INDICATOR

TO : Dept. of State

JAN 15 12 00

FROM : Amcongen SAO PAULO DATE: January 9, 1963

SUBJECT : Conversations with Mr. John S. Richards and Dr. Paulo Ayres Filho.

REF :

DEPARTMENT OF STATE
BUREAU OF
INTER-AMERICAN AFFAIRS
JAN 15 1963

Enclosed are two memoranda of conversations reflecting the views of John S. Richards, President of American Chamber of Commerce in Brazil (São Paulo) and ~~representative in Brazil~~ of R. C. A., and Dr. Paulo Ayres Filho, Brazilian banker and industrialist who is also one of the top executives of Instituto de Pesquizas Economicas e Sociais (IPES). Both conversations took place on January 8, 1963 with Minister Consul General Braddock.

Daniel M. Braddock
Minister Consul General

FILED
FEB 4 1963

CONFIDENTIAL

FORM DS-323 4-62

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Drafted by: DMBraddock/mec Jan. 9, 1963

Contents and Classification Approved by:

Clearances:

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considered the plebiscite simply one more Goulart maneuver toward dictatorship; Diário Popular dismissed the plebiscite as an "unconstitutional fraud and farce." Most other papers opted for a return to presidentialism, averred that once Goulart had his strong powers back the government would have no more excuses for inaction, would have to start getting the country back on its feet.

São Paulo papers greeted Celso Furtado's plan with general favor, some particular reservations, and several doubts as to its success. O Estado and Diário de S. Paulo, for example, found a "philosophy of state-ization" to be basic in the plan, worried that its spirit was not too favorable to free enterprise and foreign private investment. Several papers doubted whether, by this token, Brazil could count on the plan's envisioned $1,500,000,000 of foreign participation.

Daniel M. Braddock
Minister Consul General

Contributors: S. C. Lyon
J. Mason

Distribution: INS/RAR, AmConGen Recife, AmConsulates Belem, Belo Horizonte, Curitiba, Porto Alegre, Salvador, Santos.

Consulate General on January 6 that the Governor had not yet committed himself and was still holding out for wider powers than President Goulart was offering (See Weekly Summary No. 53). (LIMITED OFFICIAL USE)

7. Three Year Plan generally well received.

The Three Year Plan recently prepared by Celso FURTADO found a generally favorable reception in São Paulo, although some commentators were sceptical as to whether the Federal Government would enforce it, recalling similar plans in the past which were honored in the breach. Some feared that it would lead to greater government control of the economy. Also, large rural landowners were reportedly strongly opposed to agrarian reforms envisaged by the plan. (For further details, see ConGen A-206, January 9, 1963.) (UNCLASSIFIED)

8. Correio Paulistano resurrected.

Arising like a phoenix, the São Paulo newspaper Correio Paulistano reappeared on the newsstands on January 3 after an absence of over a month. (Weekly Summary No. 52.)

It spoke vaguely of having overcome economic difficulties and stated that it would maintain the same line as before. (UNCLASSIFIED)

Comment: An official of the paper told a member of the staff of the Consulate General that financial difficulties had forced Correio to suspend publication, but that Father Victor NICKELSBURG had obtained some money from the Bank of Brazil and also, probably, from the State Savings Bank (Caixa Econômica) to rescue the paper. Cardinal Carlos Carmelo de Vasconcelos MOTTA, of São Paulo, is interested in salvaging the paper, according to this source.

Goulart's representative, Octávio Rodrigues MARIA, has left the paper.

In its new phase, Correio Paulistano appears a bit less leftist and anti-American than before it shut down. (LIMITED OFFICIAL USE)

PSYCHOLOGICAL

1. Local press reaction.

The plebiscite on presidentialism vs. parliamentarism, and Minister without Portfolio Celso Furtado's three year economic plan, occupied São Paulo press commentators this week. O Estado de S. Paulo



December 31 and immediately commenced intensive politicking in preparation for his entry into office January 31. Rumors were rife concerning the makeup of his future cabinet, but Adhemar confirmed his intention of waiting until January 25 to announce it. However, he did inform a USAID technical adviser that the new Secretary of Security would be General Lemos Barbosa ALDEVIO (a retired Army officer, reportedly rightist, who has long been a close associate of Adhemar's).

Adhemar called for austerity and discouraged those who would seek preferment. He made clear his opposition to communism, and his support for the private enterprise system.

He emphasized his willingness to forget past conflicts and to cooperate with parties which had opposed him. He was reported to have indicated willingness to cooperate with President Goulart and even to have members of his party, the PSP (Partido Social Progressista), hold portfolios in the Federal cabinet. (UNCLASSIFIED)

Comment: Adhemar is presumably making strong efforts to line up support in enough parties to ensure a workable majority in the State Legislature. This requires skillful maneuvering, since the Legislature is fractionated among 12 parties, no one of which has over 12 percent of the seats.

Local observers express considerable scepticism concerning Adhemar's ability to collaborate with President Goulart, whose leftist tendencies are so at variance with Adhemar's professed stand. However, Adhemar has much to gain by cooperating up to a certain point, e.g. in regard to his proposed Brazilian Alliance for Progress, which would benefit greatly from a favorable attitude on the part of the Brazilian Government. Judging by Adhemar's reported statements, he hopes to collaborate with the Federal Government while retaining the right to criticize those actions which he does not agree with. (LIMITED OFFICIAL USE)

6. CARVALHO PINTO still touted for Federal cabinet.

Governor Carvalho Pinto conferred with President Goulart at Rio on January 3, and although his subsequent statements concerning this meeting were vague, the press was full of reports that he had been offered the Ministry of Finance in President Goulart's new cabinet. Some reports claimed he had accepted, others that he refused, others that he was demanding extraordinary powers as a condition for accepting.

A relative of the Governor told a member of the staff of the

0816

heavy vote, though some of the credit must go to the fact that voting was declared legally compulsory, with various sanctions against non-voters.

The large majority voting against parliamentarism is also considered a victory for Goulart. Allowance must be made, however, for the fact that parliamentarism had few proponents, and those who voted against it are not necessarily pro-Goulart.

The number of void ballots was higher than usual -- 5 or 6 per cent, compared with 2.2 percent in the October elections for Governor. The proportion of blank ballots was about the same in the two elections. These figures for void and blank ballots indicate a fairly small protest vote. (LIMITED OFFICIAL USE)

4. Electoral Tribunal voids votes cast for Communists.

The Regional Electoral Tribunal of São Paulo announced its decision voiding votes cast for Communists in the October 1962 elections. This meant that such votes would not be counted in favor of the parties on whose tickets the Communists' names appeared, and under the system of proportional representation this resulted in reallocation of the seats which they would have occupied if elected. This led to a net loss for the PTB (Partido Trabalhista Brasileira) of two seats in the Federal Chamber and two in the State Legislature.

The same court had previously ruled that the Communists could not be considered valid candidates, but had left undecided whether votes cast for them could be counted in favor of other men on the same ticket. (UNCLASSIFIED)

Comment: This is a blow to the Communists, who find their attractiveness as running mates impaired. Unable to run as candidates of the illegal Communist Party, they have been welcomed by some other parties, anxious to gain Communist votes. Now the precedent is more firmly established that known Communists can be prevented from being seated and, more important from the standpoint of the other parties, votes cast for them will not help the ticket they run on.

The judges' decision, which was 4 to 2, follows the majority of the precedents, and observers consider it legally sound. (LIMITED OFFICIAL USE)

5. Adhemar seeks links with other parties.

Governor-elect Adhemar de BARROS returned from Europe on

2. General BEVILACQUA speaks out against illegal strikes.

General Pery Constant Bevilacqua, Commander of the Second Army and ranking military figures in São Paulo, again spoke out on the subject of strikes, following up his recent statement on the subject (Weekly Summary No. 51). As reported in the press, he deplored the "indiscriminate and illegal use" of strikes, "whose consequences are so very evil for the Brazilian community." (UNCLASSIFIED)

Comment: General Bevilacqua's latest statement appears intended to clarify his previous statement, which had left doubt as to exactly what kind of strikes he opposed, and which had been attacked by some labor leaders -- O Estado even reported that members of Goulart's labor "apparatus" were insisting on the General's removal.

However, in focussing his opposition onto illegal strikes, the General is giving cold comfort to labor leaders. Brazilian labor laws are such that almost all strikes can be considered illegal -- although in practice the authorities have very frequently ignored this.

The General is due to be retired in a few months if he is not promoted. This raises the question as to why he chose to speak out at this time, antagonizing labor leaders known to be close to the President, which would hardly appear likely to enhance his chances of promotion. The answer may lie in his well-known propensity for speaking his mind, not always discreetly, which has led to his being attacked from both the right and the left at various times in the past. There are indications that as a military man he takes a dim view of strikes as akin to indiscipline, and that he is sincerely disturbed at their being used as a political instrument -- which invites interesting speculation as to what he may do if Goulart again tries to use illegal strikes for political ends. (LIMITED OFFICIAL USE)

3. Plebiscite rejects parliamentarism.

Voting in the plebiscite on January 6 was orderly and quiet. Preliminary returns indicate that over 75 percent of the eligible voters turned out in São Paulo City, and somewhat less in other parts of the State. The vote was around six to one against parliamentarism. Void ballots amounted to about five or six percent, and blank ballots were around two percent. (UNCLASSIFIED)

Comment: The turnout was fairly heavy, as nearly as can be judged from incomplete returns, though lower than for the October 1962 elections, when 86.4 percent of the electorate voted. This is being hailed a victory for Goulart, who had campaigned for a

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ORIGIN/ ACTION

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AGR	COM	FRD
INT	LAB	TAR
TR	XMB	AIR 4
ARMY 5	CIA 15	NAVY 5
OSD 12	USIA 8	NSA 3

File
RM/R
1/24/63
S Burton
No action

-20

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

AIRGRAM

732.00/1-963

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A-208 — NO. — LIMITED OFFICIAL USE — HANDLING INDICATOR

TO : DEPARTMENT OF STATE

1963 JAN 14 AM 9 26

INFO : BRASILIA, RIO DE JANEIRO

FROM : AmConGen, SAO PAULO

DATE: January 9, 1963

SUBJECT : Weekly Summary No. 54

REF :

DEPARTMENT OF STATE
BUREAU OF
INTER-AMERICAN AFFAIRS
JAN 14 1963

TABLE OF CONTENTS

POLITICAL
1. Political scene quiet; rumors of military takeover continue.
2. General Bevilacqua speaks out against illegal strikes.
3. Plebiscite rejects parliamentarism.
4. Electoral Tribunal voids votes cast for Communists.
5. Adhemar seeks links with other parties.
6. Carvalho Pinto touted for Federal cabinet.
7. Three Year Plan generally well received.
8. Correio Paulistano resurrected.

PSYCHOLOGICAL
1. Local press reaction

POLITICAL

1. Political scene quiet; rumors of military takeover continue.

The political scene continued to appear calm, although rumors persisted that the military may take matters into their own hands before long. A recent version of the rumor predicts this will occur within two months, and that General Amaury KRUEL, Minister of War, will have a leading part in forcing President João GOULART to adopt a less radical line on pain of being ousted. It is not known how much truth there is in these rumors. (LIMITED OFFICIAL USE)

FORM DS-323 4-62

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Drafted by: See last page/el 1/8/63

Contents and Classification Approved by:

Clearances:

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de Comando da Zona de Defesa Sul. In reply to earlier reports that he had been fired, General Borges said that his transfer was routine.

For the Consul:

W. Douglas McLain
American Vice Consul

cc.: Consular Affairs, Rio
Political Section, Rio
Political Section, Brasília
ARA/EST/Brazil, Washington
INR/RAR/P, Washington

Department: Pass to all posts in Brazil

Correio do Povo editorialized on the difference between "optimism and realism"; the Diário de Notícias stressed the difference between "words and deeds" in commenting upon President Goulart's statements that under certain circumstances he would welcome foreign capital to Brazil; and Jornal do Dia, although rather receptive to President Goulart's comments, asked for action instead of words.

b. Plínio Cabral, controversial Chief-designate of Civil Household, was elected a national director of the advertising agency Norton Publicidade S.A.

c. Governor-elect Meneghetti announced plans to attend a regional municipal conference in Rio on January 11.

5. Economic Notes

a. Loureiro da Silva, Mayor of Pôrto Alegre, announced that he was sending data on his plans to alleviate the chronic water shortage in Pôrto Alegre to the IBRD for consideration. At the close of one of the driest years in recent hystory, the water problem in Pôrto Alegre is worse than usual.

b. Military units, put on alert to prevent sheep smuggling from Uruguay to RGS last week, confiscated 1700 contraband sheep. Higher prices for mutton and wool here caused an increase in sheep smuggling.

c. Although the port of Pôrto Alegre continued to be relatively unaffected by the maritime strike one ship was tied up by strikers here and reports from Rio Grande indicated that the Navy had boarded at least one ship there.

d. The price of cigarettes went up an average of Cr$10.00 a package last week and there were reports that drug supplies would soon be increased by 40 percent and that cement was due to go up.

6. Miscellaneous

a. State Deputy Paulo Brossard last week accused IRGA (RGS Rice Institute) of raising its employees' salaries without authorization, of increasing its staff 100 percent by hiring 300 additional employees within the last year without civil service examinations, and of not submitting its required financial reports for 1961. IRGA denied Brossard's charges.

b. General Antônio Acioli Borges was transfered from his command of the 6th Infantry Division of III Army, and appointed Chief of Núcleo

0811

the press and by José Zacchia, Regional President of PDC, on the grounds that Meneghetti has the right to pick his own cabinet.

The restive PL continued its criticisms of Meneghetti's policies and cabinet selections, and appears to be headed for a complete break with the ADP. Although PL State Deputy Paulo Brossard announced his decision not to seek action on his bill to introduce a form of state parliamentarism (see Weekly Summaries Nº 36, A-30 and Nº 37, A-32), this decision was probably taken because the bill hasn't got a chance rather than as a conciliatory measure. In addition to continued criticism of the appointment of Plínio Cabral as Chief of Civil Household, PL leaders also adopted Barcelos' two additional targets (see above). PL members complained that Meneghetti intends to govern without consulting the parties that elected him, and will only heed advice from a small circle of friends, including his son, João Eurico Meneghetti, whom they describe as a "gray emminence". Although at the first of three ADP meetings held last week, the PL joined in a vote of confidence for Meneghetti and his cabinet, it specifically excepted Plínio Cabral from the vote and hedged on other points. At the second meeting the PL reportedly was blocked at every turn in its attempts to wring concessions from Meneghetti by a temporarily united and certainly irritated block consisting of the PSD, UDN, PRP and PDC. Apparently as a result of this treatment, the PL failed to attend a third meeting.

Comment: Meneghetti apparently does not intend to make any concessions to the PL. The party's final decision on remaining in the ADP fold is expected soon.

3. Governor Brizola's Activities

Governor Brizola completed his plebiscite campaign in RGS during which he stressed that the people should be consulted every time the Congress wants to change the Constitution.

Comment: During his coming career as a federal deputy Brizola may be expected to demand consultation of the people on many issues.

In a press conference, perhaps in a reaction to rumors of federal intervention (see Weekly Summary Nº 37, A-32), Brizola affirmed that he would turn over the state government to Governor-elect Meneghetti on January 31.

The Correio do Povo reprinted an article highly critical of Brizola from O Estado de São Paulo, entitled "Fuhrer de Bombachas".

4. Political Notes

a. Editorial reaction to President Goulart's highly optimistic speeches here in Pôrto Alegre last week was generally reserved. The

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TR	ZMB	AIR 4
ARMY 5	DIA 15	NAVY 5
OSD 12	USIA 8	NSA 3

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DEPARTMENT OF STATE

AIRGRAM

732.00/1-863

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A-33 NO. — OFFICIAL USE ONLY — Air Pouch HANDLING INDICATOR

1963 JAN 14 AM 11 14

DEPARTMENT OF STATE BUREAU OF INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS JAN 14 1963

TO : DEPARTMENT OF STATE

Brasília - 1 Salvador - 1
Belém - 1 Santos - 1
Belo Horizonte - 1 São Paulo - 1
Curitiba - 1 Rio de Janeiro - 1
Recife - 1

FROM : Amconsul PÔRTO ALEGRE DATE: JAN - 81963

SUBJECT : PÔRTO ALEGRE WEEKLY SUMMARY Nº 38

REF :

1. Plebiscite
2. ADP's Troubles (Cont'd)
3. Governor Brizola's Activities
4. Political Notes
5. Economic Notes
6. Miscellaneous

1. Plebiscite

Early voting returns in the plebiscite held Sunday indicate that presidentialism is rolling up an impressive victory with a present margin of about 4 to 1. RGS results tabulated by Tuesday morning indicated a presidentialism lead of 676,156 to 176,495. About 46,000 nullified and blank ballots had been cast. The final abstention rate seems likely to fall somewhere between 20 and 25 percent. The plebiscite apparently was carried out without incident.

2. ADP's Troubles (Cont'd)

Governor-elect Ildo Meneghetti continued his efforts to achieve some degree of harmony in his coalition ADP last week. His efforts were not assisted by fellow party member Walter Peracchi Barcelos, PSD Federal Deputy elect, who in a television speech criticized Meneghetti appointees Plínio Cabral, Chief of Civil Household, Arnaldo da Costa Prieto (PDC), Secretary of Labor, and Ziish Totta, Secretary of Education. Barcelos' speech was denounced strongly both in

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Drafted by: WDMcLain/zms 1/8/63

Contents and Classification Approved by: TJDuffield

Clearances:

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CONFIDENTIAL

-2- 1289, January 8, 7 p.m. From Rio de Janeiro

claims Goulart hoping obtain more than 6 million votes won, Quadros last Presidential claim in order set "record" Presidential mandate.

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INCOMING TELEGRAM *Department of State*

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CONFIDENTIAL

Control: 5290
Rec'd January 10, 1963
1:31 p.m.

ACTION: ES/B
INFO:
RM/R FILES

FROM: Rio de Janeiro

TO: Secretary of State

NO: 1289, January 8, 7 p.m.

RIO DE JANEIRO 1289 733.00/1-863

ACTION DEPARTMENT 1289, INFORMATION POLAD CINCARIB 1.

Referendum Note. count proceeding rapidly major states. Totals thus far as reported by radio: 4 million "no;" 900,000 "yes." According figures reported in press, Sao Paulo most overwhelmingly presidentialist among states most advanced in vote counting: 2 million "no" vs 300,000 "yes." Comparable figures other states as follows: Guanabara 550,000 vs 200,000; Rio State 300,000 vs 100,000; Minas Gerias 400,000 vs 100,000.

Abstention estimates vary but highest overall percentage reported is a little more than 30, lowest less than 20. Over 50 per cent abstention reported in Pernambuco however. Because of higher abstention rates in interior states, unreported as yet, final percentage abstention should be higher than so far reported. Embassy finds abstention rates reported for major cities and states suspiciously low, although Mangabeira announcement that voting compulsory and failure vote would be reason for civil disabilities might be responsible.

(1)

Meanwhile press speculation feverish over use Goulart intends make of results. One possibility cited is that Goulart will attempt have Presidential term re-fixed as starting with promulgation referendum results, thus giving him additional full five years. Another prognostication, previously aired, is Goulart establishing "Presidential" Cabinet immediately upon declaration final tally without waiting Congressional action under Capanema - Valadares Law. One observer claims

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INCOMING TELEGRAM *Department of State* ACTION COPY PERMANENT RECORD COPY

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9:23 a.m.

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FROM: Recife

TO: Secretary of State

NO: 168, January 8, 6 p.m.

ACTION RIO DE JANEIRO 215 INFORMATION DEPARTMENT 168

Five persons killed in out burst of violence yesterday at sugar mill of Federal Deputy Jose Lopes De Siqueira Santos near Vitoria De Santo Antao. Press reports conflicting but appears that peasants, demanding payment 13th month salary, initiated violence by attacking Lopes with knives, clubs, and fire arms.

This fourth and most serious peasant-land owner incident that area Pernambuco within past few weeks. Local press giving sensational play to incidents, portraying them as part of overall plan of agitation in prelude to peasant uprising. Secretary Public Safety, while taking precautions against spread of violence, has informed CONGEN he satisfied that incidents are unrelated and not part of any general plan.

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DMB

Recife RR-168

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Party	Outgoing Chamber	Percentage of Bench	New Chamber	Percentage of Bench
PSD	3	43	3	37.5
UDN	3	43	4	50
PTB	1	14	1	12.5
	7		8	

Comment: Interest in Mato Grosso centered on whether the one additional seat would go to the PSD or the UDN with the pre-election odds about even. The seat went to the UDN owing to the unexpected vote-getting performance of Wilson Barbosa Martins, who led his party in the returns. The Embassy will try to make an ideological evaluation on him as soon as possible.

For the Ambassador:

Harry Weiner
Second Secretary of Embassy

DISTRIBUTION: All consulates in Brazil; Amb, DCM, Service Attaches, USIS, Econ (2), POL II, Labor, Cf-Rio (3), POL-Rio (5), CF-Brasilia (3), POL-Brasilia (5).

60

0805

TOTAL VOTE FOR CHAMBER

343,710

Null votes: 11,285 (3.3%)

Blank votes 53,815 (16%)

Comment: No surprises; the party machines performed as predicted.

MATO GROSSO (Official Results)

Federal Deputies	Vote	Party	Returned Incumbent	Ideological Classification
José Ponce de ARRUDA	22,551	PSD	No	6
Wilson FADUL	22,070	PTB[1]	Yes	5
Filadelfo GARCIA	15,482	PSD	Yes	6
Rachid J. MAMED	10,744	PSD	Yes	6
Wilson Barbosa MARTINS	21,969	UDN	No	-
Rachid Saldanha DERZI	17,969	UDN	Yes	6
Yttrio CORREA DA COSTA	16,220	UDN	Yes	6
Edison Britto GARCIA	7,713	UDN	No	6

1 - All candidates of the PSD and the PTB ran in alliance; the "Aliança Democratica Social Trabalhista."

0804

GOIAS - (Unofficial Results) Cont'd.

Federal Deputies	Vote	Party	Returned Incumbent	Ideological Classification
José LUDOVICO d'Almeida	12,656	PSP	No	6
Emival CAIADO	15,542	UDN	Yes	5
Jales MACHADO	8,182	UDN	No	5
Antonio Lisboa MACHADO (First suplente)	7,212	UDN	No	5
Rezende MONTEIRO	20,671	PTB (elected in 1958, he gave up seat to be elected Vice Governor in 1960)	Yes	3
Haroldo DUARTE	15,644	PTB	No	4
Lisandro Vieira de PAIXAO (First suplente)	10,087	PTB	No	4

Party	Outgoing Chamber	Percentage of Bench	New Chamber	Percentage of Bench
PSP	1	12.5	2	15.4
PSD	4	50	7	53.8
PTB	1	12.5	2	15.4
UDN	1	12.5	2	15.4
PDC	1	12.5	0	0
	8		13	

Party Totals

PSD	146,490
Coligação	83,671
PTB	48,341

0803

São Paulo - A-118, A-159 of October 31, November 29.

The states covered in this airgram will be those for which reporting responsibility has been assigned to the Embassy office in Brasilia: Goias and Mato Grosso. Other states will be reported on in the near future.

GOIAS (Unofficial Results)

Federal Deputies	Vote	Party	Returned Incumbent	Ideological Classification-/ 1
José dos Santos FREIRE	27,257	PSD	No	5
José Peixoto da SILVEIRA	22,655	PSD	No	5
Pelio CELESTINO da Silva Filho	16,765	PSD	No	4
Anisio ROCHA	15,738	PSD	Yes	5
Geraldo d'Obadia de PINA	15,519	PSD	No	5
Gerson CASTRO COSTA	14,097	PSD	Yes	5
Benedito VAZ	13,794	PSD	Yes	5
José Cruciano de ARAUJO (First suplente)	9,908	PSD	No	5
Alfredo NASSER	12,994	Coligação[2] PSP	Yes	4-5

1 - See Embassy Despatch 891, May 14, 1962.

2.- The "Coligação Democratica" represents the opposition (to the PSD) in Goias and is composed of the UDN, PDC, and PSP. The party listed is the one the Embassy judges the individual will opt for when seated in the Chamber.

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ORIGIN/ACTION

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INT	LAB	TAR
TR	XMB	AIR 4
ARMY 5	CIA 10	NAVY 6
OSD 12	USIA 8	NSA 3

ARA 4

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

AIRGRAM

732.00/1-863

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A-786 NO. | CONFIDENTIAL | AIR POUCH HANDLING INDICATOR

TO : Department of State

1963 JAN 11 AM 7 21

ANALYSIS & DISTRIBUTION BRANCH

DEPARTMENT OF STATE BUREAU OF INTER-AMERICAN AFFAIRS JAN 11 1963

FROM : Amembassy, Brasilia Office DATE: January 8, 1963

SUBJECT: The New Chamber of Deputies: Goiás ~~and Mato Grosso~~

REF : A-344, Sept. 18, 1962; A-361, Sept. 26, 1962.

Before beginning a series of analyses of the new Chamber of Deputies as a whole, the Embassy will first attempt to complete the state-by-state results. Official returns will be used wherever possible. It is realized that some duplication may occur in cases where Consulates are in the process of preparing reports and also where reports have already been submitted to the Department by the Consulates without a copy yet having reached the Embassy.

The Embassy's records show that the following states have already been covered:

Alagoas - Recife's A-51, November 23.

Bahia - Salvador's A-32, October 16 (incomplete).

Minas Gerais - Belo Horizonte's A-25, A-26 of November 2, 27.

Para - Belem's A-35, October 15.

Parana - Curitiba's A-36, November 7.

Pernambuco - Recife's A-50, November 12.

Rio Grande do Sul - Porto Alegre's A-21, November 6.

Santa Catarina - Curitiba's A-37, November 8.

FILED JAN 16 1963

FORM DS-323 4-62 | CONFIDENTIAL | FOR DEPT. USE ONLY In Out

Drafted by: HWeiner/jhm | Contents and Classification Approved by: C. Dirck Keyser Second Secretary

Clearances:

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RJDavidson
1/16/63

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INCOMING TELEGRAM *Department of State* ACTION COPY

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42

CONFIDENTIAL

Control: 3588
Rec'd: January 7, 1963
10:59 p.m.

Rio 1276

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RMR

FROM: Rio de Janeiro

TO: Secretary of State

NO: 1276, January 7, 7 p.m.

ACTION DEPARTMENT 1276, INFORMATION POLAD/CINCARIB 22

Referendum appears to have gone off without incident throughout country. Results still very incomplete but overall voter preference seems run about 7 to 3 in favor presidentialism. Some localities however reporting surprisingly high proportion "yes" votes, to wit: Santa Catarina - 40,000 "no", 15,000 "yes"; Minas Gerais - 160,000 "no", 26,000 "yes". Little to go on re abstention rate but some estimates as low as 20 percent, which Embassy considers highly improbable.

GORDON

LTR/17

732.00/1-763

FILED
FEB 7 1963

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NAME OF OFFICER & OFFICE SYMBOL	DATE OF ACTION	DIRECTIONS TO RM/R	

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in a scandalous sequence of assaults on the Constitution and public morality. I sincerely deplore that at this stage of life Your Excellency's name is associated with this tiresome, demagogic and dangerous farce. Sincerely yours. Carlos Lacerda.

For the Ambassador:

John Keppel

John Keppel
Counselor for Political Affairs

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0799

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1		
ARA	EUR	FE
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(pouch)
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JFG Burton
1/16/63

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

AIRGRAM

732.00/1-763

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A-767 — CONFIDENTIAL — HANDLING INDICATOR

TO : Department of State

1963 JAN 11 PM 7 21

DEPARTMENT OF STATE
OFFICE OF
JAN 11 1963

FROM : AmEmbassy RIO DE JANEIRO — DATE: January 7, 1963

SUBJECT : Lacerda Attacks Justice Minister and Plebiscite

REF : Embassy Telegram ara 1223

Outspoken Guanabara Governor Carlos Lacerda replied December 27 to a message he had received from Minister of Justice Joao Mangabeira regarding the January 6 plebiscite. Mangabeira's telegram seems to have gone out to several, if not all the Cabinet Ministers and, it would now appear, to the state governors. In it, he "reminded" authorities that voter appearance for the plebiscite was to be considered "obligatory" under the law. Lacerda's reply is noteworthy for the harshness of its repudiation of Mangabeira's ministerial competence so to address himself to the governor of a state, its attack on Mangabeira personally, (through reference to the Minister's subversive past) and its depreciation of the plebiscite. The full text in translation is given below as supplementary to the summary given in paragraph 3 of the reference telegram.

This government has received the following telegram attributed to Your Excellency: "I remind /you_/ that the Court has decided that voter appearance on the 6th (plebiscite) is obligatory on pain of incurring penalties under the law. Sincerely, Joao Mangabeira." I doubt that such a juridical error will have proceeded from Your Excellency, expressed, moreover, in such crude form. Your Excellency lacks authority to address himself in these terms to the governor of a state--and Your Excellency knows very well, in view of what is remembered of his past, that he should not have committed such a blunder. I am convinced that this was an error of some hurried, thoughtless clerk who has abused your name. I am not an interventor of the Federal government in this state, nor am I obliged to put up with impertinencies. With respect to the merit of the question, I reserve to myself the right to act according to the dictates of my conscience, in the fact of a campaign paid for with public monies and funds whose source is concealed,

JAN 16 1963

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Drafted by: POL:FMicheletta/pm

Contents and Classification Approved by: DCM - Minister Bond

Clearances:
POL:CCCarson

0798

ORIGINATOR

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RM/R	REP	AF
1		
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3		
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DEPARTMENT OF STATE

AIRGRAM

732.00/1-763

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A-766
NO.

CONFIDENTIAL
HANDLING INDICATOR

TO : Department of State 1963 JAN 9 PM 3 41

FROM : AmEmbassy RIO DE JANEIRO DATE: January 7, 1963

SUBJECT : Brazilian Elections of October 7, 1962

REF : CA-5500; CA-6311 — IMM — IMM CI-2-75030

Copies of the referenced instructions have been sent Embassy Brasilia, where it is hoped that information relative to the number of candidates for the Chamber of Deputies will be available at the Supreme Electoral Tribunal. Embassy Brasilia will also attempt to find out how many of these candidates were incumbents. It should, in the meantime, be possible to arrive at a rough estimate of these figures by checking the Brazilian Elections 1962 series. A complete listing of the reports in the series is to be found in Rio's A-374, October 1, 1962.

Brasilia has under preparation a report on the final results of the October deputy elections and the composition of the new Chamber.

For the Ambassador:

Frank Micelotta
Third Secretary

FILED
JAN 18 1963

FORM DS-323
4-62

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Drafted by: POL:FMicelotta/pm

Contents and Classification Approved by: DCM - Minister Bond

Clearances:
POL:CCCarson

0797

CONFIDENTIAL

-2- 1281, January 7, 8 p.m. from Rio de Janeiro

Goulart appeared agree and requested further conversation in Rio January 9.

3. Furtado plan also discussed in general terms, although Campos not yet informed on details. Campos explained impossibility achieving foreign support wholly in form debt refunding and financing miscellaneous capital goods imports. Explained our reasons being interested in projects and feasibility this form external aid.

4. Goulart touched on his relation this Embassy, referring allegations Golpista activities by Colonel Walters and myself. On basis my Friday talk with Campos, latter queried any such charges, pointing out inter alia that Walters had never even met Lacerda and that I had not seen the Governor since early October. Goulart then said he found me personally sympathetic but feared I was getting information too exclusively from his Brazilian enemies. On Walters, however, claimed to have damning dossier. Campos said he was sure these suspicions unfounded and felt personal confrontation putting cards on table would be very useful. He is going to try to arrange for very near future. Since both published and unpublished charges against Walters include alleged meetings and conversations which did not take place, I believe this a fruitful idea and am pursuing.

5. Goulart also volunteered opinion that Brizola had become irrecoverable extremist. On dismissal Octavio Bulhoes, Goulart said he regretted action, but nature Bulhoes attack on Congress was so extreme that much of PSD antagonized and no alternative to dismissal.

6. Campos felt general tone of conversation very encouraging and his personal rapport with Goulart good.

GORDON

LTR/17

CONFIDENTIAL

0796

INCOMING TELEGRAM — Department of State — ACTION COPY — PERMANENT RECORD COPY

54-W
Action
SS
Info

CONFIDENTIAL

Control: 3569
Rec'd: January 7, 1963
10:29 p.m.

FROM: Rio de Janeiro

TO: Secretary of State

NO: 1281, January 7, 8 p.m.

LIMIT DISTRIBUTION S/S

1. At lunch Sunday, Campos gave me highlights of his 6-hour talk with Goulart Friday in and returning from Brasilia.

2. Central subject was designation key ministers. Dantas appeared as fixed point, either in Foreign Office with expanded responsibility or in Fazenda. Discussion alternative Foreign Ministers produced few ideas, with Goulart himself raising possibility Vasco Leitao da Cunha. Goulart not firm on Carvalho Ponto for finance, considering him good and respectable but concerned that he might try use position to build up independent political stature in bid for presidency after 1965. Goulart apparently has in mind grooming Dantas as PTB candidate, believing he could win if center and right divided among Ademar, Carvalho Pinto and Kubitschek. Alternative for Finance suggested by Goulart was Deputy Leite Neto, a respectable moderate Deputy from the north or possibly Faraco. Balbinos' name was discussed without enthusiasm. On Mines and Energy, Goulart expressed greatest enthusiasm for present Minister Eleizer Batista, describing him as most able present Minister (others especially praised were Helio de Almeida and Darci Ribeiro), but felt he would be ideal for Presidency Petrobras. Goulard convinced Petrobras badly needs rehabilitation, and has been swayed by argument he Goulart might be responsible for failure of great nationalist enterprise created by Vargas. Goulart said ex-Labor Minister Pinheiro Neto was a fool and would not be appointed Chief Civil Household as widely reported by press. There was no discussion of military ministers. Campos urged that restructuring be done quickly after plebiscite, not later than January 20.

732.00/1-763

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NAME OF OFFICER & OFFICE SYMBOL		DATE OF ACTION	1/7/63	TO RM/R

0795

CONFIDENTIAL - NOFORN

MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION

DATE: December 19, 1962

SUBJECT: Results of Ambassador's Trip to Washington

PLACE: The Ambassador's Office, American Embassy, Rio

PARTICIPANTS: Air Minister Major Brigadeiro Reynaldo Joaquim Ribeiro de Carvalho Filho
Ambassador Lincoln Gordon
Colonel Robert D. Kalb, Air Attaché

Air Minister REYNALDO called at the Embassy on December 19, 1962, to discuss with Ambassador Gordon the results of the Ambassador's recent trip to Washington, including the problems of the C-130 aircraft, C-47 aircraft, helicopters, and in addition, the question of Communists in the Brazilian Air Force, as well as certain subjects brought up by the Air Minister.

The Ambassador stated that during his stay in Washington, he had attended many conferences concerning the problem of procuring C-130 aircraft for Brazil, including discussions of the uses to which such aircraft would be put, both civil and military. The Air Minister injected the comment that the BAF was different from the USAF, in that much of its work was in direct support of the interior as no other Brazilian agency or group could provide such services. The Ambassador then continued that as a result of the conferences, including one with Secretary McNamara, the C-130 project looks favorable; but there were still some steps to be taken, e.g., President Kennedy must be consulted on his return from Nassau. The Ambassador concluded this part of the discussion with an expression of hope that a decision would be soon forthcoming.

As concerns the C-47 aircraft, Ambassador Gordon mentioned that an effort was being made to place this item in the 1963-1964 Military Assistance Program. The Air Minister replied that these aircraft were to be used in the Amazon area.

The Ambassador stated that U.S. officials believe some helicopters can be placed in the Military Assistance package. However, it would not be possible to consider any such number as the 100, which they were thinking of procuring from Poland. The Air Minister stated this number was for procurement over a long time period and would not be required at this time. The Ambassador agreed that the BAF needed some helicopters for the purpose of Search and Rescue and support for the Army.

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0794

ORIGIN/ACTION

ARA - 5		
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ARMY 5	CIA 16	NAVY 5
OSD 12	USIA 8	NSA 3

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

AIRGRAM

732.5622/1-463

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A-767 — CONFIDENTIAL - NOFORN — XR: 732.5 HANDLING INDICATOR 732.00

TO : DEPARTMENT OF STATE

FROM : Amembassy RIO DE JANEIRO DATE: January 4, 1963

SUBJECT : Conversation between Air Minister Major Brigadeiro Reynaldo Joaquim Ribeiro de Carvalho Filho and Ambassador Gordon

REF :

Attached is a memorandum of conversation held between Air Minister Reynaldo and Ambassador Gordon.

Lincoln Gordon

Attachment:

Memorandum of conversation, December 19, 1962.

FORM DS-323 4-62

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Drafted by: AA:Robert D. Kalb:mls

Contents and Classification Approved by:

Clearances:

0793

Page 2
A-48
[redacted]
Salvador

Comment: Considerable friction has developed between the incumbents and the newly elected officials in Sergipe. Friction of the same sort is becoming felt in Bahia, but the language used here remains courteous.

Governor Magalhães has definitely cancelled plans to take leave before handing the government over to Lomanto on April 7.

Comment: Aside from the risks which he would run in not being on hand to defend himself from attacks on his administration, the Governor's decision is also reported to stem from concern over delays in the preparation of reports of accomplishments by his various department chiefs.

Election Results for Bahia are to become official on January 10.

Comment: Governor-elect Lomanto is particularly anxious to have his election confirmed officially before he starts on his trip to the United States, Europe and Israel, January 11.

Two Parliamentary Inquiry Commissions convened on January 3 in Salvador to look into irregularities connected with the Sao Francisco Valley Commission and Petrobras.

Comment: The inquiry into Petrobras has fanned the controversy over communist influence in the enterprise which has been reported previously.

Harold M. Midkiff
American Consul

0792

ACTION

ARA-4

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DEPARTMENT OF STATE

AIRGRAM

732.00/1-463

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A-48 NO.

OFFICIAL USE ONLY

1963 JAN 11 RN HANDLING INDICATOR

TO : DEPARTMENT OF STATE

INFO: Amembassy, Rio and Brasilia

CLASSIFICATION & DISTRIBUTION BRANCH

FROM : AMCONSULATE, Salvador DATE: January 4, 1963

SUBJECT: Weekly Summary, Salvador

REF :

DEPARTMENT OF STATE
BUREAU OF
INTER-AMERICAN AFFAIRS
JAN 11 1963

POLITICAL:

President Goulart cancelled his trip to Bahia for January 3. The Minister of Transportation visited Salvador during the last days of the year and brought the message that the President could not come.

Comment: The Consulate has learned that the change in plans resulted from the very bad state of the unpaved sections of the Rio-Bahia highway because of heavy rains. The principal objective of the visit apparently was to inaugurate the Bahian segment of the highway in a ceremony in Jequie. However, it was foreseen that the moment would not be psychologically opportune, since hundreds of cars, many in Jequie, are waiting an opportunity to move on the highway. Little publicity has been given to the reason for the change in the President's plan, possibly because news of his visit here had been linked more to the plebiscite campaign and to the significance of the trip to Governor-elect Lomanto's standing with the President. There is little doubt that the change in plans has been a blow to Lomanto who had made rather elaborate preparations for the President's call at his city.

Sergipe Governor-elect has announced he will not be able to pay all state employees with resources he expects to have. He proposes to pay the lowest income groups and withhold payment of full salaries to the higher salaried employees. Most of the recent nominations to state jobs by the current lameduck governor reportedly have been for positions in the higher income brackets.

FORM DS-323 4-62

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Drafted by: HMM:dkiff:la

Contents and Classification Approved by:

Clearances:

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Rio A-761

CONFIDENTIAL

suggestions and criticisms so that it will be possible to perfect the steps and measures that will make it a tool adequate to the solution of the problems which concern the nation"; and (2) The news that Jango now plans to appoint his new Cabinet toward the end of January instead of by January 10 as earlier given out.

It would be a disquieting development indeed if Goulart were to undertake to execute the Plan via presidential decree. Encouraging signs to the contrary, there is no guarantee that he will not, in fact, elect to do so. But it is too early as yet, in the country's fluid situation, to predict just what line he is likely to take in the implementation of the Plan.

For the Ambassador:

John Keppel
Counselor for
Political Affairs

CONFIDENTIAL

0790

ORIGIN/ACTION

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ARMY 5	CIA 10	NAVY 5
CRD 12	USIA 8	NSA 3

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DEPARTMENT OF STATE

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732.00/1-463

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A-761 NO.

CONFIDENTIAL

HANDLING INDICATOR

TO : Department of State

1963 JAN 9 PM 3 41

INTERDEPARTMENTAL
JAN 9 1963

FROM : AmEmbassy RIO DE JANEIRO DATE: January 4, 1963

SUBJECT : Dispute in Government Over Execution Three Year Plan

REF :

The substance of the Three Year Plan drawn up by Celso Furtado is being reported and commented on separately by the Embassy. Meanwhile, the Embassy observes that, only days after its release, the press reports a certain amount of controversy within the government over the method to be adopted for putting the plan into practice. The alternates reportedly being disputed are meaningful for the question of what kind of government Goulart intends or hopes to run after the January 6 plebiscite.

Some of Goulart's further-left advisors, it is reported, have been urging him to put the Three Year Plan into operation immediately after the plebiscite, without waiting to obtain specific enabling legislation for its several provisions either from the present Congress or the newly-elected one which will meet some time after January 31. The administrative device which would be employed under this scheme would be the issuing of "decree laws" effectivating the measures proposed in the Plan. This style of executing the Plan would, of course, imply the appointment of a de facto "presidential" Cabinet soon after the plebiscite, a possibility which has been much discussed, the impression persisting that it would be in accord with the wishes of Goulart himself. Such a Cabinet would not have been passed on by the Congress.

The alternate method for putting the Plan into operation would require, according to newspaper speculation and reports, regarding the Plan as provisional and inviting discussion of its particulars with a view to their possible modification and, hopefully, improvement. There are two signs that may indicate that Goulart has opted for the latter method: (1) The following statement as contained in his New Year's Eve speech, advertised as intended principally to present the Plan to the nation: "The government plan will be widely distributed in order that all may contribute...with /suggestions and

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FORM DS-323 4-62

Drafted by: POL:FMicelotta/pm

Contents and Classification Approved by:

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0789

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A-201
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Brazil's forthcoming plebiscite on presidentialism versus parliamentarism received major attention this week. Consensus: President João Goulart will receive the strong presidency he wants; the plebiscite is being engineered by Goulart, and all the Government's propaganda machinery is working for him; the disastrous conditions in the country probably won't improve much even when Goulart has the mandate he seeks; the President's regime is shaky, and will so continue.

Prime Minister MacMillan's meeting with Kennedy in Nassau struck most commentators as successful: Great Britain has discovered the necessity of interdependence; the multilateral nuclear force envisioned by Kennedy is a great step forward.

Daniel M. Braddock
Minister Consul General

Contributors: S. C. Lyon
J. Mason

Distribution: INS/RAR, AmConGen Recife, AmConsulates Belem, Belo Horizonte, Curitiba, Porto Alegre, Salvador, Santos.

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0788

5. Arms Cache Discovered, Linked to Cuba-Supported Plan For Uprising

A cache of weapons and ammunition was discovered December 27 by agents of DOPS, the São Paulo State Police Department of Political and Social Order. Two cases containing sixty automatic pistols, a machine gun, four muskets, and considerable ammunition were dug up near Taubaté, about 80 miles northeast of the city of São Paulo. The guns were of Czechoslovak manufacture, and the machinegun was wrapped in Cuban newspapers.

Officials of DOPS informed the press, which devoted a great deal of space to the case. Officials were said to have advanced the hypothesis that the arms came from Cuba, sent as part of a plan to arm peasants for a general revolt throughout the country.

Soldiers of the Second Army later tested surrounding areas with mine detectors, without any further discoveries being announced. (UNCLASSIFIED)

Comment: Coming soon after sensational announcements concerning training of peasants for guerilla warfare in Goiás and other places in Brazil, the latest finds aroused much speculation. However, official announcements have been non-committal, merely stating that investigations are continuing. (UNCLASSIFIED)

6. O Estado Accuses Subsecretary Of Justice Of Being Communist

Prestigious O Estado de S. Paulo accused Lieutenant-Colonel Carlos CAIRROLI, Chief of the Federal Department of Public Security, of being a Communist. Cairroli indignantly denied the accusation, in terms which indicated that he considers the term "Communist" an insult.

O Estado has proof that Cairroli, if not actually a member of the Party, is at least a strong Marxist, according to information given to a member of the staff of the Consulate General by an official of O Estado. (OFFICIAL USE ONLY)

PSYCHOLOGICAL

1. Local Press Reaction

São Paulo editorialists gave almost unanimous approval to the Cuban prisoners for supplies deal, with much praise for the open-heartedness and voluntary generosity of the American people. U.S. prestige was enhanced, Cuba's diminished, by the event, most papers felt.



3. KUBITSCHEK Calls For Curbs On Inflation; Complains Of Lack Of Comprehension of Brazil's Problems in U.S.

Ex-president Juscelino Kubitschek gave scant attention to the upcoming referendum during his visit to São Paulo December 27, explaining that the voters are already sufficiently informed concerning it. Instead he focused on the dangers of inflation, calling for a policy of fiscal austerity for at least six months after restoration of presidential powers. Recognizing the dangers of the present galloping inflation, he blamed the International Monetary Fund, being quoted as saying: "The policy of the IMF, which my successor adopted, was the cause of all the economic crises which we are now experiencing." He pointed with pride to the achievements of his own administration, when he defied the IMF.

He was further quoted as saying, "There is a climate of total incomprehension of the problems of Brazil" in the United States. "The atmosphere is icy with regard to Brazil...They are watching us with folded arms." He attributed this to the attitude of a large part of the American press, "stemming principally from an erroneous comprehension of our foreign policy with regard to Cuba." (UNCLASSIFIED)

Comment: Kubitschek's lack of active campaigning for the plebiscite supports the view that he expects a victory for presidentialism in any case, and will not be sorry if a large degree of abstention keeps it from being a personal victory for Goulart, a possible future rival.

His strictures of the IMF and its policies, and his talk of "incomprehension" in the United States, suggest that in his role of adviser for the Alliance for Progress he means to maintain a highly independent stance. (LIMITED OFFICIAL USE)

4. CARVALHO PINTO Continues To Be Rumored For Finance Minister

Speculations continued as to the possible appointment of Governor Carvalho Pinto to be Federal Minister of Finance following the end of his term as Governor in January. The Governor issued a denial which seemed to leave open the possibility that he might later accept. A relative of the Governor recently confirmed to a member of the Consulate General staff the news reports that the Governor had been offered the post, but had refused except on condition that he be given wide powers, which Goulart was not willing to grant. (LIMITED OFFICIAL USE)

0786

2. Referendum Campaign Remains Tepid

The campaign for the referendum January 6 remained comparatively quiet, save for numerous large advertisements in the press calling for a vote of "no" against parliamentarism, and a plethora of "singing commercials" on the air to the same end (allegedly paid for by diverting government funds).

The opposition was seldom in evidence, even during the broadcast periods which are officially reserved for presentation of political views free of charge. Some stations broadcast music during part of these periods, alleging that no party representative had made an appearance to use the air time.

The Liberator Party (Partido Libertador) was accused of illegally advocating abstention from the balloting. It had in fact broadcast this line during the official air time, but apparently the Regional Electoral Tribunal at São Paulo does not intend to take cognizance of the charge.

Predictions concerning abstention in the referendum are in the neighborhood of 30 percent for the State of São Paulo. This would be much higher than in the October 1962 elections, when about 86 percent of the registered voters turned out. Several GOULART supporters have been quoted in the press as predicting a turnout of "at least 70 percent" of the voters, as though this would be a creditable showing.

President Goulart campaigned for the plebescite at the city of Araçatuba, in the interior of the State of São Paulo. His speech there followed familiar lines, calling on all voters to take part in the franchise, without insisting that they vote "no" (UNCLASSIFIED)

Comment: The public seems apathetic concerning the referendum, considering it a foregone conclusion that the vote will go against parliamentarism. The parties opposing Goulart apparently consider it useless to campaign actively, except for the minor Liberator Party, which still claims that the parliamentary system has not had a fair trial. The fact that a considerable proportion of free air time is going unused suggests that many politicians share the apathy of the voters, or at least see little profit in public discussion of the issue. (OFFICIAL USE ONLY)

0785

ORIGIN/ACTION

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ARMY 5	CIA 10	NAVY 5
OSD 12	USIA 8	NSA 3

ARA 4

File RM/R 1/21/63 B J Burton No action

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

AIRGRAM

732.00/1-463

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A-201 NO.

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HANDLING INDICATOR

1963 JAN 7 AM 9 23

TO : DEPARTMENT OF STATE

INFO : BRASILIA, RIO DE JANEIRO

DISTRIBUTION

FROM : AmConGen, SÃO PAULO

DATE: January 4, 1963

SUBJECT: Weekly Summary No. 53

REF :

TABLE OF CONTENTS

POLITICAL
1. Political Scene Quiet -- Perhaps Deceptively So
2. Referendum Campaign Remains Tepid
3. Kubitschek Calls For Curbs On Inflation; Complains Of Lack Of Comprehension Of Brazil's Problems In U.S.
4. Carvalho Pinto Continues To Be Rumored For Finance Minister
5. Arms Cache Discovered, Linked to Cuba-Supported Plan For Uprising
6. O Estado Accuses Subsecretary of Justice Of Being Communist

PSYCHOLOGICAL
1. Local Press Reaction

POLITICAL

1. Political Scene Quiet -- Perhaps Deceptively So

The usual holiday lull made the political scene at São Paulo appear unusually quiet. However, widespread rumors continued that the military will take over control of the Federal Government within six months (see AmConGen Airgrams A-190, December 21, 1962; A-181, December 14, 1962; A-110, October 24, 1962, A-79, September 26, 1962). It is not known how much truth there is to these rumors. (LIMITED OFFICIAL USE)

FORM DS-323 4-62

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Drafted by: See last page/el 1/2/63

Concurred and Classification Approved by:

Clearances:

0784

CONFIDENTIAL

RM/R
FILE

Brazilian Plebiscite of January 6

In a plebiscite on January 6 Brazilians will vote on whether or not to continue the parliamentary system. The latter was superimposed on the presidential system in September 1961 to overcome opposition among the Brazilian military against Goulart's succeeding Quadros as President. There is general agreement that the vote will be heavily in favor of a return to the presidential system. On the other hand the electorate appears apathetic and voter participation will probably be very low. A small vote, even though favorable to presidentialism, would be interpreted as a blow to Goulart's prestige. Hence Goulart and his supporters are campaigning actively to get out the vote. While the approximate size of the vote will probably be known within a few days after January 6, it will very likely take at least several weeks to get a reasonable indication of the outcome.

It would be unduly optimistic to expect that political crisis and tension will cease after January 6. The national legislature has 90 days to implement the plebiscite decision. There is considerable sentiment, given a return to the presidential system, for (a) stronger legislative control over foreign policy, (b) a legislative veto over [redacted] appointments and (c) legislative authorization of currency emissions. Although Goulart has at times appeared amenable in principle to such restrictions, an actual attempt to impose them could lead to considerable disagreement. Also in the choice of a cabinet to serve under the new system Goulart must compose an alliance of political forces which assures him a broader political base and a congressional majority, or else risk further serious political conflict. These immediate problems may be overcome in order to permit effective international consultations on Brazil's financial problems.

President Goulart has had an obsessive preoccupation with the early restoration of the presidential system. He and those around him have generated several political crises in the past six months to force a vote on the restoration of the presidential system. While Goulart's judgment may be open to question, he none the less feels that he has been handicapped in exercising effective national leadership and direction under the parliamentary system. He and others around him have asserted that they would be able to move forward constructively and effectively on many of the issues on which we have expressed concern to them once the political issue of restoration of the presidential system is out of the way. We have some indications that this will be the case; that, for example, the new national cabinet will have a broader and more representative political base.

CONFIDENTIAL

0783

CONFIDENTIAL

165

JAN 4 1963

RM/R

FILE

MEMORANDUM FOR MR. McGEORGE BUNDY

THE WHITE HOUSE

Subject: The Brazilian Plebiscite on January 6, 1963.

The attached memorandum on the plebiscite election of January 6 in Brazil provides background which may be of interest to the President.

J. W. Davis
for
William H. Brubeck
Executive Secretary

732.00/1-463

S/S-RO

JAN 4 1963

A true copy of signed original

Enclosure:

Memorandum on Brazil plebiscite.

ARA-My Martin

ARA:ESI/B:RJBarton:am 1/4/63

Clearances:
EST - Mr. Wellman

CONFIDENTIAL

0782

SECRET

-2- 1255, JANUARY 3, 7 PM, FROM RIO DE JANEIRO

REPRESENT RADICAL ATTEMPT NEUTRALIZE MILITARY AS ONLY FORCE CAPABLE OF EFFECTIVE OPPOSITION AT TIME WHEN PREPARATIONS FAR FROM COMPLETE FOR POSSIBLE COUNTERACTION BY MILITARY AGAINST FURTHER GOULART MOVE TO LEFT.

GORDON

COT/21

* AS RECEIVED.

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Control: 1541
Rec'd: JANUARY 3, 1963
7:27 PM

FROM: RIO DE JANEIRO

TO: Secretary of State

NO: 1255, JANUARY 3, 7 PM

PRIORITY

ACTION DEPARTMENT 1255, POLAD CINCARIB 21

ESTADO DE SAO PAULO AND JORNAL DO BRAZIL CARRIED JANUARY 2 SIMILAR REPORTS FROM SOURCES DESCRIBED AS HIGHLY AUTHORITATIVE THAT GOULART INTENDS NAME LEFTIST 1ST ARMY COMMANDER OSVINO FERREIRA ALVES WAR MINISTER IN POST-PLEBISCITE CABINET. OTHER PAPERS CARRIED SAME NOTICE JANUARY 3, INCLUDING GOULART SUPPORTER ULTIMA HORA.

COLUMNISTS FOR JB AND CORREIO DA MANHA QUESTIONED CREDIBILITY OF NOTICE JANUARY 3, FORMER BECAUSE NOMINATION WOULD BE "AUDACIOUS OPTION...UNLESS GOULART DECIDING RISK EVERYTHING, INCLUDING PROPOSAL AUTOMATIC REVOCATION ATO ADICIONAL." ALSO, USUALLY WELL-INFORMED COLUMNIST (ON MILITARY MATTERS) HELIO FERNANDES SEEMS EITHER UNAWARE STORY OR NOT TO BELIEVE IT. EMBASSY INCLINED ACCEPT VERSION PUBLISHED O JORNAL JANUARY 3 AS FOLLOWS: "IT KNOWN THAT LEFTIST ELEMENTS AROUND PRESIDENT, ALLIED WITH UNIONS AND 1ST ARMY MILITARY GROUPS, HAVE INTENSIFIED EFFORTS OPPOSING CONTINUATION KRUEL IN WAR MINISTRY. AT SAME TIME IT BEING GIVEN OUT HIS DEPARTURE INEVITABLE, THESE ELEMENTS CLAIMING OSVINO'S MOVE UP TO MINISTRY CERTAIN, IN ORDER TO GIVE IMPRESSION OF FAIT ACCOMPLI, THUS WEAKENING REACTION TO SUCH APPOINTMENT."

GOULART MUST BE AWARE EVENTUAL APPOINTMENT OSVINO WOULD COMPLETE ALIENATION OF ALMOST ENTIRE GENERAL OFFICER CORPS AS WELL AS EVEN MODERATE CENTRIST POLITICAL FORCES. IF PRESIDENT SHOULD BE SO RASH AS IN FACT TO NOMINATE OSVINO IT WOULD

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ACTION ASSIGNED TO:		ACTION TAKEN		
NAME OF OFFICER & OFFICE SYMBOL		DATE OF ACTION		DIRECTIONS TO RM/R

0780

and research. The teacher will not experience restrictions of a philosophical, religious or political character in the exercise of his profession.

15. The maintenance of public health is the duty of the State which will establish healthful conditions of existance and labor throughout the nation as well as providing medical, hygemic and hospital services for all.

Translated by:
TJO'Donnell

0779

9. Trade unions will be organs of protection of the working forces. Therefore, they should enjoy freedom and autonomy.

10. The right to strike will be safeguarded.

11. The State will be democratically organized, maintaining its traditional federal form and respecting the autonomy of the municipalities, the following principles being observed:

---formation of the state organs with the exception of the Judiciary by universal sufferage with a direct and secret ballot.

---a sovereign and permanent Congress

---functional autonomy of the judicial power

---sufficient and guaranteed salaries of public authorities.

---gratuitous justice

---neutrality of the state in philosophic and religious beliefs.

---freedom of organization for political parties within democratic principles.

---foreign policy will be oriented on the principle of the equality of rights and duties of nations and will seek the development of peaceful relations among them. Only the Congress will be competent to decide between peace and war.

12. All citizens will be equal before the law, assured of the freedoms of movement, assembly, association, thought both written and spoken, and the freedom of faith and worhsip.

13. The legal equality of men and women will be safeguarded.

14. Education is the right of every citizen who is entitled to it within the limits of his talent and capacity, without charge. Education will seek to give to men the capacity to adapt to the society in which they live and not to a group or class. Public education will be organized to serve public, not commercial interests. Teachers will have freedom of instruction

0778

On the basis of the foregoing principles, the Movement adopts the following program:

1. The Movement defends the maintenance of private property within the limits of the possibility of their private use without loss to the collective interest. It judges that simple intervention of the public powers in the economy is not enough. Rather, it is necessary to socialize the basic means of production. That is, the Movement believes that all productive assets which by their nature confer economic power on individuals with risk to the public interest, ought to be transferred to the public domain.

2. This socialization of the basic means of production should be gradual, considering the desirability of each concrete case and should only be enacted by means of just indemnization through a vote of a democratically constituted Congress, and administered by organs designated for each enterprise by the community.

3. The agrarian reform will consider the specifics of each region and the nature of the rural expolitation. Public fazendas and cooperative fazendas will be organized on a community basis, assisted materially and technically by the state. The problem of the Latifundio will be resolved by a system of large scale exploitation because in this means their fragmentation will not obstruct social progress. However, given the diversity of economic development of the different regions, the distribution of land in small portions for individual use will be facilitated where communial exploitation is not practicable.

4. Indirect taxes will be abolished and those taxes which reclaim for the state capital income in the strict sense and inheritances will be increased.

5. Public expenditures will be calculated and approved by Congress in a manner which assures the public welfare.

6. Foreign trade will remain under the control of the State. The distribution of wealth will be protected from the obstacles which it encounters by the adoption of proper forms of distribution, especially through cooperatives.

7. Work will be considered the right and social obligation of all able bodied citizens. The State will safeguard the exercise of this right. The citizen will give to society maximum service within the limits of his capabilities and according to the social need, without loss of his liberty regarding the choice of enterprise and character of occupation.

8. The freedom of contract of work will be curbed by the current limitations of collective agreements and by labor legislation.

0777

The Pernambuco Students' Union intends to form a movement for the political education of the people.

Whereas, from the injustice of the capitalistic economic order flows deep social inequalities and the predominance of some nations over others.

Whereas, the transformation of this unjust economic and social order can be obtained through democratic processes.

Whereas, the progressive growth of relationships through social interchange, simultaneously the effect and cause of a growing intervention of public power, can and should take place permitting and assisting the development of the whole personality of man:

It is resolved to form the present movement under the slogan: "Socialization and Liberty," guided by the following principles:

I. The Movement considers the liberal democratic victories to be inalienable human rights, but it considers them insufficient as a political form to overcome an economic regime of exploitation of man by his fellow man.

II. The Movement seeks, in the economic field, a far reaching structural transformation of society in which all of the productive assets which by their nature bestow economic power upon individuals at the sake of the public welfare will be reserved to fulfill the demands of the country and the regions.

III. In the cultural field, the Movement seeks the education of the people in democratic principles, aiming at the fraternity of man and the abolition of all class priveleges and race prejudice.

IV. The Movement defends the freedom of partisan organization, believes in the democratic processes of political contest and understands that the political tactic ought to be considered according to the truth that the ends do not justify the means.

V. The Movement does not dedicate itself to fight for the exclusive interests of one class, but for all who live from their own work.

VI. The Movement judges that society can and must reconcile within itself, on the one side, the autonomous collaboration of individuals and groups, and on the other side, the coordination and orientation carried on by the public authorities.

0776

ORIGIN/ACTION		
ARA 4		
RM/R 1	REP 1	
ARA	EUR	FE
NEA	CU 3	INR 5
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AGR 10	COM 10	FRB 3
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RJ Burton

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

AIRGRAM

732.00/1-263

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A-64 NO. — UNCLASSIFIED — HANDLING INDICATOR

TO : DEPARTMENT OF STATE

1963 JAN 9 PM 4 DEPARTMENT OF STATE BUREAU OF INTER-AMERICAN AFFAIRS JAN 11 1963

INFO: RIO DE JANEIRO, BRASILIA

ANALYSIS & DISTRIBUTION DIVISION

FROM : Amconsul RECIFE DATE: January 2, 1963

SUBJECT : Pernambuco Students Union Movement of Socialization and Liberty

REF : Weekly Summary 23, (Airgram A-56)

The Pernambuco Students Union recently formed a Movement of "Socialization and Liberty," issuing a statement of principles on which the "movement" is based. The "movement" is not expected to have political significance, but a free translation of the statement of principles is attached in the possibility that it might be of interest as a reflection of the current thinking of Latin American youth.

The statement reflects an abrupt rejection of capitalism as a just economic system compatible with the true interests of a democratic society; it calls for the socialization of the basic means of production and other government intervention and control as the best means of assuming an absence of economic class exploitation.

Although elements of Marxism are clearly evident in the statement of principles it should be pointed out that the authors of the statement, present leaders of the UNP, consider themselves and are considered to be anti-Communist.

Lowell C. Kilday
Lowell C. Kilday
American Vice Consul

Enclosure:

1. Statement of Principles (Free translation)

FILED JAN 14 1963

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Drafted by: [illegible]

Contents and Classification Approved by:

Clearances:

0775

PSYCHOLOGICAL

The most notable aspect of a routine week of news and editorial thought is the continued beating of the plebiscite drums. The bulk of the material originates from without, but occasionally the columnists find something they wish to say on the subject.

Socrates Times de CARVALHO in Diario da Noite says that "Everyone knows that the problem is not of regime---it is of men. And you know that in the parliamentarianism of today, as in the presidentialism of tomorrow, Jango is going to govern with the same men that have surrounded him since the beginning of his public life." Luis CISNEIROS in his columnar view entitled "Nos Bastidores da Politica" proclaims, "Jango is beating at the door of the Plebiscite...We are going to give him what he asks for, but we retain afterward the right to demand of him a productive and austere government, the height of confidence we concede to him now in order that he may recover himself and recover us also."

Foreign capital received some sporadic but pointed attention. An advertisement appearing in Jornal Pequeno clamors, "Don't pay royalties to the Americans. Support the fight of the National Industry. Use Moura Batteries." On the other hand, again quoting Luis Cisneiros, "It was foreign capital that made the economic independence of the United States which, today, they teach the western world. Is that not a good argument?" (UNCLASSIFIED)

Lowell C. Kilday
American Vice Consul

Contributors:

LCKilday
CTucker

0774

January 6, the predominant attitude toward the plebiscite seems to be a marked disinterest. No real contest for public opinion is involved, since no regional politician has declared in favor of a "yes" vote. Anti-Goulart forces in the area apparently feel that their most effective weapon now is silence. By remaining silent they avoid stimulating voter interest and increase the liklihood of a heavy abstention in the plebiscite, thus making it more difficult for Goulart to interpret the plebiscite return as a strong vote of confidence and support. Thus, neither the local PSD nor the UDN has bothered to request to participate in the free television and radio time allotted to political parties for a discussion of the issues involved in the plebiscite.

In this same vein, it has been reported that Governor SAMPAIO has refused to loan state vehicles and certain other equipment of the state to the Regional Electoral Tribunal to facilitate preparations for the plebiscite.

Arraes and the other plebiscite campaigners, on the other hand, have already served notice that a "No" majority in the plebiscite will be interpreted not only as a choice between two systems of government but as a strong popular demand for the immediate institution of the many radical reforms espoused by leftist-nationalists. (LIMITED OFFICIAL USE)

2. President Goulart Expected in Northeast

According to several press reports, President João Goulart is expected to visit several cities of Northeast Brazil next week, arriving in Recife on or about January 4, and possibly continuing on to Fortaleza the same day. Presumably, the purpose of the visit is to plump for a heavy turnout in the January 6 plebiscite.

Comment: Jango is frequently reported to be on the eve of a visit to the Northeast, yet he rarely arrives here. Since assuming the Presidency, he has made one visit to this area. That he would choose this critical moment to flatter a part of the country with a relatively small number of voters seems unlikely. Yet the rumors and press reports both in Recife and Fortaleza, continue to insist that he will be here on January 4. (LIMITED OFFICIAL USE)



ORIGIN/ACTION

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DEPARTMENT OF STATE

AIRGRAM

732.00/1-263

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A-63 NO.

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HANDLING INDICATOR

TO : DEPARTMENT OF STATE

INFO: RIO DE JANEIRO, BRASILIA, SÃO PAULO

FROM : Amconsul RECIFE

DATE: January 2, 1963

SUBJECT : Weekly Summary No. 27

REF :

Belem-1
Portoalegre-1
Curitiba-1
Belo Horizonte-1

TABLE OF CONTENTS

POLITICAL

1. Arraes Heads Plebiscite Campaign
2. President Goulart Expected in Northeast

PSYCHOLOGICAL

POLITICAL

1. Arraes Heads Plebiscite Campaign

Led by Governor-elect MIGUEL ARRAES, the campaign for a "No" vote in the January 6 plebiscite has become somewhat more vigorous as of late. Arraes has held public rallies in Pernambuco, Paraiba, Ceara, and Rio Grande do Norte, urging a heavy turnout and a "No" vote on January 6. Ex-Minister of Labor, PINHEIRO NETO also toured the area this week, making a pitch on behalf of President GOULART, and various senators and federal deputies from the area have returned from Brasilia to take part in the campaign. In Recife, an informal campaign team, headed by Arraes and consisting of asserted leftist politicians, has been set up to carry the message to the voters. Finally, it is widely believed that Goulart himself will come to the Northeast prior to January 6, attempting to stir up voter interest.

Comment: Despite the increased effort to turn out the voters on

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Drafted by: See last page/ag

Coding and Classification Approved by:

Clearances:

0772

b. A good RGS bean crop began arriving upon the local market in quantity amid rumors that COFAP will soon impose controls on this commodity to insure and adequate supply of beans for Guanabara, etc.

W. Douglas McLain
American Vice Consul

cc.- Consular Affairs, Rio
Political Section, Rio
Political Section, Brasília
ARA/EST/Brazil, Washington
INR/RAR/P, Washington

Department: Pass to all posts in Brazil

0771

5. Bombing Incident

In response to an editorial in the Diário de Notícias, calling for the prompt apprehension of those responsible for the recent bombing of the former home of Arlindo Pasqualini, anti-Brizola director of Fôlha da Tarde, and the home of Adel Carvalho, contributor to the Caldas Junior newspapers, Governor Brizola last week made public a letter to the Chief of Police, instructing him to spare no efforts to find the bombers. The bombings prompted Pôrto Alegre Mayor Loureiro da Silva to send a message of support to Pasqualini and Carvalho. Political comment both in Assembly Committees and in the Municipal Chamber developed along predictable partisan lines. Pasqualini continued attacking Governor Brizola in the Fôlha da Tarde.

Comment: No matter what he says or does, Brizola has been embarrassed by the bombing incident and Pasqualini's reaction.

6. Governor Brizola's Activities

Last week Governor Brizola: 1) met with Plínio Cabral, Governor-elect Meneghetti's controversial Chief of Civil Household, to arrange for the orderly transfer of administrations. Brizola promised Cabral full cooperation (see paragraph 1, Comment, above); 2) scheduled the windup of his plebiscite tour in RGS which will take him to Rio Grande today, then to Pelotas, Santa Maria and Passo Fundo, with a final meeting in Caxias do Sul on January 4; 3) issued a New Year's message to the people of RGS in which, among other things, he referred to 1963 as the year of "emancipation or submission", and expressed the hope that people would "prepare.... to carry out the duties that 1963 will demand of us".

7. Political Notes

a. According to Última Hora, PTB leader João Caruso will become head of the SUPRA (Superintendência de Reforma Agrária).

b. A special State Assembly Committee is investigating "grave irregularities" in the operations of DAER (Departamento Autônomo de Estradas de Rodagem). The Assembly will consider the Committee's report when it begins its last meeting on January 18.

8. Economic Notes

a. The rice situation in RGS showed rare signs of stabilizing last week with the announcement of an increase of rice deliveries to IRGA and a decision not to confiscate rice in hands of RGS cooperatives. The new head of COAP, Colonel Edson Lima, recently named to replace Waldemar Boeira da Paixão, announced he expected to remain in charge of COAP only for a few months.

0770

In spite of this, reports of the imminent collapse of Meneghetti's coalition ADP, continue to circulate. According to these reports, the PL will quit the ADP soon; Meneghetti's own PSD is unhappy about the Governor-elect's designation of Plínio Cabral as Chief of Civil Household, instead of their candidate; and the UDN, suffering from internal squabbles and angry because it received only one secretarial post, will soon send Meneghetti its "suggestions" for changes in his cabinet. At the week's end, these and other rumors apparently forced from Meneghetti a public denial that he planned to dismiss Cabral within three months.

Comment: The PL's bill to limit his powers apparently has been squelched, and Meneghetti probably will succeed in arranging an uneasy truce among the restive elements of his ADP. However, the prognosis for the ADP as an effective political instrument is not good.

3. Plebiscite

In advance of the January 6 plebiscite Governor-elect Meneghetti announced his support of presidentialism even though his political party, the PSD, has left this an open question. He urged all qualified voters to participate and predicted a victory for presidentialism.

Governor Brizola announced the results of a local poll on the plebiscite made by the IBOPE (Instituto Brasileiro de Opinião Pública e Estatística) according to which presidentialism will win by a margin of 3 or 4 to 1 in RGS and 7 to 1 in Pôrto Alegre. The poll also predicted that 4 percent of the voters would abstain.

Comment: Since better than a 100 thousand Riograndenses head for the beaches every summer weekend (where they will be able to vote but are not likely to do so), the poll's prediction of 4 percent abstention seems low. However, most observers here agree that the victory of presidentialism in RGS is only a matter of degree.

4. Pay Raises for RGS Government Workers

To the surprise and discomfiture of many of its supporters, the so-called Suely amendment to Governor Brizola's bill to raise salaries of State employees, instead of reducing the total amount of the raise proposed by Brizola, apparently will add several billion cruzeiros to the deficit to be inherited by Governor-elect Meneghetti (see Weekly Summary №36, A-30). Meneghetti's reaction has been to announce that he will not pay any amount of the raise in excess of Cr$21 billion. The law, which now has been signed by Governor Brizola, will be effective upon publication (within a few days).

Comment: Whether he limits the amount of the pay raise to Cr$21 billion or not, Meneghetti is still in budgetary difficulty. Such a reduction also would give opposition groups a convenient weapon against Meneghetti.

0769

1. Promised to reduce inflation with a "three-year plan" which will not require "outside aid" and which will not slow Brazil's rate of development;

2. Urged all eligible to vote in the plebiscite;

3. Referred to the purchase from Poland, of a 200,000 kilowatt thermoelectric power plant for RGS, defended commerce "with the entire world", and noted that Brazilian trade with the USSR had increased from U.S.$20 million to U.S.$100 million during the past year;

4. Promised the municipal officials that a threatened slash in the cities' share of Federal income tax receipts would not take place; and

5. Made an appeal for non-partisan cooperation from the municipal officials.

The Goulart-Meneghetti conference was, on the surface, a love feast. After the meeting Meneghetti expressed his complete satisfaction with their talk and said they had agreed that he would forward his plans requiring federal aid to Brasilia. Goulart, in turn, pledged his full cooperation with the Meneghetti administration. Ultima Hora, waxing almost lyrical, described a picture of Goulart, Brizola and Meneghetti as the "Alianca pelo Rio Grande" and wrote that Meneghetti was impressed by Goulart's "good will". The Diario de Noticias, in an interesting interpretation, praised Meneghetti for rising above partisan politics where the welfare of the State is concerned.

Comment: Goulart's expressions of good will and campaign-like promises created a generally good impression here where, for the time being, his words may be taken as deeds. In his dealings with Meneghetti he is caught in a cleft stick since, however reluctant he may be to aid Meneghetti's administration, he cannot turn his back on his own State. It is possible that Meneghetti's support for presidentialism (see Plebiscite, below), which has angered some of his supporters, was in the nature of a quid pro quo for Goulart federal aid. In the meantime, rumors and unconfirmed reports persist that Goulart and Brizola plan federal intervention in RGS to prevent the new state administration from taking office. Unlikely as this now appears, it would be possible to manufacture a justification for intervention by fomenting strikes and disturbances between now and the end of the month.

2. ADP's Troubles Continue

Last week the PTB announced it would not support the PL's bill to limit the Governor's powers (see Weekly Summary № 36, A-30). Senators Mem de Sá and Daniel Krieger attempted to mediate the difficulties between Meneghetti and the PL, and other elements of the ADP (PSD, PDC, PRP and UDN) announced their full support of Meneghetti and his cabinet choices.

0768

ORIGIN/ACTION

	ARA-4	
RMR 1	REP 1	AF
ARA	EUR	FE
NEA	CU	INR 5
E 4	P	IO
L	FBO	AID 12
AGR 10	COM 10	FRB 3
INT 7	LAB 6	TAR 2
TR 2	XMB 4	AIR 4
ARMY 5	CIA 10	NAVY 5
OSD 12	USIA 8	NSA 3

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DEPARTMENT OF STATE

AIRGRAM

832.00/1-263

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A-32 — OFFICIAL USE ONLY — AIR POUCH

HANDLING INDICATOR XM-832-00

TO : DEPARTMENT OF STATE 1963 JAN 6 AM 11 53

Rio de Janeiro-1 Brasilia Office-1 Curitiba-1
Belem-1 Belo Horizonte-1 Recife-1 Salvador-1 Santos-1 Sao Paulo-1

ANALYSIS & DISTRIBUTION BRANCH DEPARTMENT OF STATE BUREAU OF INTER-AMERICAN AFFAIRS JAN 7 1963

FROM : Amconsul PÔRTO ALEGRE DATE: JAN 2 1963

SUBJECT : PÔRTO ALEGRE WEEKLY SUMMARY Nº 37

REF :

1cc to ORB

1. President Goulart Visits Pôrto Alegre
2. ADP's Troubles Continue
3. Plebiscite
4. Pay Raises for RGS Government Workers
5. Bombing Incident
6. Governor Brizola's Activities
7. Political Notes
8. Economic Notes

1. President Goulart Visits Pôrto Alegre

In a brief but busy 7-hour visit to Pôrto Alegre last Saturday, President Goulart, radiating confidence and goodwill, addressed a convention of RGS municipal officials; inaugurated the new TV-Gaucha station here, and conferred privately with Governor-elect Meneghetti.

Goulart was met at Salgado Filho Airport by an enthusiastic crowd chanting "não" in support of his plebiscite views, and by Governor Brizola, who left the President's side only during the conference with Meneghetti. Pôrto Alegre's Mayor Loureiro da Silva also greeted Goulart with thanks for past Federal Government cooperation and a pledge of his support in the plebiscite.

FILED 10 33

At the municipal officials' convention and the TV inauguration Goulart:


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Drafted by: WDMcLain/zms 1/2/63

Contents and Classification Approved by: WDMcLain

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Info SS SR G SP L H CAP E AID P USIA INR

FROM: RIO DE JANEIRO

TO: Secretary of State

NO: 1233, DECEMBER 31, 7 P.M.

REFERENCE: EMBTELS 1203 AND 1223

RESIGNATION OCTAVIO BULHOES, AND ITS ACCEPTANCE BY GOB, ANNOUNCED IN PRESS DECEMBER 28. JULIO DE JOUZA AVELLAR, DIRECTOR, BANK OF BRAZIL REDISCOUNT DEPARTMENT, NAMED AS INTERIM ACTING EXECUTIVE DIRECTOR OF SUMOC.

RMR

EMBASSY NOT YET HAD CHANCE DISCUSS BULHOES RESIGNATION WITH HIS INTIMATES. HOWEVER, RECENTLY THERE HAVE BEEN GROWING INDICATIONS BULHOES DID NOT EXPECT OR DESIRE STAY LONG ON JOB. HE SEEMED INCREASINGLY PHYSICALLY AND EMOTIONALLY STRAINED, WHILE AT SAME TIME FELT LOSS OF INFLUENCE AND WIDENING GULF OF UNDERSTANDING BETWEEN HIMSELF AND GOVERNMENT COLLEAGUES. SOME OF HIS RECENT PUBLIC AND PRIVATE UTTERANCES HAVE BEEN INCREASINGLY UNGUARDED AND OF NATURE INVITING CONTROVERSY. ANY CASE APPARENTLY DID NOT RESIST DISMISSAL.

LITTLE DOUBT GOULART WELCOMED BULHOES RESIGNATION, EVEN THROUGH SUMOC DIRECTOR FAVORABLY KNOWN ABROAD. BULHOES LEAVING SISOP* TO LEFT-WING OF PTB (AS WELL AS TO SOME ANTI-IMF FOLLOWERS OF KUBITSCHEK) AND TENDS TO OFF-SET LEFTIST UNHAPPINESS DISMISSAL FORMER LABOR MINISTER PINHEIRO NETO ON ISSUE HIS CRITICISM FINANCIAL POLICIES ESPOUSED BY BULHOES.

BULHOES RESIGNATION DOES NOT NECESSARILY PORTEND ANY BASIC CHANGE STATED POST-PLEBISCITE FINANCIAL PLANS LOOKING TOWARD ACCORD WITH U.S. AND IMF. AVELLAR CONSIDERED BASICALLY CONSERVATIVE. WAS CLOSE COLLABORATOR OF MOREIRA SALLES.

GORDON

RNL

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ACTION ASSIGNED TO	ACTION TAKEN
NAME OF OFFICER / OFFICE SYMBOL	DATE OF ACTION	DIRECTIONS TO RM/R

0765

A-46
Salvador

the Bahian State Secretary for Matters affecting the south of the state. State tax revenues have reportedly been cut to the extent of two billion cruzeiros by the bad cacau crop, and the Federal government has reportedly thus far pumped in three billion cruzeiros in an attempt to relieve credit strains. In the meantime, the cacau port of Ilheus is reportedly paralyzed by a strike of stevedores demanding payment of the 13th month salary. Port management indicates that no cacau would have been shipped in any event because of the prohibitively high stevedoring costs there.

Harold M. Midkiff
American Consul

TM

0764

INFORMATION/ACTION
ARA 4.

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OSD 12	USIA 8	NSA 3

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ARA/ES 1/8
RJ Burton
1/10/63

20

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

AIRGRAM

732.00/12-2862

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A-46 NO. | OFFICIAL USE ONLY HANDLING INDICATOR

TO : DEPARTMENT OF STATE

INFO: Amembassy, Rio and Brasilia

FROM : Amconsulate, Salvador

DATE: December 28, 1962

SUBJECT: Weekly Summary

REF :

DEPARTMENT OF STATE
OFFICE OF
INTER-AMERICAN AFFAIRS
JAN 7 1963

POLITICAL:

The plebiscite continues to be much talked of, but little enthusiasm is shown for it. Governor-elect Antonio Lomanto Junior is trying to stimulate interest in the issue and hopes he can draw many voters to the polls for a negative vote. He has stated privately that he considers a good showing at the polls to be an additional demonstration of his popular support, and he hopes the results will impress President Goulart who is to bring the Bahia campaign to a close at the Governor-elect's home city of Jequie on January 3.

Comment: Lomanto's relations to the president are on a friendly footing at present but there is much political gamesmanship in the air.

Communists have cut down their activities very noticeably since the Cuban quarantine, according to a high state official. The same source indicated that President Goulart's Christmas message brought further confusion into the communists' ranks. Some of them believe it represents a softening of the president's traditional line, and they have taken offense at this. This group may well seek to persuade voters to vote for retention of the parliamentary system on January 6.

ECONOMIC:

The damages of the drought of a year ago in the cacau region of the State were estimated at a total of Cr$8 billion by

JAN 11

FORM DS-323 4-62

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Drafted by: HMMidkiff:WHBMatthews:/la

Contents and Classification Approved by:

Clearances:

0763

field report No. HBR-3240 of December 13, 1962, which, among other things, reports (1) alleged plans by the General to take certain interventional action with the Brazilian press and (2) the General's concept of his present post as a springboard to a political career. The Embassy also concurs in the source appraisal of the contents of that report.

The Embassy does not as yet know a great deal about General Albino Silva. His ascendancy has been sudden. It is obvious that he is presently riding on the crest of a wave of President Goulart's full confidence.

The Embassy is mindful of the Department's request for a biographic sketch on Silva. We hope to be in a position within a very short time to provide a thoroughgoing appraisal of this new performer in the Brazilian political arena.

For the Ambassador:

Charles C. Carson

Charles C. Carson
Second Secretary

0762

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DEPARTMENT OF STATE

AIRGRAM

732.00/12-2862
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A-739 NO. SECRET XR.732.11 HANDLING INDICATOR

TO : Department of State

ANALYSIS & DISTRIBUTION BRANCH

~~This documents consists of 2 pages. Number 1 of 1 copies, Series A~~

COPY NO. JAN 7 1963 SERIES A

BUREAU OF INTELLIGENCE AND RESEARCH

FROM : AmEmbassy RIO DE JANEIRO DATE: December 28, 1962

SUBJECT : Reported Actions and Plans of General Albino SILVA.

REF : Department's A-181, December 7, 1962

Pole - no action
ARA 1/5/63
RG Shelton 1/9/63

At the time of the preparation of field report No. HBR-3193 the Embassy accepted the intelligence reported therein as probably true in its entirety.

Some of the then reportedly scheduled personnel changes in the National Security Council have now taken place. We do not, as yet, see any special significance in them.

With regard to rumored plans of General Albino Silva having to do with Brazilian telephone facilities, the Embassy has no additional information on the specific points mentioned in the report. The lack of such information, however, does not diminish the Embassy's initial assessment of the rumors as probably true. We can be sure that Brazil's leftist ultra-nationalists, to which group Silva undoubtedly belongs, will not be satisfied with anything less than complete nationalization of the country's communications systems. The actions attributed to Silva in the telephonic field are logical preliminary steps toward that end.

That Silva regards the Brazilian Navy and, to a lesser extent, the Army as "reactionary" is something perhaps more than probably true. (The Embassy's airgram A-725, December 26, 1962, describes current thinking on the part of what we believe to be the overwhelming majority in the ranks of the Brazilian Armed Forces with regard to leftist elements in the Brazilian Government and on its periphery.)

By this time, the Department will have seen copies of

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DS-323

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Drafted by: POL:CCCarson/rstp

Contents and Classification Approved by: DCM - Minister Bond

Clearances:
POL:JKeppel
Mr. Brady
USARMA - Col. Walters

SECRET

0761

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ARA

INCOMING TELEGRAM

CONFIDENTIAL

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CORRECTION ISSUED:

12/31-62 - 9:40 PM TRT

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RMR

-2- 1223, DECEMBER 28, 8 P.M. FROM: RIO DE JANEIRO - CORRECTED PAGE TWO.

COMMANDER OSVINO ALVES OVER PARTICIPATION FEDERAL TROOPS IN SECURITY MEASURES FOR PLEBISCITE. MEANWHILE, GOVERNOR CARLOS LACERDA REPLIED TO CIRCULAR TELEGRAM JUSTICE MANGABEIRA SENT CABINET MINISTERS AND OTHER AUTHORITIES DECEMBER 26 "REMINDING" THAT VOTING IN PLEBISCITE TO BE CONSIDERED "OBLIGATORY". EXPRESSING "DOUBT" TELEGRAM WOULD HAVE ORIGINATED FROM JUSTICE MINISTRY, LACERDA TOLD MANGABEIRA HE LACKED AUTHORITY ADDRESS HIMSELF "IN SUCH TERMS TO STATE GOVERNOR (I AM NOT FEDERAL INTERVENTOR)." AND IN VIEW HIS PAST (REFERENCE TO MANGABEIRA'S EARLY SUBVERSIVE CAREER) MANGABEIRA, "SHOULD NOT HAVE COMMITTED SUCH BLUNDER."

4. ADMINISTRATION SEEMED BE ATTEMPTING IMPROVE ONE ASPECT FOOD SUPPLY SITUATION RIO-SAO PAULO, BEEF BEING ALMOST UNOBTAINABLE TWO CITIES SINCE COFAP IMPOSED PRICE CEILINGS DECEMBER 10. AT RECENT MEETING INCLUDING FOUR FOREIGN MEATPACKERS SUPPLYING 40 PERCENT TWO CITIES MEAT SUPPLY, ALBINO SILVA, AND CHIEF COFAP, GOB REPORTEDLY PROMISED BY JANUARY 7 LIFT BEEF CEILINGS ON ALL BUT CHEAPEST CUTS IF PACKERS WOULD PLEDGE IMMEDIATELY RESUME PRACTICALLY SUSPENDED OPERATION. PACKERS RELUCTANTLY AGREED.

5. AT FORMAL INSTALLATION DECEMBER 27 AT FOREIGN OFFICE OF NEW ORGAN FOR COORDINATING TRADE WITH BLOC (COLESTE) FOREIGN MINISTER REJECTED AS CONTRARY TO "CLEAR AND LEGITIMATE NATIONAL INTEREST" CRITICISM GOB EFFORTS PROMOTE SUCH TRADE JUSTIFYING POLICY ON GROUNDS "SOCIALIST WORLD PRESENTS GREATEST RATE CONTINUOUS ECONOMIC GROWTH, OFFERING MARKET OF HIGH POTENTIAL".

GORDON

BA

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CONFIDENTIAL

-2- 1223, DECEMBER 28, 8 PM, FROM RIO DE JANEIRO

COMMANDER OSVINO ALVES OVER PARTICIPATION FEDERAL TROOPS IN SECURITY MEASURES AGF*PLEBISCITE. MEANWHILE, GOVERNOR CARLOS LACERDA REPLIED TO (#) "REMINDING" THAT VOJONE* IN PLEBISCITE TO BE CONSIDERED "OBLIGATORY". EXPRESSING "DOUBT" TELEGRAM WOULD HAVE ORIGINATED FROM JUSTICE MINISTRY, LACERDA TOLD MANGABEIR, HE LACKED AUTHORITY ADDRESS HIMSELF "IN SUCH MANNER TO STATE GOVERNOR CARWHEYE* AM NOT FEDERAL INTERVENTOR." AND IN VIEW HIS PAST (REFERENCE TO MANGABEIRA'S EARLY SUBVERSIVE CAREER) MANGABEIRA "SHOULD NOT HAVE COMMITTED SUCH BLUNDER"

4. ADMINISTRATION SEEMED BE ATTEMPTING IMPROVE ONE ASPECT FOOD SUPPLY SITUATION RIO-SAO PAULO, BEEF BEING ALMOST UNOBTAINABLE TWO CITIES SINCE COFAP IMPOSED PRICE CEILINGS DECEMBER 1Ø. AT RECENT MEETING INCLUDING FOUR FOREIGN MEAT-PACKERS SUPPLYING 4Ø PERCENT TWO CITIES MEAT SUPPLY, ALBINO SILVA, AND CHIEF COFAP, GOB REPORTEDLY PROMISED BY JANUARY 7 LIFT BEEF CEILINGS ON ALL BUT CHEAPEST CUTS IF PACKERS WOULD PLEDGE IMMEDIATELY RESUME PRACTICALLY, SUSPENDED OPERATION. PACKERS RELUCTANTLY AGREED.

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GORDON

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(#) OMISSION. CORRECTION TO FOLLOW.

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37

Action ARA

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Control: 15041
Received: DECEMBER 29, 1962 4:05 AM

FROM: RIO DE JANEIRO

TO: Secretary of State

NO: 1223, DECEMBER 28, 8 PM

ACTION DEPARTMENT 1223, INFORMATION CINCLANT POLAD UNNUMBERED.

CURRENT DEVELOPMENTS OF APPARENT IMPORTANCE RESIST CONFIDENT INTERPRETATION FULL SIGNIFICANCE BUT SEEM INDICATE GOULART STILL ENDEAVORING, WITH GENERAL SUCCESS, CONCILIATE DIVERGENT PRESSURES AND INFLUENCES WHILE MOVING TOWARD ESTABLISHED OBJECTIVES, MAIN IMMEDIATE ONE BEING THAT OF ACHIEVING STRONG PRO-PRESIDENTIALIST VOTE IN PLEBICITE.

1. INFELICITOUS, ILL-ADVISED REMARKS OF SUMOC DIRECTOR GOUVEIRA BULHOES ON REMITTANCE OF PROFITS LAW (EMBTEL 1203) LED TO HIS DISMISSAL, GOB REQUESTING RESIGNATION AT BEHEST PTB "GRUPO COMPACTO" SPEARHEADED BY LEADER ALMINO AFONSO. VARIOUS "GRUPO" MEMBERS REPORTED TO CONSIDER DISMISSAL "POSITIVE ACT OF GOB REPAIRING INJUSTICE COMMITTED AGAINST LABOR MINISTER JOAO PINHEIRO". JULIO AVELAR, DIRECTOR REDISCOUNTING OFFICE BANK OF BRAZIL, CITED AS BULHOES' REPLACEMENT. AVELAR REPORTEDLY "DISPOSED IMPLEMENT POLICY AS SET FORTH BY CABINET".

2. PERSISTENT RUMORS SAY CARVALHO PONTO OFFERED FINANCE MINISTRY IN NEW CABINET. IN PLANNED ADMINISTRATIVE REFORM, HOWEVER, FINANCE MINISTRY POWERS WOULD BE REDUCED, VITAL PLANNING FUNCTIONS WOULD BE TRANSFERRED TO NEW MINISTRY, LIKELIEST CANDIDATE FOR LATTER PORTFOLIO PRESENTLY BEING CELSO FURTADO.

3. BULHOES CARVALHO, NEW CHIEF JUSTICE GUANABARA REGIONAL TRIBUNAL ISSUED INSTRUCTIONS DECEMBER 27 FOR CONDUCT PLEBISCITE CAMPAIGN, INCLUDING "AUTHORIZATION" RADIO AND TV STATIONS INTERRUPT BROADCASTING IN EVENT CAMPAIGNERS URGE VOTER ABSTENTION OR "CRITICIZE CONSTITUTED AUTHORITY". CARVALHO ALSO CONFERRED WITH FIRST ARMY COMMANDER

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Rio - 1223

732.00/12-2862

0758

OPTIONAL FORM NO. 10
5010-104

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

Memorandum

CONFIDENTIAL

Brazil - Campos

TO : ARA - Mr. Martin

DATE: December 28, 1962

FROM : EST - Mr. Wellman

SUBJECT: Brazilian Affairs

I recommend that you give Ambassador Campos the opportunity to call on you before his departure for Brazil on January 3. He would of course like to have a favorable decision on interim assistance before his departure. I believe you should give him a chance to talk with you even if, as is likely, no answer can be given on interim assistance before he leaves.

I talked to Minister Counselor Maciel for an hour and a half this morning. I had the opportunity to make it completely clear that our difficulties are created by reasons of questions about the orientation, direction and posture of the Brazilian Government and particularly President Goulart. I was able to expand on this and give examples. I made it clear that other problems such as inflation, expropriations, matters of reforms and differences in foreign policy are secondary to the main issue as to whether there is a basis for cooperation with the Brazilian Government.

Maciel did not dissent from my analysis; in fact, he indicated he agreed with it. He made the following observations:

1. He believes that Goulart has been interested in demonstrating that the parliamentary system will not work in Brazil, that this has been responsible for the conflicting Brazilian voices and that there will be more unity of direction when he has reclaimed his powers after the plebiscite.

2. He questioned the timing and publicity of what he described as the tremendous pressure upon Brazil as a result of the Attorney General's visit, the President's press conference statement, the "inspired" press comment and the refusal of interim financial assistance.

3. He expressed the fear that Brazil and the United States were on a collision course, that the extreme leftists would use United States pressure for their own ends and that as a result Goulart might be pulled farther to the left.

4. He expressed the opinion that the Brazilian Government had been exceedingly moderate in not making capital of the pressure of the United States implicit in the refusal of financial aid to meet Brazil's immediate critical problem.

5. He expressed

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BRAZIL - Meeting Campos

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Ultima Hora opines without reference to any particular facts that the deteriorating relations between Brazil and the United States "began at the precise moment that the Republican Party ascended to power: 1952."

The only consistent thought threading through stories and columns alike is that the fault lies elsewhere--not in Brazil.

Lowell C. Kilday
American Vice Consul

Contributors:

LCKilday
WSSmith
CTucker

0756

Toscano as Commander of the 3rd Naval District.

Comment: Local scuttlebutt has it that Governor-elect MIGUEL ARRAES requested the naval command change. Although he and Diaz Fernandez hold different political views, it is said, their personal relationship has always been friendly and cordial and thus Arraes desired the return of Diaz Fernandez. This would not seem to square with Diaz Fernandez' repeated description of himself as Arraes' nemesis. During his previous tour in Recife, Diaz Fernandez delighted in telling of how frightened Arraes was of his wrath.

General Guerreiro's transfer, the Consulate General has been informed, was requested by Guerreiro for family reasons. (LIMITED OFFICIAL USE)

ECONOMIC

1. Strikes

13 Brazilian flag vessels were caught in the port of Recife by the nation wide maritime strike beginning December 21st. So far, the strike has been conducted in an orderly manner here. Naval forces have taken over operation of only one ship, and maritime union leaders voluntarily permitted two tankers to sail for Fortaleza with badly needed fuel. Nonetheless, if protracted, the strike will result in an uncomfortable shortage of certain basic foodstuffs and manufactured goods which must be shipped up from the industrial south.

As of the end of the week, workmen engaged in construction of the COPERBO synthetic rubber plant were also out on strike and local telegraph workers were threatening to walk out. (OFFICIAL USE ONLY)

PSYCHOLOGICAL

More follow-up stories on the visit of ROBERT KENNEDY have appeared than ever were written on the visit itself. Most of them are couched in the positive tone of straight reporting, but the actual content is more of a speculative nature on the exact meaning of the visit of the President's younger brother.

Of greater importance is a note of anxiety pervading the outwardly optimistic character of the stories. For example, one story is headlined "Brazil is not Going as Badly as the United States Supposes." Other heads proclaim "Bad Understanding between Brazil and U.S. Can Be Overcome: Premier", "Foreign Policy of Brazil Continues to Worry U.S.", "Friendly Relations Gradually Diminishing between U.S. and Brazil."



Comment: It would be disheartening indeed to see Alves develop a close relationship with any of the countries of Eastern Europe, but this visit should not be taken as evidence that he intends to do so. Even CID SAMPAIO made the Grand Communist Tour following his election in 1958, so one may presume a certain amount of curiosity on the part of Alves as a motivating factor in this trip. At the same time, it should be remembered that Alves is a politician and, as such, is not likely to reject out of hand any assistance the Soviets, Czechs, or Poles might offer to Rio Grande do Norte. It would seem to be premature, though, to conclude that in accepting whatever Communist assistance might be offered, Alves would be turning his back on the Alliance for Progress, to which he is heavily, and it is believed sincerely, committed. (LIMITED OFFICIAL USE)

2. PSD-UDN Coalition Hopeful of Gaining Seat in Chamber of Deputies

The Pernambuco PSD-UDN electoral coalition (known as the Frente Popular Democratica) is hopeful of increasing its representation in the Chamber of Deputies by at least one seat, possibly two. The increase would come about through a cancellation of the mandates of WALDEMAR LUIZ ALVES and, possibly, FRANCISCO JULIÃO, newly-elected federal deputies of the PSB. (See Weekly Summary 25) This week, State Deputy CONSTANCIO MARANHAO obtained a certificate from the state legislative archives establishing that in 1946 Waldemar Luiz Alves had been elected 4th suplente (substitute) for state deputy on the ticket of the Communist Party. The FPD hopes to use this certificate to establish Alves' ineligibility to serve in an electoral position. Coalition lawyers are confident that the Superior Electoral Tribunal will disqualify Alves on the basis of his Communist affiliation and declare his votes to be null, thus allowing the PSD-UDN one more seat in the Chamber. All concerned seem to agree that it will be much more difficult to obtain acceptable documentary evidence of Julião's association with the Communist Party, but an attempt will be made to have him ruled ineligible anyway.

Federal Deputy GERALDO GUEDES is the first suplente on the PSD-UDN ticket, and GILENO de CARLI is the 2nd. Guedes has indicated that he desires not to serve again so de Carli would probably occupy the additional seat if Alves is disqualified, and his votes nullified. (LIMITED OFFICIAL USE)

3. Changes in Military Commands

7th Army Region --- General NILO GUERREIRO departed Recife and the command of the 7th Army Region this week. His successor, General ALBERTO RIBEIRO de PAZ, is scheduled to arrive in Recife about the middle of January.

3rd Naval District --- It was announced this week that Vice Admiral ARNOLDO TOSCANO, Commander of the 3rd Naval District, has been relieved of his post. His successor will be Admiral AUGUSTO ROQUE DIAZ FERNANDEZ, who preceded

0754

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DEPARTMENT OF STATE

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1963 JAN 4 AM 9 04

DEPARTMENT OF STATE
BUREAU OF
INTER-AMERICAN AFFAIRS
JAN 4 1963

TO : DEPARTMENT OF STATE

INFO: RIO DE JANEIRO, BRASILIA, SÃO PAULO

FROM : Amconsul RECIFE DATE: December 27, 1962

SUBJECT: Weekly Summary No. 26

REF :

FILED
FEB 4 1963

TABLE OF CONTENTS

POLITICAL

1. Governor Aluizio Alves to Visit Soviet Union
2. PSD-UDN Coalition Hopeful of Gaining Seat in Chamber of Deputies
3. Changes in Military Commands

ECONOMIC

1. Strikes

PSYCHOLOGICAL

POLITICAL

1. Governor Aluizio Alves to Visit Soviet Union

It was reported this week that Rio Grande do Norte Governor ALUIZIO ALVES would depart soon on a thirty day trip to the Soviet Union, Poland, Czechoslovakia, and Israel. The purpose of the trip, according to the press, would be to discuss "programs of cooperation with his Government, matters related to irrigation, and the purchase of agricultural materials for his State."

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Drafted by: See last page/ag

Contents and Classification Approved by:

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A-734
Rio de Janeiro

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distance. Many do, however, make periodic visits to these towns returning with as much rice as can be carried. Many others, however, stand in hours long lines in the public squares of Rio to purchase rice direct from government sources at subsidized prices.

By this tactic the Administration tries to achieve two objectives. In the first place, it sets itself up as the benevolent supplier, bringing rice to the people at low prices while charging that the state is unable to maintain the supply line. Secondly, it creates popular unrest and dissatisfaction in the hope that the Governor will be blamed or perhaps even that unrest will flair into violence giving the federal government the excuse it undoubtedly would like to have to intervene in the state.

The latter possibility was hinted at recently by War Minister Kruel. In answer to a published telegram from Lacerda to Goulart asking why the Army was selling rice in Guanabara (and over the ceiling price at that). Kruel, on Goulart's behalf, stated that the armed forces were always called on to intervene in case of crisis or catastrophe to "mitigate the suffering of the people." The crisis arising out of the rice supply, he added, "should have been avoided by the state officials who are responsible for supplying the city." How officials of a state, which produces only three per cent of its normal rice consumption, should go about maintaining the supply, the Minister did not say.

A number of papers have, indeed, come to Lacerda's support charging openly what are so obviously the federal government's objectives. Unfortunately, editorials are not widely read and it is likely that only very few people really understand what is going on. What is more disturbing is, that with the establishment of SUNAB, the list of items immediately under control of a single federal organ and the scope of such control will be greatly augmented so that such pressures on the rebellious and vocal Governor of Guanabara (or other recalcitrants) can be kept up for a long time.

For the Ambassador:

John Krizay
Second Secretary of Embassy

CONFIDENTIAL

0752

ORIGIN/A FOR BNE-4

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OSD	USIA	NSA
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DEPARTMENT OF STATE

AIRGRAM

833.01/12-2762
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A-734 — CONFIDENTIAL — XR 833.00
NO. — HANDLING INDICATOR

TO : DEPARTMENT OF STATE

FROM : AmEmbassy, RIO DE JANEIRO DATE: December 27, 1962

SUBJECT: The Use of Price Controls as a Political Instrument

REF :

The enforcement of absurdly low ceiling prices on a regional basis over the past several months provides a clear example of how the price control authority can be used as a political instrument and how the much broader authority of SUNAB might be used when it begins full operations (See Embassy Airgram A-494, October 31). At the present time price control administration falls under COFAP (Federal Price and Supply Commission) which is to be incorporated into SUNAB next year.

833.00/12-3162 Com

The case at issue involves the control of prices over rice and, since early this week, beef. While roughly the same ceiling prices have been established in all major population centers, so far as is known to the Embassy, they have been consistently enforced only in the State of Guanabara (essentially the city of Rio de Janeiro) whose Governor, Carlos Lacerda, happens to be probably the most eloquent and vocal critic of the Goulart Administration.

As a consequence of these price ceilings being enforced by COFAP in Guanabara, these products have disappeared from the markets of Rio de Janeiro while remaining in abundant supply in all neighboring towns and cities just across the state border at prices two and three times the established ceiling price.

This tactic is effective in cutting off the supply of the Guanabara residents only because of the very poor transportation and communications network as a result of which many of the lower income groups either do not know of the availability of the products in nearby towns or do not have the time or money to travel that

/distance

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FORM DS-323 4-62

Drafted by: ECON:JKrizay:dml — Contents and Classification Approved by: R. Eakens

Clearances: RVKorp — FAS - FMilam — POL - Mr. Kepp

0751

democracy in Latin America." He "continues to maintain a highly moderating influence over the Brazilian labor movement...."

Comment; If one accepts the obvious conclusion of this series of editorials, Goulart and followers now have more interest in getting along with the United States. That is presumably a good thing. Question: do they believe the incredible distortions and outright lies which led to this conclusion? If so, they are extraordinarily naive. If not, they think we are extraordinarily naive. (LIMITED OFFICIAL USE)

Daniel M. Braddock
Minister Consul General

Distribution: INS/RAR, AmConGen Recife, AmConsulates Belem, Belo Horizonte, Curitiba, Porto Alegre, Salvador, Santos.

7121

0750

of the International Monetary Fund are also at fault, however. They point out that Brazil is growing twice as fast as countries following IMF advice (using pre-Goulart statistics to prove it). O Estado is out on a lonely limb with the IMF.

The significant exception to this general theme is leftist/nationalist Ultima Hora, which in a series of three remarkable editorials argued that Brazil/U.S. relations had never looked rosier. The editorials looked as if they had been planted directly by Goulart; Ultima Hora has always been São Paulo's number-one Yankee-hater. Among the odd premises on which the paper based its happy conclusion were the following:

a) The whole problem between Brazil and the United States was the fault of the Republicans. Robert Kennedy, however, is the antithesis of Richard Nixon and his visit is consequently encouraging.

b) The "policy of starvation" of the IMF has been the major direct manifestation of the problem. It is a "Blockade of Brazil," comparable to the "blockade" of Cuba.

C) The Americans learned something from their intransigent policy toward Cuba. Dictated by Big Business, this policy pushed Fidel into the hands of the Communists. The lesson should teach the Americans to lift the "Blockade of Brazil."

d) As a start in lifting the "Blockade," the Americans should do their duty and free the credits which they have "owed" Brazil since the Quadros regime.

e) The Brazil Desk of the Department of State has always "invested stupidly in the most nefarious representatives of the extreme right in Brazil .... (such as) a notorious agent of international fascism, Carlos LACERDA...."

f) There are signs that the Brazil Desk has finally seen the light, however. Juscelino KUBITSCHEK, bitter enemy of the IMF, was recently called to Washington in a rush to save the Alliance for Progress.

g) The forces of reaction (read centrists and rightists) were roundly defeated in the October 7 elections, accounting for part of the new attitude in Washington.

h) "The facts show that João Goulart is the best political and social investment for the preservation of representative

0749

O Estado began to come out with editorials which obliquely but unmistakably accused Cardinal Motta of being at variance with the unequivocal anti-Communist line of the Vatican. Petulant and ineffective replies were received (and printed in full) from Monsignor Enzo GUSSO, an adviser to the Cardinal and until recently a leader of the Catholic University students. The squabble promises to continue for a long time. (LIMITED OFFICIAL USE)

Comment: Talk among opposing churchmen is that the Vatican is aware of the problem and concerned by it but reluctant to take harsh action. The publicity which the feud is getting should, in any case, hasten a resolution; but haste seems to be a very relative term in Church politics. (LIMITED OFFICIAL USE)

5. Correio Paulistano Gone for Good?

Correio Paulistano, one of the oldest São Paulo newspapers, was run by a Catholic priest for two years. Like almost all São Paulo papers except O Estado, it evidently had financial problems. A little before the October 7 elections, it appeared to change hands, becoming a mouthpiece for President João Goulart and Otávio MARIA, his São Paulo candidate for Federal Deputy. Maria did not get elected. The paper carried on into November, then suddenly stopped reaching the newsstands. There were reports of financial and labor problems. One report has it that Otávio Maria simply "rented" the paper from its clergyman owner and dropped it after the election. (OFFICIAL USE ONLY)

Comment: It was a poor paper and is probably lamented mainly by the Consulate General, which found it an extremely useful source of information during its brief existence as a Goulart mouthpiece. It is curious -- and probably a real reflection on Goulart's São Paulo hangers-on -- that Correio should be allowed to die before the January 6 "plebiscite." (LIMITED OFFICIAL USE)

PSYCHOLOGICAL

1. Local Press Reaction

Brazil/U.S. Relations -- Two Views

São Paulo papers are absorbed with the problem of relations between the United States and Brazil, especial attention focusing on the American Attorney General's surprise visit. With one significant exception, all papers hold that there is real trouble and that Brazil is mainly to blame. They believe that the rigid policies

0748

from England and exercises some personal persuasion. In any case, Quadros will retain a political base in São Paulo. Anyone with his vote-getting strength (and it is still impressive) will find politicians to jump on the band wagon. If the PTN should defect, the talk of a new Janista party might well amount to something. (LIMITED OFFICIAL USE)

4. Church Feud Breaks Into Print

There has long been an open split between the conservative and left wings of the Catholic Church in São Paulo (see Despatch 291 of June 5 and subsequent reports). The main issue has not, unfortunately, been traditional anti-liberalism versus a new social consciousness. If anything, the conservative wing has been more effective than the other in modern social endeavors. (The conservatives run an active and democratic labor movement, for example, while the left-wing Church labor movement has been mostly confined to talk.) The issue has rather been ideological: the left wing is violently anti-capitalist -- the United States being lumped among the capitalists -- and little inclined to view communism as a menace. One practical result of the left-wing attitude has been to keep the Catholic University firmly on the side of the Communists in student elections, swinging the balance of power in the State Student Union (União Estadual de Estudantes -- UEE) to the Communists on several occasions. São Paulo Cardinal-Archbishop MOTTA, a nice but evidently muddled old man, supports the left wing. Priests have told officers of the Consulate General that there is no parallel to this situation in any other Brazilian diocese.

Both the left and the conservative wings of the Church until recently preferred not to wash their dirty linen in public. The conservative "outs" are still publicly discreet when they are clergymen, but influential daily O Estado de S. Paulo has decided to speak out loudly in their defense. O Estado is well informed on the issue, and most of the brains in the dispute are apparently with the conservatives. The left wing, on the other hand, has impressive demagogic talent, especially among the Dominican priests and some of the Christian Democratic Party extremists. The left/right feud has been building up for years and might have broken into print in any case, but the catalyst seems to have been some recent flagrant left-wing abuses. One Alípio de FREITAS, reportedly suspended from priesthood for Communist activities in the northeast, made a Commie-line speech in São Paulo without any disclaimer from Cardinal Motta (Weekly Summary 49 and Airgram A-191 of December 27). Influential and effective members of the conservative wing were transferred or threatened with transfers to the interior of the State.

0747

polls on January 6.

The outright opposition to GOULART in São Paulo -- UDN and those like-minded -- has been singularly helpless in figuring out a way to cope with the plebiscite. The lack of an articulate opposition, however, has meant a lack of publicity for the whole issue, which may paradoxically be the most effective opposition possible. The wavering middle-ground opposition -- mostly the PSD and the other conservative old Getulistas -- is calling loudly for a presidential definition: what are Jango's plans and policies if he emerges strengthened from the vote? Failing a definition, these potential allies cannot campaign enthusiastically for the plebiscite. If things go on as they are, moreover, the outright and the wavering opposition currents talk of uniting behind an eventual anti-Goulart coup. This union would leave the President with very little political base indeed in São Paulo. The Paulista PTB does not get along with Goulart; his São Paulo military dispositivo looks shaky (Weekly Summary 51); his local labor dispositivo is neither dependable nor all-powerful.

Governor-elect Adhemar de BARROS has been much wiser than Goulart with his politics. Adhemar is still in Europe collecting photographs of himself with various world figures. He is postponing his local political maneuvers, it appears, until after both the holiday recess and the plebiscite. (LIMITED OFFICIAL USE)

2. DANTAS Still Talking Like Finance Minister

San Thiago Dantas visited São Paulo again to campaign for the plebiscite. Rumors to the contrary (see Weekly Summary 51), he still spoke like a hopeful Finance Minister and a partner of President Goulart. (OFFICIAL USE ONLY)

3. Janistas Falling Apart?

If the non-Janista opposition to Adhemar is slow in taking shape, the Janista group is doing no better. Federal Deputy Emílio CARLOS, leading vote-getter and spark plug of the PTN (Partido Trabalhista Nacional), makes little secret of his disenchantment with QUADROS. If the PTN should defect, Jânio would be left with only the MTR, which has a useful nucleus of Deputies in the State Legislative Assembly but not in the Federal Chamber. (LIMITED OFFICIAL USE)

Comment: Emílio Carlos has long had an off-again on-again relationship with Quadros. It might be on again when Jânio returns



ORIGIN/ACTION

ARA-4		
RMVR 1	REP	AF
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ARMY 5	CIA 10	NAVY 5
OSD 12	USIA 8	NSA 3

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

AIRGRAM

732-09/12-2762

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A-192 NO. LIMITED OFFICIAL USE

1963 JAN 2

DEPARTMENT OF STATE BUREAU OF INTER-AMERICAN AFFAIRS JAN 3 1963

TO : DEPARTMENT OF STATE

INFO : BRASILIA, RIO DE JANEIRO

FROM : AmConGen, SÃO PAULO DATE: December 27, 1962

SUBJECT : Weekly Summary No. 52

REF :

[redacted]
mcaafee
ARA/EST/B
1/3/63
A.J. Burton

TABLE OF CONTENTS

POLITICAL
1. Begin Holiday Recess
2. DANTAS Still Talking Like Finance Minister
3. Janistas Falling Apart?
4. Church Feud Breaks Into Print
5. Correio Paulistano Gone for Good?

PSYCHOLOGICAL
1. Local Press Reaction

POLITICAL

1. Begin Holiday Recess

Not even this year's "plebiscite" campaign and chronic semi-crisis have entirely overcome the traditional year's-end political apathy in São Paulo. The campaign belongs strictly to the politicians (and only a few of them); the public, from all appearances, could not be less interested. Politicians and political observers unanimously expect an easy victory for presidentialism in the plebiscite, but further than that they will not yet venture a guess. There is no precedent for predicting how the public will vote when an issue, and not a man, is the major question. The struggle is not so much between presidentialism and parlamentarism as between disinterest and the legal obligation to vote. Sanctions against non-voters are heavy on paper but often avoidable in practice; it remains to be seen whether they are strong enough to get an authoritative segment of the voters to the

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Drafted by: DCProper/el 12/26/62

Contents and Classification Approved by:

Clearances:

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INCOMING TELEGRAM — Department of State — ACTION COPY — PERMANENT RECORD COPY

47
Action
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CONFIDENTIAL

Control: 13514
Rec'd: December 26, 1962
10:39 p.m.

FROM: Rio de Janeiro

TO: Secretary of State

NO: 1202, December 26, 9 P.M.

PRIORITY

Embassy telegram 1194 732.00

Crisis atmosphere in Rio de Janeiro subsided over weekend and ensuing Christmas holiday. Having reportedly instituted legal proceedings against Diario Carioca for last weeks conspiracy charges, Lacerda issued Christmas eve good will message to people Guanabara. Goulart and War Minister Kruel also made conciliatory Christmas declarations emphasizing Brazilian devotion Christian sentiments, et cetera. Maritime strike only partially effective, will probably be abandoned soon.

Press reports two new military developments: (1) announcement of nationwide army alert until January 6 "in order guarantee order" during plebiscite campaign; and (2) convocation of December 26 meeting with Kruel of lieutenant-generals assigned Rio, statedly to consider non-political subjects. We have no indication at this point as to possible further significance these developments.

Navy Minister Sqzano December 22 announced he was dropping charges against admirals who returned decorations. Navy officer corps thus appears to have won this round at least in struggle with left-leaning Minister.

GORDON

MJA-6

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FILED Wash DC 12 PM '63

RIO DE JANEIRO-1202 732.00/12-2662

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NAME OF OFFICER & OFFICE SYMBOL	Wallis ES/B	DATE OF ACTION	Dec 63
DIRECTIONS TO RM/R			

0744

6. Political Notes

a. Correio do Povo carried an Associated Press account of "US News and World Report"s" recent analysis of the US Government attitude toward Brazil. The article was printed prominently at the top of the front page with a four-column headline reading "North American Magazine Makes Terrible Libel Against Brazilian Authorities".

Comment: The location of the article and the wording of the headline is significant in the conservative and usually pro-American Correio do Povo.

b. A conference of RGS mayors was postponed from December 22 to December 29, in order to take advantage of President Goulart's scheduled presence here. In addition to addressing the conference that day, Goulart plans to meet with Governor-elect Meneghetti and to inaugurate the new TV-Gaucha station.

7. Ecònomic Notes

a. Statistics released by the Faculty of Economic Sciencess of URGS indicate that the cost of living in RGS has increased 42.4 percent during the last 11 months.

b. The maritime strike has had no apparent effect upon cargo movement in Pôrto Alegre.

c. RGS transportation companies have started pressing for a 40 percent increase in freight rates.

W. Douglas McLain, Jr.
American Vice Consul

cc.- Consular Affairs, Rio
Political Section, Rio
Political Section, Brasília
ARA/EST/Brazil, Washington
INR/RAR/P, Washington

Department: Pass to all posts in Brazil.

Mail

0743

4. Pay Raise for RGS Government Workers

The Assembly passed Governor Brizola's lame-duck bill to raise the salaries for State employees in a form only slightly watered-down by the so-called Suely ammendment. The raises, effective in January, will add about Cr$16 billion to the annual budget, bringing the anticipated deficit to be inherited by the Meneghetti administration to about Cr$36 billion. The original Brizola Cr$79 billion budget, which included about Cr$6 billion for pay raises, estimated a Cr$11 million surplus, but the Assembly, after an examination of optimistic revenue estimates, approved a budget which was scheduled to produce a Cr$21 billion deficit. After approval of this budget Brizola introduced his bill for an additional Cr$15 billion in salaries.

Meneghetti has stated that although he considers the budget unworkable, he will try by "all legal means" to operate within its provisions. He points out that while government workers definitely need a raise, as a group they consume a disproportionately large share of the State's budget (an estimated 43 percent) to the detriment of other sectors of the population.

Comment: It is difficult to see how Meneghetti can avoid serious money trouble as soon as he takes office. While he will undoubtedly try to cut spending, the near-impossibility of significantly thinning the ranks of the bureaucracy, leaves him with no other recourse than to try to cut spending in the less-watery 57 percent of the budget earmarked for purposes other than salaries.

5. Governor Brizola's Activities

The Diário de Notícias, in a front page editorial, criticized Herbert Levy, President of UDN, for his accusations last week that Brizola was trying to promote Federal intervention in RGS as a prelude to intervention in Guanabara. The newspaper commented that Brizola's actions during the time of Quadros' resignation in 1961 should be sufficient guarantee that he would not connive at preventing Governor-elect Meneghetti from taking office but failed to draw a distinction between whose ox is being gored. In a letter to the Diário de Notícias Governor Brizola denied Levy's charges and attacked him as a representative of the interests of the "dominate classes".

The homenagem scheduled for Brizola on December 22 (see Weekly Summary Nº 35, A-39) was postponed to January 22, at Brizola's request, in order that he might devote more of his time to the plebiscite campaign.

Last week Governor Brizola stepped down as president of CODESUL (Comissão de Desenvolvimento Sul) and Governor Braga of Paraná took his place.

0742

Jornal do Dia appropriately commented that Meneghetti had been presented with his first crisis even before taking office.

Comment: While the PL's actions could be based on its dissatisfaction with Cabral's appointment and Governor-elect Meneghetti "independent line", it must be recalled that the PL has been traditionally in favor of parliamentarism and that it always has been noted for its intransigence even in maverick-minded RGS. The numerically weak PL must count on support from the PTB and other opposition splinter groups in its attempt to install parliamentarism here. The PTB just conceivably might assist in the passage of this measure when the recessed Assembly re-convenes for its last ten days in late January, if only to embarass Meneghetti. It might do so upon the assumption that it would always be able to vote parliamentarism out again when next the PTB elects a Governor. Best present estimates are that although Meneghetti might loose his two PL Secretaries, the parliamentarism measure will not get off the ground. However, the PL's actions are the first signs of legislative trouble ahead for Meneghetti whose uneasy coalition, even at full strength, will not command an Assembly majority.

2. Departure of Consul Sharp

The departure of Principal Officer Frederick D. Sharp III, on December 20, was mentioned in a small paragraph in the "Diversas" column of Correio do Povo. In his weekly Friday night radio address, Governor Brizola read the item and discussed it for about 10 minutes. The gist of his comments was that"this represents the end of an episode and the withdrawal of a diplomat who said the Brazilian people needed 30 more years of education before they will be able to vote intelligently.... "This is a great Christmas present for us".

3. Pre-Christmas Bombings

On Saturday, December 22, the former home of Arlindo Pasqualini, anti-Brizola director of Fôlha da Tarde, and the home of Adel Carvalho, contributor to the Caldas Junior newspapers, were rocked with bomb blasts which injured no one. Pasqualini, whose son and daughter-in-law and grandchildren live in this former residence, had received threatening letters for his criticism of Brizola. He reacted angrily and subjectively with a front page editorial in the Fôlha da Tarde which linked Brizola with the bombings and congratulated him on his success in "provoking hatred among Brazilians and introducing vilainy as a political method". He advised the "terrorists of Mr. Brizola" of his change of address and wrote that it was obvious Brizola had admirers of great worth and exceptional talents. Although on the next day Brizola published denials of Pasqualini's unveiled charges that his was the responsibility for the bombings, the newspaperman repeated his accusations in another page one editorial in which he used the harshest language the Consulate has so far seen published in reference to Brizola.

0741

Origin/ACTION: ARA-4

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ARA	EUR	FE
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ARMY 5	CIA 15	NAVY 5
OSD 12	USIA 8	NSA 3
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Belo Horizonte 1

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

20 AIRGRAM

732.00/12-2662

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A-30 NO. | OFFICIAL USE ONLY | Air Pouch HANDLING INDICATOR

TO : DEPARTMENT OF STATE

Brasilia -1 Salvador -1
Belem -1 Santos -1
Curitiba -1 Sao Paulo -1
Recife -1 Rio de Janeiro -1

1962 DEC 31 AM 10:45 CLASSIFICATION LEVEL OF AFFAIRS 1963 ANALYSIS & DISTRIBUTION ENTRIES

FROM : Amconsul PÔRTO ALEGRE

DATE: DEC 26 1962

SUBJECT : PÔRTO ALEGRE WEEKLY SUMMARY No 36

REF :

1. PL Threatens to Bolt from the ADP
2. Departure of Consul Sharp
3. Pre-Christmas Bombings
4. Pay Raises for RGS Government Workers
5. Governor Brizola's Activities
6. Political Notes
7. Economic Notes

1. PL Threatens to Bolt from the ADP

Reportedly dissatisfied with Governor-elect Meneghetti's appointment of Plínio Cabral (an admitted ex-Communist) as Chief of Civil Household, the PL (Partido Libertador) last week threatened to withdraw from the Governor-elect's coalition Aliança Democrática Popular (ADP). At the same time a PL leader introduced a measure in the State Assembly which would establish a state parliamentary system. If the PL carries out its threat to withdraw, Meneghetti will have to seek a new Secretary of Interior and Justice to replace PL Deputy Coelho de Souza, and a new Secretary of Public Security to replace PL member Otávio Cardoso; both nominated only last week. The PL's bill would greatly reduce the governor's executive powers by removing from his power of appointment and control almost the entire state cabinet. At the week's end, Dr. Décio Martins Costa, president of the PL, stated, somewhat paradoxically, that while the PL will not participate in Meneghetti's government, the ADP should be maintained. The press is referring to the entire situation as the "low blow" and the

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Clearances:

Ret no action ARA/CSP/LO 1/9/63 RJ Burton

0740

5. Expected Visit of Governor Brizola

Governor Leonel Brizola of Rio Grande do Sul is scheduled to come to Belo Horizonte on December 26. (Note: This report is being drafted on December 26, before the Governor's arrival.) The visit is not official, although he will call on Governor Magalhães Pinto as a matter of protocol. According to Governor Brizola's telegram to Governor Magalhães Pinto announcing the visit, he is coming at the invitation of "students, labor unions, and journalists" to discuss national problems and the plebiscite question. The main part of the program will consist of a talk in the auditorium of the Department of Public Health building and of a televised press conference.

The visit has not met with any significant public enthusiasm. Most of the publicity, which has been only moderate, seems to be self-generated, with Governor Brizola apparently committed to foot the bill. The press has reported that a journalist by the name of Hélio Polito has been charged by Governor Brizola with the task of giving publicity to his visit and specifically with the job of arranging for the preparation of posters reading: "The people of Minas Gerais present their greetings and respects to the Governor of Rio Grande do Sul." Newspaper announcements of the visit evidently stem also from a single source and are paid for by the interested parties. According to press reports, Governor Brizola has specifically requested that his press conference be broadcast throughout the State irrespective of cost, the clear implication being that he will pay for all expenses.

The lack of public enthusiasm may be ascribed in part to the fact that this being a holiday period, newspapers are published only intermittently and most people are vacationing or celebrating the holiday season with their families. There is some reason to suspect, however, that a great many people look askance at Governor Brizola's visit. The newspapers have reported some protests to that visit. One such report relates the incident of a professor in the University of Minas Gerais who was so incensed at seeing political posters of Governor Brizola pasted on the wall of the Post Office that he ripped off some of them himself. He then went to the editorial office of the Estado de Minas, the most widely read daily, and lodged a public protest with that paper against the display of Governor Brizola's "subversive" posters in a government building.

Edmund A. da Silveira,
American Consul

0739

problems, and their inclusion in the Government would give the Governor the majority he needs in the Assembly to pass legislation he deems essential. In these two parties, the name of Federal deputy-elect Bento Gongalves Filho, State president of the PSP, has also been very much in the news in connection with a possible Cabinet appointment.

The State Administration has been conducting a serious study aimed at a fundamental reorganization of the administrative structure. Recommendations stemming from that study will affect both the Secretariats and semi-independent agencies. At the Cabinet level the general expectation is that legislation will be recommended to organize the Secretariat of Labor-already authorized but not yet implemented--and to create two new Secretariats, those of Economic Development and Administration. Slated for elimination are the Secretariats of the Interior and Transportation, which have become obsolete, having lost most of their original functions to other departments. What leads the Consulate to feel that the study is serious is that the working group is headed by Prof. Paulo Neves de Carvalho, one of the Governor's advisors and a man who enjoys a high professional reputation in the field of public administration. He has studied in the United States, where he received a Ph. D. degree in public administration from U.C.L.A.

4. Possible Alignment of Government Forces in the State Legislative Assembly

In his continuing efforts to ensure a safe majority in the State Legislative Assembly for his proposals, Governor Magalhaes Pinto has been in frequent consultation with the leaders of the political parties represented in the Assembly. As of now, indications are that the Governor may count on the support of the PTB, PSP, and the three minor parties in the Assembly. These parties, together with the UDN, would give him a safe majority--56 deputies out of 82--except for the fact that party discipline is so fickle that individual deputies can vote against party directives with relative impunity. The prospects will favor the Governor, however, if he is able to bring into his administration, as is the tendency at the moment, the PTB and the PSP which have 12 and 9 deputies, respectively. These two parties would give the Governor a reasonably safe majority.

The Governor's attempts to entice PR support have met with failure despite the good personal relations he enjoys with PR president Artur Bernardes Filho. Having suffered a serious setback in the last elections, the PR is in no position to bargain, and as a consequence the Governor is unwilling to pay the price asked: presumably a Cabinet post or State bank position on the board of directors. As for as the PSD is concerned, it has always been in the opposition, where it is expected to remain since, unlike the PR, it has retained strong electorate backing.

0738

Quadros' personal secretary--, Cirilo da Cunha (UDN), Bento Gonçalves (PSP), and Senator Camilo Nogueira da Gama (PTB). The committee has programmed a series of meetings throughout the State, extending to January 4.

The reason for the refusal of the PSD and the PR to enter in the inter-party scheme is not disagreement on aims. Rather, those parties, and in particular the PSD, have stood in opposition to the Magalhães Pinto Administration and, therefore, do not wish to be identified in any way with an arrangement sponsored by the Administration. In the case of the PSD, there are the additional factors of Senator Kubitschek's leadership and Presidential ambitions that may collide with those of Governor Magalhães Pinto.

3. Impending Cabinet Reorganization

Speculation about the coming reshuffle of Governor Magalhães Pinto's Cabinet and immediate staff, planned for January, has been intensified as a result of a rash of resignations incumbent officials have submitted in order to allow the Governor a free hand in the reorganization of his staff. The Governor's present staff, including Cabinet members, was reshuffled prior to the October elections to permit many of the incumbents to run for elective office. With the elections out of the way, the Governor is now able to draw on elected officials to fill policy-making positions in the various executive departments and semi-independent agencies on a permanent basis. A large number of the incumbents, however, are expected to remain in the Government either in their present or different positions.

The speculation revolves around names of potential appointees, political parties to be represented other than the UDN, and basic reorganization of the administrative machinery. Among the new names, that of Federal deputy-elect Aparecido de Oliveira (UDN) is most often mentioned for the post of Secretary of Agriculture, a position he occupied temporarily at the time incumbent Secretary Pedro Salvo went to the United States on a business trip. That Aparecido de Oliveira may occupy some important post in the State Government is a plausible expectation since he remains very close to the Governor, having been at one time his personal secretary in private life. Although it would be idle to discuss at this time other names in the news in connection with the personnel reorganization, it is interesting to note that if the present talked-about candidates are appointed, there is likely to be a marked shift to the left in the Administration's political tone.

Of the parties, other than the UDN, that appear to have a chance of gaining Cabinet or other important Government posts, the PTB and the PSP are in the forefront. They are both represented in the State Legislative Assembly, have been for some time sympathetic to the Governor's political

0737

His television appearances have included two interviews--one in Rio de Janeiro on December 1 and the other in Belo Horizonte on December 10--in which he was more explicit than usual in indicating his reasons for wanting a return to Presidential rule, what type of government he contemplates after the plebiscite, and what he expects from a strong President. Under the present regime, he maintained, authority is diluted, and as a consequence responsibility cannot be ascribed to anyone. By way of illustrating his point, he said that in seeking assistance for problems in Minas Gerais that fall under the jurisdiction of the Central Government, he had sometimes to go to the President, sometimes to the Prime Minister, and sometimes to one of the other ministers with the result that he got nowhere.

The Governor has often advocated a new road for Brazil. In defining what this road was, he said that it should have no ideological ties with extreme leftist or rightist movements. "We must," he said on the Belo Horizonte television program, "reject solutions based on the exercise of force." I often preach non-conformity but not rebellion and the consequent worsening of the crisis. Revolution and coups are no remedy. I preach a democratic solution." What he expects of a government with the authority to rule is an end to a policy of economic development based on inflation and of favoritism to the few. He wants a government that will be able to institute basic economic, social, and political reforms without violence to individual initiative and freedom. In a reference to foreign economic assistance, he said that Brazil, while receiving that aid, should be able also to count on the industry of its citizens and on its national capital resources. He insisted all along on a democratic foundation for a strong government.

The second phase of the plebiscite campaign has operated through an inter-party committee, actually established under the auspices of the Governor and the Administration party, the UDN, but to which all parties have been invited. To date three parties have joined forces with the UDN: the Labor Party (PTB), the Social Progressive Party (PSP), and the small Socialist Party (PSB). The PSD and the Republican Party (PR) have apparently decided to campaign outside the inter-party scheme. There is some question whether Vice Governor Clovis Salgado, a member of the PR, is supporting the inter-party arrangement. The fact that his signature does not appear in the agreement setting-up the committee constitutes strong evidence that he is not, even though inter-party committee officials claim that the reason for the absence of his signature is that he was in Guanabara at the time the document was signed.

Among the leaders in the inter-party arrangement are Federal deputies--elect San Tiago Dantas (PTB), José Aparecido de Oliveira (UDN)--ex-President

0736

It is too early to say whether or not there has been more than a temporary setback in the close relations that had developed between the Governor and the President since Federal deputy-elect Tancredo Neves left the Prime Ministry. The persistent opposition of the PSD to the Magalhães Pinto Administration and the prospects of the return of Federal deputy Tancredo Neves to President Goulart's Cabinet, however, may once more bring about the political isolation of the Governor of Minas Gerais. Having alienated the hierarchy of his own party, the National Democratic Union (UDN), he runs the risk of being left high and dry.

To the extent that the Governor will now attempt to get back in the good graces of his party, it will be possible to determine whether he has come to a parting of ways with the President. If there is, in fact, a split between the two men, its basic cause may well be that there is no longer a reciprocity of interest between them. On the question of the plebiscite, for instance, the Governor cannot offer the President anything that he does not already have. Indeed, virtually all political parties in the State have come out in favor of voting to strengthen Presidential powers, and with the possible exception of the Governor's own party, he has had little influence in this outcome. Even the Governor's influence on the State section of the UDN is far from absolute. A number of UDN municipal committees and Federal and State deputies are reported to be dissatisfied with his opposition to the national stand of his party on the plebiscite question. President Goulart may have reached the conclusion that at this juncture the Governor needs him more than he needs the Governor.

2. Developments in the Plebiscite Campaign

Governor Magalhães Pinto has continued with his efforts to promote a large turn-out at the polls for the plebiscite and has been urging the electorate to vote against the parliamentary regime. Only the results at the polls will give evidence of his success, but the predominant note so far is public apathy. Although the general expectation is that the electorate will reject the parliamentary system, its opponents fear a high proportion of abstentions.

The plebiscite campaign has consisted of two main phases. In one of these the Governor has taken the lead and played a virtually single role. In the other a number of political leaders have endeavored to bring about collective party action. The Governor has personally taken the initiative in advancing his cause through meetings with Governors of other States and television appearances and speeches in Minas Gerais and elsewhere in Brazil. He has, for instance, received in the last two or three weeks the visits of the Governors-elect of Rio de Janeiro, Pernambuco, and Ceará.

0735

the coming plebiscite, the President having presumably relegated the Governor to the backstage in the political maneuverings.

The close collaboration of political enemies of the Governor with the President may be a source of friction. The political column of the local opposition daily, Correio de Minas, appearing on December 2, stated that the Governor had told the President at their previous meeting that he could not participate in the plebiscite campaign side by side with old political adversaries such as Senator Juscelino Kubitschek and Federal deputy-elect Tancredo Neves, both of the opposition Social Democratic Party (PSD). According to this source, the President has replied that he had no reason to reject the collaboration of those men.

Events connected with a meeting in Rio de Janeiro on December 6 between the Governor and the President lend weight to the belief that there is some kind of friction between the two men. The local Catholic daily, O Diário, a generally reliable paper, reported that although the meeting had been previously set by the President, the Governor had to wait in Rio for the President for several days. In order finally to corner the President, this news source reported, the Governor was forced to stay up until 2:30 in the morning at the President's hotel to await his arrival. Although the Governor has denied this episode, the denial has left some room for doubt. At that early hour a meeting was set for later in the day. According to the same paper, the conversation at the meeting was fraught with dissent, the Governor having blamed the Federal Government for timidity, contradictions, and aimlessness in the administration of the country's finances and urged the President to adopt firm and clear-cut administrative policies. The President is reported to have been angry with the Governor for his charges of moral corruption and disorganization in the Federal Administration.

On his return from Rio, the Governor said at his regular press conference that although his meeting with the President had taken place in a friendly atmosphere, they had engaged in a "frank exchange of ideas." In view of the moderation that characterizes the Governor in all his acts and of the context in which the statement was made, the audience left with the impression that he was at the very least quite unhappy with the President.

The Governor's own version of the meeting was that he had suggested to the President certain measures to resolve the present national crisis. Among these measures was the appointment, immediately following the plebiscite, of efficient, honest, and experienced officials in the high echelons of the Federal Administration.

0734

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OSD 12	USIA 8	NSA 3

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DEPARTMENT OF STATE

AIRGRAM

732.00/12-2662

732.111

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A-30 NO. | OFFICIAL USE ONLY | HANDLING INDICATOR

TO : DEPARTMENT OF STATE

FROM : AMCONSUL, Belo Horizonte DATE: December 26, 1962

SUBJECT : POLITICAL SUMMARY FOR DECEMBER, 1962 (through December 25) STATE OF MINAS GERAIS

REF : --

Table of Contents

1. Possible Rift Between Governor Magalhães Pinto and President Goulart
2. Developments in the Plebiscite Campaign
3. Impending Cabinet Reorganization
4. Possible Alignment of Government Forces in the State Legislative Assembly
5. Expected Visit of Governor Brizola

- - -

1. Possible Rift Between Governor Magalhães Pinto and President Goulart

There have been some indications of a possible fall out between Governor Magalhães Pinto and President Goulart. The most plausible reason for the fall out, as given by those who believe that a deterioration in the previously close relations between the Governor and the President has actually taken place, is that President Goulart has not treated Governor Magalhães Pinto with the consideration he feels is due him for his outright support of the President. According to this side of the argument, the alleged friction has arisen specifically in connection with

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Drafted by: EdaSilveira:ada 12/26/1962

Contents and Classification Approved by:

Clearances:

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In reality, the practice of Communism, making a boast of hypocrisy, is the most absolute, unquestioned negation of ideas. This, moreover, is easily deduced from its own propaganda, which cannot hide or disguise its complete contempt for everything having to do with the dignity of the individual.

Exactly the opposite occurs with our Western civilization, whose organization has as its basis this dignity, which is the condition fundamental to the existence of happy, prosperous nations and peoples. There is, therefore, no place here for this foreign regime, which disdains that which is most worthy, the human being.

27 years ago the Armed Forces, to the unanimous applause of our people, gave the deserved response, weapons in hand, to the insidious Communist conspiracy. In Rio de Janeiro, in Recife, in Natal, heroes sacrificed themselves in order categorically to affirm that the sons of this noble country will defend at the cost/their own lives the right of its people to live free, worthy lives. of

Convinced that democracy, which offers equal opportunities to all and which, under the protection of the law, assures to everybody freedom and the conditions for progress, is the only truly human and just system, we Brazilians will proceed sincerely and confidently in our march toward the future, faithful to the sentiments of humanitarianism, which in the past as the present has been a fixed constant in the guidance of the nation.

And we, soldiers of Caxias, reaffirm at this time, bowing in our thoughts before the sacred memory of the glorious dead of '58, that we are alert, vigilant, and ready to defend the most sacred heritage of our elders: the independence and the integrity of Brazil, the honor and the dignity of the Brazilian people.

Fighting men of Brazil /"armas"/, attention! The nation relies on your conscientious, unshakeable, and permanent loyalty.

0732

UNCLASSIFIED

Translation of Minister of War Amauri Kruel's Order of the Day,

November 27, 1962

November 27, if it makes us recall and lament the sacrifice of Brazilian lives, to whose memory we render our fond gratitude and the sincerest and most expressive homage, also brings us comfort in being able to affirm that, 27 years ago, Brazil sealed with the brave and generous blood of her heroic sons her fidelity to democracy and her faith in liberty, the only principle capable of giving sure direction to a nation in the conquest of a humanly just and worthy life.

If, on the one hand, we regret that in that time some few Brazilians were the victims of poisoning by the insidious virus spreading unwholesome ideas--because they are destructive of the human personality --to the extent of making their own hands, in the quiet of the night, the vehicles executive of the treasonous assassination of their compatriots, on the other hand we exalt the prompt, energetic and decisive reaction that, interpreting the will of the vast majority of the people, convincingly proved our spontaneous and vehement repulse of a regime that, by the very means utilized in the vain attempt to impose itself, showed its brutality and inhumanity.

Craftily and insincerely proposing to bring about better material conditions of life, Communism seeks to insinuate itself into the bosom of society under the false pretense of being the redeeming idea, when in reality its true aims are to dominate the world and enslave man for the benefit of a small, ambitious and power-hungry minority. Deception, accompanied by trickery and hypocisy, is its favorite weapon. Calling itself mankind's salvation, it is, in fact, the merciless executioner of human dignity, whose manifestation it will have to destroy beforehand, prior to imposing its absolute rule. Liberty, religious belief, individual rights, and many other conquests of Western civilization are words without meaning in the language of materialist Communism, which not harboring the idea of the human being, denies everything that might contribute toward dignifying it.

It calls itself the benefactor of the people, who know no better because they are submitted to the absolute bondage of a minority which, joined in an organization to which it gives the name "party", claiming infallibility for itself, does not admit of the discussion of ideas or allow the existence of an opposition.

0731

of the government's actions, particularly its assignment of figures like Osvino to key posts. The military (by which is meant, throughout this report, the centrist majority) is profoundly concerned lest Goulart so consolidate his "dispositivo" or scheme of military commands--operating, presumably, in concert with labor-led public agitators--as to enable him to carry off a coup in his favor. Their acts are designed to discourage him from trying it.

Whether the military will succeed in holding Goulart in check--in frustrating his supposed intent to impose either a Castro-like or Varga-ist regime on the nation--is a question of first importance which regrettably is unanswerable. The military is sufficiently alerted. Individual generals seem disposed to go along with a golpe as soon as Goulart makes known his supposed anti-democratic intentions. The trouble is that Goulart will not tip his hand, particularly if this is the design he does harbor. And in the meantime, the military seems reluctant to draw a line beyond which they will not let Goulart go.

For the Ambassador:

Frank Micelotta
Third Secretary

Enclosures: As stated.

1. War Minister Kruel's November 27 Order of the Day

2. List of recipients of Order of Naval Merit

0730

labor leaders, especially in confrontations with rabidly anti-Communist and Goulart-hating Guanabara Governor Carlos Lacerda, has intensified that suspicion.

A closely connected issue is that of Federal use of the military in interference with local law enforcement, such as on the occasion of Navy Minister Suzano's despatching a contingent of marines aboard a Naval vessel to settle a labor dispute in Santos (Weeka 44).

The same sector of military opinion disapproves of many tenets of Brazil's "independent" foreign policy. The Goulart government's equivocal stand during the Cuban crisis particularly provoked them. The military is worried about the presence of suspected Communists or pro-Communists in the Goulart government.

While hoping by their public statements and attitude-taking to exert pressure on the government toward generalized goals, the military appears to have one specific, immediate objective: that of keeping the Ministry of War in the hands of a trustworthy, effective anti-Communist military man. Present incumbent Amauri Kruel seems to fit their specifications (though some might cavil that he is too closely linked with Goulart personally). Thus, when Kruel, who was made War Minister in the Provisional Cabinet appointed as a consequence of the September Capanema Law (Airgram 400), was confirmed in his post along with the remainder of that Cabinet (Weeka 49), 61 generals, almost every one of those assigned in the Rio area, showed up at the War Ministry December 12 to congratulate him and make an ostentatious public display of their support and approval. Probably any of a number of other high-ranking generals in the post would similarly satisfy the military. Their aim is probably not so much to promote the ascension to or the retention in the job of this or that figure but to keep Osvino Ferreira Alves out of it. Osvino has been rumored for the position, though that likelihood seems reduced in the wake of the developments reported above. Jair Dantas Ribeiro's name has also come up as a sort of compromise candidate capable of satisfying Goulart and the bulk of the military. However, his star too has faded in recent days.

Lurking constantly in the background is the shadow of coup. It is, of course, the unstated threat, the enforcer, behind the military's pressure on Goulart. Conversely, it is also the military's fear, one of the basic reasons for their disapproval of so many

0729

1959, to the Navy Minister, under cover of a letter in which he begged out of an order which would now include persons whose admittance he considered "a derision and a mockery" and who had never done anything for the Navy. As of December 18, 44 naval officers had followed his lead. Twenty-four of these were retired admirals. Twenty other officers who returned medals, however, were on active duty, although six admirals among them were unassigned.

Recipients of the Order of Naval Merit were awarded the medal in ceremonies in Rio de Janeiro, December 13. Later the same day, President Goulart and others were honored with a luncheon aboard the cruiser Tamandare in Rio harbor. Many of the Navy officers previously awarded the Order of Merit failed to wear the medal at the day's ceremonies.

Speaking at the luncheon aboard the Tamandare, Minister Suzano's talk at the luncheon echoed the line that has made him objectionable to so much of the Navy: he said that in order to achieve a just, Christian society in Brazil, Brazilians would have to see to it that "our wealth really be ours, exploited by us, for our own well-being and happiness".

III. Conclusion: Military Pressures on Goulart

None of this took place in a vacuum. The moderates and conservatives in the military have, with full knowledge that they were doing so, been reacting politically to political actions. This despite their protestations of their wish to divorce the military from politics. Alarmed by the trend they see the Goulart administration taking, they are exerting efforts to halt or reverse that trend.

Centrist elements in the Armed Forces (probably 65-70 per cent of the officer corps) dislike the Goulart administration's tendency to favor ultra-nationalist, leftist, anti-American officers and to place them in positions of key importance. The assignment of Osvino Ferreira Alves to the 1st Army is the outstanding example of this; another is Navy Minister Suzano, still another is Goulart's dependence on General Albino Silva not only as his Chief of Military Household, but in special missions such as his dramatic flight to Cuba during the crisis and the entrusting to him of the politically significant problem of rice shortages in Rio de Janeiro (Week 49).

The Armed Forces have always viewed Goulart's labor contacts with suspicion. Osvino's intimacy with leftist or pro-Communist



that in the world in which we live there is no place for neutrals and the non-committed."

Signs there were that the Goulart government had attempted to play down the November 27 observances. Kruel's Order of the Day, strong as it was, went out to the separate commands accompanied by strict instructions that its use was to be exclusive in all units; it was not to be altered, replaced or added to by local commanders. At the solemnities in São João Batista Cemetery, attendance of the public was not encouraged. Morais read his speech at breakneck speed, apparently under orders to do so. He did not pause when applause broke out. In fact, guards posted throughout the crowd quickly discouraged manifestations of approval when portions of Morais' speech evoked them.

Nevertheless, the military was encouraged by this year's observance of November 27. Even the haste of Morais' reading of his speech at the cemetery did not completely choke off cries (or mutterings) of "Muito bem!" (Hear, hear!), some proceeding from generals and admirals sharing the reviewing stand with Goulart and Lima. Our Army Attache was told by a number of his contacts that Rolim's speech at the Clube Militar would have caused him to be jailed a few months ago. And many military men commented in private (as newspapers did publicly) on the irony of Hermes Lima's presence at the cemetery ceremonies in view of his personal participation in the 1935 plot. Raul Ryff's present occupancy of the post of Press Secretary to President Goulart was similarly noted.

C. The Order of Naval Merit Awards

Navy Week, celebrated December 7-13, came hard after. President Goulart, with the concurrence of Prime Minister Hermes Lima, approved a list of persons to be awarded the Navy's Order of Naval Merit drawn up under the responsibility of Navy Minister Araujo Suzano. The list (copy attached) included such notorious Communist-sympathizers, leftists, ultra-nationalists, and haters of the United States as Leonel Brizzola, Admiral Candido da Costa Aragão, Carlos Lacerda, Air Force Brigadeiro Francisco Teixeira, Federal Deputies Sergio Magalhaes, Floy Dutra, Bocayuva Cunha, State Deputy Adalgisa Nery, journalist Samuel Wainer, Raul Ryff, etc. Two of Minister Suzano's sons were also on the list.

First to rebel was Navy Commander Julio de Sá Bierrenbach, captain of a Navy frigate and formerly Naval aide to Governor Carlos Lacerda. Bierrenbach returned his medal, awarded him in



the commemorations. One newspaper columnist quoted a general at the solemnities at São João Batista Cemetery as saying: "I never saw so many admirals together". And an admiral's reply: "Only on a date like this, one of unanimous rejection of the cowardly enemies of our country, can Admiral Suzano (Minister of the Navy) count on such an impressive turnout of our companions". Ceremonies on the evening of the same day at the Clube Militar also were well-attended.

As for what was said, War Minister Kruel's Order of the Day (full text attached), itself a strong anti-Communist statement, merely pointed out the road down which others went farther. Kruel swiftly dismissed the Communists of 1935 as "victims of poisoning by the insidious virus spreading unhealthy ideas" and proceeded further to condemn Communism as "the most absolute and unmistakeable negation of ideas" which "seeks... to insinuate itself into the bosom of society" in order to "dominate the world and enslave mankind...in complete contempt for all that refers to the dignity of the human being." Concluding, Kruel promised that Brazilians "will continue, serene and confident, in our march into the future, faithful to humanist sentiments...". The Army, he pledged, would remain "attentive, vigilant, and ready to defend...the independence and integrity of Brazil..."

At the traditional ceremonies at São João Batista Cemetery in Rio de Janeiro, at which President Goulart and Prime Minister Hermes Lima were present, General Aluisio de Miranda Morais gave the address for the Armed Forces. Beginning dramatically, with an invocation of the ghosts of those who died in the Communist attempt, Morais swore that "the abject spectacle of November 27, 1935 will never be repeated in this land...This is not only the firm determination of the national will, but the unshakeable aim of the Armed Forces which have called me to this public hearing--as their interpreter--to manifest this belief..."

Morais termed Communism "a totalitarian mystique as false and tortuous as it is surreptitious in its shameless seductions," "sordid evolutionist materialism" for which "right and justice are chimeras."

The two speakers at the Clube Militar the evening of November 27 were equally harsh in their denunciation of Communism, but General Inacio Freitas Rolim was unique among all the day's military declaration-makers in alluding to a tendency of the present government to play the Communist game. "...The invasion of India by troops of Communist China", he said, "...is proof

0726

One generalized objective of these displays is that of pressuring President Goulart to cease promoting the influence of pro-Communist or dangerously leftist figures in government and especially in the military. A specific objective seems to be that of retaining General Amauri Kruel in the Ministry of War--or blocking the ascension of Osvino Ferreira Alves to the post in the Cabinet to be named after the January 6 plebiscite. The larger political panorama contains signs that these efforts may be having some effect to the extent at least of imposing caution on Goulart and his advisors.

II. Military Displays Discontent

A. The Maurell Filho Case

General Emilio Maurell Filho had been Commander of the 1st Military Region only four months when he was directed by 1st Army Commander General Osvino Ferreira Alves to relieve Colonel José Campos Aragao for having made a speech favorable to the United States. Maurell refused. "Invited" to assume another post by army Chief of Staff Machado Lopes, Maurell declined, holding firm even when War Minister Kruel reiterated the invitation. It was not until President Goulart himself called Maurell to his presence that he agreed October 30 to leave his 1st Military Region post.

On November 6 Maurell made a speech in the form of an "order of the day" describing in scarcely-veiled terms the circumstances of his removal. In it he declared that "the fight against Communism is a permanent goal to be achieved, with all its energy and perserverance, by the armed forces." He denounced the "participation of officers and enlisted men in party politics"; "the association of military men with labor organizations, some of them of notoriously Communist tendencies," etc. When Maurell officially assumed his new post the next day, 28 high-ranking generals showed up at the ceremony uninvited. Maurell's new boss, Chief of Staff Machado Lopes, hurriedly ended the ceremonies in order to avoid embarrassing displays or pronouncements.

B. The November 27 Commemoration

Every November 27 Brazil pays homage to the 28 soldiers who died in the 1935 Communist attempt on that date to bring off a coup. This year, in their attendance at scheduled ceremonies and in the tone and content of their pronouncements, the military seemed to evidence a feeling that there was particular point in

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DEPARTMENT OF STATE

AIRGRAM

732.00/12-2662
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NO.

HANDLING INDICATOR

TO : Department of State

FROM : AmEmbassy RIO De JANEIRO DATE: Dec. 26, 1962

SUBJECT : Brazilian Military Uneasy Over Political Situation

REF :

I. Introduction and Summary

In the past crucial weeks following the elections and preceding the January plebiscite, the Brazilian military has displayed increasing restiveness over the administration's toleration or encouragement of leftist-nationalist elements on the political scene and over its evident willingness to manipulate the military to suspect ends. Thus, on three separate occasions impressive numbers of high-ranking military men have made a point of showing their distaste for Communism or manifesting their support for those who go on record as opposing the use of the military as a political tool of the administration.

The first of these occasions was the ceremony marking the departure of General Maurell Filho from the command of the 1st Military Region. Removed for political reasons, Maurell had made a speech warning of the danger of Communist infiltration and decrying the involvement of some military men in political activities.

The second major occasion was the November 27 commemoration of the 1935 Communist takeover attempt. The third involved the award of the Navy Order of Merit to numerous civilian and military figures during Navy Week, December 7-13.

FORM DS-323 4-62

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Drafted by: POL: FMicheletti

Contents and Classification Approved by: EMB: Minister Bond

Clearances: POL: JKeppel

0724

SECRET

-2- 1194, December 22, 4 p.m. from Rio de Janeiro

returning navy merit medal.

Strike of maritime workers continuing, navy reportedly preparing operate enough merchant marine ships to assure petroleum and food supplies.

GORDON

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SECRET

0723

INCOMING TELEGRAM — Department of State — ACTION COPY — PERMANENT RECORD COPY

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FROM: Rio de Janeiro

TO: Secretary of State

NO: 1194, December 22, 4 p.m.

PRIORITY

Embassy telegram 1191

We get impression that any plans Osvino and company may have had for direct intervention in Guanabara have either been scrubbed or postponed, possibly at meeting yesterday which Osvino reportedly held with various senior army, navy and air force officers and Santiago Dantas, at which "security measures" (i.e., probably personnel changes) "particularly in Guanabara" were discussed. ULTIMA HORA reduces scare nature its treatment by claiming First Army intelligence has penetrated Lacerda plot thus nipping in bud. There may indeed not have been any idea of actually intervening at this time (and in our opinion atmosphere in armed forces not propitious at moment for such attempt), "plot" scare possibly being intended (a) to reduce effectiveness of anticipated Lacerda charges and accusations; (b) create enough of atmosphere of impending intervention lead some anti-regime officers to stick necks far enough out to permit action to be taken against them and others regime would like to get rid of. At same time many of charges against Lacerda allege that "plot" intended certain actions for immediately after Christmas or first days of January, thus making this good period to watch Osvino and company closely.

Naval Attache reporting separately on developments in Brazilian Navy, recent events including refusal by Naval Personnel Director, Admiral Moreira Maia, and Chief of Fleet Headquarters, Admiral Silva Junior, to obey Suzano order to arrest 22 admirals returning navy

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0722

INCOMING TELEGRAM *Department of State* ACTION COPY PERMANENT RECORD COPY

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Control: 12376
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10:28 p.m.

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FROM: Rio de Janiero

TO: Secretary of State

NO: 1191, December 21, 7 p.m.

PRIORITY

Rio's pro-regime papers ULTIMA HORA AND DIARIO CARIOCA December 21 carry scare headlines accusing Lacerda of using recent arrests of Peasant League organizers as excuse for plot to sabotage plebiscite and assassinate Osvino and Suzano. Hermes Lima arrived Rio December 20 stating that focus of agitation was in Guanabara. ULTIMA HORA line on Attorney General's visit seems to be changing somewhat, now emphasizing how forcefully Goulart spoke to Attorney General, and criticizing Ambassador for being led astray by reactionaries.

Current situation is complicated by nation-wide maritime workers strike led by anti-Communist Union of Ship Officers, called unexpectedly last night. GOB has declared strike illegal (not done in recent case of Communist-led strikes), alerted navy, appointed admiral as "interventor" in shipping companies, and started arrest strike leaders. Does not, however, seem likely strike will spread or last long.

Whether charges against Lacerda represent more than "normal" pre-plebiscite propaganda not yet clear.

GORDON

DLW/6

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NAME OF OFFICER & OFFICE SYMBOL	DATE OF ACTION	DIRECTIONS TO RM/R

Rio - 1191

732.00/12-2162

0721

speaker, Eng. Anderson Caio Soares. Petrobrás Director Domingos Spolidoro substituted for Brizzola and gave a nationalistic pep-talk.

Election results are not now expected to be announced formally until sometime in January.

President Goulart is expected in Bahia on January 3 at which time he is to bring to a close the plebecite campaign. The ceremonies are to take place in Jaquié, Lomanto's home town and it is expected that the mayors of many municipalities as well as other dignitaries will gather there for the occasion.

State and Municipal finances in Bahia and Sergipe are reported to be in very bad condition. Increased payments for salaries and for lame duck appointments without commensurate increases in income have caused one mayor-elect at least to threaten to resign before assuming office. He said his only job would be to pay salaries and the local treasurer could do that.

ECONOMIC:

The drought has definitely been broken by recent rains in most of the interior auguring well for Bahian agriculture.

SUDENE and the Ministry of Agriculture have agreed, according to the press, to apply CR$15,000,000 to research in basic food production to be carried on by the Instituto Agronômico do Leste in Bahia.

Harold M. Midkiff
American Consul

JNL

0720

ORIGIN/ACTION

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DEPARTMENT OF STATE

AIRGRAM

732.00/12-2162

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A-43 NO. | OFFICIAL USE ONLY | XR-816.00 HANDLING INDICATOR

TO : DEPARTMENT OF STATE

1962 DEC 31 AM 10 45

INFO: Rfo and Brasilia

ANALYSIS & DISTRIBUTION BRANCH

FROM : AMCONSULATE, SALVADOR DATE: December 21, 1962

SUBJECT: Weekly Summary:

REF :

DEPARTMENT OF STATE
BUREAU OF
INTER-AMERICAN AFFAIRS
JAN 2 1963

POLITICAL:

The Plebecite is being given much attention in the press and radio but the atmosphere is one of apathy on the part of the public. Governor Juracy Magalhães has announced he will cast a blank ballot. He stated he was for a presidential system but could not vote for it now since the campaign which is being waged for repeal of the act establishing parliamentarism is distorting the issues by attempting to place the blame for the critical situation of the country on a parliamentary system which was not even put into effect.

Communist influence in the petroleum enterprises continues to be the subject of editorials and articles.

Comment: There are indications that Governor-elect Lomanto will have considerable influence over Petrobrás activities in Bahia and will not agree to have Francisco Mangabeira remain the President of Petrobrás. Mangabeira's support of Waldir Pires during the election has been aired in the press during the past two days. On the other hand, strong support has been given Mangabeira by labor organizations in the petroleum enterprises and elsewhere, and by the valedictorian of a class of 16 geologist who graduated from an advanced course offered by Petrobrás, taught by American professors. The class elected to have Leonel Brizzola be their speaker but at the last moment Brizzola "was unable" to come to Salvador. He was much eulogized by the student

DEPARTMENT please pass copy to Recife.

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FORM A-62 DS-323

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Drafted by: HMMidkiff/WHBMatthews:jm

Contents and Classification Approved by:

Clearances:

0719

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Comment:

In view of the position of Sr. Noschese as President of the influential state Federation of Industries, his views carry weight in the business community. Other businessmen confirm that talk of a possible military coup is not uncommon in São Paulo circles. An important dissenting voice, however, is Dr. Paulo de Almeida BARBOSA, President of the Associação Comercial de São Paulo. In a conversation with the Consulate General Economic Officer Barbosa stated that the classes produtoras were strongly committed to legitimate constitutional government and had a horror of any violent overthrow of constituted authorities. He admitted there were elements favoring a coup, but thought this attitude less prevalent than at times in the past. While firmly opposed to President Goulart's past policies, Barbosa seemed to believe that Brazil would be able to muddle along, avoiding extreme solutions, until the end of the Goulart presidential term.

RCDesmond:ip
12/21/62

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0718

LIMITED OFFICIAL USE ~~EMEX~~

MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION

DATE: December 20, 1962

PLACE: Federation of Industries Building

SUBJECT: Expectation of Coup Among Businessmen at São Paulo.

PARTICIPANTS: Sr. Rafael NOSCHESE, President of Federation of Industries of São Paulo.

Richard C. Desmond, Principal Economic Officer, American Consulate General, São Paulo.

Copies to: Amembassy Rio (2cc)
ARA (1cc)
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Amembassy, Brasilia (1cc)

Sr. Noschese said he is convinced that continuation of present national economic and financial policies would lead to an upheaval in Brazil. He noted that President Goulart had indicated he would institute more vigorous measures to curb inflation after the referendum in January. Sr. Noschese, however, had no confidence in the promises of President Goulart which in the past, he said, had frequently been broken. Noschese said that while he hoped he was wrong, he believed President Goulart would continue to follow demagogic policies which would continue to lead the country toward financial collapse. If this proved true, Noschese said, something would have to be done. The most likely eventuality was a military coup, and he himself would support it, distasteful as the idea was. He justified his attitude saying he believed in democratic government, but that continuation of present policies would lead away from democratic government. Noschese remarked that interruption of essential imports due to lack of foreign exchange would accelerate the crisis. He seemed to imply that postponement of this eventuality by stopgap aid would serve no useful purpose. Noschese said he believed his opinions were widely shared among the classes produtoras. He thought the movement he envisaged, if it developed, would receive strong support from Governor-elect Adhemar de Barros.

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0717

Info/Action

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G. J. Burton
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DEPARTMENT OF STATE

AIRGRAM

732.00/12-2162

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1962 DEC 26 AM 11 58

TO : DEPARTMENT OF STATE

INFO: Rio de Janeiro
Brasilia

ANALYSIS & DISTRIBUTION BRANCH

FROM : Amcongen, SÃO PAULO

DATE: December 21, 1962

SUBJECT: Military Coup Expected by Business Groups in São Paulo.

REF : Congen A-181 of December 14, 1962 and A-183 of December 20, 1962.

Enclosed is a memorandum of conversation by Mr. Richard C. Desmond, Principal Economic Officer, reporting the opinions of Sr. Rafael NOSCHESE, President of the Federation of Industries of the State of São Paulo, with regard to the likelihood of a military coup against President GOULART.

Rumors of a coup have been frequent of late at São Paulo, with predictions that it will take place within three to six months. The rumors are vague as to precisely what form the coup will take or exactly which military men will lead the coup. Some informants point to recent pronouncements by War Minister General Amaury KRUEL and General Pery BEVILACQUA, Commander of the Second Army at São Paulo, as evidence that military men formerly considered strong supporters of Goulart are moving toward a position of trying to set limits to his alleged fiscal irresponsibility and softness toward Communists. (For the Consulate General's evaluation of General Bevilacqua's statements, see Congen A-181 of December 14, 1962 and A-183 of December 20, 1962.)

One form of the rumors is that the military will not displace Goulart, but will dominate him, forcing him to appoint acceptable men to the cabinet and to pursue more conservative policies.

It is not known how much truth there may be in such rumors.

Daniel M. Braddock
Minister Consul General

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FORM DS-323 4-62

Drafted by: SCLyon:ip 12/21/62

Contents and Classification Approved by:

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ORIGIN/ACTION: ARA 4

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DEPARTMENT OF STATE

AIRGRAM

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TO : Department of State

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DEPARTMENT OF STATE
BUREAU OF
INTER-AMERICAN AFFAIRS
ANALYSIS & COORDINATION
BRANCH JAN 2 1963

FROM : Amconsulate BELÉM, PARÁ

DATE: December 21, 1962

SUBJECT : Brazilian Elections 1962; Report No. 19 - Maranhão

REF : Belem's A-35 ara

Although the Electoral Tribunal in São Luis has not yet released the final results of the October 7 elections, observers indicate the following victories:

For Senator:

Victorino de Britto FREIRE (PSD) (suplente, Miguel Monteiro Lima)
Sebastião ARCHER da Silva (PSD) (suplente, Jose de Matos Carvalho)

For Federal Deputy:

Alberto Wadih Chames Aboud (PSD)
Cid Rojas Americo de CARVALHO (PSD)
Eurico Bartolomeu RIBEIRO (PSD)
Ivar Figueiredo Saldanha (PSD)
Joel Barbosa Ribeiro (PSD)
José de Matos Carvalho (PSD)
José Ramalho BURNETT da Silva (PSD)
Lister Segundo Silveira CALDAS (PSD)
Luiz Fernando Oliveira Freire (PSD)
Luiz Gonzaga Barros Coelho (PSD)
Renato Bayma ARCHER da Silva (PSD)
Henrique de LA ROQUE Almeida (PSP)
José Guimarães Neiva Moreira (PSP)
Miguel Antonio BAHURY (PSP)
José Ribamar Ferreira de Araujo Costa (Coalition UDN, PR, PTN)

JAN 7 10 33 AM FILED

The sixteenth seat for the Federal Chamber of Deputies is still in doubt with either Pedro Braga Filho or José Damião de Souza Rio likely to be victorious.

HYMAN BLOOM
American Consul

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Drafted by: HWMashek:pf

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0715

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RMR

FROM: Rio de Janeiro

TO: Secretary of State

NO: 1184, December 20, 9 p.m.

INFO: RM/R FILES

12/21/62

PRIORITY

Embassy telegram 1140

Prime Minister Lima after Cabinet meeting December 19 issued statement in Brasilia describing as "without foundation" charges of Guanabara police on 18th that arrest Peasant League official Clodomir dos Santos Morais and two associates revealed plans for armed subversion in January.. Prime Minister said in part: "...these reports, based on certain isolated facts, seek establish atmosphere of alarm and even panic whose purpose is less to combat extremism than perturb national public opinion at exact moment process of normalization of Brazilian institutional life being completed. Nation can be sure that through organs of information and control at its disposal GOB able guarantee public order and assure normal functioning institutions and individual freedoms. GOB aware episodes referred to by police and knows their nature and scope. GOB will not slacken vigilance it has always maintained throughout national territory against subversive activities".

GORDON

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0712

JORNAL DO COMMERCIO
June17, 1962

Assessor De Kennedy Parte Para O Sul Do País: Tarefa Encerrada

Ontem, muito cêdo ainda, no Hotel da Boa Viagem, o professor Henry Kissinger, assessor militar do presidente Kennedy, conversou mais de meia hora com o padre Melo, pároco do Cabo, e conhecido em todo o país, e, mesmo no exterior, pela sua luta em favor dos camponeses.

O encontro deveria ter ocorrido na noite do dia anterior, porém, devido à dificuldade de comunicação telefônica, foi marcado para a manhã de ontem.

DINHEIRO APENAS

Consoante o que chegou ao conhecimento da reportagem, o assessor do chefe do govêrno norteamericano ouviu, durante muito tempo, o padre Melo num relato da situação em Pernambuco e, mesmo, no Nordeste, face à gravidade do problema social.

Chegou a dizer, mesmo, o pároco do Cabo, que não adiantava a chegada de comida. «Precisamos é de dinheiro. O povo precisa é de ver solucionados os seus problemas mais graves».

COM O GOVERNADOR

Do Hotel, o assessor do presidente Kennedy rumou ao Palácio do Govêrno, onde foi recebido pelo snr. Cid Sampaio, com quem estêve palestrando cêrca de duas horas. Problemas de ordem geral, principalmente os ligados ao Nordeste, foram focalizados pelo chefe do govêrno pernambucano.

ALMOÇO: IMPRESSIONADO COM CELSO


As 13 horas, em sua residência da avenida Norte, o professor Jordão Emerenciano, chefe da Casa Civil do Palácio do Govêrno, recepcionou o professor Henry Kissinger, com um almôço no qual estiveram presentes o Secretário de Agricultura, snr. Antiógones Ferreira; o cônsul-geral dos Estados Unidos, snr. Eugene Delgado Arias; o sociólogo Gilberto Freyre; o snr. Bruno Luzzatto, executor e coordenador no Nordeste da «Aliança para o Progresso»; o secretário do governo, snr. Manoel Brotherood; o economista Celso Furtado, superintendente da SUDENE; o vice-cônsul Lowell Kilday e o deputado Murilo Costa Rêgo.

No decorrer do ágape, o professor Henry Kissinger teve oportunidade de abordar aspectos da visita que realizou ao Recife, tendo afirmado que ficara muito impressionado com o snr. Celso Furtado, pessoa, com quem mantivera contacto, e que havia elaborado um grande plano para o Nordeste.

REGRESSO

Depois, em companhia do vice-cônsul Lowell Kilday, o assessor do presidente Kennedy realizou ligeira visita pelos pontos históricos e pitorescos de Olinda e Recife. Retornou a Washington, às 18 horas, via Rio de Janeiro.

ENCONTRO



O governador Cid Sampaio, o snr. Henry Kissinger e o cônsul norteamericano, reunidos no gabinete do chefe do Executivo.

JORNAL DO COMMERCIO
June 16, 1962

Assessor De Kennedy Esteve Com Furtado, Mas Julião Faltou Ao Encontro

Ao desembarcar, anteontem, no Recife, o professor Henry Kissinger, de Harvard e assessor do presidente Kennedy para assuntos militares, mostrou desejo de conhecer e manter contacto imediato com o deputado Francisco Julião, fundador das famosas «Ligas Camponesas».

O encontro foi acertado, na mesma noite, entre membros da comitiva norte-americana local e o parlamentar. Este, muito cedo às 9 horas da manhã para receber o mestre de Harvard e uma das maiores autoridades civis (anques em assuntos militares.

DESAPARECEU

Para a residência do deputado Francisco Julião, no bairro da Várzea, nesta capital, o snr. Henry Kissinger rumou, após o café, no hotel da Boa Viagem, em companhia do vice-cônsul Lowell Kilday.

Ao chegar à mansão, foi informado de que o parlamentar já havia saído, (os visitantes chegaram à residência do parlamentar 15 minutos antes das 9 horas). O assessor do presidente Kennedy esperou mais de uma hora pelo snr. Francisco Julião. Depois desse tempo, voltou à cidade.

Mais tarde, ao JORNAL DO COMMERCIO, manifestou sua decepção por não ter conhecido o criador das «Ligas Camponesas».

PROGRAMA

Ainda na parte da manhã, o professor Henry Kissinger fêz uma visita de cortesia ao sociólogo Gilberto Freyre, na residência dos Apipucos. Almoçou no Hotel São Domingos, com o cônsul Delgado Arias e com o vice-cônsul Lowell Kilday.

Retornou ao hotel, e, às 14 horas, visitou o industrial Antôgenes Chaves.

NA SUDENE

Na SUDENE, chegou às 17 e 15, sendo recebido pelo superintendente Celso Furtado. Foi acompanhar do vice-cônsul Wayne Smith. O encontro durou mais de meia hora, durante o qual foi posto a par, de maneira sintetizada, do programa de trabalho do organismo.

O professor Henry Kissinger mostrou-se interessado em conhecer êste ou aquele ponto do programa da SUDENE bem como aspectos diversos do Nordeste.

VISITA AO GOVERNADOR

Hoje, às 10 e 30, o professor Henry Kissinger fará uma visita de cortesia ao governador do Estado. Será recepcionado, às 13 e 30, com um almôço pelo professor Jordão Emerenciano, chefe do Cerimonial do Palácio do Govêrno.

Às 15 horas, fará uma ligeira visita aos pontos históricos e pitorescos de Olinda e Recife. Às 18 horas, retornará ao Rio.

KISSINGER NA SUDENE



O professor Henry Kissinger, de Harvard e assessor militar do presidente Kennedy, estêve, ontem, durante mais de meia hora, na SUDENE, para um encontro com o snr. Celso Furtado. Pela manhã, havia sido logrado um encontro com o deputado Francisco Julião, que, apesar de acertar tudo, antecipadamente, não esperou pela visita do professor Kissinger. Com o economista Celso Furtado, o assessor do presidente Kennedy focalizou assuntos da região Nordestina, mostrando-se interessado em conhecer o plano do organismo e aspectos diversos dos problemas regionais. O professor Henry Kissinger é visto na flagrante acima, com o superintendente da SUDENE (ao lado do assessor, o vice-cônsul Wayne Smith.

Assessor da Casa Branca veio observar situação política e social brasileira

Chegou ao Recife, à tarde de ontem, por via aérea, o sr. Henry A. Kissinger, membro do Centro de Assuntos Inter-Americanos da Universidade de Harward, e entre outros altos cargos que exerce, assessor da Casa Branca para estudos sobre defesa do país, notadamente de natureza militar.

Após receber os cumprimentos, no Aeroporto dos Guararapes, do sr. Luiz Brotherhood, secretário do governador Cid Sampaio, bem como dos srs. Lowell Kildoy, vice-cônsul americano, e E. Elban, do USIS, o visitante concedeu entrevista à imprensa, no hall do aeroporto.

VIAGEM DE OBSERVAÇÃO

"Estou realizando uma viagem de observação sobre problemas políticos e sociais brasileiros, a convite do Ministério das Relações Exteriores. E isto, aliás, o primeiro país latino-americano que tenho oportunidade de visitar, tendo-me causado a melhor impressão possível as cidades por onde já passei, como, por exemplo, São Paulo, Belo Horizonte, Salvador, Rio e a deslumbrante Brasília.

Encontro-me no Brasil simplesmente como um estudioso e observador da rua vida política, econômica e social. Em circunstâncias assim desreferenciosas, não me seria lícito emitir conceitos ou dar impressões sobre importantes aspectos de uma nação como esta que, sem favor, é uma das mais poderosas do continente, bem como das mais progressistas do mundo. Por conseguinte, os poucos/simos dias em que aqui me encontro não me dão autoridade para definir tais programas nacionais com a responsabilidade que tenho.

Pretendo — continuou — permanecer no Recife até o próximo sábado. Não elaborei programa especial, pois procurarei me informar a respeito das questões sociais e políticas locais, com repercussão na vida brasileira, entre os mais diferentes setores da população do Estado, desde o simples homem da rua até a mais destacada autoridade. O resultado de minhas observações é exclusivamente para minha orientação pessoal ou emprego nas atividades que exerço, como pesquisador, professor e dirigente de instituição científica. A despeito do honroso convite oficial do Itamarati, para vir ao Brasil, esta minha viagem tem caráter absolutamente particular".

POLÍTICA EXTERIOR

Após insistentes perguntas dos jornalistas, no intuito de que o entrevistado falasse sobre a política brasileira, declarou: "O progresso econômico e social do Brasil representa um problema de fundamental importância para os Estados Unidos. Não há dúvida de que esse progresso está a depender, de maneira especial, dos rumos da atual política exterior do Brasil, em relação à América do Norte.

Em seguida, o sr. Henry A. Kissinger abordou outros assuntos, sem implicações na vida nacional. Disse que não acreditava na possibilidade de uma explosão atômica ocidental, do mesmo modo que estava inteiramente convicto de não terem os Estados Unidos o menor interesse no estabelecimento de um estado de beligerância com qualquer nação do Oriente, assim como na utilização de armas nucleares para se defender, no caso de serem atacados por qualquer potência estrangeira. A menos que esse eventual ataque seja à base das referidas armas nucleares, pois a resposta ao mesmo só poderia ser com armamentos atômicos, dos quais os Estados Unidos possuem um bom estoque.

A algumas perguntas sobre a situação norte-americana, em face do Laos, o sr. Henry A. Kissinger respondeu evasivamente, tendo, enfim, admitido a possibilidade de conceder nova entrevista à imprensa, quando concluir sua visita no Recife, donde prosseguirá viagem para o norte, sábado.



ASSESSOR DE KENNEDY VEIO VER O NORDESTE — Para uma visita de quatro dias e atendendo a convite do Ministério das Relações Exte riores do Brasil, chegou ontem a esta capital o professor George Kissinger, catedrático da Univ ersidade de Harvard e assessor do presidente John Kennedy Para assuntos jurídicos. Veio obs ervar os problemas sociais e econômicos nordestinos. O professor Kissinger, que se vê, na foto, com a reportagem, prestou declarações ao DIÁRIO, as quais vão publicadas na última página desta edição

Em A-RIO fls
Rio 8/7-0/62-

JORNAL DO COMMERCIO

June 15, 1962

Assessor De Kennedy Diz Que Estados Unidos Não Deflagrarão Guerra: Chegou Ontem Ao Recife

Revelando não acreditar na eclosão de uma guerra nuclear por acidente, o professor Henry Kissinger, da Universidade de Harvard e conselheiro da Casa Branca para assuntos militares, afirmou, ontem, ao pisar solo pernambucano, que os Estados Unidos não começarão nenhuma espécie de guerra.

Desembarcou, no aeroporto dos Guararapes, às 16 horas, de bôrdo de um avião da linha doméstica da Vasp, o com procedência da capital baiana. Recebeu os cumprimentos do dr. Manuel Brotherhood, secretário do govêrno e representante do governador do Estado, do vice-cônsul Lowell Kilday e do adido cultural assistente Steven Ebbin.

DESARMAMENTO

Falou à imprensa no restaurante do aeroporto, tendo dito, inicialmente, que sua visita não tem caráter oficial. Aqui ficará até o próximo domingo, quando retornará ao Rio, onde já estêve, em visita de estudos e para conhecer aspectos da situação política brasileira.

Escritor de nomeada, o professor Henry Kissinger é autor de uma série de obras sôbre assuntos militares, entre elas «Nuclear Weapons and Foreign Policy» e «The Necessity of Choice», que são seus dois mais importantes e conhecidos trabalhos no campo militar.

Sôbre o desarmamento, tem o seguinte ponto de vista: Os Estados Unidos são favoráveis ao desarmamento geral e completo, mas desejam que antes sejam apresentadas medidas específicas, sem o que consideram impossível qualquer progresso nas discussões.

Não advogam indiscriminadamente uma inspeção geral e completa (contrôle sem desarmamento), mas uma inspeção paralela e intimamente relacionada com as medidas de desarmamento que forem sendo adotadas, ou seja, um desarmamento gradual, controlado em cada etapa. Entendem os Estados Unidos que os graves problemas políticos internacionais não devem de ter conexão com os problemas de desarmamento — a questão de Berlim, por exemplo.

As medidas para o desarmamento não se efetivarão, se não houver, ao mesmo tempo, um abrandamento das tensões nos casos mais sérios da política internacional de hoje. Esta é uma posição tradicional dos Estados Unidos: êles subordinam o progresso do desarmamento à solução dos problemas políticos causadores das tensões internacionais. Embora reconheçam que qualquer progresso inicial na questão de desarmamento possa aliviar a tensão geral e favorecer o encaminhamento das soluções de problemas políticos específicos, tal progresso estaria limitado pela falta de acôrdos políticos mais sólidos e permanentes.

CONTACTO DIRETO

O professor Henry Kissinger, que divide suas atividades semanais com dois dias em Washington, em contacto com a Casa Branca, e o restante da semana em Boston, na Universidade de Harvard, de onde se mantem em contacto diário com o Pentágno, através de linhas telefônicas especial e diária, revelou enorme curiosidade sôbre a realidade política brasileira, de que se manifestou grande estudioso e desejoso de ainda aprender muita coisa.

CAPACIDADE NUCLEAR

Êle faz uma distinção entre possuir uma bomba atômica e

ASSESSOR DE KENNEDY



Revelando não acreditar na eclosão de uma guerra nuclear por acidente, o professor Henry Kissinger, da Universidade de Harvard e conselheiro da Casa Branca para assuntos militares, afirmou, ontem, ao pisar solo pernambucano, que os Estados Unidos não começarão nenhuma espécie de guerra. êle aparece no flagrante acima, ao descer nos Guararapes, recebendo os cumprimentos do vice-cônsul Lowell Kilday e do adido cultural-assistente Steve Ebbin.

POLITICOS

dista do poderoso grupo da "Cia. Usinas Nacionais". Pois bem, esse empresário então com as idéias de pagamento sobre-carregadas, mais sobrecarregadas, mais antieconômicas do que as das empresas. Pois, a questão dos juros que se vem notando de ano para ano. E' a consequência do empreguismo, para contrabalançar isto o governo Vêem pleiteando de maneira diferente para sustentar a empresa. E

JORNAL DO COMMERCIO
June 17, 1962

Assessor De Kennedy Parte Para O Sul Do País: Tarefa Encerrada

Ontem, muito cêdo ainda, no Hotel da Boa Viagem, o professor Henry Kissinger, assessor militar do presidente Kennedy, conversou mais de meia hora com o padre Melo, pároco do Cabo, e conhecido em todo o país, e, mesmo no exterior, pela sua luta em favor dos camponeses.

O encontro deveria ter ocorrido na noite do dia anterior, porém, devido à dificuldade de comunicação telefônica, foi marcado para a manhã de ontem.

DINHEIRO APENAS

Consoante o que chegou ao conhecimento da repertagem, o assessor do chefe do govêrno norteamericano ouviu, durante muito tempo, o padre Melo num relato da situação em Pernambuco e, mesmo, no Nordeste, face à gravidade do problema social.

Chegou a dizer, mesmo, o pároco do Cabo, que não adiantava a chegada de comida. «Precisamos é de dinheiro. O povo precisa é de ver solucionados os seus problemas mais graves».

COM O GOVERNADOR

Do Hotel, o assessor do presidente Kennedy rumou ao Palácio do Govêrno, onde foi recebido pelo snr. Cid Sampaio, com quem estêve palestrando cêrca de duas horas. Problemas de ordem geral, principalmente os ligados ao Nordeste, foram focalizados pelo chefe do govêrno pernambucano.

ALMOÇO: IMPRESSIONADO COM CELSO

As 13 horas, em sua residência da avenida Norte, o professor Jordão Emerenciano, chefe da Casa Civil do Palácio do Govêrno, recepcionou o professor Henry Kissinger, com um almôço ao qual estiveram presentes o Secretário da Agricultura, snr. Antiógenes Ferreira; o cônsul-geral dos Estados Unidos, snr. Eugene Delgado Arias; o sociólogo Gilberto Freyre; o snr. Bruno Lozzatto, executor e coordenador no Nordeste da «Aliança para o Progresso»; o secretário do govêrno, snr. Manuel Brotherood; o economista Celso Furtado, superintendente da SUDENE; o vice-cônsul Lowell Kilday e o deputado Murilo Costa Rêgo.

No decorrer do ágape, o professor Henry Kissinger teve oportunidade de abordar aspectos da visita que realizou ao Recife, tendo afirmado que ficara muito impressionado com o snr. Celso Furtado, pessoa, com quem mantivera contacto, e que havia elaborado um grande plano para o Nordeste.

REGRESSO

Depois, em companhia do vice-cônsul Lowell Kilday, o assessor do presidente Kennedy realizou ligeira visita pelos pontos históricos e pitorescos de Olinda e Recife. Retornou a Washington, às 18 horas, via Rio de Janeiro.

ENCONTRO



O governador Cid Sampaio, o snr. Henry Kissinger e o cônsul norteamericano, reunidos no gabinete do chefe do Executivo.

JORNAL DO COMMERCIO

June 17, 1962

Assessor De Kennedy Esteve Com Furtado, Mas Julião Faltou Ao Encontro

Ao desembarcar, anteontem, no Recife, o professor Henry Kissinger, de Harvard e assessor do presidente Kennedy para assuntos militares, mostrou desejo de conhecer e manter contacto demorado com o deputado Francisco Julião, fundador das famosas «Ligas Camponesas».

O encontro foi acertado, na mesma noite, entre membros do consulado norte-americano local e o parlamentar. Este, marcou às 9 horas de ontem para receber o mestre de Harvard e uma das maiores autoridades civis ianques em assuntos militares.

DESAPARECEU

Para a residência do deputado Francisco Julião, no bairro da Várzea, nesta capital, o snr. Henry Kissinger rumou, cedo o café, no hotel da Boa Viagem, em companhia do vice-cônsul Lowell Kilday.

Ao chegar à moradia, foi informado de que o parlamentar já havia saído, (os visitantes chegaram à residência do parlamentar 15 minutos antes das 9 horas). O assessor do presidente Kennedy esperou mais de uma hora pelo snr. Francisco Julião. Depois disso tempo, retornou à cidade.

Mais tarde, ao JORNAL DO COMMERCIO, manifestou sua decepção por não ter conhecido o criador das «Ligas Camponesas».

PROGRAMA

Ainda na parte da manhã, o professor Henry Kissinger fêz uma visita de cortesia ao sociólogo Gilberto Freyre, na residência dos Apipucos. Almoçou no Hotel São Domingos, com o cônsul Delgado Arias e com o vice-cônsul Lowell Kilday.

Retornou ao hotel, e, às 14 horas, visitou o industrial Antiógenes Chaves.

NA SUDENE

Na SUDENE, chegou às 17 e 15, sendo recebido pelo superintendente Celso Furtado. Fez acompanhar do vice-cônsul Wayne Smith. O encontro durou mais de meia hora, durante o qual foi pôsto a par, de maneira sintetizada, do programa de trabalho do organismo.


O professor Henry Kissinger mostrou-se interessado em conhecer êste ou aquele ponto do programa da SUDENE bem como aspectos diversos do Nordeste.

VISITA AO GOVERNADOR

Hoje, às 10 e 30, o professor Henry Kissinger fará uma visita de cortesia ao governador do Estado. Será recepcionado, às 13 e 30, com um almôço pelo professor Jordão Emerenciano, chefe do Cerimonial do Palácio do Govêrno.

As 15 horas, fará uma ligeira visita aos pontos históricos e pitorescos de Olinda e Recife. As 18 horas, retornará ao Rio.

KISSINGER NA SUDENE



O professor Henry Kissinger, de Harvard e assessor militar do presidente Kennedy, estêve, ontem, durante mais de meia hora, na SUDENE, para um encontro com o snr. Celso Furtado. Pela manhã, havia sido logrado num encontro com o deputado Francisco Julião, que, apesar de acertar tudo, antecipadamente, não esperou pela visita do professor Kissinger. Com o economista Celso Furtado, o assessor do presidente Kennedy focalizou assuntos da região Nordestina, mostrando-se interessado em conhecer o plano do organismo e aspectos diversos dos problemas regionais. O professor Henry Kissinger é visto no flagrante acima com o superintendente da SUDENE (ao lado do assessor, o vice-cônsul Wayne Smith).

PERNAMBUCO



Assessor da Ca situação políti

Chegou ao Recife, à tarde de ontem, por via aérea, o sr. Henry A. Kissinger, membro do Centro de Assuntos Inter-Americanos da Universidade de Harward, e entre outros altos cargos que exerce, assessor da Casa Branca para estudos sobre defesa do país, notadamente de natureza militar.

Após receber os cumprimentos, no Aeroporto dos Guararapes, do sr. Luiz Brotherhood, secretário do governador Cid Sampaio, bem como dos srs. Lowell Kilday, vice-cônsul americano, e E. Eiben, do USIS, o visitante concedeu entrevista à imprensa, no hall do aeroporto.

VIAGEM DE OBSERVAÇÃO

"Estou realizando uma viagem de observação sobre problemas políticos e sociais brasileiros, a convite do Ministério das Relações Exteriores. É este, aliás, o primeiro país latino-americano que tenho oportunidade de visitar, tendo-me causado a melhor impressão possível as cidades por onde já passei, como, por exemplo, São Paulo, Belo Horizonte, Salvador, Rio e a deslumbrante Brasília.

Encontro-me no Brasil simplesmente como um estudioso e observador de sua vida política, econômica e social. Em circunstâncias assim despretenciosas, não me seria lícito emitir conceitos ou dar impressões sobre importantes aspectos de uma nação como esta que, sem favor, é uma das mais poderosas do continente, bem como das mais progressistas do mundo. Por conseguinte, os poucos dias em que aqui me encontro não me dão autoridade para definir tais programas nacionais com a responsabilidade que tenho.

Pretendo — continuou — permanecer no Recife até o próximo sábado. Não elaborei programa especial, pois procurarei me informar a respeito das questões sociais e políticas locais, com repercussão na vida brasileira, entre os mais diferentes setores da população do Estado, desde o simples homem da rua até a mais destacada autoridade. O resultado de minhas observações é exclusivamente para minha orientação pessoal ou emprego nas atividades que exerço, como pesquisador, professor e dirigente de instituição científica. A despeito do honroso convite oficial do Itamarati, para vir ao Brasil, esta minha viagem tem caráter absolutamente particular".

POLITICA EXTERIOR

Após insistentes perguntas dos jornalistas, no intuito de que o entrevistado falasse sobre a política brasileira, declarou: "O progresso econômico e social do Brasil representa um problema de fundamental importância para os Estados Unidos. Não há dúvida de que esse progresso está a depender, de maneira especial, dos rumos da atual política exterior do Brasil, em relação à América do Norte.

Em seguida, o sr. Henry A. Kissinger abordou outros assuntos, sem implicações na vida nacional. Disse que não acreditava na possibilidade de uma explosão atômica ocidental, do mesmo modo que estava inteiramente convicto de não terem os Estados Unidos o menor interesse no estabelecimento de um estado de beligerância com qualquer nação do Oriente, assim como na utilização de armas nucleares para se defender, no caso de serem atacados por qualquer potência estrangeira. A menos que esse eventual ataque seja à base das referidas armas nucleares, pois a resposta ao mesmo só poderia ser com armamentos atômicos, dos quais os Estados Unidos possuem um bom estoque.

A algumas perguntas sobre a situação norte-americana, em face do Laos, o sr. Henry A. Kissinger respondeu evasivamente, tendo, enfim, admitido a possibilidade de conceder nova entrevista à imprensa, quando concluir sua visita ao Recife, dada prosseguirá viagem para o norte, sábado.



ASSESSOR DE KENNEDY VEIO VER O NORDESTE — Para uma visita de quatro dias e atendendo a convite do Ministério das Relações Exteriores do Brasil, chegou ontem a esta capital o professor George Kissinger, catedrático da Universidade de Harvard e assessor do presidente John Kennedy para assuntos jurídicos. Veio observar os problemas sociais e econômicos nordestinos. O professor Kissinger, que se vê, na foto, com a reportagem, prestou declarações ao DIÁRIO, as quais vão publicadas na última página desta edição



JORNAL DO COMMERCIO
June 15,1962

Rec. A. rio fr
Rio 5/7/62

Assessor De Kennedy Diz Que Estados Unidos Não Deflagrarão Guerra: Chegou Ontem Ao Recife

Revelando não acreditar na eclosão de uma guerra nuclear por acidente, o professor Henry Kissinger, da Universidade de Harvard e conselheiro da Casa Branca para assuntos militares, afirmou, ontem, ao pisar solo pernambucano, que os Estados Unidos não começarão nenhuma espécie de guerra.

Desembarcou, no aeroporto dos Guararapes, às 16 horas, de bordo de um avião da linha doméstica da Vasp, e com precedência, da capital baiana. Recebeu os cumprimentos do dr. Manuel Brotherhood, secretário do govêrno e representante do governador do Estado, do vice-cônsul Lowell Kilday e do adido cultural assistente Steven Ebbin.

DESARMAMENTO

Falou à imprensa no restaurante do aeroporto, tendo dito, inicialmente, que sua visita não tem caráter oficial. Aqui ficará até o próximo domingo, quando retornará ao Rio, onde já estêve, em visita de estudos e para conhecer aspectos da situação política brasileira.

Escritor de nomeada, o professor Henry Kissinger é autor de uma série de obras sôbre assuntos militares, entre elas «Nuclear Weapons and Foreign Peleys e «The Necessity of Choice», que são seus dois mais importantes e conhecidos trabalhos no campo militar.

Sôbre o desarmamento, tem o seguinte ponto de vista: Os Estados Unidos são favoráveis ao desarmamento geral e completo, mas desejam que antes sejam apresentadas medidas específicas, sem o que consideram impossível qualquer progresso nas discussões.

Não advogam indiscriminadamente uma inspeção geral e completa (contrôle sem desarmamento), mas uma inspeção paralela e intimamente relacionada com as medidas de desarmamento que forem sendo adotadas, ou seja, um desarmamento gradual, controlado em cada etapa. Entendem os Estados Unidos que os graves problemas políticos internacionais não deixam de ter conexão com os problemas de desarmamento — a questão de Berlim, por exemplo.

As medidas para o desarmamento não se efetivarão, se não houver, ao mesmo tempo, um abrandamento das tensões nos casos mais sérios da política internacional de hoje. Esta é uma posição tradicional dos Estados Unidos: êles subordinam o progresso do desarmamento à solução dos problemas políticos causadores das tensões internacionais. Embora reconheçam que qualquer progresso inicial na questão do desarmamento possa aliviar a tensão geral e favorecer o encaminhamento das soluções de problemas políticos específicos, tal progresso estaria limitado pela falta de acôrdos políticos mais sólidos e permanentes.

CONTACTO DIRETO

O professor Henry Kissinger, que divide suas atividades semanais com dois dias em Washington, em contacto com a Casa Branca, e o restante da semana em Boston, na Universidade de Harvard, do onde se mantem em contacto diário com o Pentágno, através de linhas telefônicas especiais diária, revelou enorme curiosidade sôbre a realidade política brasileira, de que se manifestou grande estudioso e desejoso de ainda aprender muita coisa.

CAPACIDADE NUCLEAR

Ele faz uma distinção entre possuir uma bomba atômica e possuir capacidade nuclear, ou seja, a possibilidade efetiva de sustentar uma guerra nuclear. Por exemplo, a capacidade nuclear da França, num futuro próximo, será muito pequena comparada com a dos Estados Unidos e da União Soviética. O mesmo acontece com a China, cuja capacidade nuclear, ademais, lhe seria útil como argumento contra os seus vizinhos, não contra o Ocidente, propriamente.

A posse de armas atômicas pela China Comunista afetaria as relações dêste país com seus vizinhos de uma forma mais efétiva do que suas relações com os Estados Unidos.

ASSESSOR DE KENNEDY



Revelando não acreditar na eclosão de uma guerra nuclear por acidente, o professor Henry Kissinger, da Universidade de Harvard e conselheiro da Casa Branca para assuntos militares, afirmou, ontem, ao pisar solo pernambucano, que os Estados Unidos não começarão nenhuma espécie de guerra. Êle aparece no flagrante acima, ao descer nos Guararapes, recebendo os cumprimentos do vice-cônsul Lowell Kilday e do adido cultural-assistente Steve Ebbin.

TEMOR

Por último, exposou sua opinião de que não se deve temer o desarmamento por receio de consequências econômicas. Sabia gradual e duraria muitos anos, o que facilitaria a reconversão da economia de guerra para uma economia puramente de paz. As despesas com armamento continuariam, para que se pudesse manter uma fôrça de polícia internacional, sistema eficientes de inspeção, extremamente dispendiosos. Há muito que fazer em estradas, escolas e reconstrução de cidades.



Department of State
FORM DS-4
1-3-59

TRANSMITTAL SLIP

CLASSIFICATION: UNCLASSIFIED

DATE: June 30, 1962

TO: AmEmbassy, RIO DE JANEIRO — For the Attention of

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Desp A-210 6/20/62

ITEMS/REMARKS

Attached are two sets of press clippings on visit of Dr. Kissinger. In accordance with Dr. Kissinger's request, another set has been sent directly to him.

IN REPLY REFER TO FILE NUMBER AND DRAFTING OFFICE

FILE NO.	SIGNATURE
	Lowell C. Kilday
CLASSIFICATION: UNCLASSIFIED	OFFICE: American Vice Consul

GPO: 859047



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AFTERNOON

=) O GLOBO
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=) A NOITE
=) A NOTICIA
=) ULTIMA HORA

San Tiago recepcionou Kissinger

O Ministro San Tiago Dantas ofereceu, ontem, no Itamarati, um almôço ao Professor Henry Kissinger, Assessor Especial do Presidente John Kennedy e que está visitando o Brasil a convite.

Participaram do almôço, durante o qual predominavam conversas sôbre o desarmamento — assunto da especialidade do Professor Kissinger —, os Embaixadores Carlos Alfredo Bernardes, Henrique Valle e Otávio Dias Carneiro, além de outros funcionários do Itamarati.

0702

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Henry Kissinger, o professor de Harvard que está no Brasil como assessor de política internacional, e enviado especial do Presidente Kennedy, depois de contatos com vários políticos, homens de imprensa e dirigentes industriais, tem repetido sua dificuldade em entender a situação política brasileira. Em sua opinião, todas as correntes políticas nacionais falam em revolução, o que lhe dificulta entender o que pensam os brasileiros.



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2 (1.ª coluna)

HENRY KISSINGER E A POLÍTICA

Diário do Correo Alves

Henry Kissinger, que era nos visita, deixa um bom capítulo de seu livro «A Necessidade de uma Escolha», publicado em 1961, no papel do intelectual na administração e na política de seu país. Além, esse livro, bem cedo vereditl no exílio e na temática de sua tese «Armas Nucleares e Política Externa», de 1957, sobre aspectos mais variados, ligados todos ao problema da política internacional e do desafio com que os Estados Unidos se defrontam no mundo de hoje. Assinala o autor que, numa sociedade que se engolfa de mais característicos de tipo complexo e de opção comercial, torna-se inevitável que auxiliar um presidente qualidades extraordinárias no manejo dos negócios e das atividades profissionais pri- vadas pessoa chamadas a desempenhar funções públicas relevantes. Torna-se, então, que o típico Ministro de Estado, ou seu Presidente, no exercício extraordinário, seja um homem saído de atividades na de presidente de advogado, em particular de advogado de grandes empresas ou companhias (corporation lawyers). Tal figura, colocada do ponto de vista político, num alto cargo político de formulação e execução da política ou seja lato sensu da palavra, é frequentemente pouco familiar com a substância dos problemas sôbre os quais tem de se pronunciar. Isto se deve sobretudo, segundo Kissinger, a que o executivo, nal modelado por um estilo de trabalho que lhe é exigido. Exemplo: o alto executivo habitua-se a exercer suas atividades numa grande dependência das idéias e concepções de seus subordinados sôbre os diversos aspectos essenciais de problemas. Dir-se-ia que êle não tem tempo para pensar, para ser original, e até para decidir entre hipóteses bem formuladas por seus assessores e secretários. Tal sistema implica colocar um alto prêmio na boa exposição ou apresentação, mesmo que os assessores especialistas em abreviaturas, que fazem sumários de uma página, sacrificam a profundidade e a relevância a seu valor mais simples. Com isto se reduz a amplitude das oportunidades, da originalidade, em benefício da tenacidade e da eficiência executiva habituais. Como o alto executivo dispõe, em virtude de suas funções, necessitando a cada instante de abreviar e explicações de seus subordinados, começa a ter de escolher uma entre várias soluções propostas e é daí que cai no espírito transacional, à base do acompromisso, como dizem os norte-americanos. Aí as insolúveis, na definição de Kissinger, um dos mais- tem sempre pensar que é a mesma coisa transacionar (compromisso) sôbre propostas sôbre questões administrativas e propostas sôbre política.

Fácil é, aí, recolher o sentido geral da situação dos executivos na alta esfera da administração e da política: pragmatismo e superficialidade, política é, em última análise, a busca dos dados mais comuns do problema. E o pragmatismo se preocupa mais com o substrato do seu cha e bigmarts. Procura reduzir o julgamento à metodologia, a valor ao conhecimento. Daí dá a gosto do grande hábito- ativos, de grupos do trabalho (evocking parties), confissões (speeches), etc. Os norte-americanos (ou vocabulário prove de dogmatismo arrogando-se todas as consequências. Mas, em troca, cacos uma espécie quase extrema: simples à dono da verdade, logo, se nem grupo de trabalho não há unanimidade, provàvelmente cada um de seus componentes está um pouco errado. E qual o caminho clima? Tomar sempre como solução inicial um pouco do ponto de vista de todos. E agora acrescentemos aêle: a história está cheia de exemplos em que o curso dos acontecimentos separou integralmente da opção entre a solução A e a solução B. Estabelecemos Acheson trabalho tivesse aconselhado o caso tomado, o da derrota. Hoje- rejeição V foi o inovador, o criador da vitória em circunstâncias tão diversas do ponto de vista da experiência e do trabalho.

O sistema norte-americano leva à proliferação de grupos, comissões, e comitês. Ora, diz Kissinger, os comitês são comunicadores, quando não esterilizadores, de idéias. Uma idéia complexa é geralmente absorvida de cada vez. Sobretudo quando ela é nova. Os componentes — os cavalheiros — geralmente se inclinam em direção à média de seus comitês. Em direção ao que é, simplesmente, mais familiar à experiência de cada um. Haverá-se, pois, naturalmente uma pressão na direção do status quo. O corolário lógico ao impor- o comitê não seria. Centenas o que já estaria. Mesmo as chamadas emitido até hoje, compostos por pessoas de face do índice administrativo-já vêm sido ajudam: colocações vagas, que representam compromissos entre opiniões de todos, ou discordância de alguns mesmo votos em separado. Em suma, o sistema de comitê, que visa a reduzir a incoerência dos chefes de alto nível na tomada de decisões, traz a consequência paradoxal de institucionalizar essa incoerência. Muito da insegurança no processo político norte-americano, segundo Kissinger, se origina, pois, desse falta de reflexão, dêsse respeito extremo aos choques administrativos e de propostas em vez de cuidar dos mais interessantes problemas políticos que implicam decisão.

Kissinger advoga uma mais forte presença de intelectuais na formulação e execução da política. Acha preciso que em muitos outros países do chamado mundo livre, o pragmatismo é menos abastado- os que nos Estados Unidos. As exigências da burocracia são menos vorazes. Nesses outros países os intelectuais podem estar mais presentes na administração e na política... mas outros erros existem. Em suma, Kissinger constata — julgamos nós que de uma forma quase decepcionado — que todo o mundo sofre não somente de lacunas administrativas como também de uma falta de sentido de direção. Só o intelectual tem de dar uma contribuição à política de ser pôsto. Ela encara uma tarefa delicada. Tem de cuidar entre Scylla — permitir que a burocracia preserve o que é importante e o que não é — e Charybde — definir fases críticas de maneira demasiado abstrata. Se se inclinar demais para a primeira forma, pode terminar em provador de questões técnicas. Se se inclinar demais para o segundo, corre o risco de confiado degradismo com necessidade de correr o martírio, em suma, de se tornar tão envolvido na política da rebelião como o estudante é envolvido pela calda do cometa.

O autor de «Necessidade de uma Escolha» sustenta claramente o que os intelectuais colaborem na administração e na política do país, do contrário a sociedade nacional corre o risco de estagnação nas mãos de grupos desprovidos de conhecimentos substantivos. Assim colaborando, o intelectual deve lealdade à organização que o emprega, até mesmo forma que conserve sua lealdade aos valores que de muito transcendem a estrutura burocrática a que pertencem e que constituem quase uma motivação última em sua vida. A colaboração do intelectual pode muito contribuir para a solução de um grave problema da sociedade contemporânea: o predomínio do propósito e gestão de direção sôbre a técnica. O livro de Kissinger parece ter sido escrito antes de o Governo Kennedy tomar posse. O atual administração dos Estados Unidos se tem caracterizado pela colaboração de intelectuais a homens de mundo acadêmico para funções de Governo, embora às vêzes apenas em capacidade consultiva, como é dêste o caso do autor que comentamos. Acrescenta Kissinger que o intelectual não deve iniciar, na exercício de funções públicas, perder seu traço distintivo a busca de conhecimentos e de soluções fundamentais, e não apenas a preenchimento das exigências administrativas. Ao mesmo tempo, de extrema valia pode ser a perspectiva não burocrática em que se coloca. É essencial ao intelectual em função pública que de tempos em tempos volte à sua biblioteca ou ao seu laboratório, do contrário êle pode tornar-se um mero administrador apenas diferente da burocracia em que êle foi recrutado do meio intelectual. Jamais o valor intelectual é atingido será substituído por uma organização baseada na especialização. Não haverá conselhos que substitua um Lincoln, um Roosevelt ou um Churchill. Tornar Kissinger deve ser encontrado um meio que habilite os homens mais capazes do país a lidar com as grandes problemas políticos nacionais e prestar serviço à nação em seus anos de formação, isto é um desafio ao nosso sistema educativo, aos altos escalões hierárquicos, à nossa própria política nacional.

Transcrições comerciais

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=) ULTIMA HORA

DIÁRIO DE NOTÍCIAS

MOMENTO INTERNACIONAL

VISITA DE KISSINGER

O SR. HENRY KISSINGER, especialista em problemas de guerra fria e agora também de desarmamento, encontra-se entre nós, como sabemos, a convite do Itamarati.

E' sempre útil o confronto de idéias e o sr. Kissinger de fato tem idéias e algumas mesmo um tanto originais. A sua presença suscita perguntas, estabelece uma problemática, anima o debate sôbre algumas das grandes questões internacionais e disto sempre fica algo de positivo. Isto principalmente quando o sr. Kissinger é, na realidade, um estudioso dos problemas que trata.

Naturalmente, já que estamos em maré de convites, seria, talvez, interessante o Itamarati lembrar-se de trazer também uns ingleses, por exemplo, P. M. S. Blackett (Prêmio Nobel), especialista em desarmamento e a personificação da antiguerra fria e do anticorrida armamentista; de Eugene Hinterhoff, especialista em problemas de «disengagement», ou seja, da criação de uma zona desmilitarizada no centro europeu; Liddel Hart, o maior teórico militar da atualidade e que tem mostrado incessantemente os perigos da guerra fria e da corrida armamentista e também a possibilidade de uma guerra mundial por acidente (contrariando nisto as recentes declarações do sr. Kissinger à imprensa brasileira) e, finalmente, o cientista e filósofo de renome mundial Bertrand Russel, cuja apresentação nos parece desnecessária, pois está quase diàriamente nas notícias dos jornais pela sua luta contra a loucura atômica. Deixamos aqui esta contribuição ao Itamarati.

Naturalmente nos Estados Unidos há também outros nomes, mas não vamos mencioná-los, por exemplo, Linus Pauling (Prêmio Nobel), pois, para isso, seria preciso alargar um pouco mais a rua Larga.

* * *

O sr. Henry A. Kissinger publicou, no que respeita a problemas da guerra fria, relações internacionais e desarmamento, duas obras fundamentais. «Nuclear Weapons and Foreign Policy» (Harper & Brothers Nova York. 1957), e «The Necessity for Choice», no mesmo editor, em 1961.

A primeira obra não é a de um homem que procura realmente os caminhos da paz, mas pode considerar-se como a de um teórico da guerra fria. Quando a ambiciosíssima Clare Both Luce o recomendou vivamente, não se enganou dentro dos pontos de vista normais e bem conhecidos da antiga representante dos Estados Unidos (melhor diríamos, de Foster Dulles) em Roma.

Nesse livro encontramos teses de justificação da guerra nuclear limitada e, mais, por mútuo entendimento entre as potências! Todo o capítulo do livro «Nuclear Weapons and Foreign Policy», que abrange esta demonstração, e mormente as páginas 228, 229, 230 e 231, por vêzes dão a impressão de que se trata de humorismo. Mas o sr. Henry Kissinger fala a sério nas guerras nucleares limitadas, nas combinações entre as partes interessadas para estabelecer as regras da destruição limitada, etc. Esta cerimônia, quase descrita no livro, entre as potências combinando a guerra nuclear limitada (o sr. Kissinger fala mesmo, na página 228, na possibilidade de se chegar a uma espécie de torneio de tipo medieval nesta variedade de guerra nuclear) dá bem a idéia da desorientação a que se chegou em alguns meios norte-americanos na época (1957) em que o livro foi escrito. Livro que, aliás, foi um êxito, o que indica suplementarmente o estado de espírito dêsses círculos americanos e mesmo de outros setores da vida americana. E se isto nosso propósito apenas criticar o sr. Kissinger, o seu estudo «Nuclear Weapons and Foreign Policy» daria matéria para conclusões graves, no que respeita à resistência ao desarmamento. Todo o livro, onde encontramos aliás, também, observações lúcidas, quando não atiram diretamente aos Estados Unidos, é impregnado de uma concepção pessimista e em nada contribuiu, globalmente, para um leve avanço no melhoramento das relações internacionais. Cumpre contudo dizer que, no segundo dos livros citados, «The necessity for choice», êste de 1961, o autor apresenta uma evolução positiva em alguns conceitos, e, embora não tenda abandonado, por inteiro, algumas teses, abre horizontes mais serenos para a solução dos problemas internacionais.

* * *

Isto, por exemplo, é verdade no capítulo dêste segundo livro, que tem por título «On negotiations». Está longe de ser o que desejamos, mas uma maior flexibilidade começa a notar-se de maneira certa. A rigidez da primeira posição não foi abandonada totalmente, mas o sr. Henry Kissinger começa a interpor novos elementos no raciocínio, isto é, começa a haver um balanceamento de prós e contras (por exemplo, no que respeita a conferências de cúpula), que indica um progresso no nosso autor, sobretudo pela forma como o assunto é apresentado. Embora insista em que não é razoável ter demasiadas ilusões nas negociações, afirma categòricamente que são importantes. Quanto à flexibilidade (ao que julgamos o sr. Kissinger não tem excessiva ternura pelo têrmo) diz as condições que não se admite e as condições em que é uma virtude.

No total, sendo como é evidente impossível analisar num artigo dois livros densos e complexos, pode, contudo, dizer-se que há uma evolução no pensamento do sr. Henry Kissinger, infelizmente longe ainda do que seria de desejar. Esperemos que num terceiro livro dê mais alguns passos em direção à coexistência ativa e eletiva.

0699

JUN 5 - 1962

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=) JORNAL DO BRASIL
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...mas". ...do espião. descongestionando o tráfego ...

Kissinger: O Desarmamento só Virá Quando a Propaganda Fôr Esquecida

O PROFESSOR Henry Kissinger, da Universidade de Harvard e assessor do Presidente Kennedy, declarou ontem que o progresso nas negociações em tôrno do desarmamento somente será possível quando os dois lados esquecerem o aspecto de propaganda em tôrno da questão e começarem a discutir medidas específicas. Estudioso do assunto, inclusive com livros publicados, Kissinger fêz essa declaração durante a conferência que pronunciou no Itamaraty, para diplomatas brasileiros e estrangeiros. Salientando que as idéias externadas eram suas e não representavam o ponto de vista do Govêrno norte-americano, o Professor Kissinger falou sôbre "Relações entre o Este e o Oeste e o problema do Desarmamento".

Podem Influir

Kissinger manifestou-se cético quanto aos resultados positivos da Conferência de Genebra, mas afirmou que as nações não-comprometidas podem influir nos entendimentos, apresentando sugestões que quebrem qualquer impasse. Contudo, isso sòmente será possível se essas nações não se deixarem influenciar pela propaganda e chegarem a um julgamento próprio sôbre o problema, após estudo técnico adequado. Frisou que o primeiro passo para o desarmamento seria a manutenção de áreas desmilitarizadas.

As Dificuldades

Para o Professor Kissinger os dois pontos que tornam difícil um acôrdo entre Este e Oeste quanto ao desarmamento são os seguintes: 1) os comunistas estão convencidos do fatalismo histórico de que o Oriente superará o Ocidente e, portanto, entregam-se a provocar desequilíbrio nas situações internacionais; 2) crêem que compreendem melhor os problemas do que os ocidentais e por isso não acreditam no exato significado das palavras usadas pelos delegados do Ocidente. Kissinger também disse que não será possível chegar-se a um acôrdo sôbre desarmamento enquanto a Rússia insistir em provocar crises regionais, como a do Laos, Viet-Nam e Berlim.

Defesa da Liberdade

Finalmente, asseverou que nenhum Presidente americano aceitará qualquer plano, por mais brilhante que seja, que implique no sacrifício da liberdade em qualquer lugar, e frisou que é difícil para os líderes norte-americanos, diante da conduta internacional da Rússia, acreditar na sinceridade das propostas soviéticas.

0698

MAY 5 - 1962

PRESS SECTION

DATE

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=) O DIA
=) DIARIO CARIOCA
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AFTERNOON

=) O GLOBO
=) TRIBUNA DA IMPRENSA
=) A NOITE
=) A NOTICIA
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[illegible] INCLUSIVE [illegible]

O «Diário Oficial», que circulou ontem, publica a relação nominal dos 495 auxiliares acadêmicos de medicina, classificados em concurso recentemente realizado, contratados pela Secretaria de Saúde e Assistência. Receberão, mensalmente, cada um, a importância de 13 mil e 600 cruzeiros. A verba anual para o referido pagamento é na ordem de Cr$ 74.351.200,00.

PLANO DE AÇÃO DO GOVERNADOR

Em portaria assinada ontem, o secretário de Finanças baixou instruções para que os diversos departamentos subordinados à secretaria quedirije, acelerem a remessa ao *Núcleo* de Planejamento dos elementos necessários ao «Plano de Ação do Governador». Ainda, no mesmo ato, aquele titular designou o seu adjunto Mauro Edson de Oliveira Manezes, para controlar a fiel observância das instruções sôbre a mantôria.

SERVIDORES INTERINOS

Todo servidor interino será inscrito ex-ofício no primeiro concurso que se realizar para o cargo que exerce. A determinação é do diretor da Escola de Serviço Público do Estado da Guanabara. Segundo o ato já baixado, a aprovação da inscrição ex-ofício dependerá de satisfação, por parte do interino, dentro dos prazos estipulados, de tôdas as determinações contidas nas instruções que regularem o respectivo concurso.

APLICAÇÃO DE VERBAS

O presidente do Tribunal de Contas da Guanabara designou comissões de servidores de seus quadros, às quais ficarão incumbidas de in loco examinar a aplicação das verbas utilizadas pelo Juízo de Menores, Colônia Penal Cândido Mendes e Departamento Estadual de Segurança Pública, tendo em vista a solicitações dos dirigentes dos referidos órgãos.

EXTINÇÃO DA FUNÇÃO DE EXTRANUMERÁRIO

O Tribunal de Justiça, em sua última sessão plenária, julgou mandado de segurança requerido por José de Almeida Filho a [illegible] Pires Júnior, Maria Apparecida de Souza — Concedidos três meses de licença especial; José Manoel Constantelo — Concedidos quatro meses de licença especial; José Novaes de Sousa Carvalho Neto, Benedita Carolina de Oliveira, Casemiro de Jesus Pereira — Cumpra-se; Maria Robin Bellak, André Spinelli — Pague-se o fumeral.

SECRETARIA DE FINANÇAS

Atos do Secretário: Removendo João Carlos Crocc para o Departamento do Tesouro.

Despacho: Construtora Travassos Penedos Ltda. — Deferido.

SECRETARIA DE EDUCAÇÃO E CULTURA

Departamento de Educação Primária — Atos do Diretor — Designando Marcia Ribeiro Moura para a escola Marechal Trompowsky; Magaly Caspary Espirito Santo para a escola Cecilo Barcelos; Avenir de Andrade Bittinta para a escola Alfredo Jurkewski; Claudette Pessoa de Albuquerque para a escola Tobias Barreto; Marilda da Silveira Couto para a escola Araujo Pôrto Alegre; Maria Heloisa Mafra para a escola Pedro Champanhat; Hilda Grieming Barbosa para a escola Brito Broca; Maria Regina Pôrto Martins Pereira da Silva para a escola Pedro Ernesto; Reynaldo Motta de Abreu para a escola Luiz de Camões; Maria Alzira de Gaceiro Fitito para a escola Joaquim Borges; Hélida Setta Guimarães Alvadas para a escola Lucia Miguel Pereira; Lia de Barros Pimentel Afonso Franco para a escola Rotary; Dina de Oliveira para a escola Mexico; Yvone Secco para encarregada de expediente e correspondência na sede do 7º DE; Regina Celia Bonadiv para substituiona da escola Madre Benedita; Lionetta Constancio para o Serviço de Correspondência; Cecilia Martins Miranda para dirigir a escola São Vicente; Eunice Alzair Motta Dagne para dirigir a escola Luis Netto dos Reis; Deidamia Pinheiro de Sousa para dirigir a escola Goethe; Alberrina [illegible]

industrial

Recife, 4 (AN) — Pernambuco [illegible] dispõe de um [illegible] trials, criado pelo Govêrno do Estado, a 52 quilômetros [illegible] em município servido pela Rêde Ferroviária do Nordeste e com grandes facilidades de transporte rodoviário para diversos pontos do território nacional. Excepcionais condições estão sendo oferecidas a todos os investidores que desejarem implantar ali suas fábricas, por parte do Estado e do próprio município onde fica o distrito, que é o Cabo. Na esfera estadual, as isenções fiscais iniciais são relativas a seis anos sem pagamento do impôsto de vendas e consignações e alguns outros taxas, enquanto o município do Cabo não cobrará nenhum dos tributos de sua órbita. Além disto, o Governador Cid Sampaio permitiu aos industriais que se estabelecerem, valendo-se desta montagem, a redução de 50% nos impostos, nos 3 anos subsequentes ao período de isenção total.

Estas informações foram dadas ao plenário do encontro de industriais e comerciantes nesta Capital, na semana passada, por iniciativa da CNC e CNI, pelo Sr. Cláudio de Paiva Lima, do Conselho de Desenvolvimento de Pernambuco.

VANTAGENS

Entre as vantagens complementares apresentadas pelo plano de industrialização lançado pelo Govêrno Cid Sampaio poderá ainda ser citado o caso do preço do metro quadrado no distrito industrial, que será de cinco cruzeiros, considerado ótimo para o local e as facilidades de acesso da matéria prima e do transporte da produção. Além disto, aqueles investidores que não conseguirem local no distrito do Cabo poderão ser beneficiados com isenções e outros estímulos nos municípios de São Lourenço, Moreno e Carpina. A única exigência feita é relativa à instalação de indústrias sem similares no Estado de Pernambuco. Os interessados na obtenção de dados complementares poderão informar-se através de pedidos ao CODEPE, Recife, Pernambuco.

PIONEIRA DIESEL NA



O clichê mostra o primeiro motor Bedford Diesel, produzido pela General Motors, em sua fábrica de San Martin, na Argentina, no momento em que era acionado pelo diretor-gerente da firma, Sr. Lloyd O. Britton, que aparece em companhia de técnicos e operários. A fábrica de San Martin, agora em fase de

EUA querem desarmamento por processo gradativo

Conferência do Professor norte-americano, Henry Kissinger — Guerra fria concorre para aumentar a corrida armamentista

«Os Estados Unidos aceitam as metas e os objetivos constantes do plano soviético de Desarmamento geral e completo, mas, antes de abraçar aquêles objetivos, querem medidas específicas, providências concretas ou detalhes, sem cuja iniciação efetiva não desejam avançar em direção às metas do desarmamento total, que seria desta forma inexequível».

Assim falou ao [illegible] pronunciada ontem, na Biblioteca do Itamaraty, o Professor norte-americano Henry Kissinger, da Universidade de Harvard e Consultor do Presidente Kennedy e do Congresso norte-americano para assuntos de Desarmamento. A conferência foi presidida pelo Embaixador Carlos Alfredo Bernardes, [illegible] Superior do Itamaraty, que se [illegible] pelo Diretor do Instituto Rio Branco, Embaixador Castelo de Oliveira.

CONTRÔLE

Dedicou o conferencista, grande parte do seu tempo ao problema da inspeção das provas atômicas, salientando que os Estados Unidos não advogam indiscriminadamente um contrôle completo e total, mas a [illegible] paralela e relacionada com as medidas de desarmamento que forem tomadas». Seria um processo gradativo de desarmamento a ser acompanhado, passo a passo, por idênticas medidas fiscalizadoras. Disse ser impossível saber-se exatamente quantas bombas atômicas existem atualmente, da mesma forma como controlar o processo completo e total da sua extinção imediata.

INTERÊSSE

Assinalou o professor Kissinger a seriedade com que o Govêrno Kennedy encara o problema do desarmamento, tendo demonstrado êsse interêsse ao criar uma repartição [illegible] agência para o Desarmamento, destinada a planificar [illegible] para o Desarmamento. Acrescentou, ainda, que o [illegible] Defesa também [illegible] que se encarregou de planificar [illegible] mamento.

A [illegible]

Conferencista [illegible] de «Armas Nucleares e Política Externas», que o problema do Desarmamento não pode ser [illegible] por meio de [illegible] ou com medidas específicos. CHOQUE [illegible] práticas, a [illegible] de não ter armas atômicas [illegible] cômico e a desnecessidade [illegible] algumas regiões [illegible] exemplo. Uma [illegible] política, a cessação [illegible] experiências atômicas [illegible] Estados Unidos se [illegible] a garantia de [illegible] pela União Soviética [illegible] também, o professor [illegible] atuação, dos depósitos [illegible] relação ao problema [illegible] que êstes devem [illegible] próprios, as suas [illegible] para o desarmamento [illegible] se colocarem as [illegible] intermediárias [illegible].

GUERRA FRIA

[illegible]singer referiu-se [illegible] [illegible]omas internacionais [illegible]am deixar de estar [illegible]ligados aos problemas [illegible]namento, ao qual [illegible]onder o abrandamento [illegible] nos casos mais cruciais da política internacional da atualidade. Referiu-se também [illegible] [illegible] causa de Berlim, [illegible] [illegible] [illegible]

JUN 5 - 1962

PRESS SECTION — DATE — U.S.I.S.

MORNING

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=) O DIA
=) DIARIO CARIOCA
=) DIARIO DE NOTICIAS
=) O JORNAL
=) JORNAL DO COMERCIO
=) JORNAL DO BRASIL
=) GAZETA DE NOTICIAS
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Fundado em 1827 — Rio de Janeiro, segunda-f

Kissinger e a guerra neurótica



Henry Kissinger, um dos chamados de Harvard, que criaram a Nova Fronteira do Presidente Kennedy, disse ontem, no Itamaraty, em conferência, que sem inspeção não é exequível o desarmamento. Kissinger (na foto, ao lado do Embaixador Carlos Alfredo Bernardes), autor da obra considerada básica sôbre um tema dramàticamente atual: Armas Nucleares e Política Externa, Acha ele que o desarmamento pode ser auxiliado pelas alianças, bem como pelas medidas preventivas como, por exemplo, a desnuclearização de certas áreas. A guerra neurótica é o que contribui, disse, para acelerar a corrida armamentista. (Mais informações na última página dêste Caderno)

0694

JUN 5 - 1962


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=) O DIA
=) DIARIO CARIOCA
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=) JORNAL DO BRASIL
=) GAZETA DE NOTICIAS
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=) A NOITE
=) A NOTICIA
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Mundo não será desarmado se prosseguir como agora na faixa das tensões, afirma Kissinger

As relações entre o Ocidente e o Oriente foram o tema da conferência do prof. Henry Kissinger, pronunciada ontem, perante numeroso auditório, no Auditório Central da Reitoria da Universidade do Brasil. Na ocasião, muito concorrida, estiveram presentes diplomatas, inclusive estrangeiros.

CONFRONTO

O prof. Kissinger, da Universidade de Harvard, é um dos consultores do presidente Kennedy, notabilizou-se pela sua

clear, face ao poder retaliatório de certa maneira, sobretudo na reformulação da política externa norte-americana. Na ocasião, o conferencista abordou os dramáticos problemas mundiais de nossos dias, estabelecendo um confronto dos pontos de vista americanos e russos sobre estes problemas.

SERENIDADE

Assinalou, porém, Kissinger que os Estados Unidos encaram com serenidade a questão do desarmamento e aceitam muitas das teses russas sobre o desarmamento geral e completo, mas não só pelo fato de haver entre elas imediatas e concretas sejam adotadas, para assegurar que o objetivo final seja alcançado. Sobre o problema da inspeção, a que a União Soviética faz da sua palestra, afirmou que ela não advoga indiscriminadamente Inspeção completa e total, mas parcial e relacionada com as medidas de desarmamento que forem sendo adotadas. Os riscos inerentes ao desarmamento são muitos — frisou — e devem ser acompanhados por dose equivalente de inspeção.

VINCULAÇÃO

Por outro lado, estabeleceu vinculação do problema do desarmamento com as tensões internacionais, citando Berlim como exemplo, para afirmar que não haverá desarmamento se países interessados não houver diminuído de tensão. Sugeriu por último o prof. Kissinger que os demais países interessados no desarmamento deverão procurar suas próprias soluções para o problema, sem de se colocarem "a priori" em posições intermediárias ou de equidistância.

0693

PRESS SECTION

DATE

U.S.I.S.

MORNING

=) BRAZIL HERALD
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=) O DIA
=) DIARIO CARIOCA
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=) O JORNAL
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=) JORNAL DO BRASIL
=) GAZETA DE NOTICIAS
=) ÚLTIMA HORA

AFTERNOON

=) O GLOBO
=) TRIBUNA DA IMPRENSA
=) A NOITE
=) A NOTICIA
=) ULTIMA HORA





PUGILISTA REVOLTADO! — Com os punhos erguidos, Jimmie Hyde, de 3 anos de idade, protesta revoltado e exclama: "Não estou certo, errei muitas coisas mesmo". No ressalvado, Jimmie ia dar um soco no ódio quando pegou, batendo com garotos mais fortes nas peculiaridades de sua residência em Fort Lauderdale, Flórida. Sobre o acidente, ele deu várias versões, principalmente acêrca de sua habilidade pugilística. (Now UPI — Exclusivo para O GLOBO)

Três Mortos no Descarrilamento do Expresso Londrino

LONDRES, 2 (FP — O GLOBO) — Três pessoas morreram e sete ficaram feridas no descarrilamento do expresso noturno Londres—Edimburgo, na madrugada de hoje. O acidente ocorreu quando o trem saía da estação de Lincoln, a 130 km ao norte da capital. Todos os passageiros estavam dormindo.

...ram-se em Moscou os dirigentes comunistas da Europa Oriental reunidos em Moscou, a partir de quarta-feira próxima, a fim de buscar uma solução para a crescente concorrência ofereida pelo Mercado Comum.

A conferência entre os principais dirigentes do bloco comunista da Europa Oriental será a primeira que se realiza desde o XXII Congresso do Partido Comunista da União Soviética, que se reuniu em Moscou no último outono.

Prevê-se que as sanções serão debatidas os problemas relativos à coordenação dos programas econômicos de vinte anos, a questão da Alemanha e o problema de Berlim, e ainda a divergência que ainda subsiste entre a Rússia e a China Comunista.



ENCONTRO DE GAULLE—MACMILLAN — O Presidente Charles De Gaulle palestra animadamente com o Primeiro-Ministro britânico Harold Macmillan, no parque do Castelo de de Champs, nos arredores de Paris. A entrevista ocorreu a fim de Gaulle. Os dois estadistas conversaram sobre uma reunião da dois dias sobre a ingressão da Grã-Bretanha no Mercado Comum Europeu. Macmillan regressou ontem a Londres. (Radiofoto Associated Press — Excl. para O GLOBO)

Queixa-se Adenauer de Exageros da Imprensa

DORTMUND, Alemanha, 2 (AP — O GLOBO) — O Primeiro-Ministro Conrad Adenauer reconheceu, hoje, que havia divergências entre êle e o Presidente Kennedy, dos EUA, porém declarou enfàticamente que tais divergências não se referiam à sua política básica.

Acaso, depois, os jornalistas de comentarem, exagerou na apreciação destes fatos, dizendo que feliam entre os a aliança entre os dois governos estivesse a ponto de rompe-se.

Adenauer fêz estas declarações ao inaugurar a convenção anual da Partido Democrata Cristão. Desmentiu as notícias de que pretendesse entrar em Berlim numa política de concessões com os países ...ático. E menos que êstes mostrem disposição de lutar realmente.

Estas notícias, acentuou o ex-lhe estariam sendo veiculadas mesmo a moldade da Europa. Sôbre o Mercado Comum, Adenauer declarou que a situação britânica em face de sua solicitação para ingressar à comunidade econômica era muito difícil.

"Desejo que a Grã-Bretanha venha unir-se a nós" — afirmou Adenauer, frisando que compreendia o problema britânico com seus vínculos com a comunidade britânica.

Papel de imprensa

Abaixo-se Indícios que a possível seja reduzido o impôsto a alfândega de venda por cento para o papel de imprensa. Os jornais publicam nova campanha visando para que o Governo torne sem efeito o impôsto aduaneiro de vinte por cento, que pesa sobre as importações de papel.

O preço de venda dos jornais foi recentemente aumentado de cêrca cinco meses, devido ao aumento do custo da produção.

Hoje a Explosão a Grande Altitude

HONOLULU, 2 (AP - FP — O GLOBO) — O tempo tornou-se hoje o segundo adiamento, por 24 horas, da explosão nuclear norte-americana a grande altitude sôbre a Ilha Johnston. A prova foi marcada para amanhã, segunda-feira.



BENNY GOODMAN EM MOSCOU — O famoso clarinetista norte-americano Benny Goodman posa com seu instrumento diante do Teatro do Kremlin, na Praça Vermelha, em Moscou. O flagrante foi feito sexta-feira última, ocasião em que Goodman ensaiava alguns números ao ar livre para o seu fã moscovitas. (Radiofoto UPI — Exclusivo para O GLOBO)

Vai Localizar Exatamente a Lua e Marte

SYRACUSE, Nova York, 2 (UPI — O GLOBO) — O problema de enviar um foguete à Lua ou a Marte é a conjunção de um foguete bastante grande. Outro problema é determinar o local onde a Lua ou Marte realmente estão.

Frank E. Lowther, cientista especializado em foguetes, é o homem que se dedica à urgente tarefa de localizar a Lua e Marte, e outros objetos espaciais, no tempo exato. Realmente, descobriu o que os paulos exatos em que os astros, pelo menos por enquanto.

Lowther, preso na trajetória de foguetes militares, está construindo um novo computador de medidas para localizar instantâneamente os objetos espaciais.

Eleições na Bolívia

LA PAZ, 2 (UPI — O GLOBO) — Foram realizadas hoje eleições parciais para eleger 36 deputados e quinze senadores da nação, às quais se caracterizaram pelo ambiente de tranquilidade e a pouca afluência de eleitores. Parece que se confirmam os prognósticos de que numerosos eleitores se absteriam de votar.

OS ESTADOS UNIDOS JAMAIS LANÇARÃO A PRIMEIRA BOMBA NUMA GUERRA ATÔMICA

— OS ESTADOS Unidos jamais começarão uma guerra atômica — afirmou a O GLOBO, esclarecendo, o professor de Harvard Henry A. Kissinger, especialista em estratégia nuclear e assessor especial do Casa Branca para assuntos atômicos.

— A menos que estejamos superados com isso Mas de crise, ou que um nosso aliado próximo o seja, não recorreremos ao nosso arsenal atômico — acrescentou.

Em sua entrevista, o Professor Kissinger, que está no Brasil a convite do Itamaraty para ministrar conferências sôbre desarmamento, afirmou, também, não acreditar na possibilidade de uma guerra atômica provocada por acidente, e disse não ser pessimista com relação ao futuro da Conferência de Genebra.

— Acredito — disse — que a moratória dos últimos testes atômicos, realizados pelos EUA e pela URSS, será possível dentro em pouco tempo nas discussões em tôrno do desarmamento.

Solução Sem Guerra

— Em meu país — afirmou Kissinger — prevalece grande ceticismo com relação à possibilidade de regime democrático sôbre o comunismo terá de ser obtida através da guerra. Os países livres têm maior capacidade evidente que os comunistas, mais recursos e, através de um ocorrer de entendimento que deve ser estabelecido, correspondência às esperanças dos povos democráticos, vencerão a disputa. Trabalhando em comum nesse sentido, com mesmo nacionalismo extremado, tenho a certeza de que a democracia sairá vitoriosa.

Guerra Por Acidente

— Não há a menor possibilidade — salientou — de uma guerra atômica ter o seu início em algum ataque falso, ou mesmo incidente de lançamento de algum militar frustrado. As bases entre o leste europeu, que circulam em alerta forçado, devem ser levadas à conta de coisas de horror. Não tem o menor fundamento. A idéia de que um sendo de grupos detectados por uma tela de radar poderia ser confundido com uma esquadrilha inimiga, ou com um ataque por mísseis, provocando uma reação, mesmo que daria início a uma guerra atômica, é inteiramente fantasiosa. Outros financistas costumam escrever que um oficial qualquer, enfurecido ao uma base perdida no Ataca, poderia apertar um botão e disparar uma arremetida de mísseis. Isto é ridículo. Em primeiro lugar, não há botões a apertar. Uma decisão como essa, que interessa a centenas de milhares de pessoas, jamais seria tomada apertando-se botões, ou por um homem só.

Ao explicar o mecanismo de defesa dos EUA, diz Kissinger:

— Ao alarme de que estaríamos sendo atacados por engenhos atômicos, centros gêmeos levantarão vôo imediatamente, contendo armas nucleares. Terão instruções, no entanto, de avançar apenas até determinado ponto, onde aguardarão ordem de ataque, que somente poderá ser dada pelo próprio Presidente Kennedy. E a ordem só será dada depois que bombas explodirem em vários territórios, ou só de países nossos aliados. Só, com todos os cuidados, ainda assim ocorrer um acidente, mesmo aí eu não acredito na eclosão de uma guerra atômica: nem os EUA nem a URSS teriam interêsse em desfechar uma guerra nuclear em razão de um acidente.

O Clube Atômico

A propósito da nuclearização da França e da China, afirmou o Professor Kissinger:

— É preciso distinguir entre fazer explodir uma bomba atômica e possuir efetivamente capacidade nuclear. O caso da França, que já fêz explodir mais de um engenho, de qualquer forma, não altera o equilíbrio nuclear do Ocidente, uma vez que nada temos a temer daquele país. Uma França armada nuclearmente não passaria de uma vitrina e o que pode nos preocupar é uma reação psicológica por parte de alguns países europeus, a Alemanha especialmente, que os levaria a querer ingressar no clube atômico. O caso da China, a meu ver, é mais grave, deve preocupar os seus vizinhos — especialmente o Japão e a Índia — e, mais que a ninguém, à própria União Soviética.

Guerra Convencional

— Do ponto de vista estritamente militar — disse Kissinger — acredito que armas atômicas passam ser utilizadas nos conflitos localizados, como os que ocorrem no Laos, Vietnã etc. Não acredito, no entanto, que o sejam. Daí a importância que se atribui, em círculos políticos e militares norte-americanos, aos exércitos convencionalmente armados e treinados. Especialmente no combate aos grupos guerrilheiros, vantajosamente empregados neste tipo de conflito, os exércitos convencionais continuam desempenhando papel muito importante.

Desarmamento

Depois de afirmar que deposita esperanças no futuro da conferência de Genebra, acreditando que as possam obter progressos nas discussões sôbre o desarmamento, o Professor Kissinger assevera não existirem problemas econômicos insuperáveis que impeçam os EUA de se desarmarem.

— Em todas as discussões sôbre o assunto, de que participei, em Washington — prosseguiu — jamais foi levantado o problema econômico como empecilho ao desarmamento. Mesmo sem ser economista, posso assegurar que a indústria norte-americana, atualmente empenhada na produção de material bélico, poderá sem relativa facilidade encontrar seus recursos para outros fins. Há muito cedo aplicar a capacidade industrial norte-americana, assim como existem vários problemas que poderiam ser resolvidos mais rapidamente se a fôsse fôssem destinados os atuais orçamentos militares. Naturalmente, uma vez decidido o desarmamento, não se irá dos atuais 45 bilhões de dólares anuais ao zero, em um pulo só. O processo deverá levar alguns anos, durante os quais grandes verbas ainda serão empregadas com sistemas de inspeção, Polícia Internacional etc. A reconversão da indústria norte-americana não deverá ocorrer sem problemas: mas êste é um problema com o qual qualquer membro da administração Kennedy gostaria de se preocupar.

JUL 2 - 1962

PRESS SECTION — DATE — U.S.I.S.

MORNING

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=) A NOTICIA
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grande nação [illegible] ainda o Almirante Burdy que cumpre codificar o direito marítimo brasileiro, de vez que o último trabalho neste sentido data de 1850.

Deputado Diz Ter Ido a Congresso Comunista em Defesa da Legalidade

PÔRTO ALEGRE, 1 (Transpress — O GLOBO) — O ex-presidente da Assembléia Legislativa, Deputado Hélio Carlomagno, compareceu à sessão de encerramento do 7.º Congresso Estadual do Partido Comunista do Brasil, que se reuniu de portas abertas, nesta capital. Ante as críticas feitas à sua atitude, declarou:

"Como presidente do Movimento de Resistência Democrática, surgido nos dias incertos da crise de agôsto de 1961, não poderia deixar de atender a um convite que, embora partido das esquerdas, representava um reavivamento daquelas inspirações extrapartidárias ideológicas, que uniram todo o povo rio-grandense na defesa da legalidade, que ainda continua ameaçada, segundo meu ponto de vista".

uído o mosteiro já foi parte de
a Manuel de Brito, fidalgo da
eneditinos. Frei Pedro Ferraz e
o do morro havia uma ermida,
n uma igreja, substituída, em
1652, teve início a construção do
as pedras para a construção fo-
Viúva, pois ignorava-se quê o
em uma pedreira. Neste traba-
juda de escravos e da própria

regra de São Bento, que ordena:
vem com os Ofícios, e o trabalho
das missões: ensinar à juventude.
to, contíguo ao mosteiro, foi fun-
ula da Conceição Saraiva, que se
do Maranhão. Originàriamente, o
steiro. As instalações atuais foram
e conta com mais de mil alunos.

âneas

rive no mosteiro há 13 anos, e já
s visitantes, disse que não é ver-
sagens subterrâneas que partiriam
pontos da cidade. Está escrevendo
nho, a ser publicado no Jornal do
ória. A única coisa parecida com
Cripta de Nossa Senhora do Pilar,
rés metros de comprimento. Con-
850, era costume sepultar as pes-
o surto de febre amarela no Bra-
costume. Nas obras de reforma
tais não reclamados pelas famí-
a Cripta.

O GLOBO
EMPRESA JORNALÍSTICA BRASILEIRA S/A

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RICARDO MARINHO
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
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O Professor Henry Kissinger, assessor do Presidente Kennedy

OS ESTADOS UNIDOS JAMAIS LANÇARÃO A PRIMEIRA BOMBA NUMA GUERRA ATÔMICA

Professor de Harvard e Assessor de Kennedy Para Assuntos Atômicos Afirma Não Acreditar na Possibilidade de Guerra Nuclear Provocada Por Acidente — Otimista Quanto ao Futuro da Conferência do Desarmamento, em Genebra — A Supremacia do Regime Democrático Sôbre o Comunismo Não Terá Que Ser Obtida Através da Guerra **(TEXTO NA QUINTA PÁGINA)**



Sindicatos têm no IS 80% de sua renda: não vivem sem ele

5a. Zona terá 120 mil eleitores

Kissinger crê na precaução contra guerra por acidente

França e China

A guerra por acidente

A decisão do conflito

JUN 3 - 1962

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JUN 5 - 1962


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Assessor de Kennedy diz que EUA aceitam a fase da URSS sôbre o desarme

O Professor Henry Kissinger, assessor do Presidente Kennedy, disse ontem, durante [illegible] que [illegible] no Itamarati, que os Estados Unidos aceitam a fase do desarmamento geral e completo, atualmente pela União Soviética, mas desejam que sejam [illegible] medidas especiais, com o que [illegible] que propuseram nas discussões.

O Professor Henry Kissinger afirmou que os Estados Unidos encaram "com muita seriedade" o problema do desarmamento e que até [illegible] dar do problema, [illegible] para o Departamento de Estado, por seu lado, possui [illegible] sobre o planejamento militar para o desarmamento.

A INSPEÇÃO

Indagado pelo Ministro [illegible] Carlos Alberto Barreiros, [illegible] criminalista-Geral de Polícia Estadual, e Antônio Camilo de Oliveira, [illegible] do Estado do Rio Grande do Norte, [illegible] [illegible] [illegible]

JUN - 7 1962

PRESS SECTION

DATE

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MORNING

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PRESS SECTION

JUN 13 1967

DATE

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...TANDO UM PROTESTO

...discernos, em ...l Lei Tribu... ...miral Néto e ... Carlos La...

...utro impôs... ...erda—Ama... ...rchante: o ...nações, que ...ão, 25% do...

Negrão de ...to de Ven... ...s 10%, ou ...de público ...e acêrto... ...nanciro do ...le recursos ...lemas 'com ...ato, porém, ...o conseguiu ...a grita que ...a sua pre... pelo então ...o Comercial, ...linha, então, justificando ...ção: "Esse ...pressivo da ...e Consigna... ...a o Sr. Ne... ...a majoração ...s sôbre um ...zeiros". Di... ...residente da ...umento dêsse ...retamente a ...bêm popular, is acarretar uma fuga em massa das indústrias instaladas no Rio.

Atente bem o leitor, e aqui vamos argumentar com os próprios dados que nos forneceu, na época, o Sr. Rui Gomes de Almeida, Ora, se 10% de aumento sôbre os 4% do impôsto de Vendas e Consignações significaria uma majoração de 3 500 cruzeiros num salário-família de 10 000 cruzeiros, perguntamos: sendo êsse aumento agora de 25%, de quanto será a majoração do mesmo salário-família? Respondemos: se 10% equivalem a 2 500 cruzeiros, 25% equivalem a 6 250 cruzeiros.

Que aconteceu de lá para cá? A economia popular se fortaleceu? Os salários se fizeram justos? Foi detido o custo de vida? Acabou a inflação? Em suma — porque naquela época, um salário-família não podia sofrer o impacto de 2 500 cruzeiros, é pode hoje aguentar 6 250 cruzeiros F E as indústrias, que iriam fugir do Rio, expulsas pelo aumento de 10%, não fugirão agora, quando o aumento é de 25%? Outra coisa: — na época a majoração de apenas um impôsto, o de Vendas e Consignações, é que era combatida. Hoje, todos os impostos foram majorados: água, esgôto, predial, indústrias e profissões, e em proporções escorchantes. E ninguém protesta?

Contra a absurda e escorchante Lei Tributária de Lacerda—Amaral Néto, protestamos nós, em defesa de tôda a população carioca.

Matias Vahia

Presidente recebeu nas Laranjeiras 6 governadores para resolver problemas

O Presidente João Goulart recebeu, ontem, no Palácio das Laranjeiras, seis governadores, com os quais discutiu problemas estaduais e encaminhou algumas soluções. O Governador Cid Sampaio, de Pernambuco, foi o primeiro a ser recebido e conversou apenas ligeiramente com o Sr. João Goulart, tratando de assuntos de interêsse de Pernambuco.

O Sr. João Goulart conferenciou, em seguida, com o Governador Chagas Rodrigues, do Piauí, discutindo medidas no sentido de apressamento das obras da usina do Rio Parnaíba. Imediatamente, foram recebidos pelo Presidente

Kissinger: problema n.º 1 do desarme é a falta de confiança recíproca

Brasília (Sucursal) — Em conferência, ontem, às 11 horas, na Universidade de Brasília, o Professor Henry Kissinger, Assessor do Presidente Kennedy e Diretor do Departamento de Govêrno e Política Internacional da Universidade de Harvard, disse que o principal empecilho ao desarmamento é a falta de confiança recíproca dos dois blocos em luta.

Outro problema sério, a seu ver, é o avanço tecnológico. Sendo lentas as negociações entre as nações, quase sempre acontece que, quando se encontra a fórmula para o desarme não se sabe mais o que desarmar, pois os engenhos nucleares objetos da discussão já estão superados por ambos os blocos — e tudo, assim, volta à estaca zero.

POR ETAPAS

O Professor Kissinger expressou sua opinião pessoal de que o desarme devesse ser feito por etapas, iniciando-se com a destruição de 30% dos engenhos de guerra. Mostrou que o propósito do desarmamento não é o de um simples manifesto, visa a garantir a segurança do mundo, sèriamente ameaçado com a corrida armamentista. Nesse ponto, comentou a possibilidade, entre outras, de se deflagrar a guerra nuclear por fôrça de um acidente.

— Os Estados Unidos encaram com tal seriedade esta possibilidade — disse êle — que um grupo de cêrca de cem funcionários altamente categorizados trabalha em regime de full time, no estudo e pesquisa do assunto. O funcionário responsável pela equipe tem até status de subsecretário e acesso direto ao Presidente da República.

NEUTROS E BRANCOS

Considerou o Professor Kissinger como perigosa a atuação de nações que não fazem parte de qualquer dos blocos, pois, embora bem intencionadas, essas nações, que não conhecem principalmente, o problema tecnológico, podem adotar soluções extremadas. Todavia — frisou — tais países podem ajudar muito enfatizando a importância do problema.

Um universitário perguntou se o desarmamento geral não causaria, nos Estados Unidos, o desemprêgo em massa de todos os que trabalham nas indústrias bélicas. O Sr. Kissinger respondeu que isso não aconteceria, pois, ocorrendo o desarme, não só os recursos empregados nas indústrias armas como os seus operários seriam transferidos para atividades civis, entre as quais [illegible] tou à restauração de rodovia

A conferência, que durou quase duas horas, suscitou debates da assistência, composta de universitários, professôres autoridades do Govêrno Federal, com o professor norte-americano. O Professor Hermes Lima, por exemplo, quis saber porque os Estados Unidos, cujo poderio militar foi exaltado pelo conferencista, não devolveu algumas bases militares que mantêm no exterior.

O Sr. Kissinger afirmou que o problema não é tão simples assim: essas bases compõem o sistema de segurança de todo o mundo livre e não foram superadas pelos mísseis.

A outra pergunta, sôbre o ônus que o mundo capitalista suporta para manter a guerra fria, disse que, sendo êste um problema mais de economia, não tinha meios para responder. Todavia, adiantou acreditar que as nações capitalistas, em especial os Estados Unidos, podem suportar durante muito tempo ainda êsse ônus.

Finda a conferência, o Senhor Hermes Lima disse ao JORNAL DO BRASIL que a estada, entre nós, de Sr. Kissinger, se prende à próxima visita do Presidente Kennedy: — Êle veio sondar o terreno, com[illegible] o Chefe da Casa Civil da Presidência.

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PERITO EM DESARMAMENTO



«Vim ao Brasil aprender e não ensinar», disse o Prof. Henry A. Kissinger, perito norte-americano em desarmamento, ao desembarcar no Galeão para uma visita não oficial ao nosso país, em que fará uma série de conferências no Rio, São Paulo, Brasília e Recife. O visitante, que visita o convite do Itamarati, é professor na Universidade de Harvard e autor de várias obras e artigos sôbre política internacional, estratégia militar, desarmamento e problema da não-militarização do espaço sideral. Na foto, o professor norte-americano, quando da sua chegada à Guanabara

Jornal do Comércio
7-4-59 [illegible]

0678

Estratégia

Encontra-se no Rio, convidado pelo Itamaraty, Henry Kissinger, professor de assuntos de política internacional da Universidade de Harvard e um dos assessôres da Casa Branca. A visita é oportuna e uma de várias do mesmo gênero que o Itamaraty está promovendo, para maior ilustração de nossas elites dirigentes e, certamente, também para interessar homens dessa categoria em assuntos brasileiros e latino-americanos. Na condição de assessor governamental é que foi convidado.

O jovem professor pode hoje ser identificado com a política de seu país no domínio da estratégia atômica global e do desarmamento. Esta posição é a de perseguir simultâneamente o aperfeiçoamento e a melhoria dos armamentos atômicos, e de explorar ao máximo planos concretos de desarmamento. Para o teórico norte-americano, a corrida armamentista atômica dos Estados Unidos mostrará à União Soviética que a vitória militar é impossível e que o melhor caminho é aceitar medidas desarmamentistas, mesmo limitadas. Kissinger costuma citar os casos da Inglaterra e da França na década dos 30, para mostrar que o desarmamento precipitado leva à guerra e não à paz.

O Govêrno dos Estados Unidos tem falado uma linguagem que freqüentemente escapa ao doutrinarismo estratégico de um assessor de assuntos atômicos e militares. Discursos como os do Secretário de Estado em janeiro último, em Punta del Este, contêm conceitos de grande flexibilidade e originalidade, em têrmos norte-americanos. Mas a paixão em tôrno da questão cubana eclipsou inteiramente afirmações ousadas da Rusk sôbre a convivência dos Estados Unidos com regimes de ideologia divergente, em qualquer parte do mundo. Quem leu o último livro de Kissinger — *Necessidade de uma Escolha* — fica com a impressão de que o erudito mestre de Harvard preocupa-se hoje, mais do que nunca, com aspectos não militares da estratégia dos Estados Unidos. Os problemas estratégicos dos Estados Unidos estão, na verdade, muito longe de serem maciçamente militares. Uma bomba atômica pode sustar outra bomba atômica, mas pode ser impotente diante da guerra econômica, diante da ofensiva ideológica, ou da agressão do tipo insurrecional. Uma sociedade, ou aliança como a nossa, está mais do que nunca, diante de um problema de estratégia militar.

Jornal do Brasil
Jun. 1, 1962

0677

EUA, mais preparados que os soviéticos, evitam a guerra, declara Kissinger

O Assessor para Assuntos Políticos do Presidente Kennedy, Professor Henry Kissinger, declarou ontem, na Escola Superior de Guerra, que os Estados Unidos se esforçam para evitar uma guerra nuclear, embora estejam mais bem preparados do que os soviéticos.

O Professor Kissinger, que é também docente da Universidade de Harvard, está realizando uma viagem de estudos e observações pela América Latina. Disse ainda em sua palestra que, com o advento da administração Kennedy, política e estratégia nos EUA sofreram modificações.

GUERRA NUCLEAR

Pôs o professor norte-americano dois pontos fundamentais da atual política dos Estados Unidos: evitar, tanto quanto possível, uma guerra nuclear, pelas suas conseqüências danosas e imprevisíveis para a humanidade, e desenvolver suas forças convencionada de maneira a possuir condições capazes de enfrentar uma guerra nuclear. Para isso estabeleceram um centro de estudos de guerrilhas, para ajudar seus amigos em dificuldades nas mais diversas partes do mundo.

Para o professor Kissinger, se uma guerra nuclear fôr desencadeada, ela será fatalmente iniciada pelos comunistas. Admite, entretanto, que os Estados Unidos vencerão essa guerra, pois dispõem de melhor estratégia e de um poder ofensivo que os russos não possuem. Assim sendo, os Estados Unidos jamais poderão ser vencidos pelos soviéticos.

PRIMEIRO ALVO

Fêz questão de esclarecer, durante a palestra, que não estava falando na qualidade de assessor do Presidente dos Estados Unidos, mas sim como professor universitário, acentuando que, naturalmente, seus pontos-de-vista, na maioria das vêzes, coincidem com as opiniões do Presidente norte-americano.

Ao fim da conferência, falando ao JORNAL DO BRASIL, o Professor Kissinger declarou que, no seu modo de ver, o primeiro alvo de um ataque atômico soviético seriam os Estados Unidos.

0676

Assessor de Kennedy Visitou "Ultima Hora"

ESTEVE ontem em visita à redação de ULTIMA HORA, o Professor Henry Kissinger, da Universidade de Harvard e assessor do Presidente Kennedy, que se encontra desde anteontem nesta cidade, a convite do Itamarati. Manteve longa e cordial palestra com nosso Diretor-Presidente, jornalista Samuel Wainer.

O visitante, autor do livro "Armas Nucleares e Política Externa", deverá pronunciar conferência, na Escola Superior de Guerra. Amanhã vai ser homenageado na Embaixada dos Estados Unidos; dia 6 viajara para São Paulo; dia 10 estará em Brasília, quando, provavelmente, se avistará com o Presidente da República; dia 12 empreenderá viagem pelo Nordeste, estando de volta ao Rio dia 15.

0675

3

Kissinger em visita ao Brasil

A convite do Itamarati, para conhecer o Brasil e pronunciar conferências na Escola Superior de Guerra, na Universidade de São Paulo e em outros centros culturais, chegou ontem ao Rio o prof. Henry Kissinger, da Universidade de Harvard. Autor de um livro que se tornou clássico, "Armas Nucleares e Política Externa", Kissinger esquematizou a nova estratégia global ante o desafio da era nuclear e o poder totalitário das armas atômicas. Ao apreciar a luta entre a democracia e o comunismo, aborda o problema das jovens nações e dá destaque especial ao Brasil, que considera o país-chave da América Latina.

Hoje, Kissinger pronunciará conferência, às 9h, na ESG, sobre "estratégia nuclear". Dia 4 falará no Itamarati sôbre "Relações Este e Oeste" e "O problema do desarmamento". Durante sua permanência no Brasil visitará São Paulo, Brasília, Salvador e Recife.

Correio da Manhã 1/7/1962

0674

Espaço é pacífico



O professor norte-americano Henry A. Kissinger (foto), da Universidade de Harvard, considerado um perito no que diz respeito ao desarmamento à não-militarização do espaço sideral, encontra-se no Brasil, a convite do Ministério das Relações Exteriores. Embora já tenha desempenhado vários cargos oficiais, o professor Kissinger declarou que se encontra no Brasil em viagem particular.

0673

Prof. Kissinger, de Harvard, chega para falar em quatro cidades sôbre desarmamento

Para uma série de conferências sôbre desarmamento no Rio, São Paulo, Brasília e Recife, chegou ao Rio o Professor norte-americano Henry A. Kissinger, da Universidade de Harvard, convidado do Ministério das Relações Exteriores do Brasil.

O Professor Kissinger, que já foi Consultor da Casa Branca, é considerado perito em política internacional e estratégia militar. Em suas primeiras declarações à imprensa, disse o Professor que não veio ao Brasil ensinar, mas aprender.

QUEM É

Autor de um livro que se tornou clássico, Armas Nucleares e Política Externa, o Professor Henry Kissinger esquematizou a nova estratégia global ante o desafio da era nuclear e o poder retaliatório das armas atômicas.

Ao apreciar a luta entre a democracia e o comunismo, Kissinger aborda o problema das jovens nações e dá destaque especial ao Brasil, que considera o país-chave da América Latina.

Durante a estada do Prof. Kissinger no Brasil, está previsto o seguinte programa: Dia 31 — Conferência na Escola Superior de Guerra, às 9 horas, sôbre Estratégia Nuclear; Dia 1 — Jantar na Embaixada Americana; Dia 4 — Conferência no Itamarati, às 18 horas, sôbre Relações Este e Oeste e o Problema do Desarmamento; Dia 5 — Almôço no Itamarati, às 13 horas; Dia 6 — Viagem para São Paulo. — Conferência sôbre Prospects of American Foreign Policy, na Universidade de São Paulo; Dia 10 — Partida para Brasília; Dia 11 — Entrevista com o Professor Hermes Lima, e, se possível, com o Presidente da República; Dia 12 — Partida de Brasília para Salvador. No mesmo dia, partida de Salvador para Recife. Visita, em Recife, ao Senhor Gilberto Freire e ao Governador Cid Sampaio, contato com a Sudene; Dia 15 — Partida de Recife para o Rio.

0672

Assessor de Kennedy faz conferência sôbre bomba

O sr. Henry Kissinger, assessor do presidente John Kennedy e perito em assuntos de estratégia militar, desarmamento e problemas do uso pacífico do espaço sideral, faz conferência hoje pela manhã, na Escola Superior de Guerra.


O sr. Kissinger chegou ontem, a convite do Itamarati. É autor de "Armas Nucleares e Política Externa", sendo ainda professor da Universidade de Harvard.

Seu programa é:

Amanhã, jantar na Embaixada Americana; dia 4, conferência no Itamarati, às 13 horas, sôbre Relações Este e Oeste e o Problema do Desarmamento; dia 5, almôço no Itamarati, às 13 horas; dia 6, viagem para São Paulo. Conferência sôbre "Prospects of American Foreign Policy", na Universidade de São Paulo; dia 10, partida para Brasília; dia 11, entrevista com o professor Hermes Lima, se possível com o presidente da República; dia 12, partida de Brasília para Salvador. No mesmo dia, partida de Salvador para Recife. Visita, no Recife, ao sr. Gilberto Freyre e ao governador Cid Sampaio, contato com a SUDENE; dia 13, partida de Recife para o Rio.

0671

Perito em Desarmamento no Rio



Para uma série de conferências no Rio, São Paulo, Brasília, Recife e outras capitais, chegam ao Brasil o prof. Henry A. Kissinger, da Universidade de Harvard, considerado perito em assuntos ligados à estratégia militar, à questão do desarmamento e ao problema da não militarização do espaço sideral. O sr. Kissinger (foto), já exerceu vários cargos no seu país, inclusive o de conselheiro da Casa Branca. Sua viagem prende-se a convite do Itamaraty.

VISITA DE PERITO EM DESARMAMENTO

Encontra-se no Brasil, para uma série de conferências no Rio, em São Paulo, Brasília e Recife, o professor norte-americano Henry A. Kissingar, da Universidade de Harvard, que viaja a convite do Ministério das Relações Exteriores do Brasil. Autor de várias obras e artigos sôbre política internacional, o professor Kissinger é considerado perito em assuntos que dizem respeito à estratégia militar, à atual questão do desarmamento e ao problema da não-militarização do espaço sideral. Embora já tenha desempenhado vários cargos públicos no govêrno dos Estados Unidos, entre os quais o de consultor da Casa Branca, o sr. Kissinger não se encontra em missão oficial e, segundo declarou à imprensa, veio ao Brasil aprender e não ensinar.

0669

Kissinger: problema n.º 1 do desarme é a falta de confiança recíproca

Brasília (Sucursal) — Em conferência, ontem, às 11 horas, na Universidade de Brasília, o Professor Henry Kissinger, Assessor do Presidente Kennédy e Diretor do Departamento de Govêrno e Política Internacional da Universidade de Harvard, disse que o principal empecilho ao desarmamento é a falta de confiança recíproca dos dois blocos em luta.

Outro problema sério, a seu ver, é o avanço tecnológico. Sendo lentas as negociações entre as nações, quase sempre acontece que, quando se encontra a fórmula para o desarme não se sabe mais o que desarmar, pois os engenhos nucleares objetos de discussão já estão superados por ambos os blocos — e tudo, assim, volta à estaca zero.

TRÊS ETAPAS

O Professor Kissinger expressou sua opinião pessoal de que o desarme devesse ser feito por etapas, iniciando-se com a destruição de 30% dos engenhos de guerra. Mostrou que o propósito do desarmamento não é o de um simples manifesto: visa a garantir a segurança do mundo, seriamente ameaçado com a corrida armamentista. Nesse ponto, comentou a possibilidade, entre outras, de se deflagrar a guerra nuclear por fôrça de um acidente.

Os Estados Unidos encaram bem tal seriedade de tais possibilidades — disse êle — que um grupo de cêrca de cem funcionários altamente categorizados trabalha em regime de full time, no estudo e pesquisa do assunto. O funcionário responsável pela equipe tem até status de subsecretário e acesso direto ao Presidente da República.

NEUTRÓS DESARES

Considerou o Professor Kissinger como perigoso a situação de nações que não fazem parte de qualquer dos blocos, pois, embora bem intencionadas, essas nações, que não dominando, evidentemente, o progresso tecnológico, podem adotar soluções errôneas. Todavia — frisou — tais países põem ajudar muito enfatizando a importância do problema.

Um universitário perguntou se o desarmamento geral não causaria, nos Estados Unidos, o desemprêgo em massa de todos os que trabalham nas indústrias bélicas. O Sr. Kissinger respondeu que isso não aconteceria, pois, ocorrendo o desarme, não só os recursos empregados nas indústrias de armas como os seus operários seriam transferidos para atividades civis, entre as quais citou a restauração de rodovias.

A conferência, que durou quase duas horas, suscitou debates da assistência, composta de universitários, professôres e autoridades do Govêrno Federal, com o professor norte-americano. O Professor Hermes Lima, por exemplo, quis saber porque os Estados Unidos, país poderio militar exaltado pelo conferencista, não deviam algumas bases militares que mantêm no exterior.

O Sr. Kissinger afirmou que o problema não é tão simples assim: essas bases compõem o sistema de segurança do todo o mundo livre e não foram superadas pelos mísseis.

A outra pergunta, sôbre o ônus que o mundo capitalista suporta para manter a guerra fria, disse que, sendo êste um problema mais de economia, não tinha meios para responder. Todavia, adiantou acreditar que as nações capitalistas, em especial os Estados Unidos, podem suportar durante muito tempo ainda êsse ônus.

Finda a conferência, o Senhor Hermes Lima disse ao JORNAL DO BRASIL que a estada, entre nós, do Sr. Kissinger, se prende à próxima visita do Presidente Kennedy. — Ele virá tratar dos preparativos — explicou o Chefe da Casa Civil da Presidência.

Henry Kissinger chega dia 29 como convidado do Itamarati

A convite do Itamarati, chega ao Brasil na próxima têrça-feira o Professor Henry Kissinger, consultor da Casa Branca e da Comissão de Desarmamento dos Estados Unidos e autor do conhecido livro Nuclear Weapons and Foreign Policy, que recebeu em 1958 o título de melhor livro do ano em assuntos internacionais, através do Prêmio Woodrow Wilson.

Henry Kissinger é Professor da Universidade de Harvard, membro do Centro de Assuntos Internacionais da mesma Universidade, e colaborador da revista dominical The New York Times. Publicou no ano passado outro livro sôbre política internacional: Necessity por Choice.

POLÍTICA NUCLEAR

Kissinger, no clássico Nuclear Weapons and Foreign Policy, condensou o esquema da nova estratégia global ditada pela disponibilidade das armas atômicas. O livro analisa o desafio da era nuclear, que tirou à guerra seu caráter tradicional de instrumento da política internacional, pois que na estratégia da era atômica a vitória total perdeu seu significado. O impasse atômico criado entre as duas potências fêz com que uma não possa destruir a outra sem receber um golpe retaliatório inaceitável.

A capacidade atômica é, pois, um instrumento de intimidação, um poder que paralisa o inimigo potencial em seu intento de lançar uma ofensiva com armamentos nucleares. Essa estratégia, nova, ditada pela disponibilidade das armas atômicas, é diferente da estratégia tradicional de buscar os meios que assegurassem a vitória física final. Tal estratégia tem muito de esotérica, visando a preservar um equilíbrio do qual depende a intimidação das ambas as potências atômicas.

O capítulo que estuda êsse problema denomina-se precisamente A Estratégia Nuclear. Kissinger explica que o essencial nesse novo período das armas atômicas é que uma potência nuclear tenha a capacidade não de evitar a potencialidade econômica e industrial da outra, como na II Grande Guerra, mas que tenha a capacidade retaliatória da potência adversa. Ora, muito mais complexa e imprevista em matéria de armamento, isso é impossível.

Nos casos de ataque a que se chama de tiranete nuclear. Uma potência nuclear lança um devastador ataque atômico contra a outra mas, num espaço de menos de meia-hora, fica sujeita a receber um golpe retaliatório também devastador, de preço inaceitável, para o atacante.

No primeiro livro, Kissinger desenvolveu tôda uma teoria para mostrar que convinha aos Estados Unidos prepararem-se para a estratégia da guerra atômica limitada, que poderia ser posta em têrmos limitados, sem que a destruição total que advém de uma guerra global fôsse seu desfecho. Em seu mêro livro, Necessity for Choice, Kissinger parece menos convencido da possibilidade de que uma potência atômica possa condicionar-se à estratégia atômica limitada. Mostra-se mais preocupado com o problema de o Ocidente vencer a grande batalha de competição econômica e social travada pelos dois grandes sistemas ideológicos que dividem o nosso mundo.

NÃO É ESPECIALISTA

Kissinger não é um especialista em assuntos latino-americanos. É possível que o convite do Itamarati desperte seu interêsse por esta parte do mundo, de importância essencial à estratégia do Ocidente.

Passará no Brasil mais de 15 dias, fazendo conferências no Rio e São Paulo, visitará ainda a Bahia, Recife, Brasília e as cidades históricas de Minas.

0667

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Enclosure No. 3

PRESS CLIPPINGS

Airgram A-210
Rio de Janeiro 8/20/62

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0666

Visit of Professor Henry Kissinger

Brasilia, June 11-13, 1962

June 11:

1740 - Arrive from Belo Horizonte

1815 - Check into Hotel Nacional

2000 - Informal Dinner at Hotel (participants: Sr. George Landau (Brasilia University); Agenor Soares dos Santos (Second Secretary, Itamaraty); Wilson Reis Netto (Architect); Mssrs. Quinn and Weiner (Embassy).

2200 - Informal gathering at home of Darcy Ribeiro (Rector, Brasilia University). Present (in addition to Brazilians also at dinner); Hermes Lima (Chief, Civil Household of the Presidency); Victor Nunes Leal (Justice, Supreme Court); Arhenius de Freitus (Counsel, Protocol Office of the Presidency).

June 12:

0830 - Sightseeing (Wilson Reis Netto and George Landau)

1100 - Lecture: "US Foreign Policy and Disarmament" sponsored by the University of Brasilia.

1330 - Lunch (Informal)

1600 - Meeting at Federal Senate: Participants: Senators Nem de Sa, Daniel Krieger, Lourival Fontes, Pedro Ludovico, Gaspar Velloso.

1800 - Call On Mayor Sette Camara.

1900 - Informal gathering at apartment of Deputy Bocayuva Cunha; Present: Deputies Bocayuva Cunha, Sergio Magalhaes and Saturnino Braga plus Third Secretary Rubens Recupero (Itamaraty) and H. A. Quinn (Embassy).

June 13:

0945 - Depart Hotel

1025 - Depart Brasilia for Salvador

0665

however, that the meeting at the Rector's residence struck Professor Kissinger as far more Leftist in tone than that which the Foreign Office arranged for him the following evening--though the latter was deliberately arranged as an encounter with the Far Left opinion whereas the former was supposed to be merely a gathering of "leading intellectuals". Too, Mr. Landau, who acted as interpreter during Professor Kissinger's lecture, did occasional, and apparently politically deliberate, harm to Professor Kissinger's meanings in English, though in this regard he committed no more politically poetic license than did the Jornal do Brasil reportage the following day.

And, finally, it should be noted that the Foreign Office neither met Professor Kissinger upon his arrival (purportedly due to misinformation) nor saw him off upon his departure. The Embassy office is inclined to chalk this (in American terms) inexcusable laxity up to irresponsibility on the part of the individuals involved. However, the possibility that Professor Kissinger did not come up to the Foreign Office expectations (i.e., failed to fit the current Dantas "line") and was therefore given less than the treatment one would expect under the circumstances cannot be entirely ignored.

Enclosure:

Schedule of Activities.

0664

but would inevitably lead to strengthening of free-world unity in the long-run, if it was, in practice, a policy expressive of Brazil's true interests (which would inevitably coincide with the broad interests of the rest of the free world). He noted, however, that such a policy, must not be allowed to become an expression of purely internal political considerations (as, for example, when it expressed consistent anti-Americanism simply for the purpose of gaining domestic adherents) or a vehicle for short-term tactical gain in the international sphere.

Comment: The Embassy office believes that Professor Kissinger's visit was very beneficial to U.S. interests, because his political and professional prestige, plus the non-official character of his visit, permitted him to speak home truths to an (influential) audience of Brazilians who simply would write off as self-interested propaganda similar statements from official sources. Thus, for example, Professor Kissinger was able to tell his university audience, in response to a question from Victor Nunes Leal inquiring as to whether or not he favored neutralist foreign policies, that a nation cannot expect to obtain the privileges of neutralism and at the same time retain the benefits of alliance.

It is unfortunate that Professor Kissinger's visit came at the beginning of the week (when many congressmen were not yet in Brasilia) and during a period when President Goulart was in Rio. Nonetheless, it is believed he was able to see a fairly representative cross section of opinion (though one which, admittedly, was weighted somewhat to the Left--see below). Indeed, Professor Kissinger himself stated that his contacts here had given him a sense of thinking on a national scale, whereas those in Rio, Sao Paulo and Belo Horizonte were more parochial in character.

It is also unfortunate that the Foreign Office representatives in Brasilia hardly seemed to be aware that Professor Kissinger was a guest of the Foreign Minister. They did, of course, organize the contacts with members of Congress noted above. Organization of the over-all program, however, was handed over to Mr. George Landau, an assistant to the President of Brasilia University. Though Mr. Landau is an ex-student of Professor Kissinger's, he is possessed of no official standing and he is, in the opinion of the Embassy officers who watched his performance upon this occasion, a gentleman of distinctly Far Leftist convictions. Indeed, there are some here who assert he is pro-Communist, though the Embassy office is unable to comment intelligently upon this possibility as yet. It is noteworthy,

0663

That afternoon, Professor Kissinger met with a group of prominent federal senators in the Senate, following which he called on Mayor Sette Camara--with whom he discussed, inter alia, the policies and philosophy of the Kubitschek Administration. (The ex-President himself was, unfortunately, not in town.)

In the evening, Professor Kissinger met with Federal Deputies, Sergio Magalhaes, Saturnino Braga and Bocayuva Cunha in the latter's home. The discussion (during part of which the drafting officer was present) ranged over the topics of domestic reform measures, U.S. assistance under the Alliance for Progress and Brazilian foreign policy. The deputies present all being of distinctly Leftist persuasion (in deliberate contradistinction to the Senators--who were mostly of the Right) their major preoccupations, at least insofar as they expressed them to Professor Kissinger, were: (1) to express their doubts about the manner in which the Alliance is being administered to date and (2) to express the hope that the U. S. Administration could lend greater support to the "progressive forces" within Brazil. Under the first heading, the deputies (particularly Braga and Magalhaes) complained both of excessive U.S. overseeing of agreed projects and of what they conceived to be the project by project (as opposed to an over-all plan) approach. As to the second, Cunha proposed that Ambassador Gordon make a public statement of support for Brazilian foreign policy, preferably before a group, of "Admirals and generals". Later, Magalhaes suggested that the U.S. government commission an "independent", but high level and prestigious, study of Brazilian problems and then widely publicize its conclusions, which he felt sure would support the theses of himself and his friends anent Brazilian problems. To the criticism of excessive U. S. interference in execution of Alliance projects, Professor Kissinger replied that the U.S. had no objections to over-all or state planning (citing India as an example). He called upon his hosts to suggest new procedures in applying the Alliance: they had none, but promised to produce a draft on the subject shortly. As to the suggested Ambassadorial speech, Professor Kissinger stated it would constitute undue interference in domestic affairs. He also objected to the implied use of foreign policy for obtaining domestic objectives (i.e., the economic and social progress implicit in Alliance objectives), which, he said, was a short-sighted and unproductive use of foreign policy. There followed a discussion of Brazil's "independent" foreign policy, which Professor Kissinger noted, would probably cause difficulties to the U.S. in the beginning

0662

CONFIDENTIAL

MEMORANDUM

To: R. H. Shields, Amembassy Rio de Janeiro June 15, 1962

From: H. A. Quinn, Amembassy Brasilia Office

Subject: Visit of Professor Henry Kissinger

Professor Kissinger arrived in Brasilia at 5:40 p.m. June 11 and departed at 10:30 a.m. June 13. His program of activities (see enclosure) was arranged by the Office of Protocol of the President of the Republic, in conjunction with Mr. George Landau, Assistant to the President of the University of Brasilia (and ex-student of Professor Kissinger).

The principal event of Professor Kissinger's first day (or evening) in Brasilia was an after-dinner gathering at the home of Darcy Ribeiro (Rector of Brasilia University). Hermes Lima (Chief of the Civil Household) and Vitor Nunes Leal (Justice of the Supreme Court) were among those present. No Embassy officer was invited to attend this function, but Professor Kissinger later described it as having a distinctly Leftist character. Indeed, he compared the tenor of this group unfavorably with that of the following evening (which comprised three ultra-nationalist deputies)--stating, with specific reference to Hermes Lima, that the thoughts expressed were: (1) foreign capital must be "squeezed out" of Brazil; (2) private enterprise was finished and only the state could do the job.

From the Embassy's point of view, the highlight of Professor Kissinger's visit occurred June 12, when he delivered a talk on the subject "U.S. Foreign Policy and Disarmament" at the University of Brasilia. An invitational affair sponsored by the University, the lecture was attended by a select group of 150 persons--the majority of whom were visibly impressed by Professor Kissinger's skilled exposition of the complexity of the disarmament problem, the major U.S. effort being made in this field, and the manner in which the non-atomic powers can make a positive contribution to the solution of this problem. Professor Kissinger's forthright and factual manner in dealing with several obviously loaded questions following his presentation (Example: Doesn't the U.S. oppose disarmament because it would close down the arms industry and create unemployment?) added still further to this favorable impact.

CONFIDENTIAL

0661

out that Mr. Pearson is not a reputable writer in the United States and that there exist in the United States anti-trust and anti-monopoly laws. Another student said that they only knew what they read in the newspapers and that it must be true since Brazilian newspapers were either U.S. owned or at least got their information from API or UPI. They said "O Globo" just happened to be written in Portuguese. Dr. Kissinger asked them if they could tell him who owned "Ultima Hora". They had no answer except that they considered their position to be to the left of "Ultima Hora". Dr. Kissinger told them that he was having difficulty classifying what Brazilians considered as "left", "middle" and "right" and even more so the positions of certain Brazilian leaders in the picture. They explained that the trouble was that many Brazilians change their positions too often or at least spend too much time looking in the wrong direction. They said that President Goulart, for instance, was looking to the right too much these days, especially since he had refused their demand for one-third representation in the running of the universities.

This constituted the main course of the conversation. Dr. Kissinger asked several questions which were more or less beside the point like "How long do you serve in office?" and other questions of an informational nature. One question, however, was whether they made any attempt to keep the Communists in their group under control or tabs. They said that they didn't because they allowed anyone that wanted to the right to join them free from control or hindrance. The only stipulation that they applied to members was that they had to be in agreement with the goals of UNE, but that Christians, Communists or anyone else was welcome under these conditions.

Finally, Dr. Kissinger asked them what they thought of the Alianca Para O Progresso and they answered that Brazil needed more than a little more water coming out of the spigot.

About 11:30 p.m., Dr. Kissinger indicated that he had to leave and the student group accompanied us to the entrance of the building and bid us a very cordial goodbye, inviting us back soon.

0660

Dr. Kissinger asked them what their policy toward the United States would be in the event that they were successful. They said that it would depend on the attitude of the United States toward them; that they could act like Czechoslovakia or Cuba or Polonia or however circumstances dictated.

When asked what their quarrel with the United States was, they replied various things such as, "The United States was interferring in the historical process and frustrating the hopes of the people by maintaining decadent capitalistic regimes in power (they used the examples of Venezuela and Guatemala)." Also, they said that the United States was guilty of following a policy of the "new colonialism" in Brazil and thereby was bleeding the Brazilian economy. They elaborated by saying that the United States businesses had come in and absorbed many of the Brazilian industries (they used the pharmaceutical industry for an example) or else they (the U.S. businesses) made use of Brazilian industries (they used petroleum for their example) but still managed to rake off the profits in the form of royalties paid for the use of brand names (such as Esso).

Dr. Kissinger asked if there was any policy which the United States could adopt which they would favor and this stopped them for a period. Then one said that it was not likely that the United States would adopt any policies which they would favor because the United States government had to consider the "position" of the U.S. industrialists. Dr. Kissinger pointed out that it was foolish to think that there was any one position of the industrialists or military or anyone else. He explained that within the United States itself that there were several industrialist positions, those on the east coast being more internationally oriented and more likely to favor trade with other countries while those in the middle section of the country tended to be more isolationalists in their attitude. On military questions there might be a separate attitude from each of the services, and so on. They said that they would be satisfied if the United States would at least not meddle in other countries' affairs. Dr. Kissinger pointed out the contradiction in their ideas that the United States should not support military dictatorships in countries such as Paraguay and thereby aid in their overthrow while they at the same time wanted the United States to not meddle in other countries' affairs. One of the professional students switched back to another topic and said that the fact that the United States government catered to the interests of the trusts and monopolies was well known and that even U.S. writers such as Drew Pearson had exposed numerous examples to demonstrate the fact. Dr. Kissinger pointed

0659

Dr. Kissinger asked them what they wanted to do in Brazil and they said that they wanted to supplant the present capitalistic structure with a socialist one. Dr. Kissinger asked them what they meant by a "socialist" regime, and they said mainly one where the means of production were in the hands of the state. However, they said that Brazil, although it would make use of the revolutions of other countries such as Cuba and China, would have to work out its own particular régime. Dr. Kissinger asked them why a country like India could not serve as their model and they replied that India had failed in its revolution because it had tried to carry it out with the bourgeoise. They said that the world and history had entered into an accelerated pace of development, that Russia had accomplished in 40 years what it had taken the United States much longer to accomplish, that China had achieved the same thing in 10 years, and that Cuba had done it in only 3 years. Furthermore, they said that the capitalist system is no good anymore because: (1) It's too slow; (2) There aren't anymore countries left to exploit in order to make the system work since Africa, the Middle East, etc. are themselves becoming free from the colonial system; and (3) the capitalistic system is in evident decay. They explained that the capitalistic system in Brazil is in a state of crisis, that they have prepared the people by politicizing (making the people aware of the facts as they see them)them and that they should be able to bring about the revolution pacifically. However, they warned, the reactionary forces (the industrialists, the latifundists, Lacerda, etc.) might try a coup to prevent them but that the coup would fail because the people were politically aware and wouldn't permit it. They continued by saying that the Army also would not be able to stop them since it was now aware that the people were against such moves as evidenced by the reaction of the people to their actions during the crisis brought on by Janio's resignation. In addition, the army was changing its allignment as shown by the necessity of the reactionaries in the Army to falsify the recent elections in the Clube Militar to stay in power. Furthermore, they said that it was just a few older generals who were resisting, that from Colonels on down to Sargeants, that the Army was with them.

When Dr. Kissinger asked them concerning their leaders, they said that men like Brizzola and Juliao were with them but that "the revolution would create its own leaders" as had happened in Cuba. In fact, they seemed to have little in the way of actual plans of what they would do if they were to be successful in carrying out a revolution.

0658

CONFIDENTIAL

Airgram A-210
Enclosure 2
Page 1
Rio de Janeiro

MEMORANDUM

To: Mr. D'Alessandro* June 5, 1962

From: Bob Hayes**

Subject: Visit of Dr. Henry Kissinger to UNE on June 4, 1962

On the evening of June 4, 1962, Dr. Henry Kissinger, Professor of Harvard University and authority on disarmament, spent approximately two and one-half hours interviewing the officers of the UNE. The Student Affairs Grantee acted as interpreter in the interview. The main people involved from the UNE were the following: Clemente Rosas Ribeiro, Vice President for International Affairs; Marco Auerelio Garcia, Vice President for Educational Matters; Alvaro Jose de Oliveira, Vice President for University Co-ordination; Iraja Caetano, First Secretary. In addition to these, there were numerous "students" with greying temples who were not introduced but who eventually entered the discussion. One of the people was introduced as Cialdo or Oduvaldo, "gerente" of the PCB. (Not Odulvaldo Viana Filho, the playwright.)

The general form of the talks was that of an interview in which Dr. Kissinger asked the students questions. However, later on, the students began asking Dr. Kissinger questions, usually of the loaded variety, like "Why does the United States aid Salazar in maintaining his oppressive dictatorship?" The tone of the talks was quite candid both on the part of Dr. Kissinger and the students. The students maintained a respectful and cordial attitude throughout the talks and seemed quite honored with Dr. Kissinger's presence.

After explaining that he was primarily interested in finding out about their positions and plans, Dr. Kissinger began asking questions to which the students reacted in the hoped-for manner. That is, they expressed in a very frank manner their plans for revolution. Although it is difficult to remember all the questions asked or exactly how the questions were phrased, the following is a sample of the tone of some of the questions if not the actual words used and the substance of the answers received.

*USIS - Public Affairs Officer
**USIS - Binational Center Grantee for Student Affairs

CONFIDENTIAL

0657

it is also true that some of our friends have gotten into the habit of confusing petulant criticism with alternative policies and confusing gestures with substance and I will therefore suggest to you that the great strength of the free nation is that of combining the partnership with a respect for each other's dignity and drawing strength from their diversity. That they must not consider diversity an end in itself, but also not be too bothered by it. The problems I discussed cannot be solved except on the community basis and on the basis of this partnership, and here again the Western Hemisphere first, the North Atlantic area second, has the heaviest responsibility and the greatest opportunity; that is why I am so happy to have this opportunity to visit your country at this time and I would like to take this opportunity to thank you for listening to me so patiently.

0656

for example in Viet Nam, can never overwhelm one point any faster than our ability to reinforce that point. In all of this we have a great deal to learn and everyone has a great deal to learn and it may turn out that the problem of counter-insurgency is going to be one of the most serious ones that we may face over the years ahead. I have gone into some of these details in order to explain the very many different facets that American strategic thinking has to deal with and also to explain to you that many of our foreign policies are the result of the need to adjust to these new conditions. We have in our disarmament negotiations, for example, to keep in mind that our responsibility is not simply to develop some abstract utopia but to make sure that however desirable disarmament may be we do not, through the process of disarmament, create weaknesses that invite attack. For us these problems cannot be expressed in manifestos but only on concrete truths. We have the problem that we must always maintain one military establishment while preparing another military establishment and the problem, therefore, of conducting one policy while keeping open the option of another. Too many other people in the world believe that the United States by itself can take care of all of its problems and therefore have conducted toward us somewhat utopian attitudes. On the one hand they have exhorted us to standards of abstract perfection for which, I may say, their own conduct has not always offered very many examples. On the other, they have expected us to deal with all their complete problems at a high level of technical skill. They have often tried to commit us, at one and the same time, to complete disarmament and to complete defense of them. They have had the benefit of knowing deep in their hearts that they would be defended by us and therefore they could afford the luxury of certain positions for which they would not have to pay the price. Now I am not saying that only the United States thinking has to undergo changes in the 1960's--so does the thinking of many of our friends. Because it is perfectly clear that the United States by itself, powerful as it is, cannot bear the entire responsibility. The political task of the 1960's is whether we can create a true partnership in the world with those countries with whom we are linked by tradition and by values and by past associations; the big challenge is not how we can play the tactics of every day but whether it is possible to create this partnership on the basis of real equality. I will say frankly that we have often gotten into the habit over the past 15 years of taking a somewhat fatherly, somewhat self-righteous attitude, what we call a "father knows best" attitude;

0655

we have to develop capabilities which in the past had not been thought of.

Again, it is easy to say that the best way to deal with insurrectional war or guerrilla war, or whatever you want to call it, is to make the government popular. This is what our intellectuals often like to say, and I am certainly in favor of governments that are responsive to the needs of their people. However, the difficulty of guerrilla war arises from the fact that it does not require very many guerrillas to produce chaos. A government could satisfy 95% of the people, and still be faced with a guerrilla movement in its country, given a certain kind of geography. The fact of guerrilla war depends, in part, upon social discontent, but it also depends in part on whether there are areas in the country where guerrillas can hide...

Whether there is some discontent which cannot be quickly alleviated, it has generally been calculated that it takes about 10 regular troops to defeat one guerrilla and this is because the objective of the regular troops is different from the objective of the guerrilla. The regular troops have to maintain order practically 100% of the time. The guerrilla, in order to produce chaos, they have to be successful only in a very few cases. The guerrillas don't have to attack until they have overwhelming strength at one particular point. They don't have to attack for months at a time, where regular troops have to maintain order always. The guerrillas can disperse, they can hide sometimes in the local population or in inaccessible territories, they can produce the illusion of victory on the part of the regular authorities while rallying for a new attack. The successes guerrillas have are almost never due to military successes. Even in Algeria, if you look at the casualty list of the French army, it was surprisingly little towards the end. In fact the weakness of the Algerian guerrillas is shown by their inability to deal even with the French OAS as soon as they utilized guerrilla tactics. But, they produced just enough insecurity to make orderly government impossible and to see the prospects of an indefinite war. Now, in the past, military forces have had the problem (that is traditional military forces) of relating supply lines to what they learned, if you will forgive me, in war colleges and so forth, and have had great difficulty in dealing with guerrilla movements. One of the top priority items in American strategic thinking today is to develop facilities for counter-insurgency. One of the drawbacks that the traditional military have had is that their mobility has been too low, usually the guerrillas have been able to concentrate faster than traditional forces. The attempt that is now being made in the United States in creating the Special Forces is to set up communication systems and to develop abilities so that guerrillas,

0654

to us and threats to Europe--even in that case the damage which Europe would suffer would be incomparably greater than the damage that the United States would suffer. Even though some of our friends have difficulty understanding this, our purpose is much more to spare them than to spare ourselves, because if today we launched an attack we would suffer heavy but tolerable losses. Europe would suffer catastrophic losses. And this is why you now see, in the American military thinking, an increased attention to trying to prevent the Soviets from seizing territory. We must have a capability which makes it impossible for them to seize a part of Germany, or Austria, or Turkey, or whatever country you may want--to seize it quickly and then bargain, already being in posesssion of the objective of the dispute. We must get into a position to prevent quick victories, and this is one of the major tenets of current American military policy.

Now that, too, presents enormous technical problems, which I cannot go into in my talk but which I will be glad to discuss in the question period, about the relationship between conventional and nuclear forces, about the relationship between tactical nuclear weapons, conventional weapons, and strategic weapons. The problem of how you can have tactical weapons and yet retain political control; the problem of how you can fire one nuclear weapon without every local commander thinking that he is now authorized to fire his own weapon, and therefore bringing on a catalysm...The decisions (with regard to such problems) are not entirely up to us. Always at my university the students parade with signs, "Ban the bomb", and I think it is a noble sentiment. However, if you ask yourself whether an American president can run the risk of not equipping our troops with nuclear bombs when we know the other side possesses them, you see what the difficulty is. Never again can we put forces into the field without being ready (for the possibility) that the other side might use nuclear weapons against them, regardless of what our view is about nuclear weapons. Our troops have to be trained for nuclear war. We must have a capability for nuclear war no matter what emphasis we place on local defense, because the decision is no longer up to us.

Now, how do you conduct nuclear war other than a counterforce strike? How do you use nuclear weapons from the battlefield? How do you maintain cohesion in your military establishment under those conditions? I must say frankly that I do not believe that these problems have been studied with the same intensity and the same success as the question of strategic nuclear war. And yet these are the problems of the 60's, just as strategic war was the problem of the 50's. And another problem of the 60's is one that we face now in Viet Nam, the problem neither of general war nor of local war, but the preblem of insurrectional war. And here again

0653

And again, I can assure you, not because anyone likes to do this. But we have had to do it because in any transitional period we have to maintain both our old posture and acquire a new posture. Great Britain, in 1939, had made the mistake of falling behind, and it suffered nearly total disaster before it could catch up again, and it could catch up only because the New World came to its rescue. There is no United States standing behind us, if we suffer the losses that Great Britain did in 1940. It will be the end, not only of us, but of all our friends. Now, as you read in the newspapers, this attempt to place greater emphasis on local defense has created very grave problems in our relations with our allies. Our allies have gotten used--our European allies have gotten used to the idea that basically their defense was being conducted entirely or largely from the United States. To be sure, they made some contribution of their own. But I think it is fair to say that their contribution was in the form of an admission price to the American nuclear guarantee. They made a contribution, not because they thought they would ever have to use their forces, but because they were afraid that without making such a contribution we wouldn't keep our forces on the continent, and they wanted our forces on the continent, not because they expected us to fight on the continent but with the same attitude that Marshal Foch had on 1914, when the British asked him how many British soldiers he wanted and he said, "Give us one, and we'll make sure he gets killed on the first day of the war".

Many of our allies in Europe looked at the American military establishment on the continent as a form of automatic trigger for the American nuclear forces in America. And they are now faced with the fact that, as the 60's develop, whether we want to or not, much greater emphasis will have to be placed on local defense. Much more of an effort will have to be made to stop Communist attacks where they take place. It can be of no consolation to anybody to be liberated after the Communists have occupied them. It ought to be of no interest to anybody to be protected only by means of general nuclear war. Many of our critics in Europe are under the misapprehension that we are trying to protect our own territory while devastating Europe. This is not true because, if you analyze the number of nuclear weapons that the Soviet Union has deployed against Europe, they are over ten times as large as the nuclear weapons that the Soviet Union has deployed against the United States.

If we launched a counterforce attack against the Soviet Union, that destroyed the same percentage of both categories of weapons, if we destroyed 90% of the weapons deployed against the United States, and 90% of the weapons deployed against Europe--that is, if we made no distinction between threats

0652

their forces. And this adds a new dimension to our strategic problems...Until fairly recently, the security of the free world depended to an enormous extent on the ability of the United States to launch a counterforce strike. The Soviet Union possessed superior resources in mobilizable manpower, not in actual manpower but in mobilizable manpower. But we could offset this by the realization on the part of the Communists that if they attacked any of our friends we would destroy their homeland and that we could destroy their homeland without much damage to the Western Hemisphere. This condition, in my judgment, still exists, but as the sixties develop we must face the fact that this situation is bound to change. Now many of our European friends will not admit to themselves that this situation is likely to change. And they constantly attempt to maintain the military posture of the last fifteen years. In my view, and in the view of many of my friends in the United States, this would be suicidal. The possibility for Soviet pressure is bound to multiply. The kind of challenge we have had in Berlin, that we are now getting in Southeast Asia, is bound to increase if we have no alternative between either acquiescing in Soviet military moves or surrender. No formal declaration can do away with the fact that a counter-force strategy is declining in the technical ability to conduct it, in the ability to communicate it to our political leadership and, above all, in its credibility to the Communists.

This is why the new American administration has striven so hard to create other alternatives between general war and doing nothing. When you read about the build-up of conventional forces in the United States and our appeal to our European allies to build up more conventional forces of their own, this is not because today we doubt the ability to conduct the traditional strategy, but because any strategy has to be planned three to five years ahead. And as we look three to five years ahead we have to consider that the possibility exists that we have to be able to defend many areas of the world by means other than the strategy that was dominant in the 1940's, and even in the 1950's. We have to place much more emphasis than has been placed in the past on local defense. We must be able to prevent the other side from over-running territories and thereby confronting us with a fait accompli. Of course, we have to retain the ability to conduct a general warfare. Of course, our strategic forces have to be in a high state of readiness. But with all these difficult and complex efforts in the strategic forces, we have to add forces which were not necessary in the 1950's. Within the past year we have had to increase our military budget by nearly 20% for this reason.

0651

numbers of airplanes, made it evident that, in any aggression, whether we struck first or whether we struck second, the United States was certain to win a war.

After 1956, or 1957, the Soviet Union began to acquire a strategic military capability in somewhat larger numbers--which meant that the price of a strategy, of attacking their strategic forces, was going up. But even then, and my judgment would be, even today, if we launch the attack first we will wipe out the Soviet means of retaliation and they will not be able to do severe damage anywhere within the Western Hemisphere. However, the change that I talked about is coming, and it consists of the fact that this ability to launch a strategic attack, which in the technical literature is called a counterforce strategy, is bound to decline. It is bound to decline for a number of reasons and regardless of what we do. It is bound to decline because the numbers of weapons on both sides is almost certain to increase. If, therefore, we have today the ability to destroy, say--let me just pick a figure out of the air--say 90% of the Soviet strategic forces, and even if this percentage remains constant, this is, even if we should continue to be able to destroy 90% of the Soviet strategic forces, the absolute number represented by the remaining 10% is bound to increase, and therefore the cost of that strategy is bound to increase. Secondly, as missiles come into being it is going to be technically more difficult to conduct what I have called a counterforce strategy. It is technically more difficult because, when one was dealing with airplanes, it was always necessary to concentrate a certain number of airplanes on a given base. Therefore, one successful attack could put out of commission several of the other side's bombers. With missiles, if they are properly deployed, one missile should not be able to destroy more than one missile on the other side--at best--and probably two or three missiles would be required to destroy one on the other side. This tremendously increases the force requirement for a successful attack. Thirdly, with airplanes one had to plan essentially only one kind of an attack. That is, an attack with bombers on air bases. With missiles, there are so many different varieties that one has to coordinate many different types of attack. Some missiles will be mobile, some missiles will be in concrete shelters, some will be on land, others will be at sea. Still others will be in the air. To launch a coordinated attack, against all of these weapons, simultaneously, is going to be fantastically difficult. It is going to be very hard for the Soviets to destroy our forces, I would guess, by the middle sixties, impossible. And this is good. But it will be increasingly hard also for us to destroy

0650

We have to think, also, of such matters as...how to protect the weapons we have in case of a Soviet attack. No matter how powerful our ability is to strike first, since we want to prevent war and not start it, for us the significant index is what ability we have to strike second. In order to strike second with a chance of success, we have to be able to protect our forces, and this, again, depends on their weight, on their mobility, on the ability to put them into concrete shelter, which is technically called "hardening". It depends on our ability to penetrate Soviet defenses and, assuming that we have been attacked first, to penetrate Soviet defenses with a depleted force while our communication system is in a certain state of disarray. We have to do all of this without risking accidents and with the military commanders being kept responsive to political control. All of this, I assure you, is technically a very complicated process, not to be measured by how many megatons we have altogether. In fact, one thing can be said for certain: If our military strength remained at its present level, even though that strength is sufficient to obliterate the Soviet Union, within five years the Soviet Union would be able to destroy our strategic forces. With the present generation of missiles, and with their present ability to penetrate, we have a good deterrent for 1962. In 1967 or 1968, if we stay put and the Soviets continue, they are likely to have developed defenses, they are likely to have developed penetrations for our defenses, and nothing could be more fatal than for us not to continue our development; nothing could be more fatal for peace and for freedom.

Now this is the defensive side of our strategic forces, but this is only a small part of our military problem. Because it is not enough simply for our strategic forces to be able to survive surprise attack. We also have to protect not only the territorial United States but our allies in Europe and in Asia, not to speak, of course, of the Western Hemisphere. And here there has been a dramatic change in the strategic situation over the past ten years. When the United States entered the nuclear age, we had an atomic monopoly, we were the only country in the world possessing nuclear weapons. This period lasted from 1945 until about 1950. In 1950--1949 to be exact--the Soviet Union exploded its first nuclear bomb. There were many who then said, now there is an atomic stalemate; but as France is learning, there is a long way from exploding one nuclear bomb to having nuclear capability. And for six or seven years after 1949, while the Soviet Union had a few nuclear bombs, the United States possessed a pressing military strategic superiority. By strategic I mean the ability to destroy the military capability of the opponent without being destroyed--without suffering unacceptable damage in return. The location of our bases, the extraordinary state of training of our Strategic Air Command, the relative

0649

In the past it was always important--always necessary--to mobilize before launching a decisive attack. Even the German victories in World War II were caused, not by strategic surprise, but by tactical surprise. It was known that the Germans were marching their troops, in fact, it was generally known where they were marching their troops. What was novel were the tactics they employed and the points they chose for their attacks.

In the post-World War II period the new feature is that it is no longer necessary to mobilize before launching a decisive attack. In fact, it is foolish to mobilize before launching a decisive attack. With strategic weapons capable of firing at--when our Minutemen come fully into being--at ten minutes notice; with weapons requiring, at most, half an hour to reach one part of the world from any other part of the world; with weapons moving over reasonably unpredictable courses, there is required a state of readiness that no military establishment has ever had to maintain in peacetime. In the past the United States could always afford initial defeat because the worst that could happen to us was that we would have to work harder after we had been defeated. Today we cannot afford a single defeat in the strategic field, and we cannot remedy the defeat if it should ever happen. It is senseless to tell us that the other side may never attack and to read us long declamations of Communists because we have to remember that these are the same people who arrested the leaders of the Hungarian revolution while negotiating an armistice with them, and who executed them after having given them a promise of safe conduct.

We have to be in a high state of preparedness. No country in the modern period can afford to run the risk of being overwhelmed in a surprise attack. Nothing would be more dangerous for the peace of the world than for the United States to relax its military posture so as to make a surprise attack possible. How to protect our strategic forces so that the Soviet Union, no matter how reckless it may be, cannot calculate with the possibility of a decisive victory--that is one of our primary achievements, or primary tasks, and it is one of the hardest to explain. It is not sensible to argue, as was often done abroad (and incidentally, when I say "abroad" I cannot mean Brazil, because I don't know enough about Brazil, I must say, to my shame, to know what the discussion is in this country), but very often in Europe it was said when we resumed nuclear testing, that we already possessed enough nuclear weapons to destroy the Soviet Union three times over, and therefore we were being silly to start testing again. Now, one can debate the testing issue any way one wishes, and I am not going to go into it. I simply want to say that destructive power is only one index, and a very small index, of a nation's strategic capability.

0648

The most effective military establishment in the world will be ineffective if any potential aggressor believes that he can get away with aggression...(or, if it isn't ineffective it will, at least, produce a war that will have, in the best of circumstances, enormous losses, even on the winning side.)

Now I went so much into the psychological and political background in order to make clear to you, first of all, that these problems are taken very seriously in the United States and also that they have features which far transcend the strategic requirements. And also I would urge you to keep in mind one other background feature, and it is this: No matter what the views are of people of various military schools in the United States and of various political points of view, we are in a position which is different from that of some of our critics abroad, in that the United States has the responsibility, as I said before, ultimately, for the future of freedom. The mistakes we make are likely to be irretrievable. If there are certain proposals that may be made to us no matter how brilliant they are in the abstract that we cannot afford to entertain, not because they are not theoretically good, but because we cannot run the risk of the consequences of failure. We have to conduct a policy within narrower limits--because we are responsible not only for the best things that can happen, but also for the worst things that could happen. An American president cannot afford to experiment too much, no matter how open-minded he is, because if the experiment fails he cannot say, like some of us professors, "I've made a terrible mistake--I will now go back to my library and I'll write another book".

Let me now turn to some of the more strategic problems and here I would urge you to keep in mind that the post-war period has demonstrated that there are no absolute truths in military theory in the nuclear age. Many of the policies that were appropriate in 1945 and even in 1955, may have to be changed in the 1960's. When you read in the newspapers, for example, about the problems we have in our discussions with our European allies, I would say that most of them are due to the fact that the United States, possessing more advanced weapons, has had to come to a realization about their changed significance. And the discussions that are now going on within the NATO Alliance are due to the fact that it is always painful to adjust to new realities, particularly if there is a certain inequality in the ability to make certain technical studies. Now the characteristics of the post-war period--of the weapons of the post-war period, that are most novel are the destructiveness of the weapons, the rapidity with which they can be delivered, the enormous premium that this places on a sudden attack.

0647

learned a few years previously. Also we have the problem in our bureaucracy that a decision is very painful to reach, and once embodied into a document it acquires certain sacrosanct qualities, partly because no one can face psychologically the prospect of going through the whole horrible process again. For this reason there has been, often, and that too is being remedied, a certain inertia about changing doctrines once they have existed. This is one of the problems raised by deterrence.

A secone one is that, in order to be effective, those who engage in military planning have to keep in mind not only the purely military considerations but they have to keep in mind what the political leadership can understand and will accept. In the United States the military chiefs can make a technical military proposal but cannot prescribe the foreign policy that goes with that proposal. Looked at another way, if they come up with military proposals no matter how good and how technically competent if the political leaders will not accept them or cannot comprehend them they have in an important way failed in their jobs. The best strategy in the world does not do us any good if the military leadership does not have confidence in it. And here again we face first a psychological problem before we come to the military problem. The psychological problem is that nuclear strategy is technically so complicated that it sometimes is hard to see how one can ever convey all of its aspects to people who have many other responsibilities. Our highest Air Force commanders, for example, who spend full time on the problem of strategic war, require elaborate computers to help them with their targeting and similar matters. And they spend full time on this. The political leaders in all countries (I don't know how it is in Brazil but I would be amazed if it were different) have so many other things to do that they can give perhaps an hour a day to any one issue, and the gap here between the very sophisticated plans that may be made by the military establishment and what the political leaders think the military establishment is doing, is one of the big problems of any modern society, and is a particular problem for our society, which, after all, bears the heaviest burden of responsibility since any mistakes that we make do not affect us alone, but affect the freedom of hundreds of millions all over the world.

Then there is yet a third psychological problem...(which) is that, regardless of the adequacy of our plans from a technical military point of view, and regardless of whether we can convince the political leadership of the adequacy of these plans, the test of deterrence is not so much what we think but what the aggressor thinks. We have to have a military posture not only convincing to us but, above all, convincing to the other side.

0646

we could win a war, provided we attacked first, at relatively little damage to ourselves. And yet throughout the post-war period we have been gradually losing this tremendous superiority because we have not wanted anything for ourselves but merely to prevent others from taking our territory.

The problem of deterrence is on many levels a psychological problem; for example within our military establishment there are very often debates among the military services about the nature of proper strategy. And I would urge any of you who may have doubts about the fighting spirit of the American military establishment to visit the Pentagon at the time that the military budget is being discussed by the various military chiefs. Now the difficulty is that since the deterrence is proved negatively by things which do not happen, it is very hard to prove this is the best strategy. Any of you who have studied philosophy or logic will know that it is almost impossible to prove why something does not happen. Did the opponent never even intend to attack? Is one pursuing the best of the possible deterrent strategies, or the worst of the possible deterrent strategies? You cannot say.

Then there is the problem that technology has changed at a fantastic rate even in the post-war period. In the past a weapons system would be good for a generation at least. The weapons at the beginning of World War I were not radically different from the weapons say, around 1890. However, the weapons of 1945 are already anachronistic in 1962. In fact, the weapons of 1956 are anachronistic in 1962. Every five years our military establishment has had to readjust to a new technology. The result has been that the experts of one period have often been the obstacles to understanding of another period, and if Col. Renny forgives me, I feel that in many cases the traditional professional military expertise has not been relevant to many of the problems that have arisen. Or so at least we professors who mix into this business constantly, insist. The fact that somebody was a general in World War II does not--did not give him an experience he can use very easily in relation to nuclear problems. In fact, sometimes the scale of experience on which military expertise was formed has been almost an obstacle to coming to grips with the nuclear problem. Now this is not so true of the newer--of the younger generation of our military chiefs, but even they have the problem that every four or five years they have to relearn the lessons that they thought they had

0645

Americans of 1945 would have liked nothing better than to be able to withdraw into our traditional isolationism. Many, even today, would like nothing better than to be able to do away with the burden of arms. It has, therefore, been a novel experience for us to have to think in terms of military power and to think in categories which have been familiar to other societies, particularly in Europe, throughout their history. It is an entirely new experience for Americans to understand or to have to learn that they have become completely vulnerable to attack from abroad. It is not easy to get adjusted to the fact that the security of areas thousands of miles away depends on our actions and, if I may say so, very often on our assistance. It is hard for us and sometimes hard for the tough peoples with whom we have to deal. And adjustments are required on all sides. This you must keep in mind when I tell you about military thinking and strategic thinking in the United States. There is not in the United States a monolithic approach to these problems. There is not what can be called a military group as opposed to a civilian group. These decisions in the United States are made in a somewhat complicated process, and I think it is fair to say that all groups concerned with this have had a fair amount to learn in the last 15 years. Now, with this as a background, I would like to make a few observations about the strategic problem, more specifically.

It is a fact that in the postwar period the problem of military power, at least for us, has had an entirely novel characteristic. Never before has a country possessed as much strength as the United States now has, and yet never before has total strength been so difficult to apply to particular situations. In the past--in military history--it was always possible to translate military superiority into political advantage. In the present period, the problem of the meaning of military superiority is one of the most complicated ones with which the military establishment has to deal. I do not like the phrase often used in polemical literature to the effect that it does not make any difference if you can kill somebody five times if he can kill you once, because it oversimplifies the issue. But still, there is something in it and it does define some of the dilemmas which we face. This is a problem to which I shall come back.

Then there is the relatively novel situation that the military policy of the United States is dominated by what may be called the doctrine of deterrence. That is, our desire is less to win a war than to prevent a war from happening. Again one reads very often in the foreign press about the aggressive tendencies of the United States. Yet it is a fact that for the longest time in the post-war period and probably even today

0644

CONFIDENTIAL
(UNCLASSIFIED when separated from covering Airgram)

Lecture by Professor Henry Kissinger, of Harvard University, at the Escola Superior de Guerra, Rio de Janeiro, May 31, 1962, as recorded on tape

Subject: Nuclear Strategy

Mr. Chairman, Gentlemen, there are many officers in the American Armed Forces that would welcome an opportunity to do what your Chairman did just now, namely to introduce me when I don't understand a word of what is being said.

I would like to take this opportunity, which is the first one I have in Brazil, to tell you how very touched I have been by the warmth of the reception I have had and by the thoughtfulness with which I have been treated, and even though this is my first-- ah, my second day in Brazil I know that I will leave with very warm human feeling for the country.

For the sake of the peace of mind of the official Americans who might be here, I think I ought to make clear that I speak to you as an irresponsible Harvard Professor and not in any official capacity. In fact, if you give them a little encouragement the Americans here might tell you that once a man has identified himself as a Harvard professor, the adjective "irresponsible" is quite unnecessary. I will speak to you, then, as an observer of the American strategic and political thinking. Where I agree with official policy it is because I want to and not because I have to, and where I don't fully agree with it, you will find that I won't in the course of my presentation, and you will keep in mind that no one can keep this standing as an expert who does not disagree with official policy from time to time.

The problem of strategy and its relationship to foreign policy came on the United States with unexpected suddenness at the end of World War II. Most Americans, if you had asked them during World War II as to what kind of world they were fighting for, would almost certainly have said that it would be a world in which we could return to the situation that existed before 1939 where we could live without a consciousness of foreign danger and where military problems were the concern of only a small professional group within the various military departments. When I read in many foreign newspapers in countries that I have visited, before being here, about the urgent desire of the United States to intervene in affairs all over the world and the way Americans allegedly enjoy military problems, I do not recognize the United States with which I am familiar. Most

0643

APPROVED:

Robert Eakens
Acting Deputy Chief of Mission

DISTRIBUTION: All Consulates in Brazil; Service Attaches; USIS; Econ (2); Pol Brasilia (5); Pol Rio (5); Pol II; Labor; CF (3).

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0642

The following Brazilians were present at Col. Renny's luncheon: General Malan, Chief of Cabinet, C/S-Army; Admiral Murillo, Director, Armed Forces Staff School; Brigadier Ballousier, Deputy Inspector, Air Force; Col. Neuton, Secretary, JBUSMC.

The Embassy does not have a complete guest list for the Moreira Salles luncheon but among the guests were: Antonio Galloti, President of Brazilian Traction, Light and Power Company, Ltd., a Canadian concern; Roberto Marinho, Editor of O Globo; Virgilio Tavora, Minister of Transport and Public Works; Joao Alberto Leite Barbosa, stockbroker and writer on economics for O Globo and the weekly magazine O Cruzeiro; and, Demosthenes Madureira de Pinho, lawyer and Professor of Law at the University of Bahia.

The Ambassador's dinner for Professor Kissinger was attended by the following Brazilians: Ambassador Carlos Alfredo Bernardes, Secretary-General of the Foreign Office; Samuel Wainer, editor of Ultima Hora; Dr. Luiz Alberto Bahia, political editor of the weekly Visao; Dr. Candido Mendes de Almeida, former head of the leftist-ultranationalist Superior Institute of Brazilian Studies (ISEB) and currently an advisor to the Economic Development Bank; M. F. Nascimento Brito, editor of Jornal do Brasil; Dr. Israel Klabim, of Klabim, Irmaos & Cia.; Admiral Luiz Teixeira Martini, Director of the Escola Superior da Guerra; and Dr. Trajano Pupo Neto, Director of the National City Bank of New York in Rio. A frank, informal after-dinner discussion was an eye-opener as to the ideas of leftist elements among the group. Indicative of the tenor of their remarks was a question put by Wainer, "What would the US reaction be to the establishment of a socialist republic in Brazil--not like the Soviet Union but rather along Yugoslavian lines?"

Professor Kissinger's visit had good press coverage. Clippings are attached (Enclosure No. 3) for transmittal to Professor Kissinger if the Department does not need them for its own files.

Also enclosed are copies of a memorandum prepared in Brasilia concerning Professor Kissinger's visit there (Enclosure No. 4).

For the Ambassador:
Robert H. Shields (per Pearson)
Robert H. Shields
First Secretary of Embassy

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0641

The Professor's Brazilian "control officer" was Second Secretary Antonio Carlos de Souza Tavares, of the Department of Culture and Information. Tavares is related in some degree to San Tiago Dantas.

The highlights of Professor Kissinger's visit to Rio were his lectures at the Escola Superior da Guerra (subject: "Nuclear Strategy") and the Foreign Office's Rio Branco Institute (subject: "East-West Relations and the Problem of Disarmament"). The first lecture was reserved to students at the Escola, who displayed a keen interest in the subject and asked numerous questions. The lecture was recorded on tape, has been transcribed (with great difficulty because of defects of the recorder), and is being translated into Portuguese for distribution to members of the class, who are persons holding influential positions in the civil government and the military. Copy of the English text is attached (Enclosure No. 1). At the Rio Branco Institute Professor Kissinger had a large audience consisting mostly of Brazilian diplomats, but with a considerable number of foreign diplomatic corps and of nondiplomatic Brazilians also in attendance.

Embassy officers have heard from both Brazil's military men and diplomats numerous spontaneous expressions of appreciation of Professor Kissinger's visit and lectures, and there is no doubt that he did much to educate these groups as to the problems involved in disarmament.

Professor Kissinger's program in Rio included the following other activities: (1) Interviews with Foreign Office Secretary-General Bernardes, Governor Lacerda, newspaper editors Nascimento Brito (Jornal do Brasil) and Samuel Wainer (Ultima Hora), Crockett de Sa (President Goulart's labor adviser) and Anisio Teixeira, an outstanding figure in Brazilian education; (2) a meeting with representatives of the leftist National Students Union (memorandum on this meeting attached as Enclosure No. 2); (3) a visit to a Brazilian labor court; (4) luncheon at the Copacabana Palace Hotel given by Brazilian diplomats; (5) luncheon with Brazilian military officers at the same hotel given by Lt. Col. William Renny, USAF, US liaison officer with the Escola Superior da Guerra; (6) dinner given by Finance Minister Walter Moreira Salles; and (7) dinner at the Embassy given by Ambassador Gordon.

0640

ORIGIN: ARA-4

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ARA	SOA	IPE
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3	1	2
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AGR	COM	FRB
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ARMY	CIA	NAVY
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OSD	USIA	NSA
12	8	3
	ABC 7	

19

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

AIRGRAM

732.00/8-2062
IT 611.00
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A-210 NO. | CONFIDENTIAL | HANDLING INDICATOR

TO : Department of State

1962 AUG 24 PM 1 17

RM/AN
ANALYSIS & DISTRIBUTION
BRANCH

FROM : Amembassy Rio de Janeiro DATE: August 20, 1962

SUBJECT : Visit of Professor Henry Kissinger, Harvard University, to Brazil - May 30-June 16, 1962

REF :

The visit of Professor Henry Kissinger, of Harvard University, to Rio de Janeiro May 30-June 5 and June 15-16 (with trips to Sao Paulo, Brasilia, Belo Horizonte, Recife, Salvador intervening, and reported separately) was an event of major interest to Brazilian diplomatic, military, intellectual and political sectors, representatives of which besieged the Embassy in considerable numbers in search of private interviews with Professor Kissinger, who had to turn down most of these requests because of lack of time.

Professor Kissinger was an official guest of the Foreign Office, which organized his program in Brazil, with the assistance of the Embassy and US Consulates where this assistance was required. According to a Foreign Office official, the invitation to Professor Kissinger was a personal initiative of the Foreign Minister San Tiago Dantas.

Enclosures: 1 Ltr

1. Lecture - "Nuclear Strategy" Escola Superior de Guerra.
2. Memorandum re Meeting with UNE Representatives.
3. Press Clippings.
4. Memorandum re Professor Kissinger's Visit to Brasilia.

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FORM DS-323 4-62

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Drafted by: POL:RHShields:rpc

Contents and Classification Approved by:

Clearances:

0639

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one subject domestic or foreign predominating. Two leading papers, prestigious O Estado de S. Paulo and Folha de S. Paulo, considered President Kennedy's press conference remarks about Brazil. O Estado proved to its readers the seriousness of the country's financial situation by the simple fact that the U.S. President dealt with it, considered Kennedy's appraisal the plain truth and the U.S. desirous of helping Brazil if only the efficacious way can be found. Folha agreed with Kennedy, found it "...lamentable that observations have to come from abroad to the effect that no outside help can have a decisive influence against the Brazilian inflation."

Folha went on to say that President Kennedy was wrong in completely accepting the position of the IMF, in the latter's disagreement with Brazil. Inflation in Latin America is somehow different, more basic, tied up with rapid development, said the paper without explaining exactly how, and can't be cured by simply following the counsels of the "orthodox professors" of the IMF. Diário de São Paulo generally agreed: the same economic principles cannot be applied to all countries; Brazil should give up some of its obsession for development at any cost, and the IMF should relax its financial dogmas.

Discovery of a convoy of arms bound for Communist would-be guerrillas in Goiás, provoked comment. General feeling -- the government should define its position regarding Red activities. Diário de São Paulo saw increased Communist activity as the result of the renewal of diplomatic relations between Brazil and the USSR.

Daniel M. Braddock
Minister Consul General

Contributions: D. C. Proper
J. Liebof
J. Mason

Distribution: INS/RAR, AmConGen Recife, AmConsulates Belem, Belo Horizonte, Curitiba, Porto Alegre, Salvador, Santos.

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706

0638

could not have a worse servant or one more in opposition to its fundamental goals, according to this editorial. (UNCLASSIFIED)

Comment: Coming from Estado, the attack is not surprising. It was almost inevitable that Kubitschek's traditional São Paulo opponents should regret his new job for both political and moral reasons. Consulate General officers have heard much the same opinion from labor leaders and adhemaristas. The basic objection is to the strengthening of Kubitschek's 1965 presidential candidacy. (LIMITED OFFICIAL USE)

5. Goulart Plays "Labor Unity" Tune

Some forty labor leaders associated with the Democratic Union Movement (Movimento Sindical Democrático -- MSD) met with José Walter Loureiro COIMBRA, newly-appointed Regional Labor Delegate in São Paulo, on December 13. Several MSD leaders spoke out strongly and at length against the recent Labor Ministry and Federal Government support of Communist labor leaders, indirectly implicating President Goulart. They added that for the past five months the MSD top leadership had been seeking an interview with Goulart without success. In reply the Regional Labor Delegate said he was a personal friend of the President, whom he described as "excessively good-hearted." Sr. Coimbra hinted that the President was being poorly advised in labor matters, and took great pains to assert his own independence from Presidential labor advisors (by inference Gilberto Crockatt de SA). The Delegate promised to help the MSD leaders obtain an interview with Goulart, provided they stopped their public attacks on the President. He went on to suggest that the various factions of the São Paulo labor movement should resolve their differences and unite. (LIMITED OFFICIAL USE)

Comment: The Labor Officer's soundings among MSD leaders immediately following the above meeting revealed a great deal of skepticism regarding Goulart's intentions. The President clearly wishes to control a united Paulista labor movement (most powerful in Brazil). Apparently he is unconcerned that under present circumstances such a unified movement would almost certainly be controlled in fact by the Communists. (LIMITED OFFICIAL USE)

PSYCHOLOGICAL

Local Press Reaction

São Paulo editorial comment was a mixed bag this week, no

0637

necessary if economic and political problems continue to worsen (see Airgram A-181 of December 14). From the information available to the Consulate General, this conclusion about Bevilacqua is very premature. Even taking his statements at face value, it is not clear whether he believes in enlightened capitalism or in corporate-statism on the model of Vargas, Salazar, and Mussolini. The weird fragments of irrelevant erudition which ornament the General's speeches suggest that he is capable of supporting half-brained, exotic schemes. The only thing which seems established is that he is not, as he has sometimes been considered, knowingly pro-Communist. (LIMITED OFFICIAL USE)

3. Carvalho Pinto Rumored for Finance Minister

Starting at about the time of Goulart's São Paulo plebiscite campaign (item 1), persistent rumors had it that the President was piqued with San Thiago DANTAS and wanted to invite Carvalho Pinto to be Finance Minister in the post-plebiscite cabinet. (UNCLASSIFIED)

Comment: Without ruling out the possibility that this rumor is authoritative, one must note that there exist the conditions for its starting by spontaneous combustion. Carvalho Pinto is perhaps the most respected administrator and economic planner in Brazil, has been excessively anxious to remain on speaking terms with Goulart (Weekly Summaries 49 and 50), has spoken heatedly about inflation and nothing else, and is obviously unsure of his future plans. (He has, for example, shown even more than his habitual evasiveness toward the offer of a Leader Grant.) It is also very conceivable that Goulart planted the rumor to raise his stock before the January 6 plebiscite. Even if the offer of the Finance Minister is genuine, one important consideration militates against Carvalho Pinto's acceptance of it: he is not the type to accept the job without assurance of the conditions for success, and Goulart would hardly be eager to grant these conditions. Goulart's desperation and Carvalho Pinto's ambition, however, might eventually close this gap. If São Paulo history is any indication, that would be real cause for encouragement. (LIMITED OFFICIAL USE)

4. Estado Attacks Kubitschek Link with Alliance

In its lead editorial on December 12, O Estado de S. Paulo deeply regretted ex-President Juscelino Kubitschek's invitation to be a consultant to the Alliance for Progress. The Alliance

0636

Goulart's sales message was double-barreled: in addition to claiming that abstention from voting would be anti-democratic, he plugged for the "Mangabeira [Justice Minister] thesis," which would return full powers to the President as soon as the presumably favorable verdict of the plebiscite became known (without waiting for Congress to reform the constitution). The goods he offered in return were (a) prompt payment of debts the Federal Government owes the municipalities, (b) increased attention to agriculture and the rural areas, (c) effective measures against inflation. The latter was perhaps in reply to a formal warning from Carvalho Pinto, who spoke against inflation with much more heat and conviction than were evident in his plug for presidentialism.

Agriculture Minister Renato da Costa LIMA was simultaneously campaigning with farmers in other areas on behalf of the President. (LIMITED OFFICIAL USE)

Comment: Between KUBITSCHEK (Weekly Summary No. 48), Costa Lima, Goulart, Carvalho Pinto, and Magalhães Pinto, the campaign has done much more in the "interior" than in the capital city. It is by no means evident that it has aroused massive public interest anywhere. (LIMITED OFFICIAL USE)

2. General BEVILACQUA Opposes Strikes

Second (São Paulo) Army Commander Pery Constant Bevilacqua, in an instruction to garrisons under his command, went on record as intending to suppress strikes -- whether all of them or just certain of them was not clear. In one passage he seemed to oppose only those which went to excess (political strikes?), comparing them to "Bolshevism." In another passage, he seemed to believe that labor court judgments should entirely obviate strikes. The General's instruction was attacked by the Communists and Communist-led unions. Conservative classes and the Democratic Union Movement supported him, the latter choosing publicly to believe that he opposed only political strikes. The non-Communist "third force" labor movement was unhappy. (LIMITED OFFICIAL USE)

Comment: In this and other actions since assuming command in São Paulo, Bevilacqua has made an evident effort to tranquilize the conservatives and live down his reputation as an extreme leftist-nationalist. He has partially succeeded. At least some informed conservatives for example, seem to expect that he would support the anti-Goulart coup which they believe may become

0635

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INT	LAB 6	TAR
TR	XMB	AIR 4
ARMY 5	CIA 15	NAVY 5
OSD 12	USIA 8	NSA 3

file
no action
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1/2/63
RJ Burton

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

20 AIRGRAM

732.00/12-2062

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A-183 NO. — LIMITED OFFICIAL USE — HANDLING INDICATOR

1962 DEC 21 AM 10 51

TO : DEPARTMENT OF STATE

INFO : BRASILIA, RIO DE JANEIRO

RIVAN ANALYSIS & DISTRIBUTION BRANCH

FROM : AmConGen, SÃO PAULO

DATE: December 20, 1962

SUBJECT : Weekly Summary No. 51

REF :

DEPARTMENT OF STATE BUREAU OF INTELLIGENCE AND RESEARCH DEC 21 1962

TABLE OF CONTENTS

POLITICAL
1. Goulart Campaigns for Plebiscite
2. General Bevilacqua Opposes Strikes
3. Carvalho Pinto Rumored for Finance Minister
4. Estado Attacks Kubitschek Link with Alliance
5. Goulart Plays "Labor Unity" Tune

PSYCHOLOGICAL 1. Local Press reaction

POLITICAL

1. GOULART Campaigns for Plebiscite

President Goulart's December 10 appearance in São José do Rio Preto, northwestern São Paulo, was the biggest event yet in the State campaign for the January 6 "plebiscite." He delicately refrained from calling for a "no" vote to parliamentarism, asking simply for a large voter turnout. (The Liberator Party and the daily Estado de S. Paulo openly preach voter abstention; the UDN and other anti-Goulart but pro-presidentialism currents hint broadly at the same solution.) Governor CARVALHO PINTO campaigned with the President and for the first time came out clearly and publicly for a return to presidentialism. Minas Gerais Governor Magalhães PINTO, a last-minute surprise visitor, pushed the Goulart line even more strongly.

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Drafted by: See last page/el 12/19/62

Contents and Classification Approved by:

Clearances:

0634

fishing interests in the Northeast is warming up again. Customs officials in Recife have impounded eight Japanese fishing boats for investigation, charging them with violations, in one way or another, of the INBRAPE (the Japanese company) agreement with the GOB. Port authorities this week refused to sell fuel to two other Japanese boats, supposedly on the grounds that they had been illegally selling in Trinidad and British Guiana catches taking from Brazilian waters. (OFFICIAL USE ONLY)

2. Bus Strike May Be Averted

A city wide bus strike set for December 21 involving not only the city transportation company (CTU) but also privately operated lines, may be averted. Operators of private routes announced this week that local representatives of the Bank of Brazil have promised immediate payment on 60% of the CR $42 million loan they had requested to help them pay the 13th month salary stipulation. The CTU is endeavoring to work out a means of satisfying its employees too, and if private lines continue to function, chances are the CTU will not strike. (LIMITED OFFICIAL USE)

PSYCHOLOGICAL

The launching of the communications satellite "Relay" and President KENNEDY's statement at his press conference concerning Brazilian economic difficulties being a problem for Brazil both received scant attention at the hands of the Northeast journalists. The thirteenth month salary and the plebiscite command far more editorial attention.

In an attempt to make the return to presidentialism the answer to Everyman's problem, large advertisements are running daily in all the Recife newspapers proclaiming "The hour of saying NO against misery, illiteracy, lack of land and usurpation of your vote has arrived."

Shallow tub-thumping finds a blatant outlet; reason is a still, small voice buried in the middle of a columnists lamentations. "In international politics, the country is drifting. There is not a straight line in our attitudes. While fussing over Americans in order to obtain financial assistance, since the nation is financially flat on its back, what is seen internally is the leftist and communizing wave playing the Russian and Cuban game of the most scurrilous anti-Americanism. Not being fish or fowl, neither wine nor water, the Brazilian government ends up being nothing." Thus does Periscopio in Diario de Pernambuco sum up the U.S-Brazilian relationship."

Wayne S. Smith

Lowell C. Kilday
American Vice Consul

Contributors:
LCKilday
WSSmith
CTucker

3. Julião's Mandate to be Challenged

The Consulate General was informed this week that an attempt will be made to have the Regional Electoral Tribunal or the Superior Electoral Tribunal cancel the mandates of newly-elected Federal Deputy FRANCISCO JULIÃO and WALDEMAR LUIZ ALVES. The basis for the legal action, reportedly, will be the 1948 ruling on the illegality of the Communist Party, prohibiting it from taking part in elections. Presumably, it will be charged that the Communist affiliations of both Julião and Alves render them ineligible for election.

Comment: It would appear that this movement stands little chance of success. The authors may, however, obtain a good bit of adverse publicity for Julião by dwelling on his relationship with the recently-arrested Ligas Camponesas arms-runner, CLODOMIR DOS SANTOS MORAIS, and the fact that Morais, at the time of his arrest, carried a card addressed to Julião by a Soviet-diplomat. (CONFIDENTIAL)

4. Arraes' Candidate Loses Bid to Head Local Bar Chapter

JOSE CAVALCANTI NEVES, short-lived candidate for Governor of Pernambuco during the recently campaign, soundly whipped FERNANDO JUNGMANN in this week's elections for President of the Pernambuco Chapter of the Bar Association. This will be Neves' second term in office.

The election for this important though non-official post held political implications since Fernando Jungmann was considered to be Arraes' candidate while Neves was regarded as Governor SAMPAIO's choice. It had been rumored that Arraes intended to appoint Jungmann as Secretary of Justice but most observers now feel that due to this defeat he lacks the prestige for the job. (OFFICIAL USE ONLY)

5. Ceara Deputy Contest Still in Doubt

Due to contested precincts, charges of fraud, and a number of irregularities of procedure in certain voting districts throughout the state, it is still not known who will represent Ceara in the next Chamber of Deputies. The processing of the charges and counter-charges filed with the Regional Electoral Tribunal is moving slowly, but all hope that the final election results will be known before the end of another month. (UNCLASSIFIED)

ECONOMIC

1. Customs Seizes Japanese Fishing Boats -- Again

The running battle between the Brazilian Government and the Japanese

0632

of presidential powers in the January plebiscite.

Arraes' public statements upon his arrival on December 14 and at the Regional Electoral Tribunal on December 15 contained no revelations and no indications of the policies he will follow as Governor or the persons he will ask to serve under him. He served warning on his political enemies that he would brook no opposition of the type he encountered during the campaign (presumably he means dirty politics, name calling, etc., but nobody is quite sure) and he took a few thinly-veiled swipes at the United States. (e.g. Brazil must emancipate itself from the exploitation of foreign monopolies...We must construct what is ours and avoid letting international groups take away from our land the wealth created with our sweat and our suffering.") Aside from that, the statements both promised and appealed for reforms and, in general, reiterated campaign declarations.

Comment: It may be of interest to note that at the December 15 ceremony, reserved seat areas and boxes were invaded by the general public. The Portuguese Consul, seated in one of the boxes reserved for the Consular Corps, came very near to being physically expelled from the box by the invaders, who were shouting: "No more reserved seats for the likes of you. The rabble (a poem) elected Arraes and these seats now belong to the rabble." (OFFICIAL USE ONLY)

2. Northeast Indifferent to January Plebiscite

Despite the visit of Governor BRIZZOLA to the Northeast a few weeks ago, the area remains largely indifferent to the plebiscite scheduled for January 6. Although almost all politicians have come out in favor of a return of the presidential powers, few seem to be working actively for the vote that would bring about this return. At the municipal and ward level, it is reported, political leaders refuse to instruct their voters how to vote and, more important, refuse to furnish any of the traditional booty which the average Northeastern voter expects in return for his vote. To rectify this indifference, and possibly to show his strength as a regional political leader, Governor-elect Miguel Arraes is said to be preparing to head up a vigrous regional campaign to turn out the voters in support of President Goulart. Unless Arraes has unanticipated success, it is likely that there will be a huge abstention on January 6, especially in the rural areas. Of those who do vote, the majority are expected to vote for a restoration of the presidential system. (OFFICIAL USE ONLY)

0631

ORIGIN/ACTION
ARA-4

RM/R	REP	AF
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ARA	EUR	FE
NEA	CU	INR 5
E	P	IO
L	FSO	AID 12
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INT	LAB	TAR
TR	XMB	AIR 4
ARMY 5	CIA 15	NAVY 5
OSD 12	USIA 8	NSA 3
	NSC 2	

DEPT./PASS:
BELEM
PORTO ALEGRE
CURITIBA
BELO HORIZONTE

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

20 AIRGRAM

732.00/12-2062

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A-61 NO. | CONFIDENTIAL HANDLING INDICATOR

TO : DEPARTMENT OF STATE

1962 DEC 24 PM 2 40

INFO: RIO DE JANEIRO, BRASILIA, SÃO PAULO
Belem-1
Porto Alegre-1
Curitiba-1

RDVAN
ANALYSIS & DISTRIBUTION BRANCH

FROM : Amconsul RECIFE
Belo Horizonte-1

DATE: December 20, 1962

SUBJECT: Weekly Summary No. 25

REF :

DEPARTMENT OF STATE
BUREAU OF
INTER-AMERICAN AFFAIRS
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12-27-62
No action
R. Burton

TABLE OF CONTENTS

POLITICAL

1. Miguel Arraes Returns to Recife -- Election Certificates Awarded
2. Northeast Indifferent to January Plebiscite
3. Julião's Mandate to be Challenged
4. Arraes' Candidate Loses Bid to Head Local Bar Chapter
5. Ceara Deputy Contest Still in Doubt

ECONOMIC

1. Customs Seizes Japanese Fishing Boats -- Again
2. Bus Strike May Be Averted

PSYCHOLOGICAL

RECEIVED
DEC 26 1962

POLITICAL

1. Miguel Arraes Returns to Recife -- Election Certificates Awarded

After an absence of almost two months, Governor-elect MIGUEL ARRAES finally returned to Pernambuco this week. The immediate purpose of his return at this time was to receive the certificate of his election as Governor of Pernambuco, but he was also expected to resume his position in the game of politics, starting first with a campaign for the return

FORM DS-323 4-62

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Drafted by: See last page/ag

Contents and Classification Approved by:

Clearances:

0630

The reinforced squad which had been providing a 24-hour guard on the Consulate premises since the beginning of the Cuban crisis on October 22, was withdrawn today, following a call on the Principal Officer by III Army G-2 Lt. Col. Carlos Alberto Rocha advising him of this move.

6. Economic Notes

a. The Chinese Communist Trade Mission visiting Brazil under the auspices of the Banco do Brasil came and went last week with extremely little local impact.

b. Agriculture Minister Renato Costa Lima spent several days in Pôrto Alegre last week studying the rice supply situation and his only public pronouncement was that the cereal crops of Brazil are expected to be excellent.

c. Interesting to note was the announcement this week that the telephone rates in RGS will rise by 40 percent as of January 1, 1963. It will be recalled that Governor Brizola would not allow IT&T to raise its rates when it needed capital to improve its service and equipment.

Frederick D. Sharp III
American Consul

cc.: Consular Affairs, Rio
Political Section, Rio
Political Section, Brasília
ARA/EST/B, Washington
INR/RAR/P, Washington

Department: Pass to all posts in Brazil.

0629

"some" formula for a wage raise and that Brizola returned from his plebiscite campaigning in the North, assured the quick termination of an effort which was already considered a failure since the stoppage was not complete. Brizola's last two"political strike" attempts have thus been less than a total success.

4. Governor Brizola's Activities

In addition to his strike settlement and Peace Corps effort, the peripatetic Brizola made several trips to and from Rio, one of which was to receive the Ordem do Mérito Naval using the presidential Viscount as his vehicle. Correio do Povo this week reprinted the denunciation of Brizola in the Commie Classe Operária, which charged him as an opportunist demagogue and stated that every position and action he has taken has had the aim of promoting his political career.

Two homenagens to Brizola are programmed for the end of this week, according to press reports, one on December 22 which supposedly will be attended by President Goulart, as well as a long list of Brizola admirers including the Ministers of Navy, Air and Agriculture, and the Marine Corps Commander, the presidents of Banco do Brasil and BNDE, as well as Governors Mauro Borges, Miguel Arrais and Vice Governor Eloi Dutra. On the following day in Santa Maria the railroad labor center, Brizola will be hailed as the leader of national liberation in a leftist and ultra-nationalist generated and organized show which, the announcement states, will pull 50 thousand workers together.

Fôlha da Tarde's rumor column this week stated that the Federal Government may intervene in the States of Guanabara and Rio Grande do Sul after the plebiscite on January 6, and one comment heard is that Brizola is frantically seeking a way to prevent the inauguration of Meneghetti, for he cannot afford to have his administration of the State put under the magnifying glass of the opposition.

5. Military Developments

III Army Commander, General Jair Dantas Ribeiro, and III Military Region Commander, General Genaro Bomtempo both returned last Friday after a period of leave in Rio.

General Isaac Nahon has taken over as Commander of the 6th Infantry Division, Artillery, replacing General Manoel Mendes Pereira.

Many eyebrows were raised this week in Pôrto Alegre when army reservists from the last two classes were summoned to their former units for physical examinations and an updating of their present addresses. Although reporting to their former units is a standard procedure, this operation was more meticulously carried out this time than it has been the case in the past.

0628

M. G. - Can you identify the Generals noted on p. 3?

RHS

No info. in files. Inquiried with CIA; no response as yet.

1/8/63 Has no info re this

0627

Deputy Chief of Military Household: Major Nabuco Rodrigues Martins
State Attorney General: Dr. José Barros de Vasconcelos
Commander of Brigada Militar: Coloñel Otávio Frota
Chief of Staff-Brigada Militar: Colonel Raul de Oliveira

The Consulate has been told by informed sources that this selection is considered to be most fortunate as the Meneghetti forces have carried out their declared intention of putting together an administration made up of talented and forward looking men. Three other comments heard in praising the selection are that not one State party director was named, that they are all qualified technicians, and that really for the first time people from the interior of the State have been picked for a State Cabinet. Among the outstanding choices are, of course, Deputy Daniel Faraco, banker Emílio Kaminski, and agronomist Adolfo Fetter. Public relations specialist, Plínio Cabral, should have the know-how to keep old Meneghetti from falling into publicity traps.

2. Peace Corps Volunteers Withdrawn

Early last week the six Peace Corps volunteers stationed in RGS were brought to Pôrto Alegre bag and baggage, by their sponsoring organization ASCAR (Associação Sulina de Crédito e Assistência Rural) and on Thursday they departed in their own vehicles for Rio. ASCAR's parent group ABCAR (Associação Brasileira de Crédito e Assistência Rural) had received a request from State Agricultural Secretary João Caruso for their withdrawal on a technicality, stating that the Government of RGS had not been consulted prior to their assignment here. This move was obviously taken at the insistence of Governor Brizola who for some time has been attacking the presence of the Peace Corps in Brazil as a para-military organization bent on subverting the internal order of the country. No press coverage attended their withdrawal and the first public disclosure of the volunteers' departure came during Brizola's weekly Friday night broadcast when he announced their withdrawal at his request, taking some 10 minutes of the 2 1/2 hour monologue to say that these "FBI trained"youths were training as intelligence specialists for the United States Government and that they would become completely knowledgeable on all aspects of the area in which they operate. He said in effect that they were not really technicians since they were not graduated in any technical field and their activities could only be suspect particularly since they traveled with "these trunks, the contents of which no one ever sees". Brizola reiterated that he was to make a representation to the Brazilian Security Council on the Peace Corps in the near future. The Consulate believes that Governor Meneghetti will be receptive to the return of the Peace Corps to RGS if and when approached after his inauguration as Governor.

3. Brief State Civil Servants Strike Terminates

The strike of bureaucrats which was, incidentally, illegal terminated after 48 hours last week. The fact that Meneghetti accepted

ORIG/ACTION
ARA-4

RM/R 1	REP 1	AF
ARA	EUR	FE 4
NEA	CU	INR 5
S 4	P	IO
L	FBO	AID
PC 13	45-c 1	
AGR 10	COM 10	FRB
INT	LAB 6	TAR
TR	XMB	AIR 4
ARMY 5	CIA 10	NAVY 5
OSD 12	USIA 8	NSA 3

File
RM/R
1/21/63
RJBurton
No action

6

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

AIRGRAM

732.00/12-1962
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A-29 NO. | OFFICIAL USE ONLY | Air Pouch HANDLING INDICATOR

TO : DEPARTMENT OF STATE 1962 DEC 28 AM 8 29

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DEPARTMENT OF STATE
DEC 1 1962

FROM : Amconsul PÔRTO ALEGRE DATE:

SUBJECT : PÔRTO ALEGRE WEEKLY SUMMARY Nº 35

REF :

1. Meneghetti's Cabinet
2. Peace Corps Volunteers Withdrawn
3. Brief State Civil Servants Strike Terminates
4. Governor Brizola's Activities
5. Military Developments
6. Economic Notes

1. Meneghetti's Cabinet

After considerable backing and filling and many logrolling sessions between parties forming the ADP coalition, Governor-elect Ildo Meneghetti finally announced his State Cabinet on December 15, as follows:

Secretary of Interior and Justice: Deputy Coelho de Souza (PL)
Secretary of Public Security: Otávio Cardoso (PL)
Secretary of Treasury: Emílio O. Kaminski (PRP)
Secretary of Administration: Antônio Pires (PRP)
Secretary of Public Health: Hélio Helbert dos Santos (PSD)
Secretary of Economy: Deputy Daniel Faraco (PSD)
Secretary of Agriculture: Adolfo Antônio Fetter (PSD)
Secretary of Education: Prof. Zilah Totta
Secretary of Labor: Arnaldo da Costa Prieto (PDC)
Secretary of Public Works: João Magalhães Filho (UDN)
Chief of Civil Household: Plínio Cabral
Deputy Chief of Civil Household: José Garrastazu
Private Secretary: Carlos R. dos Santos
Chief of Military Household: Coloneł Orlando Pacheco

JAN 22 1963

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FORM DS-323 4-62

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Clearances:

FDSharp/zms 12/18/62

Contents and Classification Approved by:
FDSharp

0625

W I T H D R A W A L N O T I C E

RG: 059

ENTRY: CDF60-63

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WITHDRAWN: 02/24/95 by: JAS

FOIA RETRIEVAL #: 949515 01580 00010



W I T H D R A W A L N O T I C E

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TEL 1140 FR RIO DE JANEIRO TO SECSTATE

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NND: 949515 WITHDRAWN: 02/24/95 by: JAS

FOIA RETRIEVAL #: 949515 01580 00009

0623

To whatever degree the government participated in the formulation of the statement, it will probably have a salutory effect on Goulart's efforts to obtain a larger vote on January 6.

For the Ambassador:

J. Phillip McLean
Third Secretary of Embassy

APPROVED:

C. Dirck Kyser
Second Secretary of Embassy

DISTRIBUTION: All consulates in Brazil, Service Attachés, USIS, Econ (2), Labor, Pol II, Pol Rio (5), CF (3), CF Brasilia (2), Pol Brasilia (3)

TRDB

published nor commented upon it.

The most interesting press comment centered around the trip to Rome of Hugo de Faria. The President's Chief of the Civil Household left for Rome and arrived back in Brazil shortly before the return of the first group of Bishops. As early as December 6, Helio Fernandes in his column in Diario de Noticias had commented that the purpose of Faria's trip was to secure a statement from the Bishops in favor of the vote in order to reduce the number of abstaining voters.

Dom Helder Câmara anticipated further comment on the association between the hierarchy's statement and Hugo de Faria's timely presence in Rome by specifically stating that the Chief of the Civil Household had not exerted any pressure on the Bishops to issue the appeal. In the December 14 edition of Correio da Manha, Mauricio Caminha de Lacerda said that Faria arrived in Rome after the meeting of the Bishops which approved the statement but was given knowledge of its contents which he relayed to Goulart upon his return to Brasilia.

CONCLUSION: It is extremely difficult to assess the Brazilian government's involvement in the issuance of the Bishop's statement. Hugo de Faria left for Rome with the title of "the President's special representative to the Vatican Council". As the trip of this "special representative" was scheduled to coincide with the closing days of this first session of the Council and Faria's stay there was extremely short, it may be better to say that he was sent as "the President's special representative to the Brazilian Hierarchy". This would harmonize well with the role Hugo de Faria has played in the past, acting as one of Goulart's major conciliators with the moderate and conservative elements in the country.

The President may have sent the Chief of his Civil Household to Rome to obtain a statement of the Bishops in favor of a "no" vote, but it is more likely that he is satisfied with the appeal as it was issued, for it seems to be assured that the vote will produce a favorable (for Presidentialism) "No" majority. Goulart's worry is that a light turn-out at the polls will be interpreted as a vote for "Presidentialism" but against the President.

It is possible that Hugo de Faria bargained with the prelates on a "quid pro quo" basis (especially in light of a Correio Braziliense item on December 15 stating that Father Arguimedes Bruno would be appointed to an office in the new presidential cabinet as the first priest ever to hold such an office); on the other hand, he may have expedited the issuance of a statement that the Bishops had already intended to make.

0621

ORIGIN ACTION

ARA-4

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AGR	COM	FRB
INT	LAB	TAR
TR	XMB	AIR 4
ARMY 5	CIA 10	NAVY 5
OSD 12	USIA 8	NSA 2

59

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

AIRGRAM

732.00/12-1763

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AIR POUCH HANDLING INDICATOR

TO : Department of State

1962 DEC 21 AM 8 55

DEPARTMENT OF STATE BUREAU OF INTELLIGENCE AND RESEARCH ANALYSIS & DISTRIBUTION BRANCH DEC 28 1962

FROM : Amembassy BRASILIA Office DATE: December 17, 1962

SUBJECT : Bishops Issue Statement in Support of Plebiscite Vote.

REF :

File ARA/BR Desk 12/27/62 R. Burton

On December 11, the National Conference of the Bishops of Brazil issued a short statement which included a strong pastoral appeal to all franchized Brazilians to vote in the plebiscite on January 6. The Bishops stated that their pastoral responsibilities compelled them to speak to the consciences of their flocks and to clearly point out that it is imperative to vote and "to do it in the best manner possible". The statement noted that this appeal was being made without any partisan sentiment but only in line with their "pastoral concern" and directed the voter "to deposit in the ballot box the vote of his own personal convictions".

The appeal was issued upon the return of the Bishops from Rome and the Second Vatican Council. Archbishops Dom Vicente Scheres (Pôrto Alegre), Dom José Newton (Brasilia), Dom Luís Felipe (Uruguaiana) and Dom Hélder Câmara (Auxilary-Archbishop of Rio) delivered the statement to President Goulart at Laranjeiras Palace in Rio. During the visit, friendly remarks were exchanged between the Prelates and the President on the subject of the Brazilian government's aid to the Brazilian hierarchy during the Council.

The story was given prominent space and headlines in most of the Brazilian press, but editorial comment was light. Conservative O Globo ran a front page editorial praising the Bishops for their stand and agreeing with the substance of their words, but underscoring on the reference to voting according to one's personal convictions. One significant exception to the general wide circulation of the statement is to be noted in the fact that O Estado de São Paulo neither

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0620

732.00/12-1762

0619

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DATE December 14, 1962

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SUBJECT Possible AG Visit to Brazil

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U ✓ 4

M ✓ 5

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06 18

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-2- 1142, December 14, 9 p.m. from Rio de Janeiro

current problems of common interest to the two countries. Mr. Kennedy is being accompanied on this informal visit by Mr. Edwin M. Martin, Assistant Secretary of State for Inter-American Affairs, and Mr. Ralph Dungan, Special Assistant to the President. The party will depart Brazil on Monday evening."

3. I intend go Brasilia Sunday mid-day accompanied by Kubish, Keppel, and Walters. Have set date with Goulart at about mid-day, Monday to be followed by luncheon and conversation as far into the afternoon as he or we desire. Can accommodate entire party including crew in Brasilia Embassy building.

GORDON

KEA:4

Note: Mr. Johnson (SS) notified 12-14-62, CWO-M.

Note: Passed White House 12-14-62, 11:00 p.m.

NOTE: Advance copies to SS-O 12/14/CWO-M

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0617

INCOMING TELEGRAM Department of State ACTION COPY

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Action
SS

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9:06 p.m.

FROM: Rio de Janeiro

TO: Secretary of State

NO: 1142, December 14, 9 p.m.

01

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EYES ONLY ASSISTANT SECRETARY MARTIN

PASS DUNGAN WHITE HOUSE

1. Confirming my TELECON with Martin, Goulart warmly welcomed idea of possible visit Attorney General, and said would happily rearrange plans for trip to North to permit informal discussion of all problems economic and political. Volunteered Brasilia preferable to Rio, to minimize publicity. Thought useful divide discussion in two phases: One on economic and financial problems where he would have two or three advisers, and one on political problems with only Attorney General and himself, suggesting I should interpret. (In practice, I would prefer professional interpreter.) Said would like opportunity to explain to President's brother exact internal situation, including problems of regime, nature of Communism in Brazil, and other such subjects. In his shrewd way he obviously sensed basic purpose of proposal.

2. He suggested no publicity until meeting takes place. Especially with arrival now scheduled Sunday night, this may be difficult. I recommend that we be prepared with something on following lines, if possible holding issuance until Monday. "The Attorney General of the United States, the Honorable Robert Kennedy, is extending a previously planned trip to the Panama Canal Zone for a brief visit to Brazil. He has accepted the invitation of the President of Brazil, the Honorable Joao Goulart, to join the President for an informal luncheon in Brasilia on Monday December 17, and a discussion together of current

(1)

NLJ 92-149, 12/20/82

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ACTION ASSIGNED TO	ACTION TAKEN	
NAME OF OFFICER & OFFICE SYMBOL	DATE OF ACTION	DIRECTIONS TO RM/R

06 16

d. MTR (Cont'd)

Elected	Category	Votes
Candido Norberto dos Santos	IV	26,812
Flávio Antônio Lopes Ramos	III	7,703
Osmar Lautenschleiger		4,155
Heitor Silveira Campos	I	3,363
1st. Alternate: Marino Job Abrahão	II or III	3,150

e. PDC - 27 candidates - 90,704 votes

Elected	Category	Votes
José Sperb Sanseverino	V	9,260
Adolpho Puggina		8,192
Mário Mondino	V	8,042
Nelson Marchezan		7,679
1st. Alternate: Arnaldo da Costa Prieto		6,533

f. PRP - 37 candidates - 79,071 votes

Elected	Category	Votes
Alberto Hoffman	VI	12,199
Antonio Setembrino de Mesquite	VI	5,348
Oscar Westendorff		4,808
1st. Alternate: Hélio Alves de Oliveira		4,533

g. UDN - 32 candidates - 63,488 votes

Elected	Category	Votes
Poty Irineu Cachapuz de Medeiros	V	8,034
Arthur Bacchini	VI	6,809
Synval Sebastião Duarte Guazzeli	II or III	6,143
1st. Alternate: Larry Pinto de Faria	V	5,915

h. ARS - 36 candidates - 33,135 votes

Elected	Category	Votes
Marino Rodrigues dos Santos	I	3,609

Frederick D. Sharp III
American Consul

cc.: Consular Affairs, Rio
Political Section, Rio & Brasília
ARA/EST/Brazil & INR/RAR/P -Washington
Department: Pass to all posts in Brazil

D. (Cont'd)

3. a. PTB (Cont'd)

Elected	Category	Votes
Moab Caldas	II	8,581
Wilmar Correa Taborda		8,478
João Brusa Netto	III	8,428
Aldo da Silva Fagundes	V	8,334
Harry Alziro Sauer	V	7,921
Pedro Jorge Simon	III	7,876
Álvaro da Cunha		7,811
Henrique Henkin	III or V	7,762
Rubens Dario Porciúncula		7,716
Walter Bertoluci		7,240
1st. Alternate: Lidovino Antônio Fanton		7,087

b. PSD - 55 candidates - 236,527 votes

Elected	Category	Votes
Ariosto Jaeger	VI	10,783
José Arlindo Kunzler		10,023
Gustavo Langsch	VI	8,339
Reinaldo Cherubini		8,171
Ari da Silva Delgado	VI	8,164
Porcínio Borges Pinto	VII	8,134
Antonino Fornari		8,026
Hed Santos Borges		7,680
Alexandre Machado da Silva		7,168
José Augusto Amaral de Souza		7,162
Euclides N. Kliemann		7,052
1st. Alternate: Romeu Scheibe	V	6,887

c. PL - 33 candidates - 125,614 votes

Elected	Category	Votes
Paulo Brossard de Souza Pinto	VI	12,507
Guidbem Borges Castanheira	V	8,412
Francisco Solano Borges		7,715
Getúlio Marcantonio	V	7,710
Honório Pereira Severo	V	6,429
Dario Beltrão		5,798
1st. Alternate: Octávio Omar Cardoso		5,700

d. MTR - 54 candidates - 102,614 votes



D. (Cont'd)

1. Voting by Party (Cont'd)

	Votes
PL	125,614
MTR	102,249
PDC	90,704
PRP	79,071
UDN	63,488
ARS	33,135
PSP	21,242
-Blank Ballots	90,412
-Nullified Votes	29,520
Total	1,353,697
Electoral Quotient for each seat	24,076

2. Composition of RGS State Assembly, February 1, 1963:

PTB	23
PSD	11
PL	6
MTR	4
PDC	4
PRP	3
UDN	3
ARS	1
PSP	-

Total 55

3. Results by Candidate:

a. PTB - 69 candidates - 481,735 votes

Elected	Category	Votes
José Lamaison Pôrto	III	27,102
João Caruso	III	20,873
Wilson Vargas da Silveira	III	20,788
Justino Costa Quintana	II or III	14,039
Sereno Chaise	III	13,447
Siegfried Heuser	IV	12,690
José Fidelis Ramos Coelho	III	11,907
Suely Oliveira	III	10,516
Ayrton D'Avila Barnasque	II or III	9,714
Marcírio Goulart Loureiro	III	9,333
Hélio Fontoura	III	9,198
Antonio Visintainer	II or III	9,175
Beno Orlando Burmann		8,873



3. a. PTB (Cont'd)

Elected	Category	Votes
Walter Giordano Alves	III	22,575
Ruben Bento Alves		19,164
Clay Hardman de Araujo	I or II	18,277
Osmar da Rocha Grafulha	III	18,271
Antonio Bresolin	III	18,031
Milton Garcia Dutra	II	18,001
1st. Alternate: Croacy Cavalheiro de Oliveira	II	16,393

b. PSD - 16 candidates - 286,378 votes

Elected	Category	Votes
Tarso de Morais Dutra	VI	57,185
Walter Peracchi Barcellos	VI or VII	55,114
Luciano Correa Machado	VI	27,276
Daniel Agostinho Faraco	V	24,944
Clovis Pestana	V	20,172
Lauro Franco Leitão	VI	18,192
Ary Rodrigues Alcântara		13,452
1st. Alternate: Marcial Gonçalves Terra		12,010

c. ADP - 17 candidates - 286,155 votes

Elected	Category	Votes
Carlos de Brito Velho(PL)	V	71,853
Euclides Triches (PDC)	V	34,450
Alcides Flores Soares Jr. (UDN)	VI	32,726
Pedro Affonso Anschau (PRP)	VI	27,802
Raul Pilla (PL)	VI	20,858
Cid Furtado (PDC)		17,943
Norberto Harald Schmidt (PL)		16,224
1st. Alternate: Arno Fernando Arnt(PRP)	VI	10,494

d. MTR - 13 candidates - 66,882 votes

Elected	Category	Votes
Jairo Brum	II	42,095
1st. Alternate: Valdyr Mozzaquatro	II	6,308

D. State Deputies

1. Voting by Party

	Votes
PTB	481,735
PSD	236,527

B. Governor:

	Party	Category	Votes
Ildo Meneghetti	ADP-PSP	VI	502,356
Egydio Michaelsen	PTB	V	480,131
Fernando Ferrari	MTR	IV	290,384
-Blank Ballots			41,510
-Nullified Votes			39,316
Total			1,353,697

C. Federal Deputies:

1. Voting by Party:

	Votes
PTB	554,518
PSD	286,378
ADP	286,155
MTR	66,882
-Blank Ballots	134,296
-Nullified Votes	25,468
Total	1,353,697

Electoral Quotient for each seat 45,801

2. Composition of RGS Delegation to Federal Chamber, February 1,1963:

PTB	14
PSD	7
ADP	7
MTR	1

Total 29

3. Results by Candidate:

a. PTB - 29 candidates - 554,518 votes

Elected	Category	Votes
Floriceno Paixão	III	69,035
Paulo Mincarone	III	60,416
Cezar Prieto	V	37,762
Ney Ortiz Borges	III	28,413
Adylio Martins Vianna	III or V	25,166
Armando Temperani Pereira	II	24,927
Zaire Nunes Pereira	III	23,772
Unirio Carrera Machado	II or III	23,494

0611

ORIGIN/ACTION

RM/R	REP	AF
1		
ARA	EUR	FE
NEA	CU	INR 5
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AGR	COM	FRB
INT	LAB	TAR
TR	XMB	AIR V
ARMY 5	CIA 10	NAVY 5
OSD 12	USIA 8	NSA 3

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DEPARTMENT OF STATE

AIRGRAM

732.00/12-1962

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A-26 NO. CONFIDENTIAL 1962 DEC 17 AM 9 53 Priority HANDLING INDICATOR

TO : DEPARTMENT OF STATE

Brasilia / Santos / Curitiba / Salvador / Belem / Belo Horizonte / Recife / Sao Paulo /

DEC 18 1962

FROM : Amconsul PÔRTO ALEGRE DATE: DEC 14 1962

SUBJECT : BRAZILIAN ELECTIONS 1962: Official Results of Rio Grande do Sul Elections as Announced by

REF : Tribunal Regional Eleitoral.

Of a total of 1,561,162 registered voters in 6,923 electoral districts, 1,353,697 votes were cast on October 7, 1962. The abstention rate was 13.28 percent.

The official results as published by the Tribunal Regional Eleitoral (TRE) are as follows:

A. Federal Senator:

	Party	Category	Votes
Mem de Sá (PL) (Alt. Fernando Gay da Fonseca)	ADP 1/	VI	572,334
Daniel Krieger (UDN) (Alt. Nestor Pereira)	ADP	VI	567,882
Mariano Beck (PTB) (Alt. Alter Cintra de Oliveira)	PTB	IV	513,601
Antonio Brochado da Rocha (PTB) (Alt. João Carlos Gastal)	PTB	III	539,665
-Blank Ballots			461,480
-Nullified Votes			52,432
Total			2,707,394

1/ Aliança Democrática Popular, coalition of PSD, UDN, PL, PDC and PRP parties; PSP.

CONFIDENTIAL

FORM DS-323 4-62

FOR DEPT. USE ONLY: In Out

Drafted by: FDSharp

Contents and Classification Approved by: FDSharp

Clearances:

LIMITED OFFICIAL USE

MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION

Date: December 11, 1962

PLACE: Offices of O Estado de São Paulo

SUBJECT: Brazilian Economic Problems Threaten to Provoke Revolt.

PARTICIPANTS: Frederico Heller, Economic Editor of the Estado de São Paulo.
Richard C. Desmond, Economic Officer, American Consulate General, São Paulo.

Copies to: Amembassy Rio (2cc)
ARA (1cc)
INR (1cc)
Central Files

The reporting officer called on Sr. Heller to ask his opinion on current issues of importance to São Paulo businessmen, notably availability of credit to pay the "thirteenth month" Christmas bonus, inflation and shortage of foreign exchange.

Sr. Heller commented on these problems in rather summary fashion. He said the problem of credit shortage would be met without difficulty in view of the expansion in the money supply accompanying the great increases in currency issue that are taking place and will continue until the end of the year. These increases will naturally give a further impetus to inflation. With respect to foreign exchange, Sr. Heller's remarks seemed to imply the conviction that the United States would feel impelled to provide under any circumstances a minimum of aid sufficient to continue the flow of essential imports. He attributed the recent rise in the parallel rate of the dollar in part to political tension and in part to a tendency of some people, faced with the prospect of stricter tax collections, to put money into dollars. He expressed doubt that the official rate would be adjusted before the plebiscite in January.

Asked about the attitude of São Paulo businessmen to current economic developments, Sr. Heller said the majority of the classes produtoras hoped and expected a military coup to take place about June or July, if the rise in the cost of living continued unabated. This estimated timing was based on a rate of inflation that prevailed somewhat earlier. If inflation continued at the rate of the last few weeks, the estimated

0609

ORIGIN/ACTION

ARA-4

RM/R	REP	AF
1	1	
ARA	EUR	FE
NEA	CU	INR 5
S 4	P	IO
L	FSO	AID 12
AGR	COM 10	PRS 2
INT	LAB	TAR
TR 2	RAB 4	AIR 4
IMMI 5	CIA 10	NAVY 5
JUD 12	USIA 8	NSA 3

5

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

AIRGRAM

832.00/12-1462
XR 732.00

FOR RM USE ONLY

A-181 NO. LIMITED OFFICIAL USE HANDLING INDICATOR

TO : DEPARTMENT OF STATE

INFO: RIO DE JANEIRO

FROM : Amcongen, SÃO PAULO DATE: December 14, 1962

SUBJECT : Expectation of Coup Said to be Common among Business People.

REF : Congen A-110 of October 24, 1962, and A-79 of September 26, 1962. CERP, D-10

Attached is a memorandum of conversation between the reporting officer and the economic editor of the Estado de São Paulo in which the latter stated that many business people are expecting a military coup to be provoked by current economic problems. Recent Consulate General Weekly Summaries have reported increasingly outspoken opposition to the Goulart Administration in São Paulo circles.

The Consulate General will endeavor to verify how accurate this source's observations are concerning the attitude of business groups. The Consulate General will also be alert for evidence concerning the attitude of General Pery Bevilacqua. The opinion ascribed to him in the conversation is not in keeping with a common impression that he is a Goulart supporter. It would not, however, be in conflict with the impression of the General contained in A-79.

For the Minister Consul General:

Richard C. Desmond

Richard C. Desmond
Consul

FORM DS-323 LIMITED OFFICIAL USE FOR DEPT. USE ONLY ☑ In ☐ Out

Drafted by: ECON:RCDesmond:rip 12/14/62 Contents and Classification Approved by:

Clearances:

Comment: Though the issue of communist infiltration into the petroleum enterprises in Bahia has not been rebutted, the incident which led to the newspaper exposure seems to be closed. Dr. Manoel Pinto de Aguiar, a Director of Petrobras, and Dr. Francisco Mangabeira, President, have expressed confidence in Jairo Faria, the refinery's superintendent.

The newspaper campaign has been very effective in alerting the public and officials to the danger of red infiltration in the petroleum monopoly. It resulted in elaborate statements by the high officials of Petrobras which shed light on this administration's social-economic-political doctrine. (A separate despatch follows.)

ECONOMIC:

Oil Drill Plant for Bahia: Mr. Lewis Remick of the International Development Bank announced to the local press this week that the Bank will loan ten million dollars to BRASQUIP, a private company, to construct a factory in the immediate vicinity of Bahia to manufacture oil well drill bits. Mr. Remick reportedly authorized the release of the first 650,000 dollar installment of the loan.

Increase in Bahia State Royalties from Petrobras?

Bahia is attempting to change the system of computing royalties on production of oil by Petrobras. Presently, Petrobras pays Cr. $739.35 per barrel of oil refined within the state (at Mataripe) and Cr. $515.19 per barrel for oil exported from Bahia. Since most oil is exported for refining in the exterior or in the south of Brazil, Bahia's "take" in real terms is considerably less than a dollar a barrel. The state is now attempting to establish the royalty for all oil produced at the higher "domestic" figure, regardless of where it is refined. If so established, Bahia's yearly royalties will amount to at least 57 million cruzeiros annually, and possibly as much as 75 million cruzeiros, depending on the volume of production.

Harold M. Midkiff
American Consul

8

0607

ORIGIN/ACTION

RM/R 1	REP	AF
ARA ARA-4	EUR	FE
NEA	EU	INR 5
E 4	P	IO
L	FBO	AID 12
AGR	COM 10	FRB
INT 7	LAB	TAR
TR 2	XMB 4	NIB 2
ARMY 5	CIA 10	NAVY 5
OSD 12	USIA 8	NSA 3
Recife 1		

59

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

AIRGRAM

732.00/12-1462

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A-41 NO. OFFICIAL USE ONLY HANDLING INDICATOR

1962 DEC 22 PM 1 21

TO : DEPARTMENT OF STATE

INFO: Rio and Brasilia

ANALYSIS & DISTRIBUTION SECTION DEPARTMENT OF STATE DEC 27 1962

FROM : AMCONSULATE, SALVADOR DATE: December 14, 1962

SUBJECT: Weekly Summary

REF :

File ARA/Est/B no action 12-27-62 R. Bacton RS RB

POLITICAL:

Governor-elect Lomanto Junior has been spending much time with members of state economic agencies. He has established temporary headquarters in the Economic Planning Commission.

Comment: Lomanto's activities with these economic agencies are in good part, at least, aimed at preparing himself for his trip to the United States and Europe in January and February.

State Assemblymen voted an increase in salary for themselves in an overtime session just prior to their recess. They also voted to give themselves double credit for time spent in assembly functions for pensions purposes.

Comment: This action has been much criticized. It is now reported that 80% of the state budget is absorbed by salaries leaving little for works. The assemblymen's action will not improve the situation.

Election results are to be formally announced December 23 at which time those elected will be granted their commissions. Some seats are still in question.

The Petroleum Refinery employee responsible for the leftist edition of JORNAL DE MATARIPE (see last week's Summary) has been dismissed.

DEPARTMENT please pass copy to Recife.

OFFICIAL USE ONLY

FORM 4-62 DS-323

FOR DEPT. USE ONLY ☑ In ☐ Out

Drafted by: HMMidkiff/WHBMatthews:la

Contents and Classification Approved by:

Clearances:

0606

LIMITED OFFICIAL USE

São Paulo
A-179
5

PSYCHOLOGICAL

1. Local Press Reaction

São Paulo editorialists were preoccupied with domestic concerns again this week. Removal of Labor Minister João Pinheiro Neto was seen by most papers as one of the few good things done so far by the government of Premier Hermes LIMA. Writers felt that Pinheiro Neto's criticism of the International Monetary Fund, Ambassadors Campos and Gordon, and SUMOC's president had hurt U.S.-Brazilian financial negotiations. Leftist/nationalist Ultima Hora vehemently defended Pinheiro Neto, said the administration needs and will get him back.

O Estado de S. Paulo saw this week's Bank of Brazil strike as purely political, and almost all other writers agreed.

Several papers called on Petrobras' president to confirm or deny reported Communist-"Cubanist" control of an oil refinery in Bahia; others including O Estado simply confirmed the fact and used it to point up a history of Communist activity within the national oil company.

Folha de S. Paulo carried a signed article entitled "The Alliance for Progress will Fail in Brazil." Main argument was that the United States, contrary to its traditional support of free enterprise, is running the Aliança on a government-to-government basis, thus fostering "state-ization."

The ideological/political strife between the USSR and Red China continued to interest commentators. General feeling: the monolithic Communist bloc no longer exists.

Daniel M. Braddock
Minister Consul General

Contributors: D.C. Proper
J. Liebof
J. Mason

Distribution: INS/RAR, AmConGen Recife, AmConsulates Belem, Belo Horizonte, Curitiba, Porto Alegre, Salvador, Santos.

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São Paulo
A-179
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5. Goiás Governor Urges More Work, Less Politics

Goiás Governor Mauro BORGES TEIXEIRA, in São Paulo for a short visit, blamed the "national situation" -- first topic of conversation for everyone these days -- on too much politics and too little work. He did not, however, pin the blame on anyone in person. He did not express outspoken support of ex-Labor Minister PINHEIRO Neto, as some observers had expected. He reportedly confirmed and regretted the recent news of Communist activities in his State. (OFFICIAL USE ONLY)

Comment: Mauro Borges was evidently determined to appear cautious and moderate. (OFFICIAL USE ONLY)

6. José Bonifacio Leaving Politics?

Speaking over São Paulo television in a filmed appearance (he is traveling in Europe), defeated gubernatorial candidate José Bonifacio Coutinho NOGUEIRA said that he did not intend to return to political party activity. (UNCLASSIFIED)

Comment: His only useful role in the immediate future would be in the opposition to Adhemar de Barros, and it is far from clear (in view of his unexpectedly weak showing in the elections) that he could make a contribution even there. José Bonifacio would evidently like to stay in politics, but does not know how to do it. It remains to be seen, for that matter, whether there is anyone willing and able to lead an effective non-Janista opposition -- a very important concern. (LIMITED OFFICIAL USE)

7. Campaign for Electoral Districts Begins

Several São Paulo civic organizations have joined in a campaign, still small-scale, to convince Congress to institute a system of electoral districts. Governor Carvalho Pinto is supporting it, as are several newspapers. (UNCLASSIFIED)

Comment: This sort of civic campaign still seems to be a novelty. The present one is for an excellent cause. Without underestimating the formidable difficulties facing it, one can recall that a similar movement recently and successfully publicized the need for ballot reform (a much simpler problem). (OFFICIAL USE ONLY)



month Christmas bonus. While workers in private banks in São Paulo did not strike, many of these banks also closed since their operations depended largely on the Bank of Brazil. As expected, the Workers State Command (CEST) and São Paulo City Inter-Union Pact (PUI) -- both Communist-dominated -- supported the strike. Perhaps the most unusual aspect of the strike was a front-page editorial in the December 7 São Paulo edition of leftist/nationalist Ultima Hora expressing "concern over the constant use of that powerful instrument which the democratic regime affords the workers: the strike." In the past the newspaper mentioned has strongly backed virtually every strike, whether politically or economically motivated. (OFFICIAL USE ONLY)

Comment: An important factor in the success of the Bank of Brazil strike was the ability of the Communist strike leaders to convince the striking workers that their relatively well-paying jobs would be jeopardized by passage of the bank reform bill. On the other hand, however, the Communist-led São Paulo Local Union of Bank Workers failed in its attempt to pull out workers in private banks, whose reaction to the entire issue was one of almost complete apathy. (OFFICIAL USE ONLY)

3. Goulart Opposition Rallies Around Judge DAVIS

The Navy Minister's interference in Santos last week (Weekly Summary No. 49, item 1) is a cause célèbre for São Paulo's increasingly articulate opponents of President Goulart, who claim -- correctly -- that it amounted to federal intervention in the State and presidential disrespect for the courts. A majority of the members of the Municipal Chamber have proposed making Judge Francis Selwyn Davis (whose injunction was blocked by the Marines) a "citizen emeritus" of São Paulo, and politicians and private groups have pointedly honored him. Governor Carvalho PINTO has been the target of heavy criticism for reacting so mildly to the federal interference. (LIMITED OFFICIAL USE)

4. Adhemar Still Traveling

Governor-elect Adhemar de BARROS has left the United States and is now prospecting for investments in Germany, according to press reports. His absence leaves a political near-vacuum in São Paulo. The latest word is that Adhemar plans to let the vacuum continue until the end of December. (OFFICIAL USE ONLY)

Comment: He is probably wise to stay away as long as he can. Myriad old cronies would be pestering him for jobs, and he has indicated a desire to move in better company for the next four years. (LIMITED OFFICIAL USE)



specific credit to Juscelino KUBITSCHEK's government for getting the automobile factories started. Kubitschek, coincidentally, was in São Paulo preaching the same theme.

Goulart also appeared to be following Kubitschek's line on inflation. The President hoped to reduce the inflationary rate from 48 percent to 30 percent within a year, but not by cutting expenses. "... I have never believed in the efficiency of fighting the inflationary spurt by a drastic and indiscriminate reduction of expenses, which would inevitably provoke a period of stagnation...." If he believed that a non-drastic and discriminate reduction of expenses was necessary, he kept quiet about it.

The truck factory's President and Goulart's host was João Batista Leopoldo FIGUEIREDO, who also happens to be President of IPES, a businessmen's "democratic action" group which the extreme left considers reactionary "economic power" incarnate. Figueiredo's lengthy prepared speech read President Goulart a lesson on inflation, free enterprise, and the value of foreign investments. (LIMITED OFFICIAL USE)

Comment: Goulart thus took a long new step toward trying to mend his relations with businessmen and foreign investors. (For a preceding step, see Weekly Summary No. 49.) In his recent São Paulo appearances he has praised Italian, Japanese, and Swedish investments -- but not yet any from the United States.

It is probably not reading too much into the picture to see Goulart as a confused and worried man. His unpreparedness, mild incoherence -- both this week and last -- and apparent glumness contribute to this picture. Similarities between his and Kubitschek's line suggest that the ex-President may be finding it possible to exploit the current President's confusion. (LIMITED OFFICIAL USE)

2. Political Strike Closes Bank of Brazil

Bank of Brazil offices in São Paulo and interior cities were closed on December 6 by a strike of the bank's employees, called by the Communist-controlled São Paulo State Federation of Bank Workers in response to orders from the Communist-controlled National Confederation of Workers in Credit Institutions (CONTEC). The strike was in protest against the bank reform bill sponsored by Federal Deputy Daniel FARACO and a bill presented by Senator Sérgio MARINHO allegedly restricting the thirteenth-

0602

ACTION		
INR-5		
RM/R 1	REP 1	AF
ARA 3	EUR	FE
NEA	CU	INR
E 4	P 1	IO 2
L	FBO	AID 12
	USIB 1	PC 2
AGR 10	COM 10	FRB
INT 7	LAB 6	TAR
TR	XMB	AIR 4
ARMY 5	CIA 10	NAVY 5
OSD 12	USIA 8	NSA 3
	HEW 1	NSC 2

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

AIRGRAM

732.00/12-1362

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179 NO. LIMITED OFFICIAL USE WNS HANDLING INDICATOR

TO : DEPARTMENT OF STATE 1962 DEC 8 08

INFO : RIO DE JANEIRO, BRASILIA

FROM : AmConGen, SÃO PAULO DATE: December 12, 1962

SUBJECT: Weekly Summary No. 50

REF :

DEPARTMENT OF STATE RECEIVED DEC 14 PM 4 28 OFFICE OF PUBLICATIONS CENTER

TABLE OF CONTENTS

POLITICAL
1. Goulart Mending Fences
2. Political Strike Closes Bank of Brazil
3. Goulart Opposition Rallies Around Judge Davis
4. Adhemar Still Traveling
5. Goiás Governor Urges More Work, Less Politics
6. José Bonifacio Leaving Politics?
7. Campaign for Electoral Districts Begins

PSYCHOLOGICAL
1. Local Press Reaction

POLITICAL

1. GOULART Mending Fences

President Goulart, inaugurating a Swedish truck factory in São Paulo on December 8, praised the automobile industry in general as an example of helpful foreign capital. (Leftist nationalists have often attacked the foreign-controlled car and truck factories for "sucking the blood of Brazil" through "excessive profits.") According to press reports on the President's extemporaneous speech, he said that enlightened wage policies like those of the automobile industry were the best weapons to combat "extremisms" (read Communism). "... I was never against the participation of [this kind of] foreign capital," he explained. He gave

FORM DS-323 4-62 LIMITED OFFICIAL USE FOR DEPT. USE ONLY ☑ In ☐ Out

Drafted by: See last page/el 12/11/62 Contents and Classification Approved by:

Clearances:

FILED DEC 31 1962

0601

ALLIANCE FOR PROGRESS

This was a fruitful week for the Alliance. The first school built under the Pernambuco education agreement was dedicated on December 7 and a health project agreement was signed the same day with Pernambuco. On December 3 a very significant education project agreement was signed with Rio Grande do Norte and Alliance officials are now negotiating a health agreement with Paraiba as well. (UNCLASSIFIED)

PSYCHOLOGICAL

Any doubt that Leonel Brizzola has acquired an interest in the weekly Jornal Pequeno was dispelled with the appearance of the December 8th edition. Flashing a glaring new masthead with liberal gobs of red ink splattered on the front and back pages in the form of headlines and comments, Brizzola is extolled with the enthusiasm characteristic of a well paid claque. Picture after picture shows Brizzola before the microphone, in a car, on a platform, and always surrounded by leftists such as CLAUDIO BRAGA, President of the Railroad Union, LAMARTINE TAVORA, Federal Deputy, and in one case, with Communist party member MIGUEL BATISTA.

A blatant headline proclaims "Yankee Espionage on the Route of Brizzola" with the story below alleging that two cinematographers of the "American Department of State" followed Brizzola on his entire itinerary through the Northeast. The article then goes on to say the Brizzola did well in calling attention to insidious Yankee activities and that other revelations will be made soon.

Lowell C. Kilday

Lowell C. Kilday
American Vice Consul

Contributors:

WSSmith
CTucker

COMMENT: Promotion of FRANCISCO OLIVEIRA, the present SUDENE Sub-Director, to the Director's chair is not to be regarded without misgivings, he being inexperienced, brash and heavy-footed. Appointment of Armando Monteiro, on the other hand, inspires little more confidence, projecting SUDENE as it inexorably would directly into local political squabbles. It was often rumored during the elections that President Goulart had promised the SUDENE post to Armando Monteiro in return for the latter's agreement to run on an independent ticket to the ignominious end in the gubernatorial race, thus taking votes from CLEOFAS and helping Arraes. If so, it is additional reason not to want to see him running SUDENE. (LIMITED OFFICIAL USE)

ECONOMIC

1. Shortages

Recife has been virtually without milk for over three months. With no fresh product available, supplies of powdered and canned milk have been so decimated that by this week powdered milk was almost as difficult to obtain as fresh. Dairy owners say the failure is due to the fact that while feed prices have risen apace with the inflationary spiral, the price of milk has been held at a level fixed by COAP, and that they can no longer absorb the loss. Whatever the reason, Recife's juvenile and infant population suffers for it and public tempers are wearing thin.

Gasoline also was again unobtainable in Recife this week, though this time only for a matter of two days. An officer of the Consulate General travelling into the deep interior of the state reported a shortage of fuel there too, becoming more critical in proportion to the distance inland. The western most reaches of Pernambuco have reportedly been without fuel stocks for several weeks. A similar situation exists in most of the other states of this consular district as well. (UNCLASSIFIED)

2. New Operators of Electric Power System Criticized

Pernambuco Tramway's contract to furnish Recife electric power expired last July and was picked up by the State Government. The company's assets are now in the hands of a federal court pending settlement of indemnity problems, etc. Recife's power system, though never much to brag about, has deteriorated noticably since July. Power failures (frequent enough before) have become commonplace and fluctuations in the current more drastic. An editorial in Diario da Noite this week complained bitterly against the poor service and warned that unless measures were taken to remedy the situation "many will soon be demanding that Pernambuco Tramways return."

Even leftist/nationalist Ultima Hora chimed in with an article reporting an investigation just called for by the State Assembly to ascertain why rates have been hiked six times in 5 months without proper authorization. (LIMITED OFFICIAL USE)



FURTADO stated that SUDENE and Alliance for Progress had found the road to effective co-operation, and the materialization of the high ideals springing forth from the Punta del Este Conference, he went on, would now be realized.

Speaking to a group of military officers and São Paulo businessmen on the same day, Furtado again referred favorably to Alliance for Progress, saying that it would play a vast role in the development of the Northeast. He also assured the group of his own firm belief in private enterprise and of its importance in developing the economy. (OFFICIAL USE ONLY)

COMMENT: Furtado's favorable comments are a welcome change from the barbed remarks recently of several other SUDENE officials. Furtado was obviously trying to smooth things over, and, in fact, relations between Alliance and SUDENE have improved significantly during the past week or so. Another SUDENE official told an officer of the Consulate General this week that he was more optimistic than he had been for several months, not only with regard to moving ahead more rapidly with development programs, but also with the possibility of formulating a better working relationship between SUDENE and USAID. (LIMITED OFFICIAL USE)

2. Strikes

Local bank employees obeyed a nationwide strike order on December 6, paralyzing banking operations for over 24 hours, and only returning to work the next day after receiving orders to do so from their national headquarters.

Port workers threatened to walk out as of December 8th and were to be joined by stevedores and warehouse workers. The port of Recife would thus have been closed for the 10th time this year. Fortunately, the strike was averted, at least momentarily.

Meanwhile, employees of the city bus company (CTU) are threatening to paralyze public transportation within the next few days unless given a substantial wage increase, which the CTU says it cannot pay. (OFFICIAL USE ONLY)

3. Armando Monteiro Filho Rumored as Furtado's Replacement

For several weeks now the local rumor mill has pegged ex-Minister of Agriculture ARMANDO MONTEIRO FILHO as soon to replace Celso Furtado as SUDENE Director. Most local papers have reported the rumor at one time or another without comment. Interestingly enough, Jornal Pequeno, newly aligned with Governor Brizzola and his crowd, this week blossomed out with a story which not only reported the rumor (said to have come from authoritative sources in Rio), but seemed pleased with its fragrance. (LIMITED OFFICIAL USE)



ORIGIN/ACTION

ARA-4

RM/R	REP	AP
1		
ARA	EUR	FE
NEA	CU	INR 5
E	P	IO
L	FBO	AID 12
AGR	COM	FRB
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ARMY 5	CIA 15	NAVY 5
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	NSC 2	

DEPT. PASS
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BELO HORIZONTE

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no action
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R Bueno

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

AIRGRAM

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732.00/12-1362

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A-59
NO.

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HANDLING INDICATOR

TO : DEPARTMENT OF STATE

1962 DEC 17 PM 1 47
DEPARTMENT OF STATE
DEC 18 1962

INFO: RIO DE JANEIRO, BRASILIA, SÃO PAULO
Belem-1
Porto Alegre-1

FROM : Amconsul RECIFE
Curitiba-1

DATE: ~~December 13, 1962~~

SUBJECT : Weekly Summary No. 24

REF Belo Horizonte-1

Gpm
Wellman
CLS
RBB
2. Crane
See econ items
RBB

TABLE OF CONTENTS

POLITICAL

1. Celso Furtado Comments Favorably on Alliance for Progress
2. Strikes
3. Armando Monteiro Filho Rumored as Furtado's Replacement

ECONOMIC

1. Shortages
2. New Operators of Electric Power System Criticized

ALLIANCE FOR PROGRESS

PSYCHOLOGICAL

POLITICAL

1. Celso Furtado Comments Favorably on Alliance for Progress

With Governor-elect MIGUEL ARRAES out of town and the pyrotechnic BRIZZOLA having returned to his own stamping grounds, the week passed quietly in Recife. Perhaps the most significant, and encouraging, development was seen in several indications of a more friendly posture on the part of SUDENE. Speaking at the signing of the Rio Grande do Norte education agreement on December 3, SUDENE Director CELSO

Drafted by: See last page/ag

Contents and Classification Approved by:

Clearances:

0597

will be automatically restored by favorable plebiscite vote with congressional approval unnecessary. ULTIMA HORA charges that as price for deal PSD insists on a) Senate control foreign relations, b) Chamber approval Cabinet appointments, and C) Chamber control currency emissions. These unacceptable, paper asserts, to "nationalists".

5. GOB action to exempt sulphur from import deposit requirement (Embassy telegram 1129), issue we have been trying to get resolved for many months, was one of several gestures made recently in our direction, others including tax legislation, postponement effective date minimum wage raise until January, and some concessions by SUDENE.

BOND

LM:HC

0596

3. Emergency rice distribution operation in Guanabara commenced December 12 (paragraph 14 Embassy telegram 1123) with rice here being distributed by Osvino's First Army, Albino Silva (according ULTIMA HORA) having said "Lacerda does not merit confidence" and leftist press carrying slogan "Rice for people yes, Lacerda no". In other states, such as Sao Paulo, where distribution promised, Albino Silva said rice would be turned over to Governors. This, of course, one more step in government efforts undermine Lacerda authority and carry out progressive federal intervention Guanabara. Lacerda on TV December 11 and 12 publicly charged that Petrobras refusing deliver asphalt for Rio streets, and that threatened Central of Brasil RR strike, ostensibly over 13th month issue, was intended pave way for disorders and direct First Army intervention.

As in situation in navy, danger is that government (or more aggressive elements therein) will be successful through policy of selective provocation in defeating opposition piecemeal (Navy and Lacerda government having been among areas of most extreme anti-Goulart feeling).

Kruel, however, may help in keeping situation in Guanabara from getting too far out of hand. Lacerda December 13 apparently sent Emissary to Kruel saying that provocatory attempts were being made bring State and Army into clash. Kruel reportedly sent word back that Lacerda "should comply with law and defend public order and to these ends could count on support of Army".

Also during morning of December 13 spokesman for railway workers stated workers would get 13 month wages prior to Christmas, would not strike but would "support Goulart in efforts overcome country's present difficulties".

4. Nature of post-plebiscite government still appears object much pulling and hauling. What appeared few days ago to have been relatively firm Goulart-PSD understanding regarding rapid setting up of congressionally-approved presidentialist (de facto or de jure) regime has apparently come under attack from PTB left which is now calling for execution of Mangabeira thesis: i.e., full presidentialism will be

0595

INCOMING TELEGRAM *Department of State* ACTION COPY PERMANENT RECORD COPY

CONFIDENTIAL

43
Action
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Control: 7332
Rec'd: December 13, 1962
9:29 p.m.

FROM: Rio de Janeiro

TO: Secretary of State

NO: 1134, December 13, 6 p.m.

INFO: RM/R FILES

PRIORITY

FOR ASSISTANT SECRETARY MARTIN

Following is continuation situation reporting intended take up where Embassy telegram 1123 left off. Other than Rio Grande du Sul request for removal all Peace Corps volunteers from state (reported Embassy telegram TOPEC 55) most significant developments as follows:

1. Protest movement (paragraph 12 Embassy telegram 1123) among naval officers at award of Navy Medal of Merit to Brizzola, Aragao, Raul Ryff etc., has grown. By now 19 retired admirals (including ex-Minister Sylvio Heck and former CNO Ary dos Santos Rongel), two vice admirals and five Rear Admirals (members latter groups are active but unassigned) and eight captains (all active) have returned their previously awarded medals to Navy Minister Suzano. Latter has publicly stated he will take disciplinary and legal action against all Naval officers returning decoration. (Further details available in Naval Attache messages 11 December 1800Z and 13 December 1515Z). Award ceremony taking place December 13.

2. Very large group generals called on Kruel yesterday to express support for him as Minister of War. Purpose clearly was to attempt influence Goulart keep Kruel on in post-plebiscite government and based on thought he was anti-Communist and best available under circumstances. A few known anti-Communist generals were not among group presumably on basis Kruel too close to Jango, while Osvino attended presumably to avoid isolation.

3. Emergency rice

CONFIDENTIAL

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ACTION ASSIGNED TO.	ACTION TAKEN	
NAME OF OFFICER & OFFICE SYMBOL	DATE OF ACTION	DIRECTIONS TO RM/R

732.00/12-1362

0594

ORIGIN ACTION

ACA-4

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DEPARTMENT OF STATE

AIRGRAM

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CA-6405 NO.

CONFIDENTIAL HANDLING INDICATOR

TO : Amconsgen, SAO PAULO

INFO : Amembassy, RIO DE JANEIRO

FROM : The Department of State

DATE: Dec 12 3 02 PM '62

SUBJECT : Pro-Communist Activities of Father Alipio de Freitos

REF : Sao Paulo's A-168.

Consulate General requested consult with Embassy re desirability discussion with church authorities of possibility deterring Father Alipio de Freitos, apparent Roman Catholic priest, from pro-Communist activities such as those reported A-168 item 5.

BALL, ACTING

CONFIDENTIAL

FORM DS-323 1-62

FOR DEPT. USE ONLY ☐ In ☒ Out

Drafted by: ARA:EST/B:HSheldarts 12/11/62

Contents and Classification Approved by: EST:WWellman

Clearances:

EST/B - Mr. Burton RB

Executive Order 10501

FAIR.001/12-1262

XR-732.00

0593

EXPEDIENTE

DEPARTAMENTO DE IMPRENSA NACIONAL

DIRETOR-GERAL
ALBERTO DE BRITO FERREIRA

CHEFE DO SERVIÇO DE PUBLICAÇÕES
MURILO FERREIRA ALVES

CHEFE DA SEÇÃO DE REDAÇÃO
FLORIANO GUIMARÃES

DIÁRIO OFICIAL

SEÇÃO I — PARTE I

Órgão destinado à publicação dos atos de nomeação descentralizados
lavrados nas oficinas do Departamento de Imprensa Nacional

BRASÍLIA

ASSINATURAS

Repartições e Particulares		Funcionários	
Capital e Interior:		*Capital e Interior:*	
Semestre . . .	Cr$ 600,00	*Semestre* . . .	Cr$ 450,00
Ano	Cr$ 1.200,00	*Ano*	Cr$ 900,00
Exterior:		*Exterior:*	
Ano	Cr$ 1.300,00	*Ano*	Cr$ 1.000,00

— As Repartições Públicas deverão remeter o expediente destinado à publicação nos jornais, diàriamente, até às 15 horas, exceto aos sábados, quando deverão fazê-lo até às 11,30 horas.

— As reclamações pertinentes à matéria retribuída, nos casos de erros ou omissões, deverão ser formuladas por escrito, à Seção de Redação, das 9 às 17,30 horas, no máximo até 72 horas após a saída dos órgãos oficiais.

— Os originais deverão ser datilografados e autenticados, rasurados, por quem de direito, ressalvadas as emendas.

— Excetuadas as para o exterior, que serão sempre anuais, as assinaturas poderão tomar, em qualquer época, por seis meses ou um ano.

— As assinaturas vencidas poderão ser suspensas sem aviso prévio.

Para facilitar aos assinantes a verificação do prazo de validade de suas assinaturas, na parte superior do endereço são impressos o número do talão de registro, o mês e o ano em que findará.

A fim de evitar solução de continuidade no recebimento dos jornais, devem os assinantes providenciar a respectiva renovação com antecedência mínima, de trinta (30) dias.

— As Repartições Públicas cingir-se-ão às assinaturas anuais renovadas até 28 de fevereiro de cada ano e às iniciadas, em qualquer época, pelos órgãos competentes.

— A fim de possibilitar a remessa de valores acompanhados de esclarecimentos quanto à sua aplicação, solicitamos usem os interessados preferencialmente cheque ou vale postal, emitidos a favor do Tesoureiro do Departamento de Imprensa Nacional.

— Os suplementos às edições dos órgãos oficiais só as fornecerão aos assinantes que os solicitarem no ato da assinatura.

— O funcionário público federal, para fazer jus ao desconto indicado, deverá provar esta condição no ato da assinatura.

— O custo de cada exemplar atrasado dos órgãos oficiais será, na venda avulsa, acrescido de Cr$ 0,50, se do mesmo ano, e de Cr$ 1,00, por ano decorrido.

Emilio Ribeiro Blanes, natural da Espanha, nascido a 11 de maio de 1922, filho de Ramon Ribeiro Llibares e de Josefa Blanes Garcia, residente no Estado de São Paulo

Mirnlet Komuel, natural do Japão, Kravenak, residente no Estado de São nascido a 7 de março de 1928, filho de Kessiko Komuri e de Sumio Komuri, residente no Estado de Sho

Marie Rose Vitali, natural do Egito, nascida a 21 de abril de 1936, filha de Alberto Bantaleim e de Perlaine

A-683, 12/12/62
Enclosure No. 1
Rio de Janeiro

Art 17

ESTADOS UNIDOS DO BRASIL

DIÁRIO OFICIAL

SEÇÃO I — PARTE I

DECRETO N.º 46.237 — DE 18 DE JUNHO DE 1959

ANO CI — N.º 175 CAPITAL FEDERAL SEGUNDA-FEIRA, 17 DE SETEMBRO DE 1962

ATOS DO PODER LEGISLATIVO

LEI COMPLEMENTAR Nº 2 — DE 18 DE SETEMBRO DE 1962, AO ATO ADICIONAL

Dispõe sôbre a vacância ministerial, e dá outras providências

O Presidente da República:

Faço saber que o Congresso Nacional decretou e eu sanciono a seguinte Lei:

Art. 1º Vagando, por qualquer motivo, o cargo de Presidente do Conselho e, conseqüentemente, os dos demais Ministros, o Presidente da República, sem prejuízo da observância do Art. 6º do Ato Adicional, nomeará um Conselho Provisório, que se entenderá com a formação do novo Conselho de Ministros.

Parágrafo único. As Pastas não preenchidas na constituição do Conselho Provisório, ficarão sob a gestão dos respectivos Subsecretários de Estado, na forma do § 3º do art. 17 do Ato Adicional.

Art. 2º A Emenda Constitucional nº 4, de 2 de setembro de 1961, será submetida a "referendum" popular no dia 6 de janeiro de 1963.

§ 1º Procedido pelo Superior Tribunal Eleitoral o recolhido, o Congresso reunir-se-á, dentro do prazo de 30 (trinta) dias, o eleitorado terá prazo de 90 dias da ação decorrente da consulta.

§ 2º Terminado êste prazo, se não estiver promulgada a emenda revisora do parlamentarismo ou instituidora do presidencialismo, continuará em vigor a Emenda Constitucional nº 4, de 2 de setembro de 1961, ou voltará a vigorar, em sua plenitude, a Constituição Federal de 1946, conforme o resultado da consulta popular.

§ 3º Terão direito a votar na consulta os eleitores inscritos até 7 de outubro de 1962, aplicando-se à sua apuração e à proclamação do resultado a lei eleitoral vigente.

Art. 3º Esta Lei entrará em vigor na data de sua publicação, revogadas as disposições em contrário.

Brasília, 18 de setembro de 1962, 141º da Independência e 74º da República.

João Goulart

UNCLASSIFIED

A-683, 12/12/62
Enclosure No. 2
Page 1 of 1
Rio de Janeiro

COMPLEMENTARY LAW NO. 2 - of September 16, 1962, to the ADDITIONAL ACT.

Covering ministerial vacancies, and other measures

The President of the Republic:

I hereby make it known that the National Congress decrees and I sanction the following Law:

Article 1 - There becoming vacant, for any reason, the post of President of the Council and, consequently, those of the other Ministers, the President of the Republic, without failing to comply with Article 8 of the Additional Act, will nominate a Provisional Council, which will become extinct with the formation of the new Council of Ministers.

Sole Paragraph. The positions not filled upon constitution of the Provisional Council, will remain under the direction of the respective Under Secretaries of State, in accordance with Paragraph 2 of Article 17 of the Additional Act.

Article 2 - Constitutional Amendment No. 4 of September 2, 1961, will be submitted to popular "referendum" on January 6, 1963.

Paragraph 1 - Once the result is proclaimed by the Superior Electoral Court, the Congress will organize, within a period of 90 (ninety) days, the system of government based upon the option resulting from the consultation.

Paragraph 2 - At the end of this period, should the amendment revising parliamentarism or instituting presidentialism not be promulgated, there will continue in force Constitutional Amendment No. 4 of September 2, 1961, or there will again come fully into force the Federal Constitution of 1946, according to the result of the referendum.

Paragraph 3 - Voters registered up to October 7, 1962, will have the right to vote in the consultation, the current electoral law being applicable for the counting of votes and proclamation of the results.

Article 3 - This law becomes effective on the date of its publication, provisions to the contrary being hereby revoked.

Brasilia, September 16, 1962, 141st year of Independence and 74th year of the Republic.

JOAO GOULART



power to name a provisional Cabinet "without failing to comply with Article 8 of the Ato Adicional". (Article 8 of the Ato Adicional states: "The President of the Republic will, in the event of a vacancy, within the period of three days, submit the name of the President of the Council of Ministers to the Chamber of Deputies". Thus, Goulart was obliged to submit Hermes Lima's name to the Chamber within three days after the reconvening of the present Chamber.)

(2) As will be evident from the above, the initiative (that is, the obligation to take it) lies with the President. The existence of a quorum is irrelevant.

(3) The duration of the provisional Cabinet was not connected with either the plebiscite or the expiration of the present Congress. It was conceivably connected with the accession of the new Congress for, assuming that the present Congress had not met and thus forced the submission of the Cabinet for approval, the assembling of the new Congress would have had the same effect. Present indications, however, are that Goulart intends for the present Cabinet (essentially the provisional one, with the exception of Labor Minister Joao Pinheiro Neto) which has now been approved, to resign on January 10. Then, reports say, he will form a new provisional Cabinet, obtaining informal guarantees from party leaders of its approval upon the new Congress' convening. PSD leader Amaral Peixoto has reportedly agreed to this scheme, and it would appear that Goulart is also seeking concurrence of at least certain UDN elements, notably Minas Gerais Governor Magalhaes Pinto.

For the Charge d'Affaires, a.i.:

John Keppel
Counselor for Political Affaires

Enclosures:
Capanema Law text
Translation of text

0589

ORIGIN/ACTION
ARA #4

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OSD 12	USIA	NSA 3

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DEPARTMENT OF STATE

AIRGRAM

732.00/12-1262

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A-683 NO.

CONFIDENTIAL

HANDLING INDICATOR

TO : SecState WASHINGTON DEC 14 AM 8 06

ANALYSIS & DISTRIBUTION BRANCH

FROM : AmEmbassy RIO DE JANEIRO DATE: December 12, 1962

SUBJECT : Status of Provisional Cabinet Under Capanema Law

REF : A-175, December 3, 1962

ARA/EST/BC & Action 10 12-18-62

Transmitted herewith is the Portuguese text of the Capanema Law as given in the Diario Oficial of September 17, 1962. Also enclosed is an unofficial translation.

The Capanema Law is more in the nature of a gentlemen's agreement than anything else. It was a temporary device, sufficiently satisfactory to pro-regime and opposition forces alike, to overcome a crisis that threatened to prevent the October 7 elections. It is another symbol of the Brazilian genius for compromise. Its constitutionality has remained unchallenged simply because no political groups have considered it in their best interests to challenge it. At the time of the promulgation of the Capanema Law the press described it, with typical Brazilian humor, as "more or less constitutional". Brazilian legal experts and the general public seem to have applied to the Capanema Law one of the favorite maxims of Getulio Vargas which, roughly translated, is as follows: "Let the matter stand as it is until we have time to get a good look at it".

The Department will have received the Embassy's reports of Prime Minister Hermes Lima's success in obtaining congressional approval of himself and his Cabinet. The questions posed by the Department seem now to be academic. We are, however, submitting the Embassy's answers, as of the time of the asking, as follows:

(1) The Cabinet cannot continue indefinitely with provisional status under the Capanema Law. The key phrase is in Article 1 of the law which establishes the President's

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FORM DS-323

Drafted by: POL:FMTicelotta/CCCarson/rstp

Contents and Classification Approved by: DCM - Minister Bond

Clearances: POL:JKeppel

CROSS REFERENCE FILE

BRAZILIAN POLITICAL AFFAIRS AS THEY RELATE TO CUBAN MISSILE CRISIS.

732.00/12-1262

XR 737.00

SEE

TEL. 1127 FROM RIO DE JANEIRO, DEC. 12, 1962.

0587

W I T H D R A W A L N O T I C E

RG: 059 TAB #: 8

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ACCESS RESTRICTED

The item identified below has been withdrawn from this file:

Folder Title: 732.00/12-1262

Document Date: 12/12/62

Document Ser.#:

TEL 1127 FR RIO DE JANEIRO TO SECSTATE

In the review of this file this item was removed because access to it is restricted. Restrictions on records in the National Archives are stated in general and specific record group restriction statements which are available for examination. The item identified above has been withdrawn because it contains:

X Security-Classified Information

NND: 949515 WITHDRAWN: 02/24/95 by: JAS

FOIA RETRIEVAL #: 949515 01580 00008

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RioA-675

but were unable to prevent a violation of Constitutional order. Now, then, by putting the matter to a vote, I will fight so we can return to full Constitutional order, which we defended at that time.'

"He added that the certainty that the plebiscite will be held on Jan. 6, 63 proves he was right when he favored a plebiscite on October 7, 1962, as a normal, sinsible solution. We would then have been out of the period of perplexity we are going through now.

"As to the President's attitude on the plebiscite question, Mr. Brizola stated:

"'I noticed that the President, in his conciliatory role, is naturally convinced that the plebiscite will be held on January 6, but he will not rule out examining the problem from another angle.'

"And he added, a personal opinion: 'I believe the present Congress could meet and say, 'Well, let's revoke, let's set things right....' I believe the Brazilian people would even admire such an attitude, such a contribution from Congress. I believe also that the present Congress could open up liberal prospects for the incoming one, and this would be constructive.'"

0585

Rio 675

I have lived through these problems, and I found out something was missing in my state. Our people were working all right, better and harder than before. And I found something was missing, something was escaping from there. That's when I began to check, to survey, to measure, to follow our wealth and find out where it was going. As I checked, I began to understand everything. I understood the problem of the Northeast, which previously I had attributed to droughts. I soon realized that droughts are the least important factor up there. The whole Northeast is the victim of cruel, inhuman economic exploitation. Thus I came to understand Latin America too.'

VARGAS

"The Governor went on: 'When I took office, I placed President Vargas' (suicide) letter on my desk, under the glass top. After I'd reached these conclusions, one day, having read the letter hundreds of times, I looked at it and read it again and to my surprise I then understood it, because, in keeping with previous pronouncements of his, he'd approached the matter with great authority. President Vargas' letter was very important to me, to consolidate my beliefs. For he was a serene, well-balanced man, a conciliatory man who sought compromise, and he left behind this document in which he mentions no other problems, advocates no ideological position, recommends no specific doctrine for the Brazilian people. He stuck entirely to exploitation, because, at the end of a long career, he came to the conclusion that that was the most serious of all problems.'

"He went on: 'It was as if he had said, 'There's no solution for this firm, because it's working at a loss. This deep-rooted evil must first of all be eliminated before a solution can be found for all problems.'"

"Governor Brizola added:

"I believe such a thing is possible. I believe this country has a great potential that must be put to work. It must essentially make use of its inner reserves and energies. Will our trade decrease? Well, let it! If the firm is operating at a loss, it's better to cut down on business, or rather, cutting down on business becomes compulsory, to overcome the trouble. International matters may be very unfavorable, but what I consider fundamental is an appeal to our resources and the defense of our reserves. We are capable of building a great Nation and most of us aren't aware of that."

"Resuming his informal chat, Governor Leonel Brizola asked newsmen for their impressions on the plebiscite. 'Do you think the Brazilian people will choose presidentialism, or will it take a position of indifference?' His question aroused various comments.

"On the same subject—the plebiscite—Governor Brizola remarked that in his opinion the campaign he is about to launch would be a veritable follow-up on the August, 1961, movement in defense of Constitutional order. He declared: 'We prevented the implantation of dictatorship in our country,

0584

Rio A-675

"ANSWER: 'What I can say to you is that I intend to give the best of my strength, if possible to make it the reason for my political life, to fight for our liberation. Now whether the crisis we're going through can lead us in that direction more or less quickly, only time can tell.'

"Asked if such an effort might lead him to disagree with the present Administration, the Governor repeated that only time could tell.

"In answer to another question, he said he plans to visit several states on his campaign for the plebiscite. He added that he will try to defend the thesis that we must return to Presidentialism as an instrument, as a peaceful solution capable of leading us to immediate change.

"In another interval when he chatted informally with the newsmen, the Governor called their attention to the fact that he had not talked of 'bloody revolutions.' He commented further on what he called a 'liberating mission,' stressing that those who are aware of our national situation should convey that same awareness not only to the masses but to people in government as well. And he added: 'Some prominent men in Brazilian life are authentic patriots, but they have not yet awakened. They are still imbued with theories inflicted on us since the war. That doesn't mean, either, that we are in a position of absolute knowledge concerning our destiny. No. We still have much to learn. But there's no doubt whatever that a liberating mission awaits us.'

"He added further: 'I have not talked about bloody revolutions or civil war, I have not talked about violent subversion—for our country possesses a historic tradition of great decisions, of serious decisions, that were arrived at by persuasion. I will do all I can to find peaceful solutions. But the ideaof a revolution is not altogether ruled out. For I believe that safeguarding our sovereignty is much more important than the evils that could come from revolution.'

"Another question: 'Does the President share your ideas?'

"Answer: 'I am convinced that President João Goulart is aware of all this, although our approaches might differ as our temperaments differ. Besides, our responsibilities also differ as our jobs differ.'

"He was asked then which political forces he could rely on for his liberating mission, and he replied: 'I am sure that we'll be able to count on more and more Brazilians every day. And I mean people from all origins, all walks of life, all cultural levels, including our brethren in the Armed Forces. Believe me, this awareness is gaining intensely! So much so that sometime ago many of us did not even think of it. I, for one, did not. And I came to these conclusions not so much through research and theoretical data as through actual contact with the problems, in my state's governorship. Incidentally, a governorship that has been the victim of frequent injustice, though it does not deserve any special praise.

0583

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his way is better, and a third prefers his way. Meanwhile our furniture, our chairs, are being carried out through the broken-down door. We must remain united, defend our door, and later settle the arrangement of furniture. That, to me, is the question. And note this! There is in all that no doctrinaire restriction on the American way of life. No! I think that way of life is fine for them. May God make them very happy. The question now has to do with us, not with Russia, or any other country. It is a question for householders, a position any home-owner would take to defend his home. I think all of this is serious for us because we have social injustice, impediments to our development, the aggravation of impoverishment for our people, while other peoples develop. I think all of this is very grave, particularly when we consider the veritable mess we're in, because, at this rate, Latin America will end up being annexed by the United States. And we'll have to learn to speak English here.'

"He went on:

"'This may sound a little sectarian to you. And I am sorry we have come to this. I would rather there were no reasons for this because, personally, I don't really have any a priori mental reservations about the United States, not at all. And for that very reason I think there's a liberating mission that is up to us Brazilians, us, Latin Americans. Nor do I wish to advocate for us a way such as the Cubans took. Not at all. Each must find his own suitable solution in accordance with his own conditions.'

"Governor Brizola added:

'In that connection, a man from my state said something interesting the other day. He said, 'Look, Governor, I've been following this whole thing over the radio, and I've come to this conclusions all of us Latin Americans are like on the edge of a swamp, see, and there's flames pushing upon on us from behind. So there's nothing to do but get on the other side of that swamp. That's all we can do! Now, we're all living through some pretty baffling things here, and we don't know what to do. And the man threw himself into the swamp, whiskers and all. He just took himself off. He sank a little here, got stuck further on, got bitten by snakes, but he kept on going. That's why we Latin Americans have all placed ourselves in a position where we've got to leave that man with the whiskers.' Well, let's leave him!' the Governor went on, and added: 'Let's see how he's doing. He found himself a way out, and we sort of watch his progress and try to learn from him. If tomorrow we must cross the swamp, we'll know we can't, because that's where he sank. Or that's where the snakes are. We'll know where dry land is, but we'll just have to cross the swamp, we'll have to.'

"Another question: 'Does that mean you hope for a revolution during the present Administration?'

0582

Rio A-675

"Another question: 'Mr. Governor, how much longer will it be possible to keep up this promiscuousness which you said exists between Brazil and the United States?'

"The Governor answered that, if it depended on him, starting today a re-examination would be carried out of the maze of agreements, commitments, and particularly businesses and operations. He added that on that score he hopes to be able to offer the Nation's government, as well as its people, a contribution as intensive, as ample, as possible, and study the details of this whole complex of relationships. He informed newsmen that he is now preparing a memorandum to the Government about the so-called 'Peace Corps', or 'Volunteers for Peace,' in which he will attempt to demonstrate that this is not only undesirable but risky and dangerous for our country. He will try to show that it is a quasi-military contingent whose purpose is to become intimately acquainted with our country.

"Another question: 'Do you consider yourself ineligible for the presidency in 1965?

"The Governor said that he sincerely does not think of such a thing. Also on his plans for a political future, the Governor said: 'I know that for you gentlemen it is not easy to know my state of mind because, generally, politicians are moved by their own interests, their ambitions, and I am going through a phase in my life when I remain quite aloof from such interests and ambitions which generally are part of the classic political career. I consider myself fulfilled from the viewpoint of the classic career. I have come to the conclusion that, from such a viewpoint, I have enjoyed an exceptional situation, actually a reason for personal pride, in having achieved the governorship of my state, having started from where I started, and that, from now on, I intend to devote myself entirely to the service of my country without concerning myself with this or that position, with this or that prospect from the personal standpoint. I believe I have acquired a certain amount of political experience (?) and I wish to apply it well toward change, toward liberation for our country. And please remember that in all this there is no concern with an ideological position. It is rather a patriotic question than affiliation to a doctrine or ideology, for in my understanding, what is essential for us is to achieve as comprehensive as possible a union of all true Brazilians, of all Brazilians who love this country, so we can stand in defense of our door that has been broken down and through which our furniture is being taken away. We must even conquer ideological differences that separate us, for if we have nothing to face here but our own convictions, within a few days we won't have any furniture in our house, in accordance with our patterns.' (Sic!)

"The Governor went on:

'Each one of us here may have his preference as to the arrangement of the furniture in this room. But I think the process of exploitation of our country is as serious as it is in all Latin American countries, and that it is not the most suitable way for us--patriotic Brazilians--to stand here and argue about our differences of opinion, simply because one says, 'I like the furniture better this way,' while another claims

0581

Rio A-675

of his behavior as serious as the one referred to. Among them, there was a statement by the Consul in a public speech at Porto Alegre--and for that reason many persons left the premises--that the United States wanted nothing but 'unconditional' friends."

"Brazil-U.S. Relations

"In that connection, the Governor said he did not actually attach much importance to the fact. 'Other aspects of our relations with the United States are much more important,' he pointed out. 'In fact, they are no longer relations, but a kind of promiscuity. And promiscuousness is no good in friendship among people, let alone among nations, especially because, in my opinion, this growing promiscuity that has been characteristic of our relations and of exchange between our country and the United States is the most influential and relevant factor in our post-war crisis.'

"The Governor stated that we have formed with the United States a kind of society, approximately similar to that of La Fontaine's fable about the lion, the goat, the sheep, and the calf. He added that the U.S. always keeps the lion's share. Then he said: 'And, mind you, this has nothing to do with ideological positions or with the Cold War, but exclusively and solely with our own interests.'

"Economic Power

"In a brief pause during his press conference, Governor Brizola chatted with the newsmen and said they have a rendesvous with this country. 'Also the newspapers,' he added, 'whatever we have been able to recover of the Brazilian press's authenticity, the day we can free our press from economic domination." (sic)

"The Governor reminded those present that a few days ago he had heard from a high-ranking Army Officer the expression of his confidence that we could achieve change the way we achieved the abolition of slavery. Although our Congress favored slavery, it was a Congress made up of large landowners. The officer allegedly said to the Governor that in his belief we could achieve change nowadays despite the fact that Congress is mostly conservative. In this connection, the Governor stated that he did not share the officer's optimism, for at the time when slaves were freed, Brazil's press was genuinely abolitionist and reflected the Brazilians' aspirations. Governor Brizola added: 'It is true that our press has exceptions, very encouraging ones, but we are concerned even with the permanency of such exceptions, for as things get worse, they surely will not put up a resistance. But some day we will find a way to free our press from economic domination. If such domination were mainly Brazilian, there would be important extenuating circumstances, but since economic power in Brazil is heavily influenced by international economic power, it happens that--without offense to our newspapers--they are conditioned to the influence of, and in many cases dependent upon, economic power."

0580

RIO A-675

"Asked if he believed the Congress would have a sufficient quorum to revoke the 'Ato Adicional', he answered this is unlikely, to judge by tradition. Experience, he said, has taught us that it is unlikely there will be a sufficient quorum for such deliberations. Elaborating on his reply, Governor Brizola reiterated his belief that there will be a plebiscite January 6. He added: 'Of course, high political and parliamentary spheres are always concerned with such negotiations, something which, as a matter of fact, has been a great evil in our country.'

"Asked if he planned to meet with Ambassador Lincoln Gordon in the near future, he answered 'No'."

"SHARP III

"Another matter brought up had to do with the case of U.S. Consul Sharp III in Rio Grande do Sul. The Governor disclosed that he had spoken yesterday with Prime Minister Hermes Lima on this subject and told him again that, in this case, he was merely doing his duty as a citizen and a governor. He added that 'in his turn, Professor Hermes Lima told me he is examining and considering the problem.'

"Still on that subject, Governor Brizola said he had taken cognizance of Ambassador Lincoln Gordon's note on it and that this note had not surprised him. He further said that from now on we must brace ourselves for growing arrogance on the part of North American authorities and of the managers of U.S. corporations. He remarked that, for himself, he sincerely regretted the incident. First because such a diplomatic authority as a Consul should not have uttered unflattering opinions on our people and our country. Second, because the diplomatic authorities of such an important country make use of primitive methods and processes in dealing with a 'de facto' situation. The Governor stressed that he referred to the U.S. Embassy's plain denial, in viewof facts which did happen beyond the shadow of a doubt. Governor Brizola explained that if the diplomatic authorities had for example affirmed that there had been a misinterpretation, among other reasons because of the Consul's faulty Portuguese pronunciation, the explanation might have been acceptable, but a mere denial, a formal denial, justifies a more serious moral judgment not only of the Consul in Porto Alegre but of the Embassy itself, which has endorsed the behavior of its representative in Rio Grande do Sul.

"The Governor then said the country's government has an option: either it believes in a Governor who based his statements on the indisputable word of a member of our Armed Forces or it believes in those diplomatic authorities' plain denial. The Governor added: 'Actually, all we did was mention an attitude taken by the abovementioned Consul. But there are other aspects

0579

Rio A-675

matters of interest to his state and that they had gone over the Nation's problems, particularly concrete and objective measures that could make it possible for the Nation to pull out of the crisis into which it plunged in August, 1961. The Governor said he had given the President his opinion frankly and loyally and had come away with the impression that the President's greatest concern is overcoming difficulties and problems arising out of the crisis as well as the present regime's deficiencies, so he can concentrate with all his energy on the Nation's administrative operations.

"'Ato Adicional' and Plebiscite

"Referring to the plebiscite, Governor Brizola stated he considers it a victory for the people and thinks, therefore, that a plebiscite would constitute the truest solution to the political crisis. He conceded that the Congress may revoke the 'Ato Adicional' if it admits that it was a mistake to promulgate it in the first place. He added that it would be advisable for the present Congress to make liberal-minded decisions aiming at making easier the tasks of the recently elected Congress. He also said it would not be desirable, in his opinion, for the present Congress to work out a new regime, for it lacks the authority to do so. He added that if this happens, the Nation will probably be thrown into another crisis.

"The Governor then said he is convinced that 'we will have a plebiscite come January 6,' a date he considers a deadline for the present regime. He added that, if it should depend on him, he will do his best to achieve Presidentialism again, for in his opinion that would represent restoration of Constitutional order itself, which, in his understanding, was violated during the August, 1961 crisis. And he added: 'I am for a return to Presidentialism so that our Nation may recover its own principle of authority for its Government and achieve with it a climate suitable for the serious and important decisions it must take. I refer to social and economic changes as the normal and peaceful, perhaps the only, way that can lead Brazil out of its present crisis. Such changes' the Governor said,'cannot be halfway or false measures, and must be immediate. For if they are not, they run the risk of becoming obsolete.'

"The Governor compared the situation to that of a sick person who can be saved by means of strong medication. If treatment is delayed, however, it may be that surgery alone can save the patient.

"The Governor further stated that nothing special was brought up during his conversations with the President, besides an analysis of the above-mentioned matters.

Another question put to the Governor had to do with the time estimated as necessary for negotiations on measures related to revocation of the 'Ato Adicional'. The Governor answered that he had already made known his viewpoint and that, as far as the negotiations and understandings were concerned, it was not up to him to give an opinion or to supply information.

0578

Rio A-675

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Following is text of a release issued by Governor Brizola following press conference in Brazilia November 14, 1962:

"Governor Leonel Brizola spent two hours today in the Planalto Palace's Press Room answering questions from, and chatting informally with, accredited newsmen. With him were Representative Helio Fontoura from Rio Grande do Sul, his private secretary, in addition to Representative Victor Issler and Mr. Hugo Ramos, besides other close advisors. In his interview Governor Brizola said he was convinced there will be a plebiscite on January 6, but he conceded that the Congress may still declare null and void the 'Ato Adicional' (by which Brazil became a Parliamentary Republic in August, 1961), if it admitted that it had been a mistake to have brought it into being. He referred to structural changes as a peaceful and normal route to take, perhaps the only one that can lead Brazil out of its present crisis. He repeatedly mentioned the consequences of exploitation which takes capitals away from Brazil and Latin America, bringing about social unrest and preventing the development of these nations.

"Meeting with President Goulart

"The first question answered by Governor Leonel Brizola had to do with matters dealt with in his meeting with President Goulart yesterday. The Governor said he had talked at length with the President about various

matters/

UNCLASSIFIED

0577

ORIGIN/ACTION		
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INT	LAB	TAR
TR	XMB	AIR 4
ARMY 5	CIA 10	NAVY 5
OSD 12	USIA 8	NSA 3

File
RM/R
1/21/63
B J Burton
No action

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

AIRGRAM

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732.00/12-1162

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A- 675 NO. | UNCLASSIFIED | AIR POUCH HANDLING INDICATOR

TO : DEPARTMENT OF STATE

DEC 13 AM 9 04

1962

DISTRIBUTION

FROM : AmEmbassy, RIO DE JANEIRO DATE: December 11, 1962

SUBJECT : Press Conference By Governor Brizola

REF :

Enclosed is an English translation of the text of a release summarizing a press conference held November 14 by Governor Brizola of Rio Grande do Sul.

This text should be of particular interest to those in the Department, USIA, AID, and other agencies who are following Governor Brizola's expanding campaign of agitation against the United States.

For the Chargé d'Affaires, a.i:

Frank H. Oram

Frank H. Oram
Counselor of Embassy for
Public Affairs

Enclosure:

As stated

FORM 4-62 DS-323

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Drafted by: USIS:GWCooper/FHOram:rr

Contents and Classification Approved by: HNWare

Clearances:

0576

It is apparently these remarks that led some Brazilian papers to proclaim that Goulart intended to assume power shortly after the plebiscite. Goulart's real meaning seems to have been that he would take the results of the plebiscite, if favorable to his position, as a mandate to initiate some sort of legal political action. Nonetheless, Goulart has been sufficiently sybilline that he can, if it later appears possible and feasible, graceefully yield to "popular demands" that he assume greater powers.

The action he would initiate would presumably be the formation of a presidential cabinet, probably to be submitted to Congress for its approval before the final revocation of the Ato adicional, where he would hope to be able to muster sufficient PTB and PSD strength. This approach would have the added charm, from Goulart's point of view, of diffusing responsibility, since Congress would be in the position later of having approved his cabinet. At the same time, such an approach would not appreciably diminish his personal position, at least in the long run, since the necessary PSD support or such a maneuver could later be dropped.

In his December 4 remarks, Goulart also referred to what he described as a "classified" IMF document in which Latin American countries were categorized as "respectable", "irregular", and "delinquent", on the basis of their degree of observance of IMF financial standards. Brazil, he said, was the only nation in the third category, and yet has had an average GNP growth rate of 7.2 per cent per annum over the past decade. By comparison, he said, the countries which have hewed to the IMF line have suffered stagnation, unemployment, and social crises.

Goulart maintained that Brazil's economic problems have been caused in reality not by any fault of Brazil or Brazilians, but by the decline in prices of Brazilian exports. To meet this problem, he proposes to institute, when he has full presidential powers, "a policy of exchange austerity". He mentioned minerals export agreements with a Belgian and two German groups for a total cumulative value of $3.2 billion over a 12-year period as a further step in the direction of solution of these problems.

He denied that Brazil had sought or would seek new loan money as a way out of its present financial difficulties, saying that all that would be sought by the San Tiago Dantas mission then being planned would be "new and reasonable maturities" for existing debts. He added that "In view of the fact that I have received from President Kennedy express manifestations of solidarity and sympathy to the program that Brazil will bring to the consideration of the government of the United States, I believe that we will obtain these

0575

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TR	XMB	AIR 3
ARMY 5	CIA 10	NAVY 5
OSD 12	USIA 8	NSA 3

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

AIRGRAM

732.11/12-1162
XR 732.00
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A-671 NO. | CONFIDENTIAL | AIR POUCH HANDLING INDICATOR

XR 832.00

TO : Department of State

FROM : Amembassy, Brasilia Office DATE: December 11, 1962

SUBJECT : Goulart Policy Statements

REF :

On December 4, 1962, President Goulart of Brazil held a press luncheon during which he set forth some of his views about present and future Brazilian problems. There is enclosed a translation of a verbatim press report of some of his remarks.

President Goulart, while reserving final judgment on the validity of Justice Minister João Mangabera's thesis that the coming January 6 plebiscite will automatically revoke the Ato Adicional (amendment of September, 1961, to the Brazilian constitution, substituting the parliamentary system for the presidential system), opined that the plebiscite would only "bestow on Congress a moral obligation to reformulate the Federal Constitution, and, on the basis of the referendum, the system of government." This change, he believed, "would not be automatic, and could not be, since constitutional reform will remain the responsibility of Congress."

In reply to another question later on, Goulart said that the cabinet about to be submitted to Congress would last only about one or two months. He elsewhere said that he had insisted to PSD national chairman Amaral Peixoto on "the necessity of not waiting until Congress meets." He had insisted, he went on, "on the necessity, not mine or his, but Brazil's, of not waiting much longer for reforms, whether political, resulting from the plebiscite, or constitutional, in the economic and social order, as demanded by the people.

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FORM DS-323 4-62

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Drafted by: CDKeyser/PMcLean/pm

Contents and Classification Approved by:

Clearances:

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W I T H D R A W A L N O T I C E

RG: 059 TAB #: 7

ENTRY: CDF60-63 1 / 3 / C /
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BOX: 1580

ACCESS RESTRICTED

The item identified below has been withdrawn from this file:

Folder Title: 732.00/12-1162

Document Date: 11/12/62

Document Ser.#:

AGRAM 39 FR CURITIBA TO STATE

In the review of this file this item was removed because access to it is restricted. Restrictions on records in the National Archives are stated in general and specific record group restriction statements which are available for examination. The item identified above has been withdrawn because it contains:

X Security-Classified Information

NND: 949515 WITHDRAWN: 02/24/95 by: JAS

FOIA RETRIEVAL #: 949515 01580 00007

0573

Police Training Agreement for RGS, and has taken preliminary steps to force the withdrawal of Peace Corps volunteers from this State in keeping with his earlier condemnations of the Peace Corps as a para-military organization bent on subversion of Brazilian institutions.

4. Political Notes

While Meneghetti has finally promised to name his secretariat on December 15, rumors continue to flourish. Thus far in addition to Faraco as Secretary of Economy the following names have appeared: João Magalhães (UDN) Agriculture; Coelho de Souza (PL) Interior and Justice; Gay da Fonseca (PDC) Education; and Truda Palazzo (unattached) Treasury.

According to the local press this week, the ADP coalition parties are considering the possibility of becoming a united party under that banner and spreading on a national basis as a formalized opposition to the PTB. This development, if it prospers, could well become the harbinger of a genuine two party system in Brazil.

5. Economic Notes

It was announced this week that 3.5 billion cruzeiros in Federal funds would be released to this Stated in order to pay overdue salaries to civil servants and for certain public works projects.

The Chinese Communist Commercial Mission which has been touring Brazil under the Banco do Brazil arrives on Thursday in Pôrto Alegre for a 3-day visit.

Frederick D. Sharp III
American Consul

cc.: Consular Affairs, Rio
Political Section, Rio
Political Section, Brasília
ARA/EST/Brazil, Washington
INR/RAR/P, Washington

Department- Pass to all posts in Brazil.

0572

so-called secret instruction on strikes issued recently in São Paulo in which he said that the strike is the imposition of the will of the minority over the majority and the dictatorship of one class over the rest has received wide coverage on the local press. It would appear that Pery has come a long way since his congratulatory letter to Brizola upon the seizure of the IT&T telephone company in Pôrto Alegre.

2. Rice Situation

In spite of attempts to obtain information and opinion on the current rice situation, both local and nationally, the Consulate has been unable to gather information of substance on which to report objectively. Moves and counter-moves by the supply and price control authorities and the trade, defy analysis at present as this political football is kicked from one side of the field to the other. The President's Military Household Chief, General Albino Silva, was here over the weekend in an attempt to instil some sort of order into the situation but his thinly veiled threats of coercion failed to bear fruit. It is understood that the Federation of Commercial Associations is to publish another "White Paper" this week in spite of Government hints of the impropriety of such a publication. The charges by Rio's O Globo, of a 1 billion cruzeiro embezzlement of IRGA by Brizola in order to pay for his political campaign in Guanabara brought about a swift denial by General Silva and IRGA's President Eduardo Kraft, and Brizola returned to Guanabara yesterday, after a week here, in order to press charges against O Globo for its so-called irresponsible allegations. The local COAP president told the press that the COFAP plan to take over rice and other foodstuff distribution using IRGA alone as the shipper from RGS could not work and the trade here concurs heartily. It would appear that the back-and-filling in the rice supply situation is but one more item of evidence in the widely recognized, and possibly studied, ineptitude of the Government in its continuing efforts to undermine present socio-economic institutions.

3. Governor Brizola's Activities

In a flurry of activity on the Brizola-style agrarian reform front prior to termination of his functions as Governor, Brizola within the next two weeks is reportedly to deliver almost 200 deeds to landless peasants for land which, as reported previously, has been seized by the State Government a second time.

The furore reported in the Rio press brought on by the announcement of the intention of awarding the Ordem do Mérito Naval to a group of recognized leftists, including Governor Brizola, has received wide coverage in the local press including a full report of the communication which accompanied the return of his medal to the Navy Ministry by Capitão-de-Fragata Júlio Sá Bierrenbach.

In continuing his anti-American campaign the Consulate understands that Brizola is considering renewing his complaints against the ill-fated

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ORIGIN/ACTION

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OSD	USIA	NSA
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Rec'd IC file ARA/EST/B R. Burton 1/11/63

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

AIRGRAM

732.00/12-1162

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TO : DEPARTMENT OF STATE 1962 DEC 18 AM 10 17

Brasilia 0 ffice-1 Belem-1 Belo Horizonte-1
Curitiba-1 [redacted] Recife-1
Salvador-1 Santos-1 Sao Paulo-1

ROUTING ANALYSIS & DISTRIBUTION BRANCH

EST/B

FROM : Amconsul PÔRTO ALEGRE DATE: DEC 11 1962

SUBJECT : PÔRTO ALEGRE WEEKLY SUMMARY Nº 34

REF :

1. Bureaucracy Strike
2. Rice Situation
3. Governor Brizola's Activities
4. Political Notes
5. Economic Notes

1. Bureaucracy Strike

At midnight, December 10, all State civil servants in RGS went on strike to support the wage increase for the bureaucracy which had been presented in a bill to the Assembly by "lame-duck" Governor Brizola. In view of the anticipated State government deficit of some 20 billion cruzeiros, Governor-elect Meneghetti's supporters in the present Assembly had resisted passing this irresponsible and inflationary bill. One Consulate source reports that a minor bureaucrat told him that this was part of Brizola's campaign to demoralize the Meneghetti administration even before it comes to power. Amazing to note that Brizola's new Secretary of Labor Hamilton Chaves, Commie-lining former press secretary, pleaded with the leaders of the strike to postpone the walk-out until an 11th hour proposal had been submitted to the Assembly, stating that the strike should not be used as a tool with which to pressure the legislative branch. This line of reasoning is all the more strange in view of Federal Government's and PTB's efforts to demoralize the Federal Chamber by the strike mechanism throughout the political crises over the past several months. Incidentally, II Army Commander General Pery Bevilacqua's

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Drafted by: FDSharp/zms 12/11/62

Contents and Classification Approved by: FDSharp

Clearances:

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ORIGIN/ACTION

INR-5

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84

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

AIRGRAM

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CA-6311 — NO.

CONFIDENTIAL — HANDLING INDICATOR

TO : Amembassy, RIO DE JANEIRO

INFO: BRASILIA

Dec 10 1 28 PM '62

FROM : DEPARTMENT OF STATE — DATE:

SUBJECT : Brazilian Elections of October 7, 1962

REF :

The documents and information requested in the Department's CA-5500 of November 17, 1962 will be appreciated at the Embassy's earliest convenience.

RUSK

Declassified E.O. 12356

CONFIDENTIAL

FORM DS-323 4-62

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Drafted by: INR/CS:DSimmons 12/6/62

Contents and Classification Approved by: INR/CS:CWSnider

Clearances: ARA/EST/B - Mr. Ralph J. Burton RB

Classified by INR/CS

Pol 23-10 Braz-US

0569

(IRGA). According this politically motivated, but conceivably accurate, charge, Brizola had unpegged rice prices and set up forced contribution on side as method covering shortage in IRGA funds arising from his misuse these funds for campaign purposes. In deal with Rio Grande do Sul authorities December 8 Albino Silva temporarily disestablished IRGA as purchasing agent and established own working group as sole government purchasing agent for rice shipments to Guanabara and other states. Albino has denied existence of scandal and Brizola reportedly intends to come to Rio to do same.

15. Noteworthy that (presumably Jango-cleared) communique issued by Magalhaes Pinto after December 6 talks with Goulart mentioned "irregularities attributed to authorities who manage economic and financial sectors . . . ." While December 6 ULTIMA HORA editorial (see 6 above) also mentioned possible charges of corruption. We are uncertain what other potential scandals government may be worried about although Polish sale of thermoelectric plant for use in Rio Grande do Sul, mentioned by Lacerda in December 3 TV broadcast, has drawn explanatory Hermes Lima statement as to why unnecessary to sell to lowest bidder in government to government deal, and may be good candidate especially if reportedly usual high dollar comission was paid.

16. Sunday press carried resumes of Kenworthy NEW YORK TIMES article on USG concern over Brazilian situation and BRAZIL-HERALD carried (apparently self-generated) Paul Vanorden Shaw column praising USG and Embassy for "new, fearless and business-like no-nonsense policy" and saying further US assistance to Brazil "predicated on sound monetary and banking practices."

17. Goulart has appointments in Petropolis December 11 and Rio December 14, reportedly plans to spend most of week here.

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ACTION COPY

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INCOMING TELEGRAM *Department of State*

46-M

CONFIDENTIAL

Control: 5202
Rec'd: December 11, 1962
2:20 p.m.

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FROM: Rio de Janeiro

TO: Secretary of State

NO: 1123, December 10, 7 p.m. (SECTION 3 OF 3)

PRIORITY

ASSISTANT SECRETARY MARTIN FOR GORDON

12. Navy Ministry December 7 published list of persons to be awarded Navy Medal of Merit including Brizola, Aragao, Samuel Wainer, Raul Ryff, Eloy Dutra, Adalgisa Nery and others of like ilk. One naval officer, Captain Bierrenbach, returned his previously awarded Medal of Merit publicly disclosing protest nature of his gesture. Other officers reportedly considering similar action, while sources close to Minister Suzano quoted him as saying Bierrenbach will be disciplined.

13. Criticism still continuing here re Suzano dispatch of frigate and company of Marines to Santos week before last after court had ordered Stevedores Union to open membership to extra dock workers. Suzano issued explanatory statement saying carrying out duty of maintaining order in port, but was attacked by Herbert Levy and others for disrespect for courts and encroachment on rights of states.

14. Albino Silva, who about two weeks ago was entrusted by Goulart with (politically motivated) emergency effort to break Rio rice shortage, promised success within ten days, which has not yet materialized but is now again promised for Wednesday. On December 7 he went to Porto Alegre and saw Brizola and others. December 8 O GLOBO attributed trip to difficulties arising from charge of 300 cruzeiros per bag of rice levied on exporters by Rio Grande do Sul Rice Institute

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GPO 930 560

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CONFIDENTIAL

-2- 1123, December 19, 7 p.m. (SECTION II OF III) from: Rio de Janeiro

seizure was of watermarked paper which since its importation subsidized, restricted by law to use for magazines, books, newspapers and in this instance was being used for political brochures. Macedo reported as "disposed ask guarantees from General Osvino to present interruption of democratic processes during plebiscite campaign."

9. In conversation with Colonel Walters December 5 Second Army Commander Peri Bevilacqua talked at length about dangers presented by unlimited right to strike, theme he reportedly circulated to his command with Kruel approval in secret instruction. On December 6 JORNAL DO BRASIL, presumably reflecting opinions of some governmental circles, referred to bank strike as "subversive" and termed CGT "illegal". One of first acts of new Labor Minister after confirmation was to issue statement condemning "political strikes". Even ULTIMA HORA December 7 printed front page editorial saying "public not always sufficiently informed to understand and accept frequent paralyzation of vital sectors".

10. Kubitschek reported talked to Goulart more than hour December 7 and was also in contact with San Tiago Dantas. According ULTIMA HORA December 10 Dantas still probable Finance Minister, had briefed Kubitschek so latter could present GOB domestic plans to President Kennedy next Friday.

11. Previous press comment had cast some doubt on Dantas' nomination, Helio Fernandes, for example, saying job still open and Dantas, Balbino, Gastao Vidigal and Moreira Salles under consideration. Rumor widely enough spread to lead Lomante Junior publicly to try to veto possibility of Balbino appointment.

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INCOMING TELEGRAM *Department of State*

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CONFIDENTIAL

Control: 5184
Rec'd: December 10, 1962
10:31 p.m.

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FROM: Rio de Janeiro

TO: Secretary of State

NO: 1123, December 19, 7 p.m. (SECTION II OF III)

PRIORITY

ASSISTANT SECRETARY MARTIN FOR GORDON.

5. Same busy day Jango, still in very early morning, saw San Tiago Dantas and Samuel Wainer, lunched with San Tiago Dantas, received Osvino Alves, Virgilio Tavora, Pinheiro Neto and CGT. According ULTIMA HORA, Goulart promised CGT he would reinstate Pinheiro in Labor Ministry after plebiscite, that dismissal was disciplinary action but that he agreed with Pinheiro's criticism of IMF.

6. Afternoon edition of ULTIMA HORA December 6 carried unsigned front page editorial (probably written by Wainer after consultation with Jango) saying reactionary circles led by Lacerda were planning excite and at same time capitalize on wave of wage demands and protests over Pinheiro Neto dismissal. Paper said plot to be launched within next 36 hours, was intended to sow panic, thus disrupting plebiscite and was supposed to culminate in charges of corruption in certain sectors of government. Editorial went on to say that War Minister Kruel would issue stern public warning to "golpista" group.

7. Kruel in December 6 press interview granted on arrival Rio from Brasilia warned "plotters whether of right or left" that army was prepared maintain order.

8. On December 7 Guanabara police raided several leftist premises in Rio including Brizola apartment, office of Rubens Macedo, GRAFICA LUZ and GRAFICA BRASIL. Apparently only useful /seizure

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GPO 930 500

0565

CONFIDENTIAL

-2- 1123, December 10, 7 p.m. (SECTION I OF III), from Rio de Janeiro

1. Goulart left Hermes Lima to take full blame for Pinheiro dismissal thus deflecting some leftist criticism from himself. CGT member, for example, reportedly told Goulart December 6 "Hermes Lima has sold out to foreign capital".

2. National Students Union December 5 issued manifesto attacking government and calling San Tiago Dantas mission to Washington "way of handing over what still remains of this country to United States".

3. In December 5 Recife speech (not carried by national news media) Brizola reportedly said that revolution to solve Brazil's problems "has scheduled date and by early February its results will be known". (While by "scheduled date" Brizola probably meant January 6, his phraseology may not have pleased Goulart. Commenting on speech TRIBUNA DA IMPRENSA stated Goulart advisors believe Brizola in preaching revolution in northeast was "tied to scheme of extreme left which does not enjoy full support of Communist Party, or which at least has its base in leftist sectors existing in PTB and government from which Governor of Rio Grande do Sul receives his support and stimulus".)

4. Arriving in Rio about 1 a.m. December 6, Goulart immediately summoned UDN Minas Gerais Governor Magalhaes Pinto, who had had request in to see him for several days, reportedly intending to "break" with Goulart. At this interview and another later in day Goulart apparently talked governor out of intention, promising that present cabinet would resign January 10, that he would form new cabinet from most efficient and honest from all parties. In return governor apparently promised to continue to campaign in favor return to presidentialism. (These events presumably reflect (a) Magalhaes Pinto reaction to rumored Goulart-PSD deal which might have left him and his 1965 ambitions out in cold and (b) Jango's efforts to keep all potentially useful elements from whatever party on string.)

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Control: 5171
Rec'd: December 10, 1962
9:34 p.m.

FROM: Rio de Janeiro

TO: Secretary of State

NO: 1123, December 10, 7 p.m. (SECTION I OF III)

PRIORITY

ASSISTANT SECRETARY MARTIN FOR GORDON

Developments past few days here have remained within general framework previous Embassy reporting. Confused, fluid situation and atmosphere at least mild alarm some participants, however, noteworthy in themselves and best illustrated by reporting some of events, statements and rumors. Most of this useful merely as background, although information contained in paragraphs 10 and 17 could have operational significance.

One caution which in previous reporting we perhaps have not made sufficiently explicit for uninitiated readers is that conflicts inside PTB and allied groups illustrated by current events should by no means be interpreted as fight between "good guys and bad guys", and that tactical nature Goulart's equivocal but currently mildly "conservative" course should be kept always in mind. We at least would not be at all surprised if disciplined elements of Communist movement here were in accord current Goulart policy.

Goulart, moreover, undoubtedly does not mind some atmosphere of crisis on eve plebiscite since this stirs voter interest and may enlarge his subsequent opportunities to expand own powers. This, however, is subject his ability maintain control which has appeared less than perfect last few days. Current situation, in addition, especially financial and with regard relations with United States, leaves him less than accustomed room for maneuver.

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0563

32

INCOMING TELEGRAM *Department of State*

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Control: 4231
Rec'd: December 8, 1962
7:42 a.m.

34
Action
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AIR
IAB

RMR

FROM: Rio de Janeiro

TO: Secretary of State

NO: 1116, December 8

Prime Minister Hermes Lima presented to Chamber December 5 Cabinet identical with previous one except for substitution Benjamin Eurico da Cruz for Joao Pinheiro Neto in Labor Ministry. After several failures evening December 6 muster quorum Chamber approved Cabinet on third try at 11:30 p.m. Vote 137 to 27.

BOND

HEK/14

Rio 1116

732.00/12-862

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READ BY NOA
DUTY OFFICER
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12/8/62

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NAME OF OFFICER & OFFICE SYMBOL	Mrs Shields/EST/B	DATE OF ACTION	12-10-62
		DIRECTIONS TO RM/R	File

GPO 930 800

0562

A-39
Salvador

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3

Completion of Rio-Bahia highway delayed until March: The Director General of the Departemento Nacional de Estradas de Rodagens announced a new delay in the expected January completion of the pavement of the Rio-Bahia highway. Because of recent rains (allegedly), the highway will now be completed in March. Three hundred kilometers are still to be paved at the present time.

/Harold M. Midkiff

Harold M. Midkiff
American Consul

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0561

of the newspaper attack on these developments in the refinery.

Comment: The courageous and outspoken attack on the refinery and on PETROBRAS administration generally for permitting, and even fostering, Communist activities within the petroleum enterprises of the Bahia area, is a departure from the neutral attitude generally assumed by local newspapers and has been very well received locally. The controversy has come at a time when the principal officers of PETROBRAS are having sessions in Salvador, and is designed to draw national attention to the situation in the petroleum industry.

HEALTH MEASURES: During the visit of Minister of Health to Bahia in the course of the week, a program was worked out for improving health conditions along the Bahia-Rio highway. This is a pilot project which the Minister hopes to expand. Also, a rural health program for Bahia State, embracing federal, state, US and international health agencies, was signed by the Minister, the local SESP director, the Governor, and John Dieffenderfer, Regional AID Director, on December 4.

ECONOMIC:

New Lubrification Oil Plant - With appropriate ceremony, the Companhia Bahiana de Lubrificantes (COBALUB) inaugurated its motor oil and lubricants plant at Madre de Deus, a few miles from Salvador. COBALUB is owned jointly by the Matarazzo Metalurgica of Sao Paulo, the Groupo Rheem Metalurgica, Esso Standard do Brasil, and the Banco da Bahia. When completed in January 1963, the plant will form a self-contained complex with a can and a drum factory. It is reported to represent an investment of one half billion cruzeiros and will be capable of supplying 28 million of the 37 million liters of lubricants used annually in Northeast Brazil.

Petrobras starts two plants - American firm awarded contract. During the week, Petrobras, the Brazilian oil monopoly, laid the cornerstones of an asphalt plant in Madre de Deus, and a plant to produce gasoline from natural gas.

The American Engineering firm Foster Wheeler Corporation of Livingston, New Jersey, won the contract to construct an ammonia plant for Petrobras in the nearby town of Camaçari. This will be a unit in the Petrobras Petrochemical complex. Work will probably start around June, and Foster Wheeler intends to bring in ten to twenty American technicians to remain for approximately a year to supervise construction.

Port of Ilheus threatened - The cacau port of Ilheus, second only to Salvador in the States of Bahia and Sergipe in the value of its shipping, is seriously threatened by new working rules and wage agreements won recently by stevedores in the South of Bahia. These reportedly raise the cost of loading a metric ton of Cacau in Ilheus to 28,000 cruzeiros, compared to only 11,000 in Salvador. It is therefore now more economical to transport the cacau from the growing region inland from Ilheus to Salvador by truck than to ship directly from Ilheus.

0560

~~OPNOW~~/ACTION

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INT 7	LAB	TAR
TR	XMB	AIR 4
ARMY 5	CIA 15	NAVY 5
OSD 12	USIA 8	NSA 3
Recife 10		

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

20 **AIRGRAM**

732.00/12-762

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A-39 NO. | OFFICIAL USE ONLY | 47 HANDLING INDICATOR

1962 DEC 13 PM 1

TO : DEPARTMENT OF STATE

INFO: RIO and BRASILIA

FROM : AMCONSULATE, SALVADOR DATE: December 7, 1962

SUBJECT : Weekly Summary

REF :

File
ARA/EST/B
Section
12-18-62
R. Burton

DEC - 1962

POLITICAL:

Governor Leonel Brizzola visited Aracaju, Sergipe during the week and was made an honorary citizen of Sergipe by the State Assembly. He was escorted to the Assembly by Acting State Governor ~~Dionisio Machado~~ and before a packed house is reported to have stated, among other things, that the principal reason for the unbalanced situation in which Brazil finds itself is the "spoliation of our economy." He is also reported as having stated that the present juridical system "does not satisfy our necessities, and must be changed, since it does not deal with fundamental questions pertaining to people's aspirations and it foments social injustice."

Comment: Local newspapers have since carried reports that President Goulart is annoyed (aborrecido) at Brizzola.

Governor Juracy Magalhães may not take leave of absence as previously reported. This change of mind is reported to be connected to national political developments.

Pro-Communist activities in the Petroleum Refinery at Mataripa were severely attacked by three of the four local newspapers in the course of a week. The attack was launched by the influential A TARDE following publication of the November issue of the JORNAL DE MATARIPE, the monthly refinery newspaper, which had several Communist-slanted articles and editorials. The superintendent of the refinery made a very weak reply in the press, dodging the issue completely, and A TARDE rebutted in a most effective manner. The Mataripe Labor Union, the University and Secondary Students' Unions and the Bank Employees' Union published statements supporting the Mataripe administration. The State Assembly voted a resolution in support

DEPARTMENT please pass copy to Recife.

FORM 4-62 DS-323

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Drafted by: HMMidkiff/WHMatthews: la

Contents and Classification Approved by:

Clearances:

0559

W I T H D R A W A L N O T I C E

RG: 059

ENTRY: CDF60-63

TAB #: 6

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Folder Title: 732.00/12-662

Document Date: 06/12/62

Document Ser.#:

TEL 1102 FR RIO DE JANEIRO TO SECSTATE

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NND: 949515

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CROSS REFERENCE FILE

BRAZILIAN POLITICAL, FINANCIAL,
AND LABOR SITUATION.

732.00/12-662

SEE
TEL. 1103 FROM RIO DE JANEIRO,
DEC. 6, 1962

XR 832.10

XR 832.06

0557

CROSS REFERENCE FILE

732.00/12-662

BRAZILIAN POLITICAL, FINANCIAL,
AND LABOR SITUATION.

XR 832.10

SEE
TEL. 1103 FROM RIO DE JANEIRO,
DEC. 6, 1962

XR 832.06

0556

ACTION COPY

INCOMING TELEGRAM *Department of State* PERMANENT RECORD COPY

ARA

35

CORRECTION

12/8/62 6:47 a.m.

Action SS

Control: 3275

Rec'd: December 6, 1962 10:51 p.m.

Info

FROM: Rio de Janeiro

TO: Secretary of State

NO: 1103, December 6, 6 p.m.

The serial number of this message received as 1113 should be corrected to read 1103.

wjh/8

FW 032.88/12-1262

THIS MESSAGE RECEIVED FROM OPERATIONS CENTER AT 12:20 PM 12/9/62 CA-6 ARA DUTY OFFICER

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0555

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-2- 1113, December 6, 6 p.m., from Rio de Janeiro (SECTION II OF II)

presented for congressional approval and if it would, initially at least, be nominally headed by Prime Minister, left foggy.

Chamber having difficulty getting quorum and Cabinet approval vote on Lima Cabinet. Does not seem to make much difference since present Cabinet can continue as provisional.

BOND

LM

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INCOMING TELEGRAM *Department of State*

43
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Info

SECRET

Control: 3224
Rec'd: December 6, 1962
8:05 p.m.

FROM: Rio de Janeiro

TO: Secretary of State

NO: ~~1113~~ 1103, December 6, 6 p.m. (SECTION TWO OF TWO)

PRIORITY

ASSISTANT SECRETARY MARTIN FOR AMBASSADOR GORDON

LIMIT DISTRIBUTION S/S

Goulart seems thus far to be winning battle. He in effect has threatened Afonso group with loss of influence in government if they do not accede to his leadership and accept his policies. Tactic used by him in this struggle, and policy which in fact he may mean at least temporarily to pursue, is alliance with PSD, which he termed "indispensable" in his December 4 press luncheon. Alliance would, of course, give him majority even without "grupo compacto". That his threat seems to be having its effect was indicated by Almino Afonso performance in Chamber December 6 in debate on Hermes Lima Cabinet confirmation when Afonso said that although he protested Pinheiro dismissal PTB (meaning himself and grupo compacto) would support Cabinet (which he had threatened not to do as recently as December 5.)

Precisely what Goulart in fact has in mind for new government not clear. Afonso did not support Mangabeira thesis about automatic return to presidentialism immediately after plebiscite. Goulart's own stand on this was equivocal, while Lima gave thesis more support. Press widely reports some sort of Goulart deal with PSD for congressional tolerance his unilateral creation of government (presumably coalition) immediately after plebiscite which would theoretically stay stable until the end of his term of office. When and if this regime would be presented for

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7/26/63 File

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by regime have been original promotion of Dantas' mission, government's wage policy, and toleration of November 27 commemoration of 1935 suppression of Communist take-over attempt. Also relevant is Itamaraty December 3 statement saying in recent speeches Brizzola expressed personal views not taken into consideration by GOB since traditional US-Brazilian ties "too well established to be affected by persons not in position to criticize."

Another illustration such "soft" GOB policy is recent apparent break in AID-SUDENE impasse (though some concessions both sides) producing likelihood of signature number of agreements, most important of which covers establishment of water systems in 57 cities in Northeast.

BOND

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SECRET

0552

that of Goulart. Speculation we included toward end section 7 Embassy telegram 1072 may be relevant regarding short range policies toward US which this group favors.

Dissident side so far has centered aroung PTB Chamber leader Almino Afonso, who presumably has "grupo compacto" with him, and has obvious allies among Communist labor leaders. Presence Pinheiro Neto and Brizzola on this side not clear although they have made recent statements clearly in accord with line group favors.

Skirmish that brought struggle partly to light was vote on confirmation Hermes Lima December 3. Almino Afonso and large segment (grupo compacto) of PTB available Brasilia failed to vote. Goulart made no visible attempt win their support and Lima confirmed by support UDN-PSD, also unsolicited by Goulart personally, but probably forthcoming due UDN-PSD fears of new crisis.

Dissension further revealed by clash provoked by Labor Minister João Pinheiro Neto's remarks as reported in Embassy telegram 1083. Despite Afonso disapproval and threat of general strike, administration dismissed Pinheiro from Cabinet December 4.

Guanabara bank workers union (Communist led) December 5 decided to strike starting midnight December 6 over two issues, desire for what amounts to fourteenth month pay and objections to projected banking reform. Press reports that in meeting in which strike was called bank workers criticized Goulart for "having surrendered to foreigners" in dismissal Pinheiro Neto from labor post.

Presumption is that Afonso and adherents are dissatisfied with various Goulart moves sincerity of which is open to question by us but which anyway worry "hardliners". Among such moves

by regime

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INCOMING TELEGRAM Department of State

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43
Action
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Control: 3275
Rec'd: December 6, 1962
10:51 p.m.

FROM: Rio de Janeiro

TO: Secretary of State
1103

NO: ~~1113~~, December 6, 6 p.m. (SECTION ONE OF TWO)

PRIORITY

ASSISTANT SECRETARY MARTIN FOR AMBASSADOR GORDON

LIMIT DISTRIBUTION S/S

Events past several days indicate considerable disarray, among forces of left here, although in many instances position of individual figures and nature their true positions less than clear.

Outcry has been raised by dissident and/or undisciplined individuals and groups against Goulart and government on number of grounds, including Pinheiro Neto dismissal, wage policy, and projected bank reform. Issues at stake, however, appear to cover tactics to be followed with regard wide range of issues regarding nature of regime and relations with United States.

Goulart side not very clear in composition, President himself hedging bets on number of issues, but presumably leader. Side seems probably to include Dantas and maybe Furtado. Front man for Goulart policies which are coming under criticism is Hermes Lima who may or may not in fact support policies he is putting forward on behalf Goulart. Illustration apparently tactical nature policies advocated by this side is remark "best patrimony of Goulart's policy is relations with US" made by Lima December 5 press conference, sentiment on which his sincerity is open to grave doubts, as in fact is that of

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E. Burton
JUL 15 1963

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OUTGOING TELEGRAM Department of State

INDICATE: ☐ COLLECT ☐ CHARGE TO

02077
1962 DEC 6 PM 7

CONFIDENTIAL
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Origin

ACTION: Amembassy RIO DE JANEIRO 1221

INFO: Amembassy BRASILIA 44

UPI report datelined Rio Dec 5 refers to story Jornal do Brasil Dec. 4 to effect that police had uncovered cache of Cuban arms and pamphlets on guerrilla and sabotage tactics in Dianopolis, Goias. Dept interested in obtaining evidence Cuban involvement these activities.

see 1122 from Rio

END

RUSK

Rio/1221 732.00/12-662

Cleared by RMA

(2)

Drafted by: ARA:CMA:GMSutton/smb 12-6-62

Telegraphic transmission and classification approved by: CMA - John Burn Crimmins

Classification: EST - Mr. Shields

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INCOMING TELEGRAM *Department of State*

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Action ARA

Control: 5122

Rec'd: December 10, 1962 [illegible] p.m.

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FROM: Rio de Janeiro

TO: Secretary of State

NO: 1122, December 10, 7 p.m.

PRIORITY

DEPTEL 1221.

Embassy still seeking facts and will report fully later.

Governor Mauro Borges of Gaias on visit Rio last week told press December 4 seizure arms and arrests by state police at Dianopolis day before result steps he had taken twenty days earlier basis information provided by federal agents. Said while lacking precise details, he confident arms not Cuban but Brazilian. Governor observed fate of armed men remote region Northeastern Goias not news and such incidents as occur usually outcome farmers disputes over property lines. In Rio television interview on December 6 Governor took same attitude, saying Goias has neither guerillas nor warfare and passed off present episode as similar far west movie plot noting area in question like US western frontier century ago. Asserted local authorities competent handle any troublemakers.

Newspaper O ESTADO DO SAO PAULO on December 7 carried lengthy report special correspondent at Dianopolis depicting Communist activities that area as extremely serious and noting that while large-scale Cuban financing suspected no proof thereof exists so far.

BOND

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CTW/6

Rio 1122 RM/R File

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GPO 930 500

0548

CARRY THEM OUT. ' BRAZIL CANNOT GIVE ITSELF THE LIBERTY OF SPENDING SINGLE DOLLAR WHICH IS NOT INDISPENSABLE TO ITS DEVELOPMENT." BELGO MINIERA AGREEMENT ALREADY CONCLUDED AND SIMILAR AGREEMENTS ABOUT TO BE CONCLUDED WITH THYSSEN AND MANNESMAN GROUPS THE LAST TWO OF WHICH HE SAID SHOULD BRING IN 2 BILLION DOLLARS OVER 12-15 YEARS ALL OF WHICH WOULD BE RE-INVESTED IN BRAZILS STEEL INDUSTRY. "A COUNTRY WHICH CAN SIGN CONTRACTS OF SUCH PROPORTIONS IS ON WHICH HAS ALL THE REQUIREMENTS FOR RECUPERATION."

SAID HE HAD INFORMED PSD LEADER AMARAL PEIXOTOO THAT THE COUNTRY CANNOT WAIT FOR THE NEXT CONGRESS TO MAKE ECONOMIC REFORM.

(4) DENIED THAT ANY OF SEVERAL LETTERS HE HAS RECEIVED FROM KENNEDY MENTION BRAZILIAN DEPOSITS ABROAD NOR TO ANY PROSPECTIVE LOAN." I HAVE NOT SOUGHT NOR AM I SEEKING PRESENT FROM U.S. AND TO GO FURTHER: I THINK BRAZIL IS IN A POSITION TO. OVERCOME ITS PRESENT DIFFICULT SITUATION WITHOUT NEW LOANS. WE WANT ONLY COMPENSATION FOR THE DETERIORATING PRICES OF OUR EXPORTS, THROUGH REASONABLE EXTENSIONS ON REPAYMENTS ON LOANS WHICH WERE NOT CONTRACTED BY MY GOVERNMENT."

(5) CABINET-PSD AND PTB AGREE THAT PRESENT CABINET SHOULD BE MAINTAINED SINCE ITS LIFE EXPECTANCY WILL BE ONLY ONE OR TWO MONTHS TO BE REPLACED BY "PRESIDENTIALIST" MINISTERS.

(6) OAS - SAID HE DIDN'T KNOW WHETHER BRAZIL SEEKS OAS MEETING ON REINTEGRATING CUBA. "BRAZILS THINKING WAS EXPRESSED WITH GREAT BRILLIANCE BY SAN TIAGG DANTAS AT PUNTA DEL ESTE WITH IDEA BEING FOR CUBA TO RETURN TO BOSOM LATIN AMERICA FAMILY."

(7) PINHEIRO NETO AFAIR -- SINCE GOVERNMENT IS PARLIAMENTARY RESPONSIBILITY IS PRIME MINISTER'S. PERSONALLY DOES NOT BELIEVE PINHEIRO MADE ACCUSATIONS (AGAINST ROBERTO CAMPOS AND OTAVIO BULHOES) " AND IF HE CRITICIZED (SUMOC) INSTRUCTION 204, I SEE NOTHING WRONG IN THAT." KEYSER
UNQUOTE BOND

MGG/3

0547

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Control: 3007
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INFO: RM/R FILES

FROM: RIO DE JANEIRO

TO: Secretary of State

NO: 1099, DECEMBER 6

PRIORITY

RIO 1099 732.00/12-662 XR 032.00

FOLLOWING FROM BRASILIA REPEATED FYI

QUOTE

UNCLAS OFFICIAL USE ONLY PRITY131 FIFTH
AT LUNCHEON DECEMBER 4 FOR 60 BRAZILIAN JOURNALIST AT ALVORADA PALACE BRASILIA GOULART RESPONDED TO QUESTIONS WHICH HAD NOT REPEAT NOT BEEN SUBMITTED IN ADVANCE. TRANSLATION FULLEST AVAILABLE TEXT FOLLOWS BY AIRGRAM. HIGHLIGHTS:

(1) DISAGREED MANGABEIRA THESIS THAT VOTE FAVORABLE TO PRESIDENTIALISM IN JANUARY 6 PLEBISCITE WOULD AUTOMATICALLY ANNUL ATO ADICIONAL: "(THE THESIS) DOES NOT POSSESS AUTHENTICITY. THE PLEBISCITE WILL ONLY BESTOW ON CONGRESS THE MORAL OBLIGATION TO REFORMULATE THE FEDERAL CONSTITUTION AND THE SYSTEM OF GOVERNMENT. I PERSONALLY BELIVE THIS CHANGE IS NOT AUTOMATIC..."

(22 CITED "CLASSIFIED" (RESERVADO) IMF DOCUMENT "SENT TO MED FROM THE U.S." WHICH CATEGORIZES COUNTRIES (1) "RESPECTABLE" (2) "IRREGULAR" (3) "DELIQUENTS" (TRANSVIADOS) VIS-A-IS THEIR OBSERVANCE OF IMF POLICIES. GOULART SAID THAT BRAZIL IS ONLY COUNTRY IN THIRD CATEGORY YET HAS MADE GREAT ECONOMIC PROGRESS--CITED 7.2 PERCENT GNP GROWTH -- WHEREAS THE "RESPECTABLE" HAVE EXPERIENCED" UNEMPLOYMENT, GRAVE SOCIAL CRISES AND INSOLUBLE POLITICAL PROBLEMS."

(3) SAID BRAZIL'S ECONOMIC PROBLEMS ARE NOT EXCLUSIVELY ITS OWN FAULT. IT HAS BEEN SUFFERING FROM WORSENING TERMS OF TRADE. ITS EXPORT PRICES HAVE DECLINED 111 PERCENT IN THE PAST DECADE. "AFTER JANUARY I HOPE TO HAVE MUCH MORE AUTHORITY TO LAYOUT A PROGRAM OF EXCHANGE AUSTERITY. WE WILL FIX RIGID PRIORITIES AND

JAN 8 1963

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	DIRECTIONS TO RM/R: File

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INCOMING TELEGRAM *Department of State*

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NUMBERED

Control: 3042
Rec'd: December 6, 1962
3:25 p.m.

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RMR

FROM: Rio de Janeiro

TO: Secretary of State

NO: 1098, December 6, 7 p.m.

PRIORITY

FOLLOWING FROM BRASILIA AS 130 TO RIO DE JANEIRO DECEMBER 5, 2 PM REPEATED FYI SIGNED KEYSER:

"Plebiscite.

Goulart, while obviously running for full presidential powers in December 4 press luncheon and separate conversation group mayors, said at luncheon he does not share Mangabeira's view plebiscite alone sufficient grant full powers. His view plebiscite will morally obligate Congress reformulate constitution and system of government. Noted, however, his deep respect Mangabeira and his own lack competence such matters.

In possible effort confuse issue for benefit of Goulart, Hermes Lima said in evening press conference he shared Mangabeira's view ATO ADICIONAL would be revoked by simple proclamation results plebiscite. Said question remains open. Similarly, Mangabeira reiterated his views to press here yesterday, although prefacing his remarks with caveat that speaking privately, not as Minister nor as President PSB.

Comment: Goulart gets benefit being on side virtue, can later gracefully yield importunities loyal subjects. "

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		DIRECTIONS TO RM/R	File

Rio 1098

732.00/12-662

FILED DEC 6 1962

0545

CONFIDENTIAL

process necessary. At same time he indicated CGT not controlled by Communists (which Embassy regards as entirely inaccurate) and implied CGT would be considered as worker central by government.* His close relations with Communist Labor leaders this latest development very clear.

Whether Pinheiro, or Campos (as threatened, according some papers) or others will resign, as yet unclear. Fuller significance these events and relations other concurrent developments also remain to be clarified.

BOND

DPB/1

* As received.

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ACTION COPY

INCOMING TELEGRAM *Department of State* PERMANENT RECORD COPY

57

CONFIDENTIAL

Action ARA

Control: 2238
Rec'd: December 5, 1962
1:07 p.m.

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FROM: Rio de Janeiro

TO: Secretary of State

NO: 1083, December 5, 10 a.m.

Entire Rio press, much in Sao Paulo and presumably elsewhere in country concerned with statement by Minister Labor Joao Pinheiro Neto on late TV program night December 3 or early December 4. Entire press seems agree Minister stated "there is a financial dictatorship in country" and GOB cannot resolve its problems "as long as Sumoc is in hands Mr. Otavio Bulhoes and Ambassador Roberto Campos". Some press organs (ESTADO DE SÃO PAULO and JORNAL DO BRASIL) also stated he referred to Ambassador Gordb* was being part of scheme, but no clear references or quotes available. References to Ambassador, if made, may have been made informally following telecast and been heard by few persons.

Queried on December 4, Pinheiro reported as defending position and stating he will not resign as long as workers, who indicated him for position, maintain their confidence in him. He also quoted as having said that "maneuvers aimed at my dismissal were part of economic pressure of IMF to overthrow ministers one by one and to end with downfall of President Goulart".

Prime Minister reported generally as being irritated by statement and asking for Pinheiro's resignation. Gilberto Crockatt de Sa quoted as stating he will attempt find solution within 24 hours, since Pinheiro's position, as given on TV, "is not far distant from ideas of President Goulart". Attitude Goulart unclear with press reports conflicting.

Communist-dominated CGT threatening nation-wide general strike if Minister Labor resigns, according Dante Pelacani given in press.

Minister Labor recently stated to Romualdi and Labor Attache that capitalism had failed for Brazil and of no further value, that [illegible] and US aid in

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0543

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MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION

DATE: November 29, 1962

PLACE: Auto Club and American Chamber of Commerce, São Paulo

SUBJECT: Relations between Brazilian Federal Government and Federation of Industries of the State of São Paulo.

PARTICIPANTS: Rafael NOSCHESE, President of the Federation of Industries of the State of São Paulo
Dr. Paulo de Almeida BARBOSA, President of the Commercial Association of São Paulo
Scott C. Lyon, Acting Principal Officer, American Consulate General, São Paulo

Copies To: Amembassy, Rio de Janeiro (2cc)
Amembassy, Brasilia (1cc)
ARA (1cc)
INR (2cc)
Central Files (2cc)

Sr. Noschese was the guest of honor at the luncheon meeting of the American Chamber of Commerce on November 29, 1962. In pre-luncheon conversation, he told with satisfaction of the meeting he and other officers of the Federation had a few days ago with Minister Niles BOND at the American Embassy at Rio de Janeiro, in which the Federation officials had presented proposals for Alliance for Progress activities under Federation sponsorship.

Sr. Noschese also told of a meeting of Federation officials with Hugo de FARIA, Chief of the Civil Household of the President of the Republic, on November 28, 1962, at the Federation headquarters in São Paulo. The meeting had been called at the urgent request of Federal authorities, but the Federation officials had been disappointed to find out that Faria had come merely to solicit Federation backing for the campaign to get out the vote for the plebescite in January 1963. Faria came "hat in hand," according to Noschese, to ask that Federation members furnish transportation to the polls and encourage their employees and others to vote. He indicated that the Federal administration fears a massive abstention

0542

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ARA	EUR	FE
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TR	XMB	AIR
ARMY	CIA 10	NAVY
OSD	USIA 5	NSA 3

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

AIRGRAM

832.062/12-562
XR 732.00

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A-170 NO. | LIMITED OFFICIAL USE | HANDLING INDICATOR

TO : DEPARTMENT OF STATE

INFO: RIO DE JANEIRO
BRASILIA

FROM : Amcongen, São Paulo DATE: December 5, 1962

SUBJECT : Relation Between Brazilian Federal Government and Federation of Industries of the State of São Paulo.

REF : CERP, D; ConGen A-90, October 5, 1962, ConGen A-158 of November 29, 1962.

Enclosed is a memorandum of conversations with leaders of the Federation of Industries of the State of São Paulo and the President of the Commercial Association of São Paulo, in which they expressed strong misgivings concerning the Federal Government and gave insight into the internal workings of the Federation and Association, with particular reference to their ineffectiveness in influencing the Federal administration at present.

For the Minister Consul General:

Scott C. Lyon
Consul

FORM DS-323 4-62

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Drafted by: POL:SCLyon:ip

Contents and Classification Approved by:

Clearances:

0541

estabilidade. A segunda força são as classes produtoras. Nas classes produtoras há, em geral, um grande desejo de ver combatida a inflação. Mas a inflação se combate como conjunto de medidas, cada uma das quais fere os interesses de um setor da economia do país. Em geral existe uma certa resistência feita por cada um desses setores às medidas que diretamente o afetam. É necessário que todos compreendam que o combate à inflação representa a aceitação temporária de um sacrifício em benefício da recuperação da saúde econômica do país.

"A terceira força é a classe trabalhadora do Brasil: Jamais a classe trabalhadora poderá aceitar bem o tipo de medidas anti-inflacionarias frequentemente sugerido por certa classe de economistas que consiste exclusivamente em procurar diminuir o poder de consumo, através de uma contemporarização de salários, o que no fundo representa uma redução de salários reais. Todas as vezes que reduzimos o poder de consumo da classe trabalhadora, estamos praticando uma medida antiinflacionária. Mas é preciso compreender o alcance social dessa medida. Introduzimos, então, no nosso problema, um elemento social sem o qual nenhuma solução economica será válida e nem sequer exequível. Temos de realizar a política de reversão da inflação sem pretendermos diminuir o poder de consumo da classe trabalhadora do país. A classe trabalhadora do país já está em níveis de consumo que, na realidade, não toleram compressões. O que o govêrno tem de pedir a elas, e o que terá o direito de pedir no momento em que conseguir unir os seus próprios atos inequívocos de contenção inflacionária aos propósitos declarados das classes produtoras, é uma tregua salarial, uma tregua salarial cuja característica é esta: Os salarios não se movimentarão, senão rigorosamente de acordo com o índice de desvalorização da nacional."

0540

uma fórmula que imediatamente satisfaça a todos e que possa eliminar a necessidade do plebiscito, creio que isso será bom para o Brasil. Juridicamente é legítimo e politicamente representará uma grande economia de forças.

"Se, porém, os partidos não conseguirem imediatamente encontrar essa formula, então melhor seria que não nos perdessemos em longas discussões em torno do assunto e nos concentrassemos desde já nas questões de ordem econômica e social. O sr. Ministro da Fazenda, em declaração que prestou há dois dias, traçou um quadro panorâmico da economia brasileira um tanto sombrio e atemorizador. Creio que o Ministro da Fazenda não exagerou. Creio mesmo que é dever do homem público, em certos momentos, colocar o seu povo a par da gravidade da situação que ele atravessa. As cifras muitas vezes não estão ao alcance do povo. Como as crises já vêm de longe, o povo não se apercebe de que está em faixas de perigo. Há uma política que prefere ocultar sempre ao povo a gravidade de determinadas situações. Mas creio que a escola certa é a que não alarma o povo inutilmente, mas que também o convoca quando a participação dele é indispensável à exatidão das soluções. Estamos agora num desses momentos. Em primeiro lugar, o processo inflacionário, hoje, aumentando os meios de pagamento do país de uma forma que não guarda mais nenhuma relação proporcional com o aumento da produção e da renda, gerou 'deficits' que o Govêrno Federal terá de enfrentar, no próximo ano, com novas e perigosas emissões. São 'deficits' em primeiro lugar de ordem interna, 'deficits' orçamentários, das emprêsas públicas, das autarquias, e também gerados pelos subsídios cambiais que ainda pagamos a determinados produtos. Daí provem uma situação para o Tesouro que, se tiver de ser atendida através de recursos obtidos pela emissão provocará na elevação do custo de vida alguma coisa que se pode tornar catastrófica. Ao mesmo tempo que isso, existe o problema do 'deficit' em moeda estrangeira, na balança de contas.

"Mesmo que o comércio do Brasil com outros países lograsse se equilibrar no ano que vem, o 'deficit' dos serviços, as amortizações da dívida externa e também as operações a curto prazo que devem ser resgatadas ou renovadas no próximo ano, já constituiriam uma massa de compromissos deveras alarmante para a Nação."

3. Asked about "the battle to reverse the inflationary movement," Dantas replied:

"Vejo nesta batalha, sobretudo, três forças engajadas; a primeira dessas forças, não pode deixar de ser o governo. É o governo quem tem de dar o exemplo, e o primeiro movimento de contenção da inflação é pois, do Governo. Um governo capaz de ações coerentes será capaz de evitar os atos que ameaçam a

mas traduz o nosso direito de aplicar êsses princípios a soluções concretas, que temos que encontrar no curso da vida internacional de que participamos."

2. Question by the interviewer: "How do you look on the possibility of annulling the plebiscite [the referendum on parliamentarism versus presidentialism], as permitted by the Additonal Act, permitting Congress to use its own powers to initiate reforms immediately?"

Dantas said: "Já tive oportunidade de me manifestar, até mesmo aqui em São Paulo, sôbre esta tese já conhecida como tese Mangabeira. Penso que juridicamente é muito defensível. O Brasil adotou o sistema presidencialista através da Constituinte que elaborou a Carta de 1946. Não se julgou necessário naquele momento, e de fato não o era, submeter a Constituição de 46 a um referendo popular. Quando sobreveiu a crise política ocasionada pela renúncia do presidente Jânio Quadros, o Congresso adotou, num ambiente extremamente conturbado, o parliamentarismo, através do Ato Adicional. Para que reforma tão profunda adotada em condições tão especiais pudesse contar com a confiança do povo era preciso um plebiscito. Foi êsse plebiscito que a lei Capanema fixou para o dia 6 de janeiro. Se agora todos os partidos políticos representados no Congresso se pusessem de acordo para eliminar a inovação e voltassem aquilo que a Constituição de 46 estabeleceu, tenho a impressão de que não teríamos de fato a necessidade de um plebiscito para homologar aquilo que fôra obra de uma Constituinte plenamente aceita pelo povo. Há, porém, o aspecto político, que a meu ver é um pouco mais inquietante. Temo que os partidos não se ponham de acordo com tanta facilidade sôbre uma emenda constitucional que, além de revogar o Ato Adicional, ainda teria que dispor alguma coisa sôbre os poderes do presidente da República e do Congresso, e sôbre as recíprocas limitações.

"Então correríamos o risco de ver abrir-se a oportunidade de uma nova crise política, a exemplo das que se tem sucedido no correr dêste ano, e que tem prejudicado a prioridade que o govêrno, o Congresso e o povo devem dar aos problemas econômicos, financeiros e sociais do país. Creio que êsses problemas já não suportam novas moratórias. O processo inflacionário a que estamos submetidos agravou-se nos últimos tempos, e, o fato dêsse processo estar já apresentando certos sinais de desordem, que positivamente impressionarão qualquer observador, mostra que as atenções do Govêrno e do povo precisam ser concentradas neste campo, e não toleram nenhuma distração para a área dos problemas internacionais. Por isso, vou responder de uma forma muito prática. Se os partidos, cujos representantes estão em Brasília, encontrarem no correr desta semana

Foreign

Text of Speech Given by Ex-Minister Santiago DANTAS over São Paulo Television on November 13, 1962, as reported in Correio Paulistano of November 14, 1962.

1. Replying to a question on his foreign policy, Dantas said:

"O Brasil hoje pratica uma política externa independente. Estas palavras escritas na capa deste livro, Política Externa Independente, representam uma conquista, conquista da maturidade política do nosso povo. Não somos hoje um país que siga simplesmente, no campo da política externa, o que outras chancelarias pre-determinam ou elaboram; nossos objetivos são conhecidos, deitam suas raizes nas convicções democráticas do nosso povo. Nos princípios e na segurança da nossa própria nacionalidade, e graças a essa confiança que temos em nós mesmos, é que podemos já como nação adulta, manter relações com países de todas as áreas, sejam quais forem seus regimes ou princípios ideológicos. É o que tambem acontece com as outras democracias evoluidas do nosso tipo. Todas elas estão abertas às normas da coexistência, porque é dentro dessas normas que conseguiremos salvaguardar a paz e firmar cada vez melhor a nossa área própria de interesses para resolução dos nossos problemas nacionais.

"Muitos dos que nos acusam de havermos conduzido a política externa brasileira para demasiado perto dos países socialistas, talvez suponham que os Estados Unidos da América hajam estranhado de algum modo esta tomada de maioridade do nosso país. O meu depoimento é em sentido contrário. O govêrno americano compreende e respeita as razões pelas quais o Brasil tem necessidade de definir a sua própria política e por êsse motivo, de afastar-se muitas vezes de certas soluções apresentadas pelo bloco ocidental. Quero dizer que isso não significa para nos uma posição neutralista. O neutralismo apareceu como uma tentativa de certos Estados de formarem um terceiro bloco de nações. De um modo ou de outro, o neutralismo é uma posição rígida, e a nossa é uma posição internacional bem mais flexível. Sendo independente, ela nos permite algumas vezes nos aproximarmos do ponto de vista das nações que integram um bloco político militar, outras vezes do ponto de vista das nações que integram o outro, e, algumas vezes, até tomarmos atitudes francamente próprias, que se identificam com a nossa posição neutralista /this is probably a misprint; "independente" seems to be what Dantas had in mind/. Esta independência é a única atitude legítima. Não significa nenhuma infidelidade a princípios e objetivos que são fundamentais do nosso povo,

0537

"Even if the commerce of Brazil with other countries succeeds in balancing itself in the coming year, the deficit in services, the amortization of the external debt, and also the short term obligations which must be met or renewed in the coming year, would by themselves constitute a mass of commitments extremely alarming to the nation."

3. Asked about "the battle to reverse the inflationary movement," Dantas replied:

"Above all, I see three forces engaged in this battle. The first of these forces can only be the Government. It is the Government which has to set the example, and the first movement to contain inflation must, thus, come from the Government. A government capable of coherent actions will be capable of avoiding actions which menace stability. The second force is the producing class /industry/. In the producing class there is, in general, a great desire to see inflation combated. But inflation must be combated by a coordinated series of measures, each of which affects the interests of a sector of the economy of the country. In general there exists a certain resistance to these measures in each of the sectors which are directly affected. It is necessary for all to understand that the fight against inflation requires the temporary acceptance of a sacrifice to bring about the recuperatinn of the economic health of the country.

"The third force is the laboring class of Brazil. The laboring class will never be able to accept willingly the sort of anti-inflationary measures frequently suggested by a certain type of economist, which consists exclusively in trying to diminish the power of consumption by means of holding back on /contemporisaçâo/ wages, which in fact represents a reduction in real wages. Each time we reduce the consumption of the laboring class, we are practicing an anti-inflationary measure, but it is necessary to understand the social repercussions of this measure. We introduce to our problem, then, a social element without which no economic solution will be valid nor even attainable. We must carry out the policy of reversing inflation without aiming at a diminution in the consumption of the laboring class of the country. The working class of the country already has levels of consumption which, in reality, cannot stand reductions. What the Government must ask the workers, and what it will have the right to ask when it has succeeded in uniting its own unequivocal and anti-inflationary measures to steps promised by the producing classes, is a wage truce /tregua salarial/, a wage truce with this characteristic: wages will not change except rigorously in accordance with the depreciation of the national currency."

Free translation by DCProper

0536

aggravated recently, and the fact that this process is already beginning to show certain signs of disorder, which will deeply impress any observer, shows that the attentions of the Government and of the people must be concentrated in this field and will not tolerate any distraction in the area of international problems. Therefore, I shall reply in a very practical manner. If the parties, whose representatives are in Brasilia, can this week find a formula which satisfies all, and which can eliminate the necessity of the plebiscite, I believe that this will be good for Brazil. Juridically it is legitimate and politically it will represent a great economy of effort.

"If, however, the parties do not immediately succeed in finding this formula, then it will be better that we not lose ourselves in long discussions on the matter and that we concentrate right away on economic and social questions. The Minister of Finance, in a declaration two days ago /to Congress/, drew a panoramic picture of the Brazilian economy which was somewhat dark and frightening. I believe that the Minister of Finance did not exaggerate. I further believe that it is the duty of public men, in certain moments, to make their people aware of the gravity of the situation which confronts them. Financial statistics are often not within the grasp of the people. As crises build up for a long time, the people do not perceive when they reach the danger zone. There is a political school of thought which always prefers to hide from the people the gravity of certain situations. But I believe that the correct school is that which does not alarm the people needlessly, but which on the other hand summons when the people's participation is necessary for proper solutions. We are now at such a moment. In the first place the inflationary process, today, increasing the currency in circulation in the country in a manner which no longer retains any proportional relation to the increase of production and income, generates deficits which the Federal Government will have to meet, in the next year, with new and dangerous emissions of currency. They are deficits in the first place of a domestic nature, budget deficits of the public enterprises, the autarchies, and in addition generated by the exchange subsidies which we still pay on certain products. From this results a situation for the treasury which, if it should have to be met by resources obtained from the emission of currency, will provoke in the rise of the cost of living something which could become catastrophic. At the same time there exists the problem of the foreign currency deficit in the balance of exchange.

0535

legitimate attitude. It does not signify any infidelity to principles and objectives which are fundamental to our people, but translates our right to apply these principles to concrete solutions, which we have to find in the course of the international life in which we participate."

2. Question by the interviewer: "How do you look on the possibility of annulling the plebiscite [the referendum on parliamentarism versus presidentialism], as permitted by the Additional Act, permitting Congress to use its own powers to initiate reforms immediately?"

Dantas: "I have already had the opportunity to speak, here in São Paulo, about this suggestion known as the Mangabeira thesis. I think that juridicially it is very defensible. Brazil adopted the presidential system through the constituent assembly which drew up the Constitution of 1946. It was not considered necessary at that time, and in fact it was not, to submit the Constitution of 1946 to a popular referendum. When the political crisis occasioned by the resignation of President Jânio QUADROS occurred, Congress adopted parliamentarism in an extremely agitated atmosphere, by means of the Additional Act. In order for so profound a reform adopted in such special conditions to obtain the confidence of the people, a plebiscite is necessary. It was this plebiscite that the Capanema Law set for January 6. If, now, all of the political parties represented in Congress reach an agreement to eliminate the innovation [parliamentarianism] and return to that which the 1946 Constitution established, I have the impression that we should not in fact need a plebiscite to ratify that which was the work of a constituent assembly fully accepted by the people. There is, however, the political aspect, which in my view is a little more disturbing. I fear that the parties may not so easily reach agreement on a constitutional amendment which, in addition to revoking the Additional Act, would further have to make some disposition concerning the powers of the President of the Republic and of the Congress, and concerning their reciprocal limitations.

"In that case we should run the risk of creating an opportunity for a new political crisis, following the example of those which have taken place one after another throughout this year, and which have prejudiced the priority which the Government, the Congress, and the people must give to the economic, financial, and social problems of the country. I believe that these problems will no longer admit new moratoria. The inflationary process to which we are submitted has become

0534

Foreign

Text of Speech Given by Ex-Minister Santiago DANTAS over São Paulo Television on November 13, 1962, as reported in Correio Paulistano of November 14, 1962.

1. Replying to a question on his foreign policy, Dantas said:

"Brazil today practices an independent foreign policy. The words written on the cover of this book, Independent Foreign Policy, represent a conquest, a conquest for the political maturity of our people. Today we are not a country which simply follows, in the field of foreign policy, what other foreign offices predetermine or organize. Our objectives are well known. They have their roots in the democratic convictions of our people, in the principles and assurance of our own nationality; and thanks to this confidence which we have in ourselves, we can, as a nation which has reached adulthood, maintain relations with countries in all areas of the world, whatever their systems of government or ideological principles. The same thing is true of the other advanced democracies of our type. All of them are receptive to the rules of coexistence, because it is by following these rules that we shall succeed in safeguarding the peace and progressively solidifying our own area of interests for the solution of our national problems.

"Many of those who accuse us of having swung Brazilian foreign policy too near the socialist countries perhaps suppose that the United States of America has in some way found objectionable this position supported by the majority of our people. My testimony is quite to the contrary. The American Government understands and respects the reasons for Brazil's need to define her own policy, and hence to draw back many times from certain solutions presented by the Western bloc. I wish to say that this, for us, does not signify a neutralist position. Neutralism originated as an attempt by certain States to form a third bloc of nations. In one way or another neutralism is a rigid position, and ours is a much more flexible international position. Being independent, it sometimes permits us to come close to the point of view of the nations making up one politico-military bloc, other times to the point of view of the nations which make up the other; and sometimes we even take attitudes frankly our own, which identify themselves with our neutralist /this is probably a misprint; "independent" seems to be what Dantas had in mind/ position. This independence is the only

0533

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12/5/62

financial line, which seemed calculated to reassure São Paulo big business. Talk of a "wage truce" was obviously likely to ease business mistrust. So was the fact that Dantas specifically assigned the lead in the fight against inflation to the Government, by implication refuting the leftist line that business "exploitation" of the working classes is primarily responsible for the rising cost of living. São Paulo is obviously the place to begin winning the confidence of industry, but it is not clear whether Dantas succeeded.

(B) The playing-down of the anti-Western implications of his foreign policy seemed calculated to soothe both the United States and the generally pro-U.S. leading Paulista classes. Dantas, a skilled stage director, did not have to change the props -- he just played a different light on them. It is not the first time he has chosen to do this in São Paulo. By the same token, his responsible financial talk seemed directed at American and international monetary authorities as well as Brazilian businessmen.

(C) Dantas' line on domestic politics was characterized by caution, practicality, and an apparent desire not to get caught in the middle. In another São Paulo interview, however, he did seem to accept the desirability of "mitigated" -- i.e., weakened -- presidentialism. Mr. Goulart's newspaper did not print that one.

Twelve days after Dantas' November 13 speech, prestigious O Estado de S. Paulo published what it considered to be a scoop concerning the purpose of his trip. The United States, according to this scoop, had already decided to open a credit of one billion dollars to Brazil and was even thinking of raising the credit to two or three billion. The money was to go both for balance-of-payments aid and long-term development projects. Eight hundred million would be granted right away to consolidate foreign debts and help stabilize the cruzeiro; the rest would come in parcels as successive steps in a forthcoming development plan were put into effect. Estado had high hopes for the results of this aid in spite of its total lack of confidence in the current government. In later articles, the paper toned down its predictions.

For the Minister Consul General:

Scott C. Lyon

Scott C. Lyon
Consul

Enclosures: 2
1) Translation of Speech
2) Portuguese original

ORIGIN/ACTION

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INT	LAB	TAR
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OSD 12	USIA	NSA 3

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DEPARTMENT OF STATE

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HANDLING INDICATOR

TO : DEPARTMENT OF STATE DEC 7 AM 7 45

INFO: RIO DE JANEIRO

RMZAN ANALYSIS & DISTRIBUTION BRANCH

DEPARTMENT OF STATE BUREAU OF INTER-AMERICAN AFFAIRS DEC 7 1962

FROM : Amcongen, SÃO PAULO DATE: December 5, 1962

SUBJECT : DANTAS Speaks Like Finance Minister

REF : São Paulo Airgram A-152 of November 22, 1962

Ex-Foreign Minister San Thiago DANTAS' speech of November 13 over São Paulo television was summarized in the Weekly Summary under reference. A complete translation is now enclosed in the hope that it will be of use to officers concerned with his announced trip to the United States. Dantas' São Paulo appearance is also of interest as a preview of his intentions if, as is rumored, he is offered the Finance Ministry.

The Consulate General's source is a text from São Paulo daily Correio Paulistano, a GOULART mouthpiece. Ex-Foreign Minister Dantas is so good an off-the-cuff speaker that it has always been difficult to get texts of his São Paulo performances, but the Correio report seems nearly verbatim. The fact that this second-rate daily had the best text available would in itself indicate that President Goulart was directly pushing Dantas' latest São Paulo appearance.

The speech seemed to lend itself to the following conclusions:

(A) Dantas spoke as if he were already Finance Minister, giving substance to existing rumors that he was in line for that job. During other public appearances in São Paulo on the same mid-November visit, he dropped the news that he was about to depart for the United States to take charge of the Brazilian U.N. delegation. This immediately started local gossip that his Cabinet ambitions in fact depended on the attainment of an unspoken goal of his trip to the United States: that of obtaining large sums in foreign aid and financial credits. This hypothesis was reinforced by the scholarly seriousness of his

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thinker" and "honest administrator." Adhemar's own sheet O Dia not too surprisingly found the same event very useful for future relations between the two countries.

Anniversary of the 1935 Communist uprising was played heavily: Brazil must always remember the "barbarism of totalitarian methods." O Estado went further, mentioned President Goulart as one of the high officials "paving the way for red indoctrinators."

Most commentators sympathized with postponement of San Thiago Dantas' presumed search for U.S. dollars, seeing the delay as time for the government to better formulate the financiá plans and proposals Dantas will try to sell Uncle Sam.

Congress sent Goulart a bill setting up a Brazilian Code of Telecommunications; Goulart vetoed certain sections thus perverting the code into a potent weapon for government control of radio and television. Congress rejected the bill as returned, and most of São Paulo's press applauded.

For the Minister Consul General:

Scott C. Lyon

Scott C. Lyon
Consul

Contributors: DCProper
J. Liebof
J. Mason

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of reported electoral irregularities, the anti-Communist incumbents (and losers) are petitioning the Labor Ministry to annul the elections. The São Paulo Local Union of Taxi-cab Owner-Drivers elected a Communist President in the November 20-29 elections over a non-Communist incumbent who had held the post for 14 years. (OFFICIAL USE ONLY)

Comment: The present Labor Minister (or a similarly Goulart-dominated successor) is unlikely to annul a Communist electoral victory. The Communists' priority interest in dominating the transportation field is demonstrated by their concerted and successful drive to win control of the cab drivers union. (LIMITED OFFICIAL USE)

9. AFL-CIO Representative Visits São Paulo

Serafino ROMUALDI, AFL-CIO Inter-American Representative and Executive Director of the recently-formed American Institute for Free Labor Development (AIFLD), visited São Paulo November 28-30. Through meetings with local labor leaders he achieved his principal objective: to lay the groundwork for the selection of some 30 (including perhaps 11 or 12 from São Paulo) young militantly democratic Brazilian unionists to attend a 3-month AIFLD course in union leadership to begin January 28, 1963, in Washington. (UNCLASSIFIED)

PSYCHOLOGICAL

1. Local Press Reaction

São Paulo editorialists continued to condemn the ChiCom invasion of India, and the Nehru-Menon policies that contributed to the situation. The main point, however, in a number of minds, was the implications of the conflict in terms of communist ideology and policy. Prestigious O Estado de S. Paulo summed up a general view, referring to the differences between Communist China and Russia: "Communism is now at the crossroads of its history...this might mean a bifurcation of the paths Soviet and Chinese Communists will follow in the future."

Leftist-nationalist Ultima Hora was alone in approving Cuba's demand that U.S. military bases be inspected as well as its own.

The paper also directed its irony at Adhemar de Barros' audience with President Kennedy and his subsequent press statements, ridiculing his pretentions as a "political

0529

6. Estado Claims Inside Information on Dantas Mission

On November 25, shortly after ex-Finance Minister San Thiago Dantas' visit to São Paulo (Weekly Summary No. 47), Estado de S. Paulo's lead editorial gave an inside story on Dantas' announced trip to the United States. Estado -- usually careful with its facts if not its criticisms -- believed that the United States Government had already decided to advance Brazil at least one billion dollars in aid and credits. The amount might even go up to two or three billion, according to this story. Some eight hundred million would be used at once to support the cruzeiro, the rest coming along later. Despite its extremely low opinion of the Brazilian government, the paper hoped that the aid would do great good. Later in the week, Estado toned down its expectations. (OFFICIAL USE ONLY)

7. Labor Minister Flubs São Paulo Visit

Labor Minister João PINHEIRO Neto spent approximately 24 hours in São Paulo on November 27-28 in a visit exceptional for its lack of coordination and advance preparation. The Minister met with Paulista textile manufacturers, labor leaders (mostly Communists and fellow travelers), called on Governor Carvalho Pinto and spoke on television. He arrived late for several meetings, canceled others at the last moment, and managed to make a record number of confusing, often self-contradictory, statements. For example: he told the textile manufacturers that the Bank of Brazil would finance payment by employers of the thirteenth-month Christmas bonus. This was promptly denied by the Bank's president. (LIMITED OFFICIAL USE)

Comment: Local non-Communist labor leaders regard the Minister as well-meaning but completely ignorant of the labor field and a "front man" for President Goulart. Pinheiro Neto did nothing in São Paulo to make them change their mind. (LIMITED OFFICIAL USE)

8. Communists Win Control of Two Key Unions

By a margin of only 45 votes out of some 3,000 total, a Communist opposition slate won the November 27 elections for the new directorate of the São Paulo Local Union of Shoe Industry Workers. This union previously had been one of the few important São Paulo City unions in the industrial sector to successfully resist Communist domination. Because

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0527

4. Another Deputy-Elect Loses Right to Hold Office

The Superior Electoral Court on November 27 refused to reconsider the São Paulo Regional Electoral Court's decision that José da Rocha MENDES Filho, as a follower of the illegal Communist Party, was ineligible to run for public office. Rocha Mendes Filho had obtained enough votes in the October 7 election to win re-election as State Deputy (though the term "Deputy-elect" used in the title is an inaccurate simplification, the candidate never really having been legally registered). The decision was similar to that which ruled out several other candidacies on November 21 (Weekly Summary No. 48), except that the candidate claimed not to be a Communist and produced Novos Rumos' disclaimers of him to prove it. (UNCLASSIFIED)

Comment: Rocha Mendes Filho was until recently a member of the Brazilian Communist Party, so the Regional Electoral Court's case seems to have been sound despite the candidate's evidence that he did not have Communist backing in his campaign. The Superior Electoral Court, in any event, is theoretically entitled to review only the legal aspects of the case and not the facts supporting the Regional Electoral Court's application of the law. Probably Rocha Mendes, like the others declared ineligible, will take his case to the Supreme Court. The question of what to do with the votes which he and the others received is still in the air. (OFFICIAL USE ONLY)

5. Catholic Priest Repeats Communist Line

Father Alipio de FREITAS, whose standing as a Roman Catholic priest was not contested by the local Church hierarchy, spoke at the headquarters of a Communist-controlled São Paulo union on November 23. According to press reports, he was of Portuguese birth and had just become a naturalized Brazilian citizen. He reportedly claimed that the "North American imperialists" had more than 32,000 soldiers disguised as Peace Corpsmen in the Brazilian northeast alone. He likewise followed the Communist line on Cuba, the United States, private enterprise, the futility of elections, and so forth. He said that he had been arrested by the Brazilian Army as a member of the Ligas Camponesas and kept imprisoned sixty-four days. Many priests in the northeast, he was quoted as saying, had given up preaching rather than preach lies. (UNCLASSIFIED)

Comment: Some Catholic clergymen have cooperated with Communists in São Paulo, but this is the first case which has come to the Consulate General's attention of an apparently outright Marxist/Leninist priest. (LIMITED OFFICIAL USE)

0526

hydroelectric project, President Goulart was warmly grateful for Italian financing. Foreign capital investments of this kind, he said, helped the "economic emancipation" of Brazil. According to press reports on his short, extemporaneous speech, he mentioned the goal of "Brazilian economic emancipation" four times. He welcomed all foreign investments which contributed to "emancipation" but was against a certain type of capital, which comes to speculate in our country, which comes here to get rich at the cost of the suffering and misery of the Brazilian people." He did not explain the differences between good and bad capital in detail, but he did approve of that "which comes to collaborate with us in the field of iron and steel (siderurgico), in the electric energy field, and in other fields of fundamental importance to the basic infrastructure of our development ...." (UNCLASSIFIED)

Comment: This throws some light on the difference between "good" and "bad" capital, since it specifically throws in the former category energy, iron and steel and "basic" investments. It leaves uncertain the status of the vast majority of actual or potential American private investment in Brazil. (LIMITED OFFICIAL USE)

3. Referendum Campaign in Low Gear

Three of the four Governors present at the Urubupungá inauguration on November 26 (item 2) came out publicly and unequivocally for a return to presidentialism: Fernando Correia da COSTA of Mato Grosso, Ney BRAGA of Paraná, and Celso RAMOS of Santa Catarina. The discreet Mr. Carvalho Pinto reportedly gave the press an informal, soft-spoken interview which was also mildly in favor of a "no" vote to parliamentarianism in the January 6 referendum (plebiscite). Hugo de FARIA, Chief of the President's Civil Household, visited São Paulo to drum up interest in the issue but got very little publicity. Deputy Almino AFFONSO, on the same errand, was less fortunate. In a single statement he argued (a) that Brazil had for practical purposes returned to a presidential system in any case; (b) that the nation's pressing problems continued because the President had insufficient authority to deal with them under the parliamentary system. Goulart's São Paulo opponents did not let the inconsistency pass without comment. In general, mounting concern with national problems -- sometimes expressed as opposition to the President -- still seems greatly to outweigh Paulista interest in the January 6 vote. (LIMITED OFFICIAL USE)

0525

the unionization and could not send his police on a conflicting mission. The São Paulo court's injunction was then suspended by the Federal Court of Appeals (Tribunal Federal de Recursos) pending the higher court's decision on the case. This did not alter the fact that the Navy Minister had previously acted in apparent open contempt of a Brazilian court. Judge Davis formally denounced the Minister to the Federal Chamber of Deputies, calling his intervention an "unspeakable act of piracy" against São Paulo. The judge holds that the Chamber must now decide whether the Minister committed a "crime of responsibility." Governor CARVALHO PINTO sent a muted protest to the President, the State Legislative Assembly protested violently at both the Federal intervention and the Governor's meekness, and numerous private groups likewise made violent protests.

The confrontation stemmed from the refusal of the Santos Local Union of Stevedores to admit to membership several hundred stevedores (termed "bagrinhos" - catfish) holding temporary credentials from the Santos Port Captain. With the help of the Communists, and reportedly on orders from Goulart labor hatchet-man Gilberto Crockatt de SÁ, the present directors forcibly seized control of the stevedores' union in September and deposed the former President. The latter had to be "purged", in the eyes of Goulart's labor advisers, for his opposition to the Goulart-instigated July 5 and September 14 political strikes in Santos and his participation in the Democratic Union Movement (Movimento Sindical Democratico - MSD). The current lineup there had the deposed union president and MSD leaders on the side of the bagrinhos, opposed by the present illegal union directorate supported by Goulart and the Communists. (LIMITED OFFICIAL USE)

Comment: This affair was a vivid example of Goulart's disregard for democratic institutions when his personal power base is threatened. (It does not seem likely that the Navy Minister was acting as other than the President's instrument.) The immediate effect of the incident has been to increase the already loud opposition to the President coming from important São Paulo circles. (LIMITED OFFICIAL USE)

2. Goulart on Helpful vs. Harmful Foreign Investments

Speaking November 26 at the signing of contracts for financing the Urubupungá (São Paulo and Mato Grosso)

0524

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

AIRGRAM

732.00/12-562

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HANDLING INDICATOR

TO : DEPARTMENT OF STATE

INFO : RIO DE JANEIRO, BRASILIA

1962 DEC 7 AM

DEPARTMENT OF STATE
BUREAU OF
INTER-AMERICAN AFFAIRS
DEC 7 1962

RM/AN
ANALYSIS & DISTRIBUTION BRANCH

FROM : AmConGen, SÃO PAULO

DATE: December 5, 1962

SUBJECT: Weekly Summary No. 49

REF :

ORIG	ACTION
	ARA-4
RMR 1	REP 1
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ARA	EUR
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NEA	CU
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TR	XMB
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ARMY 5	CIA 15
NAVY 5	
OSD 12	USIA 8
NSA 3	
	NSC 2

File
no action
ARA/ESP:RB
1/14/63
RJ Burton

TABLE OF CONTENTS

POLITICAL

1. Navy Minister Blocks Court Order
2. Goulart on Helpful vs. Harmful Foreign Investments
3. Referendum Campaign in Low Gear
4. Another Deputy-Elect Loses Right to Hold Office
5. Catholic Priest Repeats Communist Line
6. Estado Claims Inside Information on Dantas Mission
7. Labor Minister Flubs São Paulo Visit
8. Communists Win Control of Two Key Unions
9. AFL-CIO Representative Visits São Paulo

PSYCHOLOGICAL 1. Local Press Reaction

FILED
JAN 15 1963

POLITICAL

1. Navy Minister Blocks Court Order

When a São Paulo civil court ordered admission of non-unionized stevedores into a Communist-influenced, pro-GOULART union in Santos, the Navy Minister acted fast to preserve law and order -- by forcefully blocking the court's injunction. Judge Francis Selwyn DAVIS, who had issued the injunction, asked the São Paulo State Government for police to enforce it. He was turned down: the Governor had been officially informed that a detachment of marines was being sent to block

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Drafted by: See last page/el 12/4/62

Contents and Classification Approved by:

Clearances:

CA-6406
12-12-62

0523

7. UEP Initiates Movement in Favor of "Socialization and Liberty"

Based on the theme "Socialization and Liberty" the Pernambuco Students Union this week launched a "movement" of popular political education which will try to bring about a "profound change in the economic and social structure of Brazil." The UEP initiated this latest extra-curricular activity by distributing a note to the press spelling out the "movement's" basic principles, and seemingly attempting to define for the "movement" an ideology containing elements of both capitalism and communism. (UNCLASSIFIED)

Comment: The "movement" itself is not likely to attract much attention outside of student circles and is probably without significance. The statement of principles, however, is of considerable interest as an accurate reflection of the political-economic views of the university student in this area. A translation is being prepared for submission to the Department. (OFFICIAL USE ONLY)

PSYCHOLOGICAL

"Were it not for the enormous popular curiosity surrounding his person, the campaign of Governor Leonel Brizzola in the Northeast in favor of presidentialism would have suffered a tremendous flop." Thus, the visit of Brizzola to the Northeast was described by a writer in Jornal do Commercio. It is debateable whether the United States suffered more at the hands of Brizzola or whether Brizzola suffered more at the hands of the local press and television. Jornal do Commercio devoted more coverage to the visit than even Ultima Hora which was rather more conservative than usual in its coverage. Diario de Pernambuco carried only a brief story of his arrival. The reason for this, explained one local journalist, was that Brizzola paid Jornal and Ultima Hora for the coverage, but did not pay Diario.

In addition to the above comment, Brizzola received rather harsh treatment at the hands of other columnists and in three commentaries on "Correspondente 6", a nightly show on Channel 6. Mr. Brizzola's trip to this area could not be termed a success for him.

Wayne S. Smith
Per
Lowell C. Kilday
American Vice Consul

Contributors:
LCKilday
CTucker

0522

to succeed Senator BARROS CARVALHO as President of the State PTB. Although Pessoa de Queiroz will reportedly sit with the PTB in the Senate, he apparently feels that the party apparatus did not support him as fully as it should have in the recent elections, and thus accepts no obligation to strengthen the party by serving as its state head. Senator-elect JOSE ERMIRIO de MORAIS and his suplente Professor PINTO FERREIRA, are now the leading candidates for the job. (OFFICIAL USE ONLY)

5. Cid Sampaio Denies Anti-American Statements

Governor Cid Sampaio issued an official statement to the press this week denying the truth of wire service reports that during a press conference in Rio de Janeiro he had called for a break in U.S.-Brazilian relations as a solution to Brazil's economic problems. "Such reports, he said, can only be taken as a poor joke." (UNCLASSIFIED)

Comment: This is a good example of the irresponsible reporting and editing that is so prevalent in Northeastern journalism. If anything, Governor Sampaio has become a stouter supporter than ever of the United States. (OFFICIAL USE ONLY)

6. University Students Launch Literacy Campaign

The Pernambuco Students Union announced this week that it would join with the Cultural Extension Service of the University of Recife in a vigorous campaign aimed at achieving a drastic reduction in Pernambuco's high rate of illiteracy (est. 68%). UEP, in cooperation with the Cultural Extension Service, will first offer a short course to university students in the technique of teaching literacy and then will sponsor classes at the University for illiterates between the ages of 14 and 18. The announcement of this program implied that Minister of Education DARCY RIBEIRO would provide financial support. (UNCLASSIFIED)

Comment: The field of literacy erradication has become almost overcrowded as of late. Besides the University and the UEP, the Catholic Church, the Presbyterian Church, the State of Pernambuco, and the City of Recife are engaged in attacks upon the blight of illiteracy. Unfortunately, the campaigns are competitive instead of complementary. The city's course, offered through the Communist-front Movimento de Cultura Popular, probably teaches more politics than it does reading and writing, and the state's course, while not nearly so political, seems to have been created primarily as an alternative to the city's course. The UEP classes, it is to be lamented, will be influenced greatly by the Movimento de Cultura Popular. (OFFICIAL USE ONLY)

0521

Sampaio's argument. The story goes that Brizzola was extremely rattled and extremely angry when he terminated the call. (LIMITED OFFICIAL USE)

2. Rural Labor Union Leaders Meeting Concludes

The two week meeting of rural labor union leaders (See Weekly Summary No. 21) concluded on Friday, November 30. Led by Padre PAULO CRESPO and MARIA JULIETA COSTA CALAZANS, the group of rural syndicate leaders from Maranhão, Sergipe, Piaui, Ceara, Rio Grande do Norte, Bahia, Paraiba, Pernambuco, and Rio Grande do Sul had discussed the various problems confronting the rural labor union movement, proposed solutions, and ultimate goals. Prior to adjournment, the group wired an appeal to the Minister of Labor to act on the application of some 120 various unions and four federations (Rio Grande do Norte, Sergipe, Pernambuco, and São Paulo) for approval and recognition as registered labor organizations. On conclusion of the meeting, it was announced that the First National Convention of Rural Syndicates will be held in Natal from June 15 to 20, 1963, and that the 2nd Congress of Rural Workers of the Southern Region of Brazil will be held in Porto Alegre from June 13 to 16, 1963. (UNCLASSIFIED)

Comment: As Padre Crespo remarked to an officer of the Consulate General who visited the group, it is a comment on the times in Brazil that the Ministry of Labor makes almost daily announcements of its intention to help the rural worker to organize while at the same time refusing to act on applications for recognition that were submitted to the Ministry by organized unions over four months ago. (OFFICIAL USE ONLY)

3. Soviet Wheat Arrives in Recife

Ten thousand tons of wheat from the Soviet Union were offloaded in Recife last week from the Yugoslav merchant vessel Ravni Kotari.

Giving the appearance of either cooperation or competition, depending on the eye of the viewer, the Greek-owned freighter North Marchioness pulled into port the same day, tied up next to the Yugoslav vessel, and started to offload five thousand tons of wheat from the United States. (UNCLASSIFIED)

4. Pessoa de Queiroz Rejects Presidency of State PTB

It became known in Recife this week that Senator-elect FRANCISCO PESSOA de QUEIROZ, owner of the powerful Pernambuco communications combine headed by Recife's Jornal do Commercio, has rejected an offer

0520

The United States, Brizzola repeatedly told his audiences in Recife, Jaboatão, Caruaru, Garanhuns, João Pessoa, Campina Grande, and Maceio, was responsible for all of Brazil's ills. Brazil's relations with the United States had descended to the level of promiscuity. Brazil's commercial relations with the United States favored only the United States, and thus should be sharply curtailed or suspended in favor of a transfer of Brazilian commerce to the socialist countries and Europe. The Alliance for Progress would resolve nothing. The Peace Corps was a paramilitary organization and he would soon demand from the Council of Ministers the explulsion from Brazil of all volunteers.

During the second day of his visit, Brizzola received from the State Assembly of Pernambuco the title of Honorary Citizen of Pernambuco. This honor was voted him in October, 1961 for his "noble defense of the Constitution" of August, 1961. Interestingly enough, Brizzola did not harangue the State Assembly as he did all other audiences during his visit. Although he did touch upon the "spoilation from which Brazil suffers" the greater part of his speech was dedicated to a pleas for the abolition of the parliamentary system and the address reportedly was mild and reasoned.

Finally, Brizzola came very close to involving himself in a local squabble among Recife's extreme leftists over who will be the "nationalist" candidate for Mayor of Recife in August, 1963. Brizzola apparently was all primed to speak in favor of the candidacy of ALNIR BRAGA, President of the Rede Ferroviario do Nordeste, when local supporters of PELOPIDAS SILVEIRA convinced him that he would only harm himself by entering this family dispute. Braga and one of his main supporters for the candidacy, Federal Deputy LAMARTINE TAVORA, who had done most of the organizing work for Brizzola's visit, even supplying a 2,000 man claque to greet him at the airport, must have been more than a little miffed when Brizzola suddenly backed down from his commitment to speak in Braga's favor. (LIMITED OFFICIAL USE)

Comment: Brizzola had reason to be disappointed with the reception which greeted him in Recife. Aside from the railway workers claque at the airport, and the "descamisados" who filled the Teatro Santa Isabel to listen to his T-V harangue, Recife seemed noticeably cool toward Brizzola. Reportedly, he was greeted more warmly in some of the other cities he visited, but in Maceio, the press reported, a fist fight broke out among members of his audience and his appearance had to be suspended.

An interesting sideline is that Governor CID SAMPAIO is said to have almost dismembered Brizzola in an argument which took place during Brizzola's call on the Pernambuco governor. First hand reports indicate that Governor Sampaio challenged Brizzola's assertions that the United States was the bane of Brazil's existence, and that Brizzola could not match the logic of

05 19

ORIGIN/ACTION

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RM/R 1	REP 1	AF
ARA	EUR	FE
NEA	CU 3.	INR 5
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	Belem 1	
AGR	COM	FRB
INT	LAB 6	TAR
HEW 7	XMB	AIR 4
ARMY 5	CIA 15	NAVY 5
OSD 12	USIA 8	NSA 3
Belo Horizonte 1		

DEPT. PASS
BELEM
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BELO HORIZONTE

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

AIRGRAM

732.00/12562

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A-56 — LIMITED OFFICIAL USE — CH 2 30

NO. — HANDLING INDICATOR

1962 DEC 12

TO : DEPARTMENT OF STATE

INFO: RIO DE JANEIRO, BRASILIA, SAO PAULO
Porto Alegre-1
Curitiba-1

RMAN ANALYSIS & DISTRIBUTION BRANCH

FROM : Amconsul RECIFE — DATE: December 5, 1962

SUBJECT : Weekly Summary No. 23

REF :

file
POL 15-1/ES 15-1
12/3/62
R. J Burton
noaction

DEPARTMENT OF STATE BUREAU OF INTER-AMERICAN AFFAIRS DEC 13 1962

TABLE OF CONTENTS

POLITICAL

1. Governor Brizzola in the Northeast
2. Rural Labor Union Leaders Meeting Concludes
3. Soviet Wheat Arrives in Recife
4. Pessoa de Queiroz Rejects Presidency of State PTB
5. Cid Sampaio Denies Anti-American Statements
6. University Students Launch Literacy Campaign
7. URP Initiates Movement in Favor of "Socialization and Liberty"

PSYCHOLOGICAL

POLITICAL

1. Governor Brizzola in the Northeast

Governor Leonel Brizzola spent five days in the Northeast last week, arriving in Recife on November 26 and departing Maceio on December 4. While the ostensible purpose of his visit was to campaign in favor of a "No" vote in the January plebiscite, it became very clear that the plebiscite was the least of his concerns. One rather got the impression that he was here first to agitate, and secondly to agitate against the United States.

FORM 4-62 DS-323

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Drafted by:

Contents and Classification Approved by:

Clearances:

05 18

WITHDRAWAL NOTICE

RG: 059

TAB #: 5

ENTRY: CDF60-63

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Document Date: 04/12/62

Document Ser.#:

AGRAM A-648 FR BRASILIA OFFICE TO STATE

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0517

b. Pôrto Alegre, the home of Varig Airlines, was struck a harsh blow this week by the loss of a Varig Boeing 707 at Lima. In an obvious political play, Governor Brizola interrupted his campaign for presidentialism in the Northeast to attend the funeral services for RGS crew victims, but will return to the hustings next Sunday, according to the press.

Varig has now replaced most of its Constellation Super-G service between Pôrto Alegre, São Paulo and Rio de Janeiro with Electra II aircraft. One of the advantages of the new aircraft is that they can land at Santos Dumont Airport in downtown Rio rather than the more inconvenient Galeão.

c. The overwhelming rejection by the Federal Chamber of President Goulart's objections to the Código Nacional de Telecomunicações was received with great relief in RGS, particularly since the information media of this State had taken the leadership in the campaign allerting the country to the menace to the press and radio freedom.

d. As a result of the long dry spell which RGS has gone through over the past several months, a severe water shortage is threatening Pôrto Alegre and while city authorities are working under forced draft in order to overcome the chronic deficiencies in the waterworks system, the Mayor has called on people to conserve water as much as possible pending much needed rain to raise the reserve levels.

e. Two local newspapers are reportedly in severe financial difficulties. The Jornal do Dia, Roman Catholic-oriented morning daily may have to cease operations unless the church steps in with substantial assistance. The sensation-seeking and often left-lining Ultima Hora of the Samuel Wainer chain, is also in critical financial condition and it is understood that it has been two months since its employees were last paid. Local director Neu Reinert has been fired and Wainer reportedly has directed that the paper support the Meneghetti government in an effort to keep the paper's head above water.

Frederick D. Sharp III 09 DEC

Frederick D. Sharp III
American Consul

cc.: Consular Affairs, Rio
Political Section, Rio
Political Section, Brasília
ARA/EST/Brazil, Washington
INR/RAR/P, Washington

0516

c. On the plebiscite front, the ADP has announced that it will campaign for parliamentarianism while the PSD, as a party, has requested guidance from the National Directorate. The forces supporting the return to presidentialism have undertaken a campaign to influence public opinion in this direction and the city of Pôrto Alegre is fairly well painted with the word não while sleek and convincing advertisements appealing to the people to vote against the parliamentary system have began to appear in the press.

d. Governor Leonel Brizola's inflammatory speech delivered in Recife last Friday night was rebroadcast locally by means of tape recording that same night. Having urged the breaking off of economic and commercial relations with the U.S. and the establishment of close contacts with Europe in his TV encounter with Breno Caldas and Arlindo Pasqualini (see item 2d, Weekly Summary Nº32, A-24, November 27, 1962) the Governor, from Recife, clarified which part of Europe he meant by specifically mentioning the "socialist countries of Europe". He said that this was the only way to stop Brazil's inflation and to stop its economic crisis. Every mention of the Alliance for Progress during that speech was greeted with cat-calls and boos, although this could have been anticipated by the packed house of ultra-nationalist leftists sympathizers in attendance. Brizola also said that he intended to make a formal representation against the Peace Corps to the Brazilian National Security Council in the near future, alleging that the Peace Corps is a paramilitary organization bent on subverting the Northeast. Today's press carries an interview granted by Brizola following his return to Pôrto Alegre on Sunday in which he gives as a foregone conclusion the return to presidentialism following the January 6 plebiscite. He went on to say that 1963 will be the year of important changes. The Governor stated that he was impressed with the great number of Americans which he observed in the Northeast and he said "even the military authorities with whom I spoke on this subject made me able to ascertain that no one knows what that group is up to there. And no American takes his wife or his children to the Northeast". While most knowledgeable gaúchos seem to brush off Brizola's diatribes against the U.S. as the thrashing of a wildman, it seems more than probable that they underestimate the impact he may be having on the virtually uneducated masses elsewhere in Brazil for his demagogic appeal is well recognized. It seems odd that while Brizola is preaching against the Alliance for Progress on the Brazilian national stage, that Plinio Kroeff, president of the RGS Federation of Industries, should be crying aloud in Rio that RGS is one of the states which most needs Alliance for Progress investments.

e. While it probably will not bear fruit, the local PSD is attempting to obtain from the Tribunal Regional Eleitoral the cancellation of the seating of Pôrto Alegre municipal councilman Marino dos Santos as the sole Aliança Republicana Socialista (i.e. Communist) State Deputy on the grounds that he is a self-confessed Communist.

2. Miscellany

a. Capitão de Fragata Sidney Hélio Melecchi formally took over as Port Captain for RGS on November 28.

05 15

ACTION		
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ARA	EUR	FE
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DEPARTMENT OF STATE

AIRGRAM

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732.00/12-462

FOR RM USE ONLY

A-25 NO. — OFFICIAL USE ONLY — AIR POUCH HANDLING INDICATOR

TO : DEPARTMENT OF STATE

1962 DEC 11 AM 10 35

RM/AN ANALYSIS & DISTRIBUTION BRANCH

FROM : Amconsul PÔRTO ALEGRE DATE: DEC - 4 1962

SUBJECT : PÔRTO ALEGRE WEEKLY SUMMARY Nº 33

REF :

DEPARTMENT OF STATE BUREAU OF INTER-AMERICAN AFFAIRS DEC 12 1962

File ARA/EST/B no action - 12-18-62 R. Burton

1. Political
2. Miscellany

1. Political

a. Over the past week the press has been full of rumors concerning the composition of Meneghetti's cabinet, with a formal announcement promised by the end of this week. Thus far the only firm appointment is that of Daniel Faraco (reelected PSD Federal Deputy) who is to be Secretary of Economy. The naming of Faraco would be a good omen for he is a most experienced RGS political figure who has served on the Finance Committee in the Federal Chamber.

b. Not to be outdone by the Federal Government in this field, the 1963 budget for the State of Rio Grande do Sul passed by the Legislative Assembly this week, shows a deficit for next year of 20 billion cruzeiros, with expenditures of 79 billion cruzeiros as against 59 billion cruzeiros of receipts. Following this deficit spending pattern, the 1963 budget of Pôrto Alegre will show a deficit of 550 million cruzeiros with 4.49 billion cruzeiros in expenditures as against 3.94 billion cruzeiros in receipts. How these deficits are to be made up has not been mentioned but one would assume that Federal funds will be forthcoming and/or short term obligations will be issued by the State and Municipal governments to cover the shortage.

FORM 4-62 DS-323 — OFFICIAL USE ONLY — FOR DEPT. USE ONLY ☒ In ☐ Out

Drafted by:	Contents and Classification Approved by:
FDS/zms 12/4/62	FDSharp
Clearances:	

05 14

relations with Latin America, in a continuation of President Roosevelt's Good Neighbor policy, the general interpretation of the election results has given rise to a considerable degree of favorable comment.

One editorial commented that the President's victory would enable him to give the Alliance a new push. "This is the reason," the editorial concluded, "for the favorable repercussion the U.S. election results have had in our midst." Another editorial voiced the view that the elections had enhanced President Kennedy's prestige and authority and, in an approving tone, gave as one of the reasons for this outcome the decisive way in which the President had forced the Soviet Union to withdraw from its position in Cuba.

5. Appraisal of October Elections in Minas Gerais

(See Consulate's A-26, dated November 23, 1962.)

Edmund A. da Silveira,
American Consul

0513

the beginning of the Magalhães Pinto Administration. The election losses, however, have shaken the Party machinery with the result that serious thought is being given within the Party to the idea of collaboration with the State Government. The fact that Vice Governor Clovis Salgado is a member of the PR hierarchy and is not on too friendly terms with the Governor does not augur well for the materialization of PR support.

3. Reaction to U.S.-Cuban Crisis (Cont'd)

Public comment on the U.S.-Cuban crisis has dwindled considerably as the possibilities of averting actual warfare have improved. Such comment as there is continues to be preponderantly favorable to the actions and attitude of the United States in the Cuban case.

Typical of the reaction the Consulate has observed was an editorial appearing in the widely read Estado de Minas of November 6 which expressed approval of the Government of Brazil decision to confirm the vote of the Brazilian representative in the Organization of American States in favor of the blockade. The editorial pointed out that had Brazil voted against the blockade, not only would the country be acting in isolation of the other American states but would also be committing suicide in the process. Other editorial opinion has suggested a revision of Brazilian attitudes to conform with the demonstrated fact that Cuba has become an occupied country.

Even Federal deputy San Tiago Dantas, now slated for the post of Minister of Finance, has apparently back-tracked from his previous views on the blockade. At a press interview in Belo Horizonte in early November, he stated that Brazil's opposition at Punta del Este to sanctions against Cuba was based on the absence of any specific evidence showing the Cuban Government as a military threat. On October 22, he said, what was placed before the Organization of American States was a concrete fact demonstrating the existence of a definite threat of military aggression. Therefore, he concluded, Brazil's vote for measures to impede the arrival of armaments in Cuba and the use of nuclear weapons in the Hemisphere was right and necessary. He also stressed the need to remove from Cuba all Soviet-installed nuclear bases and to terminate the military liaison between Cuba and the Soviet Union. He added, however, in connection with his stand on the right of self-determination for the Cuban people, that the existence of foreign military bases in a country did not abrogate that right and gave as an example the location of Soviet and U.S. military bases on foreign soil.

4. Comments on U.S. Election Results

The results of the November elections in the United States have been generally interpreted as strengthening the Democratic Party and President Kennedy's Administration and, by implication, as a sign of approval of the Alliance for Progress. Because the Alliance has always been linked in the public mind with a desire on the part of the Kennedy Administration to improve

05 12

without the popular mandate that only a plebiscite can provide, the President can never claim or exercise effective power, a situation that would have adverse repercussions also on State governors. It is evidently to prevent that kind of situation from arising that the Governor has been consolidating support for his plans from all political quarters in and outside of Minas Gerais and intends to engage in a personal campaign to persuade the electorate throughout Brazil of the necessity to go to the polls on January 6. Acceptance of Governor Magalhães Pinto's thesis is evidenced in a State PTB directive, sponsored in part at least by Federal deputy San Tiago Dantas, which aims at promoting the plebiscite idea throughout Minas Gerais.

2. Governor Magalhães Pinto's Efforts to Strengthen His Position in The State Legislative Assembly

Governor Magalhães Pinto has been sounding out several party leaders outside the UDN for the purpose of organizing the support he vitally needs in the new State Legislative Assembly. The Assembly's failure to cooperate in the past two years with the Governor and the changes in the legislative house resulting from the recent elections point to the urgency of the Governor's search for reliable support.

Since the UDN holds only 26 seats in the Assembly out of a total of 82, the Administration has somehow to persuade a minimum of 16 non-UDN deputies to vote with the UDN. Indications are that other parties think that one or two Cabinet posts, in the expected Cabinet reorganization in January, would be the best possible form of persuasion.

So far the evidence is that the best chances from the Governor's point of view lie with the PTB, which holds 12 seats in the Assembly. The Governor's close support of President Goulart's policies, the measure of collaboration the State PTB had already been lending the State Government in the last few months prior to the elections, and the fact that the State PTB did not do too well in the last elections are all factors that strengthen the Governor's bargaining position. He has now reinforced his hand by supporting the candidacy of San Tiago Dantas for Minister of Finance who would presumably be the Minas Gerais representative in the Federal Cabinet. Despite the Governor's favorable bargaining position, it has transpired from conversations between PTB Senator Camilo Nogueira da Gama, the president of the State section of the PTB, and the Governor, that the PTB is holding out for two Cabinet posts, those of Agriculture and Public Health.

Although the support of the PTB alone would not suffice to give the Administration the necessary majority in the Assembly, political circles feel that the Governor could get the additional votes from among the minor parties represented in the Assembly. Gossip is rampant with respect to the possible collaboration also of the Republican Party (PR). The PR, which is still considered one of the four major parties in the State despite serious losses suffered in the October elections, has been in the opposition since virtually

05 11

the plebiscite. His position became official with the publication on November 25 of a manifesto signed by him.

The Governor's manifesto was addressed to the people of Minas Gerais and marked the official opening of the pro-plebiscite campaign in the State. The manifesto, in which the Governor urges the people to assert effectively their participation in the decisions of the government, asks the electorate to demand without further delay the basic reforms which the nation so dramatically requires.

More interesting than the manifesto itself, in the context of the present political struggle to increase Presidential powers, was the press interview the Governor gave when he issued the manifesto. The interview underlined the enormous differences that exist between his position and that of his own party, the National Democratic Union (UDN), at the national level. By way of explaining why he does not share his party's criticism of President Goulart, the Governor stated that in his opinion the President can be criticised and made responsible for his actions only after the re-establishment of the Presidential regime, for under the present regime the business of governing is really the prerogative of the Cabinet.

At one point in the course of the interview, the question of reform of the political party system was brought up again in connection with the Governor's opposition to parliamentarianism. He criticised the parliamentary regime for permitting an excessive number of parties and for ruling through party hierarchies. This situation, he stressed, vitiated the democratic process and left Brazil without leaders with a cause or program to serve; instead what the country had was party presidents.

Comment: The Governor's manifesto came only after a series of consultations with a number of political leaders, including the State of Bahia's Governor-elect, Lomanto Junior, and Minas Gerais re-elected Senator Camilo Nogueira da Gama, both from the Labor Party (PTB). There seems to be little doubt in anybody's mind that the people want to get rid of the present form of parliamentarianism. There is some doubt, however, whether the electorate, being weary after the October election and lacking even the stimulus of having particular candidates to vote for, will go to the polls in large enough numbers to provide the country with a clear-cut decision. A poor showing at the polls would also have the effect of strengthening the determination of the opposition to restrict the powers of the President through legislative action. For these reasons, there is a school of thought that contends that since the will of the people is already known, the Additional Act, which brought in the parliamentary system at a time of political crisis, can be revoked without the costly process of a plebiscite. Despite this line of reasoning, the Governor fears that

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ARMY 5	CIA 10	NAVY 5
OSD 12	USIA 8	NSA 3

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

AIRGRAM

732.00/12-362

A-28 NO. | OFFICIAL USE ONLY | HANDLING INDICATOR

TO : DEPARTMENT OF STATE

1962 DEC 9 AM 8 34

INFO : Rio de Janeiro - Brasilia

RM/AN ANALYSIS & DISTRIBUTION BRANCH

FROM : AMCONSUL, Belo Horizonte

DATE: December 3, 1962

SUBJECT : POLITICAL SUMMARY FOR NOVEMBER, 1962 STATE OF MINAS GERAIS

REF : --

DEPARTMENT OF STATE BUREAU OF INTER-AMERICAN AFFAIRS 1 Copy Retention ARA/AEA/B 12/10/62 Ralph Burton

Table of Contents

1. Administration Manuevers for the Plebiscite
2. Governor Magalhães Pinto's Efforts to Strengthen His Position In The State Legislative Assembly
3. Reaction to U.S.-Cuban Crisis (cont'd)
4. Local Comment on U.S. Congressional Election Results
5. Appraisal of October Elections in Minas Gerais.

Following the very busy election campaign, November was by contrast a quiet month in political developments. It was a period spent for the most part in preparation for the scheduled January 6 plebiscite and in negotiations between the State Government and political leaders aimed at power arrangements. Comments on the Cuban situation continued but with diminishing intensity. The U.S. Congressional election results were well received and given good press and radio coverage.

1. Administration Manuevers for the Plebiscite

FILED

Although the question of whether there will be a plebiscite for the people to decide on a return to a strengthened Presidential regime has been in some doubt, Governor Magalhães Pinto, after consultations with other political leaders, has taken a definite stand in favor of holding

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Drafted by: EdeSilveira:kfk 11/30/1962 | Contents and Classification Approved by:

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INCOMING TELEGRAM — Department of State

47-W
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Control: 1072
Rec'd: December 3, 1962
9:00 p.m.

051

FROM: Rio de Janeiro

TO: Secretary of State

NO: 1072, December 3, 6 P.M. (SECTION 1 OF IV)

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Control: 360
Rec'd: December 1, 1962
7:21 p.m.

INFO:
RM/R FILES

FROM: Rio de Janeiro

TO: Secretary of State

NO: 1067, December 1

FOLLOWING FROM BRASILIA REPEATED YOU FOR INFORMATION:

127 --QUOTE

Hermes Lima confirmed as Prime Minister morning November 30 shortly after midnight November 29 by bare minimum of 164 votes against 37 and 2 abstentions. Since confirmation Prime Minister requires majority of all members, whether present or not, 163 would have represented rejection. Fact that only 203 deputies bothered being present this vote indicates lack effort Lima's and Goulart's own party, PTB, support Goulart nominee.

Failure over last several days of Camara to muster quorum to vote on questions directly related to this problem. PTB deputies have remained off floor until sure of obtaining favorable majority. UDN has accused PTB of deliberately obstructing voting. Yesterday about half PTB deputies left Brasilia, including PTB leader Almino Afonso, who reportedly in disagreement with Goulart. Rumours his resignation now being denied. Signed Keyser

UNQUOTE

GORDON

LM

Rio 1067

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Pol 32.00/12-162

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Control: 364
Rec'd: December 1, 1962
7:45 p.m.

FROM: Rio de Janeiro

732.00

TO: Secretary of State

INFO
RM/R FILES

NO: 1118, December 1, 8 p.m.

Following from Brasilia repeated you:

QUOTE

128, November 30, 10 p.m.

Reference: Telegram 17

We believe Goulart has not been interested forcing confirmation Lima because he felt he would benefit from another crisis just before plebiscite. Such a crisis would have tended to discredit further parliamentary government and tended also whip up added interest people in new election. Last nights confirmation evidently obtained with PSD, PND, UDN votes as well that portion PTB still present, apparently reflection belief conservative parties crisis now not their interest. Signed Keyser.

UNQUOTE

GORDON

DLW/6

Rio Aug 1068

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
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732.00/12-162

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intranquility. Poor Country!" Thus, their lack of confidence in their government vents itself.

Lowell C. Kilday

Lowell C. Kilday
American Vice Consul

Contributors:

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CTu[illegible]

0504

Rio Grande do Sul has purchased the controlling interest in Recife's recently-revived weekly, Jornal Pequeno. Brizzola's interest in the paper is to be managed and controlled by leftist-nationalist Federal Deputy LAMARTINE TAVORA, who intends to retain most of the paper's present staff but will publish daily instead of weekly. Brizzola is said also to have acquired ownership of a radio station in Paraiba's most populous city, Campina Grande.

Brizzola himself, in his first public statement during his current visit to the Northeast, flatly denied the truth of the rumors, thus giving impetus to their circulation. (OFFICIAL USE ONLY)

3. Arraes Quiet on His Government

MIGUEL ARRAES has remained extremely quiet since his election as the next Governor of Pernambuco. With the exception of the one widely-reported press conference in Recife, he has given no public indication here of the policies he will follow in governing the state, nor has he yet indicated who will serve in his cabinet. According to the press, Arraes has spoken publicly once or twice in Rio de Janeiro, but he seems only to have repeated some of the statements he made on October 27. Almost nothing is being said locally of Arraes' probable policies, and there is little speculation regarding the Arraes cabinet. This is quite odd since Recife normally is a city of many rumors and few secrets.

The absence of speculation regarding the Arraes' administration probably means that Arraes himself is only now formulating a program of government and that he still has not selected the persons who will occupy the key positions in his administration. That he is making very few public statements of any kind is taken locally as a sign of recognition that he made a very poor showing in his October 27 meeting with the press. (OFFICIAL USE ONLY)

PSYCHOLOGICAL

Local leftists began beating the drums for the forthcoming visit of Leonel Brizzola by running a box advertisement on page one of all the local newspapers headed in bold type "Nao". The body of the ad explained that the purpose of the visit was to ask the Nordestinos to vote against parliamentarianism. In addition, they began publishing a list of persons and/or organizations who had contributed money to defray the expenses of radio, TV and press publicity and also the expenses of hospitality. The amount given by each contributor is also listed.

The local editorialists confine their activities, for the most part, to their favorite subject--national introspection. They deplore Brazil's place under the sun with such pessimistic offerings entitled "The Orgy of a Poor Country", "Many Plans, Little Execution" (this one deals with SUDENE) and "We Are Going to Ruin". "The reality is the confusion, the dissatisfaction, the strike, the national

0503

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ARMY 5	CIA 10	NAVY 5
OSD 12	USIA 8	NSA 3

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DEPARTMENT OF STATE

AIRGRAM

732.00/11-3062
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A-54 NO.

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HANDLING INDICATOR

TO : DEPARTMENT OF STATE 1962 DEC 10 AM 11 07

INFO: RIO DE JANEIRO, BRASILIA, SÃO PAULO
Recife — Porto Alegre -1 ANALYSIS & DISTRIBUTION BRANCH
Belem -1 Curitiba -1 Belo Horizonte -1

FROM : Amconsul RECIFE DATE: November 30, 1962

SUBJECT : Weekly Summary No. 22

REF :

DEPARTMENT OF STATE BUREAU OF INTELLIGENCE AND RESEARCH DEC 10 1962

File
No action
ARA/CA
12-11-62
Ralph Burton

TABLE OF CONTENTS

POLITICAL

1. New Auxiliary Archbishop for Recife Named
2. Brizzola Reported New Owner of Recife Newspaper
3. Arraes Quiet on His Government

PSYCHOLOGICAL

POLITICAL

1. New Auxiliary Archbishop for Recife Named

It was announced this week that Dom JOSE LAMARTINE SOARES of Rio de Janeiro has been appointed to fill the newly-created position of Auxiliary Archbishop of Recife and Olinda. Judging by his statements to the press following the announcement of his appointment, Lamartine Soares appears to be of that part of the clergy that believes fervently in and strives ardently for the enactment of sweeping democratic social reforms. If so, he shall be a welcome complement to Archbishop Dom CARLOS COELHO, whose interest in social reforms is great but whose energies are flagging. (OFFICIAL USE ONLY)

FILED 2:34 PM

2. Brizzola Reported New Owner of Recife Newspaper

It is widely rumored in Recife that Governor LEONEL BRIZZOLA of

FORM 4-62 DS-323

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Drafted by: See last page/ag

Contents and Classification Approved by:

Clearances:

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[redacted]

RM/R

FILE

[redacted]

Department Telegram No. 1168 to Embassy Rio, November 27, 1962

[redacted]

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(36)

This document consists of 1 pages
No. 3 of 12 Copies, Series A

RM/R

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[redacted]

[redacted]

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

AIRGRAM

SECRET

TO : Amembassy, RIO DE JANEIRO

Copy 1 Series A

FROM : Department of State DATE:

SUBJECT : Plans of Leftist Organization Allegedly Headed by High Brazilian Government Officials

REF : Department's A-122, October 26, 1962

Would appreciate receiving by week December 3 Embassy comment requested in A-122.

[redacted]

SECRET

0499

6. We should press for an active, vigorous, organized and continuing support by the entire Brazilian government and its leadership on behalf of the Alliance for Progress, the Peace Corp and Food for Peace. If we can get the Brazilian leadership committed to move on these fronts and on similar issues, we are forcing them to build a favorable image of the U.S. in Brazil and we put them in opposition to the extreme left who have been getting away with their attacks thus far. This proposal requires a halt to public attacks from GOB officials themselves from the top down (e.g., Furtado and SUDENE officials) and public repudiation of unwarranted charges.

7. The foregoing posture should be maintained at all times by the Ambassador and his top officials in their dealings with President Goulart and other Brazilian government officials. It should also govern the posture of U.S. Government officials in Washington vis-a-vis Brazilian diplomatic representatives and visiting Brazilian officials.

0498

4. Recognize that the foregoing alternative results cannot be brought about principally by U.S. actions but must be generated within Brazil by the Brazilians. Our influence can contribute but cannot be decisive. A too clear injection of U.S. pressures will risk confusing the central issue, i.e., Goulart policies and performance, with U.S. policies and performance.

5. Avoid too drastic a confrontation with Goulart which might cause an unpredictable explosion in any of several directions. This does not foreclose the possibility that a new combination of circumstances may justify such a confrontation.

Suggested Course of Action

1. Phrase discussions of U.S. economic assistance in the context of our desire to help Brazil economically and financially (i.e., we are only asking that the Brazilian Government come forward with a sound plan of its own and evidence of fulfillment so that we have a basis for committing funds and seeking appropriations.) To bring in other issues encourages Brazilian charges that our aid is for selfish economic and political purposes. It also encourages the present Brazilian administration to engage in a kind of reciprocal blackmail at which they are far more adept than we.

2. Expropriations, SUIETEX, profit remittance limitations and the like should be discussed primarily in terms of Brazil's own economic well-being and its need to encourage private investment. U.S. Congressional prescriptions and reactions and their impact on our ability to help Brazil can be brought into discussions but in this context.

3. Any suggestion that the U.S. should be motivated to give aid for fear that Brazil would otherwise seek closer economic ties with the Communist nations, should be rejected. It should be made apparent that the U.S. will not even listen to such blackmail. More than this one might challenge the ability of Goulart or others to carry the Brazilian people in such a direction.

4. Threats of possible anti-U.S. attacks unless we go along with the demands of the Goulart administration should likewise be rebuffed. It should be made clear that we will not do business with Brazil on that basis.

5. We should make clear in all official contacts, especially with Brazilian foreign ministry officials, that the U.S. opposes the recent Brazilian policy line on (a) the role of the OAS in relation to Cuba and (b) on Cuba itself. We should make it clear that we will oppose the Brazilian government on these issues even though we will be working with them in their interests internationally on many other issues.

0497

The chief problem appears to be Goulart himself because of (a) the kinds of political support and alliances he finds essential, (b) his own preoccupation and almost exclusive experience in the field of manipulation for political power, and (c) his incapacity for and apparent lack of interest in giving permanency and drive to constructive social, political and economic objectives for the country.

From past experience it appears that Goulart is a compromiser, one who maneuvers pressures and then retreats or compromises in the face of strong counter-pressures. This suggests that he can make accommodations away from the left as surrounding forces and pressures compel it. It also suggests that he will shift back and forth in response to shifting political pressures and circumstance. Further it is possible that the chaos which can be brought on by his own inadequacies and his inability to follow a consistent constructive course could force an explosion with accompanying political turmoil and violence in which Goulart could be as much or more a victim rather than an instigator.

The following two questions are pertinent in assessing the future in relation to Goulart's capacity for compromise:

1. Will Goulart advisors, after all the encouragement they have had, permit him to compromise toward Congress and the Governors without trying to seize power illegally.

2. Will center-right forces, as they become aware of their strength as a result of Goulart compromises, be willing to stop short of removing him--because so distrusted, weak and unrespected.

Suggested Guidelines to a Course of Action

1. Avoid promoting a polarization of extremes (neither of whose orientation is acceptable to us). Such a polarization produces a situation in which the large mass of Brazilian people can be split or swayed in support or rejection of either extreme.

2. Avoid giving the Goulart Government any basis on which it can divert resentment of the Brazilian people from Goulart to the U.S. In other words we must so select and press specific issues that Goulart will be given the minimum opportunity to mobilize significant resentments against us.

3. Promote the mobilization of a strong, widespread resistance within Brazil which will force the Goulart administration either along lines conducive to more harmonious Brazil-U.S. relations or out of power.

0496

(21) SECRET

SUBJECT: U.S. Government Posture in Existing Political Situation in Brazil.

Existing Political Situation

Shortly after President Goulart returned from his visit to the U.S. last spring he advised the U.S. Ambassador that he had to depend on the small "compact left" group of the PTB (mostly extreme leftists, crypto-communists and communists) as his shock troops in political battle; that the conservative and centrist political forces were all against him. He thereafter forced down the throat of the Congress by crisis tactics a Council of Ministers headed by Brochada da Rocha which reflected the foregoing political orientation and which contrasted with the prior ministry which came closer to being a coalition of the center. When Brochada da Rocha fell by his own political ineptitude, the new provisional ministry headed by Hermes Lima was still a stop-gap arrangement which could not be said to represent in any degree a cross-section of the political thinking in Brazil.

Goulart's alliance with and dependence on the "compact left" has meant that the Goulart government has given a free hand to and condoned the type of thinking that the extremists represent. Attacks against the U.S. and U.S. programs have gone unchallenged. Where pressures have compelled the Goulart administration to go along with us, as in the recent Cuban crisis, this has been accompanied by placating gestures toward the extreme left. In addition Goulart has manipulated military appointments and promotions to bring into key positions officers more responsive to Goulart and to the extreme leftist type of thinking. Under the Goulart regime the extreme leftists have been able to move ahead more freely in their infiltration in the student and labor fields.

Despite the above there are various indications that Goulart and his extremist supporters have not in any serious degree quelled possible effective resistance on the part of democratic elements of center and moderate left and right who constitute a majority. For example, we have had various positive gestures of stronger support for the U.S. from the Brazilian military than from the Brazilian government during the recent Cuban crisis. On the political side Minas Gerais Governor Magalhaes Pinto is mobilizing a coalition of moderate governors to act as a restraining influence working with the Goulart administration. Also Sao Paulo Governor-elect Adhemar de Barros is building alliances to establish counter-political pressure against the Goulart administration. It appears too that the centrist-conservative elements in the Congress, by confirming the nomination of Hermes Lima as prime minister, have outmaneuvered Goulartists and denied them the opportunity to generate a pre-plebiscite crisis over the choice of Hermes Lima. In the area of public unrest, attempts to mobilize widespread strikes and disorders in support of Goulart in the September plebiscite crisis were relatively unsuccessful. There are strong democratic movements among the peasants and in the labor and student fields.

E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.3 NLJ-306-2

SECRET

0495

OPTIONAL FORM NO. 10
5010-106

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

Memorandum

SECRET

This document consists of 5 pages
No. 1 of 9 Copies, Series A

POL-36

TO : ARA - Mr. Martin

DATE: November 30, 1962

FROM : EST - Mr. Wellman

SUBJECT: U.S. Government Posture in Existing Political Situation in Brazil.

There is attached a paper on the above subject prepared in Brazilian Affairs. If you approve it as a basis for discussion, copies will be distributed to representatives of those offices and agencies who will be attending the meeting with Ambassador Gordon on Thursday, December 6, to consider this subject. The analyses and conclusions are tentative and by no means exhaustive, but they should help to focus attention on the principal issues and to suggest courses of action.

Approve: OK EM

Disapprove: _____

Attachment

EST/H.Wellman 11/30/62

SECRET

0494

of action selecting cabinet. From juridical viewpoint, additional act obviously in force for 90 days after plebiscite, but Justice Minister now expresses informal opinion that plebiscite vote for Presidentialism does away with Parliamentary system forthwith.

I can see in all this ample room for further frustrating period of heavy politicking on nature of regime and division of power.

GORDON

MRJ/16

0493

32

INCOMING TELEGRAM *Department of State*

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Control: 12329
Rec'd: November 30, 1962
7:29 p.m.

ACTION: EST/B
INFO:
RM/R FILES

Rio 1062

FROM: Rio de Janeiro

TO: Secretary of State

NO: 1062, November 30, 6 p.m.

Implications January 6 plebiscite.

In separate conversations with Santiago Dantas November 27 and Hermes Lima November 29, I raised question political consequences low participation electorate in plebiscite, even with heavy majority voting against maintenance Parliamentary amendment. Suggested as hypothesis 30 percent attendance with 80 percent of votes favoring Presidentialism. Dantas replied that results juridically would be return of Presidentialism, but President himself would be weakened. That type vote would greatly encourage Congress to seek substantial limitation Presidential powers compared 1946 constitution. At same time, he admitted President in fairly strong bargaining position with Congress, since two-thirds of both houses required for constitutional amendments and 1946 constitution automatically restored 90 days after plebiscite if no other amendments adopted. Lima did not mention weakening of President, and thought even light vote would suffice, provided proportion of actual votes favoring Presidentialism were very large.

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I expressed to both grave concern that 90-day period would be another series of battles and crises between President and Congress. Both admitted possibility, but thought President was committed to acting like real executive once plebiscite over. Lima raised question whether government to be formed after plebiscite would require Parliamentary endorsement under terms additional act. This would considerably limit President's freedom

(1)

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0492

MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION (Cont.)

TORRES, the Brazilian representative with the "nine wise men" of the Alliance for Progress, to form part of his government. Monteiro seemed to consider it likely that Torres would serve.

SCLyon:el 11/26/62

0491

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São Paulo
A-161
Encl. 1
Page 1

MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION

DATE: November 23, 1962

PLACE : Rotary Club, Avenida Higienopolis, São Paulo

SUBJECT : Ary TORRES Reportedly May Form Part of São Paulo State Government Under Adhemar de BARROS

PARTICIPANTS: Humberto MONTEIRO, head of União Cultural Brasil-Estados Unidos
Scott C. LYON, Acting Principal Officer, São Paulo

COPIES TO : AmEmbassy, Rio de Janeiro
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During the course of a luncheon conversation, Humberto Monteiro stated that he had recently conferred with Adhemar de Barros, Governor-elect of the State of São Paulo, who had offered him a "leading position" in the State Government. (Monteiro did not specify what the position would be. He has been mentioned for Secretary of Finance.)

Monteiro said that he had told Adhemar, "I have never voted for you, but I will accept a position for which I consider myself qualified." He explained that he considered it his duty, and that of other businessmen in São Paulo, to support Adhemar in attempting to give good government to the State. He is inclined to give Adhemar a "credit of confidence" despite his past record. He believes that Adhemar is taking correct positions, in support of private enterprise and of the United States.

Adhemar has enlisted a good man in Professor Teótonio Monteiro de BARROS 1/, in Monteiro's opinion. Also Adhemar has asked Ary

1/ Professor de BARROS, a professor of law at the University of São Paulo, is said to be Adhemar's principal representative in São Paulo during Adhemar's current absence from Brazil, according to Vincente de Paula RIBEIRO, a local businessman who has been in fairly close contact with Adhemar recently.

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DEPARTMENT OF STATE

AIRGRAM

732.00/11-2962
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NO. HANDLING INDICATOR 511.323

TO : DEPARTMENT OF STATE

INFO : RIO DE JANEIRO, BRASILIA

1962 DEC 3 PM 12 10
DEPARTMENT OF STATE
BUREAU OF
INTER-AMERICAN AFFAIRS
DEC
ANALYSIS & DISTRIBUTION
BRANCH

FROM : AmConGen, SÃO PAULO

DATE: November 29, 1962

SUBJECT: Ary TORRES Reportedly May Form Part of São Paulo State Government Under Adhemar de BARROS

REF : ConGen A-41 to Department dated August 22, 1962: "EDUCATIONAL AND CULTURAL EXCHANGES: FY 63 Foreign Leader Program -- Nomination of Governor Carlos Alberto Alves de CARVALHO PINTO."

Ary Torres, Brazilian member of the "nine wise men" of the Alliance for Progress, may form part of the Government of the State of São Paulo under Adhemar de Barros, who is to assume the governorship in January 1963, according to Humberto MONTEIRO, a São Paulo businessman who has recently been in contact with Adhemar. See enclosed memorandum of a conversation with Sr. Monteiro.

Should Sr. Torres enter the São Paulo State Government, he might well resign his position as one of the "nine wise men" with the Alliance. In this case consideration might be given to the possibility that the present Governor of the State of São Paulo, Professor Carlos Alberto Alves de Carvalho Pinto, might be available to take Sr. Torres' place.

Professor Carvalho Pinto may be visiting the United States in early 1963, if current plans for a leader grant work out. (See ConGen A-41 under reference.)

For the Minister Consul General:

Scott C. Lyon
Consul

Enclosure: Memorandum of Conversation

FILE

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FORM 4-62 DS-323

Typed by: SCLyon:el 11/26/62

Comments and Classification Approved by:

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São Paulo
A-160
7

The Chicom-India situation, in the general concensus, shows that neutralism is a bad policy in our days because the objectives and appetites of Communism are the same as those of Naziism. General sympathy toward India and the condemnation of China marked the editorials except for Ultima Hora who ignored the touchy subject now troubling the Communist camp.

Little attention was given to this week's meeting of the Communist Party Central Committee in Moscow; leading O Estado de S. Paulo opined that de-stalinization is orienting new trends of the USSR's dominant group; however, it expressed doubts that any significant change will occur in Soviet foreign policy.

For the Minister Consul General:

Scott C. Lyon
Consul

Contributors: D. C. Proper
J. Liebof
J. Mason

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0487

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He complained of Federal neglect, claiming that Acre had been visited by American and German Ambassadors but never by any Brazilian authority, not even those who had been responsible for it as a territory. He took the traditional swing at ex-Petrobrás official Walter LINK for torpedoing chances of finding oil in Acre. (OFFICIAL USE ONLY)

8. New Janguista Regional Labor Delegate Named

José Walter Loureiro COIMBRA replaced Mário Romeo de LUCCA in the post of São Paulo Regional Labor Delegate on November 20. As principal local representative of the Labor Ministry, the São Paulo Delegate plays a key role in the settlement of virtually all wage disputes, strikes, and intra-union squabbles. The previous delegate, a respected labor lawyer and PDC stalwart, was rumored to have resigned in protest over Labor Minister João PINHEIRO Neto's clumsy self-seeking meddling in the settlement of the metalworker strike on October 30-31. The new Delegate is a career Labor Ministry official, a fellow gaucho and a reported crony of President Goulart. According to one prominent local union leader, the two other leading candidates for the job were a Communist labor leader and a protegé of Gilberto Crockatt de SÁ, Goulart's labor adviser. (LIMITED OFFICIAL USE)

Comment: This appointment should afford Goulart greater control over the local labor scene. With the exception of the Communists, there have been relatively few strong Goulart supporters among Paulista union leaders. The change in delegates appears to confirm other more nebulous signs that Goulart is actively seeking to bolster his support in the São Paulo labor movement. (LIMITED OFFICIAL USE)

PSYCHOLOGICAL

1. Local Press Reaction

The Cuban crisis and Communist China's aggression against India were spotlighted in the editorial sections of São Paulo's newspapers this past week. Most local dailies continued to analyze the implications of the Cuban crisis with favorable comments for the United States' position and the feeling that the crisis constitutes a landmark in Soviet foreign policy and that today the USSR is closer to the West than during Stalin's era. Predictably, left-leaning Ultima Hora reasoned that the Soviet Union's retreat in Cuba was for the sake of peaceful co-existence.

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0486

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Party officers using authority delegated to them by a previous convention. It happens, however, that this delegation of convention authority is contrary to PR statutes and, some observers believe, to national electoral law also. (OFFICIAL USE ONLY)

Comment: By this vote against "formalism" -- i.e., the word of the law -- and in favor of political expediency, the Court would appear to have wiped out one of the already feeble legal guards which are available to protect party integrity. Full details of the decision, however, are not yet known to the Consulate General. (LIMITED OFFICIAL USE)

6. General KRUEL Campaigns for Presidentialism and the "Dispositivo"

War Minister Amaury KRUEL, visiting São Paulo on November 20, openly urged that the parliamentary/presidential referendum be held as scheduled on January 6: "Since the people were not heard last August, they should be consulted now." He further held that (a) the national situation was entirely calm; (b) "Brasilia is as untouchable as Petrobrás," denying substance to a rumored return of the capital to Rio de Janeiro; and (c) pooh-poohed reports of Communist infiltration in the military. In this last, he was enthusiastically joined by Second (São Paulo-based) Army commander Pery BEVILACQUA. Bevilacqua reportedly took advantage of the occasion to declare that the military had the duty of taking an interest in all politics except that strictly connected with the parties. "We cannot permit corrupt politicians to muzzle us," he was quoted as saying. (OFFICIAL USE ONLY)

Comment: Perhaps the Kruel visit was connected with mounting São Paulo criticism of the President and his military "dispositivo" ("arrangement" of friendly officers in key posts). The General also did his bit in the referendum campaign. In neither connection did he make any noticeable contribution to the Goulart cause. If anything, he further stirred the opposition. (LIMITED OFFICIAL USE)

7. Acre Governor Queues for São Paulo Help

Third Governor of a poor state to visit São Paulo in the last few days was Acre's José Augusto de ARAUJO, arriving on November 22. The stated purpose of the visit was to obtain investments from São Paulo industry, but Araujo did not follow the example of preceding visitors (Weekly Summaries No. 46 and No. 47)in specifically boosting Adhemar de Barros' "Brazilian Alliance for Progress." He came too late to see Adhemar (item 2) and may not have known whether the "Brazilian Aliança" was intended to apply outside the Northeast.

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0485

to endorse Carvalho Pinto's slogan in the recent gubernatorial campaign: "Good things deserve to continue" ("O que é bom deve continuar"). Adhemar was referring specifically to the "Second Plan of Action" for economic development, which would have been carried out if Carvalho Pinto's choice had been elected -- and, it seems, may still be adopted in large part. In the same vein, Adhemar seems to have invited large numbers of prestigious Paulistas to "participate in his Government" in one way or another, often apparently unspecified. Some of the invitees are from opposition currents. (OFFICIAL USE ONLY)

Comment: Adhemar's intentions for his State Government continue to sound encouraging. He is demonstrating an extraordinary willingness to bend over backwards in politeness to his talented opponents. (LIMITED OFFICIAL USE)

4. KUBITSCHEK Campaigns for Presidentialism -- and Presidency

Ex-President Juscelino Kubitschek visited three São Paulo "interior" cities on November 24, campaigning for a vote in favor of presidentialism in the January 6 referendum. The tenor of the visit was summed up in a passage from one speech: ". . . let us not rest on the conviction that presidentialism does not need our vote. Legislative forces continue active, working against us. And it will be unhealthy for the cause of democracy if our excessive confidence causes abstention [in the referendum]. . . ." (UNCLASSIFIED)

Comment: This is the kickoff of the "plebiscite" campaign in São Paulo, and it comes late. There has been little evident public interest in the issue, and less than a month of campaign time remains before the holiday political paralysis. There is unanimous belief that the public prefers presidentialism, but indifference coupled with opposition to Goulart (item 1) could weaken a manifestation to this effect, as Kubitschek fears.

Though Kubitschek naturally denied that he was already thinking of the 1965 presidential election, he was just as obviously campaigning for it. Most of the speakers who introduced him and gave him "honorary citizenships" were not at all timid about boosting his candidacy. This is one campaign that is getting started in plenty of time. (LIMITED OFFICIAL USE)

5. PR Candidates Allowed to Take Office

The TSE on November 20 decided to allow São Paulo Republican Party (PR) Deputies-elect to take office. The one Federal and several State Deputy candidates in question had been "nominated" by

0484

remains. There is a precedent for crediting the votes to their party, in which case PTB candidates who were not successful in the October 7 elections would move up to a seat as Deputy. Another and later precedent would point to declaring their votes void, in which case the election results would be re-calculated and other parties would profit. The decision is up to the TRE. (UNCLASSIFIED)

Comment: The remaining decision on what to do with the votes is of interest, as it will have an important influence on PTB strength in São Paulo. But the major decision has been taken, and it provides a way to get the Communists out of the legislatures in fact as well as in name. This decision (if upheld by the Supreme Court) could be of the greatest importance, putting real teeth in the long-standing illegality of the Communist Party.

All the candidates barred from office are in fact members of the Brazilian Communist Party (PCB). The Consulate General's information on a few unsuccessful candidates who were also denied registry is less definite, but in general it appears that the TRE acted with discretion and on the basis of good information. The TSE postponed to a later date its decision on José da Rocha MENDES Filho, a recently expelled member of the PCB who ran for State Deputy on the PSB slate, and who was also denied registry by the TRE.

The TSE decision has caused local political observers to speculate that the pending decision on legalizing the Communist Party may also be negative, though there is no evident direct legal connection.

(A more detailed report will be in the pouch with this Summary). (LIMITED OFFICIAL USE)

3. Adhemar Off to U.S.

Governor-elect Adhemar de BARROS left São Paulo on November 19 for a trip to the United States and Europe. He told reporters that he hoped to see the American President but realized that President Kennedy was a very busy man. (Other communications on the subject were exchanged between the Consulate General and the Department.) He meant to get advice on his proposed "Paulista Development Bank (or Fund)" which is shaping up as the principal mechanism of his "Brazilian Alliance for Progress."

Before leaving, Adhemar sent incumbent Governor CARVALHO PINTO an extremely friendly letter. To the press, Barros went so far as

0483

São Paulo Municipal Chamber refused to deliver to Goulart's brother-in-law BRIZOLA an honorary citizenship which he had been voted months earlier. Mendonça (a member of Governor-elect BARROS' PSP) claimed that Brizola's actions in recent months had made him unworthy of the honor. Mendonça seems likely to be re-elected President of the Chamber in December. (b) The Rector of the State-owned but semi-independent University of São Paulo sent President Goulart a public message asking for effective Government leadership in the fight against inflation. The Rector's unprecedented message spoke in the name of the entire Council which runs the University. (c) The São Paulo Commercial Association (representing local business) formally opposed the Government's proposed new tax measures. Main reason given was that the higher taxes would hurt business without effectively combating inflation, since the government gave no evidence of being willing to take the necessary corresponding austerity measures. In effect, the businessmen told the President: "We do not want to give you more money when you have given us every reason to believe that you would misuse it." Business opposition to higher taxes is hardly remarkable, but the reason given for the opposition is significant. (d) The "Democratic Parliamentary Action" group in the State Legislative Assembly released a manifesto accusing the Government of -- among other things -- "criminal exploitation of the financial-economic situation." (e) Leaders of the important local American Chamber of Commerce have indicated that they are pessimistic about the future of free enterprise in Brazil, disillusioned with Goulart, and would consider it in error for the United States to bail the Brazilian President out of his financial predicament. (LIMITED OFFICIAL USE)

2. Communist Candidates Barred from Office

The Regional Electoral Court (Tribunal Regional Eleitoral -- TRE), as reported before the elections, refused to register the legislative candidacies of several men accused of being members of the illegal Communist Party. The candidates appealed to the Superior Electoral Court (TSE), which granted them what amounted to provisional permission to run, pending a final decision on their case. A TSE ruling on November 21 went against them (by refusing to reconsider the lower court's decision), with the President of the Court having to cast the deciding vote to break a three-three deadlock. An appeal will probably be made to the Supreme Court. In the meantime, the following -- all of whom ran on the PTB slate -- have lost their right to take office: Federal Deputy candidates Geraldo Rodrigues dos SANTOS and Rio Branco PARANHOS; State Deputy candidates Luciano LEPERA, Luiz Tenório de LIMA, Mario SCHENBERG, and Oswaldo LOURENÇO. The question of what to do with their votes

0482

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ARMY 5	CIA 10	NAVY 5
OSD 12	USIA 8	NSA 3

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

AIRGRAM

732.00/11-2962

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TO : DEPARTMENT OF STATE

INFO : RIO DE JANEIRO, BRASILIA

FROM : AmConGen, SÃO PAULO DATE: November 29, 1962

SUBJECT: Weekly Summary No. 48

REF :

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12-12-62
R. Burton

TABLE OF CONTENTS

POLITICAL
1. São Paulo Opposition to GOULART Mounts
2. Communist Candidates Barred from Office
3. Adhemar Off To U.S.
4. KUBITSCHEK Campaigns for Presidentialism--and Presidency
5. PR Candidates Allowed to Take Office
6. General KRUEL Campaigns for Presidentialism and the "Dispositivo"
7. Acre Governor Queues for São Paulo Help
8. New Janguista Regional Labor Delegate Named

PSYCHOLOGICAL 1. Local Press Reaction

POLITICAL

1. São Paulo Opposition to GOULART Mounts

President Goulart has never had more than lukewarm popularity in São Paulo, but seldom in recent years -- even during the crisis preceding his taking office as President -- has he aroused so much outright opposition. Examples: (a) The Municipal Chamber of São Bernardo do Campo, an industrial suburb, could not muster a majority large enough to vote "honorary citizenship" to the President (proposals of honorary citizenship are almost never voted down). At the same time, President Hélio MENDONÇA of the

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Typed by: See last page/el 11/27/62

Content and Classification Approved by:

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0481

STATE DEPUTIES (CONTD)

Partido Socialista Brasileiro -- PSB -- Brazilian Socialist Party

	Name	Votes 1962
1.	Cid Franco	15,488
§ 2.	José Rocha Mendes	6,122
	1st Suplente: Raul Schwinden	3,329

§ May be declared ineligible for office on grounds of communism. See text of airgram.

0480

STATE DEPUTIES (CONTD)

Partido Trabalhista Nacional -- PTN -- National Labor Party

Name	Votes 1962
1. José Adolpho Chaves de Amarante	28,037
2. Araripe Serpa	15,201
3. Oswaldo Massei	12,251
4. Ruy de Almeida Barbosa	10,508
5. Francisco Scalamandré Sobrinho	10,387
6. Francisco Amaral	7,774
7. Venicio Camilo Giachini	7,366
8. Jamil Gadia	6,483

Partido de Representação Popular -- PRP -- Popular Representation Party

1. Shiro Kiono	11,753
2. Carlos Kherlakian	11,204
3. Onofre Sebastião Gosuen	7,583
4. Orlando Iazzetti	7,435
5. Nabi Abi Chedid	6,883
6. José da Siveira Sampaio	6,826
7. Wilson Nogueira Lapa	6,625
1st Suplente: Jairo Azevedo	6,048

0479

STATE DEPUTIES -- PRT (CONTD)

Name	Votes 1962
3. Leônidas Ferreira	8,763
4. Jamil Dualibi	7,655
5. Antonio Morimoto	7,210
6. Carlos Renê Egg	6,971
7. Augusto do Amaral	6,801
8. Gustavo Martini	6,432
9. Gualberto Moreira	6,293
1st Suplente: José Sabino	6,069

Partido Social Democrático -- PSD -- Social Democratic Party

1. Conceição da Costa Neves	32,097
2. Pinheiro Júnior	15,754
3. Alfredo Farhat	14,665
4. Juvenal Rodrigues de Moraes	9,339
5. João Hornos Filho	8,806
6. Ioshifumi Utiyama	7,655
7. Domingos José Aldrovandi	7,380
8. Cruz Secco	7,161

0478

STATE DEPUTIES -- UDN (CONTD)

Name	Votes 1962
9. Nelson Perreira	7,175
10. Paulo de Castro Prado	6,513
11. Fioravante Iervolino	6,245
1st Suplente: Nilson Ferreira da Costa	6,154

Partido Social Trabalhista -- PST -- Social Labor Party

1. Pedro Geraldo Costa	16,379
2. João Mendonça Falcão	14,410
3. Adhemar Monteiro Pacheco	8,826
4. Oswaldo Rodrigues Martins	8,482
5. Ubirajara Keutenedjian	8,039
6. Galileu Bicudo	6,628
7. Roberto Gebara	6,080
8. Ariovaldo Roscitti	5,459
9. Jaime Daige	5,152
10. Hozair M. Marcondes	4,986
1st Suplente: Aristides Troncoso Peres	4,247

Partido Rural Trabalhista -- PRT -- Rural Labor Party

1. Januario Mantelli Neto	9,992
2. Pedro Pascoal	9,254

0477

STATE DEPUTIES -- MTR (CONTD)

Name	Votes 1962
4. Paulo Planet Buarque	9,525
5. Murillo de Souza Reis	8,396
6. José Lurtz Sabiá	8,284
7. Herotildes Carvalho de Araujo	8,097
8. Nadir Kenan	7,220
9. Esmeraldo Soares T. de Campos Filho	7,193
10. Juvenal de Campos	7,092
11. Joaquim Gouvêa Franco	6,934
1st Suplente: Lucio Casanova Neto	6,309

União Democrática Nacional -- UDN -- National Democratic Union

1. Camilo Ashcar	17,283
2. Francisco Salgot Castillon	13,912
3. Cesar Arruda Castanho	13,209
4. Israel Dias Novaes	12,566
5. José Luiz Cembranelli	7,977
6. José Costa	7,440
7. Homero Silva	7,422
8. Mario Telles	7,267

0476

STATE DEPUTIES (CONT'D)

Partido Trabalhista Brasileiro -- PTB -- Brazilian Labor Party

	Name	Votes 1962
1.	Omair Zomignani	18,774
2.	Louro Gomes	18,614
3.	Benedito Matarazzo	12,759
4.	Altimar Ribeiro de Lima	10,951
§ 5.	Luciano Lepera	10,640
§ 6.	Luiz Tenorio de Lima	10,019
7.	Osvaldo Gimenez	9,809
8.	Mauricio Leite de Moraes	9,071
§ 9.	Mario Schenberg	8,615
§ 10.	Oswaldo Lourenço	8,397
11.	Miguel Jorge Nicolau	7,935
12.	Costabile Romano	7,738
1st Suplente:	Paulo Nakandakare	7,652

§ On November 21, the Supreme Electoral Court upheld a judgment that these candidates were Communists and hence ineligible for office. See text of Airgram.

Movimento Trabalhista Renovador -- MTR -- Labor Renovation Movement

1.	Anselmo Farabulini	16,024
2.	João Batista Botelho	11,951
3.	José Rosa da Silva	9,621

0475

STATE DEPUTIES -- PSP (CONTD)

Name	Votes 1962
11. Manoel Joaquim Fernandes	7,877
12. Luiz Signorelli	7,084
1st Suplente: Gilberto Geraldo Siqueira	6,968

Partido Democrata Cristão -- PDC -- Christian Democratic Party

1. Solon Borges dos Reis	19,116
2. Roberto Cardoso Alves	15,094
3. José Felicio Castellano	13,702
4. Nicola Ávalone	12,179
5. Chopin Tavares de Lima	11,651
6. Ruy de Mello Junqueira	10,818
7. Domingos Lot Neto	10,783
8. Modesto Guglielmi	10,491
9. Nagib Chaib	9,945
10. Valerio Giuli	9,913
11. Fernando Mauro Pires da Rocha	9,435
12. Semi Jorge Resegue	9,421
1st Suplente: José Santilli Sobrinho	9,076

0474

STATE DEPUTIES (CONTD)-- PR

Name	Votes 1962
8. Renato Cordeiro	8,327
9. Jacob Pedro Carolo	8,285
10. Alfredo Ignacio Trindade	8,275
11. José Sidnei Cunha	7,875
12. Diogo Nomura	6,958
13. Oswaldo Santos Ferreira	6,823
1st Suplente: Odilo Antunes de Siqueira	6,766

Partido Social Progressista -- PSP -- Social Progressive Party

1. Silvio Fernandes Lopes	21,236
2. José Blota Júnior	14,093
3. José Jorge Cury	13,304
4. Hilário Torloni	12,034
5. Cyro Albuquerque	11,954
6. Orlando Gabriel Zancaner	11,808
7. Waldemar Lopes Ferraz	11,606
8. Sinval Antunes de Souza	9,358
9. Benedito Realindo Corrêa	9,170
10. Amaral Gurgel (José Alfredo do)	8,832

0473

STATE DEPUTIES

VALID Votes	3,181,064	-	96.3%
Voided Votes	122,286	-	3.7%
Total Votes Cast	3,303,350	-	100.0%
Electoral Quotient	27,661		
Votes cast for Candidates	2,605,486	-	81.9%
Blank ballots	575,578	-	18.1%
	3,181,064	-	100.0%

Partido Republicano -- PR -- Republican Party

Name	Votes 1962
1. Leôncio Ferraz Júnior	14,311
2. Jacob Salvador Zveibil	13,569
3. Cássio Ciampolini	12,588
4. José Francisco Archimedes Lamoglia	10,705
5. Francisco Franco	10,201
6. Vicente Botta	9,808
7. Angelo Zanini	9,500

0472

FEDERAL DEPUTIES (CONTD)

Partido Social Trabalhista -- PST -- Social Labor Party

Name	Votes 1958	Votes 1962
1. Mário Coval Júnior		30,976
2. Adrião Bernardes		7,270
1st Suplente: Waldemar Alves da Costa		5,607

Partido Republicano -- PR -- Republican Party

1. Milo Cammarosano	13,479
2. Alceu Barroso de Carvalho	12,040
1st Suplente: OTÁVIO Rodrigues MARIA	11,973

Partido de Representação Popular -- PRP -- Popular Representation Party

1. PLINIO SALGADO	37,036
1st Suplente: Roberto Andraus	7,203

Partido Socialista Brasileiro -- PSB -- Brazilian Socialist Party

1st Suplente: José Antônio ROGE FERREIRA	12,646

0471

FEDERAL DEPUTIES -- UDN (CONTD)

Name	Votes 1958	Votes 1962
6. João Sussumu Hirata		15,011
7. AFRANIO DE OLIVEIRA		12,200
1st Suplente: Nicolau TUMA	17,537	11,743

Partido Trabalhista Nacional -- PTN -- National Labor Party

1. EMILIO CARLOS Kyrillos	93,654	153,999
2. HARY NORMANTON	26,259	24,909
3. MAURÍCIO GOULART		17,546
4. HAMILTON PRADO	23,333	17,455
5. LUIZ FRANCISCO da Silva Carvalho		14,148
6. Joaquim Mariano Dias Menezes		12,261
7. Tufy Nassif		9,255

Partido Rural Trabalhista -- PRT -- Rural Labor Party

1. Ruy Amaral Lemos		39,172
2. LINO MORGANTI		20,957
3. HUGO BORGHI	61,665	12,385

Movimento Trabalhista Renovador -- MTR -- Labor Renovation Movement

1. Evaldo de Almeida Pinto	18,128
2. DERVILE ALLEGRETTI	15,775
1st Suplente: Pedro Marão	8,347

0470

FEDERAL DEPUTIES (CONTD)
Partido Social Democrático -- PSD -- Social Democratic Party

Name	Votes 1958	Votes 1962
1. Paschoal RANIERI MAZZILLI	58,499	67,112
2. Antônio Sylvio CUNHA BUENO	71,578	59,442
3. YUKISHIGUE TAMURA	42,163	53,191
4. Antônio Oswaldo do AMARAL FURLAN	38,065	42,658
5. Ulysses Silveira GUIMARAES	72,286	34,191
6. Levy Gonçalves Tavares		19,731
7. João PACHECO CHAVES	22,607	15,061
8. José JOAO ABDALLA	29,086	12,693
4/ 1st Suplente: ANTÔNIO Ezequiel FELICIANO da Silva	24,187	9,870

União Democrática Nacional -- UDN -- National Democratic Union

1. HERBERT Victor LEVY	53,660	41,151
2. (PADRE) Antônio de Oliveira GODINHO		35,371
3. Ernesto PEREIRA LOPES	27,530	24,612
4. Francisco Morato de Oliveira		23,807
5. LAURO Monteiro da CRUZ	19,368	20,715

4/ Promoted to Deputy by death of Deputy from coalition partner PSD.

0469

FEDERAL DEPUTIES -- PDC (CONTD)

Name	Votes 1958	Votes 1962
5. FRANCISCO SCARPA		32,452
6. ATHIÉ JORGE CURY		25,391
7. JOSÉ MENCK	14,091	17,290
8. José HENRIQUE TURNER		16,905
9. ANIZ BADRA	13,584	14,783

Partido Trabalhista Brasileiro -- PTB -- Brazilian Labor Party

1.	JOÃO BATISTA RAMOS	30,447	43,878
2/ 2.	Geraldo Rodrigues dos Santos		35,000
3.	Candida IVETTE VARGAS Tatsch	78,063	28,067
3/ 4.	RIO BRANCO PARANHOS		26,231
5.	Paulo Jorge Mansur		19,933
6.	Celso Amaral		18,280
7.	José Jorge Resegue		17,185
8.	Helcio Maghenzani		12,733
9.	Rubens Paiva		13,440

2/3/On November 21, the Supreme Electoral Court upheld a judgment that these candidates were Communists and hence ineligible for office. See text of airgram.

0468

FEDERAL DEPUTIES (CONTD)

Votes cast for candidates	2,318,369	- 73.4%
Blank ballots	840,727	- 26.6%
	3,159,096	- 100.0%

Partido Social Progressista - PSP - Social Progressive Party

	Name	Votes 1958	Votes 1962
1.	Cantidio Nogueira Sampaio		64,860
2.	Antonio Adib CHAMMAS		33,027
3.	Antonio Mendes de Barros Filho		27,791
4.	André BROCA FILHO	18,580	26,716
5.	Arnaldo dos Santos CERDEIRA	32,102	24,951
6.	José de CARVALHO SOBRINHO	34,673	20,104
1/ 7.	Rubens FERREIRA MARTINS	20,650	19,649
8.	Geraldo Pereira de Barros		15,150
9.	Romeu de CAMPOS VERGAL		14,837

Partido Democrata Cristão - PDC - Christian Democratic Party

1.	André FRANCO MONTORO	36,646	62,463
2.	PAULO DE TARSO Santos	37,528	43,729
3.	PLINIO Soares de Arruda SAMPAIO		41,861
4.	Teofilo Ribeiro de ANDRADE FILHO		36,757

1/ Died since election

0467

SENATOR

Valid votes	6,471,690	-	98.0%
Voided votes	135,010	-	2.0%
Total votes cast	6,606,700	-	100.0%
AURO Soares de Moura Andrade	1,060,677	-	16.4%
Juvenal LINO DE MATOS	966,163	-	14.9%
Antonio QUEIROZ FILHO	678,789	-	10.5%
Roberto de ABREU SODRÉ	607,932	-	9.4%
Mario BENI	570,651	-	8.8%
ALIPIO Correa Neto	538,789	-	8.4%
NELSON OMEGNA	172,704	-	2.6%
Marcelino Serrano	50,117	-	0.8%
Blank Ballots 1/	1,825,868	-	28.2%
	6,471,690	-	100.0%

1/ Note that the high number of blank ballots for Senator is misleading. Many voters evidently forget that they should check the names of two senatorial candidates, as against one for any other elective office. When only one name is checked, the voter is considered to have cast one blank ballot.

FEDERAL DEPUTIES

Valid votes	3,159,096	-	95.6%
Voided votes	144,254	-	4.4%
Total votes cast	3,303,350	-	100.0%
Electoral Quotient	53,544		

0466

GOVERNOR (CONTD)			
ADHEMAR Pereira de Barros	1,249,414	-	38.7%
JANIO da Silva Quadros	1,125,941	-	34.8%
JOSÉ BONIFÁCIO Coutinho Nogueira	722,823	-	22.4%
CID Franco	35,653	-	1.1%
Blank ballots	96,346	-	3.0%
	3,230,177		100.0%
VICE-GOVERNOR			
Valid votes	3,231,259	-	97.8%
Voided votes	72,091	-	2.2%
Total votes cast	3,303,350	-	100.0%
LAUDO Natel	1,200,807	-	37.2%
José Vicente FARIA LIMA	944,604	-	29.2%
THEOTONIO Monteiro de Barros	543,411	-	16.8%
REMO FORLI	56,897	-	1.8%
Blank ballots	485,540	-	15.0%
	3,231,259		100.0%

0465

São Paulo

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A- 159
Encl. 1
Page 1

1962 São Paulo Election Results

Last names are underlined and preferred "campaign names," when known, are put in upper case (as in other reports in this series).

Following Brazilian practice, blank ballots (votos brancos) are considered valid and included in the "valid votes" columns below. Voided ballots (votos nulos), however, are not considered valid. Percentages of voided votes are thus calculated against total voter appearance at the polls, whereas percentages of blank ballots are computed from the remainder after the voided votes have been subtracted. This can cause confusion. One cannot, for example, simply add the percentages of blank and voided ballots to find the total percentage of voters who did not successfully vote for a candidate.

The Regional Electoral Court still gives the total number of São Paulo voters as 3,822,235. This does not subtract some voters who have recently left the State, so the correct figure would be slightly smaller. 3,303,350 persons voted -- 86.4 percent of the official total. All figures below are based on the 3,303,350 votes actually cast.

GOVERNOR

Valid votes	3,230,177	-	97.8%
Voided votes	73,173	-	2.2%
Total votes cast	3,303,350	-	100.0%

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0464

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São Paulo
A-159
3

It seems almost sure that the PTB or the losing candidates individually will appeal to the Supreme Court, but their chances are obviously much more slim than they were before the TSE decision. It is not clear whether either the PTB or President GOULART will push the case very hard. They have showed a notable lack of enthusiasm so far. Local PTB interest might pick up, however, if the TRE (who must make the decision) should declare the votes of the ineligible candidates voided. In this case, there would be a re-calculation on the electoral quotient and the PTB would lose two Federal and four State Deputies to other parties. The other possibility is that the votes will remain credited to the party, in which case others from party ranks would move up to the vacant seats. There are said to be only two precedents for the decision -- one going each way. The latest, and the only one from São Paulo, voided votes under similar circumstances. Curiously, President Goulart's São Paulo newspaper mouthpiece is quietly pushing this latest precedent -- undoubtedly a reflection of his feud with local PTB leader Ivette VARGAS.

The decision on whether or not to void the votes is of some importance, as São Paulo PTB strength depends heavily upon it. But the major decision, that against the Communist candidates, has already been taken. It appears to establish a solid precedent for enforcing existing law and getting the Communists out of the legislatures in fact as well as in name.

The Consulate General had withheld submission of this report hoping for a prompt clarification of the above matters, but it now seems that they will drag on. The enclosed list of elected candidates shows them just as the public voted, disregarding later court decisions except in the footnotes.

For the Minister Consul General:

Scott C. Lyon

Scott C. Lyon
Consul

Enclosure: List of São Paulo Vote Totals

Distribution: INS/RAR, AmConGen Recife, AmConsulates Belem, Belo Horizonte, Curitiba, Porto Alegre, Salvador, Santos.

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0463

in question, then, had evidently been nominated illegally according to their own statutes and perhaps according to national laws also. But these things are seldom so simple in Brazil; expediency and immediate political considerations often outweigh "formalism" (i.e., the law). This is what seems to have happened in the case of the PR Deputies. The TSE suspended the TRE ruling of ineligibility before the election and allowed the candidate to run pending final decision, then ruled definitely in their favor on November 21. One Federal and several State Deputies were affected. The TSE decision seems unfortunate, since it further weakens the already feeble incentives for party integrity.

The MTR has a case pending which is much smaller in scale but apparently similar otherwise. The decision of the TSE is expected to be the same.

In view of the TSE's disregard of "formalism" in the PR case, many politicians had expected that the Communist candidates would also obtain a favorable decision. They had been declared ineligible by the TRE under a provision of the TSE election instructions which reads: "Registry will be denied to candidates who, publicly or ostensively, are part of or are adherents (adeptos) of a political party whose registry has been canceled." This was obviously intended for the illegal Communist Party. Previously, however, the instruction seems to have been observed in the breach. For this year's election, the TRE zealously refused registry to Communist candidates. It appears to have applied the zeal with discretion; with one exception all of the candidates who were held ineligible -- all of those who later were elected, at least -- were indeed members of the Communist Party of Brazil. So far as the Consulate General has seen, they have not even denied this. The single exception was Rocha MENDES Filho, who was recently expelled from the Communist Party. The TRE's case, then, seemed strong.

The Communist candidates, like those of the PR, got provisional permission to run from the TSE. But unlike the PR candidates, the decision went against them on November 21. It was a cliff-hanger in the best Brazilian tradition, with the TSE President breaking a three-three tie and casting his decisive seventh vote to uphold the lower Court's application of the law. (The merit of the candidates' case, theoretically, was not considered.) Rocha Mendes Filho's case was not included and had not yet been decided upon as of the drafting of this report on November 23. Those involved in the November 21 decision had all run on a PTB slate; Rocha Mendes ran as a candidate of the PSB.

0462

ORIGIN/ACTION: ARA-4

1		4
ARA	EUR	FE
NEA	CU	INR 5
E	P	IO
L	FED	AID 12
AGR	COM	FRB
INT	LAB	TAR
TR	XMB	AIR 4
NSAW 5	CIA 10	NAVY 5
OSD 12	USIA 8	ESA 3

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

AIRGRAM

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HANDLING INDICATOR

TO : DEPARTMENT OF STATE

INFO : RIO DE JANEIRO, BRASILIA

DEPARTMENT OF STATE BUREAU OF INTER-AMERICAN AFFAIRS NOV 30 1962 AM 59

ROUTAN ANALYSIS & DISTRIBUTION BRANCH NOV 30 1962

FROM : AmConGen, SAO PAULO DATE: November 29, 1962

SUBJECT : Final São Paulo Vote Totals

REF : São Paulo Airgram A-118 of October 31, 1962

file action to ARA/ESH/B 12-12-62 R. Burton

The enclosure to this report gives final vote totals for the elections held in São Paulo on October 7, 1962. In order to keep the list UNCLASSIFIED, biographic information and ideological characterizations were omitted. They may be found in the Airgram under reference or in other reports in this election series.

All of the vote totals are very close to those given in preliminary São Paulo post-election reports, but in most cases they are slightly higher. Only in the case of two State Deputies was the outcome of the election altered from that previously reported: a PRP candidate displaced one from the MTR. One other change is not due to any modification in the count: a PSP Federal Deputy-elect died, making room for a PSP suplente (substitute).

One potential change was ruled out by a Superior Electoral Court (Tribunal Superior Eleitoral -- TSE) decision of November 20. The Regional (São Paulo) Electoral Court, (TRE), as reported earlier, had ruled that several PR candidates were ineligible. They had merely been "appointed" candidates rather than nominated by party convention, an earlier convention having delegated authority to party officers. Some authorities believe that this procedure is not legal under Brazilian electoral law, although several parties frequently fall back on it. The PR and a few other parties, however, specifically rule out such delegations of convention power in their statutes. The PR candidates

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FORM 4-62 DS-323

Drafted by: DCProper:el 11/23/62

Contents and Classification Approved by:

Clearances:

0461

the Governor's emphasis during the electoral campaign on the need for basic reforms, the subject never became an issue, and the candidates hardly ever touched on that theme. In casual conversations the writer has had with several of the candidates before and after the election, the impression received has been that while basic reforms are good and everyone favors them, they are best left alone. One senses nevertheless an inarticulate desire for reform against which the law makers may not be able to remain totally impervious.

4. The Senatorial Contest

In the senatorial contest for two seats, the two incumbents, Benedito Valadares, running on the PSD ticket, and Camilo Nogueira da Gama, running on the PTB ticket, were re-elected as was the general expectation. The only surprise in this case was the abnormally large number of blank votes, amounting to more than 50 percent of the total number of votes cast. The reason for the large number of blank votes seems to have been that many of the voters, confronted with the single ballot, did not realize that they had to vote for two candidates and, therefore, checked only one name instead of two. The total number of votes cast for the eight senatorial candidates was 2,009,382 as compared with the total number of 2,067,555 voters who went to the polls. Since there were two seats to be filled, the possible total number of votes would be 4,135,110. The problem gave rise to doubts about the validity of the senatorial election, but the State Electoral Tribunal ruled by unanimity vote to approve the election results for the Senate as they stood.

Table III gives for each of the two successful candidates and the runner-up their party affiliation, number of votes received, and political classification.

TABLE III
SENATORIAL CANDIDATES

Name	Party	Votes Received	Political Classification
Benedito Valadares Ribeiro (I) (A)	PSD	454,842	VI
Camilo Nogueira da Gama (I)	PTB	441,546	VI
Oswaldo Pierucetti (A)	UDN	379,304	VI

Edmund G. da Silveira
Edmund A. da Silveira
American Consul

0460

3. Possible Effects of the UDN Victory on Governor Magalhães Pinto's Future

The substantial victory of the UDN seems to have advanced the political prospects of Governor Magalhães Pinto. Although in a number of conversations the reporting officer has had with UDN State deputies just elected, he has gathered the impression that there is no particular ideological affinity between many of them and the Governor, their election has become generally identified with the political interests of the Governor. Certainly, the Administration will have an easier time than in the past in the State Assembly, where the UDN will be the largest party and where a combination of patronage and the psychological effects of identifying the UDN victory with the Administration will tend to keep the UDN deputies more in line with the State Government.

Although the 26 seats the UDN will have in the State Assembly are far short of an absolute majority, the Governor can probably count on enough support from individual deputies to get a good portion of his proposals enacted into law. Many of the newly elected PTB and PR deputies are already talking about a possible accommodation with the State Government on the basis of getting some Cabinet posts. These are familiar noises and, in view of their failure in the past to gain in substance, the possibility of Cabinet posts outside the UDN must be taken with a great deal of skepticism.

The UDN victory has given rise to new speculation about the Governor's intentions to go out for the Presidency in 1965. He has himself said that he is interested primarily in his present job of administering the affairs of the State in an efficient manner. He has, however, also indicated that he would accept the nomination provided there is a popular demand for his services. Since a governor of Minas Gerais is always a potential Presidential candidate, and since popular demand is a produceable commodity, the possibility of Governor Magalhães Pinto becoming a candidate for the Presidency cannot be discounted. By temperament, however, he is better suited for the job of kingmaker, and most people of independent judgment do not think the Governor sees himself as a future President of Brazil. Also, he would have to consider having as a competitor another native son of Minas Gerais, Senator Kubitschek, who seems determined not to let anyone forget that he is a candidate. The fact that his party, the PSD, ran behind the UDN in this State is not considered as affecting his political future adversely since the UDN as the party in power was expected to make substantial gains.

One question that comes to mind in connection with the UDN victory is the extent to which Governor Magalhães Pinto will or can use that victory to promote basic social and economic reforms, a subject that he stresses in practically every statement he makes. Indications are that although the Governor's views will be listened to more attentively than heretofore, there is little predisposition on the part of the elected deputies to move militantly on a program that would entail significant social and economic change. Despite

0459

TABLE II
CHAMBER OF DEPUTIES
(Total No. of Seats for Minas Gerais Delegation - 1958: 39; 1962: 48)

Party	Votes Received (1962)	Number of Seats Held by Party (1958)	Number of Seats Held by Party (1962)	Percentage of Seats Held by Party (1958)	Percentage of Seats Held by Party (1962)
PSD	753,247	19	21	49	44
UDN	554,733	8	16	21	33
PTB-PSP-PL	273,972	7	7	18	15
PR	170,270 1/	5	4	13	8

1/ The PR elected 8 Federal deputies in 1958, but defections reduced that number to 5.

STATE LEGISLATIVE ASSEMBLY

(Total Number of Seats - 1958: 74; 1962: 82)

PSD	24	18	32	22
UDN	13	26	18	32
PTB	13	12	18	15
PR	17	10	23	12
PSP	5	9	7	10
PDC	1	2	1	2
MTR-PL	0	3	0	4
PRP	1	2	1	2

0458

2. Changes in Party Strength

From the point of view of the parties as such, the National Democratic Union (UDN) was the winner. Table II shows the relative strength and share of seats held by each party. The UDN's chief competitor, the Social Democratic Party (PSD), lost strength in both the Chamber of Deputies and the State Legislative Assembly. The UDN delegation in the Federal Chamber went up from 8 to 16 deputies. Although the PSD retained its number one position in the Chamber, and even gained two seats, going from 19 to 21, the Party's share of seats went down from 49 percent to 44 percent. This loss in relative strength in contrast to a gain in seats is explained by the increase in the number of seats apportioned to the Minas Gerais delegation from 39 to 48. In comparison, the UDN's share went up from 21 percent to 33 percent.

The UDN gains in the State Legislative Assembly were even more impressive than in the Chamber of Deputies. In the State Assembly, whose membership was increased from 74 to 82, the UDN not only gained in relative strength but also displaced the PSD from its number one position. While the PSD suffered a loss of six seats, going down from 24 to 18, and its share of Assembly seats shrank to 22 percent from a previous 32 percent, the UDN doubled the size of its delegation to 26 seats and increased its share of seats from 18 percent to 32 percent.

The outstanding loser was the Republican Party (PR). This setback in the PR's fortunes was foreseen in the Consulate's A-19, dated September 28, 1962. Although the PR has little national standing, it is a major party in Minas Gerais and had elected eight Federal deputies in 1958. Defections, however, had already reduced that number to five by the time the October elections took place, and final election results only confirm that trend, for the number of PR Federal deputies elected stands now at four, or a mere five percent of the Minas Gerais delegation. It was, however, in the State Assembly that the PR suffered its major defeat, a defeat that puts into question that Party's ability to recover within the foreseeable future. The Party went down from 17 to 10 in the number of seats it held and from second to fourth place. In terms of percentage of Assembly seats, the Party's strength decreased from 23 to 12. The first signs of internal turmoil as a result of the PR losses are evident in the insistent rumor that the Party's national president, Artur Bernardes Filho, will shortly retire from the political scene.

Somewhat unexpected was the poor showing the Labor Party (PTB) made in the Chamber and the State Assembly. The PTB lost in terms of both number and share of seats with respect to the State Assembly and of the Party's share of the State delegation to the Chamber. Political circles give as one possible reason for the unexpected stagnation the fact that President Goulart has not shown much interest in the fate of the PTB in Minas Gerais.

0457

Name of Deputy-Elect	Party	Votes Received	Political Classification
Antônio Luciano	PSD	19,000	V
Guilherme Machado (I) (A)	UDN	24,768	VI
Austregésilo Ribeiro de Mendonça	PTB	15,839	V
Tancredo de Almeida Neves (A)	PSD	58,090	V
Padre José de Sousa Nobre (I)	PTB	13,856	V
Guilhermino de Oliveira (I)(A)	PSD	30,321	VI
José Aparecido de Oliveira	UDN	34,318	II
Rondon Pacheco (I) (A)	UDN	37,834	VI
Celso Gabriel de Resende Passos	UDN	26,668	IV
Walter Passos (A)	PR	19,473	V
Abel Rafael Pinto (I) (A)	PSD	27,291	VI
Bilac Pinto (I)	UDN	33,973	VI
Teófilo Ribeiro Pires	PR	19,157	V
Milton Reis (I)	PTB	20,575	III
João Nogueira de Rezende (I)	PR	20,052	VI
Carlos Murilo Felício dos Santos (I) (A)	PSD	20,626	VI
Francelino Pereira dos Santos (A)	UDN	27,366	VI
Mancel Taveira de Sousa (A)	UDN	29,624	VI
Padre Pedro Maciel Vidigal (I)	PSD	49,599	VI

Legend:

(I) - Incumbent
(A) - Recommended by ALEF
PSD - Social Democratic Party
PTB - Brazilian Labor Party
UDN - National Democratic Union
PR - Republican Party
PSP - Social Progressive Party
PDC --Christian Democratic Party
MTR-- Reformist Labor Movement
PRP - Popular Representation Party
PL - Liberator Party

0456

(TABLE I - CHAMBER OF DEPUTIES -Cont'd)

Name of Deputy-Elect	Party	Votes Received	Political Classification
Paulo Freire de Araujo (I)	PTB	19,035	V
Renato Mário de Avelar Azeredo (A)	PSD	23,900	VI
Amintas de Barros	PSD	41,834	V
Ormeo Junqueira Botelho (A)	UDN	26,592	V
Gustavo Capanema (I) (A)	PSD	18,280	VI
Elias de Sousa Carmo (A)	UDN	31,185	VI
José Monteiro de Castro (I) (A)	UDN	27,200	VI
Último de Carvalho (I)	PSD	32,650	VI
Paulo Pinheiro Chagas (I) (A)	PSD	27,294	VI
Levindo Osanan Coelho (I) (A)	PSD	21,264	VI
Oscar Dias Corrêa (I) (A)	UDN	39,873	VI
Clavo Costa	PSD	17,946	IV
Aécio Ferreira da Cunha (A)	PR	21,931	VI
Simão da Cunha	UDN	32,999	II
Francisco Clementino de San Tiago Dantas (I)	PTB	35,809	III
Gilberto de Andrade Faria	PSD	45,538	VI
Bento Gonçalves Filho (I)	PSP	17,014	III
Dnar Mendes Ferreira (A)	UDN	34,329	VI
Chrispim Jacques Bias Fortes (I) (A)	PSD	17,676	VI
Geraldo Freire (I) (A)	UDN	18,292	VI
João Herculino de Sousa Lopes	PTB	14,657	-

(cont'd)

0455

Neither can much influence be attributed to the Electoral Alliance for the Family (ALEF), a lay Catholic organization, whose purpose was to examine and recommend worthy candidates. Although among the successful candidates for Federal deputy 54 percent were recommended by ALEF, this percentage has little significance when examined in the light of the total number of ALEF-recommended candidates and the predominant conservatism of virtually all the candidates. For instance, of the 55 ALEF-recommended candidates for the Chamber of Deputies 24, or less than half, were elected. The likelihood, therefore, is that the election of the ALEF candidates was incidental to the general conservative outlook of the society rather than the result of any direct influence by the Catholic organization. This view is not meant to imply the absence of Catholic influence, for the contrary is emphatically true. This conservative influence, however, is for the most part exercised indirectly in that the whole social fabric is molded by the Catholic Church.

A considerable number of new faces were expected as a result of the increase in the number of seats apportioned to the Chamber of Deputies and the State Assembly -- 23 percent and 10 percent, respectively. The proportion of newcomers was higher in the State Assembly than in the Chamber. Of the incumbent State deputies who sought re-election, 57 percent were successful as compared with 67 percent for the Chamber. The 57-percent figure, however, does not take into account a number of State deputies who ran successfully for other elective offices, including those of Federal deputy and mayor.

TABLE I
CHAMBER OF DEPUTIES

Name of Deputy-Elect	Party	Votes Received	Political Classification
Ovídio Xavier de Abreu (I) (A)	PSD	18,422	VI
Jaeder Soares Albergaria (I)	PSD	16,021	V
Pedro Aleixo (I) (A)	UDN	29,166	VI
José Maria Alkmin (I) (A)	PSD	18,882	V
Manuel José de Almeida (I) (A)	PSD	26,975	VI
Sebastião Pais de Almeida	PSD	80,057	VI
José Bonifacio Lafayette de Andrada (I)(A)	UDN	28,996	VI
José Maurício Andrade (I)	PSD	23,723	V

(cont'd)

0454

ACTION		
ARA-4		
RM/R 1	REP	AF
ARA	EUR	FE
NEA	CU	INR 5
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L	FSO	AID 12
AGR	COM	FRB
INT	LAB	TAR
TR	XMB	AIR 4
ARMY 5	CIA 10	NAVY 5
OSD 12	USIA 8	NSA 3

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

AIRGRAM

732.00/11-2762

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A-26 NO.

CONFIDENTIAL

MARKING INDICATOR

DEPARTMENT OF STATE
BUREAU OF
INTER-AMERICAN AFFAIRS
NOV 30 1962

1962 NOV 30 AM 9 01

TO : DEPARTMENT OF STATE

INFO : Rio de Janeiro - Brasilia

RMAN
ANALYSIS & DISTRIBUTION
BRANCH

FROM : AMCONSUL, Belo Horizonte

DATE: November 27, 1962

SUBJECT : BRAZILIAN ELECTIONS 1962 - Final Report
No. 15: An Appraisal of the Election Results

REF : Consulate Despatch No. 37, June 28, 1962
ARA

The State Electoral Tribunal published the election results on November 16 for candidates for Federal and State deputy, senator, and municipal offices. On November 22, winners were declared officially elected by the Tribunal. Of 2,567,978 registered voters in the State of Minas Gerais, 2,067,555 went to the polls -- an abstention of 19 percent of the registered electorate.

1. Political Complexion of Winning Candidates

The election outcome did not bring any major upsets or surprises. Much to the contrary, it reflected essentially the moderate and conservative character of the electoral body. For the two or three extreme leftists who entered the political scene, an equal number made their departure. Communist-sympathizers Clodsmidt Riani and Sinval Bambirra, who were elected State deputies on the Labor Party (PTB) ticket, were among the few newcomers with extremist views.

On the basis of political categories set forth in the electoral report No. 1, AmEmbassy/Rio, despatch No. 891, 85 percent of the Federal deputies-elect from Minas Gerais are classified as CENTRISTS/CONSERVATIVES. The percentage in the current Congress is 90, but it includes more extremist elements, such as defeated deputy Celso Brant, than are found in the newly elected Minas Gerais delegation. Table I gives a list of the Federal deputies-elect with their party affiliation, number of votes received, and political classification. In view of the subjective element involved in the political classification of the candidates, it can hardly be said that the apparent slight shift to the left is meaningful.

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FORM DS-323
4-62

Drafted by: EAdeSilveira:kfk 11/23/1962

Contents and Classification Approved by:

Clearances:

0453

d. Rio-based Mexican Consul General Enrique Romay visited RGS this week in order to develop trade and tourism between the two countries. He made all the usual protocolary calls.

Frederick D. Sharp III
American Consul

cc.: Consular Affairs, Rio
Political Section, Rio
Political Section, Brasília
ARA/EST/Brazil, Washington
INR/RAR/P, Washington

Department- pass to all posts in Brazil.

0452

d. The peripatetic Brizola accompanied Jango to São Borja at mid-week, went to Rio on Saturday and returned Sunday for a TV confrontation with Breno Caldas and Arlindo Pasqualini on the issue of press freedom, the national economic situation and "foreign spoliation". During the program Brizola had a new twist in his usual diatribe. He urges Brazil to break off all economic and commercial ties with the US and that the country's interests lie in its earlier and longstanding ties with Europe. Which sector of Europe was left unstated. In view of other developments in the recent past, one might believe that Brizola's aim is to break down US-Brazilian relations at all costs. If Brizola is seeking to court the ultra-nationalistic left following his Cuban recantation apparently he has not been overly successful, for Prestes took another crack at him when he said that Julião and Arrais are "on the beam" while Brizola is not. This however, could be for local consumption with the hope that the international wire-services might pick it up. The TV program was something of a fiasco since, true to form, Brizola monopolized the so-called dialogue for 80 percent of the hour and a half. He left early Monday for Recife and the Northeast to preach the plebiscite gospel for the return of presidentialism. Rumor has it that Brizola is more interested in becoming president of Petrobras than he is in taking his seat at Brasilia and such a development would bode no good for any manifestation of foreign petroleum interests in this country.

e. The press reported this week that General Oromar Osório, Commanding General, First Cavalry Division, Santiago do Boqueirão, RGS, is to become Artilery Commander, First Infantry Division, Vila Militar, GB. General Oromar Osório is a leftist and his transfer to the domain of General Osvino follows the recent pattern of military command changes since the political crises of the past several months.

3. Miscellany

a. President João Goulart made a one day visit on November 21 to São Borja in order to inaugurate a hospital in the memory of his late brother Ivan. Jango stopped momentarily at Pôrto Alegre both coming and going.

b. Minister of Transportation and Public Works, Hélio Almeida, after a weekend visit to RGS during which he inaugurated several projects and inspected others said upon his departure that the Federal Government did not have sufficient funds to construct new and much needed highways, for the inflationary spiral was such that projected funds no longer could meet the rising costs. Interesting to note was his remark that the Federal Government should seek foreign financing for its highway program.

c. Last week the Caixa Economica Federal received bids for 1,000 units of low cost housing in the Porto Alegre Area from seven different firms. The total project is to cost Cr$1 billion.

0451

As of Sunday, the scene of activity shifted to Brasília with some 80 media representatives already there and more arriving. The gaúcho contingent is reportedly the most numerous and its lead is being followed, with the paulista press giving the gaúchos full credit for taking the initiative in this defense action. The Consulate is in no position to interpret the significance of the presidential vetoes to the Código but our media friends assure us that reappearance of the "thought control" apparatus which existed during the Estado Novo would be the harbinger for dictatorship and the death of liberty and democracy in Brazil.

2. Political

a. Governor Brizola's "lame-duck", and therefore irresponsible, bill to raise the salaries of the State bureaucracy (see item 2, Weekly Summary nº 29, A-21, November 6, 1962) is meeting with concerted resistence from the opposition deputies in the State Assembly and it is doubtful that the bill will pass in its present form. With Meneghetti already concerned over the large deficit which he will have to shoulder as his legacy from Brizola, one of his principal advisors tells us that if the Brizola bill is passed an estimated 90 percent of the State budget would be consumed in meeting the salaries, retirement pensions and other personnel expenses of the State bureaucracy. We have heard that if the bill is not passed the Brigada Militar may strike with possibly a sympathy strike by the non-commissioned officers of the Army. Should the Brigada go out, law enforcement in the interior would be non-existent except for those municipalities with their own skeleton forces and the fire-fighting capacity throughout the State would be nil.

b. PTB Federal Deputy-elect Clay de Araujo, a suspect Communist gave a fiery speech at the take-over of the office of Regional Labor Delegation by Nilson Odorico Xavier dos Santos a self confessed Commie, this week. Clay predicted a big national crisis in April or May 1963 and is quoted as having said the following: "Needs have no ideology and problems have no political coloration but they do have solutions whether they be adequate or not. The Government does not fabricate facts or events, but at the crossroads its action will be made felt. From the struggle between the two segments which seek to monopolize the ideas of this country, the nation will find its progress and redemption. On the one hand are the archaic forces which cover the whole gamut of self-interests and seek to maintain the status quo which is already obsolete. On the other side are the currents which believe that Brazil cannot delay or stand still, for deep-seated institutional changes must be made". It will be recalled that Clay was Secretary of Labor in Brizola's RGS government.

c. Today's Última Hora rumor column, surprinsingly accurate at times, reports that Jango wants Franklin de Oliveira (Commie author of "Revolution and Counter Revolution in Brazil") to become a member of his advisory staff in Brasília. Oliveira would work on the planning of the overall socio/economic program which Celso Furtado is putting together.

0450

ROUTING/ACTION		
ARA-4		
RM/R 1	REG 1	AF
ARA	EUR	FE
NEA	CU	INR 5
E	P	IO
L	PSD	AID 12
AGR	COM	FRB
INT	LAB 6	TAR
TR	XMB	AIR 4
ARMY 5	CIA 15	NAVY 5
OSD 12	USIA 8	NSA 3

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

AIRGRAM

732.00/11-2762

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A-21 NO. | OFFICIAL USE ONLY | 1962 DEC AM 8 13 | AIR POUCH HANDLING INDICATOR

TO : DEPARTMENT OF STATE

Brasilia -1 Curitiba -1
Belem -1 Recife -1
Belo Horizonte -1 Salvador -1
Santos -1 Sao Paulo -1

RM/AN ANALYSIS & DISTRIBUTION BRANCH

DEPARTMENT OF STATE BUREAU OF INTER-AMERICAN AFFAIRS DEC 5 1962

RB

FROM : Amconsul PÔRTO ALEGRE DATE: NOV 27 1962

SUBJECT : PÔRTO ALEGRE WEEKLY SUMMARY Nº 32

REF :

Brb no action ARA Ltr 5/13 12/10/62 R. Burton

1. RGS Information Media Begin Campaign to Save Press Freedom.
2. Political.
3. Miscellany.

1. RGS Information Media Begin Campaign to Save Press Freedom

The alarm bell rung by Breno Caldas three weeks ago (see item 4b, Weekly Summary nº 29, Consulate's A-21, November 6, 1962) on what he termed the plans of the Federal Government to infringe on the freedom of radio, TV and press in Brazil through the vetoes of President Goulart to the Codigo Nacional de Telecomunicações bill, finally awakened the owners of news media in this State this week. The association of information media owners have filled the press and air waves with their direst fears for the fate of freedom of expression, unless the President's vetoes are overridden by the Congress. Undoubtedly taking more space than would be expected because it is theirs, full coverage has been given all developments in this campaign. By week's end, tacit support, at least, had been received from the State Legislative Assembly party leadership, including PTB; the Pôrto Alegre City Council; the journalists association; the advertising agency association. And, surprisingly, Governor Brizola is reported to have sent a telegram to the RGS Congressional delegation at Brasília on this subject, although he himself throughout the entire election campaign carried on a campaign to demoralize information media in this area.

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Drafted by: FDSharp/zms 11/27/62

Contents and Classification Approved by: FDSharp

Clearances:

0449

ECONOMIC:

The Secretary for Developmental Affairs, Mr. Ivan Fachinatti, is in Brasilia discussing several projects for Bahia. One of them is expected to result in a greater production of foodstuffs in this area through crop financing. He hopes to obtain a grant of one billion cruzeiros from the Federal Government to finance food producers.

Petrobras brought in new oil wells in the past two weeks. On November 9 the daily take from Bahian wells reached 104,424 barrels -- the first time production passed 100,000 barrels per day.

The drought throughout most of the interior of the state has been broken briefly by rains, but conditions in the Sertão are reported to be severe still, in a number of municipios scattered through the interior.

Comment: Some individuals in Salvador are becoming alarmed about the drought conditions in the state. If the drought should continue for the third year, they fear urban centers may face a new invasion of migrants seeking relief. However, with the normal interior rainy season just beginning, cries of alarm may be premature.

Harold M. Midkiff
American Consul

0448

ORIGIN/ACTION

ARA-H		
RM/R 1	REP 1	AF
ARA	EUR	FE
NEA	CU	INR 5
4	P 1	IO
	FBO	AID 12
AGR 10	COM 10	FRB
INT 7	LAB 6	TAR
TR	XMB	AIR 4
ARMY 5	CIA 15	NAVY 5
OSD 12	USIA 8	NSA 3
Recife 1		

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

AIRGRAM

20

732.00/11-2362

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A-37 NO. | OFFICIAL USE ONLY | Air Pouch

TO : DEPARTMENT OF STATE

DEPARTMENT OF STATE
1962 NOV 28 PM 4 A
BUREAU OF
AMERICAN AFFAIRS
NOV 29 1962
RM/AN
ANALYSIS & DISTRIBUTION
BRANCH

Mail
no action
ARA/H/ESt
12/10/62
BC Burton

FROM : American Consulate, Salvador DATE: November 23, 1962

SUBJECT : Weekly Summary

REF :

POLITICAL:

Sergipe Governor-elect Seixas Doria is quoted in the local press as having stated in Rio that foreign capital is essential for social and economic development in his state. "Sergipe's doors will be open to all honest collaboration which does not charge interest in the form of political-ideological alienation", he said.

Comment: This is an apparent modification of his earlier position in private conversation with us that he would welcome "good" capital, illustrated as a rock salt mine, but not "bad," illustrated as a Coca Cola bottler. It must also be remembered that his present moderate words fit in with the purpose of his current trip to the South: to attract capital.

Salvador's Federation of Industrial Workers has called a 24-hour strike on November 28, as a protest to increased cost of living.

Comment: It is anticipated that the strike will not amount to much, unless the bus drivers join in. Even though the increase in cost of food-stuffs has been very much in the news recently and is a source of real concern, it does not seem probable that a major demonstration will take place on the 26th.

79 NOV 29 PM 4:42 CFD

CC to Amembassy, Rio and Brasilia
DEPARTMENT please pass copy to Recife.

FORM 4-62 DS-323

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Drafted by: HMMidkiff:la

Contents and Classification Approved by:

Clearances:

0447

CROSS REFERENCE FILE

BACKGROUND INFORMATION FOR
DISCUSSIONS WITH AMBASSADOR GORDON.

732.00/11-2362

SEE
A-580 FROM RIO DE JANEIRO,
NOV. 23, 1962

XR 732.001

XR 832.10

0446

CROSS REFERENCE FILE

BACKGROUND INFORMATDN FOR
DISCUSSIONS WITH AMBASSADOR
GORDON.

732.00/11-2362

SEE

A-580 FROM RIO DE JANEIRO,
NOV. 23, 1962

XR 732.001

XR 832.10

0445

W I T H D R A W A L N O T I C E

RG: 059 TAB #: 3

ENTRY: CDF60-63 2 / 5 / C / ---

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Document Date: 23/11/62

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X Security-Classified Information

NND: 949515 WITHDRAWN: 02/24/95 by: JAS

FOIA RETRIEVAL #: 949515 01580 00003

0444

W I T H D R A W A L N O T I C E

RG: 059 TAB #: 2

ENTRY: CDF60-63 1 / 11 / S /
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Document Date: 23/11/62

Document Ser.#:

AGRAM A-580 FR RIO DE JANEIRO TO SECSTATE

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X Security-Classified Information

NND: 949515 WITHDRAWN: 02/24/95 by: JAS

FOIA RETRIEVAL #: 949515 01580 00002

0443

Khrushchev is going along with the Chicoms on the Indian adventure because he must -- but not happily, and with the unexpressed hope that India will not succumb. For, they opine, increased Red Chinese strength is no more in Russia's interest than in the West's.

Brazil's current concern with presidentialism versus parliamentarianism gleaned considerable comment sparked by the Justice Minister's proposal to return to the former without the scheduled January plebiscite. General reaction: let the people choose.

For the Minister Consul General

Scott C. Lyon

Scott C. Lyon
Consul

Contributors: D. C. Proper
J. Liebof
J. Mason

Distribution: INS/RAR, AmConGen Recife, AmConsulates Belem, Belo Horizonte, Curitiba, Porto Alegre, Salvador, Santos.

0442

democratic unions where the Communists were defeated in free elections. Magaldi stated to the press that "it seems to us that either the Labor Minister is really not aware of developments on the labor scene, or he believes that the best policy is to ignore them." He added," We told Sr. Pinheiro Neto clearly that if the government authorities continue to close their eyes to these outrages, as they have up to now, then we, the democratic leaders, will be forced to use the force and violence which the Communists employ; we will use force to defend our rights." (UNCLASSIFIED)

Comment: The MSD leaders believe themselves very definitely menaced by what they consider to be masked but effective Federal Government support of Communist efforts to overthrow them in their respective union organizations. (LIMITED OFFICIAL USE)

10. Telegraph Workers Affiliate with International Trade Secretariat

The São Paulo Local Union of Telegraph Company Employees at an assembly on November 14 voted unanimously to affiliate with the Postal, Telegraph and Telephone International (PTTI), a democratic international trade secretariat active in most countries of the free world. This is the second São Paulo union to affiliate with the PTTI, the first being the São Paulo Local Union of Telephone Company Employees. (UNCLASSIFIED)

PSYCHOLOGICAL

1. Local Press Reaction

The Cuban crisis continued to dominate São Paulo editorial columns, with most dailies except leftist/nationalist Ultima Hora solidly behind the U.S./OAS position. A number of writers saw Khrushchev's handling of Cuba's affairs as finally exposing the sham of the island's independence and sovereignty. Cracks in the Sino-Soviet bloc, widened by their disagreement over Cuba, were seen as an exploitable plus for our side. Ultima Hora continued to skirt 'round any flat position but did decide that Kennedy's quarantine was laid down very obviously to affect the November 6 elections.

Red China's invasion of India caught editorialists' attention. All condemned the Chicoms but most found India to be paying the price of her own naivete. General feeling:

0441

opposition, and 2) the Communists did not want to catch the brunt of Governor-elect Adhemar de Barros' expected crackdown on the Santos labor movement. The new PSD president has privately indicated to other labor leaders that he intends to limit the PSD's support to justified strikes over wages and other economic issues, rather than to politically motivated strikes such as those which paralyzed Santos on July 5 and September 15. It remains to be seen whether he can resist pressures from the Communists and President Goulart to lend PSD support to their maneuvers in the labor field. (LIMITED OFFICIAL USE)

8. Labor Leaders Seek Understanding with Governor-elect

Some twenty Paulista non-Communist leaders from the predominantly Janista Workers' Union Movement (União Sindical dos Trabalhadores -- UST) met with Governor-elect Adhemar de Barros for two hours on November 13. In this exploratory meeting (UST expects to have further contact with Adhemar after his return from abroad in late December) the labor leaders tried to lay the ground work for an eventual working agreement with the incoming State administration. While UST leaders realize that Adhemar's choice for Secretary of Labor will be governed largely by political party considerations, they hope to be able to influence the selection of the candidate most friendly to labor from among the politically acceptable candidates. (LIMITED OFFICIAL USE)

Comment: The Consulate General is not aware of a single local labor leader who could be tabbed as an adhemarista. Apparently, the UST is attempting to convince Adhemar of the folly of a threatened general crackdown on all labor unions, both Communist and non-Communist, thus driving the latter into the arms of the former. (LIMITED OFFICIAL USE)

9. Democratic Union Movement Menaced by Communist Maneuvers

In an interview published by O Estado on November 17, Antônio Pereira MAGALDI, President of the Democratic Union Movement (Movimento Sindical Democrático -- MSD), commented on his meeting with Labor Minister João PINHEIRO Neto on November 13. Magaldi said that he had called the Minister's attention to Communist efforts to take over non-Communist unions by force, as recently occurred in the Santos Local Union of Stevedores. According to Magaldi, the Minister replied that he had no knowledge of any Communist maneuver aiming at taking over

0440

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6. Agriculture Minister Speaks on Coffee Policy

Speaking at a luncheon offered by European Chambers of Commerce in São Paulo on November 14, Minister of Agriculture Renato da COSTA LIMA disagreed with the international coffee agreement recently signed by Brazil. He believed that Brazil could have obtained a much larger segment of the world market by pursuing an aggressive export policy without any agreement, "because African coffee is not in a position to compete with ours."

The Minister also put in a plug for increased trade in coffee and other items with the iron curtain countries. During his visit in his home State, he reportedly went to Santos to greet the arrival of a Norwegian freighter loaded with 100,000 tons of Russian oil. The press said that he had played an important part in arranging for the import. (UNCLASSIFIED)

7. Santos City Labor Council Elects New Directorate

The Santos City Labor Council (Forum Sindical de Debates -- FSD) elected a new directorate on November 12. Only one "unity" slate of candidates was presented, in accordance with a pre-election agreement obtained by Communist from non-Communist union leaders in Santos. Domingos ALVARES, President of the São Paulo State Federation of Metalworkers, and other São Paulo labor leaders from the Workers' Union Movement (União Sindical dos Trabalhadores -- UST) were active in the behind-the-scenes negotiations leading to the composition of the "unity" slate. The new FSD president is Vitelbino Ferreira de SOUZA, non-Communist President of the Santos Local Union of Metalworkers. Orlando dos SANTOS, non-Communist President of the Santos Local Union of Tallyclerks, was elected Vice-President of the FSD. Of the remaining 3 FSD directorate members, 2 (the First Secretary and the Treasurer) are Communists; the Second Secretary has collaborated closely with the Communists in the past although this is no evidence that he is a member of the PCB. (LIMITED OFFICIAL USE)

Comment: Although the new FSD directorate is something of a mixed bag, with at least 2 and possibly 3 Communists out of 5 members, it seems to represent some improvement over the entirely Communist-dominated former directorate. Two explanations are advanced for the Communists' eagerness to form a "unity" slate led by a non-Communist: 1) The Communists doubted that an all-Communist slate could be elected over non-Communist

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0439

tacitly accepting the hemispheric Alliance which inspired it. This could open new opportunities for the original Alliance for Progress to work directly with Governors. (CONFIDENTIAL)

4. PSP for Modified Presidentialism

National PSP leaders meeting in São Paulo on November 10 decided to recommend a vote in favor of presidentialism in the January 6 plebiscite; this despite the party's statutory pro-parliamentary position. They termed the decision "realistic" in view of the fact that the parliamentary system instituted during the post-Quadros crisis "became hybrid and impracticable." But they were against returning all of the executive's powers, suggesting that Congress retain a say in Cabinet nominations and fiscal policy (foreign affairs were not specifically mentioned this time). (UNCLASSIFIED)

Comment: Adhemar, not unexpectedly, thus retained total personal control of the party and overrode those who disagreed (see Weekly Summary No. 46). This leaves him in a position to bargain with President Goulart. (LIMITED OFFICIAL USE)

5. Estado Attacks Military

The newspaper Estado de S. Paulo ordinarily considers discretion the least part of valor, attacking offenders wherever it finds them. The President and the Governor-elect are daily victims, and the slander suit which the latter has brought has not caused a respite. But Estado has drawn the line at attacking the military. Even current Second Army Commander Pery BEVILACQUA was treated with velvet gloves (Weekly Summary No. 36) despite his obvious part in President Goulart's dispositivo ("arrangement" of friendly commanders). The velvet gloves now seem to be off. Starting with the HECK case (which the paper partially caused by its interviews with the Admiral) and the MAURELL transfer (which it covered in depth), Estado is attacking even the military ministers. Example: "Unfortunately for Brazil, the acts of the Minister of War are not in accord with the ideas he claims to espouse. His profession of democratic faith is limited strictly to speeches." (LIMITED OFFICIAL USE)

Comment: This treatment from prestigious Estado could in itself be a real contribution to a military crisis. (LIMITED OFFICIAL USE)

0438

willingness to accept the help of the talented opposition forces; (b) recognized, in effect, the uselessness of purely negative anti-communism; and (c) pledged to promote social justice. Overlooking the one exaggeration, then, the speech on Adhemar's goals was distinctly encouraging. Pending the opportunity to prove his willingness and ability to carry out the goals, he must be given credit for defining them well. (LIMITED OFFICIAL USE)

3. "Brazilian Alliance for Progress" Attracting Adherents

Bahia Governor-elect LOMANTO Junior left São Paulo after a two-week stay, having formally supported Adhemar de Barros' plan for a "Brazilian Alliance for Progress" (see Weekly Summary 46 and Airgram A-144 of November 15). Lomanto said that two São Paulo industries (one of them Willys-Overland) planned to set up branches in his State.

Next to visit São Paulo was Governor-elect Seixas DORIA of Sergipe, who likewise praised Adhemar's "Brazilian Alliance" and invited São Paulo investments. He did not follow Lomanto's line to the extent of welcoming foreign capital, but he did refer favorably to a recent meeting with the American Ambassador. He asked "not for alms but for capital investment," pointing out the advantages which would come to São Paulo from an expansion of the consumer market to the Northeast.

Federal Deputy Bento GONÇALVES of Minas Gerais, a member of Adhemar's Social Progressive Party (PSP), likewise visited São Paulo and praised the "Brazilian Alliance." Leftist/nationalist newspaper Ultima Hora featured an interview to this effect with Gonçalves and played up the fact that he is President of the "Nationalist Parliamentary Front."

A columnist in another newspaper cracked: "In the Northeast they're already starting to line up for inscription in Adhemar's party, the 'Alliance for the Progress of São Paulo for Brazil,' new and whimsical name of the 'Social Progressive Party.' Seixas Doria, the nationalist ... has come down from Sergipe and signed up." (OFFICIAL USE ONLY)

Comment: The quoted press comment was a bit unkind, despite the fact that the "Brazilian Alliance" will be used as a political vehicle by Adhemar. Adhemar is doing good work in bringing leftist/nationalists around, and they cannot very well come around to praise of the Brazilian Alliance without

0437

solely responsible for the rising cost of living. The idea of a "wage truce" has not previously been broached by the Goulart Government in São Paulo. The publicity Correio gave indicated that it was a considered feeler. The idea sounded odd from friend-of-the-workers Dantas, even though the "truce" was hedged to the extent of not covering cost-of-living increases. (LIMITED OFFICIAL USE)

2. Adhemar States Goals

The Regional Electoral Court formally declared Adhemar de BARROS Governor-elect on November 15. In his speech on the occasion, Barros stressed the need of "putting our house /São Paulo/ in order." The people, he said, "are expecting from me a real miracle in accomplishments, in equilibrium, in order, in discipline ...." But despite this reflection on the preceding Governors, Adhemar stated that "I have no scars on my soul" and "no accounts to settle" with anyone. He intended to forget past battles and "offer my hand sincerely to all the parties so that they may offer me the colaboration of their best men."

Adhemar formally repeated the ideological convictions he preached during and since the campaign. He would oppose extremisms (read communism) but " not ... in open combat, by bravado, or through reprisals." Instead, he would "carry out a program capable of showing those who undermine democracy (solapadores) that, within the /democratic/ regime, we can solve the problems of the State and the nation with efficiency ...." His first goal (meta) was the "man" (read social justice). He asked for help in "humanizing capital" so that the despair of those suffering from an "impious inflation" would not destroy democracy. In foreign policy, Adhemar looked favorably on "our neighbors to the North, who were always loyal to us." He planned to "make it known that we should respect our treaties" (read Rio Pact). He favored self-determination of peoples under the influence of the East as well as of the West.

Referring to the January 6 parliamentary/presidential referendum, Governor-elect Barros said that his party has consented to a return to presidentialism (item 4) but opined that Brazil's present "difficult situation" was the fault of the leaders, not of the system. (OFFICIAL USE ONLY)

Comment: The talk of "putting the house in order" is ridiculous; The State was never in such order when Adhemar was in office. But he can be excused a natural forgetfulness on this topic. The important points are that he (a) stated

0436

Brazilian financial problems. He stressed the seriousness of the present inflation, opining that incumbent Finance Minister CALMON "did not exaggerate" the "dark and frightening" picture. He believed that "three forces" would have to cooperate in the fight against inflation. The first could only be the Government, which had to "set the example" and make the "first move." The second was the "producing classes," which had to accept temporary sacrifices. The third was the working classes. Without reducing their already minimum level of consumption, the workers might have to accept a "wage truce," foregoing all wage increases except those "rigorously in accord with the index of depreciation [of the cruzeiro]."

In the television speech and in other appearances, Dantas found Justice Minister MANGABEIRA's position on the January 6 referendum "judicially very defensible" but politically dangerous. Dantas was in favor of restoring presidentialism without the "plebiscite" if it could be done smoothly; otherwise he thought it better to go ahead with the vote. In one press interview, he seemed to accept what is popularly called "mitigated presidency" (a weaker executive), saying that Congress might well be heard on cabinet nominations and monetary policy. GOULART mouthpiece Correio Paulistano played up most of his statements but entirely omitted mention of this one.

Dantas insisted that his "independent" foreign policy was not "neutral" (since it was not rigid and doctrinaire); that it was not anti-American; and that in fact the United States had no objection to it. He suggested that a school he visited (the Technical Industrial School of São Bernardo do Campo) deserved Alliance for Progress aid and volunteered to carry a request for such aid with him on a planned trip to the United States. (OFFICIAL USE ONLY)

Comment: Very few other politicians on the scene can compete with Dantas in playing variations on a theme -- "independent" foreign policy, for example. This is not the first time that he has chosen to play his most responsible tunes in São Paulo. He as much as admitted interest in becoming Finance Minister in the first cabinet after January 6, and one got the clear impression that the São Paulo visit was intended to tranquillize big business and smooth the way. Note that Dantas, by saying that the Government must set the example in the anti-inflationary fight, implicitly refuted the leftist line (often reflected by Goulart's cronies and São Paulo newspaper mouthpiece) that business "exploitation" of the working classes is

0435

INFORMATION/ACTION

ARA-4		
RM/R 1	REP	AF
ARA	EUR	FE
NEA	CU	INR 5
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AGR	COM	FRB
INT	LAB	TAR
TR	XMB	AIR 4
ARMY 5	CIA 15	NAVY 5
OSD 12	USIA 8	NSA 3

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

AIRGRAM

732.00/11-2262

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A-152 NO. | CONFIDENTIAL HANDLING INDICATOR

TO : DEPARTMENT OF STATE

1962 NOV 23 AM 8 55

INFO : RIO DE JANEIRO, BRASILIA

RM/AN ANALYSIS & DISTRIBUTION BRANCH

DEPARTMENT OF STATE BUREAU OF INTER-AMERICAN AFFAIRS

FROM : AmConGen SAO PAULO November 22, 1962

SUBJECT : Weekly Summary No. 47 NOV 26 1962

REF :

File no action ARA/EST/B RJ Benitez 12/19/62

TABLE OF CONTENTS

POLITICAL

1. DANTAS Talks Like Finance Minister; Foresees Wage Truce
2. Adhemar States Goals
3. "Brazilian Alliance for Progress" Attracting Adherents
4. PSP for Modified Presidentialism
5. Estado Attacks Military
6. Agriculture Minister Speaks on Coffee Policy
7. Santos City Labor Council Elects New Directorate
8. Labor Leaders Seek Understanding with Governor-elect
9. Democratic Union Movement Menaced by Communist Maneuvers
10. Telegraph Workers Affiliate with International Trade Secretariat

PSYCHOLOGICAL

1. Local Press Reaction

POLITICAL

1. DANTAS Talks Like Finance Minister; Foresees Wage Truce

Speaking over São Paulo television on November 14, ex-Foreign Minister San Thiago Dantas spent much time on

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FORM DS-323 4-62

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Drafted by: See last page/el 11/20/62

Contents and Classification Approved by:

Clearances:

0434

engaged in some fairly strong criticism of the Alliance for Progress (See ConGen A-49). (UNCLASSIFIED)

Lowell C. Kilday

Lowell C. Kilday
American Vice Consul

Contributor:

LCKilday

0433

2. Soviet-Brazilian Cultural Society Formed in Recife

The press reported this week that there was recently founded in Recife a Sociedade Cultural Brasil-URSS. One Dr. LUIZ IGLESIAS was said to be the driving force behind the new organization. (UNCLASSIFIED)

3. Soviet Research Vessel Calls at Recife

The Soviet oceanographic research vessel Mickail Lamonosov called at the port of Recife on Monday, November 19 to take on fuel and provisions. The ship was reported to have on board a group of 69 technicians, led by one GEORGES PONOMARENKO, whose specific mission was the measurement of tropical currents of the South Atlantic. The vessel's last port of call was said to be Dakar while its next would be Rio de Janeiro. (UNCLASSIFIED)

4. Governor Leonel Brizzola to Campaign in Northeast

It was announced this week that Governor LEONEL BRIZZOLA would arrive in Recife on November 26 to carry on his campaign for a "No" vote in the January plebiscite. BARTOLOMEU BARBOSA, described as Brizzola's press secretary, who arrived in Recife on Saturday, November 17 told local reporters that Brizzola would campaign in various cities in Pernambuco, Paraiba, and Alagoas. (UNCLASSIFIED)

5. Fortaleza Student Leader Breaks with UNE

The Fortaleza press reports that JOAQUIM ALENCAR BEZERRA, recently elected president of the University of Ceara Law School's Student Directorate, has decided to sever relations with the National Union of Students on the grounds that the latter organization is controlled by Communists. Alencar, who reportedly was elected to his post with the ostensible support of the local Communist Party, presumably will now face strong opposition to his leadership by Communists at the University. (UNCLASSIFIED)

Comment: This is another sign of encouraging developments among student groups in the Northeast. Recently, it will be recalled, Recife's university students elected as their leader an anti-Communist who campaigned on an anti-UNE platform. (OFFICIAL USE ONLY)

6. IV Nationalist Student Week Held in Recife

The week of November 11--18 was observed by Recife University students as IV Nationalist Student Week. As in previous years, the observance was in the form of a number of speeches, lectures, and seminars sponsored by the Pernambuco Students Union. Speakers this year included Acting Mayor ARTUR LIMA CAVALCANTI, SUDENE officials FRANCISCO OLIVEIRA and JADER de ANDRADE, Father ANTONIO MELO, and others. The most significant speech was that of Oliveira, in which he

0432

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DEPARTMENT OF STATE

AIRGRAM

732.00/11-2162

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A-52 — OFFICIAL USE ONLY

NO. — HANDLING INDICATOR

TO : DEPARTMENT OF STATE 1962 NOV 28 PM 4 41

INFO: RIO DE JANEIRO, BRASILIA, SÃO PAULO
Porto Alegre -1
Curitiba -1
Belo Horizonte -1

DEPARTMENT OF STATE
BUREAU OF
INTER-AMERICAN AFFAIRS
NOV 29 1962

RM/AN
ANALYSIS & DISTRIBUTION
BRANCH

FROM : Amconsul RECIFE

DATE: November 21, 1962

SUBJECT : Weekly Summary No. 21

REF :

RM/K - Guy
12/7 - KB

TABLE OF CONTENTS

1. Rural Labor Union Leaders Meeting in Recife
2. Soviet-Brazilian Cultural Society Formed in Recife
3. Soviet Research Vessel Calls at Recife
4. Governor Leonel Brizzola to Campaign in Northeast
5. Fortaleza Student Leader Breaks with UNE
6. IV Nationalist Student Week Held in Recife.

1. Rural Labor Union Leaders Meeting in Recife

Presidents of Brazil's various state rural labor union federations and other members of the leadership of the Church stimulated rural labor union movement arrived in Recife on November 16 to begin a two week series of meeting and discussions. The first phase of the period was to consist of a detailed examination of the various problems confronting the farm worker in Brazil and the second was to concern itself with possible solutions. One unconfirmed report indicated that the most important result of the meeting would be a firm decision to fight henceforth the attempted eviction of any farmworker from any farm property anywhere in Brazil.

Comment: This meeting is only one of a series of reunions of the leaders of the rural labor union movement. It is significant only as one more sign that the national movement is becoming more consolidated and united than it has been heretofore. (UNCLASSIFIED)

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Action

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Control: 7930

Rec'd: November 21, 1962
1:11 P.M.

FROM: Rio de Janeiro

TO: Secretary of State

NO: 991, November 21, 1 P. M.

SE FOR

INFO:

RM/R FILES

Rio 991

RM/R - Lee
11/29 - KB

Embassy telegram 987.

Reference telegram should read Renaldo Cosga, not Renato Costa Lima.

GORDON

mbk

732.00/11-2162

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Control: 7473
Rec'd: November 20, 1962
5:22 p.m.

FROM: Rio de Janeiro

TO: Secretary of State

NO: 982, November 20, 5 P.M.

ACTION: ESTB
INFO:
RM/R FILES

PRIORITY

Re Wellman-Byrd telephone conversation November 19, Mangabeira proposal cancel January 6 plebiscite in favor direct Congressional action restoring full presidential powers believed Goulart-originated feeler. Mangabeira argued plebiscite unnecessary national expense in view prediction electorate will opt for presidentialism. Real motive behind proposal however seems Goulart concern lest voter abstention be so great as to vitiate result, leading to question of legal bindingness. Moreover action by present Congress would have meant faster restoration presidential powers, for under Capanema-Valadares law setting plebiscite exact details new system must await action by new Congress within 90 days after promulgation plebiscite result. Goulart possibly also worried re degree his control over new Congress.

Attempt jettison plebiscite now largely abandoned in face UDN opposition and PTB-PSD failure agree on draft implementing legislation. Some efforts still being made, but seem unlikely succeed.

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NAME OF OFFICER & OFFICE SYMBOL: [illegible]	DATE OF ACTION: 11/21/62	DIRECTIONS TO RM/R: file

0429

at Pôrto Alegre, is to be relieved in the near future. It will be recalled that General Acioly was the principal subordinate commander who disagreed with III Army Commander Jair Dantas Ribeiro's controversial telegram to War Minister Nelson de Melo during the September political/military crisis.

c. According to press reports, Pôrto Alegre Mayor José Loureiro da Silva is fed up with the myriad questionnaires he has received from the Inter American Development Bank concerning the city's loan request for a waterworks project. The Mayor seems resigned to the fact that he will not receive the loan.

Frederick D. Sharp III
American Consul

cc.: Consular Affairs, Rio
Political Section, Rio
ARA/EST/Brazil, Washington
INR/RAR/P, Washington
Political Section, Brasília

Department: Pass to all posts in Brazil

TRL

0428

declarations concerning U.S. personalities and activities in Brazil, and humorously said that he had told Prime Minister Hermes Lima that "it looks like they are trying to expel me from Brazil". As of this writing, most coverage has disappeared although Correio do Povo did reprint a recent article from Rio's O Globo concerning the meeting between Ambassador Gordon and President Goulart on the latter's aircraft on November 16. The article stated that "Goulart sought the meeting to dispel suspected misunderstandings between the two governments resulting from public statements of one who was not authorized to speak in the name of the President, but did so".

2. Political

On November 15 at an appropriate ceremony, the president of the Tribunal Regional Eleitoral, Baltasar Gama Barbosa, officially proclaimed and documented the Governor-elect, the two Senators-elect, 29 Federal Deputies-elect, and 55 State Deputies-elect--the successful candidates in the October 7 elections.

On Saturday, November 17, Governor-elect Ildo Meneghetti gave his first press interview in which he traced the general lines of his administration. He said that his government would be a popular, dynamic and progressive administration and that it would lean toward helping industrial and rural workers. He also declared that he would govern in intimate contact with the people, representatives of all sectors of activity, listening to all and trying to be responsive to the hopes and fears of each sector of the community. A detailed report on the Governor-elect's administration plans will be submitted separately.

On the issue of the plebiscite to be held January 6, a PSD leader in this State estimates that abstentions from the vote will run as high as from 50 to 70 percent. At the present time, however, not only the electorate but also the political leaders seem unsure as to whether the plebiscite will be held at all or whether the present form of government may be modified by actions of the Federal legislative branch. Little interest seems to be displayed here on whether the plebiscite occurs or not, but the consensus is, that one way or another, there will be a return to presidentialism.

3. Miscellany

a. A public announcement was made today that on orders from COFAP all rice stocks, milled or unmilled, located in RGS are to be seized by that agency of the Federal Government. As could be anticipated there has been initial outcry of protest from commercial circles at this so described invasion of the area of free enterprise. As developments occur in this matter they will be reported.

b. Fôlha da Tarde's rumor column reported this week that General Acioly Borges, Commander of the 6th Infantry Division, with headquarters

0427

ORIGIN/ACTION

ARA-4

RM/R	REP	AF
1		
ARA	EUR	FE
NEA	CU	INR 5
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L	FBO	AID 12
Recife 1		Belem 1
AGR	COM	FRB
INT	LAB	TAR
TR	XMB	AIR 4
ARMY 5	CIA 15	NAVY 5
OSD 12	USIA 8	NSA 3

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

AIRGRAM

732.00/11-2062

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1962 NOV 26 AM 7 21

DEPARTMENT OF STATE BUREAU OF INTER-AMERICAN AFFAIRS NOV 27 1962

RM/AN ANALYSIS & DISTRIBUTION BRANCH

FROM : Amconsul PÔRTO ALEGRE

DATE: NOV 20 1962

SUBJECT : PÔRTO ALEGRE WEEKLY SUMMARY Nº 31

REF :

RM/R-Yuri 26-11/28

1. Governor Brizola's Attack on Consul
2. Political
3. Miscellany

1. Governor Brizola's Attack on Consul

The scene of activity in the complaint of Governor Brizola against the Consul in Pôrto Alegre has shifted to Rio and Brasília and press coverage is now limited to concise factual reports except for Ultima Hora which has carried a couple of conjectural pieces. Only one "letter to the editor" has appeared thus far, in which the writer sarcastically chides the Governor and the country in general for exaggerated sensitivity. On Friday, the Consul received an invitation to appear on the weekly TV program "Unexpected Encounter" and was told that the other protagonist would be either the Governor or ex-Port Captain Valle. The invitation was politely declined. In his usual Friday night broadcast the Governor reported briefly on developments in the case by saying that he had been to Brasília and that the matter is now up to the Federal Government and the Foreign Office. He said that the Government is faced with the alternative of either accepting the word of a Governor or accepting the "mere denial" of diplomatic authorities. He went on to say that, were he consulted, he would have the Foreign Office politely suggest to the American Ambassador that the Consul be removed from Brazil. He related that he had been shown a diplomatic note of the Embassy which he said complained about his public

FILE

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Action ARA

Control: 7541 1962 NOV 21 AM 5 35
Rec'd: November 20, 1962
7:49 p.m.

Info SS SR G SP L CAP E AID P IOP INR CIA NSA RMR

FROM: Rio de Janeiro

TO: Secretary of State

NO: 987, November 20, 7 p.m.

Committee of super-wise men on AFP.

Bernardes told me November 20 that GOB strongly interested in work of this committee. Assuming favorable vote for Lleras Camargo and Kubitschek as members. GOB creating working group to back stop Kubitschek, including Roberto Costa Lima, Marcilio Moreira, someone from Furtado's staff, and perhaps non-Brazilians from ECLA, IDB, OAS staff, and perhaps other individual countries. Kubitschek is supposed to be writing Lleras suggesting an early meeting in Washington to lay out work, divide up countries for personal visits by two members, et cetera. Bernardes said they might invite USAID/B to have a representative sit in on at least some of working group discussions.

GORDON

MRJ

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ARA 3	EUR	FE
NEA	CU	INR 5
E	P 1	ID 2
OCT 1	FBO	AID
AGR	COM	FAS
INT	LAB	TAR
TR	XMB	AIR
ARMY	CIA 10	NAVY
OSD	USIA	NSA 3

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

AIRGRAM

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CA-5500, NO. | CONFIDENTIAL HANDLING INDICATOR

TO : Amembassy, RIO DE JANEIRO

INFO: BRASILIA

FROM : DEPARTMENT OF STATE DATE: Nov 19 12 04 PM '62

SUBJECT: Brazilian Elections of October 7, 1962

REF :

Another agency of the Government has requested a copy of the documents in the Embassy's biographic files on all candidates known to have been elected last month to their first term of office in the Chamber of Deputies. Re-elected incumbents and new incumbents already reported upon may be excluded. Material on the remaining new deputies should be forwarded as their success becomes evident.

Answers to the following questions have also been requested.

1. What was the total number of candidates for the Chamber of Deputies?

2. How many of these were incumbents?

The Embassy's cooperation will be appreciated.

RUSK

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FORM DS-323 4-62

Drafted by: IIR/CStHimmons 11/16/62

Contents and Classification Approved by: INR/CSaGWSnider

Clearances:

RAR - Mr. Ronald Schneider (in substance)

ARA/EST/B - Mr. Ralph J. Burton RB

Circular CA-5500

732.5R1/11-1962

AR 732.00

0424

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
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0423


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0422

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São Paulo
A-144
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Ultima Hora, predictably, made no comment on the Chicom-India situation. Most other papers ran editorials; all blasted the Red aggressors and several scored Brazil's official non-committal attitude toward India's request for help. Two writers found India's predicament to be much her own fault; Nehru's policies were unrealistic; neutralism is no guarantee against communist imperialism.

Daniel M. Braddock
Minister Consul General

Contributors: DC. Proper
J. Mason

Distribution: INS/RAR, AmConGen Recife, AmConsulates Belem, Belo Horizonte, Curitiba, Porto Alegre, Salvador, Santos.

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0421

(d) Similarly, the Supreme Electoral Court must decide whether to allow the candidacies of PR Deputies-elect who were not nominated in strict accordance with party statutes. (UNCLASSIFIED)

7. São Paulo Deputy Proposes Electoral Districts

São Paulo PSD Federal Deputy Antonio Sylvio CUNHA BUENO has announced his intention of pushing the Federal Chamber for institution of a system of electoral districts. Under the present system, States are the only electoral districts -- São Paulo being considerably the largest in numbers of voters -- and legislative candidate run at large within them. (UNCLASSIFIED)

Comment: Cunha Bueno should be encouraged. The Consulate General has frequently stressed its opinion that nothing but a system of electoral districts could end the present São Paulo confusion and present ordinary voters with the possibility of making an intelligent choice among legislative candidates. The confusion was worse than ever in the elections of October 7, when there were more voters, more seats to be filled, and a more complicated ballot than ever before. The problem is naturally at its worst in populous São Paulo. It is argued that electoral districts would allow more bossism in the rural zones. There is something to this, but it appears distinctly the lesser of two evils. The change to electoral districts, seemingly secondary in importance, might in fact allow profound imporovements in the democratic process in São Paulo. (LIMITED OFFICIAL USE)

PSYCHOLOGICAL

1. Local Press Reaction

The Cuban crisis, U.S. elections, and Red Chinese aggression in India dominated São Paulo editorial columns this week, in that order. While leftist/nationalist Ultima Hora refrained from further comment, most other dailies continued to analyze the Cuban situation, all agreeing with the U.S. position. General feeling: the crisis is far from over; the U.S. must remain firm; even after offensive weapons are removed Cuba will continue to be a threat to the hemisphere; Cuba is at crossroads between the Iron Curtain and the inter-American community.

U.S. elections received page one treatment in most papers, plus heavy editorial comment. General view: hurray for Kennedy and the Democrats; the President's decisive action on Cuba was source of much of his party's success at the polls; the electorate has in effect endorsed Kennedy's firm foreign policy. Ultima Hora called Kennedy legitimate heir to FDR, saw his victory as having great importance for the future and, bringing in Goulart, added that "... in the hands of these two young leaders rests the reformulation of Brazil-United States relations."

0420

5. PSP Undecided About Referendum

There are signs that the Social Progressive Party (Partido Social Progressista -- PSP) is divided over the referendum issue. Leader Adhemar de Barros seems to want positions in the national Government -- despite his publicized disagreement with President Goulart over ideological issues -- in which case he would have to offer PSP support in return. In line with this, he has made vague statements favoring a new and improved "modified" presidential system. But the PSP is by statute a pro-parliamentary party, and some of its influential members prefer to stick by their position. São Paulo PSP Federal Deputy CARVALHO Sobrinho last week dug a trench for this group, making a public statement violently against Goulart and presidentialism. As this report is drafted on November 12, it is conceivable that the conflict could come to the surface during a meeting of national PSP leaders called for November 14 in São Paulo. Adhemar will want to patch up the difference first or postpone the meeting, however. The meeting should show (a) whether -- as seems likely -- Adhemar's gubernatorial victory will enable him to quell the increasing independence of some members of his party; (b) whether he will be in a position bargain with Goulart. (LIMITED OFFICIAL USE)

6. Election Results Almost Final

The vote count for the October 7 elections is now final, with only very minor differences having developed since the last totals reported by the Consulate General. A final report will be made when the victors have been proclaimed. The Regional Electoral Court hopes this will be next week. Two minor changes have been made and two more important ones are pending:

(a) Re-elected Federal Deputy Rubens FERREIRA MARTINS recently died. Though a member of the PSP, his death will make room for Antonio Feliciano da SILVA, a member of the PSD and first suplente (substitute) in the PSP-PSD coalition. This alters the listing given in São Paulo Airgram A-118 of October 31.

(b) In the last hours of the count, the PRP gained one seat in the State Legislative Assembly at the expense of the MTR. The winning PRP Deputy is Wilson Nogueira LAPA; the loser was Lucio CASANOVA Neto. This also alters the listing given in Airgram A-118.

(c) The Supreme Electoral Court has not yet decided whether to declare Communist candidates ineligible. At least two Federal and Four State Deputies from São Paulo would be affected, all of them elected on the PTB slate. Politicians are not sure whether a decision for ineligibility would mean that the PTB would lose these seats or whether suplentes from party ranks would be promoted. Communist front organizations and Communist controlled labor unions have started a campaign to press the Supreme Electoral Court for a favorable decision.

0419

would be served by cooperation with Adhemar, but perhaps not by cooperation to the point of irritating Goulart. Lomanto's closest approximation to Adhemar's foreign policy line was his invitation to outside capital. (LIMITED OFFICIAL USE)

3. Old Governor Willing to Help New

Incumbent Governor Carvalho Pinto has hospitably received emissaries from Adhemar de Barros, instructing members of the current administrative team -- especially the planning group in charge of the "Plan of Action" -- to brief Adhemar's men and make the transfer of government as painless as possible. Carvalho Pinto openly intends to accelerate public works now in process and start as many new ones as possible. The State Legislative Assembly, in a gesture which should be of help, approved the incumbent Governor's budget without debate the first time it came up for vote. Observers can recall no precedent in recent times.

The Assembly, in fact, has proved more docile in the days since the defeat of Carvalho Pinto's gubernatorial candidate than it usually did before the Governor became a lame duck. Significant numbers of politicians from the "interior," too, have called on Carvalho Pinto to let him know that they are still with him. (OFFICIAL USE ONLY)

Comment: Carvalho Pinto and Adhemar are evidently not letting the bitterness of the campaign interfere with an orderly transfer of power. This should be of inestimable help to the Governor-elect, who in his past terms was never able to mount an administrative machine approaching Carvalho Pinto's. If the new regime can just avoid upsetting the rhythm of the last, there should be enough momentum to run a good government for two or three years -- until about the time of the presidential campaign, for example. Awareness of this may be what is making Adhemar open-minded. Carvalho Pinto's willingness to provide new public works for his successor to inaugurate should maintain his reputation as a poor politician but a good statesman. The tone of his actions makes it appear likely that the current Governor has not given up the idea of a future public career. (LIMITED OFFICIAL USE)

4. Adhemar Suspends Paraguay Trip

Adhemar de Barros was scheduled to visit Paraguay this month, reportedly on formal invitation from President STROESSNER, who was to give him an important decoration. The trip was "suspended" for medical reasons. (UNCLASSIFIED)

Comment: It probably occurred to Governor-elect Barros that such a prompt call on Stroessner would not further the image of the new Adhemar. On the other hand, São Paulo has considerable commercial interest in Paraguay, so the visit may legitimately be undertaken in time. Stroessner is apparently anxious for it; he sent a delegation to see Adhemar last week. It will be recalled that Barros spent part of his "exile" in Paraguay during the Quadros State Government. (LIMITED OFFICIAL USE)

0418

planners (item 2). The press reported that Adhemar presented his plans for a Brazilian Aliança directly to President GOULART on November 7. Rio Grande do Sul Governor-elect MENEGHETTI, according to Porto Alegre date lines, specifically endorsed Adhemar's idea on November 5 -- and also criticized Brazilian foreign policy in terms close to those used by his São Paulo colleague. Bahia Governor-elect LOMANTO Junior (item2) praised Adhemar's Aliança and made lengthy requests for aid to the Governor-elect, the incumbent Governor, and local industrialists. (OFFICIAL USE ONLY)

Comment: This half of Adhemar's two-pronged drive for a "national presence" is making more obvious progress than the other, which is an attempt to coalesce conservative Governors to exert pressure on Goulart. Meneghetti is the only Governor who has openly agreed with both schemes. This does not mean, however, that Adhemar has given up on the pressure group.

The national government seems unlikely to be eager to help with any project of Adhemar's, and he would have trouble administering a Brazilian Aliança by himself. Fortunately, the lame-duck Carvalho Pinto Government can provide many of the necessary administrative elements if the Governor-elect will accept them -- and there are signs that he may (item 3). The hemispheric Alliance for Progress should perhaps also stand by to provide technical help to its São Paulo namesake. The Brazilian Aliança was not proposed under entirely favorable circumstances, but it fills a real gap and should be helped to succeed. It is probably no coincidence that the Consul General had been stressing the urgency of São Paulo aid to the Northeast in recent private talks with Adhemar. (LIMITED OFFICIAL USE)

2. Bahia Looking for Paulista and Foreign Help

During his visit to São Paulo, Bahia Governor-elect Lomanto Junior has: (a) had friendly talks with São Paulo Governor-elect Adhemar de Barros; (b) talked at length with incumbent Carvalho Pinto, who apparently found Lomanto very interested in his ideas of meticulous planning for economic development, promising to help train Bahianos in the São Paulo techniques; and (c) was wined and dined by the São Paulo Federation of Industries, members of which expressed interest in setting up factories in Bahia. In a speech to São Paulo industrialists, Lomanto was quoted as saying: "Bahia at this moment opens her doors to receive and stimulate free initiative. National and foreign capital which really wishes to cooperate and promote the development of the State will be received and assisted." (UNCLASSIFIED)

Comment: Adhemar had hoped that Lomanto would join his alliance of conservative Governors, but judging from this visit -- and interpolating from some of Barros' side remarks -- the Bahia Governor-elect showed interest mainly in the development of his State. This objective

0417

ORIGIN/ACTION

ARA-4		
RM/R 1	REP	AF
ARA	EUR	FE
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AGR	COM	FRB
INT	LAB	TAR
TR	XMB	AIR 4
ARMY 5	CIA 15	NAVY 5
OSD 12	USIA 8	NSA 3
	NSC 2	

RM/R-E-1

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

AIRGRAM

793.00/11-1562

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A-144 NO. — LIMITED OFFICIAL USE

HANDLING INDICATOR

Bill
no action
ARA/EST/B
RJ Burton
1/9/63

TO : DEPARTMENT OF STATE 1962 NOV 16 PM 2 27

INFO : RIO DE JANEIRO, BRASILIA, ASUNCIÓN

M/MR ANALYSIS & DISTRIBUTION BRANCH

FROM : AmConGen SAO PAULO

DATE: NOVEMBER 15, 1962

SUBJECT : Weekly Summary No. 46

DEPARTMENT OF STATE BUREAU OF INTER-AMERICAN AFFAIRS NOV 19 1962

REF :

TABLE OF CONTENTS

POLITICAL
1. "Brazilian Aliança" Stirs Interest in São Paulo
2. Bahia Looking for Paulista and Foreign Help
3. Old Governor Willing to Help New
4. Adhemar Suspends Paraguay Trip
5. PSP Undecided About Referendum
6. Election Results Almost Final
7. São Paulo Deputy Proposes Electoral Districts

PSYCHOLOGICAL: 1. Local Press Reaction

POLITICAL

1. "Brazilian Aliança" Stirs Interest in São Paulo

Governor-elect Adhemar de BARROS' proposed "Brazilian Alliance for Progress" (reported in Weekly Summary 45 and in a more detailed Airgram submitted at the same time as the present Summary) seems to have struck a responsive chord in São Paulo. Janista mouthpiece A Hora actually ran an editorial praising the idea (QUADROS himself was on a ship at sea however, and could hardly have been consulted). Governor CARVALHO PINTO, another of Adhemar's opponents, did not verbally endorse the Brazilian Aliança, but he announced increases in the modest aid he has been giving the Northeast: his Government released the bulk of its Federal education subsidy for use in poorer States and promised to help Bahia train technicians and

FORM DS-323 4-62 — LIMITED OFFICIAL USE — FOR DEPT. USE ONLY In Out

Drafted by: See last page/el 11/13/62

Contents and Classification Approved by:

Clearances:

0416

SECRET

15 November 1962

MEMORANDUM FOR: Assistant Secretary Edwin Martin
Chairman, Latin American Policy
Committee

SUBJECT: Views on the Draper Report

In response to your request for written comments on the Draper Report we are submitting a review of Goulart's activities which may be helpful and which should be weighed when considering recommendation that Washington issue clear policy guidance to our mission in Brazil setting forth as specifically as possible our attitude, strategy, and tactics toward the Goulart administration. (Draper Report page 4, paragraph 2).


Richard Helms
Deputy Director
(Plans)


Attachment: As noted above

BRAZIL - CIA, Draper


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0415





0413



d. The XVI Brazilian Geology Congress was held this week in Pôrto Alegre.

e. In a statement issued in Pôrto Alegre this week Carlos Meireles, president of the Conselho Nacional de Petroleo, stated that private refineries in Brazil may well be nationalized in the near future.

f. Under the authority of the new land expropriation law which permits the State to take over lands for "social purposes Governor Brizola this week repossessed three parcels of land which he had previously taken over only to have his decree set aside by the local courts. Paulo Schmidt, head of IGRA (Instituto Gaúcho de Reforma Agraria) (c.f. Castro-Cuba's INRA) said that what IGRA really wants is a Federal subsidiary since the State has no financial means to carry out agrarian reform. As might be expected FARSUL issued a statement in which they condemn the new law as antiquate since it is dated from Vargas' time and is unmanageable. It would not be surprising to see a reversal of this Brizola insistence once Meneghetti takes over.

Frederick D. Sharp III, per DF
Frederick D. Sharp III
American Consul

cc.: Consular Affairs, Rio
Political Section, Rio
Political Section, Brasília
ARA/EST/Brazil, Washington
INR/RAR/P, Washington

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0411

success or failure of at least the early days of his administration.

In an expected move PSD orthodox maverick Hélio Carlomagno has resigned from the PSD as a protest over what he terms the party's orientation toward the defense of reactionary vested interests. Carlomagno, who ran on the PSD Federal Deputy ticket was handily defeated in the October 7 election and since he has been a stout Brizola supporter he will undoubtedly take refuge in the Brizola wing of the PTB. Accompanying him in his bolt is Raphael Perez Borges, president of the local branch of the Caixa Economica Federal.

PTB sources hopefully sent up a trial ballon this week reporting that Pôrto Alegre Mayor Loureiro da Silva will return to the PTB ranks following the departure of Brizola from the local scene as well as State PTB president João Caruso, who is reportedly to fill an important position in the Federal Government. They also state that PL squabbles over the municipal administration may assist the Mayor in his decision.

3. Miscellany

a. Members of the RGS bank employees union went on strike last Thursday when bankers refused to meet their demands for wage increases roughly comparable to those recently gained by bank employees in other states. This strike, which eventually closed all RGS banks (including the Bank of Brazil where employees ultimately walked out in a sympathy gesture) ended Wednesday with a settlement accepted by all private banks here. The employees had demanded a 70 percent wage boost based on present salaries, effective immediately; an additional 30 percent increase effective March, 1963; monthly longevity pay of Cr$2,500. per five years service; and an end to Saturday work. They accepted an immediate increase of 60 percent based on last November's (lower) salaries; a 25 percent increase in April, 1963; and a Cr$2,000. longevity increase. An end to Saturday work was accepted in principle pending enabling legislation. The workers, who received a 40 percent increase last fall and 20 percent this March, will have won a raise of about 100 percent by April 1963.

b. A six-member Department of Agriculture "wheat team", headed by Mr. Frank Leroux, General Sales Manager, FAS, visited Pôrto Alegre over the holiday weekend (November 10-12) to discuss aspects of wheat trade with local trade and other groups. The Consulate arranged meetings between members of the wheat team and representatives of local wheat cooperatives and the miller's federation as well as an air tour of the wheat producing area of RGS. Briefing and de-briefing sessions were held at the Consulate on November 10 and 12, respectively.

c. The control price on bread in Pôrto Alegre was raised by 15 cruzeiros to 50 cruzeiros per kilo today and bananas will now be sold by weight rather than piece, thus adding to the inflationary trend in the cost of living.

0410

denials of the allegations, the incident seems to be dying a natural death.

All comments made to Consulate officers agree that in fact Brizola was attacking the position of the American Consul rather than the individual concerned--probably to engraciate himself with nationalistic thinking in Brazil in order to make up for his changed position on Castro-Cuba as reported on Weekly Summary Nº 28, October 31, 1962. Brizola had been publicly condemned by Luiz Carlos Prestes, PCB leader, as well as by the Communist paper Novos Rumos for his reversal on Cuba. It is also just possible that this protest was triggered by a get-together with the working press of Porto Alegre which the Consulate gave during the last week of October and which had received considerable favorable comment. Anti-Brizola groups most notably among journalists have sounded out the Consul on offering a return get-together to publicly demonstrate friendly support for the Consul at this time. These have been discouraged in order to avoid becoming a vehicle for internal political squabbles in Porto Alegre. The Consulate understands that Governor-elect Meneghetti would be disposed to make a statement in favor of the Consul were not his inauguration as much as two and a half months away.

It is interesting to note that Brizola may have tried to force Itamarati's hand by a public disclosure of his letter to Prime Minister and Foreign Minister Hermes Lima, which effort seems to have failed if reading between the lines of Itamarati statements can be trusted. Late comment by Consulate contacts states that Brizola will probably drop the issue since the Consul has not engaged in a polemic with him and his effort with the Foreign Ministry has apparently not prospered. In assessing this incident it would appear to be just one more maneuver in Brizola's continuing anti-American campaign.

2. Political

Political activity by and large is still marking time during the lame duck period although one political observer on the eve of Meneghetti's return to Porto Alegre to be proclaimed Governor-elect tomorrow stated that Dr. Ildo is in a dilemma. He is worried about the financial condition of the State as he takes over from spent-thrift Brizola and some of his close advisors have counselled for early contact with the Federal Government for fiscal assistance. However, such a move would doubtlessly involve him in supporting Jango's plebiscite aims and the ADP parties which supported his election are divided on this subject. Moreover Meneghetti has not yet lined up with Ademar de Barros in the rumored São Paulo/Rio Grande do Sul axis (just what this proposed axis would hope to realize is not yet clear). The observer goes on to say that the Governor-elect is considering sending emissaries on various "fishing trips" to sound out the situations in São Paulo, Rio and Brasilia. At any rate he is faced with making some important decisions soon which will have a significant impact on the

0409

ORIGIN/ACTION		
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ARA	EUR	FE
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3/15 27	S/P 1	G 1
AGR	COM 6	FRB 3
INT 7	LAB 6	TAR
TR 2	XMB	AIR 4
ARMY 6	CIA 16	NAVY 5
OSD 12	USIA 8	NSA 3

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

AIRGRAM

732.00/11-1462

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A-22 NO. | OFFICIAL USE ONLY | AIR POUCH HANDLING INDICATOR

TO : DEPARTMENT OF STATE

1962 NOV 20 AM 7 2

DEPARTMENT OF STATE BUREAU OF INTER-AMERICAN AFFAIRS NOV 20 1962

RM/AN ANALYSIS & DISTRIBUTION BRANCH

FROM : Amconsul PÔRTO ALEGRE DATE: NOV 14 1962

SUBJECT : PÔRTO ALEGRE WEEKLY SUMMARY Nº 30

REF :

File no action
ARA/EST/B
11/22/62
R. Burton

1. Governor Leonel Brizola Attacks American Consul
2. Political
3. Miscellany

1. Governor Leonel Brizola Attacks American Consul

Continuing his long standing campaign of attacking the U.S. presence in Brazil, Governor Brizola issued a press release on November 7, charging the American Consul in Pôrto Alegre with meddling in Brazilian internal politics. The press release, which quoted a communication from the Governor to the Foreign Minister, was published in the Pôrto Alegre press and carried on radio in the morning of November 8. The same morning the Consulate issued a denial of the allegations which was reported in the press and on the radio beginning at noon the same day. That afternoon the subject was discussed at some length in the State Assembly, with three deputies using the charges as vehicles to attack U.S. "imperialistic designs" on Brazil. Three other deputies, principally MTR's Candido Norberto, likewise used the allegations as a vehicle to attack Brizola stating that he was merely using the American Consul as another tool in his anti-American campaign. A great many people have told the Consul that as soon as they saw the origin of the charges, i. e., the Governor and the PTB nationalistic oriented Port Captain Moura Valle, they immediately discredited the veracity of the charges. As of this writting, with the Foreign Office statements playing down the case and Embassy's

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Drafted by: FDSharp/sms 11/14/62

Clearances:

Content and Classification Approved by: FDSharp

0408

The Brazilian Alliance for Progress

The term was inevitable. São Paulo's position -- and hence responsibilities -- within Brazil are comparable to the position and responsibilities of the United States within the hemisphere. All that was needed was a pro-American politician like Governor-elect Barros to draw the rest of the parallel. According to press reports, he did so during a television program in Rio de Janeiro on October 31 and again during a conversation with President Goulart on November 7. His proposed mechanism for "Brazilian Alliance for Progress" financing to the Northeast, the reports said, was the Bank of the State of São Paulo. Governor Carvalho Pinto, as previously reported, has opened agencies of the São Paulo bank in northeastern States. Adhemar's proposal is quite new and probably he himself has not thought it out in detail, so little can be said about it at this time. In talks between Adhemar and the Consul General about the possibility of getting Alliance for Progress assistance for São Paulo, the point has been brought out by the latter that São Paulo's chances of getting such help would be improved if this State were to help in the relief and development of the Northeast, and Adhemar has indicated his willingness to work out a program for sending agronomists, veterinarians and other technicians from São Paulo to other states.

Goulart will hardly be anxious to do anything to contribute to the improvement of Adhemar's image in the Northeast, but the São Paulo treasury is full. More important than direct financial aid, probably, would be investments in the Northeast by São Paulo industialists. Adhemar enjoys considerable (though cautious) confidence in business circles and may be able to make this portion of the "Brazilian Alliance" a useful instrument for development. If he does, it will be a feather in his cap.

It is important to note that this report covers only the Governor-elect's first cautious groping toward a "national presence." His ideas should develop much further in the coming year.

Daniel M. Braddock
Minister Consul General

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789

0407

the other might bring the most help of all. It is far from clear, then, whether Adhemar can count on Lomanto for his group.

LACERDA of Guanabara has been traveling in Europe since Adhemar's plans have evolved, so not much can be said about his participation. There is one obvious block to whole-hearted cooperation between the two: they are potential competitors for the 1965 presidential election. On the other hand, each will want the support of the other's party, so a certain amount of friendliness will be indicated. Another problem is that Lacerda's UDN has traditionally opposed Adhemar for reasons which remain to be overcome. If the São Paulo Governor-elect can for the first time run a clean and progressive government, however, UDN opposition might relax. Lacerda appears to be a deeper intellect and more serious thinker than Adhemar, so the latter will probably have to follow the former's subtle guidance if the alliance is to be a success. This again may be possible. It seems clear, however, that the Governors' grouping has its full share of the centrifugal forces which affect almost all Brazilian political structures. Its performance cannot be foreseen until willingness to overcome these forces has been put to the test.

The purposes of the Governors' grouping have come out in several talks with Adhemar (reported in memorandums of conversation) and even from early interviews to the press. One goal would be to force President Goulart back to a traditional, unmistakably pro-American foreign policy. Another he has mentioned would be to force measures to control inflation. Other goals might well develop, especially if a thinker like Lacerda gets to work. It is a little difficult to see how the Governors could force these things down the President's throat -- especially the unpopular austerity measures necessary to control inflation. They might, however, at least serve to counteract some of the leftist pressure to which Goulart is submitted from those closer to him. Adhemar's personal willingness to confront Goulart seems established.

While Adhemar has never given publicity to his proposed alliance of conservative Governors, he at first made little attempt to keep it quiet. He made the tactical error of referring to the grouping as an "axis," a term with World War II antecedents which were especially unfortunate in view of the certainty that leftists would tag the Governors "reactionary." In any case, the plan might better have been kept quiet and informal. That is the policy Adhemar is now following. He denies that any plans for a conservative Governors' alliance exist. It is unlikely, however, that he will actually give up the scheme if the other participants will go along with it.

Adhemar's plans for a "national presence" have another facet and one for which he welcomes publicity. He calls it:

0406

Brazilian model for efficient use of funds for economic development.

(c) Conscientiously, São Paulo is beginning to realize that it owes something to the rest of Brazil. The situation is analogous to that of the United States in the Western Hemisphere. The conscience-stirring in this case is undoubtedly quickened by realization that São Paulo industry will profit from the growth of new Brazilian markets.

The background and the resources, then, are as summarized above. The mechanisms through which Adhemar plans to exert his influence are not so easily described -- partly because he does not seem to have given them any very thorough and coherent study himself. While the Governor-elect is knowledgeable on a variety of subjects, he does not seem to be the type to sit down and make careful plans for application of his resources. Through cut-and try procedures, however, he seems to be evolving two related lines of action. One is political and more or less sub rosa; the other is mainly economic and entirely above board.

The Governors' Pressure Group

Adhemar's intended political mechanism is a grouping of those State Governors who, he believes, share his conservative views. Governors he has specifically mentioned as being in this category are those of Guanabara, Rio Grande do Sul, and Bahia, but he appears to hope that others will be included. So far as the Consulate General knows, one leading question about this group has not been answered: Do the other Governors go along with Adhemar's views? MENEGHETTI of Rio Grande do Sul is the only one who has expressed what appears to be open agreement. According to press reports on November 6, he made a statement using terms very similar to Adhemar's and specifically mentioned a desire to cooperate with his São Paulo colleague. Adhemar is believed to have visited him at least once since the election. Possibly the concept of a conservative Governors' grouping originated with both Meneghetti and Barros. In any case, their ideas seem to coincide for the moment.

LOMANTO Junior of Bahia has been visiting São Paulo for the last week, but it is still not clear how far he goes along with Adhemar's plan. He has not made statements opposing the national Government's leftist tendencies, as Adhemar has frequently done. The closest Lomanto came to Barros' foreign policy line was a statement to São Paulo Industrialists that he welcomed investments in Bahia from any source, either south-Brazilian or foreign. He has talked with lame-duck Governor Carvalho Pinto as well as Adhemar, voicing great interest in the incumbent's "Plan of Action" for economic development and asking for help in starting a similar plan for Bahia. The inference is that Lomanto is interested first in the economic development of his State and secondarily, if at all, in Adhemar's plans to turn heat on President Goulart. If this is correct, Lomanto will want to stay on good terms with both Goulart and Adhemar, since both are in a position to help. Skillful playing off of one against

0405

hardly come as a surprise to those familiar with his long career, but his alacrity in entering the 1965 race is a little startling -- especially, one guesses, to Juscelino KUBITSCHEK, who backed him for Governor.

* ? Juscelino preferred Adhemar to Janio(B) hoped on Barros for Credit

Barros has not yet openly declared himself in the presidential race, naturally, but his refusal to make even a half-hearted denial amounts to the same thing (see Airgram A-102 of October 17, item 3). An evaluation of his chances would be premature: any number of unknown factors could be introduced before 1965. The Governor-elect's age and health might interfere. The quality of his State Government should decisively affect his chances. If all goes well for him and if he runs a better São Paulo Government than he did in the past (he seems sincere in the intention of doing so), he could create the conditions for a strong candidacy -- although at this time it is difficult to imagine him competing on par with Kubitschek. In any case, strong or weak, with the nomination of major parties or only of the captive PSP, he is likely to run. For the moment, that is the important consideration. It will affect everything else he does.

Adhemar's National Presence

To further his presidential hopes, Adhemar will want to make himself a national figure in the next three years, rather than sticking strictly to the governorship of São Paulo as did predecessor CARVALHO PINTO. As the Governor-elect puts it, "São Paulo will again be present on the national scene." He will be favored in this goal by what appears to be a growing new desire in all articulate São Paulo classes to throw their weight into the national harness. Separatist tendencies, always strong in the State, were certainly increased by the unsuccessful 1932 São Paulo "constitutional revolution" and its aftermath. The defeated Paulistas, convinced to this day of the virtue of their cause, tended to turn away from the national scene both of their own accord and as a result of pressures from the VARGAS forces. But frustration did not lead to stagnation; energies were directed inward and contributed to the State's spectacular economic development. This development in turn brought the tools for political leverage, such as great wealth and a dense population. But the leverage was not -- and still is not -- used to the full. Less important States controlled politics; smaller benches in Congress towed the large São Paulo representation around at will. Paulistas thought that they had finally won leadership when Janio QUADROS became president, but they were soon disillusioned. This time, fortunately, the disillusionment seems to be expressed not in terms of bitterness, but in a new determination to try again. The apparent new São Paulo desire to exert more national influence is expressed in three ways:

(a) Politically, Paulistas believe that they should have more say in national affairs.

(b) Economically, they think that the rest of Brazil should follow their lead. They believe that the Carvalho Pinto government was a

0404

ORIGIN/ACTION

ARA-4		
RM/R 1	REP 1	AF
ARA	EUR	FE
NEA	CU	INR 8
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RM/R-6 1		
AGR	COM 10	FRB
INT	LAB	TAR
TR	XMB	AIR 4
ARMY 5	CIA 10	NAVY 3
OSD 12	USIA 8	NSA 3

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

AIRGRAM

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LIMITED OFFICIAL USE

DEPARTMENT OF STATE
BUREAU OF
INTER-AMERICAN AFFAIRS
NOV 19 1962

1962 NOV 16 PM 2 28

TO : DEPARTMENT OF STATE

INFO : RIO DE JANEIRO, BRASILIA

RM/AN
ANALYSIS & DISTRIBUTION
BRANCH

FROM : AmConGen SAO PAULO

DATE: November 15, 1962

SUBJECT: Adhemar's National Political and Economic Plans

REF : São Paulo Airgrams A-112 of October 24, and A-129 of November 8

ARA

File no action 12-12-62

Summary: Governor-elect Adhemar de BARROS' known presidential ambitions encourage him to make full use of São Paulo's political and economic power to influence national events. He is also encouraged by the apparent readiness of the general Paulista public to assume increasing national responsibility. He appears to be preparing two mechanisms to increase his "national presence." The first is a behind-the-scenes alliance of like-minded conservative Governors. Adhemar hopes by this means to counteract leftist pressure on President GOULART, forcing greater responsibility in such matters as the budget and foreign policy. The second mechanism has just been announced. Adhemar calls it the "Brazilian Alliance for Progress." He wishes to use it to help the development of the Northeast, apparently through use of São Paulo public and private funds, and realizes that his chances of getting Alliance for Progress help for São Paulo probably depend to a considerable extent on his doing so.

Adhemar's Presidential Candidacy

As soon as the vote count showed that Adhemar de BARROS was the probable victor of the October 7 gubernatorial elections, the Governor-elect began talking like a presidential candidate. This fact is of key importance to the present report because it is clear that Adhemar's hope of being elected President in 1965 is the locus of all the rest of his national political and economic plans. His latest presidential candidacy will

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Drafted by: DCPROPER:el 11/13/62

Contents and Classification Approved by:

Clearances:

0403

MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION (CONTD)

protesting General and that failure to make the arrest would prove their essential weakness. He thought it quite possible that Maurell's speech would eventually lead to a crisis in the military. (Newspapers the next morning announced that General Maurell had in fact been let off without arrest.)

Comment: The reporting officer knew Captain Romeu well when he was Wanderley's aide, and had always found him a cheerful, happy-go-lucky person. His new bitterness was impressive.

DCPROPER:el 11/8/62

0402

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Sao Paulo A-143

MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION

PLACE: Cocktail Party DATE: November 7, 1962

SUBJECT: Pro-GOULART Officer Commands São Paulo Air Zone

PARTICIPANTS: Captain Antonio ROMEU NETO, Brazilian Air Force
Datus C. Proper, Political Officer, American Consulate General, São Paulo

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ARA
INS/RAR
Central Files

Captain Romeu confirmed that Brigadier Anysio Pereira BOTELHO, new commander of the Fourth (São Paulo) Air Zone, is a part of President GOULART's famous military "dispositivo" -- the "arrangement" whereby officers favorable to the President are being put in all important military commands. Ex-Commander WANDERLEY had been removed and assigned to an unimportant post where he had little to do. Captain Romeu said that 95 percent of all Air Force officers are against Goulart's military manipulations and would, if asked, support Brigadier Wanderley for the Air Ministry. Captain Romeu was bitter about the mean treatment to which Wanderley, an able and dedicated officer, was being subjected at the end of his career.

The informant had been the former Commander's aide, and now that Wanderley was a victim of the dispositivo, Romeu was planning to enter the inactive military reserve and accept a job with private industry. He did not know what the job would be yet, but he was determined to get out of the Air Force at any cost.

When asked about the strongly anti-dispositivo speech which had just been made by General MAURELL Filho, Captain Romeu opined that Goulart and the Minister of War would be afraid to arrest the

0401

ORIGIN/ACTION
ARA-4

RM/R	REP	AF
1		
ARA	EUR	FE
NEA	CU	INR 5
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L	FBO	AID
S/P 1	G 1	S/S 27
AGR	COM	FRB
INT	LAB	TAR
TR	XMB	AIR 4
ARMY 5	CIA 10	NAVY 5
OSD 12	USIA 6	NSA 3
		NSC 2

RM/R-E-1

Pole
no action
A-214 to 57/13
1/14/63
RG Burton

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

AIRGRAM

732.00/11-1562
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NO.

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HANDLING INDICATOR

1962 NOV 16 PM 2 26

RM/AN ANALYSIS & DISTRIBUTION BRANCH

TO : DEPARTMENT OF STATE

INFO : AmEmbassy RIO DE JANEIRO
AmEmbassy BRASILIA

FROM : AmConGen SAO PAULO

DATE: November 15, 1962

SUBJECT : Pro-GOULART Officer Commands São Paulo Air Zone

REF :

A Memorandum of Conversation on the above subject is enclosed.

Daniel M. Braddock
Minister Consul General

DEPARTMENT OF STATE
BUREAU OF
INTER-AMERICAN AFFAIRS
NOV 19 1962

FILED
JAN 15 1963

Enclosure: Memorandum of Conversation

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FORM DS-323 .62

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Drafted by: DCPROPER:el 11/8/62

Contents and Classification Approved by:

Clearances:

714

0400

The general feeling concerning the American elections seems to be that President KENNEDY's political hand has been strengthened. Most Brazilians seem to identify themselves with the Democratic party rather than the Republicans.

Edilberto Coutinho whose services with USIS/USAID in Recife were recently terminated has launched into a verbal attack on USAID's Public Affairs advisor and the Alianca program as carried forward by AID through the column of Alexandrino Rocha in Diario da Noite and Ultima Hora. At this stage, the attacks are the actions of a peevish child. The danger lies in the support he may receive from others.

Lowell C. Kilday

Lowell C. Kilday
American Vice Consul

CONTRIBUTORS:

LCKilday
CTucker
WSSmith

0399

then faltering, ended strong and captured the second seat of the Alianca de Base Civica. The first Alianca seat went to ex-shoemaker, IAPI President WALDEMAR LUIZ ALVES, while leftist Vice Governor PELOPIDAS SILVEIRA won only the spot of first suplente (substitute) on the Alianca ticket.

The new lineup of Pernambuco's representation in the Chamber of Deputies is as follows:

PSD-UDN: Mons. ALDREDO ARRUDA CAMARA, JOSE MEIRA+ ALDE SAMPAIO, NILO COELHO, JOSE CARLOS GUERRA+, JOSE COSTA CAVALCANTI+ AUGUSTO NOVAIS+, MURILO COSTA REGO+, LUIZ DIAS LINS, NEY MARANHÃO, ADEMAR DA COSTA CARVALHO, ADERBAL JUREMA, LUIZ MAGALHAES MELO+.

PTB: ESTACIO SOUTO MAIOR, LAMARTINE TAVORA, MILVERNES CRUZ LIMA, OSVALDO LIMA FILHO, CLODOMIR LEITE+, ARTUR LIMA CAVALCANTI+, HERACLIO do REGO+, TABOSA DE ALMEIDA+, AURINO VALOIS+.

PSB-PST: WALDEMAR LUIZ ALVES+, FRANCISCO JULIÃO+.

+ asterisk indicates elected for the first time. (OFFICIAL USE ONLY

3. Miguel Arraes Marries

The press has reported that Governor-elect Miguel Arraes married Miss Madalena Saboya Fiuza on Saturday, November 10 in Rio de Janeiro. (See Weekly Summary No. 19). Officiating at the ceremony was Arraes' political ally Father WANDERLEY SIMOES of Arcoverde, Pernambuco. There was no word given of the couple's immediate post-nuptial plans. (UNCLASSIFIED)

PSYCHOLOGICAL

Cuba and the Sino-Indian war were the top international news stories, but the editorial attention given the Asian war is conspicuous by its absence. However, "Cronica Internacional" in Jornal do Commercio noted that the "recent occurrences are a result of the 'foresight' of the Indian premier and the price of his position of 'non-alignment'". This is an interesting observation from one whose own country has so nimbly avoided a position in the Cuban crisis.

The death of ELEANOR ROOSEVELT was played sympathetically with a biography of her life prominently run in Jornal do Commercio. In addition, the Consulate General received many expressions of condolence from various organizations, including the State Assembly.

0398

no real assistance. Stating that "Alliance helps American firms in Brazil" and that it was different from IBAD or MAC, Coutinho went on to charge that funds thus far expended by Alliance in the Northeast amounted to far less than aid funds President GOULART's administration has made available to Governor CID SAMPAIO, an opposition politician. Even in some cases where agreements have been signed, he went on, no funds have been forthcoming. Also on November 13, Jornal do Commercio front-paged a Radiopress wire story from Rio commenting on the lack of progress made by Alliance so far. (LIMITED OFFICIAL USE)

Comment: Coutinho, of course, has an axe to grind and his criticism is prompted by spite. And the fact that leftist/nationalist Ultima Hora jumped at the chance to publish his story is hardly surprising. The fact is, however, that very few project agreements have been signed, that only a minute percentage of the US $131 million stipulated for Assistance to the Northeast in last April's agreement has actually been allocated, and almost none of the programs and projects are in a state of implementation. Alliance for Progress in the Northeast has not made any significant headway and is, therefore, vulnerable to attack by those whose interest it might serve to discredit it: leftist/ultra nationalists, extremist anti-Americans, Communists, etc. Criticism of Alliance for Progress in the Northeast, therefore, probably can be expected to increase. (CONFIDENTIAL)

2. Election Results

The official tally of votes cast in the October election for federal deputies has now been completed. As expected, the PSD-UDN coalition known as the Frente Popular Democratica was the heaviest winner though it fell short of most predictions by winning only thirteen seats. The PTB took nine (one of two more than expected) and the PSB-PST (Alianca de Base Civica) coaltion ended with two.

The greatest surprise of the entire election was the fall of PSD kingmaker ETELVINO LINS. Long considered to be the greatest power in Pernambuco politics and a politician of considerable national prestige, Lins was universally regarded a sure winner. Other PSD-UDN deputies who failed of re-election were: GERALDO GUEDES, GILENO de CARLI, JOSE LOPES de SIQUIERA SANTOS, PETRONILO SANTA CRUZ, and CLELIO LEMOS. From the PTB, only EDGAR BEZERRA LEITE and rabid anti-American ANDRADE LIMA FILHO could not muster enough votes to be elected again.

FRANCISCO JULIAO, after starting out with a heavy count and

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ACTION/INFO

ARA-4

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DEPARTMENT OF STATE

AIRGRAM

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732.00/11-1262

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A-50 — CONFIDENTIAL

NO. — HANDLING INDICATOR

TO : DEPARTMENT OF STATE 1962 NOV 21 PM 2 45

INFO: RIO DE JANEIRO, BRASILIA, SAO PAULO

Belem-1
Pto-Alegre-1
Curitiba-1
Belo Horizonte-1

RM/AN
ANALYSIS & DISTRIBUTION
BRANCH

FROM : Amconsul RECIFE

DATE: November 12, 1962

SUBJECT: Weekly Summary No. 20

REF :

DEPARTMENT OF STATE
BUREAU OF
INTER-AMERICAN AFFAIRS
NOV 23 1962

TABLE OF CONTENTS

POLITICAL

1. Sluggishness of Alliance for Progress Criticized
2. Election Results
3. Miguel Arraes Marries

PSYCHOLOGICAL

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ARA/EST/B
A d Burton
12/19/62

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POLITICAL

1. Sluggishness of Alliance for Progress Criticized

EDILBERTO COUTINHO, a young Recife journalist who recently lost the job he had been occupying on the public relations staff of Alliance for Progress' Recife office, this week got in a few licks at his former employers. In a long letter addressed to and appearing in columnist ALEKANDRINO ROCHA's November 9 contribution to Diario da Noite (see Psychological) and subsequently in an article appearing in the November 13 edition of leftist/nationalist Ultima Hora entitled "Alliance Funds Only on Paper", Coutinho attacked Alliance for Progress as being cynically designed and as operating so slowly that it would be of

Drafted by: See last page/ag

Contents and Classification Approved by:

Clearances:

0396

MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION (CONTD)

(The Consulate General was able to give limited additional information on Quadros' plans, but could not clarify whether he really had received an important lecturing invitation from some British organization.)

Comment: While the Consulate General agrees that Quadros is a highly undesirable character, it nevertheless seems like a good idea to give him as much contact as possible with influential American and British figures. He may still be open to influence, and as much of it as possible should be exercised before he is again elected to public office -- as he very well may at some time in the future. There are some indications that Jânio has left behind his Lincoln and de Gaulle phases and is considering growing a Fidel-type beard. There would be no harm in trying to talk him out of it. Perhaps the British can convince him to be Disraeli for a while.

DCPROPER:el 10/31/62

0395

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Enclosure 1
A-130
São Paulo

MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION

PLACE: AmConGen SAO PAULO DATE: October 31, 1962

SUBJECT: Jânio QUADROS' Plans

PARTICIPANTS: Mr. F. B. AIKIN-SNEATH, British Consul, São Paulo
Datus C. Proper, Political Officer,
American Consulate General, São Paulo

COPIES TO: AmEmbassy, RIO DE JANEIRO
AmEmbassy, BRASILIA
AmEmbassy, LONDON
ARA
INR
Central Files

Mr. Aikin-Sneath visited the reporting officer to find out whether some of the Consulate General's contacts could discover the true plans of defeated gubernatorial candidate Jânio QUADROS. (There have been conflicting rumors -- first that Jânio was to visit the United States to lecture on foreign affairs under the auspices of the New York or American Bar Association; but more recently that he was instead going to England to give similar lectures.) Mr. Aikin-Sneath's information was that Jânio had accepted an engagement with the Institute for International Affairs in England, but there was no confirmation of this from the British Foreign Office. He thought it odd that a highly respected, apparently semi-governmental organization like the Institute for International Affairs would extend an invitation to a person so discredited as ex-President Quadros, and equally odd that the invitation, if extended, had not been made known to the British Embassy or Consulate General here.

According to Mr. Aikin-Sneath's information, Quadros had recently bought a passage to England for himself, his wife, and perhaps his daughter on the ship Brazil Star, paying in cash at the time of purchase.

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17	8	3

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

AIRGRAM

732.00/11-962

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A-130 NO.

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HANDLING INDICATOR

TO : DEPARTMENT OF STATE 1962 NOV 13 AM 9 49

INFO : AmEmbassy RIO DE JANEIRO
AmEmbassy BRASILIA
AmEmbassy LONDON

RM/AN ANALYSIS & DISTRIBUTION BRANCH

FROM : AmConGen SAO PAULO

DATE: November 9, 1962

SUBJECT : Jânio QUADROS' Plans

REF :

DEPARTMENT OF STATE
BUREAU OF
INTER-AMERICAN AFFAIRS
NOV 14 1962

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RB-11/15

A Memorandum of Conversation on the above subject is enclosed.

Daniel M. Braddock
Minister Consul General

Enclosure:
Memorandum of Conversation

FILED
Nov 16 3 46 PM '62

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Drafted by: DCPROPER:el 10/31/62

Contents and Classification Approved by:

Clearances:

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ORIGIN/ACTION (45)

ARA-4 84

IM/R	REP	AF
1		
ARA	EUR	FE
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1756 Revised
RM/R-8

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

AIRGRAM

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TOPOL A-97 NO. | OFFICIAL USE ONLY HANDLING INDICATOR

TO : Amembassy PARIS TOPOL A-

Nov 9 9 58 PM '62

FROM : Department of State EUR/RFM DATE:

SUBJECT : POLAD AGENDA - NOVEMBER 13 - Brazil

REF :

Following, which supplements and updates to November 8 item in CER October 17, may be drawn upon or circulated in connection discussion this topic:

Results of the Brazilian Elections of October 7, 1962

Brazil on October 7, 1962, held elections for the national Chamber of Deputies, for 45 of the 66 seats in the Federal Senate, and for governors of 11 of the 22 states (as well as for various other state and municipal officers not of national import). Results are known for the Senate and gubernatorial elections. The results of the Chamber elections are not known in full detail, but the information is sufficient to judge the Chamber's approximate composition, ideologically as well as party-wise. (Within most Brazilian political parties there is a wide range ideologically from right to left.)

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The elections as a whole assured the continued predominance nationally of the center and the right. Candidates of the center or right won the gubernatorial elections in the states of Sao Paulo, Rio Grande do Sul, Bahia, Ceara, Espirito Santo and Piaui, whereas leftists won the governorships only in the states of Rio de Janeiro, Pernambuco and Sergipe - in the latter two states by a narrow margin. (Information on hand is insufficient for an ideological classification of the governors-elect of sparsely settled Amazonas and Acre.) At least 38 of the 45 newly elected Senators are centrist or rightist, and it is clear that the new Chamber (like the present Chamber) also will have a heavy (approximately 2/3) centrist-rightist majority.

The elections brought little significant change in relative party strength.

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
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Drafted by: ARA:RJBurton:gmh 11/9/62

Contents and Classification Approved by: EUR/RFM - Christopher Van Hollen

Clearances: RFM - Mr. Schaetzman

0392



AIRGRAM

TO: Ambassador, RIO DE JANEIRO
Ambassador, BRASILIA

FROM: Department of State

DATE:

SUBJECT: Request for comment on reported statement of Barbara Ley on political position of Governor Magalhães Pinto.

0391

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SAO PAULO
A-129
5

Rio Grande do Sul governor Brizola's recanting on the Cuban question, lamenting the transformation of Cuba into a Soviet missile base and admitting the truth of U.S. charges he had previously scorned, garnered news coverage and an O Estado editorial. Brizola is either a fool or an ignoramus in foreign policy matters, said O Estado, going on to question gleefully whether such an about-face should not disillusion his followers and eliminate Brizola from serious consideration as an honest leader of national revolution and anti-imperialism.

Daniel M. Braddock

Daniel M. Braddock
Minister Consul General

Contributors:
DCProper
JAMason

Distribution: INS/RAR, AmEmbassy Rio 3, AmEmbassy Brasilia 2, AmEmbassy London, AmConGen Recife, AmConsulates Belem, Belo Horizonte, Curitiba, Porto Alegre, Salvador, Santos.

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Comment: The Governor's analysis is exact. The responsibility of his line should be contrasted with that taken by Quadros, who is faced with the same problem. (Neither Quadros nor Carvalho Pinto has found a party which satisfies him, though both have been attracted to the Christian Democrats. Lack of a solid party base hurt both in the recent elections and will probably handicap their future political career.) (LIMITED OFFICIAL USE)

5. Politicians Prepare for Referendum

Ex-President Kubitschek reportedly plans to tour São Paulo in November to ask for votes in favor of presidentialism in the January referendum -- and, clearly, to do some early campaigning for the 1965 presidential election. Adhemar de Barros' PSP has discussed its position on the referendum at length in party meetings, but has still taken no firm position. Jânio Quadros' position also remains to be defined (item 3). Governor Carvalho Pinto is on the record as favoring presidentialism. (UNCLASSIFIED)

Comment: Adhemar's and Jânio's positions have been left open strictly for bargaining purposes, neither wanting to surrender a valuable lever until he has used it for what it is worth. These maneuvers, probably, are of secondary importance; all observers seem convinced that Paulistas in general favor presidentialism. On the other hand, there are strong anti-Goulart currents in São Paulo and few strong Goulart supporters -- as witness the fate of the President's candidate, Otavio MARIA, in the October 7 elections -- so there remains the possibility that a significant minority might express dissatisfaction by abstaining or voting in favor of parliamentarianism. (LIMITED OFFICIAL USE)

PSYCHOLOGICAL

1. Local Press Reaction

São Paulo newspapers gave massive coverage to the Cuban crisis, with stories and U.S. official photographs dominating front pages much of the week. Editorial interest in the subject virtually eliminated other possible topics for comment. Attitudes expressed were overwhelmingly in line with those of the United States. Goulart-controlled Correio Paulistano rather grudgingly conceded Kennedy a clear-cut strategic victory. Leftist/nationalist Ultima Hora seemed a bit confused; one day it applauded Kennedy's actions, rather softly criticized Castro for letting the Russians set up peace-threatening missile bases; another day it concluded that Krushchev had won a great victory with Kennedy's promise to avoid invasion of Cuba. Several papers, including prestigious O Estado de S. Paulo, lambasted Brazil's role as a mediator in the crisis.

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os Confirms Interest in New Party

gubernatorial candidate Jânio QUADROS embarked for
ber 31, claiming to have been invited to give a series
the "Institute for International Affairs." He had
n dickering for a similar series in the United States,
idea when the English invitation came through. Speaking
he confirmed rumors that he had refused an invitation
azilian United Nations delegation. He avoided taking
uban issue. No first-rank personages saw him off in
nas Gerais Governor Magalhães PINTO visited his ship
iro.

lso confirmed reports (Weekly Summary 43) that he was
founding a new "Christian Labor Party." Left-wing
cratic Federal Deputy Paulo de TARSO is to carry on the
unding during his absence. Jânio plans to return to
to engage in the plebiscite campaign -- on which side,
ng. One reporter quotes Quadros as saying that he shared
eonel BRIZOLA and Miguel ARRAES. (OFFICIAL USE ONLY)

Jânio's alleged invitation is news to the British
nsulate General, which are surprised that they have
med by their Foreign Office.

claimed refusal of the UN appointment demonstrates his
eady clear, for that matter) to remain active in
ics. The new party needs watching but need not inspire
ntil it gets moving: it would be hard to find anyone
botch the launching than Paulo de Tarso. If the
or Party" does start well, it could become extremely
ar-coating extremist socialism with a superficial layer
Jânio has the magnetism to attract many secondary
the new party, but is does not seem likely that figures
Arraes, or Magalhães Pinto would be willing to join
ated by Quadros. If a Quadros/Brizola alliance -- often
r does get started in this or some other way, it could
IMITED OFFICIAL USE)

lho Pinto Opposes Formation of New Parties

been rumors that Governor Carvalho Pinto and defeated
candidate José Bonifácio NOGUEIRA, like Jânio Quadros
thinking of forming a new party. The incumbent
this speculation in a formal statement on October 31:
eve that the founding of new political parties could
isis in which all party groups, without exception, are
hat is needed is a reformulation of the existing parties,
reducing them in numbers and elevating them in quality.
comes, my companions and I will not withhold collaboration
al." (UNCLASSIFIED)

Comment: One gathers that the proposed grouping of Conservative Governors -- which was rather clumsily proposed by Adhemar (Weekly Summary 43) -- may have got a cautious reception from some of the others involved. LACERDA is a potential competitor for the 1965 presidential race and might well be chary of any initiative from Barros; MENEGHETTI is reportedly receptive, but his willingness to be led remains to be demonstrated; Lomanto for the moment seems interested mainly in what São Paulo can do for his State's economic development. Adhemar will very probably lend a hand there. It will suit his presidential aspirations to become known as a benefactor of the Northeast, and in any case São Paulo is awakening to its responsibilities toward the less developed states. But it is not likely that Adhemar has dropped hopes for an axis with political goals. (LIMITED OFFICIAL USE)

2. Adhemar Winning Local Political Support

On the surface, the Governor-elect's chances for support in the State Legislative Assembly look dismal: his Social Progressive Party (PSP) elected only 12 of the 115 Deputies; the total of the parties which supported him (PSP, PSD, PRP) was only 26 Deputies -- 22.6 percent of the Assembly. Moreover, PSD backing is already embarrassing, since Adhemar de Barros is competing with Juscelino KUBITSCHEK for the Presidency. In fact, however, the situation is not so glum for Adhemar. Opportunism is a shared characteristic of the thirteen São Paulo parties, and the Governor-elect can offer inducements capable of quickly converting many "outs" to "ins." He is doing so skillfully. He has carried his "let's-bury-the-past" policy -- by far the best one under the circumstances -- to the point of publicly offering the State Secretariat of Finance to lame-duck Governor CARVALHO PINTO. Clearly, however, Adhemar would feel uncomfortable in the unlikely event that the tongue-in-cheek offer should be accepted. What he does accomplish by all the benignancy is to make it easy for less determined opponents to surrender. The most important conquest so far seems to be PTN leader Emílio CARLOS, who has already rejected systematic opposition to Adhemar and might even come around to open backing if a man from his party were supported for the Presidency of the Legislative Assembly. It is not clear whether the PTN's more fervent Janistas will agree with this change, and Jânio himself must be furious. Another important opposition party to talk of opening a "credit of confidence" is the UDN. Several of the smaller ones -- which are not so small in the new Legislative Assembly -- are coming around. (LIMITED OFFICIAL USE)

0387

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

AIRGRAM

732.00/11-862

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A-129 NO. — LIMITED OFFICIAL USE — HANDLING INDICATOR

TO : DEPARTMENT OF STATE 1962 NOV 13 AM 11 17

INFO : AmEmbassy RIO, BRASILIA, LONDON

RFAN ANALYSIS & DISTRIBUTION BRANCH

DEPARTMENT OF STATE BUREAU OF INTER-AMERICAN AFFAIRS NOV 13 1962

FROM : AmConGen SAO PAULO DATE: November 8, 1962

SUBJECT: Weekly Summary No. 45

REF :

ACTION ARA 4 20

RM/R	REP	AF
1		
ARA	EUR	FE
NEA	CU	INR 5
E	P	IO 2
L	FBO	AID 12
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INT	LAB	TAR
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ARMY 5	CIA 15	NAVY 5
OSD 12	USIA 8	NSC 3
NSC 2		

RM/R-E-1

RM/12-Gee 11/15 - BJE

TABLE OF CONTENTS

POLITICAL
1. Adhemar's National Plans Evolve
2. Adhemar Winning Local Political Support
3. Quadros Confirms Interest in New Party
4. Carvalho Pinto Opposes Formation of New Parties
5. Politicians Prepare for Referendum

PSYCHOLOGICAL
1. Local Press Reaction

POLITICAL

1. Adhemar's National Plans Evolve

Governor-elect Adhemar de BARROS at first made little secret of his intention to work with like-minded, conservative Governors to keep President GOULART in line. But during a television appearance in Rio de Janeiro on October 31, he reportedly denied the existence of a formal plan of this sort. What he wanted to organize, he said, was a non-political "union" to fight underdevelopment; a sort of "Brazilian Alliance for Progress." This was on the eve of the visit of Governor-elect LOMANTO Junior, of Bahia, to São Paulo. Lomanto is one of the men Adhemar has been counting on. The two Governors-elect got together for a chat, and Lomanto talked with Willys-Overland about installing an automobile assembly plant in Bahia. (OFFICIAL USE ONLY)

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Drafted by: See last page/el 11/6/62

Contents and Classification Approved by:

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DEPARTMENT OF STATE

AIRGRAM

732.00/11-862

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ACTION		
ARA-4		
RM/R 1	REP	AF
ARA	EUR	FE
NEA	CU	INR 5
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TR	XMB	AIR 4
ARMY 5	CIA 10	NAVY 5
OSD 12	USIA 8	NSA 3

A-38 NO. — OFFICIAL USE ONLY — HANDLING INDICATOR

TO : DEPARTMENT OF STATE

1962 NOV 20 AM 8 38

DEPARTMENT OF STATE
BUREAU OF
INTER-AMERICAN AFFAIRS
NOV 21 1962
RM/AN
ANALYSIS & DISTRIBUTION
BRANCH

file in action
ARA/E 8-4/62
11/26/62
R. Burton

FROM : Amconsul, BELEM, PARA

DATE: November 8, 1962

SUBJECT : Brazilian Elections 1962; Report No. 18 - Election Results

REF :

PARA

While the Election Tribunal is going through its final counts, it is not releasing tabulations on the election results. It is not known when the final results will be made available. Nonetheless, from the trend of returns and public consensus, it is felt certain that Edward Cattete PINHEIRO and Joaquim Lobão da Silveira will be Pará's senators. As for the federal deputies, the last figures available are given for the 10 most voted for, although changes in the line-up are likely:

José Burlamaqui de Miranda (PSD)	8,963
Armando Correa (PSD)	7,468
Armando Carneiro (PTB)	6,980
Clóvis Ferro Costa (CDP)	6,154
João Menezes (PSD)	5,993
Stelio Maroja (CDP)	5,103
Epilogo de Campos (CDP)	4,861
Gabriel Hermes (CDP)	4,612
Elias Salame (PSD)	4,549
Silvio Braga (CDP)	4,303

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NOV 27 12 29 PM '62

AMAZONAS

The only information from Manaus is that, although the election returns are not completed, Plinio Ramos Coelho is certain of the governorship and Antevila Meurão Vieira and Artur Virgilio Filho are running ahead for the two Senate seats.

Robert W. Mashek
Robert W. Mashek
American Vice Consul

cc: Rio de Janeiro, Brasilia

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FORM DS-323 4-62

Drafted by: RWMashek:rwm

Contents and Classification Approved by: RWMashek

Clearances:

0385

PTB (received 63,532 votes) - 6
Evilásio Nery Caon
Francisco Roberto Dall'Igna
Genir Destri
Rodrigo de Oliveira Lobo
Haroldo Ferreira
Walmor de Oliveira

PDC (received 27501 votes) - 2
Luiz Bianchi
Mario Tavares da Cunha Mello

PRP (received 26,968 votes) - 2
Antonio Pichetti
Livadário Nobrega

PSP (received 18.231 votes) - 1

Paulo Stuart Wright

PST (received 11,493 votes) - 0

Blank votes 37,331
Votes declared null and void 9,048

Prominent State Deputy candidates who were not elected were: Walter Roussenq (PTB, former Labor Secretary); Walter Hermann Meyer (PDC, editor of Joinville's concervative newspaper "Noticia"); and Inge Colin Barbosa Lima (PSP, the only woman State Deputy).

This year's elections prove that the balance of power between the UDN and the PSD, the state's two most powerful parties remains the dominant force - the PSD forging ahead this time. The PSD which is traditionally headed by the Ramos family and the UDN which is likewise headed by the Konder-Bornhausen families manage to balance each other's power, if one falls behind one election, he is almost sure to regain the dominant position in the next.

The PTB, which as a small but effective third force throwing its weight to the choice of the moment, is growing steadily but is yet not strong enough to adopt and follow an independent line. The present rupture with the PSD has only harmed the PTB and has shown that the PSD can do it alone quite successfully. The withdrawal of the PTB Secretaries of Labor, Justice and Health further diminishes PTB influence in the Ramos administration.

Arthur W. Feldman
Arthur W. Feldman
American Consul

0384

Well known political figures who were not elected were: Jade Magalhães (PSD but member PRP, Public Safety Secretary); Osmar Cunha (PSD, former Florianopolis Mayor); José Smith Braz (PTB, State Deputy and former State Legislative Assembly president); and Romeu Sebastião Neves (UDN, State Deputy and Pro-U.S.).

State Deputy Contest - 45 positions

The PSD presented 42 candidates; the UDN-36; PSP-32; PTB-26; PRP-24; and PST-14.

The following were victorious:

PSD: (received 209,659 votes) - 20

Henrique de Arruda Ramos
Floravante Angelo Massolini
Aureo Vidal Ramos
Edmond Jorge José Saliba
Lecian Slovinski
Abel Avila dos Santos
Waldemar Salles
Epitácio Bittencourt
Nelson Pedrini
Paulo Henrique Rocha Faria
Ivo Silveira
Ivo Reis Montenegro
Paulo Preis
Nilton Ducker
Dib Cherem
Augusto Brescia
Walter Vicente Gomes
Lauro Locks
Nilo Bianchini
João Bertoli

UDN (received 147,600 votes) - 14

Adhemar Paladini Ghisi
Affonso Ghizzo
Aldo Pereira de Andrade
Atilio Zonta
Celso Ivan da Costa
Fernando Brueggemann Viegas
Gentil Belani
Mario Olinger
Pedro Harto Hermes
Pedro Paulo Hings Colin
Reneau Cubas
Ruy Huelse
Udo Zigelli

GPO 802667

0383

Federal Senate Contest -2 positions

There were five candidates for the two seats. (UDN - 1 ; PSD-1; PTB-1; PDC-1; PST-1).

The winners were:

Antônio Carlos Konder Reis (UDN)	272,978
Atilio Fontana (PSD)	258,611

The others ran as follows:

Doutel de Andrade (PTB)	111,367
Martinho Callado Junior (PDC)	77,412
Saulo Ramos (PST)	46,237
Blank votes cast	307,136
Votes declared null and void	28,975

Doutel de Andrade felt so strongly about losing that he terminated the PTB alliance with the PSD.

Federal Deputy Contest - 14 positions

The PSD presented 8 candidates; the PTB - 8; the UDN - 14 ; and the PST - 3.

The following were victorious:

PSD (received 215,505 votes) - 6

Joaquim Fluza Ramos (highest voting in the State)
Antônio Gomes de Almeida
Lenoir Vargas Ferreira
Orlando Bertoli
Pedro Zimmermann
Osni de Medeiros Regis

UDN (received 199,876 votes) - 6

Lauro Carneiro de Loyola
Laerte Ramos Vieira
Aroldo Carneiro de Carvalho
Diomício Freitas
Álvaro Luiz Bocaiuva Catão
Albino Zeni

PTB (received 71,325 votes) - 2

Doutel de Andrade
Paulo Macarini

The PST received 19 votes

Blank votes 56,987
Votes declared null and void 7,651

0382

ORIGIN/ACTION		
ARA-4		
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DEPARTMENT OF STATE
BUREAU OF
INTER-AMERICAN AFFAIRS
NOV 19 1962

RM/AN
ANALYSIS & DISTRIBUTION
BRANCH

FROM : American Consulate, Curitiba DATE: November 8, 1962

SUBJECT : BRAZILIAN ELECTION 1962: REPORT N° 13: STATE OF SANTA CATARINA ELECTION RESULTS.

REF :

File Reaction
ARA/BSH/RD
12-17-62
R. Burton

SUMMARY:

The Santa Catarina elections were uneventful with very few upsets. Governor Celso Ramos' administration received a working majority which should smooth his work especially with the State Legislature. The two year old PSD - PTB alliance came to an end when the PTB candidates did not receive the expected support of the PSD.

x x x x x

The elections in Santa Catarina took place uneventfully with few upsets. Of the 625,142 registered voters 551,467 voted according to the Regional Electoral Tribunal.

Santa Catarina voted for two Federal Senators, 14 Federal Deputies, 45 State Deputies and 52 Mayors.

The two year old alliance between the PSD and PTB came to an abrupt end when the election results showed that the PTB candidates had not received their partner's support. As a result thereof, Doutel de Andrade, the PTB state chairman, Vice Governor, and Federal Deputy was not elected Federal Senator but was reelected Federal Deputy. After the election, Doutel de Andrade attacked the Governor and the three PTB cabinet members holding the Secretariats of Health, Labor and Justice resigned on Oct. 22. This offered Governor Celso Ramos the opportunity to strengthen his cabinet with persons showing his ideology.

cc: Brazilian Desk, Washington (1)
AmEmbassy, Rio (1)
AmEmbassy, Brasilia (1)
Mr. Henderson, AmEmbassy, Rio (2)

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0381

Christian Labor Front (6)

Anibel Cury	12.600 votes
Paulo Afonso Camargo	6.431 "
Edgar Tévora	6.085 "
Igo Ivan Losso	5.319 "
Amadeu Puppi	5.178 "
Olivio Belich	4.837 "

The Paraná Legislative Assembly will have only 17 reelected deputies. Of the rest, 26 are new-comers and two have had previous experience.

The general reaction to the results of the state elections has been favorable. Some undesirable elements, such as the PTB demagogues Abdo Acli (who came in 132th for State Deputy) and Aroldi Armstrong (who placed 151th for State Deputy) and the PSB candidates Sebastião Vieira Lins (who placed 5th for Federal Senator) and José Rodrigues Vieira Neto (who ran for Federal Deputy but who was not elected because his party did not receive the minimum of 32.000 required per party) were not elected. The nationalist and anti-American PTB State Deputies Pedro Liberti and Waldemar Deros were not reelected. The man in the street is looking forward to better future legislative-action because of the quality of the candidates elected and the success of the Ney Braga team of candidates.

It is interesting to note that of the 18 candidates recommended by the Catholic Movement for Electoral Orientation of Curitiba (Despatch n° 22 of September 21,1962) 12 were elected. The group had 100% results in its recommendations for Federal Senators, Federal Deputies and the Mayor of Curitiba. Of the 10 recommended for State Deputy, only four were elected.

Arthur W. Feldman
American Consul

GPO 802667

0380

State Deputy - 45

PTB - 12

Moacyr Silvestre	14.576	votes
Luiz Alberto Dalcanale	10.453	"
Jorge Nassar	9.420	"
Silvino Lopes de Oliveira	6.559	"
Miguel Dinizio	6.494	"
Marino Pereira	6.470	"
Joaquim Neia de Oliveira	6.038	"
Miran Pirh	5.800	"
Leon Naves Barcelos	5.653	"
Walter Alberto Pecoits	5.458	"
Eurico Batista Rosas	4.984	"
Piratan Araújo	4.984	"

PDC - 12

Antonio Ferreira Ruppel	11.224	"
João Mansur	9.937	"
Nilson Batista Ribas	8.098	"
João Antonio Borba Cortes	7.701	"
Armando Q. de Morais	7.607	"
Iosio Antonio Ueno	7.535	"
Benedito Pinto Dias	7.254	"
Arnaldo Busato	7.158	"
Odilon Tulio Vargas	7.123	"
Agostinho Rodrigues	6.609	"
Renato Loures Bueno	5.870	"
José Afonso	5.552	"

UDN - 8

José Justino Alves Pereira	8.209	"
Haroldo Leon Peres	7.516	"
Francisco Escorsin	6.785	"
Paulo Poli	6.486	"
João Vargas de Oliveira	6.471	"
Rubens Requião	5.658	"
Horácio Vargas	5.264	"
Almir Moreira	4.759	"

PSD 7

João de Mattos Leão	8.803	"
Emilio Carazzai	7.579	"
Egon Pudel	6.688	"
José Vaz de Carvalho	5.713	"
Ernesto Moro Redeschi	5.456	"
Dino Veiga	5.336	"
Leovegildo Salles	5.259	"

GPO 802667

0379

Federal Deputy - 25

PTB - 10

Kalil Maia Neto	34,286	votes
Renato Celidonio	29,724	"
Miguel Buffara	21,931	"
Antonio Baby	16,571	"
Fernando da Gama	16,509	"
Ivan Luz	16,268	"
Wilson Chedid	15,275	"
Antonio Anibelli	13,748	"
Petronio Fernal	12,142	"
Elias Nacle	12,091	"

PDC - UDN - PTN coaliton - 9

Hermes Macedo	27,567	"
Newton Carneiro	26,560	"
Jose Richa	25,773	"
Accioly Filho	24,782	"
Mario Braga Ramos	23,843	"
Zacarias Seleme	14,632	"
Jorge Cury	13,517	"
Minoro Miyamoto	11,636	"
Emilio Hoffmann Gomes	9,402	"

PSD -6

Plinio Franco Ferreira da Costa	52,306	"
João Ribeiro Junior	20,672	"
João Simões	18,032	"
Rafael Rezende	11,740	"
Paulo Pimenta Montans	8,767	"
Lirio Bertolli	8,233	"

Now that Paraná has 6.1% representation in the Federal Chamber of Deputies, the hope has been expressed that the state will be able to receive more attention from the Federal Government. The biggest complaint to date has been that the state was being by-passed when Federal assistance was being passed out. The majority of deputies will be new.

0378

candidates for the Federal Senator seats (PDC-UDN-PTB coalition - 2; PSD - 1; PR-PSP-PRP coalition - 1; and PSB-1). There were 85 candidates for the Federal Deputy seats (PSD-30; PDC- UDN - PTN coalition - 28; PTB - 24; and PSB-4). There were 279 candidates for the State Deputy seats; (The Rural Christian Labor Front - (PRT, PTN , PST, PR, PSP and MTR) - 59; PTB-56; PDC-55; UDN-50; PSD-48, and PSB-11).

Of special significance in this election was the increase of Federal Deputies from 14 to 25 seats. Paraná instead of having 4.3% representation in the Federal Chamber of Deputies will now have 6.1% due to the state's growth in population. An attempt to raise the number of State Deputies from 45 to 67 failed when the Governor vetoed the resolution.

The biggest surprise of the election results was that ex-Governor Moysés Lupion failed to be elected to any of the three positions he sought. He came in fourth for Federal Senator with 217,627 votes; was designated second Suplente for Federal Deputy with 6,479 votes having come in 36th; and did not place high enough (111th) to be designated Suplente for State Deputy. Lupion is now subject to trial on charges of embezzlement while Governor of Paraná. Reports indicate that he has fled the state's jurisdiction and will settle in Switzerland. This defeat is considered to be a personal victory for Governor Ney Braga who hotly attacked Lupion for mal-administration and embezzlement of state funds. Many attribute the poor showing of the PSD to Lupion's candidacies.

The outcome of the election is considered to be a vote of confidence in Governor Ney Braga who personally campaigned most assiduously for his choices. His two candidates for Federal Senate and his selection for Curitiba's Mayor won as did many of those he supported for State and Federal Deputies. This result was counter to the trend found in most of the other states.

A detailed analysis of the election results follows:

FEDERAL SENATORS - 2

Amauri Oliveira e Silva (PTB)	389,657
Adolpho de Oliveira Franco (UDN)	326,837
runners up were:	
Bento Munhoz da Rocha Neto (PR)	224,959
Moyses Lupion (PSD)	217,627
Sebastião Vieira Lins (PSB)	63,252

The big vote for Silva and Franco in North Paraná were more than sufficient to overcome Rocha's strength in Curitiba and in the southern and central parts of the state. The PTB now has two Federal Senators (Nelson Maculan and Silva), the UDN one (Franco). The PSD lost the two seats it formerly had (Alô Guimarães and Gaspar Veloso). Many political observers regret the failure of Rocha to win since he is considered to be a brilliant legislator.

GPO 902867

0377

ORIGIN/ACTION		
ARA-4		
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2/9/63

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

AIRGRAM

732-00/11-762

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1962 NOV 13 AM 11 24

TO : Department of State, Washington

RM/AN DEPARTMENT OF STATE
ANALYSIS & DISTRIBUTION BRANCH
BUREAU OF INTER-AMERICAN AFFAIRS
NOV 1 - 1962

FROM : American Consulate, Curitiba DATE: November 7, 1962

SUBJECT : BRAZILIAN ELECTION 1962: REPORT N° 12: STATE OF PARANÁ ELECTION RESULTS

REF :

SUMMARY:

Governor Ney Braga is considered to have received a clear vote of confidence since the candidates he supported for the Federal Senate and for Curitiba Mayor were elected as were a large number of his Federal and State Deputies. The biggest upset was the failure of ex-Governor Moysés Lupion to win any of the three positions he had campaigned for.

The following is a statistical breakdown of the election results:

For Federal Senator: 1 UDN and 1 PTB
For Federal Deputy: 10 PTB, 9 UDN-PDC-PTN and 6 PSD
For State Deputy: 12 PTB, 12 PDC, 8 UDN, 7 PSD and 6 Christian Labor Front.

x x x x

The Regional Electoral Tribunal reported that 814,842 of the total of 1,100,637 registered voters cast their ballots. Of this number, about 400,000 were women. Despite this heavy feminine vote, not one female candidate was elected. The election was peaceful and there have been very few charges of fraud even in very close results.

Paraná was voting for 2 Federal Senate seats, 25 Federal Deputy seats, 45 State Deputy seats and 6 Mayors. There were five

FEB 1 1963

cc: Brazilian Desk, Washington (1)
AmEmbassy, Rio (1)
AmEmbassy, Brasilia (1)
Mr. Henderson, AmEmbassy, Rio (2)

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Drafted by: AWFeldman:bb
Contents and Classification Approved by: AWFeldman
Clearances:

0376

was somewhat surprised when he first heard the daily Agencia Nacional production upon his arrival in Brazil.

c. The French Ambassador to Brazil is making a 3-day ceremonial visit to RGS this week.

d. Another primary necessity of life has increased in price this week in Porto Alegre, as the newspapers have increased their single copy price from 10 to 15 cruzeiros.

Frederick D. Sharp III
American Consul

cc.: Consular Affairs, Rio
Political Section, Rio
Political Section, Brasília
ARA/EST/Brazil, Washington
INR/RAR/P, Washington

Department- Pass to all posts in Brazil.

0375

State Deputy (by party) (Cont'd)

		Deputies Elected
ARS	33,135	1
PSP	21,242	-
-Blank	90,412	
-Void	29,520	
Electoral Quotient	24,076	

Alternates are those unelected candidates of each party, in descending order of votes.

Following are the Federal Deputies elected; in order of votes received: -

PTB: Paixão; Mincarone; Prieto; Ortiz Borges; Martins Vianna; Temperani Pereira; Nunes Pereira; Unirio Machado; Giordano Alves; Bento Alves; Clay Araujo; Grafulha; Bresolin; Milton Dutra.

PSD: Tarso Dutra; Peracchi; Luciano Machado; Faraco; Pestana; Leitão; Alcântara;

ADP: Britto Velho (most voted RGS Federal Deputy); Triches; Flores Soares; Anschau; Pilla; Furtado; Norberto Schmidt.

MTR: Brum.

Federal Deputies receiving more votes than Electoral Quotient:

PTB: Paixão; Mincarone. PSD: Dutra; Peracchi. ADP: Britto Velho.

A detailed report will be submitted separately.

4. Miscellany

a. The 6th Infantry Division, with headquarters in Pôrto Alegre is conducting a 5-day maneuver this week with almost two thirds of the division's strength involved. The maneuver is taking place in the São Jeronimo area some 50 kilometers to West of Pôrto Alegre.

b. Breno Caldas, owner and editor of the Correio do Povo, understandably hypersensitive as a result of Brizola's campaign against press freedom during the recent electoral campaign, denounced editorially this week a series of laws and decrees being studied by the Federal Government to control radio and television programming. Caldas sees this control framework later being projected to all news media as an important step in Jango's campaign to establish a leftist-sindicalist regime in Brazil. The fact that the "Voz do Brasil" is reportedly to be undertaking broadcasts originating locally in the near future may have triggered this editorial report. Frankly, for one who has been exposed to the government-produced and-sponsored radio programs in Franco's Spain (Hora Nacional), the reporting officer

0374

3. Election Results

On November 1 the Tribunal Regional Eleitoral (TRE) announced the official results of the 1962 elections in RGS.

Total Registration	1,561,162
Total Voting	1,353,697
Abstentions	13.28%

For Governor:

Ilde Meneghetti (ADP)	502,356
Egydio Michaelsen (PTB)	480,131
Fernando Ferrari (MTR)	290,384
-Blank Ballots	41,510
-Void Ballots	39,316

For Senator:

Mem de Sá (ADP) (Alt. Fernando Gay da Fonseca)	572,334
Daniel Krieger (ADP) (Alt. Nestor Pereira)	567,882
Mariano Beck (PTB) (Alt. Alter Cintra de Oliveira)	513,601
Antonio Brochado da Rocha (PTB) (Alt. João Carlos Gastal)	539,665
-Blank Ballots	461,480
-Void Ballots	52,432

Federal Deputy (by party)		Deputies Elected
PTB	554,518	14
PSD	286,378	7
ADP	286,155	7
MTR	66,882	1
-Blank	134,296	
-Void	25,468	
Electoral Quotient	45,801	

State Deputy (by party)		Deputies Elected
PTB	481,735	23
PSD	236,527	11
PL	125,614	6
MTR	102,249	4
PDC	90,704	4
PRP	79,071	3
UDN	63,488	3

0373

made a 180 degree switch in his position, while PTB politicians state that Brizola remains faithful to his "third position" of "neither New York nor Moscow". In our view, Brizola's statement on Cuba was dictated solely by political expediency.

2. Political

Little local political activity has taken place thus far in the "lame-duck" period. Governor-elect Meneghetti has made no pronouncements and is presently resting at a Santa Catarina spa, where he has been in consultation on administrative and budgetary matters to be considered by the present Assembly, but which will affect his administration. According to today's press, four ADP State Deputies are to present a bill to the Assembly which will contain the Meneghetti administration's preliminary program in the socio-economic field, including public investments. It is anticipated that this bill will present the plan for his first year of government.

In an unexpected move, Pôrto Alegre Mayor José Loureiro da Silva, was called on by his defeated opponent, PTB's Wilson Vargas. Although PTB spokesmen criticize Vargas, there is speculation that he was sounding out Loureiro's support for his candidacy next November as well as the possibility of Loureiro's return to PTB ranks. The Mayor was non-commital but made it clear that he had personally voted for Meneghetti in the last election, leaving little doubt as to where his sympathy lies.

With the balance of power in the State Assembly now doubtful, there is considerable talk that the MTR might ally itself with the PTB, giving a total of 27 of the 55 votes to such a bloc, it being expected that the single Aliança Republicana Socialista (ARS) vote would naturally adhere to the PTB line. The rumor that Candido Norberto (MTR) may be elected president of the Assembly for 1963 lends support to the possibility of such an alliance. Meneghetti would have difficulty in governing this state, with an Assembly divided on strictly party lines.

Lame-duck Governor Brizola has submitted a bill to the Assembly substantially increasing the salaries of State Government employees, but as yet the opposition deputies have not taken a firm position for or against such a bill, but it can be anticipated that they will resist a further burden on the State's fiscal position, for Meneghetti has openly expressed his concern that he will inherit a 20 billion cruzeiro deficit from Brizola. Brizola, in true form, stands to gain from presenting this bill, since he will not be around to pay the piper.

With regard to the plebiscite on January 6, 1963, the RGS ADP coalition parties have announced that they will operate independently, following the directives of their national party organizations. Although Brizola's position on the plebiscite is well known he has not beaten the presidentialist drum lately.

0372

ORIGIN ACTION

ARA-4

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RM/R-E-1

20

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Curitiba -1 Santos -1

FROM : Amconsul PÔRTO ALEGRE DATE: NOV - 6 1962

SUBJECT : PÔRTO ALEGRE WEEKLY SUMMARY Nº 29

REF :

DEPARTMENT OF STATE BUREAU OF INTER-AMERICAN AFFAIRS NOV 9 1962

1. Cuban Situation
2. Political
3. Election Results
4. Miscellany

1. Cuban Situation

While newspaper headlines and wire services articles continue to report the developments on the Cuban situation, public interest seems to be flaggin since most people view the crisis as abating under the strong stand taken by the US. As a nation, we have regained a great deal of respect in the eyes of the rank-and-file of local inhabitants, particularly among the upper class groups, which had felt that the US had become soft and vacillating. Editorial comment no longer is directed at an interpretation of the rationale of the US position, but now is directed toward a criticism of the equivocal position taken by Brazil and, in particular, ridicules General Albino Silva's mission to Havana.

Contrary to our expectations, no editorial comment has appeared on the switched position of Governor Brizola on Cuba and he has made no further statements on the subject, possibly under instructions from the Federal Government, for Prime Minister Hermes Lima's laconic reply to a press question that he, and not Brizola, was Foreign Minister was carried widely in the local press. ADP politicians state that Brizola

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I raised hypothesis that Castro might be entirely intransigent, either because of effective Soviet control or because of megalomaniac conviction that he had mission to spread Fidelismo over whole of Latin America. Hermes somewhat discounted former alternative on basis Fidel's deep annoyance with Soviets. Latter alternative seemed entirely new idea to him.

My overall impression was that Hermes is ingenuous and not overly intelligent, ignorant Cold War realities, and unhappily trying reconcile recent events with romantic jqith* that Castro mere Socialist reformer who may have key to what Latin America needs. As old-fashioned academic Socialist himself, finds it hard to believe that U.S. objection to Castro is not simply Capitalist aversion to Socialism. If GOB is going to play any constructive role in future Cuban developments, I suspect that ideas will have to be developed with much more able and sophisticated San Tiago Dantas -- bearing in mind his possible undependability -- rather than Hermes.

GORDON

CC

EYES ONLY

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0369

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-2- 933, November 6, 1 p.m. (SECTION ONE OF TWO) from Rio de Janeiro

also had found boasting of Goulart and Albino about success of mission quite perplexing, only explainable as design to mislead Brazilian public opinion, since in fact mission seemed a failure.

Hermes listened patiently and rather uncomfortably, interrupting on occasion to rebut a specific point. Made half apology for Darcy Ribeiro statement on ground that it needed to defuse anti-American tension at University of Brasilia. (John Keppel tells me no such tension evident, unless created by Ribeiros' very statement.) On Cuban regime, said he was only defending right of Cuba to organize socialist society, and that he had once publicly condemned denial of civil liberties and other undemocratic Cuban practices. He still harbored illusion that US had sought sanctions at Punta del Este against socialist regime as such, and seemed surprised when I pointed out that anti-Cuban case turned entirely on links with Soviet Union and subversive activities in OARS.

Turning to future, I pointed to 3 continuing problems; A) Verification effective removal Soviet offensive weapons, B) Assurance of non re-establishment, perhaps underground; and C) Continuing problem Cuba based subversion in Latin America.

On A), Hermes expressed confidence Mikoyan would obtain Castro assent to some form international verification, if necessary paying price in additional Soviet economic commitments. On B), Hermes reverted to idea securing continuing international inspection in Cuba by associating with inspection other countries, either for control of non-invasion commitment or on wider basis for supervision denuclearization Latin America as whole. On C), Hermes said this essential part of points made by General Albino and he believed Castro must accept as only way of "preserving" his revolution." Said he regarded Albino mission as only first step in continuing diplomatic effort which he hoped we would support. No indication, however, as to next steps contemplated.

GORDON

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TO: Secretary of State

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NO: 933, November 6, 1 p.m. (SECTION ONE OF TWO)

EYES ONLY

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Rio 933

First half of 3-hour Tour d'Horizon with Hermes Lima Sunday November 4 was devoted to Cuba. Other parts talk reported separately with lower classification.

Hermes had received message from Campos indicating White House concern over General Albinos' mission, including President Kennedy's question about Albinos' political orientation. Hermes expressed great surprise in view our foreknowledge sending of mission and being kept informed subsequently.

I took opportunity deliver extensive lecture, polite but firm, on background Washington suspicions and concern many aspects GOB position Cuban crisis. Cited equivocal publicity here on meaning and backing of OAS vote, unexplained consultation visit of Pena Marinho, unfriendly public statement by Education Minister, petulant tone of Goulart letter of October 25 concerning OAS, some of Hermes' own statements implying GOB support for Castro regime as such, despite condemnation in Punta del Este resolution I. With specific reference to Albino mission, I said our idea had been quiet confrontation of Castro by Ambassador Bastian Pinto, who was already acquainted with him, in effort to explore Castro reaction to clear statement of dangers and disadvantages of Cuban ties with USSR and possibility of better alternatives for them. Instead, GOB had given maximum publicity to sending of special emissary, with newspaper stories about mediation of a type which could well add to Castro prestige and perhaps fortify his intransigence. I pointed out that GOB had shared with us strong support of idea of UN inspection, but had not yet publicly criticized Castro's refusal to accept it. I

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FROM: Rio de Janeiro

TO: Secretary of State

NO: 931, November 5, 8 PM

PRIORITY

Department Circular Telegram 801; EMBTEL 894

No major acts violence sabotage reported Brazil so far. Small-scale pro-Castro demonstrations various parts country outset also threat maritime workers boycott U.S. ships singularly unsuccessful. Present diminishing agitation confined distribution handbills and telegrams, letters, petitions to Embassy protesting U.S. action. While elements responsible decidedly Castro-Communist, no evidence efforts directed from Cuba. Pattern appears normal reaction native activists and sympathizers cause international Communism. That overwhelming majority population approved US action undoubtedly significant factor tranquility here.

Unless situation changes, believe no occasion for representations indicated.

GORDON

CC

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0366

out of the COPERBO rubber plant project before he leaves office, Governor SAMPAIO's office this week announced that the first stage of the plant's construction was nearing completion and that the heavy machinery itself will arrive in January of 1963. The general tone of the statement suggested that the plant would initiate production shortly thereafter. Actually, engineers working on the project confide that it will be mid-1964 at the earliest before the plant will actually begin producing synthetic rubber on a commercial basis. Moreover, the attitude Arraes will adopt vis-a-vis the project has not been made clear and it may very well be that the whole operation will be slowed down after he assumes office. (LIMITED OFFICIAL USE)

PSYCHOLOGICAL

With the first heated excitement of the Cuban blockade abated, the press and general public reaction to the U.S. blockade of Cuba is almost unanimously favorable. There has been no loudly dissenting responsible voice. Even Communist A Hora has been searching for a positive line to follow.

The weekly Jornal Pequeno waded into the present Brasilian political situation as created by the Cuban blockade with forthrightness. Running a three-column photograph of GOULART in the center of the front page, they question, "Statesman or Tyrant". They consider the mediation efforts initiated by the Brazilian government in the Cuban situation a faux-pax since no one solicited its aid.

LEONEL BRIZOLA, who has roundly condemned the U.S. in the past, garnered the support and commendation of a large sector of the people for his condemnation of Russian bases in Cuba. Columnists SOCRATES TIMES de CARVALHO and LUIS CISMEIROS of Diario da Noite, praised his position. Said Cisneiros, "Brizola rendered Brasil a great service. His conduct was needed and heroic."

Lowell C. Kilday
American Vice Consul

CONTRIBUTORS:
LCKilday
WSSmith
CTucker

0365

3. Bill to Increase Number of State Deputies Introduced

Smarting over his defeat for re-election to the State Assembly, arch-conservative CONSTANCIO MARANHÃO has introduced a bill in the Pernambuco legislature calling for an increase in the number of deputies from 65 to 81. The additional 16 seats would not be the object of new elections but would be distributed on the basis of the elections held in October. The bill's primary support seems to lie among those deputies like Maranhao who failed re-election by a narrow margin but would would be among the winners of the proposed new seats. Otherwise, the bill is widely opposed and seems unlikely of passage in its present form.

Another bill, this one with a better chance of passage, has also been drawn up and submitted by the group of deputies who lost in the October elections. This bill would more than triple the number of employees of the State Assembly and would create a large number of super grade slots for Assembly employees. Cynics and others who know well the workings of Pernambuco politics regard the proposed super-grade positions as thinly disguised sinecures for the losing deputies. (OFFICIAL USE ONLY)

ECONOMIC

1. SUDENE Meeting

On November 5 the SUDENE Deliberative Council met in Recife to hear SUDENE Director CELSO FURTADO report on the recent Mexico meeting of the Inter-American Social and Economic Council. Furtado reportedly said that the difficulties Alliance for Progress is encountering throughout the hemisphere prompted the meeting, and that it had become clear during the course of the meeting that the success of Alliance hinged on better and more complete planning on both the national and regional levels. Referring specifically to problems encountered by Alliance in the Northeast, Furtado described them as being of an "administrative nature" which could be ironed out.

Turning to other matters before it, the Deliberative Council approved tax reduction privileges for fifteen Northeastern industries and recommended new financial assistance for the area's textile industry. (UNCLASSIFIED)

2. COPERBO

In an obvious effort to milk as much propaganda as possible

0364

of quick retorts and strong dissensions from Pernambuco officials and from two other Northeastern governors. JORDÃO EMERENCIANO, Chief of Pernambuco's Civil Household, was the first to reply to Arraes. In a lengthy statement issued to the press on Saturday, November 2, Emerenciano eloquently explained the "spirit of action" that moves the Alliance and the Alliance's concept of partnership, defended the right of state governments to participate directly in the Alliance, and criticized the Arraes-articulated concept that SUDENE alone has the competence to decide on nationally-and-internationally-financed development projects. The next day, MARCO ANTONIO de ALCANTARA, head of Pernambuco's housing section, reubtted Arraes' criticism of the state housing project, stating that the critical remarks were based on ignorance of the project's aims. At the same time, Governor ALUIZIO ALVES of Rio Grande do Norte told the Recife press that Arraes' comments betrayed a lack of knowledge and understanding of the Alliance. Alves also maintained that Arraes had erred in his assertion that state governments could not deal directly with Alliance officials. Governor PARSIFAL BARROSO of Ceara followed Alves with a strong defense of the Alliance for Progress and a dig at those who fail to perceive the benefits to the Northeast of the Alliance. Next, the leader of the Governor's bench in the State Assembly introduced the question for debate by defending the aims of the Alliance and denouncing Arraes. After a lengthy threshing by both sides, the question was dropped only to be picked up briefly by Recife's municipal council.

The incident at least proves that the Alliance for Progress does have some stout defenders in the Northeast. (OFFICIAL USE ONLY)

2. Miguel Arraes Cancels European Trip -- To Wed Shortly

Press reports out of Rio de Janeiro indicate that Governor-elect Miguel Arraes has cancelled his trip to Europe. Local rumor had it that the trip would have taken Arraes to France, Czechoslovakia, and possibly one other Iron Curtain country. Though the reason specified for the cancellation was Arraes' desire to devote himself to a study of the problems he will face as Governor of Pernambuco, it is probable that his forthcoming wedding was also a factor. Arraes, the widowed father of eight children, is to marry Miss MADALENA SABOYA FIUZA, possibly within the next week. Though Miss Saboya is not well known in Recife, she is reported to be a native of Ceara, a resident of Rio de Janeiro, and a former professor at the Sorbonne. (OFFICIAL USE ONLY)

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CIRCULAR ACTION

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TABLE OF CONTENTS

POLITICAL

1. Arraes' Comments on Alliance for Progress Draw Quick Response
2. Miguel Arraes Cancels European Trip -- To Wed Shortly
3. Bill to Increase Number of State Deputies Introduced

ECONOMIC

1. SUDENE Meeting
2. COPERBO

PSYCHOLOGICAL

POLITICAL

1. Arraes' Comments on Alliance for Progress Draw Quick Response

Governor-elect MIGUEL ARRAES' widely-reported comments on the Alliance for Progress at his October 27 press conference (See ConGen Airgram A-41) drew a number of

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A-508, 11/5/62
Enclosure 5
Rio de Janeiro

Comparative Distribution by Party of Selected State Delegations to Present and New Chamber of Deputies.

Present Chamber

	PSD	PTB	UDN	PSP	PTN	MTR	PSB	PST	PDC	PRP	PL	PR	PRT	Total
Sao Paulo	11	5	4	6	7	0	4	1	4	0	0	1	1	44
Guanabara	1	5	6	3	1	0	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	17
Rio de Janeiro	6	5	4	0	0	1	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	17
Rio Grande do Sul	7	12	0	0	0	2	0	0	0	1	2	0	0	24
Santa Catarina	3	1	4	0	1	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	10
	28	28	18	9	9	4	6	1	4	1	2	1	1	112

New Chamber

	PSD	PTB	UDN	PSP	PTN	MTR	PSB	PST	PDC	PRP	PL	PR	PRT	Total
Sao Paulo	10	9*	7	7	7	2	0	2	9	1	0	2	3	59
Guanabara	2	8	6	1	0	0	3	0	1	0	0	0	0	21
Rio de Janeiro	6	8	3	2	0	0	0	2	0	0	0	0	0	21
Rio Grande do Sul	7	14	1	0	0	1	0	0	2	1	3	0	0	29
Santa Catarina	66	2	6	60	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	14
	31	41	23	10	7	3	3	4	12	2	3	2	3	144

* Includes 2 PCB's

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A-508, 11/5/62
Enclosure 4
Rio de Janeiro

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Comparative Distribution by Ideological Category (Embassy Despatch 960, June 8, 1962) of Selected State Delegations to Present and New Chamber of Deputies.

	Present Chamber										New Chamber									
	I	II	III	IV	V	VI	VII	VIII	Uncl.	Total	I	II	III	IV	V	VI	VII	VIII	Uncl.	Total
Sao Paulo	2	6	5	5	11	15	0	0	0	44	2	3	2	7	14	14	1	0	16	59
Guanabara	1	3	1	1	6	4	1	0	0	17	1	3	1	2	6	1	0	0	7	21
Rio de Janeiro	0	3	1	2	3	7	0	1	0	17	1	2	0	1	4	4	0	1	8	29
Rio Grande do Sul	0	3	9	2	3	7	0	0	0	24	0	6	5	0	6	5	0	0	7	21
Santa Catarina	0	0	1	2	6	1	0	0	0	10	0	0	1	0	10	3	0	0	0	14
	3	15	17	12	29	34	1	1	0	112	4	14	9	10	40	27	1	1	38	144

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A-508, 11/5/62
Enclosure No. 3
Rio de Janeiro

Classification of Previous Governors and Governors-Elect by Party and Ideological Categories Established in Embassy Despatch 960, June 8, 1962.

	Previous Governors	Governors-Elect
Acre	(Formerly Territory)	PTB (Category Unknown)
Alagoas	UDN - V	--- *
Amazonas	PTB - III	PTB - V
Bahia	UDN - V	PTB - IV (or V)
Ceara	PTB - V	UDN - VI
Espirito Santo	PSD - VI	UDN - VI
Goias	PSD - III	--- *
Guanabara	UDN - IV	--- *
Maranhao	PSD - V	--- *
Mato Grosso	UDN - VI	--- *
Minas Gerais	UDN - V	--- *
Para	PSD - V	--- *
Paraiba	PDC - V	--- *
Parana	PDC - V	--- *
Pernambuco	UDN - V	PTB - III
Piaui	PTB - III	changes PTB - V
Rio de Janeiro	PSD - VI	PTB - II or III?
Rio Grande do Norte	UDN - V	--- *
Rio Grande do Sul	PTB - II	PSD - VI
Santa Catarina	PSD - V	--- *
Sao Paulo	--- +	PSP - VI
Sergipe	UDN - VI	UDN - III

* Seat not contested in 1962
\+ Carvalho Pinto - no party

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0359

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A-508, 11/5/62
Enclosure No. 2
Rio de Janeiro

WINNING CANDIDATES IN 1962 GUBERNATORIAL CONTESTS

STATE	GOVERNOR-ELECT
Acre	Jose Augusto de Araujo, PTB
Amazonas	Plinio Ramos Coelho, PTB
Bahia	Lomanto Junior, PTB
Ceara	Virgilio Tavora, UDN
Espirito Santo	Francisco Lacerda de Aguiar, UDN
Pernambuco	Miguel Arrais, PTB
Piaui	Costancio Pereira, PTB ? Para
Rio de Janeiro	Badger Silveira, PTB
Rio Grande do Sul	Ildo Meneghetti, PSD
Sao Paulo	Adhemar de Barros, PSP
Sergipe	Seixas Doria, UDN

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0358

Rio Grande do Sul		
Daniel Krieger	UDN	VI
Mem de Sá	PL	VI
Santa Catarina		
Antonio Carlos Konder Reis	UDN	VI
Atílio Francisco Xavier Fontana	PSD	VI
São Paulo		
Auro Soares de Moura Andrade	PSD	VI
Juvenal Lino de Matos	PTN	VI
Sergipe		
Francisco Leite Neto	PSD	VI
Julio Cesar Leite	PR	VI

Maranhão		
Vitorino Freire	PSD	VII
Sebastião Archer	PSD	VI
Mato Grosso		
Filinto Muller	PSD	VI
Bezerra Neto	PTB	I
Minas Gerais		
Camilo Nogueira da Gama	PTB	VI
Benedito Valadares	PSD	VI
Pará		
Eduardo Catete Pinheiro	PTN	V
Valdir Bonhid	PSD	VI
Paraiba		
João Agripino	UDN	III
Argemiro Figueiredo	PTB	VI
Paraná		
Amauri de Oliveira Silva	PTB	V
Adolfo Oliveira Franco	UDN	VI
Pernambuco		
José Ermírio de Morais	PTB ~~UDN~~	III
Francisco Pessoa de Queiroz	PTB ou UDN	VI
Piauí		
José Candido Ferraz	UDN	VI
Sigfredo Pacheco	PSD	VI
Rio de Janeiro		
Aarão Steinbruck	MTR	II
Vasconcelos Torres	PTB	V
Rio Grande do Norte		
Walfredo Gurgel	PSD	V
Dinarte Mariz	UDN	VI

0356

Winning Senatorial Candidates by State, Party and Ideological Categorization Established in Embassy Despatch 960, June 8, 1962.

State	Party	Category
Acre 1/		
Oscar Passos	PTB	U 2/
Adalberto Sena	UDN or PSP	U 2/
José Guiomard Santos	PSD	U 2/
Alagôas		
Arnon de Melo	PDC	VI
Rui Palmeira	UDN	VI
Amazonas		
Antonila Mourão	PTB	U 2/
Artur Virgílio	PTB	III
Bahia		
Antonio Balbino	PSD	IV
Josafá Marinho	PL	IV
Ceará		
Wilson Gonçalves	PSD	V
Carlos Jereissati	PTB	V
Espírito Santo		
Eurico Resende	UDN	V
Raul Giuberti	PSP	VI
Goiás		
Pedro Ludovico	PSD	VI
José Feliciano Ferreira	PSD	VI
Guanabara		
Aurélio Viana	PSB	IV
Gilberto Marinho	PSD	V

2/ Category unknown
1/ New State, only one to elect 3 Senators

0355

Winning Senatorial Candidates by State, Party and Ideological Categorization Established in Embassy Despatch 960, June 8, 1962.

State	Party	Category
Acre 1/		
Oscar Passos	PTB	U 2/
Adalberto Sena	UDN or PSP	U 2/
José Guiomard Santos	PSD	U 2/
Alagôas		
Arnon de Melo	PDC	VI
Rui Palmeira	UDN	VI
Amazonas		
Antonila Mourão	PTB	U 2/
Artur Virgílio	PTB	III
Bahia		
Antonio Balbino	PSD	IV
Josafá Marinho	PL	IV
Ceará		
Wilson Gonçalves	PSD	V
Carlos Jereissati	PTB	V
Espírito Santo		
Eurico Resende	UDN	V
Raul Giuberti	PSP	VI
Goiás		
Pedro Ludovico	PSD	VI
José Feliciano Ferreira	PSD	VI
Guanabara		
Aurélio Viana	PSB	IV
Gilberto Marinho	PSD	V

2/ Category unknown
1/ New State, only one to elect 3 Senators

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States where appropriate, perhaps the next elections will bear witness to a halt, or even a reversal of the slow but steady leftist-nationalist march of the Brazilian electorate which the present elections again illustrate.

For the Ambassador:

Frank Micelotta
Third Secretary

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POL

0354

more worrisome categories (I-III) have also. Whether the results in these states herald a national trend is even more difficult to say. Four of the five states, Guanabara, Sao Paulo, Rio de Janeiro, Rio Grande do Sul, are key ones, but they are certainly not typical. Special factors operated in each of them. Nevertheless, the Embassy's guess is that the trend discernible in these states will hold approximately true for the nation as a whole. Thus, the PSD and the UDN will do less well than predicted, the PTB and the smaller parties better. In the new Chamber the PSD will still have the largest representation. The PTB, as predicted, will come next, but instead of the 34 seat spread which the Embassy predicted, only some 15 or 20 seats will separate it from the leading party. The UDN will run a rather poor third, and the smaller parties will have slightly increased strength. In terms of ideological classification, the hostile left, or those in categories I-III, will expand its representation to 25-30% of the Chamber.

Conclusions

When the counting is over and the final tallies are announced, the 1962 elections will have produced a mixed bag of results. The left will have some reason to feel encouraged. It has already gained two notable individual victories: those of Miguel Arrais for the governorship of Pernambuco and the overwhelming endorsement, by well over a quarter of a million votes, of US-vilifier Leonel Brizzola for Federal Deputy from Guanabara. Each can do plenty of damage to United States interests in his new position. But both represent even greater potential danger as possible Presidential candidates in 1965. And if the executive branch is the most important entity of Brazilian government, the Chamber of Deputies comes second, other governmental organs lagging fairly far behind. In the Chamber the left will have scored its most impressive general gains of the 1962 elections. An increase in anti-American spoutings on the floor of the Chamber is to be expected. A greater number of bills potentially detrimental to American interests will be proposed. Moreover, Brazilian politicians are not slower than others to see that nothing succeeds like success, and future campaigns will have even more ultra-nationalist candidates purveying an anti-American line.

Obviously, elections are only one determinant in shaping a government's line and specific policies. What the Brazilian government's general orientation and particular policies will be in the future must remain largely guesswork, for they will partly depend on unforeseeable future events. Among present visible though not wholly understood factors undoubtedly the unfolding of the Cuban crisis will loom large, as will President Goulart's attitudes, acts and reactions. With these reservations, however, the 1962 elections indicate that the Brazilian government will continue, at its various levels and in its several institutions, to be one the United States can work with. Numerically, it will again be composed in its majority of persons opposed to violent change or extremist experiments. If it can be persuaded, in its totality, to take the measures necessary to improve the economic and social well-being of the Brazilian people, cooperating with the United

0353

by the fragmentation of conservative forces in the state. It is also possible that if conservatives in Rio de Janeiro state had backed one strong candidate early in the game he might have made a respectable showing or even won--though the total of votes garnered by the nationalist candidates, winner Badger Silveira and Tenorio Cavalcante, exceeded those won by the three others. (The opposite side of the coin is that the same factor in reverse also operated in Sao Paulo and Rio Grande do Sul.)

IV. The Chamber of Deputies

Partly because of the proportional representational character of the elections for Federal Deputy, the new Chamber will more palpably reflect a move toward the left. Judgments at this time regarding the composition of the new Chamber must, however, be more tentative than those regarding the governors-elect and the new Senate. For one thing, returns are still very incomplete. For another, the ideological stance of many of the new Chamber figures is unknown. And many of those elected, for one reason or another, will not take their seats at all and will be replaced by suplentes. With all these reservations, the Embassy has nevertheless studied the returns from five states and in Enclosures 4 and 5 compares the composition of their present and future delegations to the Chamber with respect to party and classification.

The performance of the several parties in these states, Sao Paulo, Guanabara, Rio Grande do Sul, Rio de Janeiro, and Santa Catarina, very closely approximates the predictions made in Embassy Airgram A-257 (September 4, 1957). The expected error in the predictions (they never pretended to absolute precision) seems, however, to be consistent on one side. In each of the five states studied, that is, either the PTB did better than expected or the UDN or PSD worse. In each state except Santa Catarina the PTB gained one more seat than predicted. In three of the five states the PSD won fewer than the number of seats predicted and in none did it win more. The Embassy's crystal ball was more accurate for the UDN, but the party did not win more seats than predicted in any of these states. To compare the Embassy's total predictions for these parties in the five states with actual performance:

	Predicted Number Seats	Actual Results
PSD	37	31
PTB	37	41
UDN	25	23

It is difficult to draw any conclusions about the distribution among ideological categories of the new deputies from the five states, for so many--38 of 144--are as yet unclassified. But it seems safe to assume that if the PTB gained more than it was expected to that the

0351

will have six members in the first three categories versus the present Senate's two. The shifts in relative strength of the three major parties are not significant, being no greater than those that occurred between 1958 and 1962 (a period of no general Senatorial elections) as a result of defections and normal attrition.

III. The Governors

Other reports, especially from the Consulates, will examine the gubernatorial races in detail. For the present, the names of the winners in the eleven contests are given in Enclosure 2. Enclosure 3 compares pre-election (before July 7, when some governors were obliged to leave office in order to be permitted to campaign for other offices) and future line-ups in the top state jobs by party and classification. Numerical totals distribute as follows:

	Governors-Elect	Before July 7
Category		
I	0	0
II	1	1
III	3	3
IV	2	1
V	10	12
VI	5	4
VII	0	0
	21	21
Party		
UDN	8	8
PTB	6	4
PSD	5	6
PDC	2	2
No Party	0	1 (Carvalho Pinto, Sao Paulo
PSP	1 4/	0
	22	21

The disappointing victories of leftists Arrais in Pernambuco and Silveira in Rio de Janeiro are offset by the relief of Quadros' loss in Sao Paulo. Meneghetti's victory in Rio Grande do Sul is also welcome, though it was no boon, the defeat of the PTB aspirant being thoroughly predictable in the light of that state's voting pattern. Still, if the gubernatorial election failed to produce a repudiation of the left by the electorate (which was not expected), the number of governors in the dangerous categories--I to III--did not increase. In Pernambuco, it seems certain that Arrais' victory was made possible /by the

4/ The gain represents new state Acre. Classification of new governor unknown.

	New Senate	1962[2]
PSD	23	21
UDN	17	20
PTB	15	13
PSP	2	1
PR	1	1
PDC	1	--
PSB	1	--
MTR	1	1
PTN	2	1
PL	3	3
PRP	--	--
PRT	--	--
PST	--	--
No Party	--	1
	66	62

With respect to the ideological categories set up in Embassy Despatch 960, June 8, 1962, composition of the present and new senior houses will compare as follows:

	New Senate	1962[3]
I (Communists or Crypto-Communists)	1	0
II (Fellow-Travelers or Useful Innocents)	2	0
III (Leftist Ultra-Nationalists)	3	2
IV (Non-Communist Radical Reformers)	5	2
V (Centrists)	15	17
VI (Conservatives)	31	29
VII (Rightist Extremists)	2	3
Sub-Total	59	53
Unclassified	7	9
	66	62

Thus, the Senate will remain what it is: a preponderantly moderate body. Fully half of the new Senate will undoubtedly be conservative, for certainly two of the presently unclassified seven Senators will fall into that category. Nevertheless, as the Embassy predicted (though principally for the Chamber of Deputies) a greater spread to the extreme manifests itself, at least to the left; the new Senate /will

2/ Embassy's A-108, July 26, 1962
3/ Embassy's A-108, July 26, 1962

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DISTRIBUTION

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2/8/63
RJ Burton

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

AIRGRAM

732.00/11-562

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~~XXXXX~~ A-508 NO. CONFIDENTIAL HANDLING INDICATOR

TO : SecState WASHINGTON 1962 NOV 13 AM 8 49

DEPARTMENT OF STATE
BUREAU OF
INTER-AMERICAN AFFAIRS
NOV 14 1962
RM/AN
ANALYSIS & DISTRIBUTION
BRANCH

FROM : AmEmbassy RIO DE JANEIRO DATE: November 5, 1962

SUBJECT: Some Elections Results and First Thoughts Thereupon

REF : (1) Embassy's A-159, August 8, 1962; (2) Embassy's A-108, July 26, 1962; (3) Embassy's A-257, September 4, 1957.

ARA 732.00/8-862

AEA 732.10/7-2662

I. General

1962 was not "the year of the political payoff[1/] that the left hoped for and others feared. If the as yet incomplete returns of the October 7 elections point to the predicted, continued growth of the leftist-nationalist movement in Brazil, they also indicate that that growth is not startlingly rapid. For the next four years a numerical preponderance of moderates will continue to dominate the Brazilian government over-all. Though the gubernatorial races produced a number of disappointments, centrist-conservatives will continue to constitute roughly two-thirds of Brazil's governors. About the same proportion of centrist-conservatives will prevail in the Senate. Returns for the Federal Chamber of Deputies are still very spotty, but they seem to indicate a more palpable move to the left. Nevertheless, that move will by no means be so far as to overcome the present moderate dominance of the Chamber.

II. The Senate

The names, parties, and classifications of the winning candidates for this year's 45 Senate seats are given in Enclosure 1. When combined with incumbents who will sit until 1966, party representation in the new Senate will compare as follows with the make-up of the present house:

New

1/ Embassy's A-159, August 8, 1962

FORM DS-323 4-62 CONFIDENTIAL FOR DEPT. USE ONLY ☒ In ☐ Out

Drafted by: POL:FMicelotta/rstp

Contents and Classification Approved by: DCM - Minister Bond

Clearances: POL:CCCarson

0348

OFFICIAL USE ONLY

DEPARTMENT OF STATE
POLICY PLANNING COUNCIL

Nov. 2, 1962.

TO : Mr. Brubeck

Bill:

To allay any ambiguity on the staff-budget problem, I've personally touched base with Roger Hilsman (through Allan Evans), Chenery and Graham Martin since talking with you this morning. I have explained that Bunker would presumably want staff support in Washington and in the field, with the bureau or area of AID tapped being expected at a minimum to pay salaries and travel expenses of staff supplied. All agree and all will sit down with Bunker and work things out equitably when he comes aboard.

H. C. Ramsey

OFFICIAL USE ONLY

0347

2. That you sign the attached letter informing Ambassador Bunker of your decision in this matter.

Attachment:

Letter to Ambassador Bunker.

Concurrences:

ARA - Mr. Martin (in substance)
INR - Mr. Hilsman (in substance)
AID/CAP - Mr. Martin (in substance)
AID/AA/P - Mr. Chenery and Mr. Gordon (in substance)

HCR

S/P:HCRamsey:rk

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#18167

DEPARTMENT OF STATE
Counselor and Chairman
Policy Planning Council
Washington

November 2, 1962.

TO : The Secretary

THROUGH : S/S

FROM : S/P - W. W. Rostow

SUBJECT : Recommendation that Ellsworth Bunker Make a Strategic Study of Brazil

You will recall your conversation in New York on October 5 with Ellsworth Bunker regarding S/P's and ARA's interest that he make a strategic study of Brazil within the S/P format as approved by the Latin American Policy Committee.

The place of the strategic study in the hierarchy of Departmental country studies is now being staffed out and recommendations will be made to you after the present demands on your time have abated. Meanwhile, the Latin American Policy Committee, the relevant bureaus within the Department (ARA and INR), and AID (the Chenery Group and AID/CAP) agree that a strategic study of Brazil should be undertaken by Ambassador Bunker and further agree to contribute staff and budgetary support to the enterprise. Mr. Martin recommends that Mr. Bunker be attached to S/P as a consultant for this purpose. This matter has been reviewed with Mr. Ball, who concurs. Ambassador Gordon has also been consulted and welcomes the study.

Recommendations:

1. That you authorize a strategic study of Brazil, to be undertaken by Mr. Bunker under the general arrangements outlined above.

APPROVE NOV 4 1962
DISAPPROVE

2. That

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FM 7.3.0/11-462

0345

18166

November 2, 1962

Dear Ellsworth:

With reference to our conversation in New York on October 5, I am happy to tell you that all interested parties share my satisfaction at the prospects of your making a strategic study of Brazil within the general format approved by the Latin American Policy Committee. If you remain willing to undertake this project, as I earnestly hope you are, I can assure you of full co-operation within the Department, within A.I.D., and on the part of Linc Gordon, who has been consulted.

In view of recent developments, I think you will agree with me that a long-range study in depth of Brazil is more important than ever. As you know, Bill Draper is now preparing his report, which will center primarily on the balance of payments problem. We will welcome your counsel on his conclusions and recommendations in the months ahead, but, as Walt Rostow and Ed Martin have explained to you, the strategic study we want you to undertake will be broader in its analysis and scope, and look further down the road than this urgent question.

We can arrange staffing and other such matters to meet your wishes as expressed to me in New York. My thought is that you will be attached to S/P as a consultant and that you will work intimately with ARA, INR, A.I.D. and other relevant agencies under a charter of authority designed to give you all the assistance and cooperation you need to see your study through to your complete satisfaction.

Sincerely,

Dean Rusk

The Honorable
Ellsworth Bunker,
Putney, Vermont.

S/P:HRamsey:mm

Cleared in Draft:
S/P:WWRostow
ARA:EMartin

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#18667

RM/R

FILE

NOV 4 1962

Dear Ellsworth:

With reference to our conversation in New York on October 5, I am happy to tell you that all interested parties share my satisfaction at the prospects of your making a strategic study of Brazil within the general format approved by the Latin American Policy Committee. If you remain willing to undertake this project, as I earnestly hope you are, I can assure you of full cooperation within the Department, within A.I.D., and on the part of Lincoln Gordon, who has been consulted.

In view of recent developments, I think you will agree with me that a long-range study in depth of Brazil is more important than ever. As you know, Bill Bowdler is now preparing his report, which will center primarily on the balance of payments problem. We will welcome your counsel on his conclusions and recommendations in the months ahead, but, as Walt Heston and Ed Martin have explained to you, the strategic study we want you to undertake will be broader in its analysis and scope, and look further down the road than this urgent question.

We can arrange staffing and other such matters to meet your wishes as expressed to me in New York. My thought is that you will be attached to S/P as a consultant and that you will work intimately with ARA, INR, A.I.D. and other relevant agencies under a charter of authority designed to give you all the assistance and cooperation you need to see your study through to your complete satisfaction.

With warm regards,

Sincerely,

Dean Rusk

Drafted by RM/R

The Honorable
Ellsworth Bunker,
Putney, Vermont.

S/P:RMeaney:rac Cleared in draft: S/P-WHeaton
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S/S - RO
NOV 2 1962
A true copy of signed original

732.00/11-462

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Federal Administration. In his first press interview following the October 7 elections, the Governor made his position unusually clear. He said then: "I wish to take part in the campaign [for the plebiscite] not only in Minas but throughout the country, since I am convinced that in a Federal regime the States can be better served through a Presidential rather than a Parliamentary system." He also stressed his conviction that, since Brazil was in urgent need of a courageous, competent, and realistic government, it was necessary for the President to be elected by direct popular vote so that his commitments be to the people rather than to particular Parliamentary groups.

It is evident that the recent elections have left the Governor as close to a state of euphoria as is possible for a person of his moderate temperament to be. He expects undoubtedly to regain his lost influence over the affairs of his Party and by so doing to build his political stature for a possible Presidential candidacy in 1965. The battle lines for the control of the UDN are now being drawn, and the latest rumors have it that the orthodox and majority wing is thinking of putting up Minas Gerais Senator Milton Campos as candidate for the National presidency of the UDN on the contention that a candidate with the prestige of Senator Milton Campos, who moreover comes from a UDN stronghold, cannot very easily be defeated by the opposition. The feeling in political circles, however, is that Governor Magalhães Pinto has almost suddenly become a formidable contender.

3. Reactions to U.S. Action on Cuba

Public and press reaction to the U.S. role in the Cuban crisis has been overwhelmingly favorable. Adverse comments have been few and far apart, virtually limited to a small group of Communist or fellow-traveller labor union leaders and university students. A typical comment the Consulate has heard is that the blockade should have been imposed sooner. With the elections out of the way, the Cuban crisis has monopolized the headlines and received wide news and editorial coverage. (See Consulate's A-23, October 31, 1962, for a full report.)

Edmund A. da Silveira

Edmund A. da Silveira
American Consul

0342

As usual Governor Magalhães Pinto was careful not to take a definite public stand on the issues discussed. Other members of the group, however, made some interesting comments to the press which showed quite clearly the thinking of the group as a whole. On the question of the plebiscite, the purpose of the meeting was to coordinate efforts to campaign for the return to the Presidential form of government. Closely linked was the second main issue discussed, that of the future composition of the National committee of the UDN, including the Party's president. The Magalhães Pinto faction within the UDN favors full support of President Goulart and the strengthening of Presidential powers in general, a stand that has collided head on with that adopted by the Party as such.

Governors Aloísio Alves and Petrônio Portela and Senator José Cândido Ferraz were the most outspoken critics of the August 1961 "Additional Act," which created the present so-called parliamentary system. They declared that the task ahead was to ensure the elimination of that Act. Regarding the coming UDN convention for the election of National officers, they stressed their strong divergence from the UDN's current policies, criticizing the Party's ruling hierarchy for being corrupt, reactionary, backward, and incapable of adapting itself to modern conditions.

Speaking to the press, the Governor's guests made other comments of current interest, particularly with respect to Pernambuco's Governor-elect Miguel Arraes and the U.S.-Cuban situation. While both Governor Aloísio Alves and Governor Petrônio Portela thought that Miguel Arraes would make a great administrator who would colaborate with his Northeastern colleagues, Governor Aloísio Alves expressed some reservations about Arraes' Communist support. The Governor from Rio Grande do Norte expressed the hope that Arraes, as a clear-thinking and experienced man, would be able to distinguish between the real factors of his electoral victory and those Communist forces which deliberately wanted to present themselves as having won the elections for him. On the U.S.-Cuban crisis, Governor Aloísio Alves made the forthright statement that while he supported the right of self-determination of the Cuban people, he did not feel that this right entitled the Cuban Government to convert Cuba into a military base that threatened the self-determination rights of neighboring countries and world peace. "Neither ought we," he continued, "on grounds of adherence to the principle of self-determination, accept the military threat for reasons of opportunism or fear."

Comment: Governor Magalhães Pinto's meeting with other political leaders from outside of his own State is part and parcel of his plan to assume a leading role in shaping the political future of his country. Right now, this role has as its main objective the return of Brazil to a Presidential form of government and the colaboration of his party, the UDN, with the present

0341

Federal deputy, José Aparecido de Oliveira - former secretary to the Governor before his election to the Government Palace and ex-President Quadros' private secretary - was a favorite of the Governor's and received his active support during the campaign. The Governor's candidate for senator, Oswaldo Pierucetti, has shown considerable electoral strength even though he has apparently lost to the two incumbent candidates.

The probable political make-up of the Minas Gerais delegations in the legislative houses remains predominantly conservative. Some notorious leftists, such as incumbent PR Federal deputy Celso Brant and PTB State deputy Hermâni Maia, seem to have lost. The appearance of new faces is less pronounced in the Chamber than in the State Assembly, where the upsurge of the UDN has dealt an almost mortal blow to the PR and has given the PSD a serious set-back.

In the senatorial contest, one noteworthy occurrence is the remarkable closeness of the vote between the two winners. Senator Valadares, although he is now in first place by a few thousand votes, ran behind Senator Camilo Nogueira da Gama in the election returns until very recently. This narrow margin is now attributed to the fact that Senator Valadares hardly campaigned, being apparently confident that his name and long background of political activity would suffice. He seems to have been right but with little room to spare.

The victory in Belo Horizonte's mayoralty race pointed to the increasing sophistication of this capital's electorate. Nylton Velloso, a wealthy businessman, conducted an electoral campaign in full Madison Avenue style. Despite his effort, he came in second to State deputy Jorge Carone, who ran a quiet campaign, concentrated among the poorer classes in the city's outlying districts. Many voters reacted negatively to Nylton Velloso's ostentatious campaigning which in the last couple of days veered on bad taste.

2. Governors' Meeting in Belo Horizonte

During the weekend of October 27-28, four governors, one senator, and two Federal deputies met with Governor Magalhães Pinto in Belo Horizonte. The occasion was the wedding ceremony of UDN Federal deputy-elect José Aparecido de Oliveira's sister, but at least two important political issues of the moment were discussed: 1) the approaching national plebiscite; and 2) the future National president and committee of the UDN. The political leaders involved were, in addition to Governor Magalhães Pinto, UDN Governors Aloísio Alves of Rio Grande do Norte, Seixas Doria of Sergipe, and Petrônio Portela of Piauí; Christian Democratic Party Governor Ney Braga of Paraná; Senator-elect José Cândido Ferraz and Federal deputy-elect Heitor Cavalcanti, both of the UDN from the State of Piauí; and, of course, UDN Federal deputy-elect from Minas Gerais José Aparecido de Oliveira. The Governors of Sergipe and Piauí were also just elected on October 7 and have not yet therefore taken office.

0340

8 to 16 seats. If this trend is confirmed, the UDN will take second place in the Minas Gerais' delegation to the Chamber. The Social Democratic Party (PSD) will continue to hold first place, as was generally expected (see Consulate's A-19, September 28, 1962), but its relative strength will have been measurably diminished. The Republican Party (PR) will return to the Chamber much weakened. Although the known results do not yet permit giving an exact figure, only four PR candidates seem as of this late date sure of gaining seats in the Chamber. This number compares with the present eight PR deputies.

State Legislative Assembly --82 seats - The UDN seems to have exceeded even the most optimistic expectations by a probable over 100 percent increase of its delegation and by replacing the PSD as the largest party. The Labor Party (PTB) is also expected to come out significantly stronger than it was before. The PR, which was the loser in the Federal Chamber, will in all likelihood be an even bigger loser in the State Assembly. One minor party, Adhemar de Barros' Social Progressive Party (PSP), has shown remarkable strength and may surpass the PR with a total of ten seats as compared with five seats in the present Assembly.

The Senatorial Race - The senatorial race has not shown any surprises. The incumbent senators, PSD Benedito Valadares and PTB Camilo Nogueira da Gama, are considered as good as re-elected even though election returns are still coming in from the interior. There have been an abnormally large number of blank ballots in the senatorial contest, an outcome that is ascribed in part to the voters' unfamiliarity with the single ballot that was instituted for that elective office.

The Mayoralty Election in Belo Horizonte - Final figures show Jorge Carone, incumbent PR State deputy, as the winner in the mayoralty contest by a large margin over the nearest contender, Nylton Velloso. This large margin was the more significant in that it was achieved in the face of an all-out publicity-minded campaign by Velloso.

Comment: All indications point to the prospect that Governor Magalhães Pinto's political prestige will rise sharply as a result of the elections. The virtually assured landslide victory for his party, the UDN, in the State Legislative Assembly will be given as proof of the electorate's support of his Administration and will consequently increase his political influence at the national level. A new and more audible wave of rumors that the Governor wants to be a Presidential candidate in 1965 is one evidence of how the election returns are being interpreted in his favor.

Although the State section of the UDN has not from the Governor's point of view fared as well in the Chamber of Deputies, a number of the probable winners were in the Governor's first Cabinet, and at least one new

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ARMY 5	CIA 10	NAVY 5
OSD 12	USIA 8	NSA 3
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DEPARTMENT OF STATE

AIRGRAM

732-00/11-262
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HANDLING INDICATOR

TO : DEPARTMENT OF STATE 1962 NOV 13 AM 7 18

RM/AR
ANALYSIS & DISTRIBUTION
BRANCH

FROM : AMCONSULATE, Belo Horizonte

SUBJECT : POLITICAL SUMMARY FOR OCTOBER, 1962 - STATE OF MINAS GERAIS

REF : -

DATE: DEPARTMENT OF STATE NOV 12 1962
BUREAU OF
INTER-AMERICAN AFFAIRS
NOV 13 1962

RM/R-Hall
11/21-KB

Table of Contents

1. A Preliminary Account of the Elections
2. Governors' Meeting in Belo Horizonte
3. Reactions to U.S. Action on Cuba

- - - -

1. A Preliminary Account of the Elections

The October elections for Federal and State deputies and municipal offices took place in an atmosphere of tranquility. The mood of the voters in Belo Horizonte was one of festivity, and virtually no untoward incidents were reported from the interior. Abstentions from the polls apparently ran under 15 percent. Final and official figures are expected to be published in ten to fifteen days, when the Consulate will prepare its round-up on the elections. Certain facts and probable results, however, can already be gathered from the unofficial partial elections returns.

Chamber of Deputies --48 seats - The results so far indicate a great victory for the State Administration Party, the National Democratic Union (UDN), with a probable increase of 100 percent - from

Couns.Cons.Affrs./Rio
Pol Section "
Embassy/Brasilia

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4-62

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Drafted by: EAdaSilveira :kfk 11/2/1962
Contents and Classification Approved by:
Clearances:

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A-503 Rio

CONFIDENTIAL

- 3 -

Magalhães Pinto then turned to the domestic financial scene, which he said was of the most critical importance and in a very dangerous condition. He blamed Kubitschek for starting Brazil on the road to its present high rate of inflation. (In addition to his really believing this, as he should, I noted that he evidently intended to use it as a campaign theme in his effort to displace Kubitschek as the leading Minas Gerais candidate for the Presidency in 1965.) He said that they had had some discussion of these problems with Goulart at lunch, and he believed that Goulart was getting prepared to face them seriously, even at the cost of some unpopular measures. I emphasized the importance of doing so quickly, rather than waiting for the plebiscite, especially in view of the constitutional deadline on tax changes. Magalhães Pinto went on to indicate his keen awareness of the desperate balance of payments situation facing the country for the rest of this year, and for next year, and the obvious need for large-scale American assistance. I told him something of the history of the frustrated efforts at stabilization assistance, and mentioned the important role of the IMF as a source of funds and as a key to the use of European funds. This led to some discussion of whether Goulart was likely to recompose the Cabinet in the near future, Magalhães Pinto expressing the view that Finance Minister Miguel Calmon was honest and capable, but lacking the political stature to get his viewpoints effectively adopted.

I remarked with some irony that the morning newspapers had carried reports of Brizola seeking a high administrative post. Magalhães Pinto said that he probably was seeking one, but thought it most unlikely that he would succeed.

Finally, I asked Magalhães Pinto his view of Arrais. He replied that he regarded Arrais personally well, and not a Communist, although unfortunately surrounded by Communists during recent years. Magalhães Pinto also expressed doubts as to the effectiveness of Celso Furtado in his new national planning job, on the grounds that what would emerge would be an intellectually highly respectable conceptual scheme, but not a truly operational plan which could or would be converted into reality.

Lincoln Gordon

Lincoln Gordon

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- 2 -

In this connection, Magalhães Pinto stressed that he thought Goulart would have trouble with the new Congress, and that to keep him on a sound track it was essential that he have organized support from a moderate group. The theme of this group would be "authentic Brazilian nationalism" as contrasted with the spurious nationalism which is really anti-American and pro-Soviet Union. The outcome of the Cuban crisis would be a tremendous help in this effort, since it both weakened the prestige of the Soviet Union and destroyed the widely held myth that Cuba was trying to pursue an indigenous revolution and should be protected in so doing by the doctrines of self-determination and nonintervention. So far at least, Khrushchev's arrogant treatment of his Cuban allies in the last few days has had very healthy repercussions in Brazilian opinion in all circles.

Magalhães Pinto then described a luncheon meeting earlier that day including Goulart and eight Governors or Governors-elect, namely: Aluisio Alves (Rio Grande do Norte); Pedro Gondim (Paraíba); Ney Braga (Paraná); Seixas Doria (elected for Sergipe); Virgilio Tavora (elected for Ceará); Petronio Portela (elected for Piauí); and Badger Silveira (elected for Rio de Janeiro); and himself. Magalhães Pinto indicated that he felt that this was the core of his "authentically nationalist" group, and also hoped to win the support of Meneghetti in Rio Grande do Sul and Celso Ramos in Santa Catarina. He thought that Mauro Borges in Goias was also a possible recruit.

Number of these UDN (Alves, Doria, Portela) — UDN will be electing new party president

Of the entire group, he expressed special concern about Seixas Doria as being a man "badly infected with far left wing ideas, but recoverable." He felt that it would be highly desirable to arrange visits to the United States for both Doria and Petronio Portela, if possible before they take office in February. He recommended that I meet both of them during the next few days while they are in Rio. After discussion with the staff, I have concluded that I should at least meet and talk with them at this point, and am now trying to make arrangements to do so.

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R J Benton

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

AIRGRAM

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1962 NOV 9 AM 8 39

KAF 611.3722
HANDLING INDICATOR

TO : DEPARTMENT OF STATE

RM/AM
ANALYSIS & DISTRIBUTION
BRANCH

FROM : Amembassy, RIO DE JANEIRO

DATE: NOVEMBER 1, 1962

SUBJECT : Conversation with Governor Magalhães Pinto

REF :

At his request, Governor Magalhães Pinto of Minas Gerais called on me Tuesday evening October 30, accompanied by José Luis de Magalhães Lins, an associate of the Governor in his banking enterprises.

As the Department knows, Magalhães Pinto was one of the key figures in working out the compromise between the President and the Congress on the plebiscite for the return to presidentialism and considers himself a candidate for the Presidency in 1965. He has been something of a maverick in the UDN, and is now actively engaged in building up a somewhat left wing UDN group, prepared to collaborate with President Goulart, and opposing the hitherto dominant elements in his party who prefer outright and uncompromising opposition to President Goulart and to the entire tradition of Getúlio Vargas. The political maneuvering is complex, since within the UDN it implies opposition to the present official party leader, Herbert Levy, and also opposition to Governor Lacerda of Guanabara; on the general national plane it involves the building of forces to support Magalhães Pinto in 1965 against the strenuous efforts of his fellow Mineiro, ex-President Kubitschek, to develop support for himself; and on the shorter run national political scene, it involves an effort to gather together a group of Governors to support the new Magalhães Pinto line, an effort contrasting with one being led by Adhemar de Barros (possibly with the cooperation of Lacerda) to organize some of the same Governors but in a posture rather more hostile to President Goulart.

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FORM DS-323
4-62

Drafted by: LGordon:mls

Contents and Classification Approved by:

Clearances:

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Diario de Pernambuco took the Brasilian government to task in an editorial for "Political Hermaphroditism". This was based on Hermes Lima's pronouncement that Brasil would defend "in Cuba or in any country" the right to determine its own political life while the Brasilian UN ambassador, ILMAR MARINHO, voted to support the U.S. action with respect to Cuba. Diario interviewed the Consul General on the matter, an interview which was accurately and sympathetically reported, and which provoked a favorable public response. Another statement by the Consul General was read by the Reporter Hoje and later reproduced in the "Jornal de Commercio."

Diario da Noite, which is owned and operated by the owner of Jornal do Commercio, presented several columnists views. LUIS CISNEIROS forthrightly defended the U.S. action and stated, "I uphold and applaud the means adopted by President Kennedy which is taking care of us also." SOCRATES TIMES DE CARVALHO compared Russia's action in Hungary with their righteous protestations of "persecutions" of Cuba. ALEXANDRINO ROCHA, press assistant to Governor-elect Miguel Arraes, in a subtle approach lacking any vituperation advanced the view that President Kennedy was strengthening his party's political fortunes by his Cuban action and by his involvement in the situation in Oxford, Mississippi.

Francisco Julião disseminated scatter-sheets entitled "From Julião to the People" with typical Communist slogans. "Death to Imperialism! Out with Kennedy! Long live the glorious socialist Cuba!"

Anti-Americanism, while obviously present, has not mustered any clamorous energy in numbers. (UNCLASSIFIED)

Eugene Delgado-Arias

Dr. Eugene Delgado-Arias
American Consul General

Contributors:
LCKilday
CTucker

JRL

0334

PPD: ADELMAR DA COSTA CARVALHO, ALDE SAMBAIO, ARRUDA CAMARA, AUGUSTO NOVAIS, ETHELVINO LINS, JOSE CARLOS GUERRA, JOSE DA COSTA CAVALCANTI, JOSE MEIRA, MURILO COSTA REGO, NILO COELHO.

PTB: ARTUR LIMA CAVALCANTI, CLODOMIR LEITE, ESTACIO SOUTO MAIRO, LAMARTINE TAVORA, MILVERNES CRUZ LIMA, OSWALDO LIMA FILHO.

PSB-PST: WALDEMAR LUIZ ALVES, PELOPIDAS SILVEIRA (Francisco JULIÃO, who started off strong, has now slipped into third place and his election is again questionable.)

Results from elections in other states in the district are still uncomplete or as reported in Weekly Summary No. 16, except in Fortaleza where Col. MURILO BORGES is apparently the new Mayor-elect.

3. Police Break Up Francisco Juliao's Protest Rally

State police broke up an October 24 rally staged in Recife's central plaza by State Deputy Francisco Juliao for the purpose of protesting the U.S. naval blockade of Cuba. Although attended by only a handful of partisans and curious spectators, in spite of a day-long loudspeaker truck advertising campaign, the rally was judged to be "agitation" when Juliao, addressing the audience, started to vilify Governor Cid Sampaio. The incident took on comic aspects when Juliao ducked into a nearby church to escape arrest, wetted down his hair with holy water and turned up his collar to disguise himself, exited through another door, and fled down a side street. (OFFICIAL USE ONLY)

4. Miguel Arraes Leaves Mayor's Office

On Tuesday, October 30, Governor-elect Miguel Arraes turned over the office of Mayor of Recife to Vice Mayor ARTUR LIMA CAVALCANTI. According to the press, Arraes was to leave Recife on October 31 on a trip to Rio de Janeiro and Sao Paulo and was not expected to resume again the duties of Mayor. (UNCLASSIFIED)

Comment: What the press did not report is the widespread rumor that Arraes is bound for Europe also, where he will visit, among other countries, Germany and Czecholslovakia. (LIMITED OFFICIAL USE)

PSYCHOLOGICAL

Editorial reaction to the blockade of Cuba ranged from strong support to detached analysis to open denunciation (A Hora) but was generally sympathetic to the American position. The biggest surprise came from leftist-nationalist Ultima Hora which not only avoided editorial comment but gave unexpected fair treatment to the United States in its news columns.

0333

even stopped on the street by total strangers who merely wanted to shake the hand of an American. Of particular significance is the fact that almost all messages received expressed the belief that the United States in establishing the blockade was acting not in its own interests so much as in defense of the Western Hemisphere and the free world. (UNCLASSIFIED)

The widespread feeling of pride and friendship for the United States was matched only by the general disgust and revulsion for President GOULART and Prime Minister HERMES LIMA for their equivocal position on the blockade and their failure to stand fast at the shoulder of the United States in this moment of crisis. While Goulart and Hermes Lima were roundly condemned for playing a two faced game of domestic politics at a time much too serious for business as normal, there was a general feeling that in the event of war Brazil would locate itself squarely on the side of the United States (CONFIDENTIAL)

2. Election Results

The Regional Electoral Tribunal finally ended its counting of the vote in the contest for Governor of Pernambuco. The official count will not be released for some weeks yet, but the unofficial results are: Arraes, 264,319; Cleofas, 249,348; Monteiro, 45,080. Thus, Arraes finished with a margin of almost 15,000 votes, proving most pre-election predictions wrong by over 25,000 votes.

The Tribunal continues its slow counting of the votes cast for federal and state deputies and by now few expect the final results to be available before the middle of November. On the basis of present indications, however, it appears that Arraes' State Assembly will have from thirty-one to thirty-three members of the Frente Popular Democratica (UDN-PSD), twelve to thirteen members of the PST, eight to nine from the PDC, four to five from the PR, four to five from the PRP, and one or two each from the PSB, PTN, and PTB. Governor SAMPAIO is confident that the Arraes opposition in the Assembly will have greater numerical strength than Arraes' support, but Sampaio probably does not expect any of those now against Arraes to trade their loyalty for a helping of the patronage cake Arraes will be dispensing.

In the contest to represent Pernambuco in the Federal Chamber of Deputies, the Frente Popular Democratica (PSD-UDN) is expected to win fourteen to fifteen seats, while the PTB should take seven or eight and the PSB-PST coalition two or possibly three. Said to be assured of election already are the following:

0332

ORIGIN/ACTION

ARA 4 20

RM/R	REG	AF
1		
ARA	EUR	FE
NEA	CU	INR 5
E	P	ID
L	FSO	AID 12
AGR	COM	FRB
INT	LAB	TAR
TR	SMB	AID 4
ARMY 5	CIA 15	NAVY 5
OSD 12	USIA 8	NSA 3
NSC 21	RM/R-E 1	

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PORTO ALEGRE
CURITIBA
BELO HORIZONTE

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

AIRGRAM

732.00/11-162

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A-43 NO. | CONFIDENTIAL | HANDLING INDICATOR

1962 NOV 9 AM 8 39

TO : DEPARTMENT OF STATE

INFO: RIO DE JANEIRO, BRASILIA, SAO PAULO

RM/AN ANALYSIS & DISTRIBUTION BRANCH

Belem-1 Curitiba-1
Porto Alegre-1 Belo Horizonte-1

RM/R - Hew
11/20 - KB

FROM : Amconsul RECIFE

DATE: November 1, 1962

SUBJECT: Weekly Summary No. 18

REF :

DEPARTMENT OF STATE
BUREAU OF
INTER-AMERICAN AFFAIRS
NOV 9 1962

TABLE OF CONTENTS

POLITICAL

1. Local Reaction to Blockade of Cuba
2. Election Results
3. Police Break Up Francisco Julião's Protest Rally
4. Miguel Arraes Leaves Mayor's Office

PSYCHOLOGICAL

POLITICAL

1. Local Reaction to Blockade of Cuba

The local reaction to the American blockade of Cuba was a loud uproar—strongly in favor of the United States. True, there were a few attempts to whip up public sympathy for Cuba's "right of self determination" (see Item 3) but they were largely unsuccessful in comparison with the spontaneous wave of pro-American emotion that swept over the city.

Telegrams, and letters from around the consular district started to arrive the morning after President KENNEDY's speech, and were followed by personal calls on the Consul General of individuals and groups who desired to express solidarity with President Kennedy and the United States. Other Americans were widely congratulated and some were

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Drafted by: See last page/ag

Contents and Classification Approved by:

Clearances:

0331

interview was his reply to a question concerning his education policy, in which he promised to expand the activities of the Communist-front Movimento de Cultura Popular over the entire state. Finally, his answer to a question concerning the visit of President KENNEDY was correct but decidedly cool.

From the point of view of immediate United States interests, the interview is most important for what Arraes had to say on the subject of the Alliance for Progress and Pernambuco's future participation in the Alliance. Declaring the SAMPAIO administration housing project, one in which USAID and the IBD are cooperating, to be "totally wrong and demagogic," Arraes stated that his government would deal with the Alliance only through SUDENE and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. Pernambuco's outstanding Alliance agreements, he said, would be reviewed by SUDENE and either terminated or maintained in accordance with the best interests of the country. Arraes based his insistence that future Alliance undertakings be through SUDENE or the Itamarati on his alleged understanding that state governments are constitutionally incompetent of dealing with foreign powers.

/s/ Eugene Delgado-Arias
American Consul General

ORIGIN/ACTION

ARA-4		
RM/R 1	REP 1	AP
ARA	EUR	FE
NEA	CU	INR 5
E 4	P	IO
L	PSO	AID 12
	ICA 3	
AGR 10	COM 10	FRB 2
INT 7	LAB 6	TAR
TR 2	XMB 4	AIR 4
ARMY 5	CIA 10	NAVY 5
OSD 12	USIA 8	NSA 3

AmAE-1

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

AIRGRAM

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1962 NOV 9 AM 8 39

RECORDS ANALYSIS & DISTRIBUTION BRANCH

TO : DEPARTMENT OF STATE

INFO: RIO DE JANEIRO, BRASILIA

FROM : Amconsul RECIFE DATE: November 1, 1962

SUBJECT : In First Post-Election Press Interview Governor-elect Miguel Arraes Says Pernambuco Will Not Deal With Alliance for Progress.

REF :

Governor-elect MIGUEL ARRAES held his first post-election meeting with the press on Saturday, October 27. The interview covered a variety of subjects, ranging from public housing in Recife to the forthcoming plebiscite to the blockade of Cuba, and was well attended by local journalists, journalists from other states in Brazil, and even several foreign television and newspaper reporters.

Those who had expected Arraes to utilize this initial meeting with the press to make a conciliatory approach to the forces that opposed his election and fear his rule were proven mistaken. A vague and platitudinous prepared statement issued at the beginning of the conference contained little that would further antagonize his opponents, but in his extemporaneous replies to questions Arraes betrayed a line of thought which is certainly extreme leftist-nationalist and on several issues closely parallels the Communist position. On foreign investment, for example, Arraes promised to greet with open arms those foreign concerns "that come to form part of the region's economy without the remittance of profits abroad." On the organization of rural workers, he gave equal weight to the rural syndicates sponsored by the Church and the "traditional Ligas Camponesas." On the solution of agrarian problems, Arraes called for the elimination of the middleman, implying that this function would be assumed by the State. Possibly the most significant portion of the

Enclosure: Selected Excerpts of Governor-elect Arraes Press Conference of October 27, 1962.

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all decrying the fact but in various words laying much of the blame on India's unrealistic foreign policy, on "neutralism", and the unworkable theory of "non-alignment."

Daniel M. Braddock
Minister Consul General

Contributors:
DCProper
JAMason

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0327

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Quadros' entry into the PTN began to look a little doubtful later in the week when party leader Emilio CARLOS came out in favor of the Cuban arms quarantine. When asked, the PTN chief said that Quadros would be received into party ranks with enthusiasm if he wanted to join, but that he would have to accept the centrist orientation of the PTN. (OFFICIAL USE ONLY)

Comment: Quadros preached no ideas and had nothing resembling a "message" in the recent campaign. His line was a masterpiece of evasive oratory. His evidently sincere conviction that he really had something to say strengthens the Consulate General's belief that he has become more messianic and unbalanced than ever. Moreover, his line of thinking now is probably located much further to the left than ever in the past. These facts, together with his remarkable political talent, keep him an extraordinarily dangerous figure despite his defeat for the governorship.

Janio has never yet been willing to be a "soldier" for anyone but Janio, so his intentions to join the PTN cannot be believed until they are carried out. (LIMITED OFFICIAL USE)

PSYCHOLOGICAL

1. Local Press Reaction

Events in regard to Cuba dominated the headlines and received heavy editorial play this week. Local papers were strongly behind the U.S. position with two prominent predictable exceptions, left-lining ULTIMA HORA and Goulart-backed CORREIO PAULISTANO. Newspapers editorials and impressions gleaned directly from the Paulista public lead USIS São Paulo to the judgment that the strong action taken by the United States in the past week has solidified São Paulo thinking behind the U.S., against Castro and the Russian incursions into this hemisphere (see also item 1). Criticism of the Brazilian government's position on Cuba/U.S./Russia within and outside the press are numerous and strong.

Several papers, including Goulart-backed CORREIO PAULISTANO, spoke benignly of the Alliance for Progress' modest but real achievements so far. CORREIO PAULISTANO appraised Ambassador Gordon's recent Rio speech on the subject. Prestigious O ESTADO DE SAO PAULO allowed that the Alliance has been hindered by its would-be beneficiaries, including Brazil.

A number of local papers noted Communist China's attack on India - -

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3. State Assembly Elections Show Gain for Confusion

Each of eight parties will have from 7 to 11 per cent of the São Paulo State Deputies elected October 7; none will have more than 11 per cent. No single party, thus, will have even a significant minority of the seats in the State Legislative Assembly. The "small" parties will have as many as the "strong" ones, the PR actually leading the list with 13 seats. Governor-elect Adhemar de Barros' PSP, paradoxically, will have almost as much leverage in the Federal Chamber as in the State Assembly. 59 of the 91 incumbent State Deputies were re-elected, forming about half of the new 115-seat Assembly, but the failure of many others was surprising. Vice Governor Porphýrio da PAZ and almost fifty other big names were defeated. Most of the successful new candidates were small town Mayors or City Council members. They obviously had more grass roots connections than the Federal Deputy candidates: an alarming 25 per cent of the voters cast blank ballots for the Federal Chamber as against 17 per cent for the State Assembly. It is not yet possible to be sure of ideological trends in the State Assembly elections; many of those elected are in the spotlight for the first time and have not made their orientation clear. The general trends in the Federal Chamber race are apparently reflected on a smaller scale in the State Deputies. (OFFICIAL USE ONLY)

Comment: The victor in the São Paulo Assembly race was confusion. Parties now mean almost nothing at the State level. One hopes the politicians will get the moral: electoral reforms to supplement the new single ballot are urgently necessary. (OFFICIAL USE ONLY)

4. Janio to Join PTN?

"I'll be a courageous soldier of the PTN," said Janio QUADROS on October 22. I shall preach our ideas from the extreme north to the extreme south, for I have bases in both extremes." He considered his near miss for the governorship not a defeat but a "splendid victory," because for the first time he "had a message" and "preached ideas." An example of the "ideas": Brazil's "independent" foreign policy, which thanks to him was "no longer the property of half a dozen privilliged persons, but a topic for discussion by the popular masses." His goal was to turn Brazil into "what Getulio [VARGAS] had his heart set on." His method: "Either we appropriate certain socialist ideas and adapt them to our principles of Christian society or we shall soon be speaking by ourselves without the people understanding us." For the time being, however, Janio believed that he was a little ahead of the people: "God . . . found that we were not yet prepared to present the message which would make possible the implanting of true democracy among us. He submitted us to this defeat." (Sources of quotes: a composite of newspaper reports on Quadros' off-the-cuff speech.)

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General received a few protest wires, but all were from unions known to be under heavy Communist influence. The Democratic Labor Movement supported the arms quarantine. Two or three attempts to organize demonstrations in a downtown area were quickly broken up by the police, but even so public opposition to the demonstrators manifested itself in one case. Most newspapers openly approved of the arms quarantine; the GOULART and QUADROS mouthpieces were more or less neutral; leftist/nationalist Ultima Hora was editorially neutral but slanted its news toward Cuba (item5). If any resentment was aroused in the inarticulate sectors of the public -- always a possibility -- it has not made itself known. (OFFICIAL USE ONLY)

2. Federal Chamber Elections Show Gains for Center and Moderate Left.

With the vote count all but final, the PSP, PDC, and PTB have each elected 9 São Paulo Federal Deputies; the PSD 8; the UDN and PTN 7; the PRT 3; the MTR, PR, and PST 2 each; the PRP 1; and the PSB none. (The PL was under intervention by its national party directorate and could not present a slate.) The São Paulo representation in the Federal Chamber will thus be divided almost evenly between six leading parties, with five smaller ones picking up the crumbs. These five smalls all improved their positions, but the significant gains went to the PDC, PTB, and UDN, in that order. Most new UDN Deputies are again centrists and most from the PDC moderate leftists or centrists. The PTB elected Deputies ranging all the way from outright Communists to conservatives, but most of its unexpected increase in votes apparently went to moderate leftists (some of the Deputies-elect are new political figures and cannot be assessed). The PTB was the only one of thirteen São Paulo parties to win more seats than expected; the PSD was the only one to prove significantly weaker. The new single ballot undoubtedly contributed to these results, intensifying the trend toward the center and away from the right and the extreme left. Deputies objectionable as individuals frequently lost vote strength. Ideologically, the biggest loser was the extreme left: the PSB failed to elect a single Deputy (as against 4 in 1958), and the Communists got only 2 (as against 3 in the smaller 1958 Chamber). Considered jointly, the conservative and rightist parties -- PSD, PSP, PRP -- also lost strength in spite of Adhemar de Barros' gubernatorial victory. (OFFICIAL USE ONLY)

Comment: The trend was healthy, though one would have preferred not to see the PTB profit from it. The PTB gain was by no means a Goulart victory, however. Goulart's campaign manager ran and lost on a PR ticket. (An airgram analysing the election in greater detail has been submitted.) (LIMITED OFFICIAL USE)

0324

INFO	ACTION
	ARA-4
RM/R 1	REP
ARA	EUR
NEA	CU
E	P
L	FBO
AGR	COM
INT	LAB
TR	XMB
ARMY 5	CIA 15
OSD 12	USIA 8
NSC 2	

RM/R-E-1

AF
FE
INR 5
IO
AID 12
FRB
TAR
AIR 4
NAVY 5
NSA 3

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AIRGRAM

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TO : DEPARTMENT OF STATE 1962 NOV 13 AM 11 14

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FROM : AmConGen SAO PAULO DATE: October 31, 1962

SUBJECT: Weekly Summary No. 44

REF :

RM/R-Gfee
11/15-KB

TABLE OF CONTENTS

POLITICAL
1. São Paulo Reacts Well to Arms Quarantine
2. Federal Chamber Elections Show Gains for Center and Moderate Left
3. State Assembly Elections Show Gain for Confusion
4. Janio to Join PTN?

PSYCHOLOGICAL
1. Local Press Reaction

POLITICAL

1. São Paulo Reacts Well to Arms Quarantine

When the Cuban arms quarantine was announced, Governor-elect Adhemar de BARROS canceled his trip to Rome; pronounced himself strongly in favor of the American action; found the official Brazilian position "contradictory"; called for unequivocal support of the quarantine; and visited President GOULART to urge his point of view. Governor CARVALHO PINTO seldom discusses national -- let alone international -- issues, but he finally came out firmly in favor of the quarantine on October 25. Leading São Paulo Brazilian and American businessmen and other members of the conservative classes made a point of expressing similar views. Opinions from State Deputies and members of the City Council ran heavily in favor of the U.S. action. The Consulate

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0323

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Comparative party strength in the 1962 and 1958 elections are as follows:

PARTY	State Deputies Elected in 1958	Percent of Bench	State Deputies Elected in 1962	Percent of Bench	Percent Change
PR	7	7.6%	13	11.3%	↑ 3.7%
PSP	16	17.4%	12	10.4%	- 7.0%
PDC	11	11.9%	12	10.4%	- 1.5%
PTB	6	6.5%	12	10.4%	↑ 3.9%
MTR[1]	0	0%	12	10.4%	↑10.4%
UDN	9	9.8%	11	9.6%	- .2%
PST	6	6.5%	10	8.7%	↑ 2.2%
PRT	6	6.5%	9	7.8%	↑ 1.3%
PSD	7	7.6%	8	7.0%	- .6%
PTN	11	11.9%	8	7.0%	- 4.9%
PRP	5	5.4%	6	5.2%	- .2%
PSB	6	6.5%	2	1.7%	- 4.8%
PL[2]	2	2.2%	0	0%	- 2.2%
	92		115		

1/ not in existence
2/ The São Paulo PL was under intervention by the national party directorate and could not present candidates.

Daniel M. Braddock
Minister Consul General

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0322

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Partido de Representação Popular -- PRP -- Popular Representation Party

6 Deputies (elected 5 in 1958)

	Name	Votes October, 1962
1.	Shiro Kiono	11.685
x 2.	Carlos Kerlakian	11.203
x 3.	Onofre Sebastião Gonsuen	7.583
4.	Orlando Iazzetti	7.435
5.	Nabi Abi Chedid	6.883
6.	José da Siveira Sampaio	6.826
x	1st Suplente: Wilson Nogueira Lapa	6.624

Partido Socialista Brasileiro -- PSB -- Brazilian Socialist Party

2 Deputies (elected 6 in 1958)

x 1.	Cid Franco	15.485
2.	José Rocha Mendes	6.132
	1st Suplente: Raul Schwinden	3.327

Partido Libertador -- PL -- Liberation Party

0 Deputies (elected 2 in 1958)

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0321

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Partido Social Democrático --PSD-- Social Democratic Party
8 Deputies (elected 7 in 1958)

	Name	Votes October, 1962
x 1.	Conceição da Costa Neves	32.077
2.	Pinheiro Júnior	15.743
x 3.	Alfredo Farhat	14.634
x 4.	Juvenal Rodrigues de Moraes	9.296
x 5.	João Hornos Filho	8.740
x 6.	Ioshifumi Utiyama	7.634
7.	Domingos José Aldrovandi	7.370
8.	Cruz Secco	7.160

1st Suplente: Goes to coalition partner PSP

Partido Trabalhista Nacional -- PTN -- National Labor Party
8 Deputies (elected 11 in 1958)

x 1.	José Adolpho Chaves de Amarante	28.022
x 2.	Araripe Serpa	15.192
3.	Oswaldo Massei	12.251
x 4.	Ruy de Almeida Barbosa	10.587
x 5.	Francisco Iscalamandré Sobrinho	10.386
6.	Francisco Amaral	7.773
7.	Vinicio Camilo Giaquini	7.365
8.	Jamil Gadia	6.483

1st Suplente: Goes to coalition partner MTR

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0320

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Partido Social Trabalhista -- PST -- Social Labor Party
10 Deputies (elected 6 in 1958)

	Name	Votes October, 1962
1.	Pedro Geraldo Costa	16.378
x 2.	João Mendonça Falcão	14.408
3.	Adhemar Monteiro Pacheco	8.810
4.	Oswaldo Rodrigues Martins	8.482
5.	Ubirajara Keutenedjian	8.039
6.	Galileu Bicudo	6.628
7.	Roberto Gebara	6.080
8.	Ariovaldo Rosito	5.451
9.	Jaime Daige	5.141
10.	Hozair M. Marcondes	4.962
	1st Suplente: Aristides Troncoso Peres	4.237

Partido Rural Trabalhista -- PRT -- Rural Labor Party
9 Deputies (elected 6 in 1958)

1.	Januario Mantelli Neto	9.991
x 2.	Pedro Pascoal	9.254
x 3.	Leônidas Ferreira	8.761
4.	Jamil Dualib	7.653
5.	Antonio Morimoto	7.162
6.	Carlos Renê Egg	6.948
7.	Augusto do Amaral	6.801
x 8.	Gustavo Martini	6.430
9.	Gualberto Moreira	6.292
	1st Suplente: José Sabino	6.068

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03 19

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MTR (continued)

6.	José Lurtz Sabiá	8.284
7.	Herotildes Carvalho de Araujo	8.091
8.	Nadir Kenan	7.220
9.	Esmeraldo Soares T. de Campos Filho	7.193
10.	Juvenal de Campos	7.092
11.	Joaquim Gouvêa Franco	6.932
12.	Lucio Casanova Neto	6.303
1st Suplente:	Leonardo Barsieri	5.711

União Democrática Nacional -- UDN -- National Democratic Union
11 Deputies (elected 9 in 1958)

	Name	Votes October, 1962
x 1.	Camilo Ashcar	17.275
2.	Francisco Salgot Castillon	13.912
x 3.	Cesar Arruda Castanho	13.208
x 4.	Israel Dias Novaes	12.559
5.	José Luiz Ce mbranelli	7.976
x 6.	José Costa	7.431
7.	Homero Silva	7.421
x 8.	Mario Telles	7.265
9.	Nelson Perreira	7.175
10.	Paulo de Castro Prado	6.511
11.	Fioravante Iervolino	6.245
1st Suplente:	Nilson Ferreira da Costa	6.153

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Partido Trabalhista Brasileiro -- PTB -- Brazilian Labor Party
12 Deputies (elected 6 in 1958)

	Name	Votes October, 1962
1.	Omair Zomingnani	18.774
2.	Louro Gomes	18.614
3.	Benedito Matarazzo	12.759
4.	Altimar Ribeiro de Lima	10.948
5.	Luciano Lepera (Candidate of the Brazilian Communist Party -- PCB)	10.631
6.	Luiz Tenorio de Lima (PCB candidate)	10.018
x 7.	Osvaldo Gimenez	9.809
x 8.	Mauricio Leite de Moraes	9.046
9.	Mario Schenberg (PCB candidate)	8.610
10.	Oswaldo Lourenço (PCB candidate)	8.396
x11.	Miguel Jorge Nicolau	7.934
x12.	Costabile Romano	7.738
	1st Suplente: Paulo Nadandakare	7.640

Movimento Trabalhista Renovador -- MTR -- Labor Renovation
12 Deputies (not in existence in 1958) Movement

x 1.	Anselmo Farabulini	16.024
2.	João Batista Botelho	11.950
3.	José Rosa da Silva	9.607
4.	Paulo Planet Buarque	9.525
x 5.	Murilo de Souza Reis	8.325

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PSP (continued)

x 4.	Hilário Torloni	12.030
x 5.	Cyro Albuquerque	11.950
x 6.	Orlando Gabriel Zancaner	11.805
x 7.	Waldemar Lopes Ferraz	11.536
8.	Sinval Antunes de Souza	9.356
x 9.	Benedito Realindo Corrêa	9.170
10.	Amaral Gurgel	8.832
11.	Manoel Joaquim Fernandes	7.877
12.	Luiz Signorelli	7.078
1st Suplente:	Gilberto Geraldo Siqueira	6.968

Partido Democrata Cristão -- PDC -- Christian Democratic Party
12 Deputies (elected 11 in 1958)

Name		Votes October, 1962
x 1.	Solon Borges dos Reis	19.078
x 2.	Roberto Cardoso Alves	15.094
x 3.	José Felicio Castellano	13.702
x 4.	Nicola Ávalone	12.170
5.	Chopin Tavares de Lima	11.641
x 6.	Ruy de Mello Junqueira	10.816
x 7.	Domingos Lot Neto	10.783
x 8.	Modesto Guglielmi	10.487
x 9.	Nagib Chaib	9.943
10.	Valerio Giuli	9.912
x11.	Fernando Mauro Pires da Rocha	9.431
x12.	Semi Jorge Resegue	9.421
1st Suplente:	José Santili Sobrinho	9.054

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0316

The following are the new Deputies:

SÃO PAULO ASSEMBLÉIA LEGISLATIVA

x indicates those State Deputies that are incumbents.

Partido Republicano -- PR -- Republican Party
13 Deputies (elected 7 in 1958)

	Name	Votes October, 1962
x 1.	Leôncio Ferraz Júnior	14.310
x 2.	Jacob Salvador Zveibil	13.569
3.	Cássio Ciampolini	12.518
4.	José Francisco Archimedes Landglia	10.705
x 5.	Francisco Franco	10.133
x 6.	Vicente Botta	9.808
x 7.	Angelo Zanini	9.497
8.	Renato Cordeiro	8.324
x 9.	Jacob Pedro Carolo	8.276
10.	Alfredo Ignacio Trindade	8.274
11.	José Sidnei Cunha	7.872
12.	Diogo Nomura	6.944
13.	Oswaldo Santos Ferreira	6.823
1st Suplente:	Odilo Antunes de Siqueira	6.631

Partido Social Progressista -- PSP -- Social Progressive Party
12 Deputies (elected 16 in 1958)

1.	Silvio Fernandes Lopes	21.236
2.	José Blota Júnior	14.093
3.	José Jorge Cury	13.303



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from his home city of Santos and, being one of the few Negro candidates, from the colored vote elsewhere in the State. These were perhaps balanced by the fraction of the disciplined PCB vote which went to Rio Branco Paranhos, another PCB candidate but one with a considerable personal following. Salvador Lossaco, an incumbent Communist, surprisingly missed re-election (the PCB had withdrawn formal support of him, but not until late in the race). Conclusion: the Communists, operating with minor support from another party (the PTB), currently command thirty to fifty thousand votes in São Paulo. (This is consistent with the number of signatures they got in the State for their legality petition.)

Party labels meant less than ever in this campaign. Example: the parties which backed defeated gubernatorial candidate José Bonifacio elected 32 Deputies, whereas winner Adhemar's got 18 and close runner-up QUADROS' a mere 9. Practically every party had members backing at least two gubernatorial candidates.

Trends in the October 7 election of State Deputies were much less noticeable than in the case of Federal Deputies. Parties in fact become so remarkably unimportant at the State level that one can attach little significance to their fluctuations. Biggest winners in the State Legislative Assembly elections were four small parties which do little more than serve as campaign mechanisms for disparate individual candidates: the PR, PST, PRT, and MTR. The MTR win of twelve seats was a victory for Janio Quadros, but it was partially counterbalanced by a PTN loss. The significant PTB gain was probably a result of the same forces at work in the Federal Chamber elections. The sharp PSP loss may well leave Governor-elect Adhemar de Barros in a bad way for legislative support, especially since it was not counterbalanced by PSD or PRP performance. Not very much can be said at this date, however -- informal groupings which form around the new Government or its opposition groups will be more important than parties in the Assembly. The new party structure is such a thoroughly heterogeneous, unworkable mess that there might as well be no parties at all.

The most significant result of the State election is the eviction of many well-known old politicians from the Legislative Assembly. The new ballot, again, was a giant-killer. About fifty candidates who had looked strong were defeated. Many were incumbents.

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The single ballot probably helped the PTB more than any other party, even the PDC. This for two reasons: the more complicated but fair ballot helped urban groups and penalized the less educated, less political-minded rural voters (who cast far more blank ballots than city folks). Second, the ballot favored candidates with small but well-organized support by eliminating a lot of the competition. Because of the many blank votes (and also because of the increase in available seats), it took far less votes to get elected in 1962 than in 1958. An outstanding example of how this worked is that of Helcio Maghenzani, a non-Communist labor leader. The reporting officer had talked to Maghenzani before preparing the predictions reported in A-78 of September 26. Maghenzani's name was nevertheless left off the prediction list; not even the candidate had any confidence of winning. He explained that he could count on all the votes of his union's workers and their families, but that would hardly be enough to win. His reasoning was good, but the single ballot removed one of its premises. It no longer took many votes to get elected; a few thousand faithful were enough.

One thing the PTB strength does not indicate is a GOULART victory. The only candidate Goulart backed openly was Otávio Maria, a thoroughly distasteful figure and leader of the São Paulo Janguista campaign organization. The party used was the PR, probably as a result of Goulart's feud with São Paulo PTB leader Ivette Vargas. The newspaper Correio Paulistano was recently bought out by pro-Goulart interests -- probably by the President himself -- and made into a campaign vehicle for Maria. With a major newspaper doing almost nothing but backing him, it seemed inconceivable that he would fail to be re-elected. He just missed, in one of the happiest results of the election. It has been characteristic of the Goulart crowd to complain of "economic power" while exercising it unscrupulously themselves. The São Paulo lesson is a healthy one. Goulart proved to have minimum São Paulo power (as in the past) and Maria's future looks glum. Ivette Vargas did not do well either, incidentally. Her vote dropped to little more than a third of that in 1958 and moderate Batista Ramos took the lead on the PTB list.

Neither can it be said that the PTB gain indicated much Communist strength. Concentration of the entire Communist effort behind one party naturally helped, but it elected only two official Communist Party Deputies as against three in the smaller 1958 Chamber. Real Communist vote strength is probably about exactly the 35,000 given Geraldo Rodrigues dos Santos. The Brazilian Communist Party (PCB) confined most of its push to him. He presumably also won some independent votes

0313

CONFIDENTIAL

It would be useful to examine changes in the ideological composition of the São Paulo bench by means of the system of biographic/ideological categories which has been used throughout Embassy and Consulate General election reporting. Unfortunately, a few of the new Deputies cannot yet be classified, so this examination must be deferred. Several trends can nevertheless be spotted by looking at changes in party strength and individual Deputies.

All but two parties came within one seat of the pre-election expectations reported in Airgram A-78 of Sept. 26. The two exceptions are the PTB, which turned out stronger than expected, and the PSD, which was much weaker. Attention may therefore be largely confined to these two. End-users are referred to A-78 for explanation of other changes in party strength since 1958. As it happens, the forces which were at work on the PTB and PSD are typical of those which affected nearly all of the other parties on a smaller scale.

More than any other São Paulo party (with closest competition from the PSP), the PSD was loaded with rich and dishonest Federal Deputies who had been involved in smelly scandals. These were generally the ones who had trouble getting re-elected. Some, like João Abdalla, were unfortunately able to squeak by. Others like Carmelo D'Agostino and Antonio Feliciano did not make it. Almost all of the objectionable types dropped heavily in vote strength. The logical explanation is that they were decisively handicapped by inability to distribute their own ballots to voters who did not know better. Voters who did know better voted differently. This in turn explains PSD resistance to the ballot reform. The PSD emerged weaker than the PSP, its coalition partner, whereas both parties had expected exactly the opposite. The PSP's ability to withstand forces similar to those at work on the PSD may be explained by party chief Adhemar de BARROS' gubernatorial victory. In total, the trend went mildly against the conservatives and the extreme right in spite of Adhemar's victory. Chalk one up for the single ballot.

The significant winners were the centrists and moderate leftists: PDC, PTB, and UDN. PDC and UDN increases were expected, and the PTB confirmed the trend (though one might have preferred to see some other party benefit by it). PTB strength came from (a) disciplined votes for two Communist Party candidates; (b) the apparent public reaction in favor of the center and moderate left; (c) the aura of respectability which the party picked up by joining José Bonifacio NOGUEIRA's governorship campaign; and (d) last but not least, the single ballot again.

CONFIDENTIAL

0312

CONFIDENTIAL

The following table compares party strengths in 1958 and 1962:

Party	Federal Deputies Elected in 1958	Percent of Bench	Federal Deputies Elected in 1962	Percent of Bench	Percent Change
PSD	11 Deputies	25.0%	8 Deputies	13.6%	-11.4%
PTN	7	15.9%	7	11.9%	- 4.0%
PSP	6	13.6%	9	15.3%	/ 1.7%
PTB	5	11.4%	9	15.3%	/ 3.9%
PSB	4	9.1%	0	0%	- 9.1%
UDN	4	9.1%	7	11.9%	/ 2.8%
PDC	4	9.1%	9	15.3%	/ 6.2%
PRT	1	2.3%	3	5.1%	/ 2.8%
PR	1	2.3%	2	3.4%	/ 1.1%
PST	1	2.3%	2	3.4%	/ 1.1%
PRP	0	0%	1	1.7%	/ 1.7 %
MTR 1/	0	0%	2	3.4%	/ 3.4 %
	44		59		

1/ Not in existence in 1958

CONFIDENTIAL

0311

CONFIDENTIAL

Partido Social Trabalhista -- PST -- Social Labor Party
2 Deputies (elected 1 in 1958)

Name	Votes October, 1962	Biographic Category
1. Mário Coval Júnior	30.972	
2. Adrião Bernardes	7.205	
1st Suplente: Waldemar Alves da Costa	5.607	

Partido Republicano -- PR -- Republican Party
2 Deputies (elected 1 in 1958)

Name	Votes October, 1962	Biographic Category
1. Milo Cammarosano	13.479	
2. Alceu Barroso de Carvalho	12.010	
1st Suplente: OTÁVIO Rodrigues MARIA	11.927	4

Partido de Representação Popular -- PRP -- Popular Representation Party
1 Deputy (elected none in 1958)

1. PLINIO SALGADO	36.938	7
1st Suplente: Roberto Andraus	7.198	6 or 7

Partido Socialista Brasileiro -- PSB -- Brazilian Socialist Party

None (Elected 4 in 1958)

1st Suplente: José Antonio ROGE FERREIRA	12,646	2 or 1

The above list contains many new names. Only twenty-eight of the forty-four incumbent Federal Deputies were re-elected. Over half of the new bench of fifty-nine are therefore new faces. Biographic information on all but fourteen of them, however, may be found in Airgram A-78 of September 26 or A-33 of August 15.

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Partido Trabalhista Nacional -- PTN -- National Labor Party
7 Deputies (Same number in 1958)

Name	Votes October, 1962	Biographic Category
1. EMILIO CARLOS Kyrillos	153.963	4
2. HARY NORMANTON	24.908	4
3. MAURÍCIO GOULART	17.546	3 or 4
4. HAMILTON PRADO	17.453	5
5. LUIZ FRANCISCO da Silva Carvalho	14.148	3
6. Joaquim Mariano Dias Menezes	11.108	5 (?)
7. Tufy Nassif	9.249	

1st Suplente: Goes to coalition party MTR.

Partido Rural Trabalhista -- PRT -- Rural Labor Party
3 Deputies (elected 1 in 1958)

Name	Votes October, 1962	Biographic Category
1. Ruy Amaral Lemos	39.138	
2. LINO MORGANTI	20.947	6
3. HUGO BORGHI	12.372	4

1st Suplente: Goes to coalition partner UDN

Movimento Trabalhista Renovador -- MTR -- Labor Renovation Movement
2 Deputies (was not in existance in 1958)

Name	Votes October, 1962	Biographic Category
1. Ewaldo de Almeida Pinto	18.126	
2. DERVILE ALLEGRETTI	15.758	4
1st Suplente: Pedro Marão	8.347	

CONFIDENTIAL

0309

CONFIDENTIAL

PSD (continued)

Name	Votes October, 1962	Biographic Category
2. Antonio Sylvio CUNHA BUENO	59.234	6
3. YUKSHIGUE TAMURA	52.580	5
4. Antonio Oswaldo do AMARAL FURLAN	42.193	6
5. ULYSSES Silveira GUIMARAES	34.173	5
6. Levy Gonçalves Tavares	19.698	
7. João PACHECO CHAVES	14.866	6
8. José JOÃO ABDALLA	12.692	6
1st Suplente: ANTONIO Ezequiel FELICIANO da Silva	9.869	6

União Democrática Nacional -- UDN -- National Democratic Union
7 Deputies (elected 4 in 1958)

Name	Votes October, 1962	Biographic Category
1. HERBERT Victor LEVY	41.090	5
2. (PADRE). Antonio de Oliveira GODINHO	34.835	6
3. Ernesto PEREIRA LOPES	24.606	6
4. Francisco Morato de Oliveira	23.792	6 or 5
5. LAURO Monteiro da CRUZ	20.629	5
6. João Sussumu Hirata	14.906	
7. AFRANIO DE OLIVEIRA	12.192	4
1st Suplente: Nicolau TUMA	11.743	5

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PDC (continued)

Name	Votes October, 1962	Biographic Category
6. ATHIÉ JORGE CURY	25.364	5
7. JOSÉ MENCK	17.280	5
8. José HENRIQUE TURNER	16.706	5
9. ANIZ BADRA	14.782	5

1st Suplente: Goes to coalition partner UDN.

Partido Trabalhista Brasileiro -- PTB -- Brazilian Labor Party
9 Deputies (elected 5 in 1958)

Name	Votes October, 1962	Biographic Category
1. João BATISTA RAMOS	43.871	4
2. Geraldo Rodrigues dos Santos (Candidate of the Brazilian Communist Party -- PCB)	34.995	1
3. Candida IVETTE VARGAS Tatsch	27.876	2
4. RIO BRANCO PARANHOS (PCB Candidate)	26.224	1
5. Paulo Jorge Mansur	19.933	
6. Celso Amaral	18.234	
7. José Jorge Resegue	17.183	
8. Helcio Maghenzani	13.728	
9. Rubens Paiva	13.440	

1st Suplente: Goes to coalition partner PSB, which elected no Deputies in its own right.

Partido Social Democrático -- PSD -- Social Democratic Party
8 Deputies (elected 11 in 1958)

Name	Votes October, 1962	Biographic Category
1. Paschoal RANIERI MAZZILLI	66.963	5

0307

CONFIDENTIAL

The following Deputies were elected:

SAO PAULO FEDERAL DEPUTIES

Last names are underlined and preferred "campaign names," when known, put in upper case. The "biographic category" number refers to the ideological characterizations which have been used throughout this election series.

Partido Social Progressista - PSP - Social Progressive Party
9 Deputies (elected 6 in 1958)

Name	Votes October, 1962	Biographic Category
1. Cantidio Nogueira Sampaio	64.820	6
2. Antonio Adib Chammas	32.981	6
3. Antonio Mendes de Barros Filho	27.783	6
4. André BROCA FILHO	26.712	6
5. Arnaldo dos Santos CERDEIRA	24.950	6
6. José de CARVALHO SOBRINHO	20.072	6
7. Rubens FERREIRA MARTINS	19.648	6
8. Geraldo Pereira de Barros	14.851	6
9. Romeo de CAMPOS VERGAL	14.679	2

1st Suplente: Goes to coalition partner PSD.

Partido Democrata Cristão -- PDC --- Christian Democratic Party
9 Deputies (elected 4 in 1958)

Name	Votes October, 1962	Biographic Category
1. André FRANCO MONTORO	62.369	4
2. PAULO DE TARSO Santos	43.689	2
3. PLINIO Soares de Arruda SAMPAIO	41.842	3
4. Teofilo Ribeiro de ANDRADE FILHO	36.629	5
5. FRANCISCO SCARPA	32.450	5

CONFIDENTIAL

0306

votes still uncounted or judicial proceedings.

The São Paulo Regional Electoral Court (Tribunal Regional Eleitoral) has never quite made up its mind just how many persons were registered and entitled to vote on October 7, though this statistic was supposed to be made public before the election. The Court's best estimate of the number of Paulista voters is 3,822,235. This figure does not reflect small losses through voter emigration or invalidated registrations.

3,303,350 persons -- 86.4 per cent of those registered -- voted. Absenteeism was thus more than double the 5.4 per cent who stayed away from the polls in 1958. Most of the difference was undoubtedly a result of voter resistance to the new single official ballot, which required more work than the privately published ballots which candidates for legislative seats formerly distributed at their own expense. Voter absenteeism was still satisfactorily small, however, the increase being a small price to pay for a much fairer new ballot.

Unfortunately, the number of blank and void ballots cast for Deputies reached really disturbing proportions. About 25.3 per cent of all who voted cast blank ballots for Federal Deputy, and another 4.4% were illegible or erroneous and had to be voided. For State Deputy, approximately 17.4% were blank and 3.7% voided. Contrast this with the 5.2 per cent of blank plus voided votes for Governor. The vote counters, incidentally, were as liberal as possible in admitting poorly written ballots.

The fraction of the public which succeeded in voting for Deputies was thus so reduced that some observers at first questioned whether it was representative. Registered voters are a supposedly select and literate group to begin with, representing little more than a quarter of the State's thirteen million-plus residents.

As it turned out, however, the new ballot must be said to have been more rather than less representative. It certainly altered the outcome of the election, but evidently in the direction that the people wanted. The voters had a better chance to pick the candidate they wanted than ever before. Whether they used it wisely is another question and one that will be examined later in this report.

After this experience, it seems very unlikely that the Brazilian Congress will succeed in repealing the new ballot. One hopes on the contrary that the Deputies will succumb to pressure for urgent complementary electoral reforms. In the giant electoral district of São Paulo, the most pressing of these is the need for breakdown of the State into electoral districts. It would also be helpful to hold the elections during Congressional recess and to discourage party fractionalization through various practical regulations which have been proposed.

0305

ORIGIN/ACTION

ARA-4

RM/R	REP	AF
1		
ARA	EUR	PE
NEA	CU	INR 5
E	P	IO
L	FBO	AID 12
AGR	COM	FRB
INT	LAB	TAR
TR	XMB	AIR 4
ARMY 5	CIA 10	NAVY 5
OSD 12	USIA 8	NSA 3

Rm/R-E-1

File no action
RAATES/B of Jan 2/9/63

20

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

AIRGRAM

732.00/10-3162

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A-118 (NO.) CONFIDENTIAL PRIORITY (HANDLING INDICATOR)

ANALYSIS & DISTRIBUTION BRANCH

62 NOV 13 AM 11 13

TO : DEPARTMENT OF STATE

FROM : AmConGen SAO PAULO DATE: October 31, 1962

SUBJECT : Brazilian Elections 1962: São Paulo Federal and State Deputies

REF : A-78 - Sept. 26
A-33 - Aug. 15

Summary: In the October 7 elections for São Paulo Federal Deputies, candidates of the center and moderate left emerged the big victors. The right and the extreme left lost. There is no doubt that the new single official ballot contributed to this trend and to the defeat of many well-known individual candidates. Parties which were the big winners are -- in this order -- the PDC, PTB, and UDN. The big loser was the PSD. The basic ideological trend was generally encouraging. Less encouraging was the increasing fractionalization of party structure: The new São Paulo bench in the Federal Chamber will be divided almost equally between six strong parties. In the State Legislative Assembly, this fractionalization was even more accentuated. The significance of a State Deputy's party affiliation was reduced to almost nothing. Until there has been a chance to watch the many new State Deputies at work, it will not be clear whether trends in the Federal Chamber election were repeated at the State level.

The São Paulo vote count for the October 7 elections was almost complete when this report was drafted on October 25. The final vote totals will show some changes, but it is not likely that they will be significant. The successful candidates will almost surely be those given in this report. In only one or two cases might the last listed winning candidates switch places with the first substitutes (suplentes) as a result of

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Drafted by: D.C.Proper:el

Contents and Classification Approved by:

Clearances:

0304

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5
AIRGRAM A-20
PÔRTO ALEGRE

Following 5 months of prohibition from supplying the Brazilian domestic market with rice, the COFAP and COAP this week restored that right to private merchants on the same basis as that presently enjoyed by IRGA (RGS Rice Institute) and the rice cooperatives. The Consulate understands that rice merchants are not completely satisfied with this solution but believe that their major problem, the possibility of seizure of rice stocks by the government, has been overcome.

On November 1, trolley fares in Pôrto Alegre will be raised by 2 cruzeiros to 9, and bus fares are to increase 36 percent.

On October 24, the Cuban situation notwithstanding, local civic groups celebrated United Nations Day in Pôrto Alegre.

Frederick D. Sharp III
American Consul

cc.: Consular Affairs, Rio
Political Section, Rio
Political Section, Brasília
ARA/EST/Brazil, Washington
INR/RAR/P, Washington

Department: pass to all posts in Brazil.

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0303

situation, and the absence of Brizola throughout the period in Rio. Moreover, since Governor-elect Meneghetti is absent from Pôrto Alegre and has not as yet been officially proclaimed, most political maneuvering is at a standstill. The Tribunal Regional Eleitoral (TRE) announces that the official results of the election will be disclosed during the next 48 hours and the official proclamation of successful candidates is scheduled for November 15.

Apparently-defeated PTB Federal Deputy candidate Floriano Maya D'Avila, believed to be a Communist sympathizer, has been studying the possibility of requesting a recounting of the gubernatorial voting believing that Michaelsen might yet have a chance. However, the ADP is confident that such a request will not be made.

Commie-lining Nonoai Mayor Jair Calixto, Brizola's bullyboy cousin, who was imprisoned shortly before the elections, has obtained his release on a writ of habeas corpus from the Superior Tribunal Federal. According to the provisions of the electoral law, he could still request that the elections for State Deputy, for which he was a candidate, be cancelled, but this is thought to be improbable.

Reelected PTB Federal Deputy Temperani Pereira, according to Última Hora, has stated that Brizola's Commie advisor, Franklin de Oliveira, author of "Revolução e Contra Revolução no Brazil" is to become an advisor to the Frente Parlamentar Nacional in the Chamber of Deputies. The press also states that Brizola's Commie press chief, Hamilton Chaves, will become a member of Jango's immediate staff in February.

In a third setback to his "agrarian reform" program, the RGS State Tribunal, by a 20 to 2 vote, reversed Brizola's expropriation at Itaquí of last May.

The open split between Juscelino and Leonel Brizola should be a blow to Jango (and his attempt for a PSD-PTB alliance), with particular impact on his campaign to return to presidentialism via the January 6 plebiscite route. What makes the JK/LB split seem irreparable was Juscelino's public statement that Brizola is "over his head" in the national political scene, and is an avid seeker for publicity-with more such statements anticipated for the near future.

3. Miscellany

The new III Army Chief of Staff, General Genaro Bontempo, arrived this week and took over his functions. III Army Commander, General Jair Dantas Ribeiro, presently on 45 days leave in Rio has turned over command temporarily to General José Teófilo de Arruda, Commander of 5th Military Region and 5th Infantry Division at Curitiba. According to good sources General Arruda is completely unsympathetic to the Osvino/Jair school of politico-military maneuverings.

0302

of the U.S. stand on Cuba and Russian bases there, and have attacked Governor Brizola's statements from Rio. However, upon his return yesterday from Rio, Brizola has taken a new position. In a statement issued last night, Brizola said that he had originally doubted the U.S. statement on Soviet bases in Cuba because the U.S. is engaged in sabotaging Cuba's revolution, but now that Krushchev openly admits the presence of Soviet bases in Cuba, LB condemns the USSR just as he condemns the U.S. for using the struggle of the Cuban people as an instrument of the cold war. Brizola's statement continued by saying that the Cuban revolution and its leaders have compromised themselves in allowing bases to be built on Cuban soil. When he supported Cuba's aspirations against the U.S., its economic power, spoliative process, etc., he did not hold that Cuba should become a Soviet satellite. Brizola went on to say that all patriots and nationalists trust that the U.N., with the active participation of the GOB, will guarantee self-determination and non-intervention in Cuba and that the foreign military either USSR or U.S., should withdraw from Cuba. It seems quite apparent that the new Brizola line has been dictated by either Jango, or Hermes Lima with Jango's support, but we may be sure that Brizola is being politically expedient at this time, and it should be predictable that his next statement will take position that the U.S. withdrawal from Guantanamo should accompany USSR withdrawal of missile bases.

Brizola is the only important RGS political figure to declare himself thus far on the Cuban situation, although the Consulate understands that Governor-elect Meneghetti is being approached by his own advisers at this time with the idea of taking a firm pro-U.S. stand. We have been given an interpretation on the apparently ambiguous position of Itamarati on the Cuban situation by a member of Meneghetti's entourage, who stated that the Pena Marinho vote in the OAS was in accord with traditional Brazilian policy and that the Brazilian position at Punta del Este on Cuba was an aberration. This source pointed out that, whereas traditionally Itamarati has been the spokesman for Brazilian foreign policy and the projector of Brazil's image in world affairs; first, under Janio, and now under Jango, it had been turned into a vehicle for domestic Brazilian politics, this role being accepted by many in the second rank in the foreign office since they had been thirsty for recognition at home something they had never previously enjoyed. The Consulate, however, cannot evaluate this interpretation.

The further postponement of President Kennedy's projected visit to Brazil has been accepted in all quarters as inevitable and some contacts do not hide their pleasure at this turn of events for they felt that Jango's government, having taken an ambiguous position in the Cuban crisis, does not merit the honor of a visit by the U.S. Chief Executive. A number of people have deplored the fact that Argentina should have offered material support for the blockade and that Brazil, which had always been the first supporter in the past, had taken a passive if not neutralist position.

2. Political Developments

No political developments of real significance have taken place in RGS during the past week because of the developments of the Cuban

0301

including Brazil despite the hiatus of Jânio. The editorial went on to say that it was sure that Jango would rid himself of the "red gang" surrounding him and firm up his solidarity with U.S., showing that Brazil is aligned in defense of democracy and the political and military unity of the hemisphere. Correio do Povo, publishing the best editorial to come out locally said that self-determination and non-intervention were fine principles but individual and collective continental security come first, when statesmen determine policy. Between totalitarism and democracy no neutralism is possible, although the preservation of peace should be sought. No one is against Cuba or the Cuban people as such, but likewise no one can permit any attempt for totalitarism and enslaving expansionism in the Western Hemisphere. Jornal do Dia editorialized that the U.S. position was the answer needed and that it was not surprised by the U.S. move for, despite Russian mouthings of peace, its arming of Cuba with offensive weapons gave the lie to its public statements. In another editorial, following the Communist protest meeting, the Jornal do Dia stated that the local Communists had reacted immediately, as anticipated, when Moscow pulled the puppet strings; asked the question of the rape of Hungary and about the freedoms they themselves enjoyed in Brazil as contrasted with the oppression of the Cuban people.

Of immediate interest to the Consulate was the placing of a squad of III Army troops in the building occupied by the Consulate for our protection as well as that of the nearby branch of the First National City Bank of New York, the only readily identifiable U.S. enterprise in Pôrto Alegre. It is believed that this guard, provided on the initiative of the Brazilian Government was instrumental in preventing possible depredations following the Communist-organized and-directed protest meeting which took place in front of the adjacent Pôrto Alegre City Hall on Wednesday evening. This meeting, attended by an estimated 300 to 400 people, obviously swelled by curious by-standers at business closing time, was harangued for approximately 2 hours by known Communists and fellow travelers such as labor leaders Jorge Alberto Campezzato and Alvaro Ayala, city councilmen Alberto Schroeter and Marino dos Santos, PTB Federal Deputy candidate Floriano Maya D'Avila, as well as defeated ARS State Assembly candidate Antonio de Pádua Ferreira da Silva. At the end of the meeting a group of approximately 100 demonstrators moved away from the Consulate building and ended up at lefstist-lining Ultima Hora, dispersing shortly thereafter.

Contrary to expectations little or no reaction has been evident in university circles, but Communist and Cuban sympathizers at Pôrto Alegre's leading high school, Júlio de Castilhos, and the Protásio Alves technical school attempted during the week to propagandize the student body. They were repulsed in this activity by anti-Communist students as well as the administration of the two schools.

Some editorials and the majority of the Consulate contacts have deplored what they view as Brazil's equivocal position in support.

ORIGIN/ACTION		
ARA 4		
RM/R 2	REP	AF
ARA	EUR	FE
NEA	CU	INR 5
E	P 1	IO
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AGR	COM	FRB
INT	LAB	TAR
TR	XMB	AIR 4
ARMY 5	CIA 10	NAVY 5
OSD 12	USIA 8	NSA 3

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

AIRGRAM

55

732.00/10-3162

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A-20 (No.) OFFICIAL USE ONLY AIR POUCH (HANDLING INDICATOR)

TO : DEPARTMENT OF STATE 1962 NOV 5 PM 12 46

Brasilia Office-1 Recife-1
Belem-1 Salvador-1
Rio de Janeiro-1 Santos-1
Belo Horizonte-1 Sao Paulo-1
Curitiba-1

RM/AN ANALYSIS & DISTRIBUTION BRANCH 10-31-62

FROM : Amconsul PÔRTO ALEGRE DATE: OCT 31 1962

SUBJECT : PÔRTO ALEGRE WEEKLY SUMMARY Nº 28

REF :

DEPARTMENT OF STATE BUREAU OF INTER-AMERICAN AFFAIRS NOV 6 1962

1. Reaction to US Blockade of Cuba
2. Political Developments
3. Miscellany

1. Reaction to US Blockade of Cuba

After the initial impact of President Kennedy's proclamation of a blockade on Cuba to prevent further Russian shipments of offensive war materiel had sunk into the minds of Pôrto Alegre's inhabitants, reaction and opinion began to be expressed. To date not a single protest other than the Communist inspired and directed protest meeting on October 24 has been noted. On the contrary, the Consulate has received numerous telephone calls, telegrams, letters and other expressions of solidarity for the position taken by the US to protect its own security, that of the Western Hemisphere and of the Free World in general.

Editorial comment has been universally favorable. Diário de Notícias stated that a crucial hour had been reached and that the U.S. and America , in general, had to take this position and that the Latin American peoples were supporting actively the U.S. through the OAS. Another editorial in the same paper stated that the world was closer to war now than at any time since World War II. The U.S. after many months of patience had reacted in the interests of hemispheric security and the protection of the Free World, and that the governments and peoples of the Western Hemisphere were with the U.S.,

FORM 4-62 DS-323

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Drafted by: FDSharp/zms 10/30/62

Contents and Classification Approved by: FDSharp

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INCOMING TELEGRAM *Department of State*

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Action ARA

Control: 19452
Rec'd: OCTOBER 28, 1962
9:29 AM

Info SS SR G SP L H SAL IO P USIA SCA INR CIA NSA OSD ARMY NAVY AIR JUS TRSY RMR

FROM: BRASILIA

TO: Secretary of State

NO: 20, OCTOBER 27.

ACTION DEPARTMENT 20, INFORMATION RIO DE JANEIRO 1185

PRESENCE OF US CONGRESSIONAL DELEGATION AT 51ST IPU CONFERENCE BRASILIA HAS PROVIDED INTERESTING OPPORTUNITY TO OBSERVE REACTIONS TO CARIBBEAN SITUATION OF DIVERSE BUT IMPORTANT GROUPS CURRENTLY IN BRASILIA.

SENATOR ROBERTSON'S SPEECH OCTOBER 24 STRONGLY SUPPORTING PRESIDENT WAS BETTER RECEIVED THAN THAT OF ANY OTHER EARLY SPEAKER IN GENERAL DEBATE. DELEGATION LUNCHEONS AT EMBASSY OCTOBER 24 AND 25, FORMER FOR CANADIAN AND LATIN AMERICAN DELEGATES AND LATTER FOR WEST EUROPEAN DELEGATES, WERE WELL ATTENDED AND SUCCESSFUL. VERY SUCCESSFUL EMBASSY RECEPTION OCTOBER 26 IN HONOR OF US DELEGATION WAS ATTENDED BY MORE THAN SEVEN HUNDRED (FOREIGN AND BRASILIAN DELEGATES, BRAZILIAN GOVERNMENT FUNCTIONARIES, DIPLOMATS, ETC.) INCLUDING, INCIDENTLY, MOST, IF NOT ALL, COMMUNIST BLOC DELEGATES WHO HAD BEEN INVITED. AMONG BRAZILIANS PRESENT AT RECEPTION WAS PRESIDENT OF CHAMBER OF DEPUTIES RANIERI MAZZILLI, AS WELL AS GOOD SHOWING FROM MILITARY. MOST CABINET MEMBERS, IN RIO AT TIME, SENT REPRESENTATIVES. WE NOTICED NO DELEGATIONS STAYING AWAY EXCEPT ALBANIANS AND MONGOLIANS WHOM WE DID NOT INVITE. ALL THIS DESPITE RAIN AND RUMORS THAT PLANNED COMMUNIST-ORANGIZED DEMONSTRATION NEAR BUS STATION WOULD MARCH ON EMBASSY DURING RECEPTION.

AS IT TURNED OUT, DEMONSTRATION NEVER GOT STARTED OWING RAIN, LACK OF ENTHUSIASM, BAD COMMUNIST ORGANIZATION AND GOOD POLICE ORGANIZATION. SOLE UNFRIENDLY INCIDENT TO DATE WAS TARRING OF EISENHOWER-KUBITSCHEK MONUMENT IN SOLITARY SPOT THREE-QUARTERS

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ORIGIN/ACTION

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RM/R-E-1

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

AIRGRAM

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732.00/10-2662

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32 NO.

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HANDLING INDICATOR

TO : Department of State, Wash. 1962 NOV 9 AM 8 39

DEPARTMENT OF STATE
BUREAU OF
INTER-AMERICAN AFFAIRS
NOV 9 1962

RM/AN
ANALYSIS & DISTRIBUTION
BRANCH

FROM : American Consulate, Curitiba DATE: October 26, 1962

SUBJECT : Brazilian Election 1962: Report No. 11: Election Results of Santa Catarina

REF :

RM/R-Hess
11/20-KB

During the Reporting Officer's visit with Governor Celso Ramos, on October 22, the Governor discussed the outcome of the elections.

He expressed great satisfaction with the outcome and stated that even though the definitive results would not be known much before October 30, he was assured that his party (Democratic Socialist Party) had elected forty-four of the fifty-seven mayors. He stated that the results for Federal Senator indicated Antonio Carlos Konder Reis and Atilio Fontana were the successful candidates, and that the parties divided the fourteen Federal Deputy seats as follows: PSD - six, UDN - six, and PTB - two.

The breakdown for State Deputies showed that the PSD had won twenty seats, the UDN fourteen seats, the PTB two seats, and the remaining nine were split up among the other parties.

The PTB, irked with the lack of support given them by the PSD, decided to withdraw from the state government and the Secretaries of Health, Labor, and Interior and Justice (all members of the PTB) resigned minutes before the Reporting Officer called on the Governor. Governor Celso Ramos greeted their resignations with satisfaction and commented to the Reporting Officer that unfortunately his Vice Governor had not joined the others in resigning. The Governor is pleased that he can now have a freer hand in his administration and interprets the election results as a vote of confidence in him.

The official list of successful candidates will be reported upon as soon as it is released.

CC: Brazilian Desk, Wash. (1) Mr. Henderson, AmEmbassy, Rio (1)
AmEmbassy, Rio (1) Mr. Walters, AmEmbassy, Rio (1)
AmEmbassy Brasilia (1)

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FORM 4-62 DS-323

Drafted by: Arthur W. Feldman

Contents and Classification Approved by: Arthur W. Feldman

Clearances:

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W I T H D R A W A L N O T I C E

RG: 059

ENTRY: CDF60-63

TAB #: 20

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Document Date: 26/10/62

Document Ser.#:

AGRAM A-122 FR STATE TO RIO DE JANEIRO

In the review of this file this item was removed because access to it is restricted. Restrictions on records in the National Archives are stated in general and specific record group restriction statements which are available for examination. The item identified above has been withdrawn because it contains:

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NND: 949515

WITHDRAWN: 02/24/95 by: JAS

FOIA RETRIEVAL #: 949515 01579 00020

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Magalhães Pinto

The Governor of Minas Gerais "is a coward", Adhemar declared, without elaborating further.

Lacerda

Carlos LACERDA, Governor of Guanabara, is a strong fighter against communism, according to Adhemar. He suffered a serious setback in the recent elections, when men he backed were defeated. His weakness is in being too aggressive for the taste of the people of Rio, where one must be gay and work through "love".

Celso Furtado

Dr. Celso Furtado, adviser to President Goulart, is a "crypto-Communist", according to Dr. de Barros. He is an "intellectual", a brilliant teacher, but not a practical doer.

President Kennedy

Adhemar referred with evident pride to a statement he recently made to the press (and later paraphrased in a recording for the Voice of America) warmly welcoming President Kennedy to Brazil. He expressed the hope that he would be able to talk to the President for fifteen minutes--"ten minutes about Brazil and five minutes about Cuba" to urge the President to maintain a strong line toward Cuba.

Request for Help

At the end of the interview, Dr. de Barros asked for help in obtaining a grant to assist a mining engineer to visit the United States to observe mining methods there (but not to study at any school). He indicated that the engineer is connected with a coal mine in which Dr. de Barros has an interest.

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0295

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He said that there are now six governors in Brazil who are strongly on the democratic side: In Rio Grande do Sul, São Paulo, Guanabara, Bahia, Espirito Santo, and Ceará. He took credit for having helped elect new governors, particularly in Rio Grande do Sul, Espirito Santo, and Bahia, and he evidently envisaged himself as leader of a coalition of the "democratic" governors. São Paulo, he said, is the key state in Brazil, and Brazil is the key country in Latin America. It is essential to maintain São Paulo as a bulwark of democracy, and he intends to fight hard to do it.

He said that he had long defended democratic principles, even against odds. He recalled that in 1958 1/ he had been present at a reception for Fidel Castro given by Afonso Arinos, the Brazilian "Chancellor", and among two hundred guests Adhemar had been the only one who maintained reserve toward Castro. When asked to explain his attitude, he explained, "Because he is a murderer!" This led to the hostess practically pulling him out of the house.

Cuba

Dr. de Barros urged that the United States maintain a strong policy toward Cuba, as exemplified by the recent imposition of a "blockade". "Once you start to beat a snake," he said, "you must keep on until you kill it." "Tell President Kennedy to hold the blockade. If he gives in on it, we are all lost."

He told of a meeting with President Goulart just after the imposition of the "blockade". Goulart had asked him, "Why are you on the wrong side?" Adhemar replied, "I have always been on this side."

Goulart

Adhemar characterized Goulart as a "difficult man", "a man of contradictions,""if you say you are on the side of God, he will say he is on the side of the Devil, and if you say you side with the Devil, then Goulart will say he is on the side of God." Goulart has a "Spanish character," said Adhemar, pointing out that he comes from a district just across the border from Argentina. Goulart is an opportunist, but not a Communist, he said.

Carvalho Pinto

Prof. CARVALHO PINTO, Governor of São Paulo, is "timid", "introverted", a "bicho-de-concha", 2/ according to Adhemar, and has lacked courage to speak out for São Paulo in national affairs.

1/ Dr. de Barros was mistaken in the date--Castro's visit to Brazil was in 1959, not 1958.
2 / Bicho-de-concha: the "barber bug", which hides in the walls of cabins.

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MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION

DATE: October 26, 1962

PLACE : Home of Governor-Elect Adhemar de Barros at São Paulo.

SUBJECT : Governor-Elect de Barros' View of Current Situation.

PARTICIPANTS: Dr. Adhemar DE BARROS, Governor-Elect of the State of São Paulo
Minister Daniel M. Braddock, American Consul General, São Paulo
Consul Robert Reynolds, American Consulate General, São Paulo
Consul Scott C. Lyon, American Consulate General, São Paulo.

Copies to: AmEmbassy, Rio de Janeiro
ARA (1cc) by Pouch
INR (1cc) by Pouch
ConGen Files.

Minister Braddock made a courtesy call on Dr. de Barros. The latter was cordial and in good spirits. He appeared rested and in fairly good health, although his eyes were somewhat bloodshot and his nose was unusually ruddy with enlarged bloodvessels lacing its surface. Apparently his household is trying to cut down on his coffee drinking--when the maid brought in coffee for the group, she brought no cup for him. He sent her out to get another cup, remarking that he customarily drinks 40 cups of coffee a day.

When Minister Braddock congratulated him on his victory in the gubernatorial election, Dr. de Barros replied that it was a victory for all of us and for the Free World. He said that he had wished to retire, but in late May or June he had decided it was necessary for him to enter the race since otherwise Quadros would be elected. Events had proven him right.

He said

0293

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in Adhemar's government. Adhemar hoped for some Alliance for Progress assistance for São Paulo and mentioned such projects as new docks for Santos and low-cost housing for the poor. Vicente said he had discouraged the thought of help for a subway for the city of São Paulo, stating that many American cities would also like to have subways but lacked the means to finance them. PL480 assistance in the form of wheat and, if possible, beans would also be sought, and an expanded Point IV program. Vicente said Adhemar had requested him to work closely with Jorge Rezende and with appropriate American officials to develop realistic projects for assistance. He indicated that Adhemar was realistic as to the needs of São Paulo as compared with under-developed parts of Brazil and would, he was sure, cooperate in any plans that could be developed whereby São Paulo would participate in relief measures for the under-developed areas. Vicente mentioned as a possibility that the State of São Paulo could encourage and assist São Paulo industrialists, including American companies, to establish plants in the Northeast.

Adhemar had stressed to Vicente his desire to have the opportunity to talk a few minutes with President Kennedy.

DMBraddock/fmw

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0292

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MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION

DATE: October 26, 1962

PLACE: Office of Minister Consul General

SUBJECT: Mr. Vicente Ribeiro reports on conversation with Governor-elect Adhemar de Barros

PARTICIPANTS: Mr. Vicente Ribeiro, Brazilian businessman
Minister Consul General Daniel M. Braddock

Copies to: Amembassy Rio (2 cc)
ARA (1 cc)
INR (1 cc)
Central Files (2 cc)

Mr. Vicente Ribeiro, a Director of the American Chamber of Commerce and long time close friend of the United States, called on me at noon today just before I was scheduled to pay a courtesy call on Dr. Adhemar de Barros, to report on a talk he had just had with Dr. Barros. Vicente said that he had gone to school with Adhemar and had known him well for many years. He said that Adhemar is quite sensitive to 1) the charge, made by the New York Times, among others, that he was a crook; and 2) charges that his electoral victory was a vote against Janio Quadros rather than a vote for him. Vicente said that he had done his best to persuade Adhemar 1) that the way to deal with the charge that he was a crook was to have a good government for all to see, and certainly not to bring suit against the New York Times; and 2) that the vote for him had been a positive vote, earned by his forthright stand against communism. Vicente said that he had done his best to impress upon Adhemar the great responsibility and opportunity that would be his as Governor of São Paulo to support the free world cause in Brazil.

Vicente said that Adhemar had assured him that he intended to have a good, clean government, dedicated to the free world cause and that with other like-minded governors he would urge such a course on President Goulart. Adhemar intended, Vicente said, to appoint only outstanding men as his principal assistants and Vicente assured me that good men would accept the call to participate

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DEPARTMENT OF STATE

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732.00/10-2662

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TO : Department of State

RM/AN ANALYSIS & DISTRIBUTION BRANCH

DEPARTMENT OF STATE BUREAU OF INTER-AMERICAN AFFAIRS NOV 1 1962

732.111

DATE: October 26, 1962

FROM : Amcongen SÃO PAULO

SUBJECT : Conversations with Adhemar de Barros

REF :

RM/R - yes 11/1/62 - KB

Enclosed are two memoranda of conversations reflecting views of São Paulo Governor-elect Adhemar de Barros as expressed to 1) Vicente Ribeiro, a Brazilian businessman who reported his conversation to the Consul General and 2) three officers of the Consulate General who called on Adhemar today.

Daniel Braddock
Minister Consul General

FILED Nov 2 1 29 PM '62

FORM 4-62 DS-323

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Drafted by: DMBraddock/SCLyon/~~KKKXXXXX~~/fmw

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Oct. 26, 1962

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Control: 19135
Rec'd: October 27, 1962
9:47 a.m.

FROM: Rio de Janeiro

TO: Secretary of State

NO: 894, October 26, 7 p.m.

Public order situation throughout Brazil during immediate post-quarantine period generally calm with only few and relatively minor disturbances.

In Rio, one mass rally on October 25 attracted about 1,000 students and youths and culminated in a march of about 500 toward Embassy. Police effectively dispersed group three blocks from Embassy as planned. Activities by subversive groups to plant incendiary devices on US Government and American controlled property learned prior to President Kennedy's speech on Cuba. At least four such devices detonated in American business establishments with little damage and no personal injuries. Police actively investigating to determine origin and persons responsible. Mass anti-US rally at 8 p.m., October 27 authorized by police for Deputado Hercules Correia, well-known Communist leader. Police planning strict control of mobs.

At Brasilia, marker commemorating visit President Eisenhower defaced by tar smear and smoke smudge from fire lighted at base. Consulate Salvador received telephoned bomb threat, which fortunately threat only. Tag end protest meeting Porto Alegre moved away from Consulate rather than toward as anticipated. All reporting posts indicate satisfactory police protection.

GORDON

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NUMBER ~~unnumbered~~ 912

DATE 10/24/62

CONTROL 18693

SUBJECT From Draper

WHITE HOUSE ✓✓ *** 2 4 3

CIA ✓ 15

SECY DEFENSE

ISA ✓ 26

JCS ***

AID ✓ 17

AID- Moscow ✓ 18

USIA

OTHER Sec'Treas ✓ 19

22 - destroyed

20 IGA - Mansfield

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CORRECTION

Control: 18693
Rec'd: October 26, 1962
12:29 p.m.

FROM: Rio de Janeiro (via pouch)

TO: Secretary of State

NO: 912, October 24.

The number of this message recorded as unnumbered should be corrected to read 912.

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SECRET

-8- Unnumbered, October 24, from Rio de Janeiro (via pouch)

It is recommended, if Washington agrees that the above analysis is substantially correct, and if warranted by the Brazilian reaction to the Cuban situation, that Ambassador Gordon be authorized to inform the Brazilian President and Finance Minister immediately of the above situation and to state that the U.S. is prepared to help if a viable solution can be found but that U.S. resources alone would be insufficient even were an acceptable stabilization plan put in force. We suggest that he then add that the resources of the European nations and Japan and the assistance of the IMF would all be needed and that it would be our considered and friendly suggestion that the Brazilian Government adopt an economic and financial program under standards which would be acceptable to those mentioned above. He could add that he feels sure the World Bank would be ready finance large scale new projects under these circumstances.

Time is very short since the Brazilian Constitution requires that tax legislation involving structural changes must be passed before November 20 (and even tax rate changes before December 31) this year if it is to become effective in 1963. It is unfortunate that this kind of statement be made prior to President Kennedy's scheduled arrival here but there seems to be no alternative particularly as his confirmation of the above position may well be the only factor persuading President Goulart of its necessity. (Signed Draper).

GORDON

DMB

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0286

them by favor and patronage.

On balance, Goulart appears to be an astute political opportunist, a more or less conscious imitator of the demagogic techniques employed by Vargas and Peron. His goal is probably personal power such as Peron enjoyed. He probably believes that he can control the political forces which he is using to reach this goal, but through his patronage is affording the Communists and ultra-nationalists opportunities to organize to take control away from him eventually. Almost certainly, he has little or no comprehension of the economic situation, or motivation to impose drastic remedial measures that would hinder the accomplishment of his political purposes.

The President should realize that his visit would strengthen and support the Goulart Administration, and give the U.S., in some measure, a stake in its success. It is in our interest, therefore, that the occasion be used to induce Goulart to adopt a realistic stabilization plan.

Conclusion.

Brazil is on the verge of financial collapse. While the internal inflation is extremely serious it is the external obligations which Brazil will soon be unable to meet without massive external assistance which threatens international bankruptcy. The 1963 deficit will reach almost one billion dollars. Even if an acceptable stabilization program were put in force by Brazil the magnitude of the deficit is such that the U.S. alone could not find the amount required. Only a consortium including the International Monetary Fund as a practical matter could bridge the gap.

IMF would undoubtedly insist on a Brazilian stabilization program which Brazil would consider harsh and politically impracticable. This is the dilemma we face.

Recommendations.

0285

it become effective during present Congress.

Brazil's decision take over all telephone, electricity and gas companies one of worst economic mistakes. Private companies concerned quite ready sell as inadequate rates have prevented keeping pace with inflation or providing needed expansion services. Take-over will, however, involve about one billion dollars (assuming fair settlement) addition to Brazil's internal debt, with large interest and principal payments added to annual budget and balance of payment, even if 75 percent re-invested Brazil. Perhaps more serious is responsibility provide efficient management and technical direction in future and finance necessary large annual expansion also opening these industries possible corruption and large-scale government subsidies.

Although Brazil has enormous deposits high-grade iron and manganese ores, repeated obstacles thrown in the way their national exploitation and potential exports perhaps $100 million year lost. In field oil, opposition prevented expenditure many millions by American oil companies. Whether U.S. resources and know-how could have found great amount oil we cannot know, but since oil imports cost Brazil quarter billion dollars year, sensible economic policy, unclouded by nationalism, would certainly have sought outside help in solving Brazil's large energy problem.

Alliance for Progress.

Comments on this and certain other questions are reserved for final report since they do not directly bear on the present critical financial situation.

The Political Context.

The political motivations and objectives of President Goulart remain enigmatic. Himself a wealthy landholder, he became Minister of Labor under Vargas and has based his political career on the support of the government-controlled labor unions and on association with ultra-nationalism, for their own purposes. Goulart has accepted their aid and support and in turn has aided

0284

(or 33) of suppliers credits from Europe extended, still remains 400 new money to be found. As illustration possibly could be covered with slight margin from following sources: A) balance of 1961 new money 84; B) AID direct and indirect help for B/P 100 (e.g. anticipation local currency costs of projects, financing projects in budget, etc); C) Export-Import 50; D) European standby balance 80, IMF including full third credit tranche 118; total 432. Recent history indicates Europeans not willing participate in major way without IMF. In view magnitude problem, believe operation impracticable without IMF but feasible if Fund participates fully. Point is attitude Europeans as well as private capital heavily influenced IMF attitude so that availability at least 200-250 probably hangs on IMF decision. On the other hand, IMF participation would be difficult to sell politically to Brazilians. IMF almost sure to insist on substantial prior performance by Brazilian Government of measures which Brazilian officials would consider politically possible only on gradual basis. This is most difficult aspect of entire problem and there can be no assurance IMF and Brazilian positions can be reconciled.

Other Serious Problems.

Instead of planning and carrying out sensible program of development and mutual benefit from her tremendous natural resources, Brazil has unfortunately pursued illogical and wasteful policies preventing sound development and balanced growth largely motivated nationalistic and at times anti-American considerations. Perhaps only harsh experience, gradual education and better understanding can bring about change, but sympathetic discussion and quiet persuasion our part may be helpful. There follows brief discussion illustrative of present unsound policy trend responsible for some of Brazil's economic problems.

During current year, discussion and recent enactment very unfavorable law regulating remittance profits by foreign investors has resulted, along with other factors, in virtual cessation flow foreign private capital to Brazil. Another law retracting some of worst features new legislation approved by Senate and important

-it-

0283

foreign exchange reserves similarly almost ran out, but strong measures restored confidence and replenished reserves and a balanced economy restored in matter of months.

What is needed Brazil in both Government itself, in business circles and public is desire and will power to see radical series adjustments through painful first year. Inflation in Brazil has become way of life - many have found ways live with it - the middle and poorer classes suffer most. Unfortunately few in our Embassy or in Brazilian or American business circles believe President or his associates willing to adop and emforce hard measures necessary bring balance and prosperity to Brazil.

Problem we face is to find way persuade President Goulart that this course of action is in best interests his country, and that only in this direction can he expect important financial support from us. If Brazil itself will make effort and full foreign help made available inflation can certainly be stopped over a reasonable period.

What Measures Required?

The Brazilian technical people know perfectly well what needed internally - progress toward balanced budget on action to remove huge subsidies to railroads, merchant marine and post office and making these services pay own way, elimination unnecessary and unproductive expenses, increased tax rates and better collections, proper wage policy firmly administered, strict controls on bank credit, and more flexible and realistic foreign exchange rate and other policies designed encourage exports and discourage unnecessary imports.

How Can External Deficit of $900 Million be Handled? (Figures in million dollars)

We estimate receipts PL-480 100 and remaining disbursements under loans made by IBRD, IDB, EXIM and AID plus new private investment may reach 150. Assume 100 of Banco do Brasil swaps renewed and 30 banking credit lines renewed, total 380 receipts leaving 520 needed. If can assume IMF postponable debt 27 extended and extension EXIM 30, Treasury 20, European standby 10 and 75 percent



withheld but arrangements were made for progressive release in spring of 1962, again subject to agreed stabilization program. This program worked out with President Goulart's Government but again not carried out by Brazil and inflation has increased in intensity. There is still 84 million dollars of promised credits held by the several agencies until Brazil does take actions already agreed upon, since present U.S. policy is to refuse any further B/P assistance until and unless satisfactory Brazilian stabilization program actually in train.

President's Visit in November.

Visit would certainly set stage for President Goulart to stress Brazil's difficulties and request massive financial help (either during visit or shortly thereafter) with expectation that U.S., under the circumstances, could hardly refuse. He would think we could not permit Brazilian financial collapse during or immediately following such visit in view of serious hemispheric and world-wide implications.

One purpose this preliminary report is make sure the President understands seriousness of present situation in Brazil and the risks to national and personal prestige that are involved. However visit would give President first hand impression of problems involved on which he will have to make hard decisions soon.

Can the Inflation be Stopped?

If Brazilian Government determined that the well-being of Brazil depended on taking the measures necessary to curb the inflation, carefully explained reasons to Brazilian public and asked support of armed forces and public in such all-out effort, it would and should have powerful financial and moral support of United States Government, Export-Import Bank, IMF, World Bank, and probably European Governments.

There are many examples in postwar history of successful currency stabilization, followed by export growth, revived foreign investment and national prosperity. In France four years ago,

-foreign-

0281

under current investment climate and exchange policies, 1963 trade and commercial deficit 250 plus interest and principal payments 650 for total deficit of 900. Details: Loan repayment 260; Banco do Brasil swap obligations due 150; bank credit lines 30; commercial arrears to be settled 120 and interest due by Government 90 million. (Note: Embassy generally agrees above figures, which eliminated 57 gold loan maturity which assume renewable). An equivalent deficit based on percentage of exports would mean United States 1963 B/P deficit of 14 billion dollars.

It would take more than entire FY-1963 Alliance for Progress appropriation for all Latin America to finance Brazilian deficit.

Internal Budgetary Deficit (Figures billions cruzeiros)

Minister Finance reports 1962 internal budget deficit will be 294, of which 100 incurred in the first eight months 1962, and additional 194 anticipated during last four months.

He also estimated calendar 1963 deficit at 944 (60percent total expenditures) if nothing done about it. He proposed expenses be reduced by 444 and taxes increased by 200, to compress deficit to 300 billions. If all his recommendations approved, which now appears unlikely deficit would still be little larger than in 1962. However could be offset to extent new foreign budgetary aid made available. He stated publicly inflation could not be stopped suddenly, and any estabilization measures taken must not interfere public investments designed expand economy. In other words, even he contemplates partial continuation inflation. Increased cost of living during past year reported more than 50 percent. The cruzeiro has shrunk to half its 1961 value.

Recent Assistance Ineffective.

Early 1961 massive financing arranged for Brazil (EXIM Bank, AID, Treasury, IMF, private banks and European sources) which postponed maturities and provided from some 600 million dollars new money. This was based on stabilization program agreed to by Brazilian Government, most of which not carried out because President Quadros resignation. Part of new money therefore -withheld-

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INCOMING TELEGRAM · *Department of State*

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Control: 18693
Rec'd: October 26, 1962
12:29 p.m.

FROM: Rio de Janeiro (via pouch)

TO: Secretary of State

NO: ~~Unnumbered~~ 912, October 24

732.00

Rio 912

FROM DRAPER - EYES ONLY

Text preliminary report Brazil follows. Entire group concurs. Copy has been given to Ambassador Gordon. You will determine distribution but might wish limit President, Dillon, Ball, Martin, Rostow, Hamilton, Moscoso and Nitze.

Group will spend week writing final report Quarry Heights, Panama, arriving Washington no later than weekend November 2 so final report available President week before proposed take-off for Brazil. Text report addressed Rusk follows:

You have asked me report on situation Brazil. Imminence of President's visit Brazil and its critical financial situation has impelled me make this preliminary report.

Unless massive external help becomes available, Brazil on brink financial catastrophe. Embassy understands at least $80 million required meet current obligations between now and January 1 for which no current resources in sight. About $70 million in gold remain Brazil's free reserves which, if used, would probably stave off crisis until end of year or shortly thereafter. However, this would leave Brazil practically without gold or foreign exchange reserves, with commercial arrears substantially excess $100 million, with huge B/P deficit in 1963.

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(1) Brazil's Balance of Payments (figures millions dollars)

After discussions Brazilian and Embassy officials we estimate,

-under-

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b) In spite of these inflationary and nationalistic policies U.S. had constantly offered its help and several times had financed Brazilian stabilization plans which had never been carried through by Brazilian Government.

c) In last five years U.S. including Export-Import Bank loans and PL 480 food had made grants of _____ and loans of _____ and is now Brazil's largest creditor.

d) Nevertheless U.S. is prepared to accept Brazilian debt moratorium until such time as situation warrants an appropriate new arrangement.

e) In the meantime, U.S. is still willing to continue its help to Brazil while Brazil's internal and external economies are being brought into balance to avoid undue hardship on Brazilian people. This help would include basic commodities, both food and oil, by continuing PL 480 food for total of 100 million dollars and by offering new Export-Import Bank loan for say 50 million dollars to maintain the inflow of oil and so assure Brazil's food and energy requirements for a few months.

8. The above statement designed to support the then existing government on a hand to mouth basis for a reasonable period while it adjusted to the shock of repudiation, and also to anticipate and offset the political repercussions from a possible offer of Russian oil. Any additional aid would depend on economic and political developments, and particularly on attitude of government toward U.S. The appropriate use of our aid and other resources following the impending financial crisis could hopefully result in a government better oriented toward the U.S. and better able to deal with Brazil's economic and financial problems. (Signed Draper)

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WHDraper/mal

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deficit, including non-postponeable obligations to IMF and World Bank, would be reduced to little over 300 million dollars.

6) While such a financial crisis would hurt Goulart seriously he and all radical elements Brazil would probably put blame on U.S. for its insufficient financial support. If Goulart should fall in resulting economic and political confusion more radical government might well take over, perhaps followed by a right wing military regime. This latter possibility may become the only alternative to an openly anti-U.S. government. These risks must be weighed in making the necessary financial decisions but we do not believe the high cost of postponing crisis and buying time by U.S. aid alone is now justified nor long possible. We believe that conditions in Brazil will get worse before they can get better and that default on external obligations is probably unavoidable since so much of Brazil's three billion dollar debt is short term. If the U.S. decides to carry out the hard line we recommend we urge that it be carried through to its logical conclusion, and not changed in midstream as we understand has happened before in the face of the inevitable political and financial pressures which such a policy provokes.

7) When and if Brazilian Government repudiates or openly fails to meet its external obligations we suggest U.S. be prepared make immediate public announcement along following lines:

a) U.S. regrets financial difficulties Brazil which unfortunately is the inevitable result of spiralling inflation during past few years, coupled with policies which have discouraged and shut off the badly needed flow of new private investments to Brazil.

0277

stabilization plan satisfactory to European lenders and IMF is put in force. President Kennedy's confirmation of this position could be by personal letter delivered later by Ambassador Gordon. Most important above initial action by Ambassador be taken next few days while still time for Brazilian Congress to enact the necessary tax legislation this year. Otherwise cannot become constitutionally effective for 1963.

3) However, under present conditions in Brazil it is considered very improbable that government will accept this proposal or that the Congress will actually enact the tax and other measures necessary to implement a stabilization plan satisfactory to the IMF. Only drastic measures such as IMF would require, including a substantially balanced internal budget and exchange rate and other policies greatly encouraging increased exports and reduced imports, can reverse present unfavorable balance of payments sufficiently to warrant large scale debt postponement and new financing help necessary in view of huge 1963 and 1964 maturities.

4) We conclude that even if the recommended offer of U.S. help is made it probably will not prevent Brazil from defaulting on its external obligations in next few months. Nevertheless consider most important politically and otherwise that offer be made, and preferably in written form for later reference and possible publication.

5) If moratorium is declared on external interest and principal payments Brazil would naturally try to avoid default on World Bank and IMF obligations. Nevertheless Brazilian external credit would practically disappear and all transactions would be on cash basis. If Banco do Brasil swaps included in moratorium or successfully extended the estimated 1963

0276

T E L E G R A M
OUTGOING

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FOREIGN SERVICE OF THE
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

SECRET - EYES ONLY
Classification

Copy 2 of 5

TO: SECRETARY OF STATE

EYES ONLY

FROM DRAPER

Text second section preliminary report Brazil follows.

Entire group consurs. Copy going by pouch to Ambassador Gordon. Suggest similar distribution as first section sent you from Rio de Janeiro. Text follows.

1) First section of preliminary report was based on announced decision that President would visit Brazil November. However our entire group strongly believes postponement of visit would be in the national interest both because of threatened financial collapse Brazil and because visit would be considered by many as approving or at least condoning Goulart's government which has failed to carry out the stabilization plans agreed with President Kennedy in April and has continued to extend patronage to anti-U.S. elements. Cuban blockade now provides perfect explanation that international situation does not permit President leave Washington now. Suggest tactically that any such postponement not be announced until few days before President scheduled leave Washington as impending visit useful in meantime gain Goulart's continued cooperation Cuba.

2) If President postpones trip we still make same recommendation that Ambassador Gordon promptly offer U.S. financial help to Brazil provided

0275

Rio de Janeiro,
October 24, 1962.

SECRET - EYES ONLY

Dear Mr. Secretary:

The LIMITEL restriction on cables just imposed has prevented dispatching the enclosed EYES ONLY cable via normal telegraphic channels to you. It is, therefore, going forward to you by pouch. If there is no such limitation in Panama, where we arrive later today, we will dispatch it from there tomorrow by cable. The financial situation in Brazil is so serious that it seemed advisable to get this preliminary report in your hands for the President's and your information as soon as possible.

Sincerely,

William H. Draper, Jr.

The Honorable
Dean Rusk,
Secretary of State,
Washington, D. C.

Encl: EYES ONLY Telegram.

(1)

Cabled

SECRET - EYES ONLY

033.00/10-2562

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(6)

CARIBBEAN COMMAND
QUARRY HEIGHTS, CANAL ZONE

This document consists of 1 page,
Copy no. 1 of 5, Series A.

SECRET

OFFICIAL-INFORMAL
SECRET

October 25, 1962.

Dear Bill:

I am enclosing the text of an EYES ONLY telegram which Ambassador Draper wished to get to the Secretary and other selected addressees as soon as possible. The LIMITEL restrictions have made it impossible for us to transmit it electrically. Therefore, by arrangement with CINCARIB, we are sending the text, under cover of this letter, with a military officer (a Colonel Hawkins) who is traveling to Washington tomorrow.

I would appreciate it if you would have the text typed up on the regular incoming telegram form and distributed in the normal manner for EYES ONLY telegrams, making sure that the Secretary sees it as soon as possible.

Best regards.

Sincerely,

Bill

William B. Connett, Jr.
Executive Secretary

Enclosure:

EYES ONLY telegram to
the Secretary (2 copies)

William H. Brubeck, Esquire,
Executive Secretary,
Executive Secretariat,
Department of State,
Washington 25, D.C.

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(With EYES ONLY Enclosure)

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SUBJECT 10 page preliminary report on Brazil

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G/PM

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Control: 18246
Rec'd: OCTOBER 25, 1962
1:48 PM

FROM: CINCARIB

TO: Secretary of State

NO: CC69768HX, 251820Z OCTOBER

RM/R

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FROM DRAPER

ACCOUNT LIMITEL RESTRICTION ON CABLING HAVE SENT 10-PAGE PRELIMINARY REPORT ON BRAZIL BY POUCH FROM RIO DE JANEIRO OCTOBER 24 WHICH PRESUMABLY ARRIVING OCTOBER 25. PURPOSE THIS CABLE TO ASSURE YOUR RECEIVING REPORT PROMPTLY.

SCP 1.

REE

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CONFIDENTIAL São Paulo A-112
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Prestigious O Estado de S. Paulo hoped Krushchev's pending visit to the UN would be made sincerely in the name of peace.

A spate of editorials congratulated Brazil on having "grown up to proper democratic elections." Many of the same papers then decried a UDN party move to persuade the electorate to abstain from voting in the scheduled plebiscite on parliamentarism, January 6. All writers agreed on the outcome: presidentialism for Brazil. Diario plugged for outgoing São Paulo Governor Carvalho Pinto as Brazil's next Minister of Finance.

Folha de S.Paulo called for revisions in the Aliança para o Progresso, a "relative failure" so far but with big possibilities stemming from the great good will on one side and great need on the other (see Item 6).

In USIS São Paulo's judgement, Mrs. Kennedy's popularity with Paulistas is such that her failure to visit the city with the President would have been greatly prejudicial to the success and effectiveness of the trip. Tenor of news stories announcing Jacqueline's change in plans to include São Paulo, bears out this judgement.

Daniel M. Braddock
Minister Consul General

Contributors:
DCProper
JMason

Distribution: INS/RAR; Amembassy Rio 3; Amembassy Brasilia 2; Amcongen, Recife; Amconsulates Belem, Belo Horizonte, Curitiba, Porto Alegre, Salvador, Santos.

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of the Basic Reforms," scheduled to be held in São Paulo on January 20-26. Purpose: to get together technicians and experts of top reputation to decide what reforms really are necessary and what should be done to get them started. The papers hope that their initiative will get the Goulart Government moving. "Because," says Folha, "one thing is certain: the basic reforms universally demanded by all levels of the Brazilian community will never sprout from the slogans of those who see in the three magic words /reformas de base/ the 'abracadabra' of all the miracles ...." (UNCLASSIFIED)

Comment: Bravo! (OFFICIAL USE ONLY)

6. Folha Criticizes Alliance for Progress

Folha de S. Paulo, long friendly to the United States, continues very much so after its recent change of management. (It was in financial difficulties despite its large circulation, and a group of local industrialists was reportedly forced to buy it to keep it from falling into the hands of Leonel BRIZOLA.) When Folha and like-minded São Paulo papers have regretted lack of "Alliance for Progress" effectiveness in the past, they have usually put almost all the blame on Brazilian authorities for failing to comply with such fundamental requirements as those for minimal planning. On October 21, however, Folha's lead editorial suggested that "a greater dose of /American/ liberality, daring, and even heterodoxy" would be needed to deal with Latin American obstacles "which can only be overcome gradually." The editorial politely but specifically criticized U.S. "bureaucracy" and "unrealistic requirements." Folha further held that "at least half" of the last year's financial aid to Brazil was really intended to solve American problems -- such as a surplus of wheat -- and had nothing to do with the Alliance properly speaking. (OFFICIAL USE ONLY, quotes UNCLASSIFIED)

PSYCHOLOGICAL

1. Local Press Reaction

President Kennedy's imminent visit to São Paulo prompted several editorials, all lauding the President as champion of the free world and welcome guest. Press lord Assis Chateaubriand, writing in his Diario de São Paulo, called Brazilian premier Hermes Lima unworthy to treat with Kennedy.

Results of the elections in São Paulo and in Brazil generally were seen by a number of conservative editorialists as evidence that the people repudiate the country's so-called "independent foreign policy," as well as communism and castroism. Leftist papers interpreted the results the other way around. Communist machinations within Brazil worried several writers.



to keeping the Adhemarista forces in power, but even that is better than giving Janio another chance. Besides, it would be a shame to see the Carvalhista forces disappear; they gave the State the best modern government it ever had.

Two more political parties are exactly what São Paulo does not need; it already has thirteen. Paulo de Tarso would be capable of committing the blunder if Janio would go along, and who knows what Janio might do? Ideologically, loss of the Tarso wing would be good riddance for the Christian Democrats, but it is not yet clear how much strength he could take with him. One hopes that Carvalho Pinto will have the sense to forestall formation of a new party in his sphere. (CONFIDENTIAL)

4. Vote for Deputies Shaping Up

Detailed conclusions on the Federal Chamber race cannot be drawn until the vote count is nearly final, which will be several more days. From the spottily distributed two-thirds of the vote which has already come in, however, one can judge the approximate number of São Paulo Federal Deputies which each party will elect with only a small expected error. The six major State parties will each elect about 6 to 11 Deputies: PSP 11, its coalition partner, the PSD, 7; PDC 9, its coalition partner, the UDN, 7; the PTB 8; the PTN 6. The six small parties should each elect from 1 to 3: the MTR 3 (in coalition with thePTN); the PSB 1 (in coalition with PTB); the PRT 2 (in coalition with the UDN - PDC); the PST and PR 2 each; the PRP 1. Looked at from another angle, the six-party administration alliance which backed José Bonifácio will elect about 30 Federal Deputies, the Adhemarista coalition 19, the Janista coalition 9, and Cid FRANCO's PSB 1.

The competition, then, now boils down mainly to that for the highest spots within individual parties, and swings in the vote count could still alter this decisively. It is evident that several well-known incumbents have dropped drastically and may fail to be re-elected; an unusual development. (UNCLASSIFIED)

Comment: The only surprising developments in party strength are from the PTB, which is stronger than expected, and the PSD, which is much weaker. There are many surprises in individual names, however. All considered, it appears that the new official ballot made it (a) easier for educated voters to pick the man they preferred, (b) harder for a few really objectionable types to buy votes, (c) easier for a man with a small but dedicated nucleus to get elected. The PTB gain and PSD loss do not reflect any unexpected strength from the left: some of the new PTB Deputies are centrists. In general, the center appears to be gaining by as much as expected. (LIMITED OFFICIAL USE)

5. Newspapers Plan Congress on "Basic Reforms"

Top-circulation Folha de S. Paulo is working with Rio de Janeiro paper Correio da Manhã to plan a "Brazilian Congress for the Definition



Governor Carvalho Pinto's "Plan of Action" or initiates what the opposition calls the "Plan of Assalt" on the Treasury. Columnist David Nasser in O Cruzeiro perhaps best sums up the wishes of the practical optimists when he hopes that Adhemar, "having no more riches to accumulate, will begin to concern himself with his biography." (CONFIDENTIAL)

Comment: In a private conversation (Airgram 109 of 10/19/62), Adhemar spoke well of Governor Carvalho Pinto, giving some hope that he may have the sense to take advantage of what he will inherit from his predecessor. This and the promised Cabinet of honest technicians seem about the only hopes: the Govemor-elect's own thoughts on São Paulo's future appear . . confused, nebulous, and mystical. The most optimistic practical guess still is that Adhemar will run two or three years of pretty good government -- if only to further his own 1965 presidential aspirations -- and keep graft and corruption below their former levels. (CONFINDENTIAL)

3. Who Will Be the Opposition?

Janio Quadros' bitterness is illustrated by his manifesto on the result of the October 7 election, which comes high on the long list of his unfortunate pronouncements. Example: "The victory, momentary and without greatness, of the reactionary and retrograde interests made up of the forces which fought me, paradoxically heralds the final victory of . . . /my/ theses." If Janio's determination to stay in politics had ever been in doubt, this would have put an end to it. The manifesto also illustrates the manner in which Janio has veered -- or been pushed -- to the left, giving a picture of what to expect when he eventually wins an election in the future. In the meantime, it is clear that Janio will be a leader of the opposition to Adhemar, a role to which he is well adapted.

The remaining question, then, is whether the opposition will be left to Janio or divided with another and more healthy leader. José Bonifácio Nogueira has left no doubt of his willingness to be that leader, but there is room for much doubt as to his effectiveness. Carvalho Pinto would be the only sure bet to direct a significant second force of opposition to Adhemar, and the lame-duck Governor has evidently not made up his mind to do it.

Both potential opposition groups are talking of forming new political parties as their vehicles. On the Janista side, the talk seems to be coming from screwball Deputy Paulo de TARSO, who would probably like to split the left wing off from his Christian Democratic Party and form a "Christian Labor Party" or some such. The source on the Carvalhista side is not clear. It may be José Bonifácio but is probably not the Governor. (LIMITED OFFICIAL USE)

Comment: The question of the opposition leader is of the greatest importance. Adhemar's objectionable governments traditionally make opposition a very fertile field, and Janio should not be allowed to till it all by himself. A split in the opposition might contribute

0267

in public -- an "Axis" of like-minded Governors. (The leftist/pro-GOULART press is not missing a chance to point out the World War II fascist antecedent to Adhemar's unfortunate choice of expression.) Members of the Axis in approximate order of Barros' priority would be the Governors of Rio Grande do Sul, Guanabara, [redacted] Bahia, and perhaps two or three others. One goal of the Axis that the Governor-elect has already mentioned privately would be to exert pressure for the control of inflation. Another he may have in mind would be to get rid of the anti-Western aspects of Brazil's new "independent" foreign policy line. (LIMITED OFFICIAL USE)

Comment: One problem confronting the "Axis" is that all of the Indians, especially LACERDA and Barros, are likely to want to be chiefs. Another is the tendency of almost all formal or informal Brazilian political groupings to fly apart under the centrifugal forces of individual members' ambitions. Time and again new parties and groups are used by individuals as personal political vehicles rather than for their original goals. Adhemar's presidential hopes will tempt him to misuse the Axis in this way. Still, he and some of its other members have more talent than the run-of-the-mill politicians and might be able to make the new machine tick. The idea of heat being brought to bear on Goulart is basically attractive, though one might wish that the heating element were other than Adhemar. (CONFIDENTIAL)

2. Adhemar Under Glass

Governor-elect Adhemar de Barros' first acts are the object of microscopic attention for politicians, friendly and opposed, hopeful and wary, who need to know whether he will carry out his promise to run a good government (for a change). The sporting set is less concerned: it confidently expects a bright new era for night clubs and cock fights. Adhemar is leaving the politicians' doubts unanswered and flying off to Rome to capitalize on the publicity of the Ecumenical Council and strengthen his useful image as a stalwart Christian and democrat.

Many politicians on the side of the current State Government are so relieved that Adhemar beat Janio QUADROS that they are not inclined to blame him for also beating José Bonifácio NOGUEIRA. Even the traditionally opposed UDN (National Democratic Union) rumbles with talk of opening a "credit of confidence" if Adhemar starts out convincingly. His talk sounds good enough. He speaks of conducting a "Government of union"; of nominating a non-partisan "Cabinet of technicians"; of using the best of the current Government's plans but giving more emphasis to the "human goal" ("meta do homen"); of letting bygones be bygones and maintaining a "policy of love." The "policy of love" has not led him to bury the hatchet with José Bonifácio, who called him nasty names; or prevented him from bringing suit against powerful newspaper Estado de S. Paulo, which still calls him nasty names. Adhemar's concrete promises will perhaps be tested first when he nominates his Cabinet of supposedly honest State Secretaries, and later when he either accepts much of

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DEPARTMENT OF STATE

AIRGRAM

732.00/10-2462

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A-112 NO. | CONFIDENTIAL | HANDLING INDICATOR

TO : DEPARTMENT OF STATE

1962 OCT 26 AM 11 36

RM/AN ANALYSIS & DISTRIBUTION BRANCH

FROM : Amcongen SAO PAULO

DATE: October 24, 1962

SUBJECT : Weekly Summary No. 43

REF :

RM/R-Fuller 10/31 - RB

DEPARTMENT OF STATE OFFICE OF INTER-AMERICAN AFFAIRS OCT 26 1962

TABLE OF CONTENTS

POLITICAL
1. Adhemar's Axis
2. Adhemar Under Glass
3. Who Will Be the Opposition?
4. Vote for Deputies Shaping Up
5. Newspapers Plan Congress on "Basic Reforms"
6. Folha Criticizes Alliance for Progress

PSYCHOLOGICAL: 1. Local Press Reaction

POLITICAL

1. Adhemar's Axis

During his campaign, and in his first pronouncements as Governor-elect, Adhemar de BARROS emphasized that "São Paulo will again make its presence felt on the national scene." At a minimum, this seemed to mean that he would not perpetuate Carvalho PINTO's determined and excessive blindness to national political responsibilities; at a maximum, that he would make a point of throwing his weight around. The maximum now seems to be what Adhemar has in mind. The underlying reason for his national interests is certainly his presidential candidacy (which is not open to doubt), though he may well be sincere in his stated conviction that Brazilian domestic and foreign policies need to be pushed back to more traditional patterns. The basic mechanism for Adhemar's intended leverage is what he calls in private conversation -- and sometimes even

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Drafted by: See last page/mc 10/23/62

Contents and Classification Approved by:

Clearances:

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development. Who will this figure be? Who in São Paulo will speak for order, for truth, and for morality?

The question remains in suspense until Janio Quadros' decision on whether or not to remain in politics is known, and until it is known whether the leadership of Janio Quadros will be contested in the anti-Adhemar area. In synthesis, who will be the chief of the São Paulo opposition? This chief will be capable of becoming the fourth1/ big national political figure, for he will lead a considerable portion of the biggest electoral college in the country.

If Janio should be this fourth major power, the victory of Adhemar would have created the conditions for rebirth of Janismo, but of a clearly leftist Janismo, the natural ally of the third group2/, other figures of which will certainly be ARRAES in Pernambuco, and BRIZOLA as a national leader of the extreme left. The candidate of the third position would thus have the support of Janismo, reborn by virtue of the rebirth of Adhemarismo in São Paulo.

1/ and 2/ -- Visão's first 1965 Presidential group is that surrounding Juscelino KUBITSCHEK; the second is the centrist/rightest opposition now gathered around Carlos LACERDA; the third is the radical left. The possibility of Adhemar de Barros' candidacy is not discussed.

Free translation by D.C. Proper.

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Sao Paulo
A-111
Page 1 of
Encl. 1.

SAO PAULO CYCLES

Visão Magazine, October 19, 1962

The victory of Adhemar in São Paulo opens room for some speculations. A difficult option between two candidates antagonistic to Janio Quadros was offered to the industrial world and the Paulista middle class. Adhemar was the worst of the two in abstract terms, but the most viable for the purpose of defeating the radical-leftist candidate /Janio/.

The instinct of self-preservation prevailed over any ethical-moral consideration and demonstrated once more that, in crucial moments, the instinct of social preservation prevails over any other consideration of a rational nature. Between the apparent choice of defeat with the candidate of reason and administrative order /José Bonifácio Nogueira/, expressed by the Plan of Action (orderly capitalistic development), and the viable return to anarchy /with Adhemar/, the industrial electorate, the middle class voter, and the working class beneficiary of São Paulo's industrialization preferred above all the defeat of the radical candidate, electing a candidate who was conservative, even though anarchic.

Paulista politics evolve formally in a cycle which goes from order to anarchy. This formalism reveals a social-Darwinistic aspect of the politics of a State during an industrializing and capitalistic boom. There are moments in which it is necessary to bring order (phase of Janio - Carvalho Pinto) to the jungle of capitalistic development and protect this development from the federal anarchy; there are others in which it is necessary to disregard order in favor of growth, for order can signify a strait-jacket on expansion, which takes place fastest under the law of the jungle.

São Paulo has consolidated its position as conservative citadel on the national scene. Janio was elected governor on a conservative platform and governed São Paulo as a conservative; Carvalho Pinto did the same; now Adhemar, also, oriented his campaign clearly along conservative lines, even in connection with foreign policy. To what should this constant voter preference be attributed? Everything indicates that the Paulista electorate, benefited by rapid industrialization, by the concentration of national income in the State, and by the highest standard of living in the country, will always vote along conservative lines. A great part of the São Paulo working class and the majority of the middle class are the beneficiaries of a favorable distribution of wealth: the classic inequal distribution of wealth between developed areas and underdeveloped areas. They vote conservatively.

Returning to the contradictory evolution of the theory of cycles, we must expect that the election of Adhemar will create conditinns for the appearance of the anti-Adhemar, the figure representing orderly

0263

disorder expected from Adhemar's government, first, could hardly favor São Paulo industrial growth, though it might not slow the expansion very much. Second, Visão would have been more realistic to discuss Adhemar as a potential presidential candidate and not just as an important pawn.

Daniel M. Braddock
Minister Consul General

Enclosure:
1 Free translation of Visão Magazine artical "São Paulo Cycles" dated October 19, 1962.

Distribution: INS/RAR, Amembassy Rio 2; Amembassy Brasilia 2.

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A-111 NO.

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TO : Department of State

1962 OCT 25 AM 11 37

RM/AN ANALYSIS & DISTRIBUTION BRANCH

FROM : Amcongen SAO PAULO

DATE: October 24, 1962

SUBJECT : An Editorial Comment on Adhemar's Victory

REF :

DEPARTMENT OF STATE BUREAU OF INTER-AMERICAN AFFAIRS OCT 26 1962

The enclosed translation of an editorial by Visão magazine is submitted because it contains about the most incisive and objective Brazilian comment so far made on Adhemar de BARROS' gubernatorial victory. The reason given for the victory is no different from that arrived at by practically all other observers: José Bonifácio NOGUEIRA was a less bad anti-Janio QUADROS candidate "in abstract terms," but in practical terms perennial candidate Adhemar seemed a safer bet to beat Janio, and that was the voters' main concern. (This is why the vote count does not reflect how close José Bonifácio actually came: he would only have had to look a little safer than Adhemar, rather than a little less safe, to turn either himself or Janio into the winner.) Visão's predictions are far-sighted: the editorialist expects Adhemar to turn the present São Paulo "order" into "anarchy" -- which might be better translated "confusion" -- but not to slow the State's economic growth. Both Adhemar and the São Paulo opposition leader (Visão wonders if this will be Quadros) are expected to be strong influences on the 1965 presidential race. The editorialist also sees that another anti-Adhemar figure like Quadros will spring up to "speak for order, for truth, for morality." (São Paulo Airgram 100 of 10/15/62 arrives at similar conclusions and examines them in more detail.)

The Consulate General would take mild exception to two of the thought-provoking editorial conclusions. The relative

1 See enclosure for free translation.

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FORM DS-323

Drafted by: POL/DOProper/mec 10/23/62

Centrals and Classification Approved by:

Clearances:

0261

week that he will open a political headquarters here to keep his contacts with the people of RGS as a possible platform for future political takeoffs and that he will continue his traditional Friday night broadcast to the people.

4. Miscellany

a. New Port Captain: Capitão de Fragata Sidney Melechi has been announced as the new Captain of Ports for RGS in place of Enio Moura Valle who has been here for just a few weeks. Valle, related to Governor Brizola, is rumored to be headed for a Petrobrás post in RGS. Melechi, according to the press is a submarine officer trained in the US.

b. Rice Stocks: COAP, the local food supply and price control organization ordered a declaration of all RGS rice stocks within 48 hours, this past week, with disappointing results, since while it had anticipated a declaration of 3 million bags, only 100,000 bags were reported.

Urban transportation fares expected to increase in the near future in Pôrto Alegre.

Frederick D. Sharp III
American Consul

cc.: Consular Affairs, Rio
Politcal Section, Rio
Political Section, Brasília
ARA/EST/Brazil, Washington
INR/RAR/P, Washington

0260

President Kennedy's trip to Brazil will be canceled and a couple of overheard street comments follow the "better-red-than-dead" line.

Further reactions and editorial comment will be reported.

2. Plebiscite

Governor Brizola in his weekly broadcast last Friday stated that the return to presidentialism, which he foresees will be the result of the January 6 plebiscite, will not resolve Brazil's problems but "represents a kind of preliminary, which should led us to the essential, to the objective which all our masses want and need-to be freed from injustices, from anxiety and the limitations which are being imposed upon it. The people want to be liberated from stagnation, from material and cultural backwardness, from marginalism and from economic spoliation". Brizola said that he does not wish superficial or half measures but that he does look for basic changes in the structure of the country, changes which will open the way for the liberation of Brazil.

Correio do Povo, in an editorial this week on the plebiscite, pointed out that with the elections just over, the people are being faced with another decision on January 6. But only really trained and educated people can possibly understand the difference between the presidential and the parliamentary systems. What is really required is an educational program to enlighten the people as to the issues. This, in Correio do Povo's view is the role for the political parties between now and January 6, for the people should not be asked to vote in the dark, on an unknown quantity.

3. RGS Election Returns

The delay in announcing the official election returns has evoked some editorial comment to the effect that over two weeks after the elections the official results are not yet known. The Consulate will, of course, report official figures as soon as released.

4. Political

a. Mayoralty Race - November 1963: As if the exhaustion from the past campaign and the anticipation for the January 6 plebiscite were not enough, inveterate and incurable political columnists are already beginning the Pôrto Alegre mayoralty campaign which will end November 1963. As of now, ADP has Vice Mayor Manoel Braga Gastal as candidate, and State Deputy Cândido Norberto is mentioned for MTR, while PTB is thought to have a number of candidates including just defeated Michaelsen, and Federal Deputy, now State Deputy Wilson Vargas, defeated by Loureiro da Silva for Mayor in 1959, as well as João Caruso, Lamaison Pôrto, Sereno Chaise and Antônio Brochado da Rocha.

b. Brizola to Keep Office Open: Not to be shut out of RGS by his election as Federal Deputy for Guanabara, Governor Brizola announced this

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DEPARTMENT OF STATE

AIRGRAM

732.00/10-2362

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A-19 NO. — OFFICIAL USE ONLY — AIR POUCH HANDLING INDICATOR

DEPARTMENT OF STATE 1962 OCT 27 AM 9 15

BUREAU OF INTER-AMERICAN AFFAIRS OCT 28 1962

RM/AN ANALYSIS & DISTRIBUTION BRANCH

TO : DEPARTMENT OF STATE

FROM : Amconsul PÔRTO ALEGRE DATE: OCT 23 1962

SUBJECT : PÔRTO ALEGRE WEEKLY SUMMARY Nº 27

REF :

RMIE - Yes
10/31 - RB

1. Reaction to Blockade of Cuba
2. Plebiscite
3. RGS Election Returns
4. Political
   a. Mayoralty Race-November 1963
   b. Brizola to keep office open
5. Miscellany
   a. New Port Captain
   b. Rice Stocks

1. Reaction to Blockade of Cuba

Pôrto Alegre awoke this morning to newspaper reports of President Kennedy's announcement last night of the US blockade of Cuba. The "good, gray" Correio do Povo headlined: "Kennedy to Krushchev: We Do Not Want Peace At The Cost Of Liberty" and "Cuba Under Blockade By The US For Having Converted Into Soviet Base". Chateaubriand chain Diário de Notícias headlined: "USA On War Footing: Any Ship Carrying Arms For Fidel Can Be Sunk". Roman Catholic Jornal do Dia: "450,000 Ships And 200,000 American Marines Surround Cuba: Kennedy Orders Total Blockade". The afternoon tabloids headlined as follows: Fôlha da Tarde - "Cuba: Soviet Ships On The Way!"; Ultima Hora - "War Can Break Out Today" and sub-head "Brizola From Rio: I Am On Cuba's Side".

There has been no editorial comment as yet but several Consulate contacts expressed relief that the US had finally taken a firm position on Cuba. Many people have asked whether

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Drafted by: FDSharp/zms 10/23/62

Contents and Classification Approved by: FDSharp

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2. Election Results

Aside from the Pernambuco gubernatorial race, elections throughout the rest of the Northeast continue to run as reported in Weekly Summary No. 16. It is anticipated that final results of most elections will be available within another week. (UNCLASSIFIED)

3. Change in IV Army General Staff

The IV Army has announced that General ALEXANDRE DE CASTRO MUNIZ DE ARAGÃO will assume command of the IV Army General Staff, replacing Col. JOAO SARMENTO, who is to become Secretary of the National Security Council. The change is expected to take place within the next week. (UNCLASSIFIED)

PSYCHOLOGICAL

While the attention of all the local papers was turned to the election returns, a new weekly newspaper made its appearance---Liga. Listed as director on the masthead is FRANCISCO JULIÃO. The tone of the stories, which are little more than outright editorials, is in keeping with the sentiments of the director. In a column entitled "The Other Side of the Story", the paper launches its campaign of rationalizing the Berlin Wall and jabbing at the situation in Oxford, Mississippi. By some tortuous reasoning, the writer moves from the wall through the favelas of Rio to U.S. aid to Germany and terminates the exercise in non sequiturs by concluding that the U.S. interest in Brazil is based on the rise of Castro's Cuba. Having decided that the MEREDITH affair in Mississippi brought the U.S. to the brink of civil war, the paper then blandly passes to a warped history lesson on the last page called "What is the Monroe Doctrine?" Liga apparently will not be handicapped by objectivity.

The leftist Ultima Hora ran a short story which stated that Cuba is the price of saving KENNEDY from an "electoral desert".

/s/ Eugene Delgado-Arias
Eugene Delgado-Arias
American Consul General

Contributors:

~~Hyday~~
Crucker

Arraes' victory is no less significant than it is spectacular. Fighting against the combined power of the Church, the State Government, and the most important agricultural, business and industrial interests, Arraes not only succeeded in gaining what is sure to be a thumping majority in Recife (approximately 35,000 votes) but also held down Cleofas' interior lead to a mere 27,000 votes. Thus, for the first time in Pernambuco history, a candidate whose principal popular support derives from the urban masses has been able to defeat the candidate of the rurally-based economic and social elite which has traditionally ruled in this state. Arraes' victory probably spells the finish of political feudalism in Pernambuco and may well presage the end of that system throughout the Northeast.

To be sure, Arraes did not win this election without much outside help. Senator-elect JOSE ERMIRIO de MORAIS contributed lavishly to Arraes' campaign, and President GOULART is thought to have rendered substantial assistance also. Either directly or indirectly, it is widely believed, Arraes also received help from Cuba, Czechoslovakia and, possibly, the Soviet Union. If that help was not enough to tip the balance in his favor, Arraes also benefitted greatly from the indecisiveness of Governor Cid Sampaio, the petty jealousies of the other members of the Arraes opposition, the old fashioned campaign approach of João Cleofas, and the candidacy of ARMANDO MONTEIRO FILHO, which seems to have taken votes which were expected to go to Cleofas. The final effect of IBAD's name-calling activities may be debatable, but the Monday morning opinion of Governor Sampaio is that it was largely counter-productive.

Arraes, it may be assumed, is well aware of the serious problems he will encounter upon assuming control of the State Government. He is intelligent enough to realize that his election has frightened many people and that unless he takes immediate steps to assuage those fears, the State may suffer an outflow of capital as well as a fall-off in new local investment. (BACARDI Rum Corporation, for example, decided before the election that if Arraes were elected it would not invest the additional 3-4 million dollars it had been contemplating.) Thus, Arraes may be expected to issue a series of moderate conciliatory statements designed to establish confidence in his government among businessmen and industrialists. He may also be expected to award some if not most of the posts of the new cabinet and other positions of confidence to persons who are known not to be Communists.

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DEPARTMENT OF STATE

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732-00/10-2262

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1962 OCT 29 AM 9 00 HANDLING INDICATOR

TO : DEPARTMENT OF STATE

DEPARTMENT OF STATE BUREAU OF INTER-AMERICAN AFFAIRS OCT 29 1962

INFO: RIO DE JANEIRO, BRASILIA, SÃO PAULO, BRIAN ANALYSIS & DISTRIBUTION BRANCH

Belem-1 Porto Alegre-1 Curitiba-1 Belo Horizonte-1

FROM : Amconsul RECIFE

DATE: October 22, 1962

SUBJECT: Weekly Summary No. 17

REF :

RS

S/M/R-Yuli 10/31-RB

TABLE OF CONTENTS

POLITICAL

1. Arraes Elected Governor of Pernambuco
2. Election Results
3. Changes in IV Army General Staff

PSYCHOLOGICAL

POLITICAL

1. Arraes Elected Governor of Pernambuco

Although some 40,000 votes remain to be counted, and although JOÃO CLEOFAS trails ARRAES by the slight margin of only 3,500 votes, it is now certain that Miguel Arraes, Mayor of Recife, is the new Governor-elect of Pernambuco. So definite is the configuration of voting in Recife, where the yet uncounted votes were cast, that even Cleofas and Governor CID SAMPAIO have publicly conceded victory to Arraes. Arraes supporters, elated by the certainty of his election, took to the streets not once but several times in joyous celebration, even before their candidate moved into the lead.

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Control: 16054
Rec'd: October 20, 1962
7:33 p.m.

INFO: RM/R FILES

Recife 160

FROM: Recife

TO: Secretary of State

NO: 160, October 20

PRIORITY

ACTION RIO DE JANEIRO PRIORITY 183, INFORMATION DEPARTMENT 160.

Although Cleofas still ahead by slight margin in official count, Governor Cid Sampaio issued statement today conceding victory of Miguel Arraes.

DELGADO-ARIAS

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FROM: Recife=CORRECTED COPY

TO: Secretary of State

NO: 158, October 19.

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ACTION RIO DE JANEIRO 181, INFORMATION DEPARTMENT 158.

With interior vote almost all counted and about 70,000 Recife votes still uncounted, Cleofas leads by slim margin of 7,000 votes. Of 103,000 Recife votes already tallied, Arraes edge in capital over 19,000 votes. Widely anticipated that Arraes will pass Cleofas on Monday, October 22 though counting not likely to finish for several days thereafter.

DELGADOARIAS

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TO : DEPARTMENT OF STATE

CONFIDENTIAL SERIES

FROM : Amcongen SAO PAULO DATE: October 19, 1962

SUBJECT : Draper Inter-Agency Survey Team Visit to São Paulo

REF : S/S G ARA PUSIA O A PM/A
Deptel 813 September 27, 1962 to Amembassy, Rio de Janeiro

An inter-agency survey team headed by Ambassador William H. Draper, Jr., visited São Paulo on October 16 and 17, 1962. The composition of the team, their activities in São Paulo, and memoranda of conversations between team members and prominent local figures are set forth in the enclosures.

In accordance with instructions contained in the referenced telegram, local publicity on this visit was kept to a minimum.

Ambassador Draper and his colleagues made many contacts with knowledgeable Brazilians and Americans at São Paulo. On departure, the Ambassador and members of his party expressed satisfaction with their visit.

Daniel M. Braddock
Minister Consul General

Enclosures:

1. Composition of the Inter-Agency Survey Team.(CONFIDENTIAL
2. Schedule for visit. (UNCLASSIFIED)
3. Guest List for Luncheon October 16 (UNCLASSIFIED)
4. Guest List for Dinner October 16 (UNCLASSIFIED)
5. Memorandum of Conversation with Dr. Gastão Eduardo de Bueno Vidigal (CONFIDENTIAL)
6. Memorandum of Conversation with Dr. Adhemar de Barros (CONFIDENTIAL)

Document consists of ... pages.

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Contents and Classification Approved by:

0252

3. Mr. Campbell's suggestion that we should take measures to unite the lower classes in their fight against communism was explored. The specific proposals which he presented have been placed before the appropriate officials for evaluation and appropriate action.

4. Mr. Campbell has been encouraged to present his suggestions directly to the action officials involved, since they also are in Rio de Janeiro, and to make his proposals in specific action form for consideration by the Ambassador and [redacted] Country Team.

GORDON

0251

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DATE SENT
October 19, 1962

FROM - USAID RIO DE JANEIRO

SUBJECT - Request of Congressman James E. Van Zandt for Comment on Letter from Mr. Donald F. Campbell

REFERENCE - DEPARTMENT'S AIRGRAM A-62

JOINT EMBASSY/USAID MESSAGE 732.00/8-2761

RIO TOAID A 334 732.00/10-1562

The Deputy Director of the USAID Mission has talked to Mr. Campbell about his views along the following lines:

1. The practice of local private American firms of advertising in unfriendly Brazilian newspapers is a very delicate problem for the Embassy, and the problem was discussed at length with Mr. Campbell.

(For the Department's information and possible use in replying to Congressman Van Zandt, Rio's daily ULTIMA HORA, which is also published in other major cities and thereby has a nationwide circulation, is leftist and ultranationalistic in its editorial policy, and notoriously unfriendly to the United States. The paper is an outspoken supporter of President Goulart and the Brazilian Labor Party of which the President is leader. Besides carrying advertising for the American and American-affiliated firms mentioned by Mr. Campbell, ULTIMA HORA also subscribes to the services of United Press International. The Embassy knows of no instances, however, of advertising by American firms in the principal communist newspaper here, NOVOS RUMOS, or any other communist newspapers.)

2. We have obtained from Mr. Campbell all of the information he has with respect to the political beliefs of the Director and staff of SUDENE. The information which he has is already available to responsible officials of the Embassy. Mr. Campbell has been assured that their decision to continue working with SUDENE was taken in the light of all of the data which he have

(1)

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PAGE 1 OF 1 PAGES

NOV 5 1962

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J. W. Howe, JS	RDOM	411	10-17-62	James W. Howe

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FROM: Recife

TO: Secretary of State

NO: 159, October 19.

ACTION RIO DE JANEIRO 182, INFORMATION DEPARTMENT 159.

Cleofas lead rapidly disappearing. Reduced to 2834 votes at 5 p.m.

DELGADOARIAS

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CONFIDENTIAL

-4- 875, October 19, 4 p.m., from: Rio de Janeiro

Results contests for 409 seats Federal Chamber Deputies still too inconclusive to support valid conclusions but nothing in presently available fragmentary returns seem indicate likelihood departure from honoral pattern Embassy's pre-electoral predictions.

UNQUOTE.

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CONFIDENTIAL

-3- 875, October 19, 4 p.m., from: Rio de Janeiro

and Espirito Santo (where UDN candidates Francisco Lacerda De Aguiar now seems likely to defeat PSD's Jones Dos Santos Neves in a race run between two pro-US conservatives). The crucial PERNAMBUCO confrontation between conservative Joao Cleofas and communist Miguel Arras is still undecided, with Cleofas barely in front but both sides claiming final victory. Bahia presents a similarly tight race between UDN-PTB backed Lomanto Junior and leftist Ultra-Nationalist Waldir Pires, with Pires now narrowly leading. Though Sergipe and Amazonas both seems present similarly tight races, Ultra-Nationalists Sezas Doria seems likely to win in former while Ultra-Nationalist PTB ex-governor Plinto Coelho now gradually widening previously Menuscule lead over PSD's Paulo Neri in latter.

Relative party strengths at gubernatorial level seems little effected by above results with exception of PTB which will apparently drop from control five states to control only two.

Although senate with two-thirds of (i.e., 45)seats up for re-election may have almost half new faces PSD-PTB party blocs appear remain largely unchanged, with UDN gaining slightly. In new state of Acre two UDN, one PSD leading. Ideologically newcomers show slight move from right toward center. One apparent comment Bezerra Neto-PTB (leading for second seat Mato Grosso but contest still close). Principal newcomers on left are Aaron Steinbruch (MTB-Rio), Joao Agripino (UDN-Paraiba), Ermirio Morais (PTB-PERNAMBUCO), Tjtonio Balbino (PSD-Bahia), Aurelio Oianna (PSD-Guanabara). Violently anti-US Jose Joffily (PSB-Paraiba) running last in field of five. Leftist Barbosalima Sobrinho (PSB-PERNAMBUCO) also beaten badly. Two strongest opponents present confiscatory (PL-RGS) appear definitely elected.

CONFIDENTIAL



Balance of election results presently available, however, indicates that leftist victory in Guanabara is something of aberration nationally.

Sao Paulo final results show Ademar (1.25 million) victor over Quadros (1.11 million) and Bonifacio (.72 million). Last minute support statement from Kubitschek probably helped Ademar over top though Quadros vote creditable performance view virtual boycott by mass media, PTB support for Bonifacio and communist advocacy blank votes (low number blanks -- 32,000 -- is poor showing for communists). Quadros sent reasonably sane congratulatory telegram to Ademar urging "good government" although denounced Carvalho Pinto bitterly. Bonifacio's relatively poor showing despite all-out assistance from State Government is severe blow national political prestige Carvalho Pinto.

Results most other gubernatorial races now fairly clear. Rio Grande Do Sul victory (now definitive) of conservative (PSD) Ildo Meneghetti over PTB candidate Michaelson and anti-Goulart maverick Ferrari generally believed (particularly in view senate victories conservative candidates noted below) be clear repudiation of Brizola extremism by own state. On other hand, equally clear victory leftist PTB candidate Badger Silveria in Rio state seems be only most obvious sign general PTB success latter state. Results in newly created Acre state are also now final, with the PTB-UDN candidate, Jose Araujo upsetting the PSD's perennial Josz Guiomard. Other seemingly certain gubernatorial races include Ceara (where conservative Virgilio Tavora piling up massive lead over leftist Ultra-Nationalist Adail Barreto), Piaui (where centrist UDN candidate Petronio Portela appears be pulling away from Constancio Perrira, the hand-picked candidate of Ultra-Nationalist outgoing governor Chagas Rodrigues),

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FROM: Rio de Janeiro

TO: Secretary of State

NO: 875, October 19, 4 p.m.

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FOR AMBASSADOR'S APPROVAL AND RELAY TO DEPARTMENT.

QUOTE FOLLOWING FROM BRASILIA:

On basis growing but still incomplete (and in many cases inconclusive) returns Embassy office believes preliminary analysis results now worthwhile.

Most startling results provided in Kay Guanabara race where Goulart's brother-in-law Lipnel Brizola swept into Federal Deputy seat by largest vote (latest unofficial count: 239,000) ever cast for Federal Deputy. Brizola's landslide victory most prominent part Guanabara electoral picture (including election leftist candidates vice governorship and first senate seat) which generally viewed as stinging defeat (one contrary indicator is general success pro-Lacerda for Head State assembly contest) for publicly pro-US and pro-AFP Governor Carlos Lacerda. Principal elements this deaft (which Embassy views with concern due Brizola's blatantly anti-US stance during recent months) believed be: 1) viciously anti-Lacerda and almost openly revolutionary electoral pose assumed by Brizola which succeeded in rallying countries of nationalists, leftists, communists, malcontents whose only firm point agreement is hatred Lacerda; 2) large amounts of money apparently spent by Brizola and company on massive propaganda campaign 3) successful effort on part Goulart forces bring full force economic power of Federal Government (which still largely concentrated in Rio area) to bear in favor pro-Goulart candidates.

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CONFIDENTIAL

-4- 875, October 19, 4 p.m., from: Rio de Janeiro

Results contests for 409 seats Federal Chamber Deputies still too inconclusive to support valid conclusions but nothing in presently available fragmentary returns seem indicate likelihood departure from general pattern Embassy's pre-electoral predictions.

UNQUOTE.

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and Espirito Santo (where UDN candidates Francisco Lacerda De Aguiar now seems likely to defeat PSD's Jones Dos Santos Neves in a race run between two pro-US conservatives). The crucial Pernambuco confrontation between conservative Joao Cleofas and communist Miguel Arras is still undecided, with Cleofas barely in front but both sides claiming final victory. Bahia presents a similarly tight race between UDN-PTB backed Lomanto Junior and leftist Ultra-Nationalist Waldir Pires, with Pires now narrowly leading. Though Sergipe and Amazonas both seems present similarly tight races, Ultra-Nationalists Sezas Doria seems likely to win in former while Ultra-Nationalist PTB ex-governor Plinto Coelho now gradually widening previously minuscule lead over PSD's Paulo Neri in latter.

Relative party strengths at gubernatorial level seems little effected by above results with exception of PTB which will apparently drop from control five states to control only two.

Although senate with two-thirds of (i.e., 45)seats up for re-election may have almost half new faces PSD-PTB party blocs appear remain largely unchanged, with UDN gaining slightly. In new state of Acre two UDN, one PSD leading. Ideologically newcomers show slight move from right toward center. One apparent Communist Bezerra Neto-PTB (leading for second seat Mato Grosso but contest still close). Principal newcomers on left are Aaron Steinbruch (MTB-Rio), Joao Agripino (UDN-Paraiba), Ermirio Morais (PTB-PERNAMBUCO), Antonio Balbino (PSD-Bahia), Aurelio Oianna (PSD-Guanabara). Violently anti-US Jose Joffily (PSB-Paraiba) running last in field of five. Leftist Barbosaslima Sobrinho (PSB-PERNAMBUCO) also beaten badly. Two strongest opponents present confiscatory profits remittance law Daniel Krieger (UND-RGS) and Mendera (are definitely elected.

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INCOMING TELEGRAM . Department of State

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CORRECTION ISSUED: SGC 10/27/62, 11:18 a.m.

43 Action 32

CONFIDENTIAL

Control: 1603
Rec'd: October 20, 1962 4:54 p.m.

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FROM: Rio de Janeiro CORRECTED COPY

TO: Secretary of State

NO: 875, October 19, 4 p.m.

FOR AMBASSADOR'S APPROVAL AND RELAY TO DEPARTMENT.

QUOTE FOLLOWING FROM BRASILIA:

On basis growing but still incomplete (and in many cases inconclusive) returns Embassy office believes preliminary analysis results now worthwhile.

Most startling results provided in key Guanabara race where Goulart's brother-in-law Lapnel Brizola swept into Federal Deputy seat by largest vote (latest unofficial count: 239,000) ever cast for Federal Deputy. Brizola's landslide victory most prominent part Guanabara electoral picture (including election leftist candidates vice governorship and first senate seat) which generally viewed as stinging defeat (one contrary indicator is general success pro-Lacerda forces in State assembly contest) for publicly pro-US and pro-AFP Governor Carlos Lacerda. Principal elements this defeat (which Embassy views with concern due Brizola's blatantly anti-US stance during recent months) believed be: 1) viciously anti-Lacerda and almost openly revolutionary electoral pose assumed by Brizola which succeeded in rallying congeries of nationalists, leftists, communists, malcontents whose only firm point agreement is hatred Lacerda; 2) large amounts of money apparently spent by Brizola and company on massive propaganda campaign 3) successful effort on part Goulart forces bring full force economic power of Federal Government (which still largely concentrated in Rio area) to bear in favor pro-Goulart candidates.

(1)

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ACTION ASSIGNED TO	ACTION TAKEN	
NAME OF OFFICER & OFFICE SYMBOL	DATE OF ACTION	DIRECTIONS TO RM/R

GPO 830 900

FILED 1962 OCT 21 11:02 AM

732.00/10-1962

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OUTGOING TELEGRAM Department of State

INDICATE IF SECRET OR CONFIDENTIAL

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ACTION: Embassy RIO DE JANEIRO 1007

Expedite reply to Dept. A-62 concerning request of Congressman Van Zandt for comment on letter from Donald Campbell.

RUSK

DRAFTED BY: AR:SSS/S:DMCampbell 10/8/62 | OFFICE/PHONE: | APPROVED BY: ARA:SSS - Mr. Kittredge

AID/LA/[illegible] Mr. Vaped

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FORM DS-322

0241

UNCLASSIFIED

Results of Brazilian Elections

RM/A

FILE

On October 7, 1962, a record number of Brazilian voters (estimated at 15 million) participated in elections for congressional, state and municipal offices. Counting is still far from complete and the outcome of several close races for key Governorships is still in doubt. Although the bulk of the vote counting will be completed in another week, several court contests are in prospect and elections may be rerun in specific electoral districts.

Although the vote tabulations are partial, and inconclusive on specific races, they are enough to confirm the prediction that no substantial change in the balance of party holdings in Congress (PSD, 33%; UDN, 21%; PTB, 20%, other 26%) would result and that its political orientation would remain predominantly centrist-conservative.

In the Senate and Chamber contests it does not appear that President Goulart's left-of-center Brazilian Labor Party (PTB), will make substantial overall gains.

In Guanabara (the city of Rio) the leftist-ultranationalist Brizola, former Governor of Rio Grande do Sul, is obtaining a record vote for an individual candidate for the Chamber but the strongest anti-Communist candidate is also polling an unusually heavy vote. PTB gains in Guanabara and in the neighboring state of Rio de Janeiro, appear to be offset by losses to the Conservative (reformist) National Democratic Union (UDN) and Conservative Social Democratic Party (PSD) in other states.

In important gubernatorial and vice gubernatorial races, PTB and leftist candidates are having mixed success. In the industrial state of Sao Paulo Janio Quadros, attempting a comeback with a generally leftist line, has been beaten for the governorship by conservative Ademar de Barros. It also appears that Michaelsen, the PTB candidate to succeed Brizola as Governor of Rio Grande do Sul, is losing to Meneghetti, the candidate of a center-conservative coalition. One important PTB gain is the victory of its candidate Elci Dutra for the Vice Governorship of Guanabara.

In the Northeast a leftist candidate has apparently been defeated in Ceara, but extremely close races are in progress in Sergipe, Bahia and Pernambuco. In the latter key state, although Communist-lining Miguel Arraes is trailing by some 10,000 votes, the outcome is still uncertain.

UNCLASSIFIED

DEPARTMENT OF STATE
EXECUTIVE SECRETARIAT

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RM/R
FILE

OCT 17 1962

MEMORANDUM FOR MR. McGEORGE BUNDY

THE WHITE HOUSE

Subject: The Brazilian Elections of October 7, 1962

With my memorandum of October 5, 1962, I forwarded a background paper on the Brazilian elections which we believed would be of interest to the President. The enclosed report on the outcome of the elections has been prepared on the basis of the partial returns received thus far from our Embassy in Rio de Janeiro.

John Lloyd III
for
William H. Brubeck
Executive Secretary

Enclosure:

Results of Brazilian Elections.

S/S-RO
OCT 17 1962
A true copy of signed original

732.00/10-1762

Memorandum by RM/R

ARA:EST/B:JWJohnson:am 10/15/62

0239

of Brazil's political maturity and strong democratic principles. The new single government-supplied ballot was generally considered a great improvement, making fraud more difficult and allowing candidates with small financial means a better competitive opportunity. Several comentators decried the large number of ballots marked for governorship candidates but left blank in regard to Federal and State Representative candidates. (Item 1). This tendency, it was felt, indicated a lack of popular interest in and prestige of the legislative branch of government. Speaking of the local São Paulo elections, editorialists generally considered the results as a rejection both of ex-President Janio Quadros and his foreign policy. Several writers emphasized that the election of Adhemar de Barros as new governor, over the incumbent administration's candidate José Bonifácio, did not reflect a repudiation of present Governor Carvalho Pinto and his regime. Rather, it was felt that Adhemar's success was due to his campaign stand as the only candidate strongly expressing opposition to Communism and leftist-extremism.

A number of papers criticized Brazil's foreign policy in connection with Afonso Arinos's appearance before the Inter-American Foreign Ministers Conference. Brazil's policy toward Cuba was considered "suicidal," "ambiguous," "unrealistic" in failing to recognize the threat of Sino-Soviet infiltration in the Western Hemisphere. Prestigious O ESTADO DE S.PAULO noted the apparent rapprochement between Sekou Touré of Guinea and the U.S., and commented wryly that a newly-emergent African nation was waking up to the danger of flirting with Russia while Brazil still dreamed of a "policy of independence." Several papers dismissed the attack in the U.N. by Cuban President Dorticos as the same old vitriol.

The situation at "Ole Miss" gleaned several additional comments, one to the effect that Kennedy's support of Meredith had not received the credit it deserved and the other praising the President as a pillar of Western democracy. A spate of editorials treated of Brazil's financial situation and the government's proposed measures to reduce Federal spending, create a "strong cruzeiro," reduce the national debt, etc. A number of writers agreed that profit remittances abroad should be controlled, but that the new law had many contradictions and should be followed more in spirit than detail. Several noted that the rate of foreign investment in Brazil has vastly reduced and that unemployment may result.

Several editorials commented on Soviet agricultural and economic difficulties, finding the fault to lie in the Communist system as opposed to the successes of democracy. One newspaper noted the inauguration of the Latin American Institute in Moscow, calling it proof of the Soviets' increasing interest in this Hemisphere.

Daniel M. Braddock per DeP

Daniel M. Braddock
Minister Consul General

Contributors:
D.C.Proper
J.Mason - J. Liebof

Distribution: INS/RAR; Amembassy Rio 3; Amembassy Brazilia 2; Amcongen Recife, Amconsulates Belem, Belo Horizonte, Curitiba, Porto Alegre, Salvador Santos.

José Bonifácio is talking about staying around in politics to "lead the opposition." It is not clear how he could do it from the sidelines. His style also needs much improving, though it was better at the end of his campaign. A more talented and experienced politician would have won the governorship with his advantages. Still, he made a fair showing for his first try -- better than the vote count would indicate -- and may be around in secondary politics for a while. (CONFIDENTIAL)

5. Labor Reaction to Adhemar Victory

While large numbers of workers obviously voted for Adhemar de Barros, the Consulate General is not aware of any Paulista labor leaders who supported his campaign. Of the various local labor groupings, the Democratic Union Movement (Movimento Sindical Democrático - MSD) seems the least disappointed at Adhemar's victory. MSD leaders, most of whom actively supported José Bonifácio, have indicated that they believe they can reach some sort of working arrangement with Adhemar. Union leaders comprising the Workers Sindical Union (União Sindical dos Trabalhadores - UST, new name chosen by the emerging group referred to in recent Weekly Summaries as the "third Force") regard Adhemar's position on labor relations as hopelessly reactionary. Most though not all UST leaders are Janistas. The great bulk of the leaders belonging to the Communist-dominated Inter-Union Unity Pact (Pacto de Unidade Inter-Sindical - PUI), following the PCB line, did not support any gubernatorial candidate. Some observers believe that the PUI might welcome an old-style Adhemar crack-down on all labor unions, whether Communist-controlled or not. With respect to the two smaller local labor groups, there is no love lost for Adhemar among either the moribund reformist Union Renovation Movement (Movimento Renovador Sindical - MRS) or the militantly vociferous "left-wing Catholic" National Labor Front (Frente Nacional do Trabalho - FNT). The latter group has the most to fear immediately from Adhemar, who is close to the management of the Perus cement factory now crippled by a bitter five-month FNT-directed strike (see A-57 of September 12, 1962). (LIMITED OFFICIAL USE)

Comment: In the event that Adhemar returns to his former anti-labor policies, including supression of strikes with justifiable economic motivation, the danger exists that some or all of the non-Communist labor groups mentioned above will be forced into alliances or "unity fronts" with the Communists. Only the latter are likely to profit from indiscriminate persecution of unions such as that which occurred under previous Adhemar state administrations. (LIMITED OFFICIAL USE)

PSYCHOLOGICAL

1. Local Press Reaction

São Paulo editorial comment this week concentrated heavily on the results of the Brazilian elections. Most newspapers considered the returns throughout the country as a defeat for the left and a victory for the forces of democracy and stability. A number of editorialists lauded the orderly way in which the elections were conducted as a sign



3. Adhemar Making Big Plans

For the Presidency: When asked whether he would be a candidate for the presidency in 1965, Adhemar said that the decision would have to wait. For him, that is roughly equivalent to saying "I will if I can." Even without such a statement, one could easily guess that Adhemar would run if his health and electoral base allowed. He was the only one of Juscelino KUBITSCHEK's obvious opponents who was not hurt by the October 7 elections. Adhemar probably made some sort of agreement with Kubitschek in return for support in the gubernatorial race, though he denies it. It is not likely to stand in his way.

For the State Government: Adhemar claims that he intends to run a first-class State Government, surrounding himself by a new team of honest young technicians. He is quite possibly sincere in this claim. He will want much better São Paulo support than he now has if he is able to be a candidate for the Presidency, and if health threatens to end his career, he may want to clear his scandalous reputation. Whether he is morally and technically able to run a good government is another question and one which only time will answer. (CONFIDENTIAL)

Comment: The question of Adhemar's desire and ability to run a good government is especially critical because of his strong stand in favor of the United States and against Communism. If he can run a good government, he will be a strong friend. If he follows his past examples -- and he seems old to make the change -- his friendliness could be counter-productive for the U.S. There is a strong possibility that in 1966 he will provide the Communists with the anti-corruption issue they have lacked in São Paulo in the last few years. (CONFIDENTIAL)

4. Adhemar's Opponents: Down but Not Out

Janio cannot be politically buried until he is physically buried. A majority of the State's voters are decisively against him at the moment, but the governorship campaign nevertheless showed that he has almost all of the old demagogic talent and part of the old following. He has traditionally thrived on anti-Adhemarismo and has a new chance to grow in this medium. He carried the city in the October 7 elections and could very likely do it again in the 1965 mayoralty race. He might even prefer to dramatize his plight by starting all over again in the City Council next year. His unique talent and style could conceivably convert this seeming loss of face into an electoral advantage.

Carvalho Pinto is a bitter man. Barring some sort of major surprise in the future, his presidential chances were ended by José Bonifácio's defeat. It is already commonly recognized, however, that the October 7 vote was against Janio and not against the current State Government, which was the best ever and one of the most popular. Carvalho Pinto's impressive accomplishments should provide him with a limited political future if he can swallow his pill and re-enter public life. He would be a logical Finance Minister, for example, for a President who was really serious about putting the nation's economy in order.



Voters must pick one Federal and one State Deputy from hundreds of competitors instead of just half a dozen, as in the other races, and must write the name of their choice on the new official ballot instead of just checking a box. As a result, blank ballots for Deputies in many regions were running about fifty per cent, as against only three or four per cent for Governor. Smaller interest in the congressional elections probably accounted for only a fraction of this discrepancy. There is still no telling whether this drastic voter confusion will alter the final results of the election. Most Deputies who are front-runners so far are well-known incumbents. (UNCLASSIFIED)

Comment: The new ballot may be altering the line-up of Deputies, not unexpectedly. It has probably weighted the scales in favor of urban centers, well educated voters, and highly organized groups. The confusion apparently did not carry over to the gubernatorial race.

A separate Airgram being submitted at the same time as this Summary contains more detailed information. (OFFICIAL USE ONLY)

2. How Did Adhemar Do It?

(a) First, by taking advantage of a split in his traditional opposition. Adhemar probably has the opposition of a majority of the São Paulo public and could not have won against any single acceptable opponent. In a two-way race he could probably have beaten Janio Quadros, who arouses even more opposition; but not, paradoxically, José Bonifácio, who was the weakest of all in the three-way race. Adhemar had only to retain his faithful nucleus of voters to win against two strong opponents.

(b) Because the vote against candidates was more critical than the vote for candidates. The anti-Janio vote turned out to be decisive, and Adhemar got almost all of it. Polls on election eve had showed ten to fifteen per cent of the voters still undecided. Most of these voters were evidently anti-Janistas determined to throw their weight wherever it would do the most good. José Bonifácio never looked like a sure bet, so the last minute swing went to reliable old Adhemar. This total of thousands of anti-Janio votes was never prior to the vote expressed as trend toward Adhemar. Added to his faithful nucleus, it became decisive. The out-dated Adhemar was thus saved from political extinction by a highly unusual election with a key issue -- anti-Janismo -- irrelevant to general trends. He had a very close scrape, even closer than the vote count shows.

(c) By making no mistakes. Both of his opponents ran more brilliant campaigns, but both made errors. In a negative campaign, the important thing was not to blunder. Janio started out very badly, giving an unconvincing explanation of his resignation and surrounding himself with an unsavory staff. Governor CARVALHO PINTO made many small errors and two large ones: picking José Bonifácio as a candidate and allowing his campaign to take on a leftist/nationalist flavor. (LIMITED OFFICIAL USE)



ORIGIN/ACTION

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OSD 12	USIA 8	NSA 3

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DEPARTMENT OF STATE

AIRGRAM

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A-102 NO. | CONFIDENTIAL HANDLING INDICATOR

TO : DEPARTMENT OF STATE 1962 OCT 20 AM 9 02

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RM/AN
ANALYSIS & DISTRIBUTION
BRANCH

FROM : Amcongen SAO PAULO DATE: October 17, 1962

SUBJECT : Weekly Summary No. 42

REF :

DEPARTMENT OF STATE
BUREAU OF
INTER-AMERICAN AFFAIRS
OCT 22 1962

TABLE OF CONTENTS

POLITICAL
1. Some Winners Already Known
2. How Did Adhemar Do It?
3. Adhemar Making Big Plans
4. Adhemar's Opponents: Down but Not Out
5. Labor Reaction to Adhemar Victory

PSYCHOLOGICAL: 1. Local Press Reaction

POLITICAL

1. Some Winners Already Known

The trends of the October 7 elections for Governor, Vice Governor, and Senators became evident in the first two days of vote counting and have changed little since: Adhemar de BARROS continues to lead Janio QUADROS and José Bonifácio NOGUEIRA by about 1,200,000 votes to 1,100,00 to 750,000; Laudo NATEL is far ahead for Vice Governor; incumbents Auro Moura ANDRADE and Lino de MATTOS will be re-elected Senators by comfortable margins. None of these men are winning by landslides, but it is clear that their victories are not in danger. Final vote count for these positions will be known soon.

The situation is not clear for the Federal and State Deputies, who are elected by a much more complicated system.

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FORM 4-52 DS-323

Drafted by: See last page /mc 10/17/62

Contents and Classification Approved by:

Clearances:

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local Diário de Notícias staff is not pleased with the situation, since it had witnessed the demoralization and confusion Última Hora created in the offices of Jornal do Dia. One Diário de Notícias staff member has made the pessimistic comment that out of this arrangement only one paper will emerge, feeling that Diário de Notícias may not be able to cope with the problems Última Hora could create.

Of great interest and adding to the confusion within the offices of Diário de Notícias is the fact that since the first of October, Última Hora has been publishing two daily editions: one late in the morning, and the other early afternoon. To date, these two editions are remarkably similar, but opinions from journalists of other papers lead to the conclusion that the two-edition (total of 55,000 circulation) could be very successful if Última Hora will continue to improve and change the second edition's make up. This, of course, remains to be seen.

b. Almost unnoticed in the furor attending the election period was the disappearance of Communist-oriented Resistência, which has apparently folded for financial reasons.

3. Miscellany

a. According to the press, Czechoslovakian Commercial Council Karel Almasy, accompanied by Vilem Havelka of the Czech publicity agency charged with the promotion of industry and commerce, spent two days in Pôrto Alegre last week in an attempt to increase commercial relations between this area and Czechoslovakia.

b. Polish Consul Josef Duda and Vice Consul Piotr Kirpluk called on the Consulate this past week, their main function, according to them, being that of an increase of commercial interexchange between Poland and Brazil.

c. COFAP President Max do Rego Monteiro, in a public statement yesterday said that he will not lift the present prohibition on rice shipments to other areas of Brazil by private merchants until the next rice harvest.

Frederick D. Sharp III
American Consul

cc.: Consular Affairs, Rio
Political Section, Rio
Political Section, Brasília
ARA/EST/Brazil, Washington
INR/RAR/P, Washington

Department: Pass to all posts in Brazil,

0233

weakness of the ADP coalition, which should have given Meneghetti a 100,000 vote victory, is now manifest; and 3) that PTB is a monolithic bloc of party discipline and organization, pointing out that Michaelsen was not a popular figure and that if PTB rids itself of its evil elements and agitators (i.e. Brizola) it represents the best political expression of the State's changing political structure.

Now that the election of Meneghetti is an accepted fact the initial steps toward establishing the base for his administration are beginning to be taken as Pôrto Alegre Mayor Loureiro da Silva heralded close cooperation between the municipal and State governments, which has not been the case during the Brizola administration. Moreover, the heads of the ADP coalition parties have issued a statement that the Governor-elect will have absolute freedom to appoint the members of his government without party pressure, although whether this will be a fact remains to be seen. In addition, Meneghetti is meeting with political leaders in the State Assembly to consider the 1963 State budget which has been put together by the Brizola administration. There seems little doubt but that the Meneghetti administration will be called upon to shoulder an infinitely greater financial burden than that which Brizola inherited from Meneghetti in 1958.

Eloi Dutra, victorious candidate for Vice Governor of Guanabara and correligionary of Brizola, spent the weekend with the Governor for the same purpose as Meneghetti has done, reported above. Incidentally, the reported"victory luncheon" in Rio to be offered in honor of Brizola by Admiral Suzano at the behest of General Osvino has caused a considerable amount of speculation in Pôrto Alegre.

2. Press Developments

a. Última Hora's Change in Printing Facilities: Since the first locally printed edition of Última Hora appeared in Pôrto Alegre, it has used the facilities of the Roman Catholic Jornal do Dia for makeup and printing. This has not been an easy marriage, but Jornal do Dia, pressed for money and forced by Archbishop Vicente Scherer to accept the proposal, has been renting the services of its excellent printing establishment to Última Hora.

However, under pressure from all members of the Church, Scherer finally took advantage of a contract option to terminate Jornal do Dia's printing services for Última Hora. As of October 1, Última Hora has been using the services of the Diários Associados organ, Diário de Notícias.

This new turn of events came as a surprise. However, reports are that the Diários Associados directors of Rio found the financial advantages too great to refuse for its RGS paper has been losing money. Our sources report that the decision to extend Diário de Notícias' facilities to Última Hora was made in Rio and over the head (and objections) of the local newspaper. It is enough to say that the

0232

PTB	12	PSD	7
ADP	8	MTR	2

In the State Assembly, as of the present writing, with not all returns in, the line-up will probably be as follows:

	Elected	Consulate's Forecast	Present
PTB	23	20/19	24
PSD	13	14/15	14
PL	5 possibly 6	6	7
PDC	4	4/5	2
UDN	3	4/3	3
PRP	3	3	3
MTR	3 possibly 4	2	-
ARS	1	1	-

Again, PTB party strength and discipline were underestimated in forecasting the results.

The Consulate will transmit final official results on all elective offices once they have been announced by the TRE, accompanied by an analysis.

The most widespread comment, particularly in the classes produtoras has been that the victories of Ademar in São Paulo, Meneghetti in RGS and, if elected, Cleofas in Pernambuco, have slowed the trend to the left giving the enlightened elements of Brazil a 4-year respite in which to work out the social and economic reforms so badly needed. Our contacts among this group report that they have read the handwriting on the wall and are prepared for 4 years of hard, and hopefully, fruitful work.

Governor Brizola's comment was that the split in the vote of the "popular forces" gave Meneghetti the victory and that the great losers in the election were the masses in this State. Brizola foresees the upcoming period of government as one of unprecedented stagnation and ineptness, but that the PTB has been strengthened in this State and that this election is but a brief reversal in the trend of which he is the standard bearer. Correio do Povo political columnist, Fay de Azevedo, however, says that Brizola suffered the greatest defeat (rather than Michaelsen) as a result of the Governor's lack of leadership in the administration of the State's affairs, and that the electorate gave him a resounding vote of no confidence. The columnist says that one cannot measure the defeat of the PTB solely in the difference between the vote for Meneghetti and Michaelsen, but rather by adding the ADP and the MTR vote which shows a margin of some 315,000, as contrasted with the Brizola 1958 PTB victory of 170,000. Pôrto Alegre Mayor Loureiro da Silva, probably the most experienced and wily politician in this State, viewed the election as follows: 1) the poor showing of Ferrari demonstrated that the supposed "clamor of the masses" was a fiction; 2) the inherent

0231

In the Federal Deputies race the final results are still undetermined but the makeup of the RGS delegation to the Chamber of Deputies will probably be as follows:

Partido Trabalhista Brasileiro (PTB) 14 or 15

Floriceno PAIXÃO
Paulo MINCARONE
Cesar PRIETO
Armando TEMPERANI PEREIRA
Walter GIORDANO ALVES
Adilio Martins VIANA
Unirio MACHADO
Ney Ortiz BORGES
Clay ARAUJO
Milton DUTRA
Zaire Nunes PEREIRA
Bento ALVES
Croacy OLIVEIRA
Floriano MAIA D'AVILA

Aliança Democrática Popular (ADP) 6 or 7

Carlos de BRITO VELHO (PL)
Alcides FLORES SOARES Jr. (UDN)
Euclides TRICHES (PDC)
Afonso ANSCHAU (PRP)
Cid FURTADO (PDC)
Norberto SCHMIDT (PL)
Raul PILLA (PL)

Partido Social Democrático (PSD) 7

Walter PERACCHI BARCELLOS
Tarso DUTRA
Daniel FARACO
Clovis PESTANA
Lauro LEITÃO
Luciano MACHADO
Ary ALCANTARA

Movimento Trabalhista Renovador (MTR) 1

Jairo BRUM

If the PTB elects as many as 15 Federal Deputies, it will have an absolute majority in the State delegation and at least 2 of the new Deputies from that party are extreme leftists, Clay de ARAUJO and Floriano MAIA D'AVILA. However, the opposition has elected 13 (possibly 14) excellent, articulate individuals and the likes of BRITO VELHO, FLORES SOARES, TRICHES, DUTRA, FARACO, and the old warhorse PILLA will not be submerged by the theatrics of the PTB deputies. If PTB has 14 and ADP/PSD 14, it will fall to MTR's Jairo BRUM to be the deciding vote in the State delegation. Interestingly enough, BRUM played a key role in the election of Langsch as State Assembly president last April. Nonetheless, the Consulate underestimated the strength and discipline of PTB in this election for we had believed that PTB, at most, would elect 12 Federal Deputies. Our estimate ran as follows:

ORIGIN/ACTION

ara-4

RM/R	REP	AF
2		
ARA	EUR	FE
NEA	CU	INR
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E	P	IO
4	1	
L	FSO	AID
AGR	COM	FRD
INT	LAB	TAR
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		4
ARMY	CIA	NAVY
5	16	5
OSD	USIA	NSA
12	8	3

(19)

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

AIRGRAM

732.00/10-1662

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A-18 — OFFICIAL USE ONLY — AIR POUCH

HANDLING INDICATOR

NO.

TO: DEPARTMENT OF STATE 1962 OCT 19 PM 12 01

Curitiba-1
Porto Alegre-1
Rio-1
Brasilia-1
Belem-1
Belo Horizonte-1
Recife-1
Salvador, Bahia-1
Santos-1
Sao Paulo-1

RM/AN
ANALYSIS & DISTRIBUTION
BRANCH
DATE: OCT 16 1962

FROM: Amconsul PÔRTO ALEGRE

SUBJECT: PÔRTO ALEGRE WEEKLY SUMMARY Nº 26

REF:

RM/R - Fuller
11/5 - RB

DEPARTMENT OF STATE
BUREAU OF
INTER-AMERICAN AFFAIRS
OCT 22 1962

1. RGS Elections Results
2. Press Developments
3. Miscellany

1. RGS Elections Results

While the cedula única made voting in Pôrto Alegre relatively easy for the elector, it did delay the counting of the votes and hence the final results of the election for governor and senators did not become known until a full week after the ballots had been cast. The final results, although still unofficial, and doubtless subject to some minor changes by the Tribunal Regional Eleitoral (TRE) are as follows:

Governor	Total	Interior	Capital (P. Alegre)
Ildo Meneghetti	504,070	445,453	58,617
Egidio Michaelsen	482,747	403,547	79,200
Fernando Ferrari	292,764	220,727	72,037
Senator			
Mem de Sá	572,114	487,270	84,844
Daniel Krieger	566,542	490,878	75,664
Brochado da Rocha	541,175	436,128	105,044
Mariano Beck	518,384	428,852	89,532

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Drafted by: FDSharp/zms 10/16/62

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1041), particularly from Adrogue and others singled out for direct or indirect excoriation of Alsogaray.

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FROM: Buenos Aires

TO: Secretary of State

NO: 1121, October 16, 7 p.m.

735.00

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INFO:

RM/R FILES

Buenos Aires 1121

Economy Minister Alsogaray appeared midnight October 15 television discussion with representatives press. Program entitled "Rumor of Week" somewhat comparable "Meet the Press", lasted two hours and was marked by numerous emotional outbursts.

Responding questions, Alsogaray attempted refute numerous charges and criticisms levelled against him and his official acts, castigated his "slanderers" and denied or tried explain away "false imputations." Said recently dissolved National Investigating Commission originally well conceived but converted by golpista minister (clearly meaning Adrogue) into instrument for discrediting government. Charged that decree limiting right to strike was hastily thrown together under Adrogue's direction and that he signed it as only alternative to resigning when he felt Adrogue should resign. Alsogaray made perfectly clear he supports revision this decree. He decried recurring rumors his resignation and dismissed as unimportant UCRI and Progressive Democratic Party demands he quit. Emphasized seriousness financial-economic crisis and called for tranquility for at least six months. Said he not indulging in politicking. Reiterated charges existence anti-UCRI "McCarthyism" within government but denied any anti-Colorado "McCarthyism" in present regime.

During program Alsogaray showed signs nervous strain and revealed quick temper several times.

Press coverage Minister's statements by major dailies uneven and reaction or editorial comment thus far lacking. Anticipate reaction similar that following October 3 speech (Embassy telegram 1041),

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PSYCHOLOGICAL

The elections claimed the major portion of press attention during the past week. Stories on the Papal Ecumenical Council appeared with regularity. Cuba and JAMES MEREDITH's tribulations in Oxford, Mississippi, received sporadic coverage during the week in the Jornal do Commercio and the Diario de Pernambuco, but was widely reported in leftist Ultima Hora and received the expected treatment in Communist A Hora. The general press attitude toward Cuba is probably best summed up by a comment concerning Cuban President DORTICOS' attacks on the U. S. in the U.N. as reflected in Jornal do Commercio's "Cronica Internacional"--"His accusations are the same as those with which we are already acquainted, characterized by a complete lack of originality."

Two major points caught the attention of all the news media with respect to the elections. They were quiet and orderly nationally, and there was approximately a thirty percent abstention by voters in Pernambuco.

The most incisive analysis of what the elections in this area may mean was posed by Diario de Pernambuco in an editorial entitled "Alarm Signals". In essence, Diario's opinion was that even if the conservative Cleofas wins, the heavy leftist vote for Arraes portends the change which is coming.

Eugene Delgado-Arias

Dr. Eugene Delgado-Arias
American Consul General

Contributors:
LCKilday
CTucker

TRL



ADAHIL BARRETO two to one so far and may well increase this margin before the counting is finished. WILSON GONCALVES (PSD) is assured of one seat in the Senate, while CARLOS JEREISSATI (PTB) and TANCREDO ALCANTARA (PDC) continue to fight for the second seat.

In the Fortaleza mayoralty contest, union leader MOURA BELEZA (PSB) is less than 1,000 votes behind COL. MURILO BORGES DE OLIVEIRA (PL) at this point.

Paraiba: Former Minister of Mines and Energy JOÃO AGRIPINO piled up an early lead in the Senate race and is now certain of victory. Incumbent Senator ARGEMIRO DE FIGUEIREDO (PTB) faltered at the start but has now overtaken Agripino's running mate, ALUIZIO CAMPOS, and is expected to win. Leftist-nationalist JOSE JOFFILY (PSB) and conservative DRAULT ERNANI (UDN) both of whom made simultaneous bids for the Senate and the Chamber, have apparently lost in both races.

Paraiba's thirteen seats in the Federal Chamber of Deputies are expected to be divided along party lines as follows: PSD, 5-6; UDN 6-7; PTB, 2-3.

Of special interest is the election to the State Assembly of FRANCISCO DE ASSIS LEMOS, President of the Ligas Camponesas in Paraiba. The other Ligas candidate, widow of assassinated Ligas leader João TEIXEIRA, was not elected.

Rio Grande do Norte: MONSENHOR WALFREDO GURGEL (PSD) is assured of his seat in the Senate, while the other is still the object of a hard fight berween TEODORICO BEZERRA (PSD) and DINARTE MARIZ (UDN). DJALMA MARANHÃO leftist Mayor of Natal, made a dismal showing in his bid for the Senate, ending up fifth of five candidates.

Alagoas: Press reports of the election results in Alagoas indicate that former Governor ARNON DE MELO (PDC) has captured first place in the Senate race. RUI PALMEIRA and TEOTONIO VILELA (both of the UDN) continue to vie for the second spot. Governor CID SAMPAIO of Pernambuco seems to be failing in his quest for election as a Federal Deputy from Alagoas. (LIMITED OFFICIAL USE)

2. Command Changes at 2nd Air Force

Former 2nd Air Force Commander BRIGADEIRO ISMAR DO BRASIL, relieved of his post by a decree published on September 29, departed Recife on Sunday, October 14. His successor, BRIGADEIRO ANTONIO JOAQUIM DE SILVA GOMES, arrived the following day to assume his new command.

Comment: Brigadeiro Brasil, reportedly picqued by the brusque manner in which he was relieved, refused to await his successor's arrival to turn over the command. Brasil, it will be recalled, was suspected of being disloyal to President GOULART during the September crisis. (LIMITED OFFICIAL USE)



The final results of the election are not expected to be known before October 22. Although ballot counting in the interior is drawing to a close, counting in Recife proceeds at the rate of about 12,000 votes per day. Once the total interior vote has been posted, and Cleofas' lead there is established, all attention will fasten on the returns from Recife. Tension around the State, already high because of the evenness of the two candidates, is expected to increase as each day's posting of the Recife vote cuts down Cleofas' lead and makes victory more possible for Arraes and less certain for Cleofas.

There is already much talk of a statewide recount of the gubernatorial vote. If a recount is requested and granted, both sides will also file a rash of complaints of fraud, ballot-stealing, etc., and the ensuing legal battle could drag on for months. (In 1946, a protracted court struggle prevented BARBOSA LIMA SOBRINHO from assuming office for a year.) Not surprisingly, the group most interested in pushing for a recount is the PSD, whose candidate for Vice Governor, PAULO GUERRA, is already assured of victory. Guerra, of course, would take over as Acting Governor if a court fight develops and is not settled before Inauguration Day.

The results of the Senate race so far confirm earlier predictions that Pernambuco's new representatives in the Senate will be São Paulo industrial baron JOSÉ ERMIRIO DE MORAIS and radio, T-V, and newspaper magnate FRANCISCO PESSOA DE QUEIROZ. Incumbent Senator JARBAS MARANHÃO may still have a statistical chance to hang on to his seat but nobody seriously expect him to be able to pick up the 25,000 votes by which he trails Pessoa de Queiroz.

In the 60 candidate scramble for the 24 seats in the Federal Chamber of Deputies, there is only one real surprise, the unexpected strength of Ligas Camponesas leader FRANCISCO JULIÃO. Julião has drawn surprisingly well in Recife, along the coast, and in the densely-populated Mata zone, and is now thought to be assured of a seat in the Chamber. Julião's running mates in the PST-PSB coalition, WALDEMAR LUIZ ALVES and PELOPIDAS SILVEIRA, are also expected to win election. The PTB vote is running as anticipated, and indications are that the PTB will have 7 or 8 deputies in the new Chamber. The PSD-UDN coalition also is drawing votes in accordance with most predictions and should elect 13 to 14 deputies.

Ceara: Former Minister of Public Works, VIRGILIO TAVORA, running on the coalition ticket of the PSD-UDN-PDC has outdrawn leftist-nationalist



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DATE: October 15, 1962

SUBJECT: Weekly Summary No. 16

REF :

DEPARTMENT OF STATE
BUREAU OF
INTER-AMERICAN AFFAIRS
OCT 22 1962

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TABLE OF CONTENTS

POLITICAL

1. Election Results
2. Command Changes at 2nd Air Force

PSYCHOLOGICAL

POLITICAL

1. Election Results

With approximately two-thirds of the total vote now counted, Pernambuco's gubernatorial contest has developed into a neck and neck race that could well end in a photo finish. As anticipated, JOÃO CLEOFAS has taken the lead in the interior of the State and present indications are that he will finish there with a 35,000--40,000 vote margin. In Recife, where vote counting is much slower, MIGUEL ARRAES' lead increases daily. On the basis of the Recife vote already counted, it is expected that Arraes will take the capital city by at least 32,000 votes. At the moment, then, it appears that Cleofas is going to win this election by 3,000--8,000 votes. If hedging is in order, however, the Consulate General hastens to point out that a stronger-than-expected pro-Arraes surge in Recife is still possible, in which case either candidate could emerge with a final 1,000 to 3,000 vote edge.

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ACTION
is assigned to
P/OPR

October 15, 1962

United States Senate

In re: Miss Carole Powers
Box 34323
Bob Jones University
Greenville, South Caroline

Respectfully referred to

Congressional Liaison
Department of State

---

with thanks for such favorable consideration as the communication herewith submitted warrants, and for a report thereon, to accompany return of inclosure.

By direction of

Hubert H. Humphrey

GPO 70028" **U. S. S.**

Please return to attention of:
L. Trihub, G 241 NSOB

Encl.
Many thanks, Hugh

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10/16/62

Request for info on Brazil

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File RB

732.00 10-15-62 Carole Powers

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October 22, 1962

Dear Senator Humphrey:

I want to thank you for your communication of October 15 enclosing a letter from Miss Carole Powers of Greenville, South Carolina. Miss Powers requests information on Brazil.

I am happy to enclose material which I hope will be of interest to Miss Powers. Included are statements which suggest other references your constituent may wish to use if she desires additional information.

I am returning your constituent's letter for your files. If I may be of any further assistance to you, please do not hesitate to call on me.

Sincerely yours,

Thomas R. Mathews
Deputy Assistant Secretary
for Congressional Relations

Enclosures:

1. From Miss Powers.
2. Selected material.

(1)

mailed by [redacted]

The Honorable
Hubert H. Humphrey,
United States Senate.

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CONFIDENTIAL São Paulo A-100
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The Senate

Incumbents Auro Moura Andrade and Lino de Mattos are being re-elected, as had appeared probable. QUEIROZ Filho and Abreu SODRÉ are running third and fourth, decisively behind the first two but close to each other. The percentages at the moment are about 22 for Auro, 20 for Lino, 14 for Queiroz Filho, 14 for Sodré. A mild surprise is that Queiroz Filho is fractionally ahead of Sodré. Had the former's organized campaign been combined with the latter's greater talent and popularity, the administration forces could almost surely have beaten Lino de Mattos.

Federal Chamber and State Assembly

It is too early to know who is being elected; many Deputies have most of their strength in a single region and some regions have not gotten their vote count in. Those who are evident front-runners at this date are almost all well-known incumbents.

It is already clear, however, that the new single ballot had a most decisive effect on the election. In the first place, it frightened some voters off entirely, approximately doubling the rate of absentions. But the rate was still small and the sacrifice acceptable. The real problem is that the proportion of blank ballots shot up drastically. In many zones, half the ballots for Federal and State Deputies were reportedly blank. Voters had to write in the names of their choices for Deputy -- instead of just checking a box in front of the names of the Governor, Vice Governor, and two Senators -- and many of them obviously could not handle it. The effect of this will probably be to stiffen the literacy requirement for voting, and perhaps to award a premium to certain tightly organized groups capable of giving voters intensive indoctrination. This is still not necessarily bad. It remains to be seen whether the new ballot distorted the vote, made it more fair, or had no significant effect. The Consulate General hopes to get a fairly accurate idea of the effect later by comparing the Deputies elected with those predicted in Airgram A-78 of 9/26, which should have been reasonably accurate in an election with the old ballot.

Daniel M. Braddock

- Daniel M. Braddock
Minister Consul General

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the question of Adhemar's attitude toward the U.S. is already settled (at least for the time being): he is effusively friendly. His stand on international politics seems close to that of Guanabara Governor Carlos LACERDA, whose support for him in the campaign was thinly concealed. In his first public statement after election, for example, he criticized the new Brazilian "independent" foreign policy; preferred "traditional friendships" -- with the U.S.; advocated joining with other nations to form a "United States of Latin America"; opposed the recent nationalistic profits remittance bill; called the Communists the only Brazilians who were not "nationalists."

Adhemar is a powerful friend and perhaps a sincere one. It would seem foolish to lose this friendship, especially when discreetly exercised influence may help him to run a good government. One cannot exclude the hypothesis that he may really want to run a good government.

On the other hand, support to Adhemar is very likely to wind up looking like support to corruption and reaction. His past governments came pretty close to representing the antithesis of the philosophy of the Alliance for Progress.

The result of such a painful decision is sometimes a policy of doing nothing. Such a policy would not be all bad in this case; one could explain to the Governor that lack of support resulted from the evident fact that São Paulo needs support less than any other State in Brazil. It would seem more productive, however, to try to maintain close personal relations with him and to give him some Alliance aid. Alliance projects should perhaps be confined to two types: (1) highly visible social projects susceptible of close control by American administrators; (2) technical help in the task of planning and running a government.

The Vice Governorship

Laudo Natel is winning easily, as expected. He has about 45 per cent of the votes counted so far. Faria LIMA is next with about 34 per cent -- a good showing in view of his small campaign. In the few days preceding the election, it became evident that he was improving his position slightly, perhaps because of voter sympathy with the lack of help he was getting from Janio Quadros. Faria Lima could have won the race with real backing, and he may still reappear as a politician. Running third in the present vote count is Theotônio Monteiro de BARROS, Adhemar's candidate, with a respectable 20 per cent of the vote. Most of the rest of the ballots are blank.

Natel has no political history, but presumably he would be an acceptable substitute if one of Adhemar's rumored ailments were to get serious. Natel, a banker, might well accept Carvalho Pinto's advice if he should become Governor early in the term.

Adhemar backed his own candidate firmly and honestly right to the end of the campaign, unlike Janio. It is not clear, therefore, whether the Governor-elect will care to work closely with his second-in-command.

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prevailing expectation is summed up by traditional opponent Estado de S. Paulo, which differs only in frankness from many other observers:

"What inglorious destiny awaits the diligent and admirable efforts of the men who work in the offices, the laboratories, the research centers of the State /under the present Carvalho Pinto Government/? With Mr. Adhemar de Barros, a whole outmoded mentality will again prevail. Great decisions will again be based on confused ideas; plans will be ripped up by ignorant . . . improvisers who detest the serious tasks of planning . . . . Corruption will again flourish with all its court of big and little miseries."

But even Estado's chief, Julio MESQUITA Filho, is a little more optimistic in private conversation. It is true that Adhemar's previous governments give no grounds for encouragement, but the Consulate General believes there is room for some hope that the coming term will be better. There are several reasons for this hope:

(1) The Governor-elect has already sworn to surround himself with a "whole new team of young men." He is likely to keep the promise, since he is convinced that he has in the past few years been "betrayed" by his old squad.

(2) He probably has his eye on the Presidency again, as mentioned earlier, and wants to go into the race with an improved reputation and better support from his home State.

(3) Whatever he puts out for public consumption, he is surely privately aware that his election is a result of anti-Janismo rather than a public verdict on Carvalho Pinto's Government. The current Government has been an outstanding success, and Adhemar is shrewd enough to spot the reasons and copy some of them.

(4) The Governor-elect will inherit a full treasury, an elaborate set of plans for developing the State, and perhaps some good medium-level technicians (the top rank will presumably be replaced). It should take a couple of years to fritter away these advantages.

In the short run, then, the prospects are not necessarily glum. Long range prospects are worse. It is difficult to imagine Adhemar continuing an austere, efficient, honest government, and the advantages carried over from the previous one do not seem likely to last four years. His opponents in the 1966 gubernatorial campaign are very likely to have another excellent opportunity to campaign against graft and inefficiency. The Communists, among others, are quick to seize such opportunities. They were ineffective in the present São Paulo campaign because of the Government's honesty and success in beginning reforms. Adhemar should provide them with a better opportunity in 1966.

U.S.Policy

This makes for an embarrassing policy decision. The question of U.S. attitude toward Adhemar needs to be considered promptly, because



him in 1958; (2) maintaining his large nucleus of voters blindly faithful to him as a person; (3) adding to this nucleus the votes of the anti-reformists, anti-Communists, and the critically important anti-Janistas; (4) making no tactical blunders. He is not winning by a large margin, and he does not seem to be winning outright in many places outside his traditional zones of influence. His strength is coming from the consistently strong second place he holds almost everywhere, while both Janio and José Bonifácio are often poor thirds.

By rights, Adhemar should be politically dead. He was saved from fossilization by a thoroughly abnormal election.

Future of the Principals

Adhemar, several reasons to the contrary not withstanding, may well be a candidate for the Presidency again in 1965. He is old physically and historically, possibly ailing, and probably committed in some way to Juscelino Kubitschek for support in the gubernatorial race. None of these problems will necessarily stand in the way of his ambition. Of Kubitschek's most conspicuous potential competitors in 1965, Adhemar is the only one who seems to be improving his position in the present election.

Carvalho Pinto's presidential chances now look slim indeed. He might have been one of Kubitschek's strongest competitors if -- but only if -- he had elected José Bonifácio. But it will be remembered for a long time that he gave São Paulo the best government ever, and some sort of political resurrection for him will be an eventual possibility.

Janio is out of the picture for the time being -- the most encouraging result of the election. The negative aspects of Barros' victory are minor compared to the opportunities for mischief which would have been available to Quadros in another position of national importance. His near success in the campaign, however, demonstrates that he cannot be prematurely buried. He still has a considerable comeback capacity. Old demagogues may die, but they do not easily fade away. Janio will have many chances to get back in active circulation: in March 1965, for instance, he could run for Mayor of São Paulo. He is carrying the city in the present election and could probably do it again, especially since he will have a chance to play in an anti-Adhemar role, his historic favorite. He might even prefer to dramatize his plight by starting all over again as a member of the City Council in October 1963. From national to city politics seems like quite a comedown, but Janio will have to run for something. Politics are as much a part of his blood as corpuscles.

José Bonifácio is making vague talk about staying in politics, to "lead the opposition," but he will have to improve his technique before there is a future in it for him.

What to Expect from Adhemar?

Adhemar is obviously an old cabbage to be turning over a new leaf, so his previous terms in office give an idea of what to expect. The

0217

It needs to be made clear that Adhemar, even at the end, never got any sort of band wagon noticeably rolling. He conducted a short and unspectacular campaign, acting on the advice of counselors who warned him that he usually makes mistakes and loses voters when he talks too much.

On the other hand, Adhemar did not make any mistakes. Both of his competitors did. Janio started out poorly, giving a laughable explanation of his controversial resignation and surrounding himself with a miserable staff. Carvalho Pinto, though very popular because of his accomplishments (he could easily have won the race if allowed to run personally), was never a politician. He made one political mistake after another from the beginning of his term, some of them small technical errors in patronage and some major blunders. The biggest was to pick José Bonifácio as his hopeful successor. José Bonifácio has a clean reputation and is believed to be honest, efficient, and centrist -- the only qualifications which would count for Carvalho Pinto -- but he is extremely lacking in voter appeal. Any sort of vaguely simpático figurehead could have been built into a winning candidate, campaigning with tremendous advantages against opponents with tremendous disadvantages. There seemed to be hope even for José Bonifácio, but he just did not produce.

José Bonifácio also made some of his own mistakes, of which the biggest was probably the attempt to creat a "popular" (read leftist/nationalist) image. Time magazine, in a description which Janio exploited to the maximum, called José Bonifácio the "aristrocratic agriculture secretary" -- an accurate picture of his public image. This image was largely the result of his family background, and it needed to be altered slightly, especially since the candidate did seem to have serious reformist ideas. But he went too far in the effort to attract the leftist vote, making reverences to several nationalist sacred cows and letting himself be associated with extremist PTB propaganda. He may even have been cautiously interested in Communist support (which he did not get). None of these excesses seemed to be improving his popularity with the left, and the results of the polls confirm that they did not. What they did do was estrange followers from the right. Conservatives in São Paulo are conservative indeed, and in the last year they have become aroused, frightened, and militant. Adhemar, who sometimes welcomed Communist support in the past, spotted the new trend -- which was not difficult -- and became a holier-than-thou anti-Communist. His labor vote does not seem to have been hurt; most factory workers are more inclined to vote for likeable people than for ideologies. His position with the landowners and city conservatives improved. Janio emerged strongest with the left, Adhemar stronger than he deserved with the right, and José Bonifácio clumsily balanced in the middle.

One must be careful not to read too much significance into Adhemar's election. It was much less a victory of ideas than of tactics, though ideas had something to do with it. Carvalho Pinto's candidate could probably have won easily against either opponent alone, and he could have won against both together if he had shown real political talent. Adhemar won by (1) taking advantage of the division in the opposition which beat

0216

be written in on the ballot (the others had only to be checked). The possible repercussions of this not unexpected problem are discussed below under the heading "Federal Chamber and State Assembly."

The Governorship

With about a million votes counted of the roughly three million cast (accurate figures not yet known), Adhemar is leading by approximately 37 per cent to Janio QUADROS' 34 per cent, José Bonifácio NOGUEIRA's 25 per cent, and Cid FRANCO's 1 per cent. The differences between the three leading candidates may change in the final count, but the trend is probably established. Adhemar is almost sure to win and Janio to run a close second. José Bonifácio will probably continue to be third by a decisive margin. This is the biggest news in the election so far. José Bonifácio is putting up a respectable performance, but he is not living up to expectations. Never during the campaign did he seem any stronger than his opponents, but observers (including Adhemar's and Janio's) did consider him practically on a par. Most experienced local politicians thought him so little behind that his chances might be evened up by a bit of vote-counting fraud, and they bet large amounts of political prestige on him. Nor were the bets confined to prestige and votes. One skilled observer hired by the candidate to take an accurate and unpublished poll confides glumly to the reporting officer that he backed his own findings by betting past his means on José Bonifácio. Governor CARVALHO PINTO, José Bonifácio, and staff were positively optimistic on election eve, for private as well as public consumption. They thought they had solid statistics to back them up. Where did they go wrong?

The Reasons

The campaign was freakish in several respects. One was that it was predominantly negative; a campaign against rather than for candidates. A majority of the voters quite clearly were in outright opposition to Janio Quadros. This feeling turned out to be the key to the campaign. But a slightly smaller and overlapping majority of the voting public was also in opposition to Adhemar de Barros (this seemed to have been amply demonstrated in previous elections). Important minorities of the public were also irresistably attracted to each of these charming scoundrels. The situation with José Bonifácio was a little bit different: he had not earned the same opposition, but neither, unfortunately, had he acquired the charm. What he lacked in repulsion was compensated for by lack of attraction. Hence the fact that the polls even on election eve showed (in what then and now seemed their most valid finding) a whopping 10 to 15 per cent of the voters in the "undecided" category. Some press observers -- mostly from outside São Paulo -- interpreted this figure as indicating a lack of interest in the election. To those on the scene, it appeared rather to be a lack of enthusiasm for the candidates. This hypothesis seemed confirmed by the small proportions of voters abstaining or casting blank ballots. The undecideds, it seems clear in hindsight, were mostly the anti-Janistas. At the very end, they evidently decided that old Adhemar was more likely than José Bonifácio to do the job of beating Janio. The results show that they were right.



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TO : DEPARTMENT OF STATE 1962 OCT 20 AM 9 01

DEPARTMENT OF STATE BUREAU OF INTER-AMERICAN AFFAIRS OCT 22 1962

RM/AN ANALYSIS & DISTRIBUTION BRANCH

FROM : Amconsul, SAO PAULO DATE: October 15, 1962

SUBJECT: First Assessment São Paulo Election Results

REF :

SUMMARY

As this report is drafted on October 10, the São Paulo vote count is beginning its third day. Adhemar de BARROS already seems a sure bet for Governor, Laudo NATEL for Vice-Governor, Auro Moura ANDRADE and Lino de MATTOS for Senators. None of these results are in themselves surprises: Adhemar always appeared to have as much of a chance as his competitors; Natel, Andrade, and Mattos were front-runners. There are one or two surprises, however, in the way the votes seem to be splitting between these men and their opponents. The vote count for the Federal Chamber of Deputies and State Legislative Assembly is not far enough along to mean much, but it appears that -- as had been feared -- the new official ballot caused major problems.

The Vote

The vote went off calmly on October 7. Voter absenteeism seemed to be running at least twice as high as the 1958 figure of 5.4 per cent, but was still not a matter of concern. The increase was presumably a result of public concern with the new single official ballot, as the weather was fine and the small number of blank votes for Governor indicated a healthy level of interest. The higher rate of abstentions would be a small price to pay for the new and much more fair ballot. Unfortunately, there was also a shockingly high rate of blank votes cast for the legislative candidates, whose names had to

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Drafted by: ROL/DCProper /mc 10/15/62

Contents and Classification Approved by:

Clearances:



Silvio Meira	103

Partido Trabalhista Brasileiro:

Americo Silva	378
Amilcar Carvalho da Silva	186
Armando Carneiro	481
Benedito Nogueira	51
Gilberto Azevedo	1,001
Raimundo Bacelar	35

Partido Social Democratico:

Annibal Duarte	167
Armando Corrêa	802
Elias Salame	210
João Menezes	465
Jose Edson Burlamaqui de Miranda	1,032
Lucival Lobato	41
Nario Pacheco	81
Ocelio Medeiros	125
Osvaldo Orico	15
Waldemar Guimarães	624

PIAUÍ

Partial returns give, for governor: Petrônio Portela, 2966; Constantino Souza, 1745. Ex-Governor Chagas Rodrigues is reported to be leading in the vote for the Senate.

FEDERAL TERRITORY OF AMAPÁ

The complete unofficial returns in the election for federal deputy are: Janary Nunes, 7,567 and Amilcar Pereira, 4,918.

FEDERAL TERRITORY OF RIO BRANCO

The complete unofficial returns in the election for federal deputy are: Gilberto Mestrinho, 2,871, and Silvio Botelho, 1,655.

OTHERS

There is no information available to the Consulate on returns from Maranhão and Amazonas, except that newspapers report Paulo Nery to be ahead of Plinio Coêlho by a small margin in the election for governor of Amazonas. The complete returns from the elections in Pará are not expected until in November. Information will be forwarded as available.

Robert W. Mashek
American Vice Consul

ACTION

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OSD 12	USIA 8	NSA 3

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DEPARTMENT OF STATE BUREAU OF INTER-AMERICAN AFFAIRS OCT 22 1962 1962 OCT 20 AM 9 01

RM/AN ANALYSIS & DISTRIBUTION BRANCH

TO : DEPARTMENT OF STATE

FROM : Amconsul, BELEM, PARA

DATE: October 15, 1962

SUBJECT : Brazilian Elections 1962: Report No. 17 -- Election Returns

REF :

The following are unofficial returns of the October 7th elections, to date: --

PARÁ

For Senator (returns from Abaetetuba, Santa Maria, Muaná, Cachoeira do Arari, Chaves, Soure, Peixe-Boi, Timboteua, and 67 of the 435 districts of Belém:

Cattete Pinheiro	23,773
Lobão da Silveira	19,862
Waldir Bouhid	18,009
Cleo Bernardo	15,697

OCT 23 1962

For Federal Deputy (67 of the 435 districts of Belém and 18 districts of the interior, the votes of which were counted in Belem):

Coligição Democrática Paraense:

Adriano Gonçalves	240
Ferro Costa	620
Epilogo de Campos	492
Gabriel Hermes	392
Haroldo Veloso	343
Lopo de Castro	463
Orlando Bordallo	177
Paulo Fender	381
Stélio Maroja	2,311
Silvio Braga	297

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FORM 4-62 DS-323

Drafted by: RWMashek:rwm

Contents and Classification Approved by: RWMashek

Clearances:

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-2- 157, OCTOBER 15, FROM RECIFE

IN CEARA, VIRGILIO TAVORA FAR AHEAD OF ADAHIL BARRETO IN GUBERNATORIAL RACE AND GENERALLY EXPECTED WILL BE EASY WINNER. WILSON GOMES WELL IN FRONT IN SENATE RACE WHILE SECOND SEAT STILL DISPUTED BY CARLOS JEREISSATI AND TANCREDO ALCANTARA.

RETURNS FROM ALAGOAS SHOW ARNON DE MELO HEADING CANDIDATES FRO SENATE FOLLWED BY RUI PALMEIRA AND TEOTONIO VILELA.

DELGADOARIAS

JTC

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INFO:
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FROM: RECIFE

TO: Secretary of State

NO: 157, OCTOBER 15

ACTION RIO DE JANEIRO 177, INFORMATION DEPARTMENT 157, 10/19-Jww

APPROXIMATELY ONE HALF TOTAL VOTE NOW COUNTED. ON BASIS THESE RETURNS ANTICIPATED THAT PERNAMBUCO REPRESENTATION FEDERAL CHAMBER OF DEPUTIES WILL HAVE 13-14 DEPUTIES FROM PSD UDN SLATE, 7-8 DEPUTIES FROM PTB, AND 2-3 DEPUTIES FROM PST-PTB. FOLLOWING ARE LEADING CANDIDATES AT THIS POINT.

PSP - WALDEMAR LUIZ ALVES, FRANCISCO JULIAO, PELOPIDAS SILVEIRA.

PTB- ESTACIO SOUTO MAIOR, LAMARTINE TAVORA, OSWALDO LIMA FILHO, CLODOMIR LEITE, ARTUR LIMA CAVALCANTI, MILVERNES CRUZ LIMA, TABOSA DE ALMEIDA, EDGAR BEZWRRA LEITE.

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PSD UDN - ADHELMAR DA COSTA CARVALHO, ALDE SAMPAIO, GILENO DE CARLI, NILO COELHO, JOSE MEIRA, JOSE CARLOS GUERRA, MURILO COSTA REGO, ETELVINO LINS, ARRUDA CAMARA, JOSE COSTA CAVALCANTI, AUGUSTO NOVIAIS, SOCRATES TIMES DE CARVALHO, CLELIO LEMOS, JOSE SIQUEIRA SANTOS, ADERBAL JUREMA, GERALDO GUEDES.

NOW SEEMS CERTAIN NEW PERNAMBUCO SENATORS WILL BE JOSE ERMIRIO DE MORAIS AND F. PESSOA DE QUEIROZ WHILE PAULO GUERRA, PSD APPARENTLY ASSURED OF ELECTION AS VICE GOVERNOR.

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IN PARAIBA JOAO AGRIPINO MAINTAINS STRONG LEAD IN BID FOR SENATE, FOLLOWED BY ARGEMIRO DE FIGUEIREDO AND ALUIZIO CAMPOS.

(11)

IN RIO GRANDE DO NORTE, MONS. WALFREDO GURGEL ASSURED ONE SENATE SEAT WHILE SECOND STILL IN DISPUTE BETWEEN TEODORICO BEZERRA AND DINARTE MARIZ.

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7:11 p.m.
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FROM: Recife

TO: Secretary of State

NO: 156, October 13

ACTION RIO DE JANEIRO 174, INFORMATION DEPARTMENT 156.

MEMBER REGIONAL ELECTORAL TRIBUNAL RECIFE TOLD JORNAL DO COMMERCIO TODAY INADEQUATE FACILITES COUNTING VOTES WILL RESULT 15 DAY DELAY FOR FINAL COUNT. THIS PROBABLY BEANS ANOTHER WEEK BEFORE DEFINITIVE RESULTS KNOWN.

ETELVINO LINS STATEMENT PUBLISHED OCT 12 TRIBUNA DA IMPRENSA RE PROBABILITY COURT ACTION ON RECOUNT DUE CLOSENESS ECLECTION ACCURATELY REFLECTS GORWING FEEILING HERE. IF RECOUNT REQUIRED, FINAL RESULTS COULD BE DELAYED MANY MONTHS, DELGADOARIAS

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FROM: Brasilia

TO: Secretary of State

NO: 14, October 13

ACTION DEPARTMENT 14; INFORMATION RIO DE JANEIRO 103.

DAVID SUSSKIND LAST NIGHT INTERVIEWED GOULART FOR THREE HOURS FOR "OPEN END" SHOW TO BE BROADCAST U.S. TV OCTOBER 21. GOULART REQUESTED SUSSKIND'S ASSURANCE NO PORTION OF INTERVIEW BE SHOWN BRAZIL. REPEATED THEME GOULART'S RESPONSES WAS THAT HE INTENDS BRING SOCIAL JUSTICE BRAZILIAN PEOPLE. SAID HE HOPED KENNEDY VISIT WOULD "STIMULATE CONCRETIZATION OF VARIOUS PLANS SUBMITTED BY BRAZIL UNDER ALLIANCE FOR PROGRESS." ON ITT SEIZURE, HE CLAIMED STATE GOVERNMENT AND LOCAL REPRESENTATIVES HAD BEEN NEAR SOLUTION "ONLY 50,000 (DOLLARS) SEPARAZING THE TWB SIDES" WHEN NEGOTIATIONS BROKEN OFF APPARENTLY ON INSTRUCTIONS HOME OFFICE. ON FLIGHT OF CAPITAL HE CALLED SUCH ACTION "UNPATRIOTIC" BUT SAID BRAZIL PROGRESSING REAGARDLESS "IN SPITE OF ALL OUR DIFFICULTIES, WE STILL HAVE NO UNEMPLOYMENT HERE." ASKED WHETHER HE WOULD LINE TO SEE CHANGE IN PROHIBITON AGAINST PRESIDENT SUCCEEDING HIMSELF REPLIED "ABSOLUTELY NOT." ON OCTOBER 7 ELECTIONS SAID TOO SOON TO COMMENT BUT DID MENTION THAT CANDIDATES WHO FAVORED AGRARIAN REFORM WERE SUCCESSFUL. ON CUBA EXPRESSED SUPPORT PRINCIPLE NON-INTERVENTION AND SELF-DETERMINATION.

WHEN PRESED SAID BRAZIL'S POSITION AT RECENT MEETINGS U.S. SPEAKS FOR ITSELF.

GOULART EXTREMELY RESERVED AT OUTSET PARTICULARLY WHEN ASKED TO COMMENT ON LACERDA'S STATEMENT THAT COMMUNISM WAS MAIN ISSUE IN RECENT ELECTIONS (GOULART REPLIED COMMUNISM WAS NOT AN ISSUE AT ALL AND THE ENTIRE PROBLEM OF COMMUNISM WOULD DISAPPEAR AS SOCIAL AND ECONOMIC CONDITIONS IMPROVED). PRESIDENT GREW INCREASINGLY WARMER AND MORE EXPANSIVE AS INTERVIEW PROGRESSES. WHEN ASKED WHETHER ALLIANCE FOR PROGRESS HAD BEEN DISAPPOINTING TO DATE HE REPLIED PROGRAM STILL IN BEGINNING STAGES AND IS SOURCE OF "GREAT HOPE TO BRAZILIAN PEOPLE". MRS. GOULART APPEARED [illegible] SHE SAID SHE HONORED BY COMPARISON MADE WITH MRS. KENNEDY. GORDON

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BRASILIA 14 732.00/10-1362

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-2- 12, October 12, 11 a.m. from Brasilia

to support regime's enemies. (See item 1, WEEKA 40).

As for recent elections, said Goulart had won notable victory, particularly in Guanabara. Said party gains most places were principally made by "Centrist" labor party members CUTIR particularly Bahia where moderate Lomanto Jr. defeating leftist Waldir Pires for Governor and where "not one commie" will be elected. (Commie Deputy Santana, he said, was expelled from PTB.) Although race still close concedes Cleofas will probably win in Pernambuco. All in all sees President's position and authority more firmly established by election and expects it to be consolidated by January 6 plebiscite. Anticipates good working relationship between Federal Government and all states (even Cleofas in Pernambuco whom he considers reasonable man) except in Guanabara where Lacerda continues enemy number 1.

Said that for foreseeable future President would be more tractable than in past because his position firmer and political harmony should be the rule. Expects communists to oppose return to Presidential system since, he says, they flourish better amidst unstable regime and foresees possibility President may restrict commie party activities. He, nevertheless, indicated President still susceptible leftist pressure generally including communist.

GORDON

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Info SS SR G SP CAP E AID P USIA NSC INR CIA NSA OSD ARMY NAVY AIR COM RMR

INFO: RM/R FILES

FROM: Brasilia

TO: Secretary of State

NO: 12, October 12, 11 a.m.

ACTION DEPARTMENT 12, SAO PAULO 3

DEPARTMENT PASS CINCARIB

POLICY

Reference telegram Sao Paulo's 27 to Rio de Janeiro and 6 to Brasilia

During Raine and Keppel call on Hugo de Faria, Chief President's civil household, occasion taken refer previous conversation (EMBTEL 640) subject alleged contributions Brazilian subsidiaries US companies to political campaigns of administration opponents. Essential points Sao Paulo telegram related to him including fact Chambers Commerce warned by Ambassador and CONGEN against taking part in political activities. Said he understood Americans might have put restrictions on use of funds contributed to IPES and agreed that IPES had started as Laudale initiative mentioning that some of its members pro-administration but its majority influence ranged from rightest opposition to administration to strong Quadros supporters also enemies Goulart regime. Asked how could distinction be made between so-called good and bad contributions when organization is doing good and bad things. As for Willy's, said Willy's director Dr. Aranha had handed 5 million cruzeiros check to rightest activist George Bhering de Mattos, head of CONCLAP, which money was used AC political campaign. Said has not yet received all reports but reports to date indicate over billion cruzeiros contributed by business firms used in recent campaign most of which went

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Control: 10794

Rec'd: October 13, 1962

3:28 p.m.

INFO: ____

RM/R FILES ____

FROM: Recife

TO: Secretary of State

NO: 154, October 12, 6 p.m.

ACTION RIO DE JANEIRO 172, INFORMATION DEPARTMENT 154.

Following incomplete returns as of 4 p.m. October 12. Cleofas 121,880. Arraes 114,152. Number of ballot boxes counted: Recife 185 interior 1211. Still uncounted Recife 500 interior 989. Despite press reports to contrary, election far from settled. Arraes now running as expected in Recife, where one-third of total vote in but Cleofas vote in interior lighter than expected so far. Vote from Arraes strongholds in interior already counted, however, while vote from Sertao, Cleofas strongest region, only now trickling in. Elections could go either way but Consulate General continues to regard Cleofas as probable winner though edge of victory may drop below 10,000.

DELGADO ARIAS

AJT

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0205

feted throughout his stay not only by the two-thousand strong Portuguese colony but also by the State Government.

Despite these special ties, public opinion has in general had some reservations about Portugal's policy toward its overseas territories. It was inevitable, therefore, for the Ambassador to be asked at his collective press conference how his country harmonized its policies toward the overseas territories with the stand the West took on colonial questions. The Ambassador felt it necessary first of all to reassert the fact that Portugal was a member of NATO and consequently an ally of the United States and other Western powers. The Portuguese people regretted not having Brazil's concurrence in their policies toward the overseas provinces, he went on to say, but he attributed this lack of support to misleading propaganda. Then he proceeded to expound the well-known Portuguese position on the colonial question. In short, Portugal's objective consists not in the establishment of a colonial relationship but rather in the integration of the overseas territories with the Portuguese nation itself. It is doubtful that this explanation convinced anyone not already convinced.

As if to underline the close ties that exist between Portugal and Brazil, Brazilian Ambassador to Portugal, Francisco Negrão de LIMA, was in Belo Horizonte shortly after the Portuguese Ambassador's official visit. Although Ambassador Negrão de Lima's visit had as its immediate cause the candidacy of his brother, Jair Negrão de LIMA, for the vice-mayoralty of Belo Horizonte, the Ambassador took the opportunity to emphasize Portugal's intense interest in Brazil and his own efforts and intentions to maintain and strengthen the bonds between the two countries.

4. Electoral Developments

See Consulate's A-15, dated September 6; A-17, dated September 14; A-18, dated September 20; A-19, dated September 28; and A-20, dated October 4, 1962.

Edmund A. da Silveira,
American Consul

7NL

0204

encountering could be resolved within a scheme of regional unity.

All in all he had an optimistic outlook regarding the future of Latin America, maintaining that not only did the American states have vast empty spaces to be developed but also possessed a feeling for individual liberties that ensured development within a democratic framework. It was the right mixture of philosophical principle and pragmatic approach that gave his talk the necessary persuasiveness to carry his audience with him.

He made several references to the United States, in praise of its farsighted policy toward regional arrangements of nations and to point out that the United States owed much of its own prosperity to that very kind of arrangement within the Union. When some of the students remarked, in a kind of question-and-answer period, that the speaker had changed his mind from the days when he had condemned the United States as an imperialistic country, he replied that the United States had changed not he. He added, too, that what the Latin American countries needed was to approach other countries, the United States included, without an inferiority complex. Indeed, he said, the United States also needs Latin America.

One student asked Mr. Haya de La Torre what he thought of the regime in Communist China. The reply was to the effect that he could only judge the regime on the basis of his conversations with refugees fleeing Red China.

Comment: The small group of antagonistic students failed utterly in their attempts to embarrass or ruffle the speaker. They caused enough commotion at the entrance to the building to bring forth the radio patrol, but the disturbance never amounted to more than a mere nuisance. At the end of the conference, the reporting officer saw a couple of young men go up to the speaker and heard them tell him that they were also Peruvian students but that they were members of the APRA party and admirers of his. To judge by the one-page handout prepared by the group of Peruvian students unfriendly to Mr. Haya de La Torre and by the questions they asked him, it seems that their animosity stemmed from a feeling that Mr. Haya de La Torre had betrayed his followers. The betrayal consisted mainly in the alleged reversal of his former militant stand against U.S. imperialism. It was this supposed turnabout that apparently rankled with the half-dozen or so students who heckled the speaker at the conference.

3. Portuguese Ambassador's Views on His Country's Policies Toward Its Overseas Territories

The Portuguese Ambassador to Brazil, João de Deus Bataglia RAMOS, made his first official visit to Minas Gerais during September 14-16. The occasion was the fiftieth anniversary of the foundation of the Portuguese Colony Center in Belo Horizonte. In keeping with the special cultural and racial ties of affinity between Brazil and Portugal, the Ambassador was warmly received and



evidence is that the State section of the PSD is now with him in its vast majority. He has by all indications succeeded through his energetic direction of the PSD campaign in building a solid base in the State from which to take off for the 1965 Presidential race.

PTB Federal deputy San Tiago DANTAS, up for re-election, expressed his conviction that the plebiscite would surely return the country to the presidential system of government. His satisfaction at this prospect was dampened only by the belief that had the date for the plebiscite been set so as to coincide with the October 7 election, the victory of the proponents of a presidential regime would have been much greater. His reasoning was that with the defeat of every candidate for governor in the 11 States having gubernatorial races a strong opponent of the presidential system is created, since the defeated candidate will want to see the powers of his victorious opponent curtailed to the maximum possible extent through a corresponding strengthening of the parliamentary regime.. Asked about his thoughts on the post-election composition of the Federal Cabinet, he stated that the Cabinet should be headed by a PSD man and would probably include three Ministers from the PTB. He does not expect to be in the new Cabinet since according to his own statement he is scheduled to go to the United States as a member of the Brazilian delegation in the United Nations General Assembly.

2. Visit of Haya de La Torre

Under the sponsorship of the Chateaubriand newspaper chain, the "Associated Dailies," the Peruvian leader of the APRA party, Victor Raul Haya de La Torre, made a two-day visit to Belo Horizonte and the nearby historical town of Ouro Prêto during September 26-27. The big event of his brief stay here was a conference he gave in the headquarters of the Commercial Association of Minas.

Although the auditorium is small, it was filled to capacity, and Mr. Haya de La Torre received most enthusiastic and repeated ovations despite some heckling and interruptions by a group of Brazilian and Peruvian students who evidenced a doctrinaire and juvenile Marxist position. The reporting officer attended the conference, and he fully agrees with the majority view that the conference was a memorable event for Belo Horizonte with respect both to content and delivery.

An exceptionally eloquent orator, Mr. Haya de La Torre was most effective in his presentation of the thesis that the socio-economic development of the Latin American countries cannot be accomplished on a national basis but requires their unification in a mold similar to that of the European Common Market. He pointed to various historical examples in support of his reasoning and expressed his belief that the difficulties the Alliance for Progress was

0202

This popular frame of mind was not a factor to be overlooked on the eve of elections. Nevertheless, there were several indications that opposition to a strengthening of presidential powers had survived. Federal deputy Oscar Dias CORREA's reaction, for instance, was typical of this position. A member of the National Democratic Union (UDN), he has long actively supported his Party's national position in favor of a parliamentary regime, or to put it more exactly, of restricting the President's powers. In line with this stand, he argued in Congress against the amendment that advanced the date of the plebiscite and charged President Goulart with having forged the political crisis to suit his purposes. A more veiled but yet unmistakable evidence of opposition to the return to a presidential system was the view that Congress must work out the exact type of presidential regime to be put before the people for a vote so as to avoid the danger of placing dictatorial powers in the hands of an unscrupulous President.

Governor MAGALHÃES PINTO, who has played a leading role in the promotion of an early plebiscite, did not hide his satisfaction with the outcome of the struggle, even though his position is diametrically opposed to that of his Party, the UDN. Although he has been an advocate of a presidential form of government for quite some time, he has generally refrained from espousing that view forthrightly. Following the Congressional vote on the plebiscite, however, he declared at his regular press conference that he was now going to fight for the establishment of a presidential regime since he was convinced that "in a country like ours, which is striving toward full economic and social development, authority cannot be diluted."

The Governor's enthusiasm did not seem dampened even when a newspaper reporter pointed to the possibility that a by-product of the solution to the political crisis might create political difficulties for the State Government. The reporter was referring to the situation in Congress during the search for a viable solution which brought together the Labor Party (PTB) and the Social Democratic Party (PSD). Since the State section of the PSD is in adamant opposition to the State Administration, the contention was that a possible PTB-PSD alliance at the national level might prevent the Governor from consolidating his bonds with the State section of the PTB. The Governor, however, made light of this possibility, saying that he was sure that the negative attitude of the UDN toward the Federal Government would change and that he was going to do all possible to influence the UDN in that direction.

Undoubtedly, the Governor's waning prestige received a shot in the arm with the outcome of the political crisis. In the absence of some more concrete achievement in the near future, however, the general opinion is that the slight rise in the Governor's political fortunes will prove to be more froth than substance.

Another happy protagonist was former President Kubitschek who has a special interest in seeing that presidential powers are not diluted. The

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TO : DEPARTMENT OF STATE

FROM : AMCONSUL, Belo Horizonte DATE: October 11, 1962

SUBJECT : POLITICAL SUMMARY FOR SEPTEMBER, 1962 - STATE OF MINAS GERAIS

REF : --

RM/R - 4 cys
10/17 - 2 cys

Table of Contents

1. Reaction to the Solution of the Political Crisis.
2. Visit of Haya de La Torre
3. Portuguese Ambassador's Views on his Country's Policies Toward Its Overseas Territories
4. Electoral Developments.

- - - -

1. Reaction to the Solution of the Political Crisis

With few exceptions, the solution of the national political crisis, which set January 6, 1963 as the date for the plebiscite on the form of government to be adopted in Brazil, met with approval and brought a feeling of relief. This reaction is not interpreted in political circles as meaning that the opponents of stronger presidential powers have suddenly changed their minds. They sensed rather that the great majority of the people were wary of the never-ending political crisis and not too convinced of the National Congress' efficacy in solving the country's urgent problem.

OCT 18 1962 LED

Couns.Cons.Affrs./Rio
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PSYCHOLOGICAL

1. Local Press Reaction

São Paulo editorials quite properly concentrated this week on matters pertaining to Sunday's elections. Newspapers lobbied for their chosen candidates: A Hora pleaded for its financial backer, gubernatorial candidate Jânio Quadros; O Dia pleaded for its owner, gubernatorial candidate Adhemar de Barros; O Estado de S. Paulo, Correio Paulistano, Ultima Hora supported incumbent governor Carvalho Pinto's candidate, José Bonifacio Coutinho Nogueira, Folha de S. Paulo, Diario de São Paulo and A Gazeta remained virtually neutral.

In the days before the election, O Estado was struck by President Goulart's skill in being all things to all audiences; his opportunism was proved, the paper said, by his speech as a conservative leader before the military, as a revolutionary before workers and peasants.

Trouble at "Ole Miss" received considerable attention. Most newspapers saw the Oxford, Mississippi affair as a setback in the U. S. journey toward complete integration. However, the prevailing tone was positive in praising the firm action taken by President Kennedy and his administration, rather than negative in playing up the still-present shortcomings of the U. S. in the race relations area.

Signing of a new wheat agreement between Brazil and the U. S., occasioned several laudatory editorials. O Estado found the terms exceptionally favorable to Brazil, and of great value to the country's economic and social development. Diário de São Paulo agreed and warned that criticisms would be heard from individuals with personal interests.

Schirra's orbital flight hit the headlines heavily and triumphantly but gleaned only one editorial--laudatory--from A Hora.

Brazil's dismal financial picture was considered by several editorialists. Diário de São Paulo regretted the tendency toward chauvinism, resulting in falling exports and diminishing foreign investment in Brazil. A Hora discussed the creation of SUNAB, national agency for supply and price control. The appointment of Celso Furtado to head the agency, said the paper, is a good one, despite the fact that like Prime Minister Hermes de Lima he is a man of the left. In A Hora's view Furtado's exercise of almost dictatorial economic powers will build, with Hermes Lima's help, a new future for Brazil.

Daniel M. Braddock
Minister Consul General

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Comment: Anti-Communist propaganda has been much more important than pro-Communist propaganda in the current campaign. Some observers say that this was not so in other recent elections. The development probably reflects public opinion directly and, to a larger extent, reflects the militance of the several anti-Communist "democratic action" groups which have sprung up in the crises since Quadros' resignation. (LIMITED OFFICIAL USE)

6. PL Supports José Bonifácio

The São Paulo section of the Liberator Party (PL) is under intervention from national party headquarters and could not formally nominate any candidates for this year's elections (Weekly Summary 30). A few PL legislative candiates ran on the slate of the UDN, a traditional ally. At the last minute, the interventor came out with moral support for gubernatorial candidate José Bonifácio. He had not done it earlier, he explained, because he had reservations towards all the candidates, but he had eventually decided to root for José Bonifácio to avoid the serious harm to the nation which might result from the victory of either of his opponents. (UNCLASSIFIED)

Comment: This is typical of the thinking of a great many conscientious Paulists, both voters and politicians. They do not like José Bonifácio very much but they are horrified by the others. (LIMITED OFFICIAL USE)

7. Paulo de TARSO vs. "Family Electoral Alliance"

The Catholic Church-organized "Family Electoral Alliance" made a mess out of the case of controversial Christian Democratic Federal Deputy Paulo de Tarso. Its first list of approved candidates did not contain his name, presumably because of his frequent cooperation with the Communists. Tarso is perhaps the worst of the giddy thinkers who argue for a confused "catholic socialism." But this line appeals to an influential wing of the Church (Despatch 291 of June 5), which evidently saw to it that Deputy Tarso turned up on an amended Alliance list a few days later. He made full use of the new stamp of approval, publicizing it in large newspaper advertisements. The Alliance then proceded to change its mind again, took back its recommendation, making Tarso a fallen angel for the duration of the campaign. (LIMITED OFFICIAL USE)

Comment: Church disapproval can hardly help Tarso, but it will not be clear until the vote is counted whether all the bumbling did him much harm. The Consulate General had expected him to get a large vote. (LIMITED OFFICIAL USE)

0197

4. Communists Little Seen in Campaign

Communist campaign efforts in São Paulo appear to have been weak, though very probably an impact has been made on a few selected electoral targets. The only significant campaign effort which the Consulate General has seen has been in official Party paper Novos Rumos, which as usual is poorly done, dull, and difficult to find on the newsstands. Novos Rumos was supposed to come out daily during the last of the campaign, but it hit São Paulo only three or four times a week in an edition smaller than the usual weekly. Even the São Paulo edition has more to do with the Guanabara than the São Paulo race. The only São Paulo candidates being plugged openly at the end were Federal Deputy aspirant Geraldo Rodrigues dos SANTOS and State Deputy contenders Luciano LEPERA, Luiz Tenorio de LIMA, Mario SCHEMBERG, and Osvaldo LOURENÇO. (OFFICIAL USE ONLY)

Comment: The Communist effort has probably been handicapped by the decision to back no gubernatorial, vice gubernatorial, or senatorial candidates. It is not clear why some of the earlier legislative candidates were dropped: Federal Deputy hopefuls Rio Branco PARANHOS and Salvador LOSSACO, for example. A decision may have been made to concentrate the limited Communist potential on the weaker Rodrigues dos Santos. In any case, the restricted field of effort will make it easy to evaluate performance after the vote count is in. (LIMITED OFFICIAL USE)

5. Anti-Communism an Election Issue

Opportunistic, shrewd Adhemar de Barros made a point of being anti-Communist throughout his election campaign. Jânio Quadros apparently was not eager for Communist support, though many of his votes probably came from ~~from~~ sectors under the influence of the extreme left. The only governorship candidate who seemed to make an effort not to antagonize the Communists was José Bonifácio, who was worried by his image as a rich conservative. (His image did not change, and his support from the right may have lessened.)

One Senate candidate--Abreu SODRE--made a point of being anti-Communist. Several State and Federal Deputy candidates did likewise, making it their most important campaign issue. Even PTB leader Ivette VARGAS made vaguely anti-Communist noises, enough to draw censure from Novos Rumos.

The UDN made anti-Communism a major campaign issue. Party President Herbert LEVY gave frequent talks on the topic and released a manifesto with anti-Communist (and anti-Government) statements a few days before elections. (LIMITED OFFICIAL USE)

0196

A relatively inactive Jânio Quadros seemed to lose the small lead he had won a few days earlier, but he continued strong. He remained the apparent favorite of the factory workers. Communist refusal to support anyone left him in a position to get most of the extremist vote. The fact that he was worried, however, was evidenced by his liberal promises of public offices and works--a tactic which he had earlier avoided and criticized.

José Bonifácio seized the initiative in the campaign, but too late for much of the public to find out about it. His debate challenge (Weekly Summary 40) probably helped a little. Carvalho Pinto helped by campaigning vigorously for José Bonifácio and, in effect, for his own presidential candidacy in 1965. The campaign's new spurt--after a month or so in the doldrums--may have helped in the big city, but it could hardly have come to the attention of the interior towns, where José Bonifácio would have to beat Adhemar to stand a chance at winning. José Bonifácio made an increased pitch for the leftist vote, but many observers felt that it gained him little and lost him strength that he already had with the conservatives (see "Anti-Communism as a Campaign Issue," Item 5). (LIMITED OFFICIAL USE)

3. Kubitschek Supports Adhemar

In a televised speech in São Paulo on October 2, ex-President Juscelino Kubitschek formally supported Adhemar de Barros for the governorship. The bulk of the speech was devoted to a justification of Kubitschek's own policy of economic development, with the implication that São Paulo had been especially helped. The objective now was to bring the rest of Brazil up to the same level, without letting São Paulo slow its progress. Adhemar, said Kubitschek, was the man to take care of the São Paulo part. (UNCLASSIFIED)

Comment: Industrialists would agree that São Paulo got the most from Kubitschek's desenvolvimentismo ("developmentism"). His word should therefore be influential, though he has not had much political success in São Paulo in the past. The impact of Kubitschek's recommendation is reduced by traditional Paulista resentment of "outside interference." His argument was also weak, since everyone with a faint knowledge of recent São Paulo history recognized that Governor Carvalho Pinto--whose political heir is José Bonifácio--did much more for the State's development than Governor Barros. The prevailing conviction is that Kubitschek's real motive in supporting Adhemar is to prevent Carvalho Pinto's 1965 presidential candidacy, an objective which would be accomplished by José Bonifácio's defeat now. Weighing all factors, Kubitschek's sponsorship of Adhemar nevertheless looks like a definite help. (LIMITED OFFICIAL USE)

0195

running scared, and they kept right on running after the official close of the race in big rallies on October 4. Giving up the earlier strained politeness, each candidate attacked each of the others in the most harsh terms. Mild-mannered Governor CARVALHO PINTO joined in outspokenly on the side of José Bonifácio NOGUEIRA. Fake rumors were launched in a real "psychological warfare" campaign. Word was spread that one or the other of the anti-Jânio candidates was withdrawing to strengthen the other, and that Jânio QUADROS was resigning in protest at José Bonifácio's unfair advantages. Anti-Adhemar papers described a cabinet full of unpopular names which BARROS had reportedly settled on in advance of the vote. Documentary evidence of Adhemar's frequent past scandals was published. An astrologist predicted José Bonifácio's victory. Ridiculously conflicting polls by various well-known organizations were published right up to the legal deadline and then made available in campaign headquarters. (LIMITED OFFICIAL USE)

Comment: The vituperation was such that it will be very hard for any one of the camps to get together with another after elections. It was also so harsh as to risk turning Adhemar or Jânio into a "victim" and creating sympathy votes.

There was one helpful change from reported practice in past elections: most reputable observers (with the glaring exception of pollsters) did not use their predictions as campaign weapons. Responsible non-partisan press and private observers admitted even in the last days that they did not know who would win and stuck to useful discussions of the issues. (LIMITED OFFICIAL USE)

2. Race Still Close on Election Eve

The gubernatorial campaign closed without major changes, none of the candidates ever having gained the obvious strength necessary to force agonizing reappraisals by the others. São Paulo observers could recall no precedent to the balanced three-way race. The question to be decided at the polls, it seemed, was who the public disliked least. Many of the votes cast were probably intended aginst either Jânio or Adhemar rather than for the opponent whose name was checked. The three-way split, unfortunately, makes it difficult for any of the currents to express themsevles clearly. Any candidate elected will face the job of obtaining public support.

Juscelino KUBITSCHEK's endorsement lent impetus to the already strong race being run by Adhemar de Barros. Adhemar, unlike his opponents, had no ups and downs in his candidacy. He looked strong--but not overpowering--from start to finish of his short campaign.

0194

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DATE: October 10, 1962

SUBJECT : Weekly Summary No. 41

REF :

DEPARTMENT OF STATE
BUREAU OF
INTER-AMERICAN AFFAIRS
OCT 18 1962

TABLE OF CONTENTS

POLITICAL:
1. Campaign Closes Loudly but Peacefully
2. Race Still Close on Election Eve
3. Kubitschek Supports Adhemar
4. Communists Little Seen in Campaign
5. Anti-Communism an Election Issue
6. PL Supports José Bonifácio
7. Paulo de Tarso vs. "Family Electoral Alliance"

PSYCHOLOGICAL:
1. Local Press Reaction

POLITICAL

1. Campaign Closes Loudly but Peacefully

The São Paulo voting went along quietly in fine weather on October 7, with no cases of violence being reported. Editorialists took great pride in this "evidence of maturity." Preliminary statistics showed the rate of abstention running at least double the 1958 figure of 5.4 percent, the complicated new official ballot presumably accounting for much of the increase.

If physical violence was lacking, however, verbal violence was not. Each of the strong candidates was clearly

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6:49 PM

FROM: RIO DE JANEIRO

TO: Secretary of State

NO: 811, OCTOBER 10

PRIORITY

VOTE COUNTING PROCEEDING VERY SLOWLY OUTSIDE SOUTH. SENATE RACES IN ALL STATES FROM BAHIA SOUTH SEEM FIRM WITH AURELIO VIANNA VICTOR OVER JURACY MAGALHES THE ONLY DEPARTURE FROM PREDICTIONS. VICTORIES OF ADHEMAR DE BARROS IN SAO PAULO AND ILDO MENEGHETTI IN RIO GRANDE DO SUL APPEAR DEFINITE AS DOES DUTRA'S LEAD OVER LOPO COELHO IN GUANABRA VICE GOVERNORSHIP RACE (23,500 VOTES WITH TABULATION 25 PERCENT COMPLETE). RIO DE JANEIRO, ESPIRITO SANTO, AND BAHIA GUBERNATORIAL RESULTS NOT YET DEFINED. IN NORTH AND NORTHEAST TABULATION LAGGING EVEN MORE AND PICTURE WILL NOT BE CLEAR FOR SEVERAL MORE DAYS; FEW OF THESE STATES WILL COMPLETE COUNT BY OCTOBER 18 DEADLINE. FAR TOO EARLY TO ASSESS CHAMBER OUTCOME, BUT NO REASON TO BELIEVE WILL DIFFER SIGNIFICANTLY FROM PREVIOUS ESTIMATES.

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FROM: Rio de Janeiro

TO: Secretary of State

NO: 802, October 9

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PRIORITY

Elections peaceful with turnout over 80 percent. Tabulation proceeding very slowly and early returns not representative in many States and leads seesawing. Estimates that country-wide picture would be clear by 10th generally revised to 13th. Gubernatorial races extremely tight with exception of Sao Paulo where Adhemar De Barros pulling steadily ahead.

GORDON

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Control: 7167
Rec'd: October 9, 1962 42
5:38 p.m.

FROM: Sao Paulo

TO: Secretary of State

NO: 63, October 9

ACTION DEPARTMENT 63, INFORMATION RIO DE JANEIRO 31, BRASILIA 8.

Factional Sao Paulo vote count shows Adhemar de Barros leading for Governor by small but probably decisive margin Janio Quadros second Jose Bonifacio third Laudo Natel winning Vice Governship Auro Moura Andrade and Lino de Mattos well ahead for Senate.

BRADDOCK

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Sao Paulo 63

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0190

Embassy reports will attempt to weigh, in the light of the election results, the prospects for resumption of the executive-legislative power struggle and the forms that struggle may take.

For the Ambassador:

Harry Weiner
Second Secretary of Embassy

APPROVED:

Philip Raine
Counselor of Embassy
for Political Affairs

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0189

the PTB Chamber leader, appeared at the Committee room and asked for a secret session. After the room was cleared, Afonso told them he had a message from the President. Goulart, he said, would guarantee order in the country and the peaceful holding of elections on October 7 if a satisfactory "political" solution were found for the present crisis. When the committee voted, the result was a tie; Fadul, Virgilio, Novais and Brito in favor of the bill and Rodrigues, Millet, Aleixo and Pinto opposed. Pinto, as committee reporter, was entitled to an additional tie-breaking vote, and he used it against the bill.

But it was a battle won in a lost war. When the voting began soon after midnight, the anti-Goulart forces were tired, dispirited, leaderless (Amaral Peixoto, national president of the PSD, disgusted at the PSD defections, had stalked out of the Congress and emplaned for Rio), fearful that a combination of the general strike and military action would result in, at the least, postponement of the elections into which they had sunk such large sums. The arch-conservative Acão Democratica Parlamentar held firm against the bill, as did at the opposite end of the specturm a few Brizzola supporters, dissatisfied with Goulart's retreat from the October 7 plebiscite demand. But the rest went mildly to the chopping block. The 164th vote was reached with only 68 in opposition. The deed done, the remaining twenty voters showed their lack of enthusiasm by voting 15-5 against. The final vote was 169-83. The President signed the bill the next day and the crisis was over.

Conclusion and Outlook

It is possible that the constitutionality of the Capanema Law will be challenged, which, if the courts sustain the challenge, would at once resurrect the power struggle in full force. More likely, the law will be accepted as a political solution to the problem, in the knowledge that the crises of July, August and September were institutional crises that came close to tearing apart the nation's traditional structure.

Between now and January 6, President Goulart will engage in as much conciliation as is compatible with building the image of himself as a responsible, determined reformer. The referendum will be, in effect, a presidential election with one candidate. He will also try to contain the social and economic pressures which have been building up in Brazil while its politicians spent a year fiddling.

The tack his opponents in the next Congress will take will depend to a great extent on the current elections. Subsequent

0188

"the Valladares amendment" was drafted which provided for a "referendum" on January 6, 1963 with the Congress having ninety days following the announcement of results to implement the referendum decision. Failure to do so would result in the automatic return to the Constitution of 1946.

At 5 a.m., the Senate passed the revised Capanema bill by a vote of 34-19. Since the Chamber version of the bill had been amended in the Senate, it would now have to return to the Chamber for decision on the change.

While the Senate voted on the Capanema bill, the Chamber was voting on the Brito Amendment. It was defeated by a vote of 97 in favor and 165 opposed. Linked in opposition to it were the PTB, the Kubitschek wing of the PSD and some conservatives who opposed the liberalized amending powers of the bill. With this vote, there remained little further doubt that Jango's forces would triumph. With the dawn of the fourteenth, the cars streamed from the Congress to Brasília's two hotels and to the great blocks of apartment houses. Ten hours later, the cars and their occupants were back.

In the afternoon of the fourteenth, the Special Committee of the Chamber charged with reporting on the Capanema bill met to consider the Valladares amendment. The committee consisted of Wilson Fadul (PTB-Mato Grosso), Artur Virgilio (PTB-Amazonas)--these two were substitutes for Clemens Sampaio (PTB-Bahia) and Oswaldo Lima Filho (PTB-Pernambuco) who had, earlier in the week, embarrassingly, declared themselves opposed to the Capanema bill when it was conceived of as an anti-Goulart measure--Oliveira Brito (PSD-Bahia), Manuel Novais (PR-Bahia), Martins Rodrigues (PSD-Ceara), Pedro Aleixo (UDN-Minas), Clodomir Millet (PSP-Maranhão) and as reporter, Bilac Pinto (UDN-Minas). The Committee debated the constitutionality of the proposed law.[12] At one point Almino Afonso (PTB-Amazonas),

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12 For a fuller discussion of the constitutionality question, see A-388. Briefly, the law would appear to be unconstitutional since Article 25 of the Ato Adicional (which by amending the Constitution became part of it) specified that if there is to be a plebiscite it must be held nine months before the close of the present presidential term (which ends in January, 1966). The Capanema law, which sets what in effect is a plebiscite for January 6, 1963 would have to be a constitutional amendment in order to be valid. As passed, it received an absolute majority (more than 163), which satisfies the requirements for a regulatory law under Article 22 of the Ato Adicional. Most observers doubt that even with a supreme effort could the two-thirds majority in both houses needed for an amendment have been achieved.

0187

figure was calling for the capitulation of a substantial part of that party. Auro Moura Andrade, President of the Senate, who had been Jango's second choice for Prime Minister in July, only to be brushed aside for not immediately declaring himself pro-plebiscite, told the Senate "if the reason that the Nation is engulfed in inflation and disorder is that there is no date fixed on the calendar for a plebiscite, then let the Congress annul this argument, without commenting on its merit, setting the date this very day so that the future can be dedicated to correcting the ills that afflict Brazil."

In the afternoon of September 13 it became known in Brasília that Brochado and his Council were ready to resign. Their resignations were formally delivered to Goulart close to midnight. (Except for Foreign Minister Arinos, who formalized his resignation in mid-afternoon so that he would immediately take up his Senate seat, thus enabling him to play an active pro-Jango role there.) Brochado asked President (of the Chamber) Mazzilli to set the hour for an appearance before the Chamber. Mazzilli, still under the impression that the Capanema law might pass the Senate that night, tried to stall him off until the following day. But Brochado was pathetically insistent, his behaviour verging on the unbalanced. He reportedly told Mazzilli that he would "just as soon die before the Chamber as in the vanguard of the revolution in Rio Grande do Sul." Shortly after midnight, Brochado mounted the speaker's stand and delivered an hour and a half resignation speech, half defensive, half mea culpa. /A complete translation will be forwarded to the Department shortly./ A violently Anti-U.S. section of the speech had reportedly been deleted earlier by Jango and the Council of Ministers.

Jango had played his hand: there was no government, the War Minister on whom the UDN had counted to balance the pro-Jango generals was now out of office and without command, the word had already been passed that General Amaury Kruel, iron-willed and completely a Jango man would "answer for the War Ministry," and the general strike was scheduled to begin in little more than twenty-four hours.

In the Senate, in the early morning hours of September 13/14, following Brochado's speech and departure from the Congress, the Capanema law was being transformed into a boomerang of victory for Goulart. Led by Senators Kubitschek, Arinos, Moura Andrade and Benedicto Valladares, and with the assistance from the corridors of Tancredo Neves and Santiago Dantas, a change to the bill, tagged

0186

in public support. To the Council's note, Lacerda nonchalantly replied that it should have been delivered to Brizzola, but privately he was more than a little concerned.

4. The Esforço Concentrado

The strategy of the anti-Goulart forces in Congress had two parts. One was to spike what they considered to be his biggest gun--his power to force the resignation of the Council of Ministers and through the presentation of unacceptable substitutes (Brizzola, for example, for Prime Minister) keep the Congress in session in Brasília and away from their election campaigning. The Chamber therefore on September 12 passed, by a vote of 184-66 the so-called Capanema bill[11] which provided for Presidential nomination of a "provisional" Council of Ministers to cover any interim periods before a permanent Council could be approved. The second step was to pass the Brito Amendment and thereby concretize the swindle that had been pulled on Brochado da Rocha in August. (If any proof were needed that plebiscite and only plebiscite was in the minds of both sides, with all other issues blown away like dead leaves--including the much-publicized "basic reforms," it was provided by the spectacle of many of the Chamber's conservatives declaring themselves in favor of a constitutional amendment that would have made possible sweeping reforms, and of "leftists" just as passionately opposed to the Brito Amendment because it did not guarantee the one sine qua non--a plebiscite.) The morning of the thirteenth Herbert Levy (UDN-São Paulo), national president of the UDN, delivered a fiery anti-Jango speech, accusing the President of trying to foist on the nation an "unjust and cruel plebiscite" after having sabotaged the proper functioning of the parliamentary system. He said Goulart "had revealed an absolute absence of the democratic vocation." Before going to the Chamber to deliver the speech, he told an Embassy officer (Embtel 583) that his party wanted to retain the parliamentary form so that Congress could keep the power of electing the President. He said he had PSD support lined up for the UDN position but admitted that the PSD's devotion to the cause was not as strong as the UDN's.

In the Senate's night session the same day that Levy in the Chamber had called for firmness against Goulart, an influential PSD

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11 After Gustavo Capanema (PSD-Minas).

0185

Fleet, issued a manifesto on September 10 warning in strong terms against Communist infiltration. The manifesto appealed to the "vital forces" of the nation, civil and military, to take preventive steps at once. Coming at the time it did, the manifesto was a clear indication that the Navy had by no means been brought into the Goulart camp by Minister Suzano. Without public announcement, the Club also began ouster proceedings against Rear Admiral Candido da Costa Aragão, ultra-nationalist Commander of the Marine Corps, who on several occasions had provided a plain-clothes detachment of Marines as bodyguards for Brizzola.

(b) Carlos Lacerda - Guanabara Governor Lacerda, engaged in a running radio/TV battle with Brizzola, opened up with his big guns on August 31 in São Paulo with an acid speech denouncing Goulart's "Communist advisers" and loosing insults at Brochado da Rocha which reportedly continued to bedevil Brochado until his death on September 26.[9] Although the insults do not appear in the unofficial texts of Lacerda's speech, he reportedly belittled Brochado as a puppet of Goulart, calling him a "vivandeira" (camp-follower) and a "peddler of plastic combs" (an overcrowded Rio profession which is one small cut above begging).

Reportedly as a move to mollify Brochado, but doubtless also linked to Goulart's long-time dislike of Lacerda, the Council of Ministers was hurriedly convoked in Rio on September 5. The Council issued a statement accusing Lacerda of conducting a "subversive" campaign against the national government...incompatible with the existence of the Federation." A clear threat to intervene,[10] and probably meant as a preamble to intervention, the threat remained dormant as the focus of attention switched to Brasília. One reason, undoubtedly, was that dispite his fear and perhaps hatred of Lacerda, Goulart, in the knowledge of his unsure standing with the armed forces, preferred to use the threat of military action as a club over the Congress rather than to test his ability to move the military in Guanabara that could have cost him heavily

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9 When asked by a member of his own party why he had not sought a meeting with Congressional leaders prior to September 10 to attempt to clear up the question of interpretation of the Brito amendment, Brochado reportedly replied, "How could I approach a Congress where not a single voice was raised to defend me against Lacerda?"

10 Articles 7 and 9 of the Constitution empower the President to intervene, i.e., seize physical control, in states in order to "maintain the national integrity."

0184

that General Enio da Cunha Garcia, a Gaucho ~~and friend of Goulart~~ and friend of Goulart, and General Machado Lopes, the military leader of the "legalidade" movement in August 1961 and now Chief of Staff of the First Army, had carried a message to Goulart from the high-ranking officers in the Rio area warning him to refrain from unconstitutional moves, since he would find little support for such action. This brought a denial from Kruel, Mello and Osvino, but of such vehemence as to leave little doubt that there was some basis for the stories.

Following the Mello-Jair telegram, sufficient numbers of high-ranking officers publicly expressed their support of Mello to make clear the existence of two camps--one willing to follow Goulart should illegal maneuvers, such as closing the Congress or postponing elections, be attempted, and the other unwilling to do so, albeit few of their number strongly supported the parliamentary system. The offices of the Ministry of War in Rio became the headquarters of the latter group--the so-called "Council of Generals".[8] Its members included among others Machado Lopes, ex-War Minister Segadas Vianna, Nestor Souto de Oliveira, President of the Joint Brazil-U.S. Military Commission, Emilio Maurel Filho, Commander of the First Military Region (a subordinate command of the First Army), Ademar de Queiros, Director of Coastal Artillery, and José Publico Ribeiro, Commander of Training Schools in Rio. Dissident rumblings were also heard from field commands in the Second and Third Armies. Presumably acting on behalf of the Council of Generals, or at least with their knowledge, the prestigious retired Marshal Eurico Dutra, Brazil's first President under the Constitution of 1946, reportedly contacted various conservative deputies in the Chamber and assured them of support whatever their decision about the plebiscite.

The Air Force and Navy remained largely silent during the crisis. There is little doubt about the pro-Goulart loyalties of their Ministers. The Clube Naval, however, with a membership of 3,000 and a Directing Council of seventy high-ranking officers, headed by Vice Admiral Sampaio, Commander in Chief of the Brazilian

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8 According to Luiz Alberto Bahia, one of the best of Brazilian political writers, the Council remains in existence--he calls it a "Military Senate"--and represents the counterbalance to the new-found power of the pro-Goulart generals.

0183

a Brizzola-owned radio station in Guanabara broadcasted statements that Governor Carlos Lacerda considered inflammatory. The Governor dispatched his military police to the station--only to find it protectively ringed by troops of the First Army. Osvino's troops also freed several union leaders arrested by Lacerda's police.

Another military figure who was prevailed on to work for Goulart was retired Marshal Henrique Teixeira Lott, unsuccessful presidential candidate in 1960. Despite having been jailed in August, 1961 by the then War Minister Denys, Lott to date had remained neutral, or at any rate silent, on national political questions. On August 26 he told Jornal do Brasil that the Ato Adicional was unconstitutional since at the time it was enacted the nation was in a state of siege.[7] He repeated his view several times in early September.

(d) Juscelino Kubitschek - An opponent of parliamentarism from its inception, since he sees himself as the likeliest presidential candidate for the 1965 campaign, Kubitschek threw his full influence behind Goulart. He went to Brasília and took his rarely-used seat as Senator from Goias. Although he did not formally address the Senate, he was in continuous touch with members of both Houses and was one of the principal drafters of the Valladares amendment to the Capanema bill, which was the basis of the final agreement. A firm PSD-UDN alliance in the Chamber could have prevented passage of that bill. Juscelino's prodding was one of the main factors in the collapse of that alliance and the forging of a PSD-PTB bloc sufficient for its passage.

3. The Anti-Jango Forces

(a) The Military - Although Goulart had the loyalty of three of the four Army commanders, there were ample signs elsewhere of dissatisfaction with his methods if not his objectives, particularly after the War Minister's hostile reply to the Jair telegram. Even before that, on the ninth and the eleventh, Jornal do Brasil reported

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7 Article 217 paragraph 5 of the Constitution reads, "The Constitution shall not be modified while a state of siege is in force." Such a state was not declared at the time, but Lott is of course correct in claiming that Congress had acted under duress.

0182

command of the Second Army in São Paulo.[5] With Osvino Alves heading the First Army in Rio de Janeiro and Jair Dantas Ribeiro heading the Third Army in Porto Alegre, only the Fourth Army in Recife under Castelo Branco could not be included in the Goulart camp.

The position of War Minister Nelson de Mello was an equivocal one. He was known to be emphatically in favor of a plebiscite. Indeed, during the August crisis he had made such strong pro-plebiscite statements in Brasília as to draw accusations of exerting illegal and unethical pressure on the Congress. Yet his loyalty to constitutional procedures put him outside the Goulart pale. When the Cabinet was reformed September 15-16, he was dropped. Mello symbolized (and symbolizes) the dilemma of the military. Anxious to see the parliamentary system abandoned and full power returned to the President, willing to publicly so state, he would not countenance extra-legal steps to achieve that end. Generals Osvino Alves and Jair Dantas Ribeiro would, and did. On September 12, Jair sent a telegram to Mello which said that only if Congress agreed to a plebiscite could he assure the "tranquility" of his region. To this Mello coldly replied that Jair's statement was (1) out of order; (2) untrue.[6] On September 15, with the general strike unfolding,

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5 Bevilacqua's speech on taking command was mild and conciliatory by comparison with the attitudes of Osvino and Jair. He said he favored a plebiscite but that he opposed the use of illegal means to attain it. Nonetheless, based on his record as an ultra-nationalist supporter of Brizzola, the statement may have been more a tactic designed to make himself acceptable to the conservative elements in São Paulo rather than a signal of his independence of the Goulart camp. On the other hand, on-the-spot observers do not discard the possibility of a genuine change of heart. (See Porto Alegre's Telegram 7 to the Department) At any rate, when Jair sent his "plebiscite or disorder" telegram to the War Minister, Peri, as well as Osvino, sent a telegram of support to Jair. Interestingly, Peri cited the views of Fernando Gasparian, a powerful São Paulo industrialist and friend of Jango, who, according to Peri, feared that instability following failure to obtain a plebiscite would hurt domestic investment!

6 This episode is not yet entirely clear. Quite possibly the politically unsophisticated and not overly-intelligent Jair was taken into camp by political advisers. His defense, upon receipt of Mello's telegram, was that his own message had been marked "Secret" and that he had not been the one who released it to the press. Presumably release was made by General Amaury Kruel, now War Minister, then Chief of the President's Military Household.

0181

the Congressional work session did not produce a satisfactory agreement on a plebiscite.[4] Propelled by its own momentum, and perhaps also by a desire to remind the President that the unions are his oldest base of support, the strike was called on the 15th despite the fact that an agreement on the plebiscite had been reached on the 14th. The strike was largely a flop. (When a delegation of labor leaders called on President Goulart in Brasília on September 20 to press their demands, particularly regarding the 100 percent minimum wage increase, they were tartly and publicly reminded that they neither represented nor controlled the majority of labor and that 60 percent rather than 100 percent might be more realistic for the wage increase.) Nonetheless, in the days preceeding the Congressional agreement, the strike threat must have influenced Congressmen still mindful of the murderous riots of July 5 in Rio State.

(b) Brizzola - On a nation-wide radio/TV hookup (which included the government-controlled Radio Nacional) the Rio Grande do Sul Governor (and PTB candidate for federal deputy from Guanabara) as a far-out supporter of Goulart, warned that revolution was certain if Congress did not restore Goulart's powers--not on April 15, 1963 but through a plebiscite on October 7, coincident with the regular national elections. By establishing October 7 as a goal and by the unleasing of the violent and subversive Brizzola, if only momentarily, Congress was given a taste (unpleasant) of what Goulart supporters were capable. Also, the Administration now had a first position from which it could fall back.

(c) The Military - An almost solid front of pro-Jango generals was completed on September 11 when Peri Bevilacqua took "interim"

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4 The labor manifesto was so extreme as to be absurd insofar as the possibility of legislative implementation was concerned. It demanded (1) plebiscite on October 7; (2) 100 percent increase in the minimum wage; (3) radical agrarian reform; (4) revoking of the National Security Law; (5) freezing of prices on basic consumer items; (6) the right to vote for illiterates and soldiers; (7) passage of a law on the right to strike; (8) permanent status for temporary government employees; (9) delegation of powers to the Council of Ministers to carry out bank reform and other reforms "necessary for economic emancipation of the nation."

0180

paragraph reads:

"The system of government instituted by the Additional Act,[2] or the one resulting from alterations to it through this amendment, will be submitted to popular referendum, either by April 15, or 60 days after the promulgation of the alterations to the Additional Act."[3]

The subject of the "popular referendum" would thus be the present parliamentary system vs. a system created under the Brito Amendment--there being no guarantee that the new system would be a presidential one. Since the great majority of the Congress is composed of parties opposed to Goulart, it is probable that what would have emerged would be another version of parliamentarism. Since the Brito Amendment would be in force for six months, with the new Congress meeting for work sessions about March 15, and with the additional sixty days mentioned in the agreement, the plebiscite could have been held as late as mid-November, 1963. On both counts, the agreement of August 17 was no agreement at all to President Goulart.

Congress had gained on two fronts: (1) it had escaped the August crisis and thus was able to get in almost a full month of campaigning before having to return to Brasília; (2) it had pulled a fast one on the Prime Minister, but of such proportions that no realistic observer could have expected Goulart to sit still without virtually abandoning his hopes of recouping his political powers. It was now up to Goulart to marshal his forces.

2. Jango's Forces

a) Labor - Communist dominated unions announced on September 10 through the so-called General Labor Command (O Comando Geral dos Trabalhadores) that a general strike would begin on September 15 if

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2 The constitutional amendment enacted on September 2, 1961 which instituted the present parliamentary form. (A-101, September 3, 1961).

3 In Portuguese: "O sistema do governo instituido pelo Ato Adicional, ou resultante de suas alteraçoes na forma desta Emenda, será submetido a referendo popular até 15 de Abril, na primeira hipotese, ou até 60 dias apos a promulgação das alterações do Ato Adicional, na segunda hipotese."

0179

1. The August 17 Agreement: A Prime Minister Duped

Late in the afternoon of August 17, the last scheduled day of an "esforço concentrado" (concentrated Congressional work session), with the Prime Minister's request for 22 delegated powers[1] dying in committees or on the Chamber floor, and the appearance of an unclosable cleavage between the President and the Congress becoming more and more real, a "compromise agreement" was suddenly and dramatically announced by the President of the Chamber. The architects of the agreement were said to be Minas Gerais Governor Magalhães Pinto, Menzes Cortes, leader of the UDN in the Chamber, and Prime Minister Brochado da Rocha. The agreement was generally supposed to mean that (1) another "esforço concentrado" would be called for September 10-15 at which the Oliveira Brito Amendment (A-164 and Embtel 422) would receive the required two-thirds vote to pass the Chamber and Senate; (2) the new Congress convening in February 1963 would decide on whether or not to abandon the parliamentary system. Should it decide to retain the system, or should it take no action, a plebiscite on the question would be held on April 15, 1963; (3) Should the Congress abolish the parliamentary system, a plebiscite would nonetheless be held sixty days after such a decision. Thus, President Goulart was left with the impression that the most probable course of events would be an April 15 plebiscite on the presidential vs. parliamentary systems, with the less likely possibility that the Congress would abolish the parliamentary form, with such action to be rubber-stamped by a plebiscite sixty days later. The agreement was to be embodied in additional paragraphs to the Brito Amendment. No text of the agreement was made public. Only on September 6, almost three weeks later, when newspapers for several days had been suggesting that the additional wording, as agreed to by the Prime Minister, had quite a different meaning, was a text published. It was released to reporters by its drafter, Menzes Cortes and it quickly showed how thoroughly Brochado da Rocha had been taken in. (The Prime Minister made no attempt to deny that he had so agreed. On September 13 during his resignation speech to the Chamber, he was interrupted by Menezes Cortes and asked directly whether he had indeed made the agreement. Brochado admitted that he had.) The

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1 Three delegated powers were granted by the Congress. One created two ministers without portfolio; the second gave the Administration the right to act to control the national food supply and food price structure, and the third created a federal cattle-raising research fund.



ORIGIN/ACTION

ARA 4		
RM/R 2	REP	AP
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TR	XMB	AIR 4
ARMY 5	CIA 10	NAVY 5
OSD 12	USIA 8	NSA 3

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

AIRGRAM

732.00/10-962
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A-400 NO. | CONFIDENTIAL | AIR POUCH HANDLING INDICATOR

TO : Secstate WASHINGTON

DEPARTMENT OF STATE 1962 OCT 12 AM 10 51
BUREAU OF INTER-AMERICAN AFFAIRS
OCT 15 1962
RM/AN ANALYSIS & DISTRIBUTION BRANCH

JW
RS

FROM : Amembassy BRASILIA Office DATE: October 9, 1962

SUBJECT : The September Political Crisis

REF :

RM/R - jw
10/17 - jww

Summary

The crisis surrounding the Congressional concentrated work session of September 10-15 was a direct continuation of the August crisis, (A-244). It grew out of the attempt by the UDN, aided by parts of the PSD and the smaller parties, to renege on the agreement of August 17, which, to the Goulart Administration, meant a plebiscite on presidentialism vs. parliamentarism by April 15, 1963. The deepening and prolongation of the crisis forced Goulart into a corner from which he had either to force the Congress to knuckle under or be defeated by it. Although the strength of his support among the military was not much greater (if at all) than it had been in July and August, and the general strike of September 15 proved much less effective than that of July 5, the addition of other factors was able to brow-beat the conservative forces in Congress: their fear of the postponement of the October 7 elections, into which they had already invested much money and in which they have high hopes of victory, and the all-out effort by Juscelino Kubitschek to break up PSD opposition to granting a plebiscite. The solution, a January 6 "referendum" on presidentialism, is without doubt a clear victory for Goulart.

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FORM DS-323 4-62 | CONFIDENTIAL | FOR DEPT. USE ONLY ☑ In ☐ Out

Drafted by: HWeiner:jw | Contents and Classification Approved by: PRaine

Clearances:

0177

the events at the University of Mississippi, the Walter Schirra space flight and the informal meeting of Latin American Foreign Ministers with Secretary Rusk on the Cuban problem all received front page treatment in the Porto Alegre press.

Frederick D. Sharp III
American Consul

cc.: Consular Affairs, Rio
Political Section, Rio
Political Section, Brasília
ARA/EST/Brazil, Washington
INR/RAR/P, Washington

0176

the 1954 election when Meneghetti ran against Pasqualini and they say that the early results are based on the urban vote of the various municipios where PTB's strength is acknowledged; that when the outlying areas begin to report, Meneghetti's strength will become manifest. This may be true, but at present, it could be whistling in the dark. The reporting officer's view is that for Meneghetti to win with a clear margin, Fernando Ferrari must cut more deeply into the normally PTB-inclined urban vote.

In the senatorial race ADP candidates Mem de SÁ and Danàel KRIEGER are slowly but steadily pulling away from PTB's Brochado da ROCHA and Mariano BECK, although the former has surprisingly out-run the latter.

In the race for Federal Deputy, it is still too early to draw conclusions, although partial results reported indicate that PTB's Floriceno PAIXÃO, Paulo MINCARONE, Giordano ALVES and Cesar PRIETO are receiving significant votes as are PSD's Peracchi BARCELLOS, Daniel FARACCO, Tarso DUTRA, and ADP's BRITO VELHO, Raul PILLA and FLORES SOARES Jr., while for MTR only Daniel DIPP seems to be making an impact.

In the race for State Deputy, no trend is discernible since only fragmentary reports are available. One informed political observer predicts that it will take 44,000 votes to seat a Federal Deputy and 24,000 votes to seat a State Deputy.

2. MISCELLANY

a. Military Changes: The press today announced that Colonel Argemiro de Assis Brasil, a Communist suspect, will assume temporarily the post of Chief of Staff of III Army, pending the arrival of General Genaro Bontempo, expected next week. Contrary to earlier reports, Colonel Assis Brasil will remain in the staff of III Army, and will not become Chief of Staff of the Armored Division, stationed in Guanabara. Taking his former position as Chief of Staff of III Military Region will be Colonel Alcy Souza Palmeiro.

b. Other Military Developments: Rather cryptic news items from Rio over the past week indicate to local observers that Jango is intensively attempting to effect a rapprochement with top army leaders in that area. Additionally, critical telegram from the officer corps in Curitiba, to the president of Clube Militar, General Magessi, protesting against the planned reception for Jango, received some attention here as did the report of Magessi's refusal to accept a court order regarding the use of the Clube's funds for such a reception.

c. Psychological: Although practically all local attention was focused on the final days of the election campaign and election day itself,

0175

ORIGIN/ACTION

ARA-4		
RM/R 2	REP	AF
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INT	LAB	TAR
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ARMY 5	CIA 10	NAVY 5
OSD 12	USIA 8	NSA 3

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

AIRGRAM

732.00/10-962

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A-17 NO. | OFFICIAL USE ONLY 1962 OCT 16 AM 9 02 | PRIORITY HANDLING INDICATOR

TO : DEPARTMENT OF STATE

DEPARTMENT OF STATE BUREAU OF INTER-AMERICAN AFFAIRS OCT 16 1962 RM/AN ANALYSIS & DISTRIBUTION BRANCH

10-9-62

FROM : Amconsul PÔRTO ALEGRE DATE: OCT 9 - 1962

SUBJECT : PÔRTO ALEGRE WEEKLY SUMMARY № 25

REF :

RM/R-Yuri 10PS-KB

1. Early RGS Election Results
2. Miscellany
   a. Military Changes
   b. Other Military Developments
   c. Psychological

1. Early RGS Election Results

After a whirlwind climax to the election campaign, RGS voted quietly and without untoward incident on October 7. As the first results of the race for Governor began to come in, all observers were shocked at the poor showing by the MTR candidate Fernando Ferrari, who, until now, has never polled better than 20 percent of the vote. At this writing it seems quite clear that his magnetic personality and apparently well financed campaign were unable to overcome his lack of a strong party organization. While his vote-getting ability, as it has in the past, may be the critical factor in the ultimate seating of either Meneghetti or Michaelsen, his political future at this time is most uncertain. On the other hand, Michaelsen's strength has surprised practically all observers who apparently had forgotten (and thus underrated) the strong party organization and vote discipline of the PTB. As unofficial tabulations were announced throughout the day yesterday, Michaelsen held a slight lead over Meneghetti who only began to inch in front late yesterday, and as this is written, with almost 30 percent of the vote counted, Meneghetti holds a lead of less than 2,000 votes over PTB's Michaelsen. Knowledgeable people report that the same thing occurred in

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Drafted by: FDSharp 10/9/62

Clearances:

Contents and Classification Approved by: FDSharp

0174

section with the words, in Portuguese, "Have you thought yet what would happen here if there were a wall as there is in Berlin?" Beneath were imitation upright railroad irons with loops of barbed wire stretched between. By noon, a sizeable crowd had collected and demonstrators tore the signs down. The entire incident was reported in all newspapers with pictures. By Thursday, the same sign was again raised in Praça Dantas Barreto, this time with red hand prints smeared over the sign. This one remained. Various newspapers through their colunists raised the question of why anyone should want to tear down such a sign when it was directed at no particular candidate by name. "Why should the opponents of candidate João Cleofas have to attack so furiously a sign symbolizing the Wall of Berlin?" asked SOCRATES TIMES de CARVALHO in Diario da Noite.

Lowell C. Kilday
for
D. Eugene Delgado-Arias
American Consul General

Contributors:
WKilday
CTucker

TAH

0173

2. Arraes Returns to City Hall

Recife Mayor Miguel Arraes moved back into City Hall on October 8 after an enforced pre-election leave of absence of almost three months. Arraes' first statement upon reassuming office was that he would start immediately to undo all of the damage done to the City by Acting Mayor MOURY FERNANDES. Among other things, this meant that Arraes intended to reappoint the department heads fired by Fernandes and to re-establish the harmonious relations between the City and the Movimento de Cultura Popular. Arraes also let it be known that he was thinking of prosecuting Moury Fernandes on charges of diverting public funds into his own pockets.

Fortunately for the peace and security of Recife, a move by the city council to bar Arraes from reassuming his office was called off at the last moment. Thirteen members of the council, spurred by Arraes' arch enemy, WANDENKOLK WANDERLY, had agreed to prevent Arraes from coming back as Mayor on the technicality that he had forfeited his right to do so by not getting the council's permission to take leave of absence. Wiser heads pointed out that such a move would result in a serious outbreak of violence so the plan was dropped only two days before Arraes' return. (LIMITED OFFICIAL USE)

PSYCHOLOGICAL

Legitimate news during the past week was again driven from the front pages of the newspapers in Recife by the political charges and counter-charges in this final week of campaigning.

Integration events in Oxford, Mississippia, were fully-reported, including accompanying photographs. However, no editorials appeared commenting on the situation. The informal discussions held by Latin American foreign ministers likewise provoked no editorial comment, nor did the final communique of the MFM.

SCHIRRA's six-orbit flight received full attention from the four local dailies on their first pages. Diario de Pernambuco reported the feat with a banner headline as did Diario da Noite. Jornal do Commercio was a little more subdued. Whether intentional or not, Ultima Hora chose to use as a front-page picture one of Schirra swimming. Unitario (Fortaleza), Gazeta de Alagoas (Maceio) and Diario da Borborema (Campina Grande) all gave full coverage to the orbital flight.

On Monday morning, two signs appeared in Recife in the downtown

0172

out with instructions to buy any vote at any price. The Cleofas camp did likewise. Convinced that Cleofas had fallen far behind, Cleofas campaign workers made a special appeal to the local monied class and, as a result, had over $CR 50 million to spend for votes in the last three or four days of the campaign.

Election day passed without incident in all parts of the state, and the quiet order at the polls and elsewhere made one wonder whether federal troops were called in to guarantee the elections or only as a political gambit. Following the voting, Pernambucanos settled back to await the tally, and all sides seemed well disposed to accept the election's outcome, whatever it might be.

First results of the voting are now trickling in. After three days, only 100,000 votes have been counted, and it is anticipated that the final count will not be ready for at least ten days. At this point, Cleofas is ahead by over 5,000 votes, and his lead is expected to increase daily. The biggest surprise so far is the small margin of Arraes' lead in Recife, considered to be his point of maximum strength. With a little more than 15,000 votes counted, Arraes' edge over Cleofas in the capitol is just over 1,000.

PAULO GUERRA is well in front in the vice-gubernatorial race and is expected to maintain his lead. Jose Ermirio de Moraes heads the pack in the senatorial contests and FRANCISO PESSOA de QUEIROZ, despite a sudden failing of support in the last week of the campaign, is running a good second. JARBAS MARANHÃO, in third place, is less than 2,000 votes behind Pessoa de Queiroz.

In the gubernatorial contest in Ceara, early results seems to confirm predictions of a sweep by VIRGILIO TAVORA (UDN-PSD) over leftist-nationalist ADAHIL BARRETO (PTB). In Paraiba, JOÃO AGRIPINO (UDN), Minister of Mines and Energy under JANIO QUADROS, has a good lead in the Senate race. Agripino's running mate, ALUIZIO CAMPOS holds the second position, but Senator ALFREDO de FIGUEREDO (PTB) is close behind and is still expected to win the second Senate slot. DJALMA MARANHAO, leftist-nationalist Mayor of Natal, failed to make much of a state-wide impression in his campaign in Rio Grande do Norte and, in early returns, is running a poor fifth of five candidates. Governor ALUIZIO ALVES' candidate, MONSENHOR WALFREDO GURGEL seems sure to grab one of the two Rio Grande do Norte seats in the Senate with the other one going to either TEODORICO BEZERRA (PSD) or DINARTE MARIZ (UDN). In Alagoas, ARNON de MELO (UDN) seems certain of victory while the three candidates for the other Senate post run even in the first returns of the election. (LIMITED OFFICIAL USE)



ORIGIN/ACTION

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DEPARTMENT OF STATE

AIRGRAM

732.00/10-862

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1962 OCT 16 AM 8 00

TO : DEPARTMENT OF STATE

INFO: RIO DE JANEIRO, BRASILIA, SÃO PAULO

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EST/B

FROM : Amconsul RECIFE

DATE: October 8, 1962

SUBJECT : Weekly Summary No. 15

REF :

RM/R-Lee 10/25-RR

DEPARTMENT OF STATE BUREAU OF INTER-AMERICAN AFFAIRS OCT 17 1962

TABLE OF CONTENTS

POLITICAL

1. Political Campaign Developments
2. Arraes Returns to City Hall

PSYCHOLOGICAL

POLITICAL

1. Political Campaign Developments

Panic and despair ruled in both the CLEOFAS and ARRAES camps on the eve of Pernambuco's gubernatorial election. In final desperate moves to overcome what each side considered to be the strong lead of the other, both sides indulged in an orgy of spending. Campaign workers from both teams rushed around the state pressing cash into outstretched palms of local political leaders, attempting to outspend each other in the purchase or repurchase of votes. Reportedly, President GOULART and the national PTB, in the final week, placed huge sums of money at the disposition of Arraes, and Arraes overcame his earlier proclaimed scruples against vote-buying and, somewhat frenetically, negotiated for large blocs of votes in various parts of the state. JOSE ERMIRIO de MORAIS, it was claimed, rented four small planes and sent his campaign aides

Drafted by: See last page/ag

Contents and Classification Approved by:

Clearances:

0170

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-2- 784, October 5, 6 p.m. from Rio de Janeiro

Rio de Janeiro - 1,115,176 voters. Four gubernatorial candidates still have chance of victory with Paulo Fernandes gaining recent weeks at expense Miguel Couto (PSP-UDN-PRT). In left near equilibrium between Badger Silveira (PTB-PDC) and Tenorio Cavalcanti (PST-PTN). Church working classes behind Fernandes as best hope but Silveira slight betting favorite.

Ceara - 853,282 voters. Virgilio Tavora (UDN) backed by overwhelming organizational strength of UDN-PSD-PTN coalition should whip UDN-dissident Adahil Barreto who is leftist standard bearer.

Pernambuco - 851,398 voters. Joao Cleofas may have a very slight edge over Miguel Arraes in this crucial confrontation, but Arraes is gaining ground due Goulart support.

Piaui - 315,158 voters. Opposition gubernatorial candidate Petronio Portela (UDN), backed by PSD and dissident PTB elements, should defeat Constantino Pereira (dissident PSD), the PTB candidate.

Espirito Santo - 370,009 voters. Ex-Governor Francisco Lacerda de Aguiar (PSD dissident backed by UDN and PTB) seems to have forged ahead of ex-governor Jones dos Santos Neves (PSD).

Sergipe - 192,503 voters. Virtual gubernatorial toss-up between Leandro Maciel (UDN with PTB and dissident PSD support) and his former protege Seixan Doria (UDN dissident with PSD dissident PTB backing).

Amazonas - (estimated) 140,000 voters. Plino Coelho (PTB) fairly or by fraud will be next governor.

Acre - 19,544 voters. Jose Guiomard (PSD) for governor.

Detailed predictions on Senate and Chamber pouched today A-390.

GORDON

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INCOMING TELEGRAM *Department of State* ACTION COPY

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FROM: Rio de Janeiro

TO: Secretary of State

NO: 784, October 5, 6 p.m.

PRIORITY

Highlights of airgram A-390 of October 5 on October 7 elections.

Estimated 85 percent record 18.5 million registered voters will go to polls Sunday to elect Congress quite similar present one (see A-257 of September 4 and A-345 of September 20) and choose new governors in 11 states. Balloting should be peaceful, although scattered violence possible. Troops ready to maintain order. Predictions difficult as undecided vote can swing election in over half the states; following are Embassy's "best bets" on gubernatorial races:

Sao Paulo - 3,822,235 voters. Quadros extremely slight favorite over Adhemar de Barros and Jose Bonifacio Nogueira both of whom have gained ground in last few days.

Rio Grande do Sol - 1,561,162 voters. In tight three-way gubernatorial race Fernando Ferrari (MTR) in spite of lack party organization, could upset Ildo Meneghetti (PSD), who has the support of broadest coalition of parties in state's history, while Egidio Michaelsen (PTB) has steadily closed gap at expense Ferrari.

Bahia - 1,206,453 voters. Waldir Pires (PSD) has pulled even with Lomanto Junior (PL with UDN and PR support).

Guanabara - 1,198,588 voters. Vice-governor race edge for Lopo Coelho (PSD-UDN) over Eloy Dutra.

/Rio de Janeiro -

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ACTION ASSIGNED TO:	ACTION TAKEN	
NAME OF OFFICER & OFFICE SYMBOL	DATE OF ACTION	DIRECTIONS TO RM/R

732.00/10-562

0168

of federal spending, and a closer rein on periodic wage increases to workers to be maintained at levels not exceeding the rise in cost-of-living (in this connection he was critical of the high wages paid to workers of such government-run operations as the railroad system, ports, and the merchant marine, which are completely out of proportion to average wage scales).

The FIESP president expressed the opinion that the industrial boom of the past fifteen years is due, in part, to efforts of industry to manufacture locally a wide range of products, including production goods, that had been imported in the past. As the first edge of public demand wears off in a few years, so will the dynamic development of Brazilian industry, unless unstinting efforts are now made to expand local consumer markets and aggressively open and develop new export markets to absorb some of the products which have not traditionally been supplied by Brazil.

Mr. Noschese indicated his support of the SUDENE[1/] in its efforts to close the economic and social gap between Northeast Brazil and the rest of the country and urged that the São Paulo State Government and local investors continue to extend financial assistance, and set up industrial facilities in that area.

The speaker strongly attacked those forces which "under the mask of nationalism . . . prey on the patriotic spirit of the people, and try today to turn the regime of free enterprise into a tyranny of the State, where there exists but one political party."

Mr. Noschese concluded his speech by pointing out that one million new jobs must be created every year, and that neither the State nor the nationalization of economic activities can achieve this aim. He alluded to the failure of the Government to operate efficiently in areas of activity running parallel to those of private enterprise, and blamed political pressure and bureaucratic "red-tape" as the major negative factors. He emphasized that demographic growth is above 3 percent per annum in Brazil, and that this phenomenon merits the continued attention of the local industry which must provide ever increasing investments to offer new jobs for the people. Finally, Mr. Noschese expressed the hope that State intervention in economic life would be limited to a strict minimum, thus giving adequate incentive to private enterprise. (End UNCLASSIFIED)

(Begin OFFICIAL USE ONLY) Comment: Mr. Rafael Noschese, 52, is a sober, reputable, businessman of liberal tendencies. Together with members of his family, he runs S. A. Comércio e Indústria Souza Noschese (manufacturers of bathroom fixtures) and Metalurgica Ferrotil S. A. (a medium-sized metalurgy whose

0167

ORIGIN/ACTION

A2a-4 (19)

RM/R	REP	AF
2	1	
ARA	EUR	FE
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E	P	IO
3	1	2
L	FSO	AID
		11
	SIP	PER
	1	1
AGR	COM	FRB
INT	LAB	TAR
	6	
TR	TSB	AIR
ARMY	CIA	NAVY
	10	
JCS	USIA	NSA
	8	3
		NSC
		7

(3)

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

AIRGRAM

832.062/10-562

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A-90 NO. | OFFICIAL USE ONLY | HANDLING INDICATOR: XR 832.061 / 732.00

TO : DEPARTMENT OF STATE

INFO: RIO DE JANEIRO

FROM : Amcon SÃO PAULO DATE: October 5, 1962

SUBJECT : President of Federation of Industries of State of São Paulo Takes Office for Two Years

REF : CERP, D

(Begin UNCLASSIFIED)

Under the presidency of Rafael NOSCHESE, the new slate of directors of the Federation and Center of Industries of the State of São Paulo (FIESP-CIESP) took office for a two-year term commencing September 26. The event is of some importance on two counts: 1. FIESP-CIESP is the major trade association in the State of São Paulo, and the opinions of its leaders carry considerable weight in São Paulo's political, financial, and business circles, while its influence at times is felt on the national political-economic scene; and 2. This is the first time that FIESP-CIESP elects a new president in ten years, inasmuch as, for five consecutive terms, no candidate ran against the solidly entrenched incumbent, Antonio DEVISATE, since his election in September 1952.

The speech Mr. Noschese gave at the FIESP inaugural ceremonies on September 26 carefully avoided reference to political figures or parties. It expressed some interesting views, including some of the opinions expressed a few days earlier to officers of this Consulate General (see Airgram A-66 of September 17), on the role Brazilian industry should play in the country's economic and social development.

Mr. Noschese stressed that private enterprise and a democratic regime offer the most favorable conditions for economic development and social progress. He advocated urgent measures to reduce the inflationary spiral through the establishment of an adequate credit policy, the stabilization

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FORM DS-323

Drafted by: ECON/ADVentura/cz 10/4/62

Contents and Classification Approved by:

Clearances:

0166

Amapá - 10,649 voters; toss up for Deputy between PSD incumbent Amilcar da Silva Pereira and Janary Nunes (PSP).

Rio Branco - over 4,985 voters; Gilberto Mestrinho (PTB) for the single Chamber seat.

For the Ambassador:

Ronald M. Schneider

Ronald M. Schneider
Political Officer

0165

Espirito Santo - 307,009 voters; Ex-Governor Francisco Lacerda de Aguiar (PSD dissident backed by UDN-PTB-PSP-PRP-PDC) seems to have forged ahead of ex-Governor Jones dos Santos Neves (PSD-PTN); nevertheless outgoing Governor Carlos Lindemberg (PSD) will become a Senator along with Raul Giberti (PSP) or Eurico Resende (UDN); Chamber seats will go to João Calmon (PSD), Dirceu Cardoso (PSD), Napoleão Fontenelle (PSD), Gil Velloso (UDN), Bagueira Leal (UDN), Oswaldo Zanello (PRP), Ramon de Oliveira Neto (PTB), and probably Argilano Dario (PTB), Lourival de Almeida (UDN), or Raimundo de Andrade (PTN).

Mato Grosso - 263,002 voters; incumbents Filinto Muller (PSD) and João Villasboas (UDN) favored for re-election to the Senate; Wilson Fadul (PTB), Filadelfo Garcia (PSD), Rachid Mamed (PSD), Mendes Gonçalves (PSD), Saldenha Derzi (UDN), Fernando Ribeiro (UDN), and Yttrio Corrêa da Costa (UDN) should all win re-election, with José Ponce de Arruda (PSD) getting the new seat.

Sergipe - 192,503 voters; Virtual gubernatorial toss up between Leandro Maciel (UDN with PTB and dissident PSD support) and his former protegé Seixas Doria (UDN dissident with PSD-PR-PSB-PDC-and dissident PTB backing); Luiz Garcia (UDN) and Francisco Leite Neto (PSD) likely Senate victors; Chamber incumbents Lourival Batista (UDN), Arnaldo Garcez (PSD), Euvaldo Diniz (UDN), and Armando Rollemberg (PR) to be joined by Francisco Macedo (PTB), José Carlos Teixeira (PSD) and João Machado Rollemberg (UDN).

Alagoas - 192,223 voters; Rui Palmeira (UDN) and Teotônio Vilela (UDN) in Senate; Cid Sampaio (PSD), Medeiros Neto (PSD), Segismundo Andrade (UDN), Carlos Gomes (UDN), Muniz Falcão (PSP), Abraão Moura (PSP), Souza Leão (PSP), Ary Pitombo (PTB) and Aloísio Nono (PTB) are leading contenders for 9 Chamber seats.

Amazonas - estimated 100,000 voters; Plinio Coêlho (PTB) fairly or by fraud will probably be the next governor; Mourão Vieira (PL-PTB) and Artur Virgilio (PTB) will probably win the Senate race, with Alvaro Maia (PSD) close behind; PTB will re-elect Deputies Almino Afonso and João Viega, and elect Paulo Coelho and probably Justino Melo; PSD will re-elect Pereira da Silva and perhaps elect Abrahão Sabbá or Leopoldo Peres; the UDN will either re-elect Jayme Araújo or elect Carvalho Leal; Wilson Calmon of the PSP may well also win re-election.

Acre - 19,544 voters; José Guiomard (PSD) for governor; Giomard, Oscar Passos (PTB), and Fontenele de Castro (PSD) for Senate; Chamber predictions not possible due to miniscule electorate, but PSD will get at least three or four of the seven seats, with PTB winning perhaps two and UDN one.

Rondônio - 12,759 voters; Enio dos Santos Pinheiro (PSD) favored over Renato Medeiros (PSP) for Federal Deputy.

0164

Goiás - 510,135 voters; Pedro Ludovico (PSD) and José Feliciano Ferreira (PSD) are favored for the Senate, although incumbent Coimbra Bueno (UDN) should come close. The PSD will elect at least 7 deputies (Anisio Rocha, Benedito Vaz, Gerson Castro Costa, Geraldo de Pina, Pedro Celestino, José Peixoto da Silveira, and José Freire), the UDN 3 (Emival Caido, Wilmar Guimarães, and Jales Machado) in coalition with Alfredo Nasser (PSP) and José Ludovico (late of the PSD), and the PTB only Antonio Rezende Monteiro and possibly Lizandro de Paixão or Haroldo Duarte.

Maranhão - 497,436 voters; Incumbent PSD Senators Vitorino Freire and Sebastião Archer should gain re-election, three Deputy slates with that of the PSD-PTB re-electing Lister Caldas (PSD), Renato Archer (PSD), and Eurico Ribeiro (PSD) along with Ivar Saldanha (PSD), José de Matos Carvalho (PSD), Luiz Coelho (PSD), and two others; the PSP returning incumbents Clodomir Millet, Neiva Moreira, and Miguel Bahuri along with two newcomers; the UDN-PR-PDC-PTN opposition coalition re-electing José Sarney (UDN), suplente Cesario Coimbra, and Pedro Braga Filho.

Pará - 421,531 voters; Senate favorites are Lobão de Silveira (PSD) and Waldir Bouhid (PSD); re-election of Armando Corrêa (PSD), João Menezes (PSD) and Océlio de Medeiros (PSD). Epílogo de Campos (UDN), Ferro Costa (UDN), Gabriel Hermes (UDN), Silvio Braga (PSP), and Armando Carneiro (PTB) very likely, with PSD and PSP or PTB electing a newcomer.

Paraíba - 405,407 voters; Argemiro de Figueiredo (PTB) and João Agripino (UDN) or Drault Ernany (PSD) for Senate; PSD should re-elect Deputies Janduí Carneiro, Humberto Lucena, and Abelardo Jurema (and Ernany if he is running) along with Teotonio Neto and Milton Cabral; UDN incumbents Ernani Satiro, João Ursulo, Luiz Bronzeado, and Raul de Góes may be joined by Vital do Rego; Jacob Franz of the PTB and José Joffily of the PSB will probably retain their seats.

Rio Grande do Norte - 321,014 voters; the forces of the rival coalitions appear evenly balanced. The Aliança Democrática Trabalhista (UDN-PR-PST-MTR) should elect Dinarte Mariz (UDN) to the Senate; the Cruzada de Esperança (PSD-PTB-PDC-PTN) should have a winner in Teodorico Bezerra (PSD); UDN incumbents Tarcisio Maia and Djalma Marinho should be joined by one other Udenista; Jesse Freire, Alusio Bezerra, and Aristo Fernandes are the probable PSD winners along with Clovis Motta of the PTB.

Piaui - 315,158 voters; Opposition gubernatorial candidate Petrônio Portela (UDN), backed by a strong coalition of the UDN, PSD, PSP, PR, PDC, and dissident PTB elements, should defeat Constantino Pereira (dissident PSD), the PTB candidate; Chagas Rodrigues (PTB) has a fair chance of taking one Senate seat, but the pair of José Candido Ferraz (UDN) and Sigefredo Pacheco (PSD) may well shut him out; Federal Deputies Dyrno Pires (PSD), Heitor Cavalcanti (UDN), Clidenor Freitas (PTB), Milton Brandão (PSP), Ezequias Costa (UDN), and Lustosa Sobrinho (UDN) should be joined by Chagas Rodrigues and João Santos (PSD) or Manoel Santos (UDN) to form the new bancada.

0163

Mario Brago Ramos, and probably one other; the PTB will return incumbents Miguel Buffara, José Silveira, Maia Netto, Antônio Baby, and Petronio Fernal along with Egon Bertch, Wilson Chedid, Antônio Anibelli, and Renato Celidonio; the PDC should re-elect Accioly Filho and find new victors in Estefano Mikilita and José Richa; Ivan Luz of the PRP and possibly José Rodrigues Viera Netto of the PSB should complete the bancada.

Ceará - 853,282 voters; Virgílio Távora (UDN) backed by the overwhelming organizational strength of a UDN-PSD-PTN coalition and the incumbent Governor should whip UDN-dissident Adahil Barreto who is the PDC-PTB-PSB-PRT-PR standardbearer; in the Senate race Wilson Gonçalves (PSD) will win; Carlos Jereissati (PTB) may defeat Tancredo Alcântara (PTN) for the second seat; the PSD should take 6 or 7 Chamber seats (Martins Rodrigues, Expedito Machado, Dias Macedo, Armando Falcão, Coelho Mascarenhas, Audísio Pinheiro, and Antonio Paes de Andrade), the UDN 7 (Paulo Sarasate, Furtado Leite, Edilson Távora, Leão Sampaio, Costa Lima, Gentil Barreira, and one other, the PTN 2 (Esmerindo Arruda and Marcelo Sanford de Barros), the PTB 4 or 5 (Barreto, Jereissati Alvardo Lins, Osiris Pontes, and Dager da Souza, and the PR and PRT probably each one - Moreira da Rocha and Bonaparte Maia.

Pernambuco - 851,398 voters; Without engaging in wishful thinking it appears that João Cleofas (UDN, PRP, PL, PR, PTN, MRT) may have a very slight edge over Miguel Arraes (PTB-PSB-PST) in this crucial confrontation over the governorship. Paulo Guerra (PSD) should win the Vice Governorship, while Francisco Pessôa de Queiroz (PTB-UDN-PRT-PR-PRP-MTR-PSP) will make the Senate along with Jarbas Maranhão (PSD) or José Ermirio de Moraes (PTB with PST, PTN and PSB support); for the Chamber the PSD should re-elect Adelmar Carvalho, Andrade Lima Filho, Etelvino Lins, Aderbal Jurema, Nilo Coelho, Gileno de Carli, Petronilo Santa Cruz, and Milvernes Lima, João Roma, or Clélio Lemos; UDN incumbents Alde Sampaio and Dias Lins should be joined by Lael Sampaio, José Cavalcanti and one other newcomer; Arruda Câmara of the PDC and Geraldo Guedes of the PL should be re-elected (all as part of a PSD-UDN-PDC-PL coalition), while the PTB will return incumbents Souto Maior, José Lopes, Lamartine Távora, Osvaldo Lima Filho, and Bezerra Leite together with Murilo Costa Rego and Artur de Lima Cavalcanti, Pelopidas Silveira and perhaps Francisco Julião.

Santa Catarina - 641,582 voters; Attilio Fontana (PSD) and Antônio Konder Reis (UDN) for Senate; PSD to re-elect Deputies Joaquim Ramos, Lenoir Vargas and Osmar Cunha along with Osni de Medeiros, Antonio Gomes de Almeida, and Orlando Bertoli; UDN incumbents Carneiro Loyola, Areldo de Carvalho, and Wilmar Dias to be joined by Alvaro Catão, Laerte Ramos, and Diomício Freitas or Roberto Mattar; Elias Adaime (MTR) and Doutel de Andrade (PTB) to be re-elected. Paulo Macarini (PTB) could win through sobras.

0162

with such strong contenders as incumbents Alves de Macedo, Antonio Carlos Magalhães, Edvaldo Flôres, Ruy Santos, Vasco Filho, and João Mendes, suplentes Rafael Cincura and Hanequim Dantas, and proven vote-getters Wilson Falcão and Heitor Dias; the PR will re-elect Manoel Novais, Antônio Fraga, Helio Ramos Raimundo de Brito and Theodulo Lins de Albuquerque or Salamão Rehem; the PTB (in coalition with the PR) should return Clemens Sampaio and Fernando de Sant'anna and elect Neci Novais, wife of the PR's leading vote getter; the PDC's Hélio Machado, the PRP's Ruben Nogueira, and the PL's Nestor Duarte will probably also gain re-election.

Guanabara - 1,198,588 voters; Vice Governor race to Lopo Coelho (PSD-UDN-PSP-PR-PRT-MTR) over Hioy Dutra (PTB-PSP-PST). Senate to Gilberto Marinho (PSD) and Juracy Magalhães (UDN) over Aurélio Viana (PSB-PTB). Chamber likely Amaral Neto (UDN), Menezes Cortes (UDN), Aliomar Baleeiro (UDN), Adauto Cardoso (UDN), Cardoso de Menezes (UDN), and Artur Jun queira (UDN) or Hamilton Nogueira (UDN) or Mauricio Joppert (UDN); Chagas Freitas (PSD), Mendes de Moraes (PSD), Nelson Carneiro (PSD), Carlos Castilho Cabral (PSD) or Marco Antonio (PST); Leonel Brizzola (PTB), Bloy Dutra (PTB), Sergio Magalhães (PTB), Waldyr Simoes (PTB), Rubens Berardo (PTB), Benjamin Farah (PTB), Breno da Silveira (PSB), Max da Costa Santos (PSB) or Roland Corbisier (PTB) or Benedito Cerqueira (PTB); Juarez Távora (PDC) and Afonso Arinos Filho (PDC) or Alberto Byington (PDC); the coalition of small parties electing at least one--Hildebrando de Góes (PSP), Paschoal Cittadino (MTR), or Mozart Lago.

Rio de Janeiro - 1,115,176 voters; four of five gubernatorial candidates still have a real chance of victory with Paulo Fernandes (PSD, PR, PRP, and PRT) gaining in recent weeks at expense of Miguel Couto (PSP, UDN, MRT). On left near equilibrium between Badger Silveira (PTB-PDC) and Tenorio Cavalcanti (PST-FIN). Only candidate without reasonable prospects is Macedo Soares (PSB, PL, and UDN dissident), but he may hurt Couto and Fernandes enough for a Silveira victory. Church and producing classes behind Fernandes as best hope, and this plus recent endorsement by Kubitschek could boost him in. Senate race to Vasconcellos Torres (PTB) and Aarão Steinbruch (MTR). Vice Governor João Batista de Costa (UDN). Chamber lineup likely to be Amaral Peixoto (PSD), José Pedroso (PSD), Getulio de Moura (PSD-defeated gubernatorial candidate in 1958), Brigido Tinoco (PSB), Mario Tamborindeguy (PSD), Moacyr Azevedo (PSD), Edilberto de Castro (UDN), Raymundo Padilha (UDN), César Guinle (UDN), Alberto Torres (UDN), Augusto de Gregório (PTB), Bocayuva Cunha (PTB), Paiva Muniz (PTB), Heli Ribeiro (PTB), Edésio Nunes (PTB), Affonso Celso (PTB), Tenorio Cavalcanti (PST), Emanoel Waissmann (PSP), plus one other PTB candidate and probably two PTN-PST nonentities on Tenorio's broad coattails.

Paraná - 1,100,637 voters; Amaury de Oliveira (PTB) and Adolpho de Oliveira Franco (UDN) for Senate; PSD deputies to include Moises Lupion, Plinio Costa, João Ribiero Junior, Mario Gomes, Oliveira Franco Sobrinho, and Rafael Rezende; UDN winners likely to be Newton Carneiro, Hermes Macedo, Garibaldi Reale,

0161

São Paulo - 3,822,235 voters; Quadros a very slight favorite over de Barros and Nogueira for governor; Laudo Natel will be Vice-Governor; Lino de Mattos (PTN) and Moura Andrade (PSD) return to Senate; Chamber as in São Paulo A-78 of September 26, 1962.

Minas Gerais - 2,565,505 voters; Valladares (PSD) and Nogueira da Gama (PTB) or Pierucetti (UDN) for Senate; Chamber to include 20 PSD (Tancredo Neves, Pais de Almeida, Gilberto Faria, Amintas de Barros, João Kubitschek, Israel Pinheiro Filho &. Antonio Luciano Pereira, or Renato Azevedo, or Mario Pires in addition to thirteen incumbents--Bias Fortes, Pinheiro Chagas, José Alkmin Guilhermino de Oliveira, Carlos Murillo, Geraldo Vasconcelos, Padre Vidigal, Ultimo de Carvalho, Maurico de Andrade, Ovídio de Abreu, Gustavo Capenema, Uriel Alvim, and Ozanam Coelho or Carlos do Lago or Manoel Almeida), 12 UDN (Celso Passos, José Aparecido de Oliveira, and Celso de Mello Azevedo, plus incumbents Bilac Pinto, Pedro Aleixo, Rondon Pacheco, Oscar Correa, José Bonifacio, José Humberto, Guilherme Machado, Geraldo Freire, and Elias Carmo) 8 PTB (San Tiago Dantas, Milton Reis, Gabriel Gonçalves, Paulo Freire, Padre Nobre, Austregesilo de Mendoça, Patrus de Souza, and Mucio Ataide), 6 PR (Celso Brant, Aecio Ferreira da Cunha, Abel Rafael Pinto, Teófilo Pires, Feliciano Pena, and Juarez de Souza Carmo), 1 PSP (Bento Gonçalves), and perhaps Mauricio Haddade of the MTR.

Rio Grande do Sul - 1,561,162 voters; In a tight three-way gubernatorial race Fernando Ferrari (MTR) in spite of a lack of party organization, may just upset Ildo Meneghetti (PSD), who has the support of the broadest coalition of parties in the state's history--PSD, UDN, PDC, PL, RSP, and PRP; Senator Mem de Sá (PL), running with Meneghetti should win, but Daniel Krieger (UDN) may well lose to the PTB's Mariano Beck; the PTB should hold on to 12 or 13 deputy seats with incumbents Floriceno Paixão, César Prieto, Temperani Pereira, Paulo Mincarone, Unírio Machado, Creacy de Oliveira, Vitor Issler, Giordano Alves, Osmar Grafulha, Adílio Viana, and possibly Lino Braun being joined by Clay Araújo and Zaire Nunes Pereira or Antonio Brezolin; the PSD will re-elect Daniel Faraco Clóvis Pestana, Raymundo Chaves, Tarso Dutra, [illegible] and Willy Proelich, while adding Walter Perachi Barcellos, Hélio Carlomagno, and possibly Ari Alcântara; Raul Pilla and Brito Velho of the PL, Euclides Triches of the PDC, Alcides Flores Soares of the UDN, Afonso Anschau of the PRP and Daniel Dipp of the MTR should round out the state's bancada.

Bahia - 1,206,453 voters; Waldir Pires (PSD with PTN, PSP, PDC, PST, and PR dissident support) is given an almost even chance with Lomanto Junior (PL with UDN, PR, PTB, PRP, and PRT support), in part due to the fact that since 1945 the opposition gubernatorial candidate has always won; Pires' running mates, Antonio Balbino (PSD) and Josafat Marinho (PL) are favored in the Senate race; the PSD should pick up 11 of the Chamber seats with incumbents Oliveiro Brito, Regis Pacheco, Hermógenes Príncipe, Edgar Pereira, Aloysio de Castro and Hélio Cabal being joined by former chamber leader Tarcilo Vieira de Melo and several new faces; the UDN should win 8 seats

0160

the short run. One hidden danger in such a victory would be increased leftist pressure to have the results annulled and a tendency on their part to look for a road to power other than through the ballot box. The effect on President Goulart could be more salutary including a greater realization of the advantages or even necessity of a greater accomodation with moderate elements. In this respect the fewer "leftist" governors elected the greater the prospect Goulart will seek the cooperation of centrist state executives, listen (if not heed) their advice, and make available to them the financial resources which they need to achieve success in seeking the economic and social development of their states (which will be the key to the continued strength of moderate political leadership).+

In contrast with the difficulty of predicting the gubernatorial winners, the Congressional balloting will result in a legislature very much like the present one, with well over 200 incumbents returning to the Chamber for four more years and the Senate remaining a bastion of Conservatism. The Embassy's earlier predictions on these races (A-257 of September 4 and A-345 of September 20) remain substantially the same with the PSD expected to win 125-130 of the 409 Chamber seats followed by the UDN and PTB at 90-95 each, the PSP at about 24 and the PDC and PR at 16 or 17 each. In the Senate the lineup will be PSD roughly 19 victors (plus 6 holdovers), UDN 11 victors (plus 8 holdovers) and the PTB 10 victors (plus 4 holdovers). (It is, of course, not possible to predict with such precision, particularly with the large number of close races, and these figures could vary as many as two or three seats either way when the returns are in.)

The state by state predictions which follow should be considered as the Embassy's "best bets" based upon the analysis of information available, which for many states is extremely sketchy. It is particularly difficult to assess in advance the electoral impact of "new" candidates except in those cases where they have run such an affluent campaign as to virtually guarantee victory (given the nature of the Brazilian electoral system). Moreover, the factors discussed in A-106 of July 24, 1962 work in such a manner that a number of candidates with relatively small vote totals will be elected while far stronger votegetters miss out, and the remainder (sobras) system will further complicate the calculation of winners in Chamber races. Thus, the Embassy can reasonably only expect that the final results will approximate the lineup indicated below.++

+ The implications of the elections for US policy and programs, particularly the Alianza, will be analyzed in post election reporting.

++ Biographic data on almost all of these candidates can be found in the basic reports on the various states as well as in the systematic election reporting from the Consulate General in Recife and the Consulates at Belo Horizonte, Salvador and Belem for the states (Pernambuco, Paraíba, Pará, Bahia, and Minas Gerais) for which no single comprehensive "status report" was prepared.

0159

ORIGIN/ACTION: ARA-7

RMR 2	REP	AF
ARA	EUR	FE
NEA	CU	INR 5
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L	FBO	AID 11
AGR	COM	FRB
INT	LAB	TAR
TR	XMB	AIR 1
ARMY 5	CIA 10	NAVY 5
OSD 12	USIA 5	NSA 3

(42)

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

AIRGRAM

732.00/10-562

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TO : DEPARTMENT OF STATE

DEPARTMENT OF STATE
BUREAU OF
INTER-AMERICAN AFFAIRS
OCT 12 1962

FROM : Amembassy RIO DE JANEIRO DATE: October 5, 1962

SUBJECT : Brazilian Election Highlights - The October 7 Elections

REF :

RM/SC - 10/19 - gwa

At least 85 per cent of the more than 18.5 million registered voters (up over 35% from 1958) will go to the polls Sunday to elect governors (in half the 22 states), two-thirds of the Senate, and the entire Chamber of Deputies (in addition to state legislatures, some mayors and many municipal councils). While local problems and political rivalries will determine the outcome in most states, and personalities still outweigh issues, there is a greater ideological content to the contests than ever before. This is particularly true in the gubernatorial races, upon which the assessment of major parties' gains and losses will chiefly depend. While the forces of the left and right rarely entered into a truly meaningful dialogue during the campaign in terms of realistic proposals for dealing with pressing problems, the campaign in several states did frequently involve the rival themes of Communist danger and need for "basic reforms," particularly in Pernambuco, Guanabara, and Rio de Janeiro. In terms of victory for one orientation or the other, the results are apt to be virtually a standoff. If the leftist gubernatorial candidates win in Pernambuco, Rio de Janeiro, Bahia and Sergipe; pull an upset in Ceará; and win the Guanabara Vice Governorship--indeed, if they triumph in four of these six races (including Pernambuco)--they will have strengthened their position psychologically as well as materially and lack of gains in the congressional balloting may be written off by them as the result of "economic corruption" of the elections. On the other hand, if Miguel Arraes is beaten in Pernambuco & moderate candidates win several other of the above mentioned races, the center and conservative forces will have cause to feel satisfied; if Quadros loses in São Paulo and Meneghetti wins in Rio Grande do Sul, their cup should run over--at least in

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0158

INCOMING TELEGRAM *Department of State*

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Control: 5425
Rec'd: October 6 1962 5 05
3:30 p.m.

ACTION
INFO:
RM/R FILES

FROM: Recife

TO: Secretary of State

NO: 151, October 5, 6 p.m.

PRIORITY

ACTION DEPARTMENT 151, INFORMATION RIO DE JANEIRO PRIORITY 166

Campaigning ended last night with all gubernatorial candidates holding 11th hour rallies in downtown Recife. City extremely animated spirit last minute campaign fervor but no serious incidents violence reported. Arraes campaign rally drew almost double number participants as that held by Cleofas. Sources in Arraes camp jubilant over success last night's rally and bnatt* fully confident victory. Cleofas assured Consulate General source last night that he also confident victory, though admittedly by narrowing margin.

With elections now only hours away all indications are race will be far too close permit accurate prediction outcome before returns begin come in.

KILDAY

RB

*As received.

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Recife 151

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0157

(14)

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Control: 5487
Rec'd: October 6, 1962
11:48 P.M.

FROM: Sao Paulo

TO: Secretary of State

NO: 61, October 5, Noon.

PRIORITY.

ACTION DEPARTMENT 61, RIO DE JANEIRO PRIORITY 31, BRASILIA 7.

Three way governorship race continues look freakishly close on election eve. Observers recall no precedent in recent Sao Paulo history. Jose Bonifacio has seized initiative in past week, almost eliminating Janios small apparent lead. Adhema continues strong, slightly helped by Kubitschek's open support. Consulate General still thinks likely that vote differences, if within one or two percent, will be resolved in Bonifacio's favor by dishonest count. But factors such as bad weather, sudden resolution of large numbers undecided voters, or confusion with new ballot could still throw small but decisive lead to any of three candidates at last moment.

BRADDOCK

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0156

September 25, 1962

MEMORANDUM FOR

Mr. Roger Hilsman
Director of Intelligence and Research
Department of State.

Attached is a copy of a memorandum alleging to describe the political position of various military figures in Brasil and comparing personnel holding key positions in the Goulart regime with those who have held positions under Quadros and before Quadros. I wonder if you would examine this with your colleagues and answer the following questions:

(1) Are these the key positions in the Brazilian military establishment in terms of exercising control over the society? If they are not, which positions in the military establishment would you consider key to the control of the country?

(2) Is the very brief estimate of the political complexion of the incumbents of the positions listed in this memo accurate? If not, what information do you have about them?

I would appreciate a reply on this request as soon as possible.

Ralph A. Dungan
Special Assistant
to the President

0155

supporters of orderly, constitutional government. They conceive of the armed forces in the role of guarantor of constitutionality with an obligation to intervene in the political process whenever such action is necessary to preserve established institutions. Although some officers, including Generals Ferreira Alves and Bevilaqua, are reportedly leftist in political outlook, there is no valid evidence to support the view that any significant number favors an extremist leftist or pro-Communist position. Moreover, the nationalistic sentiments of most military officers are not heavily tinged with anti-foreign or anti-US tones.

3. Various statements made in the first paragraph of the third page characterizing the Brochado da Rocha cabinet are incorrect,

a) Prime Minister Brochado da Rocha, who was replaced by Prime Minister Hermes Lima on September 17, did not follow policies oriented toward the leftist position of Governor Brizzola.

b) The statement that "Industry and Commerce Minister Ermilio de Morais is a member of the Communist Party" is in error on two counts: he did not become a Minister, and there is no evidence that this wealthy Sao Paulo industrialist is a PCB member, although he is supporting the gubernatorial candidacy of crypto-Communist Miguel Arraes in Pernambuco State.

c) Minister of Mines Joao Mangabeira, now Minister of Justice, is the head of the Brazilian Socialist Party (PSB) and as such a leftist; he was not President of Petrobras prior to assuming a ministerial post.

The significant fact about the Brochado da Rocha cabinet, is that it was a creature of the President, under his full control and subject to his removal at any time. The same is true of the Hermes Lima cabinet.

The statement that the shifts in military commands in Brazil (contained in the final paragraph of the attachment) are indicative of a leftward trend in the Brazilian government is only partially correct. These shifts can also be explained as shifts necessitated by the changes in administration and the efforts of the three Presidents in office since 1960 to place military commanders personally loyal to them in key positions in the military establishment.

0154

For instance,

a) there is no reliable evidence to indicate that General Osvino Ferreira Alves is a Communist and a pervert. He is considered by our military attache in Rio de Janeiro to be a leftist, ultranationalist officer, but he is also considered to be a good officer who is held in high regard by his associates. He is ambitious and is known as a tough soldier. He was a consistent supporter of former President Getulio Vargas and of Marshal Henrique Lott, a good friend of Governor Leonel Brizzola of Rio Grande do Sul, and a close ally of President Joao Goulart. As commander of the First Army he is not known to have engaged in any openly pro-Communist activities.

b) the categorization of General Amaury Kruel as a "bad political influence left of center" is believed to be in error. This general is considered a rightist by our military attache in Rio de Janeiro. He is likewise reported to be an excellent cavalryman and staff officer, one who is exceptionally well informed on Communist activities and has been a leader in the movement to eliminate Communists from the Brazilian Army. He has been a close associate of President Goulart in recent months, but in 1958 he became involved in a dispute with the then Vice President Goulart over the close political cooperation of the latter's party, the Brazilian Labor Party (PTB), with the Brazilian Communist Party (PCB).

c) the labelling of Admiral Sylvio Heck as "excellent in political action, democratic right" is likewise inaccurate, since this officer is best categorized as a reactionary rightist, who has been engaged in anti-government plotting since 1955 and has, consequently, lost considerable influence within the armed forces.

d) the allegation that Maj. Brig. Reynaldo Carvalho will appoint communists to sensitive command posts is apparently based on the fact that he has appointed one Communist sympathizer, a personal friend, to a high post.

The majority of Brazilian military officers, including those listed in the enclosure and the present incumbents of these positions, are moderate to conservative in political outlook, strongly anti-Communist, and vigorous

0153

RM/R

FILE

CONFIDENTIAL

THE POLITICAL ROLE OF THE MILITARY IN BRAZIL
(Comments on Enclosed Document)

1. The positions listed in the enclosure to this memorandum are the key commands in the Brazilian military establishment. It should be noted, however, that the Chief of the President's Military Household is not the head but rather the Secretary General of the National Security (NSC). The President himself serves as the NSC head. In addition, President Kubitschek's term in office lasted until January 31, 1961, rather than December 1960 as stated. With recent changes, at the present time the listed military positions are held by the following officers:

Minister of War	Maj. Gen. Amaury Kruel
Chief of the President's Military Household and Secretary General of the National Security Council	Gen. Albino Silva
Commander, First Army	Lt. Gen. Osvino Ferreira Alves
Commander, Second Army	Lt. Gen. Pery Constant Bevilaqua
Commander, Third Army	Maj. Gen. Jair Dantas Ribeiro
Commander, Fourth Army	Maj. Gen. Humberto de Alencar Castelo Branco
Minister of Navy	Admiral Pedro Paulo de Araujo Suzano
Minister of Air	Maj. Brig. Reynaldo Joaquim Ribeiro de Carvalho Filho

Several names of military officers are incorrectly spelled in the enclosure. The correct spelling of these names is as follows: Nelson de Mello, Geraldo de Almeida, Stenio Caio de Albuquerque, Emilio Rodrigues Ribas Junior, Artur da Costa e Silva, Sylvio Heck, Reynaldo Joaquim Ribeiro de Carvalho Filho.

2. The information given in the enclosure on the political orientation of these officers requires clarification and in several places is inaccurate.

CONFIDENTIAL



Blue 16360

CONFIDENTIAL enclosure

MEMORANDUM FOR MR. RALPH A. DUNGAN
THE WHITE HOUSE

Through: Mr. McGeorge Bundy

Subject: The Political Role of the Military in Brazil (Comments on enclosed document)

Roger Hilsman, the Director of Intelligence, forwards the attached memorandum in response to your memorandum of September 25. His document comments upon the enclosure to your memorandum concerning the political position of various key Brazilian military figures and provides answers to the questions you posed.

William H. Brubeck
Executive Secretary

CONFIDENTIAL enclosure

0151

(B6)

CONFIDENTIAL Enclosure

Blue Copy

SS#16360

OCT 5 1962

RM/R

FILE

MEMORANDUM FOR MR. RALPH A. DUNGAN
THE WHITE HOUSE

Through: Mr. McGeorge Bundy

Subject: The Political Role of the Military in Brazil

The enclosed memorandum is in response to your request of September 25 to Mr. Hilsman. The Department's memorandum comments upon the enclosure to your memorandum concerning the political position of various key Brazilian military figures and provides answers to the questions you posed.

732.00/10-562

Warren E. Slater
for
William H. Brubeck
Executive Secretary

Enclosure:

As stated.

Cleared: ARA/EST:JWilson

INR:RAR:WNSimonson 10/5/62
Retyped S/S-S 10/5/62

S/S-RO
OCT 5 1962
A true copy of signed original

CONFIDENTIAL Enclosure

cc; c/m:- ARA
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DEPT OF STATE
EXECUTIVE SECRETARIAT

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DEPT OF STATE

0150

The Governorships

The strength of the center forces in Brazil is reflected in the orientation of the incumbent and outgoing Governors, only five of whom can be classified as leftists, with almost half either members of the UDN or associated with the UDN in electoral coalitions. While the situation in certain states may shift radically, the balance is likely to remain about the same.

Three of the current contests are of particular significance. In Pernambuco in the Brazilian Northeast, the Commie-lining mayor of Recife, Miguel Arraes, supported by the PTB, is engaged in a close struggle with conservative UDN nominee Joao Cleofas. At the other extreme of the country in Rio Grande do Sul, where the leftist-ultranationalist Governor Brizola of the PTB is himself the main election issue, the PTB candidate Michaelson is running a poor third behind the anti-Brizola coalition candidate Meneghetti and the left-of-center but anti-Brizola candidate Ferrari. In Sao Paulo the attempted political comeback of Janio Quadros has brought about a close, still unpredictable three-way contest involving, besides Quadros, the corrupt but colorful Adhemar de Barros (a perennial and oft-times successful candidate) and Governor Carvalho Pinto's chosen candidate, Jose Bonifacio. Defeat for Arraes, Michaelson and Quadros would represent a considerable rollback of the radical left by moderate elements. On the other hand the victory of all three would not represent the electoral triumph for the far left, viewing Brazil as a whole, which ultranationalists and communists would claim.

ARA:EST/B:JWWilson:am 10/2/62

0149

	Chamber	Senate
PSD	189	26
UDN	93	18
PTB	95	15
Other	32	7
Total	409	66

Probable Orientation of the Next Congress

Such an outcome would mean continued dominance of the Congress by the centrist and conservative parties (PSD, UDN and most minor parties). However, given the looseness of Brazilian political party discipline and the broad ideological base of the major parties, the individual orientation of members is actually more significant than the party labels, which in the PSD and UDN particularly may conceal a political coloration ranging from extreme right to crypto-Communist. Our Embassy has analyzed the political views of the membership of the Congress elected in 1958 as follows:

	Chamber	Senate
Communists or crypto- Communists	8	0
Fellow travellers or useful innocents	17	0
Leftist ultranationalists	41	2
Non-Communist radical reformers	25	2
Centrists	101	17
Conservatives	110	29
Rightist extremists	3	3
Unclassified	18	10
	325	63

A similar analysis of the leading candidates of each party, state by state, leads to the conclusion that, if approximately the present relative strength of the parties is maintained in the new Congress, no major shift in orientation of the Congress is likely. While the prospective winners of Senate races appear on the whole to be a bit more conservative than the present Senate, the Chamber membership is likely to be somewhat less conservative. The percentage of Chamber members classified on the left of the political spectrum is likely to increase moderately from the present 30 percent, largely as a result of (a) the expected increase in the size of the PTB bloc and (b) a shift of the PTB membership (now almost half centrist) farther to the left. The center of gravity of the Chamber will probably continue to be located among the Centrists, who will surpass the conservatives numerically.

0148

Seats in the Chamber are apportioned among the states roughly on the basis of population, with a complicated system of proportional representation applied within each state, based on each voter's single vote for a candidate by name (rather than party). For the first time in Brazil a single ballot furnished by electoral authorities will be used in the large urban centers; in other areas voters will continue to use ballots provided by the separate parties (or coalitions).

The Issues

The Brazilian political party structure and the electoral system tend to focus attention on purely local issues and personalities even in congressional elections. Consequently, despite the continuing political and economic crisis in Brazil, there are few, if any, truly national issues which are likely to have a significant effect on the voting in all states. Two such are probably the continuing rise in the cost of living and the food shortages, though it is unclear that these will work uniformly to the advantage of one party as against the others. In the campaign much is heard of "basic reforms" (by which is meant agrarian, tax, electoral, and constitutional reform, among others), but the fact that everyone is now for "reform" takes a good deal of the edge off "reform" as an issue. Interest in specific reforms (as in agrarian reform in the Northeast) may make them significant locally. Even the question of the parliamentary system is not a major election issue since the decision to hold a plebiscite has already been taken. An apparent increasing crystallization of opinion against Communist infiltration in the Government and the neutralist overtones of Brazil's "independent" foreign policy may make these significant in some areas. It is not clear to what extent the anti-Communist activities of lay Catholic and business organizations have been successful in this regard.

Probable Outcome of the Congressional Elections

The mechanics of the Brazilian political and electoral system work against any major shift in party strength in the absence of overriding issues. The division of the present Congress is as follows:

	Chamber	Senate
PSD	108	21
UDN	70	20
PTB	66	13
Other	82	9
Total	326	63

In the new Congress which will have 409 deputies and 66 Senators, our Embassy expects the division to be roughly:

0147

Department of State

October 4,

RM/R

FILE

Brazilian Elections of October 7, 1962

After months of political crisis it now appears that the Brazilian congressional and state elections will be held on schedule on October 7 in an air of relative peace and calm. A key development was the recent action of the Congress in fixing January 6 as the date for a plebiscite on the continuance of the parliamentary form of government. The obsession of President Goulart with the question of presidential powers has been a major factor behind the recent agitation and cabinet crises, largely artificially created by Goulart and his leftist and ultranationalist supporters.

The Prizes and the Contestants

In this election some 15 million Brazilian voters will go to the polls to elect 409 members of the Chamber of Deputies (the full membership), 45 Senators (two-thirds of the membership), the Governors of 11 of the 22 Brazilian states, 21 state legislatures, and municipal officials in 18 states.

On the ballots will be the candidates of thirteen political parties, most of them at best regional in appeal and none with a strong, cohesive national base. The three major parties which date from the Vargas era, are the Social Democratic Party (PSD), a conservative party of the Vargas tradition, of which former President Kubitschek is a leader; the Brazilian Labor Party (PTB), a left-of-center Vargista party, headed by President Goulart; and the National Democratic Union (UDN), a generally conservative (but reformist) anti-Vargas party. The UDN is in opposition to the Goulart government, while the PSD is split. In the case of the state Governorships, the Senatorships, and sometimes the list of candidacies for the Chamber the voter will not have a clear choice between parties, but rather between the candidates of coalitions representing two, three or even more parties, the combinations varying from state to state, depending upon local considerations and personalities.

Denied registration as a legal party since 1947, the Communist Party will offer no candidates under its own aegis, but its electoral support (perhaps as many as 250,000 votes nationally) will be significant for some of its favored candidates. Though a formal alignment of leftist and nationalist elements in a popular front has not developed, these extremely vocal elements are vigorously supporting chosen candidates in all states. A leader has been leftist, anti-American, demagogic Governor Brizola of Rio Grande do Sul, who is himself running for the Chamber from the State of Guanabara. The strongly anti-Communist Governor of Guanabara, Carlos Lacerda, (UDN) has been a vocal opponent of the extreme leftists. Catholic lay groups have been taking an active part in support of moderate, anti-communist but reformist candidates. Business organizations also have been working hard for conservative and centrist candidates.

Seats in

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OCT 4 1962

RM/R

FILE

MEMORANDUM FOR MR. McGEORGE BUNDY

THE WHITE HOUSE

Subject: The Brazilian Elections of October 7, 1962

On Sunday October 7, 1962, Brazil will hold nationwide elections for Congressional, state and municipal offices. Our Embassy and consular offices in Brazil have followed campaign developments closely and in a series of special election studies have analyzed the Brazilian political party structure and electoral machinery in considerable detail. Because of the implications for U.S. interests of internal political developments in Brazil and in view of the President's scheduled visit to that country in November, it is believed that the attached summary based on the reports we have received from our offices in Brazil will be of interest to the President.

Warren E. Fletcher
for
William H. Brubeck
Executive Secretary

732.00/10-462

Enclosure:

Brazilian Elections of
October 7, 1962

S/S-RO
OCT 4 1962
A true copy of signed original

Transmitted by RM/R

ARA:EST/B:CNelson:am 10/2/62
Coordinated with INR-Mr. Simmonsgrow

ARA - Mr. Chase
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forces, will withdraw its Military Police contingents from those localities where Federal troops will be sent. Both the State and Supreme Electoral Tribunals have been careful to avoid the danger of involvement in the political maneuvering of the parties that have pressed for Federal troops. In fact, the Supreme Electoral Tribunal, by its immediate approval of the State Tribunal's request for authority to requisition Federal troops, was able to turn down a direct request from the PSD on the ground that the problem had already been resolved. The State Tribunal has also emphasized its conviction that the Governor is intent on maintaining order and that there will be no untoward incidents. For his part the Governor has declared that although his Government is well equipped to preserve order, it will abide by the Electoral Tribunal's decision since the conduct of orderly elections is what matters.

The PSD has been the primary mover in the matter of publicizing the need for Federal troops. The PR was a late comer, and its list of localities in need of Federal protection numbers as yet only 22 as compared with 130 for the PSD.

NOTE: This is the last in the series of supplemental reports on the elections from Minas Gerais. A round-up report will be prepared as soon after the elections as results are known.

Edmund A. da Silveira
American Consul

0144

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DEPARTMENT OF STATE

AIRGRAM

732.00/10-462

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A-20 NO.

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DEPARTMENT OF STATE BUREAU OF INTER-AMERICAN AFFAIRS OCT 16 1962

1962 OCT 15 AM 8 51

RM/AN ANALYSIS & DISTRIBUTION BRANCH

TO : DEPARTMENT OF STATE

FROM : AMCONSUL, Belo Horizonte DATE: October 4, 1962

SUBJECT : BRAZILIAN ELECTIONS 1962 - Supplemental Status Report No. 14 for September 27-October 3, State of Minas Gerais

REF : Consulate Despatch No. 37, June 28, 1962; Consulate A-19, September 28, 1962, Item 3, p. 4.

Assignment of Federal Troops to Police Elections

The State Electoral Tribunal has requisitioned Federal troops to be stationed in 35 cities in the interior of the State as a preventive measure to safeguard the electoral process on October 7. This number stands in sharp contrast to the 152 localities that the Social Democratic Party (PSD) and the Republican Party (PR) had listed as needing Federal protection to assure the orderly conduct of the elections.

The Tribunal was guided in its choice of cities where Federal troops are to be sent by reports it has received from its own electoral officials in the municipalities concerned and by the record where some disturbances occurred in the 1958 Congressional and State elections. Although the way is left open for the assignment of more Federal troops in response to particular requests to other than the 35 localities specified, the general opinion is that time is running too short to get through channels further requests for Federal troops. Infantry forces stationed in Minas Gerais, however, are at the disposal of the Tribunal which can send them anywhere it sees fit with or without a request from any parties.

Comment: The Consulate has learned that the State Government in order to avoid the possibility of an incident between State and Federal

Couns.Cons.Affrs./Rio
Pol Section - "
Brasilia Office

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Drafted by: EAdaSilveira:kfk 10/4/1962

Contents and Classification Approved by:

Clearances:

0143

likely to take place in the Congress in the Spring will be heated, and perhaps impassioned, a return to the dark days of the July-August-September crisis does not appear likely at the moment.

For the Ambassador:

Frank Micelotta
Third Secretary of Embassy

APPROVED:

Philip Raine
Counselor of Embassy
for Political Affairs

DISTRIBUTION: All consulates in Brazil, Service Attachés, USIS, Econ (2), Labor, Pol II, Pol (5), CF (3), CF-Brasilia (2), Pol Brasilia (3).

0142

Constitution. It can be amended by two-thirds vote in one legislative session in each of the Houses, or by absolute majority in two consecutive legislative sessions. The sophistry which enabled Congress to support the Capanema law are the provisions of Articles 22 and 25 of the Ato which provide for legislation specifying the details for the holding of the plebiscite to be passed by absolute majority.

The consensus at the moment is that it is unlikely that the constitutionality of the Amendment will be appealed.[2] Several judges to the Supreme Electoral Tribunal have told the Embassy that no appeal is expected. Leaders of several anti-presidentialist parities have announced their intention not to appeal. One of the reasons is that Brazilian politicians of all stripes prefer if possible to keep political decisions within their own purview, without resorting to judicial review. Another reason, perhaps more potent, is that the Goulart-Congress struggle was, and could again become, an institutional crisis of the most severe proportions rather than only a political-judicial dispute. Nonetheless, the possibility that extremists of either side may go to the courts must be considered a possibility.

With the Amendment in force and a "referendum" taking place, the Brazilian electorate almost certainly will vote for a return to presidentialism. But the Amendment reserves to the Congress the right to decide on the form the presidential system will take. Congress will have 90 days following the official proclamation of the referendum results to formulate that system. If it fails to do so, there will be an automatic return to the presidential system (or retention of the present parliamentary system, in the unlikely event the public opts for it through the referendum). Although he is probably willing to accept minor modifications in the former presidential system (he has so told our Ambassador), Goulart wants, in essence, the full powers of the President as they existed prior to his investiture, that is, as provided in the Constitution of 1946. The legislation to be formulated by Congress during the 90 day period, must, as provided in the Capanema Amendment, be passed by a two-thirds vote. Through bloc action of the PTB and other supporters, Goulart should be able to stall any proposals unsatisfactory to him, particularly if they are also unsatisfactory to Juscelino Kubitschek (who would view dimly any attempt substantially to diminish presidential power), since JK could swing a substantial part of the PSD into alliance with the PTB. Thus, although the debate on governmental forms which is

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2 Appeal may be made only by political parties and "autoridades", i.e., governors, mayors etc.

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DEPARTMENT OF STATE

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OSD 12	USIA 8	NSA 3

388 NO. | CONFIDENTIAL | AIR POUCH HANDLING INDICATOR

TO : Secstate WASHINGTON

FROM : Amembassy RIO DE JANEIRO DATE: October 4, 1962

SUBJECT : Prospects for Resumption of Executive-Legislative Power Struggle

REF :

DEPT OF STATE OCT 10 1962

The Capanema Amendment[1] passed by the Congress during the September 10-15 "esforço concentrado" effected a truce in the power struggle between President Goulart and the Congress. It did not end the struggle. The Capanema law was welcomed by most Brazilians since it removed any doubt that the October 7 elections would be held as scheduled. But by the spring of 1963, if not before, the executive-legislative battle may be newly joined.

If the constitutionality of the Capanema law is successfully challenged, the battle will be resumed swiftly, perhaps even before January 6, 1963, the date set by the Amendment for the "referendum". The so-called Amendment is generally agreed to be patently unconstitutional, since it changes the substance of the Ato Adicional. The Ato provides for a plebiscite to be held "nine months before the end of the present presidential term" /the term ends January, 1966/ in the event the Congress decides that a plebiscite should be held on "the retention of the parliamentary system or return to a presidential system." The Ato Adicional amended and therefore became part of the

1 A misnomer; it is in fact a regulatory law, meeting the requirement of an absolute majority required by Article 22 of the Ato Adicional but not the two-thirds required for a constitutional amendment.

CONFIDENTIAL

FORM DS-323 4-62

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Drafted by: HWeiner/FMicelotta:jw

Contents and Classification Approved by: PRaine

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Control: 3186

Rec'd: October 4, 1962
9:25 a.m.

ACTION

INFO:

RM/R FILES

TOKYO

FROM: Tokyo

TO: Secretary of State

NO: 985, October 4, 6 p.m.

ACTION DEPARTMENT 985, INFORMATION RIO DE JANEIRO 1, BONN 14, LONDON 34, PARIS 68, ROME 15, OTTAWA 1

Reference: DEPTEL 696. 732.00/9-1762

Foreign Office (Nakayama, Acting Director EAB and NARA, Chief Latin American Section) agreed US proposal for close consultation and exchange views among selected Ambassadors in Rio and will send appropriate instructions GOJ Embassy.

REISCHAUER

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732.00/10-462

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11:19 A. M.

FROM: Recife

TO: Secretary of State

NO: 150, October 4, 6 P. M.

PRIORITY.

ACTION DEPARTMENT 150, INFORMATION RIO DE JANEIRO PRIORITY 163.

Several members Cleofas Camp in conversation Consulate General officer expressed themselves most discouraged by strong last minute surge of Arraes and said they increasingly pessimistic Cleofas position. This also general consensus opinion other sources queried last two days. State Secretary Government Manoel Brotherhood told Consulate General officer this afternoon Cleofas position interior appeared fairly good but is losing strength fast in Recife area. Confided that Cleofas forces could still win but would be by extremely narrow margin, probably as little as ten thousand votes.

DELGADOARIAS

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Information by RMR

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Rec'd: October 4, 1962 5:44 PM

Info

FROM: Ottawa

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TO: Secretary of State

NO: 426, October 4, 4 PM

ACTION DEPARTMENT 426, INFORMATION RIO DE JANEIRO 1, BONN 4, LONDON 27, PARIS 29, ROME 2, TOKYO 1.

Re Department telegrams 377 and 387.

Your proposal for Canadian consultation with Ambassador Gordon has been considered by External Affairs which has now advised that proposal agreeable and Canadian Ambassador Rio de Janeiro being instructed accordingly.

LINVILLE

GDW

Ottawa 426

EST/B

RM/R-Gwin 10/4-Gwin

732.00/10-462

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OSD 12	USIA 8	NSA 3

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

AIRGRAM

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São Paulo-1

1962 OCT 15 AM 8 51

RECEIVED
ANALYSIS & DISTRIBUTION BRANCH

FROM : Amconsul PÔRTO ALEGRE DATE: OCT [illegible] 1962

SUBJECT: RGS-BRAZILIAN ELECTIONS 1962-Formal Registration of Candidates by Tribunal Regional Eleitoral

REF : Consulate's AIRGRAM A-12, dated October 3, 1962

732.00/10-362

The following corrections and additions should be made to Consulate's Airgram A-12, dated October 3, 1962:

Add, under FEDERAL DEPUTIES, page 5, number 418 (PDC), Leão SERRANO de Oliveira Brito, Army Sergeant, III.

Correct, under STATE DEPUTIES, page 6 (PDC), spelling of name on number 1026 to read Evaristo Lara dos SANTOS. On page 10 (PTB), change name on number 1264 to Waldir A. LOPES.

Add, on page 11 (PTB), number 1270 Almoré Zoch CAVALHEIRO, Army Sergeant, III. And, add on page 12 (PSD), numbers 1353 Rubens Alcantara GIAMPAOLI; 1354 Siegbert SAFT; 1355 Vicente Gomes de CAMPOS.

Accordingly, please change total number of candidates for State Deputies for PTB from 69 to 70, and total number of candidates for State Deputies for PSD from 52 to 55.

Frederick D. Sharp III
American Consul

cc.: Consular Affairs, Rio
Political Section, Rio
Political Section, Brasília
ARA/EST/Brazil, Washington
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FORM 4-62 DS-323

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Drafted by: FDSharp/zms 10/5/62

Clearances:

Contents and Classification Approved by: FDSharp

0136

Information available to the Consulate indicates that in Pôrto Alegre proper, Federal Deputy candidates are running roughly in the following order:

Peracchi	- Partido Social Democrático (PSD)
Paixão	- Partido Trabalhista Brasileiro (PTB)
Temperani Pereira	- Partido Trabalhista Brasileiro (PTB)
Brito Velho	- Partido Libertador (PL)
Carlomagno	- Partido Social Democrático (PSD)
Dutra	- Partido Social Democrático (PSD)
Mincarone	- Partido Trabalhista Brasileiro (PTB)
Pilla	- Partido Libertador (PL)
Godoy Bezerra	- União Democrática Nacional (UDN)
Brum	- Movimento Trabalhista Renovador (MTR)
Moacyr	- Movimento Trabalhista Renovador (MTR)

With regard to the lineup in the State Assembly the Consulate, after assessing a number of opinions has developed the following comparison between the present and the new breakdown by party:

Party		Present	New
Partido Trabalhista Brasileiro	(PTB)	24	20/19
Partido Social Democrático	(PSD)	14	14/15
Partido Libertador	(PL)	7	6
Partido de Representação Popular	(PRP)	3	3
União Democrática Nacional	(UDN)	3	4/3
Partido Democráta Cristão	(PDC)	2	4/5
Partido Social Progressista	(PSP)	2	1
Movimento Trabalhista Renovador	(MTR)	-	2
Partido Republicano (Commie)	(PR)	-	1
	Total.....	55	55

Frederick D. Sharp III
American Consul

cc.: Consular Affairs, Rio
Political Section, Rio
Political Section, Brasília
ARA/EST/Brazil, Washington
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Department: Pass to all posts in Brazil

0135

Partido de Representação Popular	(PRP)	2
União Democrática Nacional	(UDN)	2
Partido Democráta Cristão	(PDC)	1
	Total...	29

Some observers, with whom the Consulate agrees, believe that the PTB representation may be reduced by as much as 2 more seats, PSD gaining both of these. The rationale for this belief is that the three leading PTB vote getters in 1958 were Fernando Ferrari, now a gubernatorial candidate; Wilson Vargas, running for State Deputy; and Ruy Ramos, who died on September 21, 1962.

According to Salomão Kirjner, a leading political observer for Correio do Povo, the following Federal Deputy candidates have the best chances for election or reelection, although all named will not necessarily win:

Party	No.	Name	Reelection	Category
MTR	104	Daniel DIPP	yes	IV
MTR	110	Jairo BRUM		II
PTB	201	Adylio Martins VIANA	yes	III or V
PTB	202	Antônio BRESOLIN		III
PTB	204	Armando TEMPERANI PEREIRA	yes	II
PTB	205	Cesar PRIETO		V
PTB	206	Clay Hardman de ARAUJO		I or II
PTB	210	Floriceno PAIXÃO	yes	III
PTB	215	João Lino BRAUN	yes	III
PTB	219	Milton DUTRA		II
PTB	221	Ney Ortiz BORGES		III
PTB	223	Paulo MINCARONE	yes	III
PTB	228	Victor ISSLER	yes	III
PTB	229	Walter GIORDANO ALVES	yes	III
PSD	303	Clóvis PESTANA	yes	V
PSD	304	Daniel FARACO	yes	V
PSD	307	Lauro LEITÃO		VI
PSD	309	Luciano MACHADO		VI
PSD	313	Raimundo Lins de Vasconcelos CHAVES	yes	VI
PSD	314	Tarso DUTRA	yes	VI
PSD	315	Walter PERACCHI Barcelos		VI or VII
ADP	401	Alcides FLORES SOARES (UDN)		VI
ADP	402	Arno ARNT (PRP)	yes	VI
ADP	404	Carlos de BRITO VELHO (PL)		V
ADP	410	Euclides TRICHES (PDC)		V
ADP	413	Manoel GODOY BEZERRA (UDN)		VI
ADP	414	Norberto SCHMIDT (PL)		
ADP	416	Affonso ANSCHAU (PRP)		VI
ADP	417	Raul PILLA (PL)		VI

0134

ORIGIN/ACTION

ARA 4		
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AGR	COM	FRB
INT	LAB	TAR
TR	XMB	AIR 4
ARMY 5	CIA 10	NAVY 5
OSD 12	USIA	NSA 3

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

AIRGRAM

732.00/10-362

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A-14 NO.

CONFIDENTIAL HANDLING INDICATOR

1962 OCT 8 PM 2 35

TO : DEPARTMENT OF STATE

Salvador Bahia -, Santos -, San Paulo -, Brasilia Office -, San Luis -, Porto Alegre -, Belem Para -, Belo Horizonte -, Recife -, Manaus, Amazonas -, Curitiba -,

FROM : Amconsul PORTO ALEGRE

DATE: OCT 3 - 1962

DEPARTMENT OF STATE BUREAU OF INTELLIGENCE AND RESEARCH OCT 12 1962

SUBJECT : BRAZILIAN ELECTIONS 1962-Probable Composition of RGS Delegation to Federal Chamber of Deputies & RGS State Assembly.

REF : Consulate's Airgram A-12

According to the best estimates available to the Consulate, the composition of the RGS delegation to the Federal Chamber of Deputies will probably undergo a significant change, as a result of the elections to be held on October 7, 1962. The present party lineup is as follows:

Partido Trabalhista Brasileiro	(PTB)	12
Movimento Trabalhista Renovador	(MTR)	2 (elected in '58 as PTB)
Partido Social Democrático	(PSD)	7
Partido Libertador	(PL)	2
Partido de Representação Popular	(PRP)	1
	Total...	24

The new lineup will probably take the following form, remembering that there has been an increase of 5 seats in the RGS delegation, up to 29:

Partido Trabalhista Brasileiro	(PTB)	12
Partido Social Democrático	(PSD)	7
Movimento Trabalhista Renovador	(MTR)	2
Partido Libertador	(PL)	3

FILED OCT 12 1962

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FORM 4-62 DS-323

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Drafted by: FDSharp 10/2/62

Contents and Classification Approved by: FDSharp

Clearances:

0133

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-2- 751, October 3, 11 A. M. from Rio de Janeiro.

I took maximum speed. I reported conversation same day by priority telegram.

Although all substantive points had been agreed by all concerned, one week then passed before we received draft agreement, and several more days have been wasted in quibbles over wholly trivial drafting points, such as whether loans will be to "such Agencies as may be agreed", or "BNDE and such other Agencies as may be agreed", or "BNDE and such other Agencies as may be agreed".

In face this type unnecessary delay and this type excessive control on trivia, I and my staff cannot produce results President and Executive Branch request from us. I have worked hard at establishing credit with Brazilian authorities and public. I recently have learned from high level French visitors who interviewed President and many leading Brazilians in public and private life that widespread comment about us is that Ambassador has good will, but American Bureaucratic machine is simply too much for effective operation. In face this and other recent experiences, I am tempted to agree with them.

Can we not secure two remedies:

(A) Rapid action in Washington when we indicate urgency, which we will endeavor to do only when circumstances justify, and

(B) Broader discretion on secondary drafting issues in agreements with GOB so long as substance is preserved.

In immediate case, I expect sign agreement with appropriate speech this afternoon. Effect will be far smaller than signing a week ago, and erosion my personal credit is a real set back for U.S. influence here.

GORDON

mbk

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32

INCOMING TELEGRAM *Department of State*

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36-31

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Action ARA

Info SS SR G SP L E AID INR RMR

Control: 2435
Rec'd: October 3, 1962
12:26 P.M.

FROM: Rio de Janeiro

TO: Secretary of State

NO: 751, October 3, 11 A.M.

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POLICY.

As Washington authorities must certainly be aware a political war of great importance is taking place in this country which will determine its domestic and external orientation and with it most of this continent. We have large stakes in the outcome, and are trying to use our influence skillfully to bring about a favorable one. All elements this Country Team have been vigorously instructed by the President and all the parent agencies to contribute to this process.

In any kind of war, strategic and tactical timing of actions can easily be decisive. This pre-election week is one unique strategic moment. The present phase of GOB cordiality to us, which may be pretended or real, is of uncertain duration, but our task is to take advantage of it to make it both real and lasting.

On September 22, the President and two Cabinet Ministers made me a personal and urgent plea to proceed without delay to conclusion supplemental Fourth Wheat Agreement, in order avoid possible gap in wheat supplies in November. Our data suggest that they exaggerate danger wheat gap, but they believe it, which is the politically significant point. Pursuant agreed policy, I resisted idea concluding sales agreement before completion Fourth Loan Agreement, but with this exception / I took maximum

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Rio 751 to 6

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E.O. 10501-3 & 2 TP 811.32/10-362

0131

Sao Paulo
A-88
6

disposal -- when Brazil provides the necessary plans; ideological and political campaigning against the AFP and Food for Peace is criminal and to be condemned.

Daniel M. Braddock
Minister Consul General

Contributors:
DCProper
JMason

Distribution:
INS/RAR, Amembassy Rio 5 (2 for Mr. Schneider), Amembassy Brasília 2, Amcongen Recife, Amconsulates Belem, Belo Horizonte, Curitiba, Porto Alegre, Salvador, Santos, Amembassy Lima, Amembassy Lisbon, Amconsulate Luanda, Amembassy Léopoldville.

0130

São Paulo
A-88
5

PSYCHOLOGICAL

1. Local Press Reaction

Brazilian politics and the upcoming elections received heavy editorial treatment this week. The death of former Premier Brochado da Rocha, though heavily reported, was commented on by, expectedly, Goulart-lining Correio Paulistano and leftist/nationalist Ultima Hora. Both eulogized Brochado and Ultima Hora knew what was responsible for his fatal stroke: the heavy criticism levelled at him by Guanabara Governor Carlos Lacerda. With the exception of the same two papers, most journals criticized UN delegate Afonso ARINOS as shaping Brazil's foreign policy along former President Jânio Quadros' lines. Several dailies, including prestigious O Estado de São Paulo, castigated leadership of several big labor unions as venial, communistic, anti-democratic and dedicated to furthering President Goulart's power schemes. O Estado saw another Goulart-directed general strike in the offing, and went on to suggest that the President has amnesia: having maneuvered the country into a disorganized condition, he now cries out for projects and plans to save the situation. Other papers saw Goulart in a more favorable light this week.

With Correio Paulistano and Ultima Hora silent on the subject, other São Paulo papers condemned Fidel Castro and Soviet interference in the Cuban scene. Russian activity was generally seen as a threat to the Western Hemisphere which must be dealt with at the Foreign Ministers' Conference. Brazil, a majority of papers said, must foreswear neutrality and show itself to stand as it traditionally has, with its fellow republics of the West. "Self-determination"in Cuba has proved, with the paredón, to be "self-extermination." Several papers cast a fishy eye on the projected Soviet fishing port in Cuba, calling it a direct threat to the United States and Latin America. Diario de São Paulo and O Estado agreed that Khruschev's goal is complete domination of the Hemisphere, with the help of "progressivists, nationalists, and anti-capitalists."

The Alliance for Progress received unusually hearty applause from a number of leading papers this week: news of the synthetic rubber industry to be created in Pernambuco rated solid praise for the Alliance and Ambassador Gordon. Said various papers: a significant contribution to Brazilian progress, impossible without foreign assistance; Ambassador Gordon's statement is a true picture of what free people, free enterprise and the Alliance can achieve together; the United States is at Brazil's

0129

likely that Natél has more popularity than Jânio or anyone else in the first team. Quadros, never the one to let scruples stand in the way of votes, is trying to cut in. The worst of it is that the maneuver will probably be good for some votes. (LIMITED OFFICIAL USE)

5. HAYA de la Torre Visits São Paulo

During a well-publicized six-day visit to São Paulo, Peruvian APRA leader Victor Raul Haya de la Torre found many opportunities to emphasize the points he made everywhere in Brazil:

Cuba: Strictly anti-Fidel. Sympathetic to action against the Cuban regime, but via the Rio Pact rather than the Monroe Doctrine, which was "unilateral and obsolete." Approved of President Kennedy's policy; thought the previous administration had made "errors."

Aprista Foreign Policy: Not anti-North American. Desires "Latin American democratic interdependence without imperialisms."

Latin America: Has common problems and must unite to solve them. Frequently stressed Latin American interdependence.

Brazil: Situation better than many other Latin American countries.

Peru: Hoped there would be elections soon, wanted to run, hoped the next time the military might let him take office. (UNCLASSIFIED)

6. Angolan Refugee Relief Organization Started

The newspaper O Estado de São Paulo, which usually has good contacts with Portuguese opposition movements, reports the founding of a "Brazilian Committee for Aid to Angolan Refugees" (Comité Brasileiro de Auxílio aos Refugiados Angolanos -- CBARA) in this city. It is said to be affiliated with the Corpo Voluntario Angolano de Assistancia aos Refugiados -- CVAAR -- in Léopoldville. The CVAAR is in turn said to be connected with the Movimento Popular de Libertação de Angola (MPLA). The São Paulo group apparently plans to limit its aid to medicine, clothes, books, and so forth. Personnel of Estado belong to the organization. (UNCLASSIFIED)



whim of the "undecideds" could be the decisive factor. The winner will not have to be very popular: slightly more than thirty percent of the votes will probably be enough. (LIMITED OFFICIAL USE)

3. GOULART Makes Moderate Speech on Agricultural Reform

President Goulart did not take advantage of a September 29 highway inauguration in rural São Paulo to support José Bonifácio openly for Governor. His most important act was a short speech on agricultural reform, emphasizing its financial and technical aspects (low-interest loans, eradication of unproductive coffee, etc.). He emphasized his intention that "Brazil soon encounter an authentically Brazilian solution to the problem of agricultural reform...." (UNCLASSIFIED)

Comment: In São Paulo, technical help to agriculture seems essential to human agrarian reform. Much technical aid to agriculture, moreover, can be accomplished while the painful business of land redistribution is barely getting started. The São Paulo Government's agricultural reform plan has recognized this and, while not extremely adventurous, has made a balanced start on the problem while politicians in most of the rest of the country just talked. President Goulart has often seemed sympathetic to the leftist-extremist view that the agricultural problem could be solved simply by taking land away from the bigs and giving it to the smalls. It seems significant that this latest reference to an "authentically Brazilian solution" should have been made in context with the more responsible thinking of the São Paulo Government and Renato da Costa LIMA, the Paulista Minister of Agriculture. (LIMITED OFFICIAL USE)

4. Jânio Scuttles his Running Mate

One of Jânio Quadros' closest aides has formed a "Jan-Natél Movement" sponsoring Jânio and Laudo NATEL for Governor and Vice Governor. Faria LIMA, Quadros' original running mate, is no longer mentioned very much. (UNCLASSIFIED)

Comment: This will have a familiar smell to those who followed Jânio's Presidential campaign. Faria Lima was entirely committed to Quadros from the beginning, devoting much energy to the cause. He was also a potentially strong running mate. But while he was tagging along as an afterthought to Quadros' campaign, Laudo Natél was off to a strong start in a hard-hitting, well financed, carefully organized movement. It now seems



Comment: Adhemar and Jânio had valid points: had José Bonifácio really wanted a debate, he should have suggested it earlier. The idea would have been difficult to carry out on election eve -- but not impossible. José Bonifácio would have faced two opponents with very vulnerable points. Both would rather not talk of certain past episodes (Adhemar's graft and Jânio's resignation); neither has a platform nor a discernible set of moral and ideological values. On the other hand, both (especially Jânio) are vastly superior speakers. Courage and stubbornness might have gotten José Bonifácio through, but he must have been relieved when he did not have to find out. Though he will not gain as many votes as he might if he had proposed the debate at a more practical time, the initiative should sway a few of the "undecideds." And, right now, every vote counts. (LIMITED OFFICIAL USE)

2. Governorship Race Still Close

None of the three strong São Paulo gubernatorial competitors ever gained a decisive lead over the others, though each had his moments. Adhemar purposely avoided making his challenge until entering the home stretch, knowing that he loses in long campaigns. He counts on a voter nucleus of near-fanatic loyalty and of sufficient size to give him a really strong chance against divided opposition. Jânio's resignation from the Presidency aroused much opposition, but through sheer personal magnetism he overcame it to the extent of gaining a small apparent lead in the last few weeks. (Much of his strength is almost "invisible," coming from the least articulate voting classes.) Prime Minister BROCHADO DA ROCHA's resignation was of great help in breaking down voter resistance to Jânio's peculiar tale. José Bonifácio Nogueira always remained a serious contender by virtue of his enormous practical political advantages, though he never developed the campaign skills necessary to exploit this potential. He appeared to drop noticeably behind Jânio and perhaps Adhemar in the last days, but he may have been put back on par by his debate challenge (Item 1) and by the recent open conversion of his campaign into the first stage of a CARVALHO PINTO-for-President movement. One of the current slogans is "let's plant nogueira (walnut) in São Paulo and carvalho (oak) in Brasília."

There could still be big surprises in the campaign, but they become less and less likely as October 7 nears. A rumor campaign is in full swing, reporting that either Adhemar or José Bonifácio will withdraw (more difficult now but still possible), that Juscelino KUBITSCHEK will campaign openly for Adhemar (very likely), and so forth. Barring major developments, it appears that no one candidate will win real public acceptance and that the



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12	8	3

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TO : DEPARTMENT OF STATE

1962 OCT 5 AM 10 30

DEPARTMENT OF STATE
BUREAU OF
AMERICAN AFFAIRS
OCT 8 1962

ACTION

FROM : Amcongen SÃO PAULO DATE: October 3, 1962

SUBJECT : Weekly Summary No. 40

REF :

TABLE OF CONTENTS

POLITICAL:
1. Jânio and Adhemar Decline Debate
2. Governorship Race Still Close
3. Goulart Makes Moderate Speech on Agricultural Reform
4. Jânio Scuttles his Running Mate
5. Haya de la Torre Visits São Paulo
6. Angolan Refugee Relief Organization Started

PSYCHOLOGICAL: 1. Local Press Reaction

POLITICAL

1. Jânio and Adhemar Decline Debate

The big political initiative of the week came from gubernatorial candidate José Bonifácio NOGUEIRA, who on September 27 challenged competitors Jânio QUADROS and Adhemar de BARROS to a U.S.-style television debate. José Bonifácio suggested airing the candidates' "public lives" and "programs of government" (platforms). Both of his opponents turned the challenge down, Jânio calling it a "publicity trick" and Adhemar saying that it came too late to be taken seriously. (UNCLASSIFIED)

FORM DS-323 4-62

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Drafted by: See last page/lfw 10/2/62

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1962 OCT 15 AM 8 57
DEPARTMENT OF STATE
BUREAU OF
INTER-AMERICAN AFFAIRS
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OCT 16 1962

FROM: Amconsul PÔRTO ALEGRE DATE: OCT 5 - 1962

SUBJECT: RGS-BRAZILIAN ELECTIONS 1962-Formal Registration of Candidates by Tribunal Regional Eleitoral

REF: Consulate's AIRGRAM A-12, dated October 3, 1962

732.00/10-362

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Accordingly, please change total number of candidates for State Deputies for PTB from 69 to 70, and total number of candidates for State Deputies for PSD from 52 to 55.

Frederick D. Sharp III
American Consul

cc.: Consular Affairs, Rio
Political Section, Rio
Political Section, Brasília
ARA/EST/Brazil, Washington
INR/RAR/P, Washington

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Drafted by: FDSharp/zms 10/5/62

Contents and Classification Approved by: FDSharp

Clearances:

JAL

0124

D. State Deputies (Cont'd) ARS - (Cont'd)

No. on Ballot	Name	Present Status	Category
1815	Francisco Carlos Alvigi FICO		I
1816	Fúlvio Celso PETRACO		I
1817	Henrique ORDOVÁS Filho		I
1818	Her AGAPITO DA LUZ		I
1819	Jorge Alberto CAMPEZATTO		I
1820	José TEITELROIT		I
1821	Leopoldo Pereira PÂNCARO		I
1822	Marinho KEHN		I
1823	Marinho Rodrigues DOS SANTOS	P.Alegre City Councilman	I
1824	Nestor Vieira DORNELES		
1825	Oneron Jornada DORNELES		I
1826	Oscar DE CAMILLIS Filho		I
1827	Ottomar Ataliba DILLENBURG		I
1828	Roque Cruz VARGAS		I
1829	Rubens Riograndino Fiori BELÉM		I
1830	Solon Cantidio Lessa da SILVA		I
1831	Solon PEREIRA NETO		I
1832	Ulysses Câmara VILLAR		I
1833	Vicente Martins REAL		I
1834	Vinicio Piffero Cavalcanti TABAJARA		I
1835	Walter GRAEFF		I
1836	Washington AYRES		I

Frederick D. Sharp III
American Consul

cc.: Consular Affairs, Rio
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ARA/EST/Brazil, Washington
INR/RAR/P, Washington
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17
AIRGRAM A-13
PORTO ALEGRE

D. State Deputies (Cont'd) PL -(Cont'd)

No. on Ballot	Name	Present Status	Category
1718	Gudbem Borges CASTANHEIRA	Reelection	V
1719	Heitor GALANT	Reelection	
1720	Hélio de Souza SANTOS		
1721	Homero SO JOBIM		
1722	Honório Pereira SEVERO		V
1723	João Alvares CHAGAS		
1724	João Francisco RAMOS		
1725	José do Patrocínio MOTTA		V
1726	Júlio ANDRÉ		
1727	Loris Antonio Pasquale REALI		
1728	Nicanor Cardoso ALVES		
1729	Octávio Omar CARDOSO		
1730	Paulo BROSSARD de Souza Pinto		VI
1731	Pery de Quadros MARZOLLO		
1732	Say MARQUES	P.Alegre City Councilman	V
1733	Solon SILVEIRA		
1734	Galileu Alceu PANA	Brigada Militar Sergeant	

ARS - 36 candidates

1801	Alberto SCHROETER	P.Alegre City Councilman	I
1802	Artidor do Carmo CORONEL		
1803	Ary STEIMER		
1804	Athaydes RODRIGUES	Rio Grande Municipal Councilman	I
1805	Augusto Lourada da CUNHA		II
1806	Bruno SEGALLA		I
1807	Carlos Lima AVELINE		I
1808	Clóvis Morais RODRIGUES		I
1809	Darcy VON HOONHOLTZ		I
1810	Dilamar Valls MACHADO		
1811	Edgar José CURVELLO		I
1812	Enio FAVARO		
1813	Ewaldo Arno WEBER		I
1814	Flávio da Costa FRANCO		II

CONFIDENTIAL

D. State Deputies (Cont'd) UDN -(Cont'd)

No. on Ballot	Name	Present Status	Category
1623	Júlio BRUNELLI	Alternate,Journalist Diarios Associados	VI
1624	Larry PINTO DE FARIA	P.Alegre City Councilman	V
1625	Marcus Seibelmann MELZER		V
1626	Mário KRIEGER		
1627	Oscar Luiz JABGER		
1628	Poty Irineu Cacharuz de MEDEIROS	Reelection	V
1629	Quirino Ribeiro SOARES		
1630	Sebastião JOSÉ D'ELIA		
1631	Synval Sebastião Duarte GUAZZELLI	Reelection (anti-Brizola)	II or III
1632	Utalino FERNANDEZ		

PL - 34 candidates

1701	Adão Henrique FEET		
1702	Alvary Becker de FREITAS		
1703	Anibaldo RENCK		
1704	Antonio José de ASSIS BRASIL		
1705	Aristides Dias de MACEDO		
1706	Armando Rypolito dos SANTOS		
1707	Ataualpa de Freitas MARQUES		
1708	Caisar Abrahim CURE		
1709	Carlos Guilherme DIER		
1710	Clóvis de Siqueira COURTES		
1711	Cristiano GRAEFF Junior (Tianinho"		
1712	Dario BELTRÃO		
1713	Domingos Rosa de OLIVEIRA		
1714	Eduardo PINTO		
1715	Elizardo DUARTE NETO		
1716	Francisco SOIANO BORGES	Reelection	
1717	Getúlio MARCANTONIO	Reelection	V

D. State Deputies (Cont'd) PSP -(Cont'd)

No. on Ballot	Name	Present Status	Category
1532	Rubaldo José SCHUCH		
1533	Waldemir Carlos SELBACH "Aladim"		
1534	Walter Peterlongo ELY		
	UDN - 32 candidates		
1601	Aduci João TOMAZ		
1602	Alexandre Aurélio PEDRON		
1603	Álvaro Timóteo SILVA		
1604	Antenor Costa MENDES		
1605	Antônio Eudlydes de ALENCASTRO		
1606	Antonio MARTINS		
1607	Arno SOMMER		
1608	Arthur BACHINI	Reelection	VI
1609	Auri de Souza OLIVEIRA		
1610	Carlos Bento HOFMEISTER		V
1611	Cristiano Affonso GRAEFF"Soma Graeff"		
1612	Élio Oswino LAUFFER		
1613	Emir Ramon GASPARY		
1614	Enio Gomes		
1615	Feliciano HAMERSKI		
1616	Fortunato Conceição RICCA DE OLIVEIRA	Student	
1617	Francisco da Rosa MACALÃO		
1618	Gregório BEHREGARAY Filho		
1619	Henrique Domingos FAILLACE		VII
1620	Jorge Alberto Beck MENDES RIBEIRO	Journalist-Caldas Junior Company	V
1621	José BARRETO		
1622	José GOMES DE SOUZA		

D. State Deputies (Cont'd) PSP - 34 candidates

No. on Ballot	Name	Present Status	Category
1501	Antônio BENFICA Filho		
1502	Arthur Frederico REIF		
1503	Athos CARVALHO BERNARDES		
1504	Carlos Silva de OLIVEIRA		
1505	Clávio Brasil RODRIGUES		
1506	Dorvalino dos Santos LEAL		
1507	Eloy Prado Silveira		
1508	Eustáquio Rodrigues PEREIRA		
1509	Geraldo Daniel STEDILE	Methodist layman P.Alegre City Councilman	V
1510	Getúlio WILHELMS		
1511	Gil Reginaldo GONÇALVES		
1512	Gilseu ESTRELA		
1513	Heran Catalino GARIBOTTI		
1514	Ireno Rodrigues da SILVA		
1515	Ivo SCHNEIDER		
1516	João das Neves Gomes ANTUNES		
1517	Jorge Frederico HADELT		
1518	Jorge Pedro HILLAL		
1519	José Maria Fonseca de MENEZES		
1520	Leandro de LEMOS		
1521	Lorecy Rodrigues MENDES		
1522	Luiz Amador dos REIS Sobrinho		
1523	Luiz Gonçaga Ferreira BRUM		
1524	Mário dos Santos PINTO		
1525	Olímpio Morses MARTINS		
1526	Oly Pereira de CARVALHO		
1527	Oscar SEIXAS		
1528	Oswaldo Alves de Araujo REGO		
1529	Otto Pereira da FONSECA		
1530	Pedro Cândido Jardim GARCEZ		
1531	Rebrenho Moreira LEITE		

D. State Deputies (Cont'd)

PRP - Cont'd)

No. on Ballot	Name	Present Status	Category
1405	Antônio Setembrino de MESQUITA		VI
1406	Aristides ROLIM MILANO		
1407	Ciro KRÄS BORGES		
1408	Danton Gentil HARTMANN		
1409	Edo SPALDING		
1410	Egon RENNER	Reelection	VI
1411	Elpídio de Morais GOMES		
1412	Gaspar Feio da SILVA		
1413	Guilherme DORNEY		
1414	Hélio Alves de OLIVEIRA		
1415	Jairo Fernandes CRUZ		
1416	João Danilo DONADEL		
1417	João Francisco BARROS		
1418	João Rene de Mattos RODRIGUES		
1419	Joaquim de LUCENA		
1420	José Carvalho de ANDRADE		
1421	José da Silva CONCEIÇÃO	Negro,port worker	V
1422	Lauro Navegante GOMES	Taxi driver	V
1423	Miguel Francisco SZOSTKIEWICZ		
1424	Onil XAVIER dos Santos	Reelection	VI
1425	Orestes PERLA		
1426	Oscar WESTENDORFF		
1427	Pedro Bertholdo THOMAZ		
1428	Raul Roselino BIGARELLA		
1429	Reinoldo Luiz KOMMERS		
1430	Rudolfo Arno GOLDHARDT		
1431	Sebaldo Edgar SAENGER		
1432	Sebastião Olegário HAEFNER		
1433	Sigmundo Oscar Henrique LAUSCH		
1434	Victor José FACCIONI	ex-Pres/Secondary Students Group	V
1435	Vitalle CAMILLO		
1436	Walter ECKERT		
1437	Zilda Velho Dexheimer ARNT	Wife of Arno ARNT	

D. State Deputies (Cont'd) PSD -(Cont'd)

No. on Ballot	Name	Present Status	Category
1326	Hed Santos BORGES		
1327	Hélvio JOBIM	Reelection	V or VI
1328	João FERREIRA		
1329	João Olímpio de SOUZA		
1330	Jorge Pereira ALVES		
1331	José ARLINDO KIRSZLER	Reelection	
1332	José Augusto Amaral de SOUZA		
1333	José BACCHIERI DUARTE "João"		VI
1334	José Hugo MARDINI		V
1335	Jose Westphalen CORRÊA		
1336	Júlio Juracy da LUZ		
1337	Leonel ALVIM FILHO		VI
1338	Lourenço Erialdo VAZ DE ARAUJO		
1339	Luiz Marcantonio GREZZANA		
1340	Mauro da Silva MOTTA	Alternate	
1341	Nelson Germano WITZEL		
1342	Nelson VIEIRA MARTINS		
1343	Otávio Daudt GERMANO	P.Alegre City Councilman	
1344	Othelo PROTA		
1345	Pedro Camargo de AZEVEDO		
1346	Pedro PROLLO	Reelection	
1347	Plauto de ABREU		
1348	Porcínio Borges PINTO	Reelection	VII
1349	Procópio DUVAL Gomes de Freitas		
1350	Reinaldo CHERUBINI		
1351	Roberto LANDELL DE MOURA		
1352	Romeu SCHEIBE		V

PRP - 37 candidates

1401	Adão NUNES DA COSTA		
1402	Adriano DIAS		
1403	Alberto HOFFMAN	Federal Deputy	VI
1404	Antônio Olinto MEURER		

D. State Deputies (Cont'd) PTB -(Cont'd)

No. on Ballot	Name	Present Status	Category
1268	Wilson VARGAS da Silveira	Federal Deputy	III
1269	Wolmar SALTON		
	PSD - 52 candidates		
1301	Adalmiro Bandeira MOURA (ex-PSP)	Reelection	V
1302	Alberto Almeida de GODOY		
1303	Alceu MOSMANN		
1304	Alexandre MACHADO DA SILVA		
1305	Alfredo Augusto Barros HOFFMEISTER	Alternate	
1306	Alvimar Garcez CABELEIRA		
1307	Antonio POMARI	Reelection	
1308	Antonio Frederico KNOLL		
1309	Antonio PEREIRA DE SOUZA		
1310	Ari da Silva DELGADO	Reelection	VI
1311	Ariosto de Brito PEREIRA "Lotinho"		
1312	Ariosto JAEGER	Reelection	VI
1313	Armando WURTH		
1314	Augusto MUNIZ REIS	ex-Dir.Divisão/Transito	V
1315	Carlos Fernando BERTÓIA		
1316	Carlos Ferrari VALLS		VI
1317	Cliton Baptista RUPERTI		
1318	Darcy Silva CONCEIÇÃO		
1319	Edi SILIPRANDI		
1320	Emedino Flores DA ROCHA		
1321	Euclides Nicolau KLIEMANN	Reelection	
1322	Favorino Bastos MÉRCIO	Ch. Civil H'hold-Meneghetti's Government	
1323	Francisco Sales Ribeiro GUIMARÃES		
1324	Germano Roberto HENKE		
1325	Gustavo LANGSCH	Reelection	VI

D. State Deputies (Cont'd)

PTB -(Cont'd)

No. on Ballot	Name	Present Status	Category
1237	José LAMAISON PÔRTO(ex-PSP)	Reelection	III
1238	José Nogueira PINTO MACHADO		
1239	José VECCHIO	Reelection	IV
1240	Juracy de Assis MACHADO	PRP renegade	III
1241	Justino Costa QUINTANA	Reelection	II or III
1242	Lidovino A. FANTON		
1243	Luiz Fernando Crespo de SOUZA		
1244	Manoel CORREA SOARES	State Meat Inst.	
1245	Marcirio Goulart LOUREIRO	Reelection	III
1246	Moab CALDAS (ex-PSD)	Reelection	II
1247	Moacyr Avelar AQUISTAPACE	ex-State Sec'y/Security	V
1248	Mozart Bianchi ROCHA		
1249	Nelson Amorelli VIANA	Brigada Militar	
1250	Nolly JONER		
1251	Omar FERRI		
1252	Osmany Martins VERAS	Alternate	
1253	Paulo Costa da Silva COUTO	Reelection	
1254	Pedro Jorge SIMON		III
1255	Plauto ROCHA		II
1256	Raul Dias LEAL		
1257	Rubens Dario PORCIÚNCULA		
1258	Rui BASTIDE		
1259	Santiago GUSMÃO		
1260	Seno LUDWIG	Reelection	V
1261	Serano CHÁISE	Reelection,PTB floor leader	III
1262	Siegfried HEUSER	Reelection	IV
1263	Suely OLIVEIRA	Reelection	III
1264	Suely LOPES		
1265	Walmir GOMES DE MELLO		IV
1266	Wálter BERTOLUCCI	State Milk Inst.	
1267	Wilmar Correa TABORDA		

D. State Deputies (Cont'd) PTB -(Cont'd)

No. on Ballot	Name	Present Status	Category
1207	Alvaro da CUNHA		
1208	Antônio VISINTAINER	Mayor/Rosário	II or III
1209	Athaide Pacheco MARTINS	Reelection	
1210	Atila Simões DUARTE		III
1211	Airton D'Avila BARNASQUE	Reelection	II or III
1212	Benjamin da Silva OSÓRIO		
1213	Beno Orlando BURMANN		
1214	Carlos da Silva MARQUES		
1215	Carlos da Silva SANTOS	Reelection	III
1216	Cesar COUTO		
1217	Darcilo IVO GIACOMAZZI	Alternate	
1218	Dario Antônio Martins FUTURO		
1219	Edson de MEDEIROS		II
1220	Edu BARONI		
1221	Elias Reas AMANTINO		
1222	Emilton GRILL		
1223	Enso PEREIRA		II
1224	Guilherme DO VALLE Tonniges	Reelection	II or III
1225	Henry Alziro SAUER	Reelection	V
1226	Hélio FONTOURA	Pvt.Sec'y to Gov.Brizola	III
1227	Henrique HENKIN	Reelection	III or V
1228	Hilson Scherer DIAS		
1229	Ivo SPHANDEL	Mayor/Sarandi	
1230	Jaime Caetano BRAUN		III
1231	Jaime Medeiros PINTO		
1232	Jair de Moura Calixto	Gov.Brizola's cousin, Mayor/Honoai.	II
1233	João BRUSA NETTO		III
1234	João CARUSO	Reelection,Pres.RGS/PTB	III
1235	Jorge Prates AVELINE	State Sec'l Security Inst.	I
1236	José F. RAMOS COELHO	Gov.Brizola's Civil H'hold. S.Maria PTB Chief	III

CONFIDENTIAL

D. State Deputies (Cont'd) MTR -(Cont'd)

No. on Ballot	Name	Present Status	Category
1134	Manoel Burico Acauan da LIMA		
1135	Marino Job ABRAHÃO		II or III
1136	Mario Aguiar MOURA		
1137	Miguel Francisco Xavier da COSTA		
1138	Moacyr Tibor ERDÖS		
1139	Moyses HODARA		
1140	Mucio de CASTRO		V
1141	Nagus COSTA		
1142	Nery Pereira da SILVA		
1143	Ney Silveira da ROSA		
1144	Oly ALVES DE MEDEIROS		
1145	Oscar Mello dos SANTOS		
1146	Oscar HECH		
1147	Osmar LAUTENSCHLEIGER		
1148	Pegro Gallo SANSONE		
1149	Plinio Angelo CASTELLANIN		
1150	Ruy Honorio BACELLAR		
1151	Waldemar O'DENA		I or II
1152	Walter Fernando Gonçalves de ALBUQUERQUE		
1153	Yeddo Jacob BLAUTH	WW II Veteran, lost leg in Italy	
1154	Zaira de Siqueira FOLLY		

PTB - 69 candidates

1201	Achylles MINCARONE		
1202	Adauto AMORIM dos Santos		
1203	Adonis ESCOBAR		III
1204	Affonso José de REVOREDO RIBEIRO	P.Alegre City Councilman	IV
1205	Alcides COSTA	Reelection	
1206	Aldo da Silva FAGUNDES	Methodist lay-leader Vice-Mayor/Alegrete	V

D. State Deputies (Cont'd) MTR -(Cont'd)

No. on Ballot	Name	Present Status	Category
1104	Aloysio Alcides FRIEDRICH		
1105	André Nivaldo Iager SOARES		
1106	Antonio Hermes de OLIVEIRA		V
1107	Antonio José CAMPANI		
1108	Antonio Rath de QUEIROZ		
1109	Aristarco da Silveira PINHO		
1110	Aristides Basilio de CAMPOS		
1111	Arnoldo SCHIPHORST Junior(ex-PSP)	Alt. State Deputy	
1112	Ary Alves PORTO		
1113	Bruno NUBRICH		
1114	Candido NORBERTO dos Santos(ex-PL)	Reelection	IV
1115	Célio Osório COIMBRA		
1116	Darci ADAM		
1117	Darci Almeida MELLO	Pres/Civil Construction Wkrs.Union (MSD)	IV
1118	Érico Alves Lourenço de LIMA		
1119	Fabio Brito AZAMBUJA		
1120	Fernando Azzarini ROLLA		II or III
1121	Flávio Antonio Lopes RAMOS	ex-Delegado Reg'l/Trabalho	III
1122	Florindo DANIEL		
1123	Hgitor Silveira CAMPOS (ex-PTB)	Alternate	I
1124	Hélio de CASTRO		
1125	Hildo WOLLMAN		
1126	Ivo Lopes FERREIRA		
1127	João Bendar PEDROSO		
1128	João Carvalho CARPES	ex-Brigada Militar Commander	IV or V
1129	João Francisco VANINI		I or II
1130	Joaq Severo RECENA		
1131	José AGOSTINELLI		
1132	Joycemar Marques CARPES		
1133	Luiz Didino TERMIGNONI "Luizito"(ex-PRP)		

D. State Deputies

PDC - 27 candidates

No. on Ballot	Name	Present Status	Category
1001	Adolfo PUGGINA		
1002	Alberto PAETZOLD		
1003	Alino LORENZINI		
1004	Anildo José SARTURI		
1005	Anselmo Dias LOPES		
1006	Antônio Augusto AZAMBUJA		
1007	Archimedes Antônio da Silva ALMEIDA		
1008	Arnaldo da Costa PRIETO		
1009	Carlos Salzano VIEIRA DA CUNHA		
1010	Francisco DEQUI		
1011	Ogido Arnoldo LERMEN		
1012	Hélio ROSA Filho		
1013	João Menezes MARTINS		
1014	José Alexandre ZACHIA	Reelection	V
1015	José Barcellos GARCIA		
1016	José Sperb SANSEVERINO	P.Alegre City Councilman	V
1017	Luiz Augusto SOMMER DE AZAMBUJA	Army Captain	VI
1018	Maria Else IRIS POTTHOFF		
1019	Mário MONDINO	Reelection	V
1020	Milton KRAUSE	P.Alegre City Councilman	III
1021	Nelson MARCHEZAN		
1022	Oscar Luiz Osório RHEINGANTZ		
1023	Pedro Ádir Lourada BROLL		
1024	Sebaldo KROTH		
1025	Victorio BROCH		
1026	Evaristo Lava dos SANTOS	Army Sgt.	
1027	Zelly Correa de MORAES	Army Sgt.	

MTR - 54 candidates

1101	Adroaldo Marly STRECK	
1102	Alberto TOLOMINI	
1103	Aldo Faustino CARDOSO	

C. Federal Deputies (Cont'd) PSD (Cont'd)

No. on Ballot	Name	Present Status	Category
310	Marcial Gonçalves TERRA		
311	Milton Albino CASSEL		
312	Nemezio Miranda de MEIRELLES		
313	Raimundo Lins de Vasconcellos CHAVES	Reelection	VI
314	Tarso de Morais DUTRA	Reelection	VI
315	Walter PERACCHI Barcellos		VI or VII
316	Willy Carlos FROEHLICH	Reelection (Alternate)	VI

ADP

No. on Ballot	Party	Name	Present Status	Category
401	UDN	Alcides FLORES SOARES,Jr.	Crédito Agricola PAlegre Bco/Brasil	VI
402	PRP	Arno Fernando ARNT	Reelection (Alternate)	VI
403	PRP	Bernardino CONTE		VI
404	PL	Carlos de BRITTO VELHO	PAlegre Secy/Education	V
405	PDC	Cid FURTADO		
406	UDN	Claudio DISCHINGER		
407	PDC	Ciro TAVARES DE OLIVEIRA		
408	UDN	Didio Campos DUHÁ		
409	PL	Edison Luzardo de ALMEIDA		
410	PDC	Euclides TRICHES		V
411	PL	Henrique Fonseca de ARAÚJO		
412	PL	João ILGENFRITZ		
413	UDN	Manoel Augusto de GODOY BEZERRA		VI
414	PL	Norberto Harald SCHMIDT		
415	PL	Paschoal Peri GORRESE		
416	PRP	Pedro AFFONSO ANSCHAU	State Deputy	VI
417	PL	Raul PILLA	Reelection	VI

C. Federal Deputies (Cont'd) PTB (Cont'd)

No. on Ballot	Name	Present Status	Category
224	Reissoli José dos SANTOS		
225	Ruben BENTO ALVES		
226	Ruy Vitorino RAMOS **	Reelection	II or III
227	Ulrio Carreira MACHADO	Reelection	II or III
228	Victor Loureiro ISSLER	Reelection	III
229	Walter GIORDANO ALVES	Reelection	III
230	Zaire NUNES PEREIRA	State Deputy	III

PSD

301	Antonio SAINT PASTOUS de Freitas*	Pres/PARSUL	VI or V
302	Ary Rodrigues ALCÂNTARA		
303	Clóvis FESTANA	Reelection	V
304	Daniel Agostinho FARACO	Reelection	V
305	Hélio CARLOMAGNO	State Deputy	II
306	João Batista MARCHESE	State Deputy	VI
307	Lauro Franco LEITÃO	State Deputy	VI
308	Leovegildo ADAIL MORAIS	Leading exponent of Alliance for Progress	IV
309	Luciano Correa MACHADO		VI

** Ramos, third leading PTB vote-getter in 1958, after Ferrari and Wilson Vargas (neither running for reelection), died in an aircraft accident on Sept. 21,1962.

* Saint Pastous has made a public announcement that he has withdrawn his candidacy.

C. Federal Deputies (Cont'd) PTB

No. on Ballot	Name	Present Status	Category
201	Adylio Martins VIANA	Reelection	III or V
202	Antonio BRESOLIN	State Deputy	III
203	Antonio de PADUA FERREIRA DA SILVA		I
204	Armando TEMPERANI PEREIRA	Reelection (alternate for Grafulha)	II
205	Cesar PRIETO	Reelection	V
206	Clay Hardman de ARAUJO	ex-State Secy/Labor	I or II
207	Croacy Cavalheiro de OLIVEIRA	Reelection	II
208	Daniel Barnewitz RIBEIRO	State Deputy	III
209	Floriano MAIA D'AVILA		II
210	Floriceno PAIXÃO	Reelection	III
211	Gabriel de Miranda OBINO	ex-State Secy/Treasury	III
212	Hugo GIRAFA	PAlegre city council	I or II
213	Humberto GOEBI		
214	João de Paula e SILVA		III
215	João LINO BRAUM	Reelection	III
216	José MANDELLI Filho		
217	Manoel João MACHADO		III
218	Matheus José SCHMIDT Filho		
219	Milton Garcia DUTRA	ex-State Secy/Economy	II
220	Milton Souza de QUADROS		III
221	Ney ORTIZ BORGES	State Deputy	III
222	Osmar da Rocha GRAFULHA	Reelection *	III
223	Paulo MINCARONE	Reelection (opportunist)	III

* Grafulha was elected in 1958 but since he was appointed State Secretary of Power and Communications, his place was taken by Temperani Pereira.

A. Governor:

Candidate	Party Support	Category
Fernando Ferrari	MTR	IV
Ilgo Meneghetti (PSD)	ADP(PSD,UDN,PL,PDC,PRP) PSP	VI
Egidio Michaelsen	PTB	V

B. Senator:

Daniel Krieger (UDN)	ADP	VI
Nestor Pereira (PRP)	Alternate	VII
Mem de Sá (PL)	ADP	VI
Fernando Gay da Fonseca (PDC)	Alternate	V
José Mariano Beck	PTB	IV
Alter Cintra de Oliveira	Alternate	V
Antonio Brochado da Rocha	PTB	III
João Carlos Gastal	Alternate	III

C. Federal Deputies: MTR

No. on Ballot	Name	Present Status	Category
101	Aor Costet de MASCHENVILLE		
102	Candido José MOREIRA		
103	Cicero Xavier da ROSA		
104	Daniel DIPP (ex-PTB)	Reelection	IV
105	David Henrique SEGAL		
106	Ernani Pereira BOTTI		
107	Gabriel Pedro MOACIR		II
108	Gaudêncio Adão da SILVA		
109	Geraldo Guimarães LINDGREN (ex-PRP)	Alternate Senator Mondin	IV
110	Jairo BRUM (ex-PTB)	State Deputy	II
111	Mirandolino COMARO		
112	Raul Silva GUDOLLE		II
113	Valdir Aita MOZZAQUATRO		

ACTION		
ARA-4		
RM/R 2	REP	AF
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INT	LAB	TAR
TR	XMB	AIR 3
ARMY 5	CIA 10	NAVY 5
OSD 12	USIA 6	NSA 3

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

AIRGRAM

732.00/10-362

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Santos-1
Sao Paulo-1

DEPARTMENT OF STATE
BUREAU OF
INTELLIGENCE AFFAIRS
OCT 10 1962

FROM : Amconsul PORTO ALEGRE DATE: OCT 3 - 1962

SUBJECT : RIO GRANDE DO SUL-BRAZILIAN ELECTIONS 1962-Formal Registration of Candidates by Tribunal Regional Eleitoral.

Set forth below are the names of all Rio Grande do Sul candidates as formally registered by the Tribunal Regional Eleitoral, State electoral court. Where a candidate has not been classified according to the established categories, it should be assumed that his political orientation is consistent with that of his political party. For this purpose the various parties are classified as follows:

Movimento Trabalhista Renovador	- (MTR)-	IV
Partido Trabalhista Brasileiro	- (PTB)-	III or V
Partido Social Democrático	- (PSD)-	V or VI
União Democrática Nacional	- (UDN)-	V or VI
Partido Libertador	- (PL)-	V or VI
Partido de Representação Popular	- (PRP)-	VI or VII
Partido Democráta Cristão	- (PDC)-	V or VI
Partido Social Progressista	- (PSP)-	V
Aliança Republicana Socialista	- (ARS)-	I or II

-X-X-X-X-X-X-

FILED
OCT 11 1962

FORM DS-323 4-62 CONFIDENTIAL

FOR DEPT. USE ONLY
[V] In [ ] Out

Drafted by: FDSharp 9/27/62

Contents and Classification Approved by: FDSharp

Clearances:

See attached 88-15 for Corrections

0106

b. Contrary to our report last week, the new Chief of Staff of the III Army is to be Brigadier General Genaro Bontempo rather than General Muniz de Aragão.

c. The race riots in Missigsippi have stolen front page space from all other world events in the Pôrto Alegre press since last Friday, notwithstanding the fact that election day is just a week away.

Frederick D. Sharp III
American Consul

cc.: Consular Affairs, Rio
Political Section, Rio
Political Section, Brasília
ARA/EST/Brazil, Washington
INR/RAR/P, Washington

Department: Pass to all posts in Brazil

7141

0105

to Brochado as having broken his spirit. Others, however, recall that Brochado had been hospitalized for almost three months last year and, in truth, he had not been a well man since that time. Anti-Brizola people say that the Governor was much at fault for forcing an ill man to take the Prime Minister's chair. Objectively speaking, Brochado did not have the emotional temperament required for the rough-and-tumble of political life, and his failure, while Prime Minister, to get Brazil on the road toward reform was emotionally crushing to him, ill as he already was, and his efforts during his short tenure were physically exhausting as well.

2. RGS Election Campaign Developments

With five days remaining before election day, all stops have been pulled out and vituperation, charge and counter-charge have become the order of the day. In accordance with the electoral law, campaigning must cease on October 4 and the three gubernatorial candidates are working right down to the wire. If forced to make a prediction, the Consulate must remain ambiguous: Meneghetti should win, on form; Ferrari could well win, if he has penetrated the rural vote, and Michaelsen might possibly come through if the opposition vote splits equally between Ferrari and Meneghetti.

As reported in last week's Summary the PTB attempted to register BNDE president Leocádio Antunes as a candidate for Federal Deputy to fill the spot caused by the death of Ruy Ramos last week. The Tribunal Regional Eleitoral (TRE) unanimously rejected this bid, saying that the death of a candidate after the closing of the registration period did not permit a substitute to be named.

The Tribunal Superior Eleitoral (TSE) overruled the RGS TRE in the case of three Army sergeants who had requested registration as PDC candidates, one for Federal Deputy and two for State Deputy.

As good as any other prediction, the Fôlha da Tarde rumor column reported that a clairvoyant from Minas Gerais predicted Ferrari's victory for 80,000 votes.

While he is permitted to vote anywhere in Brazil, President Goulart has announced that he will cast his ballot in São Borja, as usual.

Governor Brizola traveled to Rio yesterday where he will remain through election day.

3. Miscellany

a. On Sunday, September 30, President Goulart, Governor Brizola and Prime Minister Hermes Lima inaugurated the first stage of the Jacuí hydroelectric plant, located approximately in the center of the State. With 70,000 kw. new capacity RGS has doubled its potential output, now 400,000 kw., since last 1961.

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ORIGIN/ACTION

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DEPARTMENT OF STATE

AIRGRAM

732.00/10-262

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A-13 NO. — OFFICIAL USE ONLY — HANDLING INDICATOR

TO : DEPARTMENT OF STATE

Rio de Janeiro-1 Recife-1
Brasilia Office Salvador-1
Belem-1 Santos-1
Belo Horizonte Sao Paulo-1
Curitiba-1

DEPARTMENT OF STATE
BUREAU OF
INTER-AMERICAN AFFAIRS
OCT 2 1962

FROM : Amconsul PÔRTO ALEGRE DATE: OCT 2 - 1962

SUBJECT : PÔRTO ALEGRE WEEKLY SUMMARY Nº 24

REF :

RMR-yes
10/1-JWW

1. Ex-Prime Minister Brochado da Rocha Dies
2. RGS Election Campaign Developments
3. Miscellany
   a. Jacui Hydroelectric Plant Inaugurated
   b. III Army Chief of Staff Named
   c. Mississipi Race Riots Featured

1. Ex-Prime Minister Brochado da Rocha Dies

Failing to respond to surgery following a brain hemorrhage former Prime Minister Francisco de Paula Brochado da Rocha died shortly after noon on September 26. During the course of the velório which was held at the Piratini Palace, President Goulart flew in from Brasilia for a 2 hour visit with the family returning that same night. Brochado da Rocha was buried the next day with full military honors usually accorded to a Chief of State. Party differences were forgotten for the moment and Mayor Loureiro da Silva and Governor Brizola, who have not spoken to each other in public since the 1959 defeat of Brizola's PTB candidate Wilson Vargas by the present Mayor, were pall-bearers. Expressions of condolences came from all over Brazil and a short-lived campaign to create a PTB hero out of Brochado was undertaken comparing him with Getúlio, Alberto Pasqualini and Salgado Filho. It does not seem to have borne fruit.

Brizola, of course, tried to make political capital over Brochado's demise by laying the blame on Lacerda's "insults"

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FORM 4-62 DS-323

Drafted by: FDSharp/xms 10/2/62 | Contents and Classification Approved by: FDSharp

Clearances:

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RM/[illegible]R

732.00/10-262

October 2, 1962

Dear Congressman Elliott:

Thank you for your communication of September 21, 1962, with which you enclosed a clipping from the column "Around The World" which deals with the Food for Peace operations in Brazil.

The administration of the surplus food program in Brazil falls within the jurisdiction of the Agency for International Development (AID). I am, accordingly, forwarding your communication to Mr. John L. Salter, Assistant Administrator for Congressional Liaison, AID. Mr. Salter can be reached on Code 182X7493. I am sure your inquiry will receive prompt attention.

If I may be of additional assistance in this matter, please do not hesitate to call on me further.

Sincerely yours,

Frederick G. Dutton
Assistant Secretary

The Honorable
Carl Elliott,
House of Representatives.

AF:NEST/Br:[illegible]Wilson:alc 9/27/62

microfilmed by RMGR

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0102

city of Alenquer, Pará, state that Brazilian flags with a hammer and sickle superimposed on its globe are props for his campaign there.

3. In addition to their readiness to cope with threats to public safety, the military forces are carrying on an active anti-communist campaign of their own, primarily through the use of books and films. Whatever else may be involved is reflected in a request made by a high-ranking officer in the local Army to the reporting officer for small firearms to be distributed to "friendly forces."

4. The conservative "producers' class" issued an anti-communist manifesto during the week of September 17, and on September 28 held the first meeting of its National Defense League to combat communism locally. Moderate, social-minded officials and businessmen have been quick to disassociate themselves from any of the group's activities, considering the Classes Produtoras to be a reactionary threat which does nothing more than provide valid bait for extreme leftists.

There is unfortunately no information on developments in the other states and the federal territories within this consular district.

Robert W. Mashek
American Vice Consul

cc: Amembassy, Rio de Janeiro
Amembassy, Brasilia

CONFIDENTIAL/ACTION

ARA-4

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OSD 12	USIA 8	NSA 3

42

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

AIRGRAM

732.00/10-162
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A-32 NO. | CONFIDENTIAL HANDLING INDICATOR

TO. : DEPARTMENT OF STATE

DEPARTMENT OF STATE
BUREAU OF
IAN AFFAIRS
OCT 8 1962

1962 OCT 5 AM 10 26

ANALYSIS & DISTRIBUTION BRANCH

FROM : Amconsul, BELEM, PARA DATE: October 1, 1962

SUBJECT : Brazilian Elections 1962; Report No. 16 -- Pará (Sept. 15-30)

REF :

RM/R-[illegible]
10/9-[illegible]

Campaigning became very active in Pará during the course of these two weeks, especially in the interior. There are, however, no significant campaign statements to report. The most outstanding events of the period have been vigorous attacks upon communists and far-leftists. It is felt that this is the first time in at least two years that subversive communism has suffered a major setback in this state. The principal events were:

1. On September 21, the Union of Petroleum Workers of Pará, Amazonas, and Maranhão (See Belém's A-27, September 14, 1962) was forced by the rallied anti-communist majority of its members to convoke a general meeting. When the leaders perceived that they were to be deposed on the spot, fighting broke out, and most of the leaders were arrested. The police seized considerable quantities of subversive communistic materials in the union's "secret" files. Although the leaders were soon released and the leadership of the union has not been decided, it is almost certain that the newly aroused opposition will not be content to lose any of its newly-gained power.

2. The case of Benedito MONTEIRO's having been refused registration as a candidate for state deputy has not be solved by the Supreme Tribunal. (See Belém's A-27, September 14, 1962). The immediate clearance he expected to obtain on his trip to Brasilia was not forthcoming nor was a backing of the Regional Electoral Tribunal's decision. It appears that the Supreme Tribunal wishes to consider the election results in its decision. Monteiro continues a most active campaign under the close watch of the military. Reports are that during the last weekend the populace of Bragança, Pará, stoned him off the platform when he began an attack on the military leaders. Unconfirmed reports from his native

CONFIDENTIAL

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FORM DS-323
4-62

Drafted by: RMMashek:rwm

Contents and Classification Approved by: RMMashek

Clearances:

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Consulate	Airgram No.	Date	Subject
Salvador	A-8	August 8, 1962	Bahian Parties Choose Sides (CONFIDENTIAL)
	A-26	September 5, 1962	Sergipe Situation Continues Unclear (CONFIDENTIAL)
	A-27	September 5, 1962	Forecast for Bahia
São Paulo	A-45	August 29, 1962	São Paulo Senate Candidate (CONFIDENTIAL)
	A-46	August 31, 1962	Politicians' Assessments of Gubernatorial Race (LIMITED OFFICIAL USE)
	A-78	September 26, 1962	São Paulo Federal Deputies (CONFIDENTIAL)
	A-85	September 28, 1962	São Paulo Reporting Roundup (CONFIDENTIAL)

0099

CONFIDENTIAL

Consulate	Airgram No.	Date	Subject
Belem	A-17	August 17, 1962	Rio Branco (CONFIDENTIAL)
	A-18	August 17, 1962	Amazonas (CONFIDENTIAL)
	A-20	August 22, 1962	UDN and PTB Party Conventions /Pará/ (CONFIDENTIAL)
	A-22	August 24, 1962	Convention of PSD /Pará/ (OFFICIAL USE ONLY)
	A-26	September 10, 1962	Acre's PSD Candidates (OFFICIAL USE ONLY)
Belo Horizonte	A-8	August 10, 1962	Supplemental Status Report No. 6 (National Democratic Union Holds State Convention) (OFFICIAL USE ONLY)
	A-10	August 16, 1962	Supplemental Status Report No. 7 - State of Minas Gerais (CONFIDENTIAL)
	A-12	August 23, 1962	Supplemental Status Report No. 8 - State of Minas Gerais (CONFIDENTIAL)
	A-14	August 31, 1962	Supplemental Status Report No. 9 - State of Minas Gerais (SECRET)
	A-15	September 6, 1962	Supplemental Status Report No. 10 - State of Minas Gerais (CONFIDENTIAL)
	A-17	September 14, 1962	Supplemental Status Report No. 11 - State of Minas Gerais (OFFICIAL USE ONLY)
Curitiba	A-19	September 5, 1962	Partial List of Paraná Candidates Backed by the Catholic Church for the October Elections (SECRET)
	A-20	September 6, 1962	A Status Report - Santa Catarina (SECRET)
	A-22	September 21, 1962	Brazilian Elections 1962: Report No. 8 (CONFIDENTIAL)
Pôrto Alegre	A-7	August 23, 1962	Rio Grande do Sul (CONFIDENTIAL)
Recife	A-23	September 11, 1962	Senatorial Race in Pernambuco: Candidacy of Pessoa de Queiros (CONFIDENTIAL)
	A-26	September 13, 1962	Pernambuco Gubernatorial Race: Miguel Arraes' Stock Admitted to be low (CONFIDENTIAL)

0098

Embassy and Brasilia Office Reports

Rpt. No.	Airgram No.	Date	Subject
25	A-192	August 14, 1962	Election Coverage Through August 15, 1962 (CONFIDENTIAL)
26	A-200	August 21, 1962	A Status Report - Rio de Janeiro State (CONFIDENTIAL)
27	A-226	August 23, 1962	Governors and Vice Governors (CONFIDENTIAL)
28	A-273	September 4, 1962	Election Developments - Alagoas (CONFIDENTIAL)
29	A-257 Brasilia	September 4, 1962	The Chamber of Deputies: A Closer Look (CONFIDENTIAL)
30	A-344	September 18, 1962	Status Report on Goiás (CONFIDENTIAL)
31	A-345 Brasilia	September 20, 1962	The Senate Elections (CONFIDENTIAL)
32	A-361	September 26, 1962	Mato Grosso Status Report (CONFIDENTIAL)

0097

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OSD 12	USIA 8	NSA 3

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

AIRGRAM

732.00/10-162

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A-374 (NO.) CONFIDENTIAL (HANDLING INDICATOR)

TO : DEPARTMENT OF STATE

DEPARTMENT OF STATE BUREAU OF INTER-AMERICAN AFFAIRS OCT 8 1962

1962 OCT 5 AM 9 58

ANALYSIS & DISTRIBUTION BRANCH

RMR-Erickson

FROM : Amembassy RIO DE JANEIRO DATE: October 1, 1962

SUBJECT : Brazilian Elections 1962. Report No. 33 - Election Coverage through October 1, 1962

REF : Embassy A-192 dated August 14, 1962.

RMR-Hess 10/9-JWW

The enclosures update the lists of reports transmitted with A-192 of August 16 and close the book on the pre-election phase of Embassy reporting. With the exception of the week immediately following the elections, post-electoral reporting will be handled in the normal manner by the regular political staff and the remainder of the unit handling the special election coverage will be dissolved. The Consulates will report on the outcome of the elections in their areas of responsibility as information on the results becomes available.

Post experience indicates that it may be some time before the full results are known. No "official" figures will be available for at least a month, and recounts, new elections in contested areas, and court actions will further delay definitive assessment of the elections.

For the Ambassador:

Ronald M Schneider

Ronald M. Schneider
Political Officer

Enclosures:
As stated.

FILED
OCT 9 1962

FORM DS-323 4-62 CONFIDENTIAL FOR DEPT. USE ONLY In Out

Drafted by: POL:RMSchneider:cgm

Contents and Classification Approved by: Niles W. Bond, Deputy Chief of Mission

Clearances:

0096

The Catholic Church, through front page advertisements during the last week in both Jornal do Commercio and Diario de Pernambuco has been running quotations from a 1937 Papal Encyclical which set forth the evils of communism. Such statements are obviously aimed at Arraes.

The sudden death of BROCHADA DA ROCHA occasioned a virulent attack by LEONEL BRIZOLA on Governor CARLOS LACERDA which was reported in Diario de Pernambuco on September 28. Brizola blamed Lacerda for contributing to Brochada's death by placing him under a severe emotional strain. The Federal government's proclamation declaring a three-day period of mourning for Brochada received brief notices in the newspapers, but Northeasterners, engrossed in their own local politics, paid only lip-service to the announcement.

Lowell C. Kilday
for
D. Eugene Delgado-Arias
American Consul General

Contributors:

LCKilday
WSSmith
CTucker

0095

ECONOMIC

1. Celso Furtado Becomes Cabinet Minister: Implications for SUDENE's Future.

SUDENE Director CELSO FURTADO's confirmation last week as Minister Without Portfolio brings up the interesting problem of how SUDENE will be administered in the future. In the past Furtado has run it with a tight rein, relegating little authority and empowering no one to make decisions without his prior approval. FRANCISCO OLIVEIRA, the Assistant Director who subs for Furtado in the latter's absence, is a rather bland, unimaginative and unaggressive official who may well have been appointed by Furtado for the very reason that the latter knew he would never have to worry about Oliveira attempting to usurp power behind his back. As a result of this restricted framework, SUDENE functions slowly, if at all, when Furtado is out of town. Oliveira usually pigeon-holes decisions until his chief's return, with all other officials following suit. The question is therefore now being asked: With Furtado a Cabinet Minister and already having announced that he will spend most of his time in Rio and Brasilia, how can SUDENE continue to function effectively? The answer is that it cannot unless organizational modifications are effected in the very near future. Furtado may remain as titular head of SUDENE, but he will have to designate someone to run the store. If he attempts to continue to administer it as closely as he has in the past, he will be forced to neglect his ministerial duties. He obviously has his sights higher than SUDENE. Many feel he is destined to become President of Brazil. His appointment as Minister has undoubtedly strengthened his political position and he can probably be expected to focus his attention more and more on his ministerial post. (LIMITED OFFICIAL USE)

PSYCHOLOGICAL

Foreign news, although still present in the newspapers in a small quantity, faded before the increased tempo of local politics. All news disappeared from the front page of Jornal do Commercio on Sunday, September 30, that page instead being used as a full page political advertisement for the paper's owner and candidate for senator, F. PESSOA DE QUEIROZ. Half of page one of Diario de Pernambuco on the same day was similarly devoted to gubernatorial candidate, João Cleofas, and others. An interview by UPI's Rio chief, DENNY DAVIS, with Miguel Arraes appeared in Ultima Hora this week. When asked where he placed himself in the political spectrum, Arraes answered, "To Hitler and the Nazis, Roosevelt was a Communist sympathizer." Arraes used the questions as a launching pad for expounding on other subjects and gave no direct replies.

0094

Alike or different, the platforms are expected to have only a minimal effect on the final outcome of the election, and their issuance at this late date is an indication that neither candidate expects to win the election on the basis of votes earned by positive proposals. Quite the contrary, the tenor of the whole campaign has been negative. João Cleofas appeals for public support not so much because he will be a good governor but because the election of the "anti-Christ, subversive, Red" Miguel Arraes, "the candidate of collectivism" would have such an appalling effect on Pernambuco, the Northeast, and Brazil. Arraes follows much the same pattern, basing his appeal for votes primarily on the charge that Cleofas is "the IBAD, millionaire candidate, the tool of the sugar barons and the economic cabal that so evilly and cynically controls Brazil and corrupts democratic processes."

Cleofas supporters, who last week felt that the Arraes camp had broken the rules of political campaigns by sending out anonymous, threatening letters, broke a few rules themselves this week. In a leaflet distributed by the thousands, the Cleofas propaganda team depicted Miguel Arraes kneeling and praying the rosary. Dangling from the rosary draped around Arraes' neck was the symbolic hammer and sickle. The leaflet's caption read: "Rosario INFAMElia." Another better-done propaganda gimmick, erected in downtown Recife, was a large replica of the Berlin wall. An accompanying sign read: "Have you thought yet /what would happen/ if there were a wall here like the one in Berlin?" Possibly signifying the effectiveness of the display, Arraes forces tore down the "wall" shortly after it was erected.

As the campaign enters its final week, Cleofas still appears to be in front, though by an uncomfortably slim margin. Last reported estimates from the Cleofas camp have Cleofas entering Recife with a 40,000--45,000 vote lead and winning the election by a final 15,000--25,000 vote majority. Other well-informed, less partisan observers, however, feel that the difference in number of votes will be less than 10,000, and that either one could emerge the victor. Both Arraes and Cleofas apparently feel that the Recife vote may well determine the final outcome, since both plan to spend the final seven days of the campaign in and around Recife. (LIMITED OFFICIAL USE)

2. Changes in Local Military Commands

In a ceremony on Friday, September 28, IV Army Commander General ARTUR COSTA e SILVA relinquished his command to General HUMBERTO CASTELO BRANCO.

The following day, September 29, it was announced that II Air Force Commander Brigadeiro ISMAR do BRASIL would be relieved of his command within a few weeks. It is not known locally who will succeed Brigadeiro Brasil. (UNCLASSIFIED)

0093

ACTION

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OSD 12	USIA 8	NSA 3

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DEPARTMENT OF STATE

AIRGRAM

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A-31
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1962 OCT 16

HANDLING INDICATOR

TO : DEPARTMENT OF STATE

INFO: RIO DE JANEIRO, BRASILIA, BELEM-1, BELO HORIZONTE-1, CURITIBA-1, PORTO ALEGRE-1

RM/AN ANALYSIS & DISTRIBUTION BRANCH

DEPARTMENT OF STATE
BUREAU OF
INTER-AMERICAN AFFAIRS
OCT 16 1962

FROM : Amconsul RECIFE

DATE: October 1, 1962

SUBJECT: Weekly Summary No. 14

REF :

RM/R - Yuri 10/25 - RB

TABLE OF CONTENTS

POLITICAL

1. Political Campaign Developments
2. Changes in Local Military Commands

ECONOMIC

1. Celso Furtado Becomes Cabinet Minister: Implications for SUDENE's Future

PSYCHOLOGICAL

FILED
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POLITICAL

1. Political Campaign Developments

With only a week remaining before the October 7 election, both gubernatorial candidates, JOÃO CLEOFAS and MIGUEL ARRAES, finally released their programs for governing Pernambuco. A hasty reading of the long, detailed platforms indicates that they are more remarkable for their similarities than their differences. One outstanding point of difference, however, is in the education planks; in Arraes' plan, state-wide education programs are to be patterned after his Communist-front Movimento de Cultura Popular.

FORM 4-62 DS-323

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Drafted by: See last page/ag

Contents and Classification Approved by:

Clearances:

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Germany via Washington, in which case Department might have opportunity for useful discussion with him.

DOWLING

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FROM: Bonn

TO: Secretary of State

NO: 958, October 1, 7 p.m.

ACTION DEPARTMENT 958; INFORMATION RIO DE JANEIRO 3, LONDON 225, PARIS 225, ROME 46, TOKYO 5, OTTAWA 5

Re Department telegram 841. 732.00/9-762 XR-432.11 XR-832.05111/9-2762

Weizz (in charge South American Economic Affairs) said that Foreign Office felt some hesitation about formal instruction Ambassadorial consultation re Brazilian trade and investment problems. On assurance that no form of collective effort intended and that other governments saw no difficult, Weizz said Foreign Office would authorize German Ambassador to exchange views informally on two points mentioned paragraph four Department telegram 727 to Rio. 732.00

Foreign Office has mentioned two special problems Germans were involved in (negotiations re return of German assets and difficulties between German shipping companies and Brazilian). According their information, law limiting profit remittances not yet in effect, but in President's hands to play as he sees fit. German firms reported that while they were not happy about it, it was not as bas as expected, and they thought they could live with it.

Weizz said that in principle Foreign Office was very interested in coordinated economic action in South America as whole, and were following developments re Alliance for Progress with much attention. He thought State Secretary Carstens might mention latter in Columbus Day speech Hamburg October 12. He himself was attending as observer meeting of economic and social council OAS Mexico City October 22. Tentatively plans to return to Germany via

Bonn-958 732.00/10-162 XR-432.11 XR-832.05111/9-2762

FILED OCT 2 1962 AM

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OUTGOING TELEGRAM Department of State

INDICATE: ☐ collect ☐ CHARGE TO

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Oct 3 5 55 PM '62

ACTION: Amembassy, MEXICO CITY 1256

732.00/10-162
724.00
832.05/16-262

"CODE ROOM: Please repeat Bonn's telegram No. 958 dated October 1, 1962, No. 604 to Secretary of State. For Mr. May.

END

RUSK

Drafted by: ARA:EST/PaMcDonald 10/2/62

Telegraphic transmission and classification approved by: EST - Mr. Mallmann

Clearances: HEA - Mr. Sinn


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FORM DS-322

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732.00/10-162



those with modest resources. The new system is easier for the candidates but a great deal harder for semi-literate voters who have to choose their man from hundreds of candidates in the State-wide electoral district. There is little to go on in guessing what will happen. At best, the system could make the elections more fair; at worst, it could cause such massive confusion that the Consulate General's discussions, charts, and predictions could be thrown out the window. If this problem materializes anywhere it is likely to be in São Paulo. See Airgram A-33 of August 15.

Daniel M. Braddock
Minister Consul General

Distribution:
INS/RAR, Amembassy Rio 3, Amembassy Brasília 2, Amcongen Recife, Amconsulates Belem, Belo Horizonte, Curitiba, Porto Alegre, Salvador, Santos, Ronald Schneider (Amembassy Rio) 30.

0087

The Federal Chamber

Basic reports: Airgram A-33 of August 15, Airgram A-78 of September 26.

The Federal Chamber race was not susceptible of much coverage in the Weekly Summaries, so the basic reports attempted to give the most detailed discussion possible of both incumbent Deputies and strong candidates.

No very dramatic changes seem in store for the Paulista bench in the Federal Chamber, but several trends of some importance appear likely. The radical and destructive left (PSB and PTB; categories I, II, III) stand to lose influence in the October 7 elections. The moderate left and especially the center (UDN and PDC; IV and V) should gain considerably. The conservative and radical right (PSD, PSP, PRP; VI and VII) may gain a little.

The State Legislative Assembly

There are so many elusive nonentities in the Assembly that it cannot well be analyzed in the manner of the Federal Chamber. The elections for State Deputy will nevertheless have some importance, and an attempt will be made after the elections to assess party, ideological, and personality changes.

Municipal Elections

Elections for the City Council and the mayoralty will be held in a few towns on October 7, but neither the individual nor the total results are expected to be important. There will be no municipal elections in São Paulo or other major cities.

Other Political Developments Affecting Elections

Certain recently generated pressures, described in the Weekly Summaries and in separate reports, will have a bearing on the elections.

Growing Church interest in politics does not seem likely to have major direct effects on the outcome of the elections, but is nevertheless of considerable long-range interest. See Despatch 291 of June 5 and Weekly Summaries 29, 30, 34, and 39.

The new single official ballot, though basically a desirable reform, is an awkward mate to other existing electoral laws. Previously, candidates for legislative seats had to print their own individual ballots, which discouraged

0086

On the other hand, José Bonifácio is probably getting a little bit stronger every day of the campaign. Though he is uninspiring, most voters who reason logically will reach the conclusion that he is likely to be better for the State than his opponents. Practical political considerations also weigh on his side: he has the most money, the best lieutenants, the most support from rural political chiefs, all the public works to inaugurate, and so on. His campaign performance has not been good, but it has not been bad enough to drop him more than a little behind his opponents. With the right breaks, the October 7 vote could still tip his way.

The Consulate General has stated its conviction that the outcome of the vote will be of the greatest importance for Brazil. The reasons are still those described in the basic despatch: Jânio has proved to be one of the most dangerous creatures outside captivity. He has come close to sinking Brazil once. Adhemar, on the other hand, would not rock the boat, but he might try to steal the oars. His past performance gives ample cause for worry that he would slow the vital progress of São Paulo, though perhaps not dangerously. José Bonifácio, whatever reservations he inspires, is the only one of the three who seems likely to contribute to the objectives of the Alliance for Progress.

The Vice Governorship

The picture was given in Airgrams A-1 of July 3 and A-60 of September 12. Laudo NATEL (VI or V) seems comfortably ahead for this not very important position. He may well get more votes than any of the gubernatorial candidates. Faria LIMA (a vague V), the Janista candidate, is his nearest competitor, but even polls bought by Jânio show Laudo Natel ahead. (Jânio seems back up to his old game of wreck-the-running-mate.) Teotonio Monteiro de BARROS Filho (VI) is running third, with Adhemar's support.

The Senate

Basic report: Airgram A-45 of August 29.

Incumbents Auro Moura ANDRADE (VI) and Lino de MATTOS (VI) have excellent chances for re-election to the two available seats. The only challenger who seems in a strong position is Roberto Costa de Abreu SODRÉ (V), probably the best man of the three. Auro is running in the coalition which supports Adhemar, but most of his votes will probably derive from his personal strength. The same goes for Lino, who is Jânio's candidate. Sodré has the official support of only his own UDN. No combination of the three strong candidates wou ld be a serious change ideologically.

0085

CONFIDENTIAL

São Paulo
A-85
2

The picture continues much as described in the basic report. Of the four candidates still in the race, Socialist Cid FRANCO (biographic category I) has no chance at all. Jânio QUADROS (flutters from II through VI), Adhemar de BARROS (VI), and José Bonifácio NOGUEIRA (V) are approaching a close finish. Even at this late date, there is hardly an observer who will rule any one of the three out. Not one of them has gotten a band wagon rolling, because for one reason or another each arouses stiff opposition in important sectors of thepublic. Adhemar and Jânio are expert demagogues with immense popular appeal, but José Bonifácio points out that "one /Jânio/ fled from his duty; the other /Adhemar/ fled from the police." Unfortunately, this severe accusation is entirely accurate, and many of the voters cannot forget it. On the other hand, José Bonifácio is extraordinarily uninspiring and sometimes downright antipático (antipathetic is a pale translation). Many Paulistas have clearly been unable to bring themselves to support him, though most agree that he would continue the best government they ever had. This accounts for the great number of "undecideds" who show up as the only honest result of most of the electoral polls. The public is not cool toward the race -- far from it -- but it is distinctly cool toward the candidates.

If any one candidate seems to have a slight edge now, it is Jânio Quadros. Prime Minister BROCHADO DA ROCHA's resignation helped him (Weekly Summary 38). But it is difficult to say whether Jânio's noticeable lead in the city of São Paulo and other industrial centers is counterbalanced by losses in the rural zones, which have as many or more votes and whose leanings are very difficult to discover. The reporting officer hears that Jânio's own staffers have run a poll which shows him only eight percent ahead in the city -- not a good margin. Whether or not this report is accurate, it seems clear that Jânio himself is not confident.

If Adhemar de Barros can hold the votes he got for the governorship in 1958, and if his two opponents split the rest at all evenly -- two plausible assumptions -- he will win. Adhemaristas are notoriously faithful. Jânio has surely not converted any of them lately and José Bonifácio has not converted enough to discourage Adhemar. Had José Bonifácio turned out to be a better campaigner, he probably could have stolen enough of his opponents' vote to convince Adhemar to withdraw, for both candidates are ferociously determined to beat Jânio. The only sure way to beat Jânio would have been to buy out Barros, but old Adhemar just never got weak enough to consider the possibility attractive. It is probably too late now. There are strong rumors that the José Bonifácio forces have just made a last major attempt to sell the idea, without success. Adhemar thinks he might win. He might.

CONFIDENTIAL

0084

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OSD 12	USIA 8	NSA 3

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

AIRGRAM

① HRW SCB 732.00/9-2862

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A-85 (NO.) CONFIDENTIAL AIR PRIORITY (HANDLING INDICATOR)

TO : DEPARTMENT OF STATE 1962 OCT 2 AM 8 03

DEPARTMENT OF STATE BUREAU OF INTER-AMERICAN AFFAIRS OCT 3 1962

ANALYSIS & DISTRIBUTION

FROM : Amcongen SÃO PAULO DATE: September 28, 1962

SUBJECT : Brazilian Elections 1962: São Paulo Reporting Roundup

REF :

RAIR-Files 10/5-Swi

This airgram provides an index to principal São Paulo pre-election reports and gives an abbreviated summary of their conclusions.

São Paulo election reporting has been written to dovetail with the nation-wide reporting done by the Embassy, not to form a self-contained series. Reports from this post have naturally gone into State affairs in depth but have not repeated work done by the Embassy which is applicable to all regions of Brazil. São Paulo reports will not be fully usable, for example, except to those who have read Rio de Janeiro Airgram A-14 of July 24 on the Brazilian electoral system. As another important example, the São Paulo series has made all possible use of the system of biographic/ideological categories explained in Rio de Janeiro Despatch 891 of May 14.

The Governorship

Basic Report: Despatch 321 of June 27, 1962

Other important items: The Weekly Summaries have in fact amounted in large part to an "election highlight" series for the last few months, and because the governorship race is by far the most important one in the current election, practically every Weekly Summary for the last year has dealt with it. The basic report summarized most of the information.

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Drafted by: DCProper/lfw 9/27/62

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The opposition (UDN, PSD, PSP, PRP-backed candidate Neri) is much better prepared this year to discourage the PTB; and reports are that the Manaus business community has invested a great deal of money in Neri's campaign and that the PSD is prepared to keep close watch on the Tribunal to see that its final decision is a true reflection of the ballots cast.

Acre

The brand new state of Acre has been referred to as the political Eldorado of Brazil because elective offices there can be picked up so cheaply--with estimates of a mere 380 votes being needed for each of the 15 state deputy posts, 2,000 each for the seven federal deputy seats, and 5,000 for the three senatorial berths at stake. Like the fabled Eldorado, however, the Acre contest has attracted a large influx of seekers for easy spoils, with the result that even here competition is strong and victory may be less easily won than some had anticipated.

In 1958, Acre's two federal deputy seats were divided between the traditionally strong PSD and the PTB. This year the PSD, standing alone, faces an alliance in which the PTB is supported by the considerably weaker UDN and PSP--and the PTB also has the advantage (particularly effective in the interior, which accounts for ten of the state's eighteen thousand votes) of controlling the state administration through recently appointed Acting Governor Aníbal Teixeira, though the latter claims to be taking no side in the electoral campaign.

In the gubernatorial race General José Guiomard dos Santos (PSD-VI), a three-term Federal Deputy for Acre and author of the legislation which made it a state, should have a distinct edge over the coalition candidate, Professor José Augusto de Araújo, who has no political background. Both men are hedging their bets, however, by running for second offices--Guiomard for Senator and Araújo for Federal Deputy. In the more complex senatorial race both the PSD and the PTB-led coalition are running full slates of three candidates. In addition to Guiomard the PSD candidates are Colonel Manoel Fontenele de Castro and Dr. Mario de Oliveira; the PTB is running incumbent Federal Deputy Oscar Passos, former Federal Deputy Hugo Carneiro, and Adalberto Sena. Further swelling the Senate lists are PSB candidate Padre Arquimedes Bruno, from Ceará, and Raimundo Figueira, President of the Amazonas Credit Bank. The latter's party affiliation has not been identified, but he is reported to be waging a vigorous campaign and, on the basis of this and his personal prestige in the area, to have a reasonable chance of election. Guiomard and Passos should win the eight-year seats, with the four-year term going as a consolation prize to whichever of the other six candidates can poll a few more votes than his rivals.

For the Ambassador:

Ronald M. Schneider
Political Officer

APPROVED BY:

Niles W. Bond
Deputy Chief of Mission

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0082

Rio Grande do Sul

In the "Gaúcho" state, where tradition says the opposition always wins the gubernatorial elections, the situation is complicated by the existence of two opposition candidates. Nonetheless, victory should go to one of them, with the MTR's Fernando Ferrari now appearing for the first time to have pulled even with Ildo Meneghetti (PSD, PL, UDN, PRP, PDC, and PSP). PTB candidate Egidio Michaelsen, who seemed to be all but out of the race, has been making a better showing and may benefit considerably from the emotional reaction to the death of Brochado da Rocha. In the federal deputy contests the PTB received a setback when its strongest vote-getting incumbent, Ruy Ramos, perished in a plane crash a week ago. His place on the ballot has been taken by Leocadio Antunes, President of the Bank of Brazil, electorally an unknown factor.

Pernambuco

As seen by Rio political observers, the critical Pernambuco campaign has developed in such a way that Cleofas for the first time may have an edge over Arraes as the final week opens. The anti-communist Family Rosary Campaign (which wound up last week with Cleofas featured at a rally of nearly 300,000 persons), the failure of the "general strike," revelations of mismanagement of the Recife city administration under Arraes, and significant PTB reaction against the leading role of the Communists in the Arraes campaign organization are pointed to as factors contributing to Arraes' loss of headway. Reportedly eight of fifteen PTB state deputies are working for Cleofas rather than their party's official candidate. Similarly, while the money of Senate candidate Ermirio de Moraes was of great help in getting Arraes off to a flying start, it has provoked a reaction on the part of voters who see in this deal an indication that Miguel is no purer than the other tarnished politicos. On the other side of the coin, Cleofas in the last two months has made effective use of the augmented campaign resources at his disposal--both from local sources and that supplied by the Brazilian Institute of Democratic Action (IBAD).

Amazonas

The immediate pre-election picture can be described as one of mounting tension, with the PTB and Governor Gilberto Mestrinho having almost all of the campaign power in their hands and with the opposition determined to break through and do battle for every vote cast. With 52,000 more eligible voters this year (140,000 registered as compared with 88,000 in 1958), the PTB candidate, former governor Plinio Ramos Coelho, has the best chance of winning; and the party is using every means possible to insure that his name is first in the minds of the electorate. These include the use of almost all of the present state government's resources, a firm control of campaign propaganda media, and, if necessary, the underlying possibility of again buying off the Regional Electoral Tribunal to assure a favorable vote count (the final blow that destroyed opposition candidate Paulo Pinto Neri's victory in 1958).

0081

The usual rash of election predictions has begun with most serious magazines and newspapers giving far more space to analysis and relatively less to flat predictions than was the case in 1958. The consensus seems to be for only limited change in the composition of Congress and extremely tight gubernatorial races in almost every state from Amazonas down to Rio Grande do Sul. (The Embassy's final predictions will be embodied in next week's Electoral Highlights, which will be transmitted in telegraphic form to facilitate dissemination before the balloting takes place.)

The Church

Much of the verbal sandstorm which obscured political developments this past week resulted from the announcement in several states of the candidates approved by the Catholic Church-sponsored Family Electoral Alliance (ALEF) (see Embassy Despatch 802 of April 11, 1962). In Guanabara last Saturday the Cardinal-Archbishop of Rio de Janeiro presided over a meeting which filled the Municipal Theater to overflowing. Explaining that the peculiarities of the electoral system made it necessary to concentrate votes on a relatively small number of candidates, Don Jaime de Barros Câmara announced the 17 federal deputy candidates and 40 state assembly hopefuls for whom a good Catholic could vote--indeed, the respected primate went so far as to remind his flock that failure to do so would be a sin for which they would have to answer to God. ALEF spokesmen reminded voters who felt their choice was being excessively restricted that the Communists in Guanabara were concentrating their support behind one federal and three state deputy candidates.

In other states the ALEF or its local equivalent were both more and less selective. In Paraná the Catholic voter was limited to only 5 of the 86 registered federal deputy candidates and 10 of the 279 state assembly aspirants. On the other hand, in São Paulo 57 federal deputy and well over 200 state deputy candidates were given the Church's blessing. All PTB candidates were excluded--since that party had given places on its ticket to a number of Communists. Moreover, incumbent PDC Federal Deputy Paulo de Tarso was denied the ALEF endorsement (which 10 PDC "rivals" received) due to his "socialistic" attitudes. In Rio state the archbishop personally tried to get two of the center-conservative candidates to withdraw in favor of PSD standardbearer Paulo Fernandes. Failing this the Church clearly stated its preference for Fernandes, and the ALEF anointed 12 federal deputy hopefuls along with Senate candidates Vasconcelos Torres (PTB) and Mario Guimarães (UDN). In the Northeastern states the Church stayed closer to its traditional technique of identifying the objectionable candidates (such as Miguel Arraes) and leaving more specific orientation of the voters to the parish priests. Father Patrick Peyton's "Family Rosary Campaign" has had undeniable effect in Pernambuco and neighboring states; his base of operations for the final pre-electoral week will be Guanabara. The total impact of the Church's active participation in this year's campaign cannot, of course, be assessed until the votes are counted.

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DEPARTMENT OF STATE

AIRGRAM

732.00/9-2862

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A-373 NO.

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HANDLING INDICATOR

DEPARTMENT OF STATE
BUREAU OF
INTER-AMERICAN AFFAIRS
OCT 2 1962

1962 OCT 1 PM 2 58

ANALYSIS & DISTRIBUTION BRANCH

TO : DEPARTMENT OF STATE

FROM : Amembassy RIO DE JANEIRO DATE: September 28, 1962

SUBJECT : Brazilian Election Highlights September 22-28

REF :

The accelerating pace of the campaign was interrupted, if only partially and temporarily, by the three days of mourning decreed by President Goulart in memory of ex-Premier Brochado da Rocha, who died of a cerebral hemorrhage on Wednesday (following his collapse at a political rally). In the eyes of some hardened political observers Brochado can do his party more good dead than alive, and Leonel Brizzola is attempting to exploit this "break" to the utmost with emotional outbursts aimed at identifying Carlos Lacerda and the UDN as Brochado's "murderers." With election day little more than a week away, the politicians everywhere are searching for that one last trick. In Pernambuco millionaire Senatorial aspirant José Ermirio de Moraes has reportedly rented all taxis for October 7; in Ceará a gasoline shortage has disrupted campaigning--except for the PTB which through "foresight" had a supply on hand; in most states one or more parties have sought to gain psychological advantage from requesting Federal troops to "guarantee" the elections against the alleged violent tactics of their opponents.

While the campaigning is still orderly and even restrained by Latin American standards, it is relatively violent for Brazil. In Guanabara several clashes occurred during the week between UDN and Communist elements (with Communist candidate Hercules Corrêa taking quite a physical beating), and in several Northeastern states shots have been fired. In Bahia rioting took place when PSD gubernatorial candidate Pires attempted to hold a rally in the home town of his opponent, Lomanto Junior. But in most of the country the campaign continues to be a battle of money and words, with both sides making embarrassing questions concerning the sources of their rivals' funds.

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FORM DS-323 4-62

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Drafted by: R. Schneider & L. Cooley:cgm

Contents and Classification Approved by:

Clearances:

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blamed by both sides, on the one hand by the opposition because it wants to embarrass the Administration, and on the other by those backers of the party in office because they feel unjustly deprived of their due. On the whole, the situation remains calm, and given the conservative temper of the people of this State, and the ability of security officials to maintain order, the Consulate believes that no undue disturbances are likely to interfere with the campaign or the election. Secretary Gouvea, however, has asserted that he will definitely resign the moment the election is over.

Edmund A. da Silveira

Edmund A. da Silveira,
American Consul

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0078

Nevertheless, many people think that the chances are fairly good for the Governor to get a majority in the State Assembly after the elections.

3. Request for Federal Troops to Assure Peaceful Elections

On September 20, the State president of the PSD, Senator Benedito Valadares, handed the State Electoral Tribunal a request for the assignment of Federal troops to 95 municipalities in the Vale do Rio Doce and São Francisco River areas as a guarantee of orderly elections. The request for Federal troops stemmed, according to Senator Valadares, from the large number of complaints the Party had received about disturbances of the public order which pointed to a possible disruption of the balloting process on October 7.

Immediately following the PSD request, the State Secretary of Public Security, Mauro GOUVEA, handed his resignation to Governor Magalhães Pinto, who refused to accept it. In his letter of resignation, the Secretary claimed that being no politician, he had sought to establish guide lines for police officials based on the public interest and on legal principles of justice. As a result, he had, the letter stated, even incurred the animosity of members of the UDN, the Governor's party. He had informed the State Electoral Tribunal, he continued, that he had taken all necessary steps to police the entire State adequately for purposes of protecting all candidates regardless of party affiliation and ensuring a peaceful election. Despite these efforts, he concluded, the PSD had shown a lack of confidence in him and, therefore, the only thing left for him to do was to submit his resignation.

The Governor followed his refusal to accept the Secretary's resignation with a public declaration of confidence in his Secretary and of his Government's capability to maintain public order. The Tribunal has now asked its electoral officials in the municipalities concerned for reports on actual conditions. The Consulate is informed that the State Electoral Tribunal, if it finds merit in the charges, has to transmit its findings and recommendations to the Federal Electoral Tribunal.

Comment: The consensus is that the PSD request is in the main a political maneuver to embarrass the Government, and that no one will be particularly hurt if no Federal troops appear. Stories of disturbances in the interior of the State are believed to be for the most part much exaggerated and even entirely fabricated in some cases. The Secretary of Public Security is regarded objectively as an impartial, fair-minded, and non-political official, if not too experienced in the administration of public security matters. His dilemma is that the job itself is regarded as a source of political patronage by the party in office. Therefore, a non-political Secretary is apt to get

0077

He has apparently the full support of his party and plenty of financial backing to judge by his expensive advertising and publicity campaign. Jorge CARONE (CENTRIST), a PR State deputy, is also conducting a vigorous campaign, and many people give him a good chance of winning. VELLOSO, however, is better organized and is conducting a much more serious and intensive campaign than any other candidate. Nelson THIBAU is the big imponderable. An apolitical candidate, he has succeeded in building up a reputation as a fool and a clown, but he has been campaigning since 1960, and the subconscious impression of his name may be worth many votes at the polls.

2. Governor Magalhães Pinto's Stand Toward Jânio Quadros and Other Candidates

The Governor's private secretary, Dr. Paulo Camilo de OLIVEIRA, has told the reporting officer that the Governor will come out in the next few days with a public declaration of support for the gubernatorial candidacy of Jânio QUADROS in São Paulo. The newspapers have also reported that the UDN Federal deputies from Minas Gerais, who are running for re-election, are incensed at the Governor's alleged favoritism toward certain non-incumbent UDN candidates for Congress. The two candidates most often named as being favored by the Governor are senatorial candidate Oswaldo Pierucetti and Jose APARECIDO de OLIVEIRA, both from the UDN.

Comment: Pierucetti was president of the State-controlled Crédito Real Bank at the time he became a candidate for senator, and before his nomination for the senatorial candidacy he had been Secretary of the Interior in the Magalhães Pinto Cabinet. José Aparecido is close to both Governor Magalhães Pinto and Jânio Quadros, having been secretary to the Governor before his election in 1960 and the private secretary of Janio Quadros when the latter was President. One of the charges against the Governor is that both candidates under one pretext or another travel on the Governor's official plane. On a recent trip, when the reporting officer had occasion to fly on the Governor's plane from a town in the northeastern part of Minas Gerais to Belo Horizonte, one of the passengers was candidate Oswaldo Pierucetti.

It is not at all surprising that the UDN Federal deputies are annoyed with the Governor in view of his diametrical opposition to the UDN national position. According to his private secretary, the Governor does not envisage a change for the better in the State delegation to the National Congress as a result of the elections and is resigned to this expected outcome. He is, however, very hopeful that the UDN representation in the State Assembly will increase substantially so that in alliance with the PTB the two parties will provide the majority he needs to pass his proposed legislation. His private secretary puts the increase of the UDN delegation in the State Assembly at 100 percent, which is a much higher estimate than anyone else has cared to give.

0076

the State Legislative Assembly. The UDN takes second place in the Congress and third place in the State Assembly. The PR has the second largest delegation in the Assembly but is in third place in the Congress. No minor party is represented in the Congress from this State, and in the State Assembly minor parties have only token representation.

Although the political experts feel very uncertain about prophesying the results of the coming election, there is a significant degree of agreement that the political make-up of the delegations that the State will send to the Federal and State legislatures will not vary measurably from the conservative complexion that predominates now. Insofar as the relative position of the parties in terms of changes in numerical strength is concerned, the general feeling is that the PSD will retain its number one position in the Congress and in the State Assembly, even though the Party may lose some strength in the Assembly. The outlook for the UDN, Governor MAGALHÃES PINTO's party, is that it will show a slight gain in the Congress and a substantial increase in the State Assembly, taking perhaps the number two position in the Assembly. There is also a fair degree of agreement that the PTB will gain in both the Federal and State legislative houses, perhaps going up to second or third place in the National Congress and to third place in the State Assembly.

The PR, according to the prevailing view, is likely to lose strength at both the Federal and State levels. The reason for this view is that the PR, which generally must join forces with the party in power in the State Administration in order to survive, has been in the opposition throughout the present Administration. The PR has also been rent by dissent in the interior of the State, where many of the Party's municipal committees have gone over lock, stock, and barrel to the UDN, completely dissolving their ties with the PR. Starved for political patronage, rent by internal dissent, and weakened in its rural foundations by the gradual urbanization of the society, the PR stands to lose strength to the other parties.

On the senatorial race, incumbent PSD Senator Benedito VALADARES is considered a sure bet. Although his popularity was beginning to falter, his constructive role in advancing a solution to the recent national political crisis has definitely improved his prospects, which were always good. Incumbent PTB Senator Camilo Nogueira da GAMA is also still favored to win, but by a narrow margin, and no one will be surprised if UDN candidate Oswaldo FIERUCETTI wins over the PTB candidate. Senator Camilo Nogueira da Gama has an advantage in that his name will appear first on the ballot. With the possible exception of PR Federal deputy Tristão da CUNHA, few people think the other four candidates for senator have very much of a chance.

On the mayoralty race for Belo Horizonte, Nylton Moreira VELLOSO (CENTRIST/CONSERVATIVE), the UDN candidate, seems as of now to be out in front.

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HANDLING INDICATOR

TO :

1962 OCT 5 AM 9 58

DEPARTMENT OF STATE
BUREAU OF
INTER-AMERICAN AFFAIRS
OCT 8 1962

FROM : AMCONSUL, Belo Horizonte DATE: September 28, 1962

SUBJECT : BRAZILIAN ELECTION 1962 - Supplemental Status Report No. 13 for September 20-26, State of Minas Gerais.

REF : Consulate Despatch No. 37, June 28, 1962

Table of Contents

1. Electoral Outlook
2. Governor Magalhães Pinto's Stand Toward Jânio Quadros and Other Candidates
3. Request for Federal Troops to Assure Peaceful Elections

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1. Electoral Outlook

On October 7 the electorate in the State of Minas Gerais will go to the polls to vote for two senators, 48 Federal deputies, 82 State deputies, and for mayors, aldermen, and other municipal officials in all the municipalities of the State. Four major parties are represented in the National Congress and the State Legislative Assembly: 1) The Social Democratic Party (PSD); 2) the Republican Party (PR); 3) the National Democratic Union (UDN); and 4) the Labor Party (PTB).

With respect to numerical strength, the PSD and the PTB occupy first and fourth place, respectively, in both the National Congress and

Couns.Cons.Affrs.-Rio
Pol Section
Brasilia Embassy

OCT 9 1962

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Drafted by: RAdaSilveira:kfk 9/28/1962

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INCOMING TELEGRAM *Department of State*

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FROM: Rome

TO: Secretary of State

NO: 753, September 28, 6 p.m.

ACTION DEPARTMENT 753, INFORMATION BONN 14, PARIS 119, RIO DE JANEIRO 3, TOKYO 9, OTTAWA 6.

Re DEPTEL 697.

FONOFF (Cozzi, head American OFF ECON AFFS) agrees on utility of close consultation and exchange of views between US and Italian Ambassadors in Brazil along lines fourth PARA REFTEL and FONOFF sending appropriate instructions. Cozzi pointed out this consultation already going on in case of certain other countries (mentioned Somalia and Argentina).

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FROM: PARIS

TO: Secretary of State

NO: POLTO 362, SEPTEMBER 27, 9 PM

POLAD AGENDA OCTOBER 2

I. 17TH UNGA SESSION

SEE SEPARATE TEL.

II. CZECH REQUEST TO ITALIAN GOVERNMENT FOR OVERFLIGHT RIGHTS POLTO A-366 REPORTS CZECH REQUEST TO ITALIAN GOVERNMENT.

III., IV., V. DEVELOPMENTS OTHER AREAS, MID-EAST AND AFRICA, SOVIET BLOC AND YUGOSLAVIA.

SINCE LACK OF TIME PREVENTED EXCHANGE VIEWS THESE ITEMS LAST MEETING CHAIRMAN LISTS SAME SUBJECTS AS LAST WEEK, I.E., (1) ARAB LEAGUE COUNCIL MEETING, (2) LIBREVILLE CONFERENCE, (3) ARGENTINA AND BRAZIL. (4) RE BRAZIL PLAN USE GUIDANCE CONTAINED TOPOLS 392 AND 393.

FINLETTER

SJR

(5) Brazil-Haiti & Yugoslavia

(6) Yemen Coup

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7:28 P.M.
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FROM: LONDON

TO: Secretary of State

NO: 1295, SEPTEMBER 27, 6 P.M.

ACTION DEPARTMENT 1295, INFORMATION RIO DE JANEIRO 2, BONN 57, PARIS 189, ROME 60, TOKYO 11, OTTAWA 25.

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FOREIGN OFFICE (SLATER, HEAD AMERICAN DEPARTMENT) CONCURS UTILITY CLOSE CONSULTATION US AND UK AMBASSADORS BRAZIL ALONG LINES FIFTH PARAGRAPH DEPTEL 1549 AND WILL SEND APPROPRIATE INSTRUCTIONS.

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EMBASSY OFFICER EMPHASIZED THAT OUR SUGGESTION NOT INTENDED IMPLY RELATIONS BETWEEN EMBASSIES WERE NOT ALREADY CLOSE AND CORDIAL, AND SLATER EXPRESSED UNDERSTANDING OUR PURPOSE.

QUESTION SIMILAR US APPROACHES OTHER COUNTRIES DID NOT ARISE.

JONES

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0071

A-29
Salvador

16. Leodegario Ludgero de Souza has not, as far as the Consulate knows, received any attention from the press, and seems unlikely to be elected. He is said to be a member of the PTB.

C. Dirck Keyser

C. Dirck Keyser
American Consul

cc: Political Sections, Rio de Janeiro and Brasilia

DEPARTMENT please pass copies to all posts in Brazil.

JRH

0070

9. Aziz Maron, a PTB candidate of Arab abstraction, from the cacau zone around Ilheus and Itabuna. He has received little press attention except in the cacau zone, and it does not seem too likely that he will be elected.

10. Necy Novais (presumably VI), who accompanied her husband, PR federal deputy and Bahia state president, to the United States during a 1960 or 1961 trip of federal deputies at U.S. Government expense, is said, as mentioned above, to be sure of election, because of her husband's capability of diverting an adequate number of his own large bloc of votes to her.

11. Dilson Ribeiro is unknown to the Consulate, although we have seen one press item identifying him as belonging to the PTB. The low level of attention he is receiving would seem to argue against his election.

12. Francisco Ribeiro Junior has been a PTB state deputy, and, more recently, delegado of the IAPETC (Instituto de Aposentadoria e Pensões para Empregados nos Transportes e Cargas). He is said to have some voting support in the cacau zone in the south of Bahia, but seems unlikely to be elected.

13. Otavio Martins Sá, of whom the Consulate knows only that he is a member of the PTB, seems unlikely to be elected.

14. Anibal Maia Sampaio (could be III, IV, V, or VI), a member of the Commissão Executiva of the Bahia PTB, is a former delegado regional of IPASE (Instituto de Pensões e Aposentadoria dos Servidores do Estado) who has told the press that he has been supported politically by PR leader Manoel Cavalcante de Novais (VI) since 1955 and who also says he supports President João Goulart (PTB III or IV). He is one of the stronger PTB candidates and could conceivably run as well as third or fourth. He is the brother of State Assembly President Cristovão Colombo Maia Sampaio (PTB) and may well be related to Clemens Vaz Sampaio (PTB III or IV).

15. Clemens Vaz Sampaio (III or IV), incumbent, is sure to be reelected. He is the leader of the PTB in Bahia and is one of the architects of the Lomanto candidacy. He has supported President Goulart in his drive for recuperation of presidential powers, and displayed anti-American sentiments during a January-March 1962, parliamentary visit to the United States. He is considered a leader of the Frente Parlamentar Nacionalista by Mancheto.

0069

A-29
Salvador

The 16 PTB candidates are as follows:

1. João Alves de Almaida, first mentioned as a potential candidate in a July 6 news item, which indicated that he hoped to win votes from social security beneficiaries. It seems unlikely that he will be elected.

2. Luiz Sergio Barbosa: Beyond the fact that he is a member of the Bahia PTB's 67-member Diretorio, the Consulate knows nothing of Barbosa, who seems unlikely to be elected.

3. Ramiro Berbert de Castro (VI), presently a suplente and formerly a deputy in his own right, who works as a journalist for the Salvador afternoon A Tarde. His past affiliation was with the PSD. As one of the stronger candidates, he has a chance of election.

4. Pedro Vilas Boas Catalão, a member of the Diretorio of the Bahia PTB, is otherwise unknown to us, and seems unlikely to be elected. He is from the cacau zone.

5. Carlos Alberto Cincura is said to be a member of the PTB and related to Rafael Cincura, a UDN federal deputy running for reelection. Carlos Alberto is unknown to us, and seems unlikely to be elected.

6. Mita Costa (perhaps III, IV, or V), is a fairly well-known former deputy who speaks well of Getulio Vargas and Brochado Rocha and who could be elected.

7. Hugo de Araujo Maria (perhaps IV), an official of the Ministry of Labor when Vargas was dictator, was Regional Labor Delegate in Salvador in 1950, and was sub-chefe da casa civil to President Goulart earlier this year. For a few hours in September, 1962, he was reportedly acting labor minister, and it is said that he has now withdrawn his candidacy in order to continue on the presidential staff as Chefe da Casa Civil. His political roots apparently include Sergipe as well as Bahia, because in June, 1962, he was mentioned as a potential candidate in Sergipe. If the report of his withdrawal should prove untrue, it is probable that he would be the second or third elected among the PTB candidates.

8. Renato Franco, reportedly a member of the PTB, about whom the Consulate knows nothing. Since the Consulate has been fairly assiduous in collecting newspaper items on all candidates, our lack of information would seem to indicate that he has received little press attention except in the cacau zone, and it does not seem too likely that he will be elected.

0068

to the control of which he is more loyal than to ideology. He has already left the UDN to retain control of it, and is apparently planning to shirt to the PTB for the same purpose. As noted below, his wife is a PTB candidate. The gains the PR is expected to make in Bahia this year are attributed to his machine's effectiveness.

8. Gastão Pedreira Filho is unknown to the Consulate, although he is advertised as a PR candidate. He has been variously described as a PR candidate and as a PTB man running as a PR candidate in the joint PR-PTB-PRP list. He seems unlikely to be elected.

9. Francisco Peixoto Junior, assumed to be a PR candidate, is unknown to the Consulate, and seems unlikely to be elected.

10. Salamão Rohem, a PR suplente, might be the sixth most popular of the PR candidates, thus winning election if six PR candidates are elected, as seems possible. He is not well known, and is from the cacau region of Ilheus and Itabuna.

THE SIXTEEN PTB CANDIDATES

Of the 16 PTB candidates, only two or three are expected to win. Clemens Vaz Sampaio (III or IV), the only incumbent PTB deputy who has been renominated (the other is Fernando Santana, a Communist who this time is running on the PSB ticket), is sure of reelection.

Another candidate who is said to be sure of reelection is Necy Cavalcante de Novais (presumably VI), a newly-admitted member of the PTB who is the wife of Manoel Cavalcante de Novais (PR VI), president of the Bahia PR. According to local political gossip, Novais plans to join the PTB himself after the election, and his wife's membership in the PTB is in the nature of a marriage d'état between the PTB and the PR. Novais, who won 40,095 votes in 1958 (winning more than any other Bahiano deputy), can easily divert enough votes to his wife to elect her.

The third PTB seat, if there is one, could go to any one of three or four candidates. Anibal Maia Sampaio (III, IV, V, or VI) could well be the man, since he apparently has had Novais' support since 1955, and may be related to Clemens Sampaio. Chefe da Casa Civil da Presidencia da Republica Hugo de Araujo Faria (probably IV) would probably be the man, but it is understood that he has withdrawn his candidacy in order to remain chefe da casa civil. Perhaps the third strongest of these four contenders is Nita Costa (III, IV, or V), with Ramiro Berbert de Castro (VI) the fourth possibility.

0067

A-29
Salvador

The ten known and presumed PR candidates are as follows:

1. Theodulo Lins de Albuquerque (V), an incumbent who will probably be reelected.

2. Raimundo do Souza Brito (VI), an incumbent who will probably be reelected. The Consulate incorrectly reported in its A-23 of August 22 that he spelt his name Raymundo and that he was a Baptist minister. It appears that he is only married to a Baptist and has been helpful in matters of interest to Protestants. He may be a lawyer, and it is understood that he has connections with the PDC as well as with Protestants.

3. Jose Vaz Sampaio Espinheira is completely unknown to the Consulate, and it is only assumed he is a PR, rather than a PTB, candidate. The lack of attention he has received from the press would appear to argue against his chances of election.

4. Antônio Magalhães Fraga (V or VI), a present PR incumbent who will probably be reelected. He is little known, as noted in the Consulate's A-22 of August 22, 1962.

5. Oscar Luna Freire is assumed to be a PR candidate, but all the Consulate knows of him is that he is a former federal deputy (1955 - 1959) and that he is the current president of the Equitativa dos Estados Unidos do Brasil, a fact which would seem to argue against his being associated with the PTB. As a former deputy, he might be one of the stronger also-rans, perhaps running seventh among the PR candidates.

6. Pedro Manso Cabral (V or VI), presently a PR state deputy and until June, 1962, a member of Juracy Magalhães' government (Secretary of Justice; he resigned to run for federal deputy), will probably be elected. If the PR elects only five deputies instead of six, he would probably have a better chance of election than Salamão Rehem, and, indeed, might get more votes than all but one or two of the present incumbents. He is a youngish (35 - 40) handsome man, pleasant in manner, who is apparently able. He has told the consul that he will divide his time between Brasilia, where policies are made, and Rio, where they are carried out, if he is elected.

7. Manoel Cavalcante de Novais (VI), is surer of election than any other candidate in any party, if past electoral statistics continue to have validity, since in 1958 he won more votes than any other Bahiano candidate. Reputedly unpleasant and venal, he is a politician of the old school who has built his highly effective machine on the patronage from the Commissão do Vale do São Francisco,

0066

4. Raimundo de Souza Brito (VI)
5. Theodulo Lins de Albuquerque (V)
(6. Salamão Rehem)

PTB: 1. Clemens Vaz Sampaio (III or IV)
2. Necy Cavalcante de Novais (presumably VI)
(3. Anibal Maia Sampaio, III, IV, V, or VI)

PRP: (1. Rubem Rodrigues Nogueira, VII)

THE PRP CANDIDATE

Rubem Rodrigues Nogueira (PRP VII -- see Consulate's Airgram A-13 of August 22, 1962, for available biographic data), is the only incumbent PRP deputy, and, according to an August 20 press report and the state PTB's first secretary, is the only PRP candidate. The news item said that Nogueira's reelection was considered sure.

MORE PTB CANDIDATES THAN PR

The remaining 26 candidates are thus PTB and PR. The Consulate has identified 16 PTB candidates (see list below) and only seven PR candidates (see list below). We have been unable to identify the three remaining candidates by party. Since the PTB at present has only two deputies, while the PR has four, it seems logical to assume that the PR would have more candidates than the PTB, and the fact that 16 appear to belong to the PTB leads us to suppose that the remaining three candidates are representatives of the PR.

THE TEN PR CANDIDATES

Of the seven known and three probable PR candidates, it is believed that five or six will be elected. This would probably mean reelection for incumbents Manoel Cavalcante de Novais (VI), Antônio Magalhães Fraga (V or VI), Raimundo de Souza Brito (VI), and Theodulo Lins de Albuquerque (V). The fifth seat would presumably go to State Deputy and former State Secretary for Justice Pedro Manso Cabral (presumably V or VI), a pleasant and apparently effective youngish man who was in Juracy Magalhães' government until last June, when he resigned to run for federal deputy. The sixth seat, if there is one, might go to Salamão Rehem, currently a suplente, who is from the cacau region around Ilheus and Itabuna.

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1962 OCT 4

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FROM: AMCONSULATE, SALVADOR

DATE: September 26, 1962

Santos-1

SUBJECT: Brazilian Elections 1962: VIII: PR-PTB-PRP Candidates for Federal Deputy from Bahia

Sao Paulo-1

REF:

The Partido Republicano (PR), Partido Trabalhista Brasileira (PTB), and Partido de Representaçao Popular (PRP) have submitted a joint list of candidates for election to the 31 seats allocated to Bahia in the Brazilian federal Chamber of Deputies, under the name Aliança Trabalhista.

The list, published in Bahia's Diário Official on Aug. 29, 1962, totaled 27 names, less than the number of seats at stake and also less than the number of candidates permissible under the law, which allows a list to have more names than the number of seats being contested. At present the three parties hold seven of the 27 seats allocated to Bahia in the current Chamber, equivalent proportionately to eight in a 31-seat delegation.

Forecasts are that the three-party list will win between seven and ten seats on October 7, with five or six going to the PR, two or three to the PTB, and possibly one to the PRP. An increase to ten seats, which is quite possible, would reflect the effectiveness of the Novais machine and small gains by the PTB. The candidates most likely to win election, in order of strength, are as follows:

PR: 1. Manoel Cavalcante de Novais (VI)
2. Pedro Manso Cabral (V or VI)
3. Antônio Magalhães Fraga (V or VI)

FILED OCT 18 1962

cc: Political Sections, Rio de Janeiro and Brasilia
DEPARTMENT Please pass copies to all posts in Brazil

FORM 4-62 DS-323

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16 Oct 62 - R. White INR/CS/BA

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A-80 Sao Paulo
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Editorials in several newspapers severely criticized Soviet actions in Cuba, classifying the Russians as false ideologists and interventionists. Opinion favored the position of the United States. Folha de São Paulo commented that the Monroe Doctrine was still valid and could be used against any threat to freedom and democracy in the Hemisphere.

Daniel M. Braddock
Minister Consul General

Contributors:
DCProper
JMason

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0063

Comment: The dinner was clearly intended as a massive expression of São Paulo approval for General de Mello's rebuke to the Third (Rio Grande do Sul) Army Commander, who tried to exert pressure for Congressional approval of President GOULART's plebiscite. Mello's position lost him the job of War Minister, but his military and civilian friends in São Paulo wanted to make it clear that he had kept their esteem. The dinner was an unmistakeable demonstration of that. (LIMITED OFFICIAL USE)

6. East German Spy Condemned

A São Paulo military court on September 19 sentenced Joseph Werner LEBEN to eighteen years in prison for espionage. It was reported that he would be expelled from Brazil after release. Leben was convicted of having sent information on São Paulo industries to East Germany. He was said to be planning espionage operations in the United States after leaving São Paulo. (UNCLASSIFIED)

PSYCHOLOGICAL

1. Local Press Reaction

All São Paulo newspapers but leftist Ultima Hora and Goulart-lining Correio Paulistano criticized the performance of the recently resigned Brochado da Rocha Council of Ministers and predicted nothing better for the new Goulart-appointed Council, stressing the leftist tendencies of its ministers. The same newspapers called for joint efforts to improve conditions in Brazil, emphasizing that the worst democracy is better than the best dictatorship. Ultima Hora and Correio Paulistano continued to defend Goulart against criticism.

The opening of the United Nations' General Assembly received good coverage by the editorialists who expressed hopes for world peace. Influential dailies O Estado de São Paulo and Diario de São Paulo launched an attack on Brazilian U.N. Representative Afonso ARINOS when he addressed the Assembly. They criticized his reference to self-determination and peaceful coexistence without mentioning the Berlin Wall and the "sovietization" of Cuba.

O Estado and Diario also commented on Brazil's foreign policy, emphasizing that there should be a close association with the United States. They also welcomed the Paris-Bonn approchement and the expected entry of Great Britain into the European Common Market as further impediments to Soviet expansion.

0062

first move in most small towns is to visit the parish priest, and when asked to explain his elusive line he says that he is a "Christian and a democrat." He often quotes from the Mater et Magistra. With all of this attention, Church officials would find it very difficult to take a position. (LIMITED OFFICIAL USE)

4. Financial Problems Hamper Election Preparations

The Regional Electoral Court was to have received a special federal allocation to finance the October 7 elections in São Paulo. The money has not yet arrived and election preparations are far behind schedule. The problem is especially complicated by the introduction of a single official ballot for legislative seats (São Paulo Airgram A-33 of August 15), which is certain to add confusion and raise the number of blank or void votes. The Court is believed to be counting on the new Cabinet to make the allocation available soon. The expectation is that the elections will come off confused but on time. (UNCLASSIFIED)

Comment: It seems likely that this pressure on the courts was one more element in President Goulart's attempt to put heat on Congress by threatening the elections. Court difficulties will inevitably increase the massive voter confusion which in any case is bound to result from the new ballot.

The expected confusion may help gubernatorial candidate José Bonifácio, who has the most educated voters. Jânio Quadros may suffer. On the other hand, the Court has introduced a vote-counting improvement which may make it more difficult than the Consulate General had expected to distort the vote in José Bonifácio's favor (see Despatch 321 of June 27). (CONFIDENTIAL)

5. Ex-War Minister Honored

About a thousand people from leading São Paulo business and Government circles attended a dinner in honor of ex-War Minister Nelson de MELLO September 20. Top Army, Navy, and Air Force officials (who were close to General de Mello during his command of the São Paulo-based Second Army) were present; new Second Army Commander BEVILACQUA was in Mato Grosso but sent a message of greeting. General de Mello's speech was strictly non-political. Senate President Auro Moura ANDRADE got to the obvious point of the dinner when he praised the General for acting "decisively against those who tried to disturb institutional order... /during the recent crisis/." (OFFICIAL USE ONLY)

0061

Administration-sponsored gubernatorial candidate José Bonifácio has put the following plank in his platform: "utilization, without prejudice to our political and economic sovereignty, of the resources of the 'Alliance for Progress.'" (UNCLASSIFIED)

Comment: Parallels between the Alliance and the Plan of Action are obvious: the latter is an outstanding Latin American example of self-help and planning. The Governor and his hopeful successor have nevertheless been chary of drawing the parallels in public, probably believing that identification of the Plan of Action with a North American initiative would be electorally harmful. It seems significant that the comparison was finally made at the height of a major electoral campaign, with José Bonifácio needing every vote he can get. The Consulate General believes that José Bonifácio is the only one of the three gubernatorial contenders who is likely to contribute effectively to the objectives of the Alliance (see Despatch 321 of June 27). (CONFIDENTIAL)

3. Church Organization Recommends Candidates

The Catholic Church-organized "Family Electoral Alliance" (Aliança Eleitoral pela Família) has released a list of candidates it recommends for the October 7 São Paulo elections. Many Federal Deputy candidates are on it, but there are some interesting omissions. No Socialist (PSB) candidates were approved; theBrazilian Labor Party (PTB) was barred (reportedly for entering in coalition with the PSB and opening its slate to Brazilian Communist Party candidates); and not all Christian Democrats made it (wild-eyed leftist Paulo de TARSO was notably absent). All important Senate candidates except Lino de MATTOS were on the recommended list. All major vice gubernatorial hopefuls made it. Of the gubernatorial candidates, only ultra-leftist Cid Franco (PSB) was left out. (OFFICIAL USE ONLY)

Comment: So many candidates were approved that the positive effects of the Alliance recommendations will be hard to calculate. Possibly the most important effects will be the negative ones on some of the politicians who were left out. Their absence might cause some voters to switch allegiance.

The one race where Church influence might be decisive is that for the governorship, but it would be difficult for Church authorities to throw their support to any one candidate. José Bonifácio Nogueira is perhaps closest to their line, but Adhemar de Barros maintains strong old ties with Church officials. Jânio Quadros has made a great point of cultivating them. His

0060

The Radio/TV Record poll gave José Bonifácio 29.37 percent, Jânio 27.50, Adhemar 26.80, and Cid FRANCO 0.76. The important figure of 13.70 percent were undecided. Results for many interior cities showed each of the major candidates with important zones of strength.

Another radio/TV network had a poll showing Jânio far ahead. (UNCLASSIFIED)

Comment: Observers of previous elections report that IBOPE traditionally comes very close on the last poll before the vote. One would suppose that it has to in order to stay in business. But the organization was clearly bought in earlier polls during the present race, and there are reports that it sold out this time too. Its failure to print detailed breakdowns is suspicious. Under the circumstances, not much confidence can be put in the poll.

The Radio Record poll has also been very accurate in the past, and it is the only current effort which shows no glaring causes for suspicion. The poll is known actually to have been taken (some are made up at desks) and the results do not show obvious evidence of tampering. Each of the candidates has zones where he is far ahead of the others (not usually allowed in purchased polls in São Paulo) and the results are much closer than buyers usually prefer. Nevertheless, one cannot rule out the chance that it was rigged in favor of José Bonifácio. At best, it was probably not taken scientifically. If the results are correct, they are too close to be meaningful and the decision is still with the undecideds.

The poll showing Jânio far in the lead is a definite fake, though he may in fact be a little ahead of his opponents.

Conclusion: the race is so close that available information is not adequate to allow a responsible prediction. The undecideds could still swing it any of three ways. (LIMITED OFFICIAL USE)

2. "Plan of Action" Compared to "Alliance for Progress"

In a speech presenting his second "Plan of Action" for economic development, Governor CARVALHO PINTO described a specific conceptual connection with Operation Pan American, the Alliance for Progress, the Bogotá and Punta del Este Conferences, the Inter-American Development Bank, the Committee of Nine, and the Latin American Free Trade Association.

0059

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DEPARTMENT OF STATE
BUREAU OF
INTER-AMERICAN AFFAIRS
SEP 27 1962

FROM : Amcongen SÃO PAULO DATE: September 26, 1962

SUBJECT : Weekly Summary No. 39

REF :

RM/R-Yerxa
10/9-Jaworski MEG

TABLE OF CONTENTS

POLITICAL:
1. Polls: Take Your Choice
2. "Plan of Action" Compared to "Alliance for Progress"
3. Church Organization Recommends Candidates
4. Financial Problems Hamper Election Preparations
5. Ex-War Minister Honored
6. East German Spy Condemned

PSYCHOLOGICAL: 1. Local Press Reaction

FILED OCT 9 1962

POLITICAL

1. Polls: Take Your Choice

Final results of the three latest polls on the São Paulo governorship race were as follows:

IBOPE (Instituto Brasileiro de Opinião Publica e Estatistica) showed Adhemar de BARROS ahead by 34.8 percent to Jânio QUADROS' 33.3 and José Bonifácio NOGUEIRA's 20.5. Breakdowns by region were not published.

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Recife 149

ACTION DEPARTMENT 149; INFORMATION RIO DE JANEIRO 159.

Reference: WEEKA telegram.

RM/R-Jun 10/12-Jun

Although still widely believed Cleofas ahead gubernatorial race and will win election, there are indications Cleofas campaign now tottering and Arraes moving up quickly. Last night Sao Luiz movie theater Cleofas propaganda film strip booed by almost entire audience which spontaneously cheered Arraes. Some close observers feel Cleofas appeal has soured in last ten days and race is now neck and neck. Final two weeks of campaign thus regarded crucial, with much depending on emotional factors and unforseen developments. Best estimates this time is victory margin will be small for either candidate. Armando Monteiros campaign may favor Cleofas since his voters would otherwise probably vote for Arraes.

Consulate General informed Arraes has telegraphed President Goulart complaining of pressure from "military and economic groups, and American Consulate General".

Some comment heard that Arraes camp may be cooking up some spectacular move at last minute to tip balance his favor.

DELGADO-ARIAS

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Control: 20911

Rec'd: September 26, 1962 7:04 p.m.

FROM: Rio de Janeiro

TO: Secretary of State

NO: 709, September 26, 4 p.m.

DEPTEL 738

1. Chamber not scheduled meet again until middle October, therefore no chance approval new Senate bill on profit remittances before elections. Calmon believes prospects excellent bill be approved during second half October and continues have pledges support of Goulart, Mazzilli and party leaders. States only reason not passed in last session was political crisis. Embassy's Brasilia office less confident than Calmon that bill will be approved before next January.

Present legislation promulgated by Senate September 4 not yet in effect, since not published in DIARIO OFICIAL. SUMOC working on drafting regulations, but Calmon indicates will not issue regulations until new Senate bill approved. Present text contains no deadline issuance regulation, except for 30-day period for regulations covering registry assets abroad (article 17). Publication DIARIO OFICIAL expected today.

2. Calmon forwarded Finance Ministry comments on investment guarantee agreement to Itamaraty early last week. Opinion favorable with minor observations apparently along lines reported TOAID A-620. We proceeding check status with FONOFF, but latters economic affairs department in somewhat confused state in view appointment Dias Carneiro as Minister Industry and Commerce.

Believe risk exists that signing investment guarantee agreement before new Senate bill adopted might prejudice chances Senate bill by giving opportunity demogogic use investment agreement by nationalists to confuse issue of US attitude toward profit remitance problem. We, however, will continue negotiate agreement

(3)

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A- 23
AmConsulate CURITIBA

Although but eleven days away from the election date, it is as yet not possible to decisively name who the successful candidates will be.

Governor Ney Braga is reliably reported to have privately become disenchanted with President Goulart and now considers him to be ineffective and to be just going along for the ride. Publicly, the Governor completely supports the President and this obviously is being done in the hope of receiving some assistance for Parana, which to date has been insignificant.

Arthur W. Feldman

Arthur W. Feldman
American Consul

THIS DOCUMENT CONSISTS
OF 4 PAGES. NUMBER 1
OF 8 COPIES. SERIES A.

AWF:lf

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0054

and some PSD mayors have even denied him local assistance. Reports indicate that the rally in Paranagua had to be prematurely terminated because of the manifested opposition of the audience. Disorders were also reported at Lupion rallies in Southwest Parana. However, great Lupion strength is reportedly found in the Northwest.

Bento Munhoz da Rocha (PR) is backed by a coalition of small parties - PSP, PRP, PST, MTR and the Rural Front. He is given a good chance and is attracting much attention by his opposition to current land reform projects and by his proposals to assist farmers to a greater extent. He is the most outspoken anti-communist of the candidates.

Sebastião Vieira Lins (PSB) is conceded little chance of election. He is traveling a great deal. However, much as he is admired in many circles for his brilliant oratory and professional reputation as an outstanding criminal lawyer and law professor, the non-leftist electorate fear his "pact with the communists". His campaign is hampered by lack of financial support, an issue he constantly brings up. However, had many of the prolitariat seen him and his family on Sept. 22 when he presented his daughter at the debutante ball given by one of the exclusive social clubs in Curitiba, it is believed he would be hard pressed to justify his position as a spokesman of the masses. He is, as a nationalist and democrat of the left, for "socialism and freedom", and against foreign trusts and capitalists who empoverish Brazil.

Recent polls show the following ~~sentorial~~ preferences:

The employees of two Curitiba Municipal offices voted as follows: Rocha - 30 votes, Franco - 17 votes, Silva - 13 votes, Lupion - 11 votes and Lins - 2 votes.

Curitiba radio station PRB-2 poll at the beginning of September showed: Silva - 500, Franco - 454, Lupion - 412, Rocha 348, Lins - 24.

A poll in Ponta Grossa, second largest city in Paraná, showed: Lupion - 896, Franco - 840, Rocha - 608, Silva - 516, Lins - 232. Of the 3092 polled, 1188 were undecided. The upper class (27%) and the middle class (20%) favored Franco and the proletariat (26%) preferred Lupion.

The significance of the Ponta Grossa poll may lie in the preferences attributed to the various classes. There is some indication that this ratio still exists throughout the northwestern part of the state, where both of the candidates have great influence because of their private interests.

/Although

THIS DOCUMENT CONSISTS OF 4 PAGES. NUMBER 1 OF 8 COPIES. SERIES A.

0053

UDN registered 1 Senatorial candidate, who is also backed by the PDC, PTN and PTB coalition; and 50 State Deputy candidates. Its Federal Deputy candidates are on the UDN-PDC-PTN slate .

PSB registered 1 candidate and 1 substitute for Federal Senator, 5 Federal Deputy and 11 State Deputy candidates.

PR has 1 candidate for Senator backed by PSP, PRP, PST, MTR and the Rural Front.

UDN-PDC-PTN coalition slate for Federal Deputy has 28 candidates.

Rural Christian Labor Front which consists of PR, PSP, PRP, PTN, PST, PRT and MTR registered 60 State Deputy candidates.

The Regional Electoral Tribunal announced that 1,100,637 voters were registered, of which 145,629 live in Curitiba. An abstention of about 20% is anticipated. As a result of which, a Federal Senator will need about 300,000 votes to be elected whereas a Federal Deputy will require about 35,000 votes and a State Deputy about 19,000 votes.

The campaigning has become more intensive as of the first of September and is not distinguished by any innovations. The senatorial campaign is being made on a more dignified level whereas the other ranks are behaving as usual, shouting, mud-slinging and making all sorts of charges against the opposition.

The Paraná Nationalist Labor Front (an Anti-communist group) recently asked the presidents of the Chamber of Deputies and the Parana Legislative Assembly for detailed information on the voting record, bills proposed and participation of those candidates seeking re-election, with the purpose of informing the membership on the qualifications of these candidates.

Amauri Oliveira e Silva (PTB) and Adolpho de Oliveira Franco (UD N), candidates for Federal Senator, are coalition candidates of the PTB, UDN, PTN, PDC parties. Governor Ney Braga is actively supporting their candidacy and is traveling almost every day of the week to campaign for them. The two candidates are stressing the need for basic socio-economic reforms.

Senate, Federal Deputy and State Deputy candidate Moysés Lupion (PSD) has been experiencing some opposition in his campaign. Audiences in the interior have not been numerous

/and

0052

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TR	XMB	AIR 3
ARMY 5	CIA 10	NAVY 5
OSD 12	USIA 8	NSA 3

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

AIRGRAM

DEPARTMENT OF STATE BUREAU OF INTER-AMERICAN AFFAIRS

732.00/9-2662

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23 NO. | SECRET | OCT 3 1962 | AIR POUCH HANDLING INDICATOR

TO : Department of State

62 OCT 1 PM 2 31

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~~THIS DOCUMENT CONSISTS OF 4 PAGES, NUMBER 1 OF 8 COPIES, SERIES A.~~

ANALYSIS & DISTRIBUTION BRANCH

COPY NO. 1 SERIES A

FROM : AmConsulate CURITIBA DATE: September 26, 1962

SUBJECT : Brazilian Elections 1962: Report No. 10: Parana

REF :

RM/R - Jwe 10-5-62 JWW

The registration of candidates was closed on August 28 with 378 candidates running for 72 legislative seats as follows: 5 candidates and 3 substitutes for 2 senatorial positions, 87 candidates for 25 Federal Deputy seats and 281 candidates for 45 State Deputy seats.

The following is a statistical breakdown of the slates of the various political parties:

PTB with PDC, UDN and PTN support nominated 1 candidate and 1 substitute for Federal Senator, 24 candidates for Federal Deputy and 57 candidates for State Deputy.

PSD with PSP and PST support registered 1 candidate and 1 substitute for Federal Senator, 30 candidates including PSP and PST nominees for Federal Deputy, and 48 candidates for State Deputy.

PDC nominated 55 candidates for State Deputy and its candidates for Federal Deputy will run under the UDN, PDC and PTN coalition.

/UDN

CC: Brazilian Desk, Wash.(1); AmEmbassy Rio (1); Mr. Henderson, AmEmbassy Rio, (1); AmEmbassy Brasilia(1); Mr. Walters, AmEmbassy, Rio (1).

Copy No(s) 5

Destroyed in RM/R Name E.E.I.P. Date 10/11/62

SECRET

FORM 4-62 DS-323

FOR DEPT. USE ONLY In ☑ Out ☐

OCT 8 1962 PM '62

FILED

Drafted by: Arthur W. Feldman:lf

Contents and Classification Approved by: Arthur W. Feldman

Clearances:

SECRET

0051

f. The settlement of the merchant marine officers strike laid to rest the predicted shortage of petroleum products.

Frederick D. Sharp III
American Consul

cc.: Consular Affairs, Rio
Political Section, Rio
Political Section, Brasília
ARA/EST/Brazil, Washington
INR/RAR/P, Washington

Department: Pass to all posts in Brazil

JNL

newsprint used by O Globo in publishing its supplement on the Alliance for Progress, for there are two potential scandals brewing here, one of these in connection with the control of rice shipments by COPA, and the other the possible malfeasance involved in the highway building program during the Brizola administration. If the timing of the disclosure of these two "bombs" is carefully planned, the ensuing publicity could damage further PTB candidacies in this State.

The rumor column of Fôlha da Tarde stated this week that RGS soybeans had been shipped to Cuba via Uruguay. It would be impossible for such to have occurred without the direct knowledge of Governor Brizola.

The State Government has just commenced a thrice-daily 10 minutes news broadcast from the Piratini Palace over Rádio Farroupilha.

4. Miscellany

a. Brizola's uncouth cousin, the bullying Mayor of Nonoai, Jair de Moura Calixto, PTB candidate for State Deputy, was jailed this past week by a local judge under the terms of the National Security Law, for threats against the judge himself, and the Mayor of neighboring Sarandi. According to reports from Nonoai, Calixto had been inciting the local residents to invade private property in the area, and one report had it that Calixto was training guerrillas there. Calixto would be capable of such, given proper backing and support which he may have. In the meantime, he has been transferred to Passo Fundo while some leftist lawyers who are Brizola's cronies are attempting to obtain a judgment for his release.

b. Ex-Prime Minister Francisco Brochado da Rocha suffered a brain hemorrhage last night and his condition following surgery is reported to be grave.

c. In the military area, General Carlos Flores de Paiva Chaves assumed command of the III Military Region uneventfully. According to the press, General Augusto Cesar Castro Muniz de Aragão is to become Chief of Staff, III Army.

d. President Goulart will come to RGS on September 30 for the inauguration of the Jacuí electric power plant, which had originally been scheduled for September 20.

e. The press reports the imminent formation of an ultra-nationalistic group bringing together the figures of Jango, Jânio, Juscelino and Brizola, the comment being that the common denominator for these four figures is undiscernible.

0049

by the combined efforts of Jango and the military might be insufficient and the complete breakdown of public order might well occur.

As if they had heeded this statement, on Friday the presidents of four leading employers groups issued a manifesto to the classes produtoras. Álvaro Coelho Borges, president of the RGS Federation of Commercial Associations; Plinio Kroeff, president of the RGS Federation of Industrial Associations; Antonio Saint Pastous, president of the RGS Federation of Rural (landowners) Association; and Emilio Kaminski, president of the Sindicate of RGS Banks, signed a plea to employers to raise wages, if not already done, independently of any government action which might be in the offing, because of the inflationary spiral which is crushing the middle class. The manifesto called for such wage increases to be instituted without the subsequent raising of prices, and that the increases be absorbed by greater productivity and improved industrial methods. At the same time, the signers of the manifesto called on employees to defend their salaries by demanding that the Federal Government take steps to cease wholesale issuance of currency and to take effective measures to combat inflation.

The manifesto has had an immediate favorable impact in most quarters including church and those labor unions identified with the Movimento Sindical Democrático. Even leftist Ultima Hora came to the support of these employers' group leaders praising them for taking the lead in a "campaign for national redemption". A few employers privately stated that to raise wages without raising prices would merely admit that the employers group had been reaping unwarrantedly high profits heretofore and increased productivity in Brazil at this point is but a dream for the future. Dispassionate observers say that the manifesto was issued in equal proportions of sincere idealism and politically motivation but there could be no doubt as to the favorable reception the manifesto has been accorded.

The press today published a telegram to President Goulart signed by the same four leaders calling on the Federal Government to take immediate effective measures against the inflationary spiral, commencing with control on the indiscriminate issuance of currency.

3. Governor Leonel Brizola's Activities

Governor Brizola, who is now practically a commuter between Pôrto Alegre, Rio and Brasília, became "the pot calling the kettle black" when he denounced Guanabara Governor Lacerda for openly participating in the deputy campaign there, stating that he would not stoop to such activity in RGS. If this be true, he is the only PTB member not actively campaigning, although not all are giving unqualified support to Michaelsen.

Brizola might do well not to call for investigations such as he has now requested of the Minister of Justice as to the source of the

0048

increasing daily, and he now commands more newspaper space than the other two candidates combined. In an unprecedented move, the three principal radio stations in Porto Alegre have formed the so-called "Renovadora" Network" which will cover Ferrari's rallies from now until the end of the campaign. No contact recalls the Caldas Junior station, Rádio Guaíba, having taken a political position in earlier campaigns and it is interesting to note that the three stations, Guaíba, Farroupilha and Difusora are owned respectively by Correio do Povo, Diário de Notícias and Jornal do Dia, the three leading Porto Alegre morning papers.

PRP Senator Guido Mondin seems satisfactorily to have explained his silence on the gubernatorial succession in this State by indirectly alluding to the fact that he was elected in 1958 on a PTB/PRP coalition slate.

The ADP has apparently determined that Ademar de Barros' support for Meneghetti would harm more than it would help, for the off-again, on-again plan for the Paulista PSP leader to attend a rally in this State has definitely been canceled.

A paid announcement today says that Antonio Saint Pastous de Freitas, president of the FARSUL has decided to withdraw his candidacy for Federal Deputy on the PSD ticket.

Correio do Povo's political columnist, Fay de Azevedo, in his weekly Sunday column, assessed the orientation of the three gubernatorial candidates as follows: Meneghetti is the candidate for the up-dated restoration of the RGS political tradition for democracy, liberty, austerity, and common sense, without, however, excluding the process of evolutionary development, progress and adaptation to the needs of the times. On the other hand, Michaelsen and Ferrari are the candidates for demagogic reformism in a disoriented, hurried, inconsequential, and perturbin fashion. If Michaelsen should win, he would govern with the PTB of Brizola and Caruso, while Ferrari expounds in true demagogic fashion. The difference between him and Brizola being that Brizola is truculent, and Ferrari, mellifluous.

As election day approaches one hears increasingly that Meneghetti supporters, who were certain of his election a month ago, are becoming concerned at Ferrari's reported penetration into Meneghetti strongholds, and while Michaelsen has improved his position, he is still rated as third in the race. Meneghetti still seems to be leading but a last minute surge to Ferrari could upset previous predictions.

2. Employers' Groups Call for Wage Increases and Government Action to Halt Inflation

Respected Correio do Povo owner, Breno Caldas, in a signed editorial last week opined that unless the sources of Brazil's social and economic unrest were eliminated by Federal Government action, the next national political crisis might boil up to the point where control of the situation

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OSD	USIA	NSA
12	8	3

RMR-E-6

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

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732.00/9-2562

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1962 OCT 3 AM 9 25

TO : DEPARTMENT OF STATE

Brasilia office -1 Belem -1 Belo Horizonte -1
Curitiba -1 ~~Porto Alegre -1~~ Recife -1 Salvador -1
Santos -1 Sao paulo -1 Rio de Janeiro -1

ANALYSIS OF DISTRIBUTION

FROM : Amconsul PÔRTO ALEGRE

DATE: SEP 25 1962

Km/R - Jeri
10/8 - Jww

SUBJECT : PÔRTO ALEGRE WEEKLY SUMMARY Nº 24

REF :

DEPARTMENT OF STATE
BUREAU OF
INTER-AMERICAN AFFAIRS
OCT 1962

1. Election Campaign Developments
2. Employers' Group Call for Wage Increases and Government Action to Halt Inflation
3. Governor Leonel Brizola's Activities
4. Miscellany

1. Election Campaign Developments

The event of the week was the death of veteran RGS PTB politician Ruy Ramos, in an aircraft accident on September 21. Ramos was the third leading vote-getter (after Ferrari and Wilson Vargas) on the PTB Federal Deputy slate in 1958 and his disappearance from the PTB ticket (along with the other two who are not running for reelection) does not bode well for PTB's chances to maintain or improve its position in the Chamber of Deputies. As the leading layman in RGS' politics, Ramos probably owed a large part of his vote to a solid bloc of his correligionaries. It is doubted that any successor of his can bring in that solid a bloc of votes. Ramos was best classified as a "useful innocent" and possessed a better mind than his fellow deputies Temperani Pereira and Unírio Machado, and PTB will find it hard to replace him. According to today's press, BNDE President Leocádio Antunes is to be his successor although there is some question as to whether his name can be registered with the TRE as a candidate since inscriptions have already closed.

The intensity of MTR candidate Ferrari's campaign is

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OCT 9 1962

FORM 4-62 DS-323

Drafted by: FDSharp 9/25/62

Contents and Classification Approved by: FDSharp

Clearances:

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CONFIDENTIAL

-2- 704, September 25, from Rio de Janeiro

51.7 -- 14.3.

I personally informed directors local American Chamber Commerce and special meeting of principal members Chamber to consider relationship with IPES of 8 FAM 253.4 shortly after receipt of Department telegram 2380. Signed by Braddock.

UNQUOTE

GORDON

SMD/DLW

CONFIDENTIAL

0045

32

INCOMING TELEGRAM *Department of State*

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Control: 19917
Rec'd: September 25, 1962
7:14 p.m.

FROM: Rio de Janeiro

TO: Secretary of State

NO: 704, September 25

Following repeated you from Sao Paulo:

QUOTE

Action Rio de Janeiro 27, Brasilia 6

Following Sao Paulo's September 24, 5 p.m.

Embassy telegrams 640 to Department and 18 to Sao Paulo.

Have discussed subject with John Richards, President American Chamber Commerce Sao Paulo and with Max Pearce, managing director Willys.

Richards confirms Consulate General's previous understanding that contributions of American firms for use in IPES-recommended projects are clearly specified as not for use in election campaigns or for other political purpose and he is satisfied this condition being met. He cannot make positive statement that no American firm Sao Paulo is making any contribution to any political campaign.

Max Pearce says Willys constantly beset for contributions for various causes, many of which it helps, but he has informed me categorically, after making some inquiries, that Willys has made no donation to any election campaign.

Breakdown Willys stock as follows by percentage: (by columns voting and non voting:) Willys Motors Inc. (US) 35.746; other US 4 -- 18, Renault 12.1 -- 21, other foreign .1 -- .7, Brazilian 51.7

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Rio 704

732.00/9-2562

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ARMY 5	CIA 16	NAVY 5
OSD 12	USIA 8	NSA 3

RM/R-E-6

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

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732.00/9-2562

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Santos -1 Sao paulo -1 Rio de janeiro -1

ANALYSIS & DISTRIBUTION

FROM : Amconsul PÔRTO ALEGRE DATE: SEP 25 1962

SUBJECT : PÔRTO ALEGRE WEEKLY SUMMARY Nº 24

REF :

KMR-Jun 10/8-GWW

DEPARTMENT OF STATE
BUREAU OF
INTER-AMERICAN AFFAIRS
OCT 1962

1. Election Campaign Developments
2. Employers' Group Call for Wage Increases and Government Action to Halt Inflation
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The intensity of MTR candidate Ferrari's campaign is

OCT 9 1962

FORM 4-62 DS-323

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Contents and Classification Approved by: FDSharp

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32

INCOMING TELEGRAM *Department of State*

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FROM: Rio de Janeiro

TO: Secretary of State

NO: 704, September 25

Following repeated you from Sao Paulo:

QUOTE

Action Rio de Janeiro 27, Brasilia 6

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
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INCOMING TELEGRAM *Department of State*

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COPIES REC'D ARA
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Control: 18900
Rec'd: September 24, 1962
8:11 p.m.

ACTION
INFO:
RM/R FILES

RM/R JW

FROM: Rio de Janeiro

TO: Secretary of State

NO: 690, September 24, 6 p.m.

ACTION DEPARTMENT 690, INFORMATION BRASILIA 29, SAO PAULO 20.

Reference: Deparmtnet telegram 762.

Sao Paulo making direct reply. American Chambers Commerce Rio and Sao Paulo informed provisions 8 FAM 253.14 upon receipt Department telegram 2380. Copy informal letter by Ambassador to Minister Braddock this subject under date March 8, 1962 sent Harvey Wellman ARA/EST.

GORDON

LM:FB-4

732.00/9-2462

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0040

of Acting Mayor MOURY FERNANDES during the brief period he has held office, attempting to show that Arraes' accomplishments as Mayor were few.

The papers also have their favored candidates for the Senate. Ultima Hora is indebted to Jose Ermirio de Morais for his purchase of CR $ 10 million worth of advertising, so Ermirio de Morais' actions and statements are covered in full detail while the other candidates are never mentioned. In much the same vein, Jornal do Commercio's publisher, Francisco Pessoa de Queiroz, allots himself at least four full pages a week of straight news coverage. Diario de Pernambuco, on the other hand, gives preferential treatment to Senator Novais Filho's bid for re-election. Diario Director COSTA PORTO is Novais Filho's suplente or substitute.

By Eugene Delgado-Arias
American Consul General

Contributors:
Wilday
WSSmith

0039

5. COPERBO Bonds Issued

At long last, the first shares of COPERBO public stock were issued this week. Under what was to have been a "people's financing" scheme, a special state sale tax was levied under which the buyer, after paying the tax, was given an appropriate number of coupons. He could then trade in a given number of coupons for shares of stock in COPERBO. For close to two years, however, Pernambuconos have paid the tax without seeing any stock. The issue had become a live political football with the opposition claiming that the money had been stolen and that no stock would ever be seen. Issuing the first shares with much fanfare just before elections was obviously a political maneuver on the Governor's part, and as such was effective, scotching charges that the whole scheme was a fraud and awakening new interest in the COPERBO operation. (OFFICIAL USE ONLY)

PSYCHOLOGICAL

Recife returned to a state of normality again this week as tension over the national political situation abated with the reaching of the compromise agreement in Brasilia. Except for one or two circumspect editorial comments on the crisis and the agreement to hold a plebiscite in January ("Pyhrric victory for President Goulart"---Diario de Pernambuco; "A wise move, in the best spirit of Brazilian democracy"---Jornal do Commercio) national politics were immediately forgotten and all attention returned to the political campaigns in Pernambuco.

Local newspapers have about discarded all rules of journalism for the duration of the gubernatorial campaign. While labeled editorials on local political issues continue as before (dull, general, no names used) each of the newspapers has taken a decided stand in the gubernatorial race and may use any or all of its pages to boost its favored candidate or to attack his opponent. Thus, Ultima Hora, with a straight face, can headline: "Arraes in the Arms of the People: Delirium of the Crowd Anticipates Victory at the Polls." Jornal do Commercio and Diario de Pernambuco, both favoring Cleofas, are somewhat more subtle than their leftist competitor but no more prone to follow a code of journalistic ethics. For example, Jornal do Commercio's foreign affairs column this week started to discuss the ways of international communism and skillfully ended with some pointed comments on the deviousness of Communist candidates for public office in non-Communist countries, clearly referring to Miguel Arraes. Diario and Jornal are now publishing an unusually large number of stories on Cuba, generally letting the headlines reflect an anti-Cuban bias---another jab at Arraes. And, both of these pro-Cleofas papers devote much space to glowing accounts of the accomplishments

0038

Having now been passed by the Council, the second stage will be sent to Congress for approval and allocation of the necessary funds. (UNCLASSIFIED)

3. Labor

a. Maritime Strike Ends

The national maritime strike which had paralyzed all Brazilian flag vessels was finally settled this week after some 18 vessels had been idle in Recife for almost two weeks. As almost all coastal shipping is carried in Brazilian bottoms, and as Recife depends upon coastal shipping for its supply of meat, petroleum, and many other foodstuffs and manufactured goods, the strike was beginning to have serious consequences here. No sooner was the maritime strike over than a strike of state employees closed the port for the seventh time this year (the eighth time counting the just terminated maritime strike which partially closed it). Upon the termination of the state employees strike, dockworkers announced their intention to go on strike within 15 days if their demands for a 100% wage increase were not met. (OFFICIAL USE ONLY)

b. Petroleum Workers

Angered by the fact that their pay checks still do not reflect the pay increase they won in July, petroleum workers were speaking seriously this week of calling another walk out. (OFFICIAL USE ONLY)

c. State Employees

Demanding a complete restructuring of the state civil service system, the Association of State Employees called a strike on September 21 (for details see Political Item No. 3). (UNCLASSIFIED)

4. German Official Discusses Aid

HERMAN GOERGEN, described as the Director of the Latin American Division of the German Information Service, visited Recife this week. Referring during a press interview to the long discussed German financial assistance to Brazil, Goergen stated categorically that the 200 million Marks set aside for Brazil remained at the disposal of the Brazilian Government. He went further and predicted that the impasse over the matter of which ships were to carry the material would soon be resolved. (UNCLASSIFIED)

0037

Comment: This was a purely political strike, designed to boost the candidacy for State Deputy of APSE leader ANTONIO BATISTA da SOUZA and to embarrass Governor CID SAMPAIO. The emergency session of the State Assembly was called not because there appeared to be any real danger of the strike spreading (it never attracted more than 10% of all state workers and most of these would have returned to work in face of a threat by Governor Sampaio to fire all strikers) but to give certain opposition deputies the opportunity to pose as champions of the civil service. In this connection, the Governor's office pointed out that the wage increase measure approved by the Assembly was almost identical to a measure he proposed over a month ago when the Assembly was meeting in regular session. (LIMITED OFFICIAL USE)

ECONOMIC

1. Hungarian Agreement with Rio Grande do Norte

Speaking at a mass political rally in Natal last week, Governor ALUISIO ALVES listed the accomplishments of his administration and then went on to describe development projects planned for the future. Alves referred to the Alliance for Progress in positive terms, citing especially a projected educational agreement. Surprisingly, however, he also mentioned an agreement apparently just signed between the State of Rio Grande do Norte and Hungary under which the latter will assist in a project to irrigate farm lands with deep water wells. According to Governor Alves, the agreement is now awaiting the approval of Itamarati and the permission of the Bank of Brazil to bring in the necessary machinery and technicians. (UNCLASSIFIED)

Comment: The agreement is probably an outgrowth of the visit to this area some weeks ago of a group led by the Hungarian Commercial Attache in Rio, and/or of a reported visit by two or more Hungarian geologists recently to several Northeastern states. (LIMITED OFFICIAL USE)

2. SUDENE Deliberative Council Approves Second Stage

Meeting in an extraordinary session on September 19, the SUDENE Deliberative Council approved the budgetary scheme for the Master Plan's next stage, which will cover a period of three years. Having already suffered some 100 amendments before approval, the projected budget calls for an expenditure of CR $115 billion 863 million over the next three years; 34 billion 358 million for 1963; 37 billion 327 million in 1964; and 44 billion 178 million in 1965. The overall figure of 115 billion 863 million represents an increase of some CR $10 billion over the figure originally quoted in the projected five year plan.

0036

2. New Student Leader Repudiates IBAD

MARCO ANTONIO OLIVEIRA MACIEL, recently-elected, anti-Communist President of the Pernambuco Students Union (UEP), issued a statement this week condemning the activities of the Instituto Brasileiro de Acão Democratica (IBAD) and repudiating efforts by IBAD to identify itself with the new administration of UEP. Maciel's statement was not an unprovoked attack on the ultra-conservative IBAD. Shortly after Maciel's election as UEP president, Acão Democratica Universitaria, the university wing of IBAD, published an article lauding Maciel, identifying itself as one of the forces united in the successful effort to elect Maciel and defeat the Communist candidate, and suggesting cooperation between IBAD and Maciel in further anti-Communist maneuvers. The repercussion among the local students was quick and loud. Immediately, other student leaders demanded to know whether Maciel was, in fact, associated with IBAD, letting him know in no uncertain terms that he could expect no further support if his reply was affirmative. Maciel's only recourse was to repudiate IBAD completely.

Comment: This attempt by IBAD to identify itself with the new, anti-Communist group in power at the University was extremely embarrassing to Maciel and the other newly-elected UEP officers. It is rather ironic that after an anti-Communist group has finally taken the leadership of the UEP that the anti-Communist IBAD should be the source of its first troubles. Further efforts in this direction by the Birchist IBAD could have the effect of unseating Maciel and returning the Communists to the UEP leadership. It is a commentary on the IBAD mentality that its local officers were reportedly non-plussed by Maciel's statement, completely incapable of understanding why he would not choose to accept their support and backing, unless he might be a Communist in masquerade. (LIMITED OFFICIAL USE)

3. State Employees Win 40% Wage Boost in Political Strike

Employees of the State of Pernambuco were granted a 40% wage increase this week in a special emergency session of the State Assembly. The special session ostensibly was called in face of the danger that a strike initiated on September 21 by the Association of Employees of the State of Pernambuco (APSE) would paralyze the entire State Government. APSE demanded an immediate increase of 70-80% and a complete re-organization of the civil service system. The measure finally approved by the Assembly and accepted immediately by APSE, provides for a 40% increase which is to become effective October 16, and Assembly leaders have informally promised to take up the reorganization immediately following elections.

0035

winning (and purchasing) of votes. Current feeling is that Ermirio de Morais and newspaper publisher FRANCISCO PESSOA de QUEIROZ will be the winning candidates in the six man contest for the two open chairs in the Senate.

In the gubernatorial race, with two weeks remaining, it is generally accepted that JOÃO CLEOFAS will emerge victorious, with MIGUEL ARRAES a close second and ARMANDO MONTEIRO FILHO a poor third. There are some strong dissenters to this point of view, however. Some close, informed observers believe that Cleofas' campaign reached its peak a week ago, and that voter preference for him has been declining steadily since then. The decline is traced to the overconfidence which reigns in the Cleofas camp and a consequent easing-off in his campaign effort.

If there has been a let-up in the Cleofas campaign against Arraes, it is not apparent to the Consulate General. Both Cleofas and Arraes fill pages of the daily newspapers with ads building up themselves and attacking each other, and the ads seem to become more virulent each day. Arraes, particularly, has become increasingly venomous of late, publicly warning the usineiros (the sugar aristocrats) that the day of retribution is approaching. Also, unknown supporters of Arraes have resorted to the unusually ugly tactic of sending anonymous letters to certain members of the Cleofas team, threatening physical violence to their families if they continue to work for Cleofas. Cleofas continues to channel the major part of his efforts toward convincing the electorate that Arraes is a Communist and that Arraes intends to "Cubanize" Pernambuco. Secondly, but increasingly in recent weeks, he attacks Arraes' image as an efficient and honest administrator of the City of Recife. Cleofas is now seeking to obtain a copy of a Cuban primer to show on television and through newspaper ads the resemblance to the primer of a literacy pamphlet published recently by the Arraes-backed Movimento de Cultura Popular.

Throughout the entire campaign there has been no real exchange of opinion on questions of substance. To be sure, both candidates promise progress and development but neither has yet seen fit to inform the electorate of how he intends to fulfill his promises. If the two candidates are in agreement at all, it is on the logic of conducting a negative campaign designed principally to show how Pernambuco will suffer if the other candidate is elected.

In the contest for Vice Governor, State Assembly President PAULO GUERRA (running mate of Arraes) is generally conceded to have a handsome lead over State Deputy ALCIDES TEIXEIRA. MORAES REGO, sharing the ticket with Cleofas, follows Teixeira at a considerable distance. Although the current of opinion is that Guerra will win on October 7, Teixeira is given an outside chance because of his proven vote drawing power and his great popularity among Pernambuco's thousands of soccer fans. (CONFIDENTIAL)

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12	8	3

DEPT. PASS:
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PORTO ALEGRE -1
CURITIBA -1
BELO HORI-
ZONTE -1
RM/R-E-6

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

AIRGRAM

732.00/9-2462

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A-30 NO. CONFIDENTIAL

1962 OCT 4 HANDLING INDICATOR

TO : DEPARTMENT OF STATE

INFO: RIO DE JANEIRO, BRASILIA, SÃO PAULO

DEPARTMENT OF STATE BUREAU OF INTER-AMERICAN AFFAIRS OCT 5 1962

FROM : Amconsul RECIFE

DATE: September 24, 1962

SUBJECT: Weekly Summary No. 13

REF :

RM/R-Miss 10/8-Jww

TABLE OF CONTENTS

POLITICAL

1. Political Campaign Developments
2. New Student Leader Repudiates IBAD
3. State Employees Win 40% Wage Boost in Political Strike

ECONOMIC

1. Hungarian Agreement with Rio Grande do Norte
2. SUDENE Deliberative Council Approves Second Stage
3. Labor
4. German Official Discusses Aid
5. COPERBO Bonds Issued

PSYCHOLOGICAL

FILED OCT 10 1962

POLITICAL

1. Political Campaign Developments

The Regional Electoral Tribunal finally approved this week the registration of the candidacy for the Senate of industrial baron JOSE ERMIRIO de MORAIS. (See Weekly Summary No. 12). Ermirio de Morais has now cleared the last technical obstacle to his candidacy and can devote full time and attention in these final weeks to the

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FORM DS-323 4-62

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Drafted by: see last page/ag

Contents and Classification Approved by:

Clearances:

0033

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54

CONFIDENTIAL

COPIES REC'D ARA

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Control: 18911

Rec'd: September 24, 1962

8:22 PM

RIO 691

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FROM: Rio de Janeiro

TO: Secretary of State

NO: 691, September 24, 7 PM

ACTION DEPARTMENT 691, INFORMATION POLAD CINCARIB 9

Department Circular Telegram 508

In conversation September 22 with FONOFF Under-Secretary Bernardes on plane to Brasilia, Bernardes expressed to me concern over telegram just received from Ambassador Campos indicating informal MFM might be expected issue joint communique. He said he fearful Brazil might be "boxed into corner" in which it would be forced choose between equally embarrassing alternatives of either signing or refusing sign such communique. He added that because of domestic political considerations GOB unable go "one inch" beyond its position at Punta Del Este last January. While Bernardes did not specifically mention timing, it almost certain customary reserve of GOB re any initiative looking toward joint hemisphere action (or even pronouncements) on Cuba will be enhanced by fact meeting as presently scheduled will take place few days before October 7 congressional elections, a factor which GOB can be expected claim (and probably believe) will severely limit its freedom of action.

EMBTEL 664. I have luncheon appointment with Hermes Lima tomorrow, with Cuban problem in general and forthcoming MFM in particular certain to be major topics of conversation.

GORDON

CC

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INCOMING TELEGRAM *Department of State*

Rio 690

47

CONFIDENTIAL

Control: 18900
Rec'd: September 24, 1962
8:11 p.m.

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FROM: Rio de Janeiro

TO: Secretary of State

NO: 690, September 24, 6 p.m.

ACTION DEPARTMENT 690, INFORMATION BRASILIA 29, SAO PAULO 20.

Reference: Deparmtnet telegram 762. 9-1862

Sao Paulo making direct reply. American Chambers Commerce Rio and Sao Paulo informed provisions 8 FAM 253.14 upon receipt Department telegram 2380. Copy informal letter by Ambassador to Minister Braddock this subject under date March 8, 1962 sent Harvey Wellman ARA/EST.

GORDON

LM:FB-4

1132.00/9-2462

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-3- 680, September 22, 7 p.m., from Rio de Janeiro.

internal propaganda campaign to build up Goulart as capable administrator deserving full Presidential powers. How far reality will accord with this campaign remains to be seen.

GORDON

REE

Note: Mr. Spencer (ARA) notified 9/23/FMH

CONFIDENTIAL

0030

agreement and would greatly prefer get both out of way beginning coming week.

On terms loan agreement Goulart said there are allegations of political use of US 20 percent. I replied this wholly baseless, use of these funds being an open book, and we would again publicly clarify at time signature new agreement.

Question Presidential visit came up only lightly. Goulart said expected November to be entirely tranquil, with reasonably definitive government in office, although some modifications might be indicated after January 31 in light composition new Congress. Felt November good time for visit. I indicated that there had been some working level discussion in Washington of a possible delay, but in view Martin telecon Friday did not pursue question.

I raised IT and T case, and he promised Bank of Brazil counter-proposal to company next week. He argues not possible to have explicit link in loan contract with expropriation compensation, but substance might be cared for through provision for loan renewal.

On plebiscite, he said felt reasonably confident of outcome, but not entirely certain. Expects only light electoral participation, and believes many of new Congressmen and also State Legislature members in opposition to respective Governors will all be pressing for parliamentary solution.

On labor situation, Goulart stressed confidence in control of unions, saying he refused strike leaders demands for immediate and excessive minimum wage increase, telling them they had neither right nor strength to force such demands.

Whole tone of both private and luncheon talks was stress on tranquility, orderly administration, planning, moderation, and good relations with US. This consistent with heavy current internal

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INCOMING TELEGRAM *Department of State*

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RIO 680

35-32-H
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Control: 18012
Rec'd: September 22, 1962
8:16 p.m.

Info
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FROM: Rio de Janeiro

TO: Secretary of State

NO: 680, September 22, 7 p.m.

PRIORITY

POLICY

At Goulart's request, I went to Brasilia Saturday for leisurely political talk followed by lunch with President, Hermes Lima, Dias Carneiro (new Industry Minister) and Bernardes.

Goulart began conversation with long statement to effect plebiscite issue now satisfactorily resolved, period of continuous domestic crisis regime safely past, and he therefore turning attention to getting administrative and financial house in order starting with new national planning and food supply effort directed by Cleso Furtado. Spoke of administrative and financial chaos left over from Kubitschek and Quadros periods, worsened by year of hybrid parliamentarianism. Said new plans would require great sympathy and cooperation from US and hoped for understanding and consideration on part President Kennedy. Apologized for Brochado-Brizzola attitudes, which he attributed to their Communist advisors. Said Brizzola would be politically insignificant after elections and he, Goulart, had cut out of Brochado resignation speech long passage of violent attack against US.

Specific urgent request was that we take immediate action avoid danger wheat shortage starting early November through immediate signature extension fourth sales agreement without waiting for fourth loan agreement. Desired amount is 750,000 tons apart from 70,000 tons sugar barter. I replied that present instructions called for simultaneous conclusion loan and sales agreement

(4)

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GPO 930 800

732.00/9-2262 TS 8:32 AM '62 RECEIVED 611.32 TS 611.3241

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32

OUTGOING TELEGRAM Department of State

INDICATE: ☐ COLLECT ☐ CHARGE TO

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Origin

Info

ACTION: Amembassy RIO DE JANEIRO 777 PRIORITY

RIO 777

Following based uncleared memcon meeting Ambassador Campos with Secretary and Under Secretary Friday afternoon September 21. Campos based request for drawing of $25.5 million under Treasury Stabilization Agreement on political rather than economic or teshnical grounds, conceding present situation in Brazil lacks circumstances monetary and political stability established as prerequisites for drawings in U.S. B/P commitments of May 1961. Asserted October 7 elections likely result more conservative or centrist Congress unless take place in atmosphere economic and financial panic; requested drawing would help prevent such panic and contribute more peaceful climate for elections. Acknowledged that even with desirable election results could not promise GOB would take necessary stabilization or other necessary measures at home or abroad. However, argued that failure U.S. provide necessary $25.5 million might lead serious economic and therefore political deterioration.

After exploring factors behind current financial situation in Brazil, Secretary stated Department would give careful consideration Campos' request.

(3)

Coordinated by RMJR

RUSK

Drafted by: ARA/EST:JWWilson/mb 9/22/62

Telegraphic transmission and classification approved by: The Acting Secretary

Clearances:
ARA/EST - Mr. Wellman
ARA - Mr. Martin
ARA - Mr. May
S/S - Mr. Kriebel

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INCOMING TELEGRAM *Department of State*

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37

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Control: 17969

Rec'd: September 21, 1962
8:33 p.m.

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FROM: Rio de Janeiro

TO: Secretary of State

NO: 672, September 21, 5 p.m.

RIO 672

Ref Dept tel 727

ACTION:
INFO:
RM/R FILES

Embassy believes approach Foreign Ministries UK, Germany, France, Italy, Japan along lines proposed should be useful but that it may be some time before GOB will be able really come to grips with trade, investment and economic problems generally. Situation complicated by October 7 elections, January 6 referendum and reorganization government within 90 days thereafter with possibility further Cabinet changes during this period. Meanwhile further collaboration with other Embassies on points (A) and (B) could be undertaken realizing any decisions reached may need await more favorable atmosphere for implementation.

In any approaches to Foreign Ministries countries mentioned above, to which Canada should be added, it should be borne in mind Embassy Rio already maintaining close and cordial relations with Embassies these countries. What Embassy has found lacking in past consultations other Embassies on economic problems has been adequate instructions from their Foreign Ministries. In our efforts secure veto objectionable articles profits remittance bill, for example, we endeavord consult Embassies most interested countries at ambassadorial level but with only partial success. British Ambassador did discuss problem with Foreign Minister and German Embassy stimulated protest by German/Brazilian commercial organization, but Counselor Japanese Embassy in absence Ambassador felt unable take any action since without instructions from Tokyo.

Pending receipt instructions this subject Embassy plans continue its practice working at all levels with Embassies other friendly countries having similar interests Brazil.

DLW

GORDON

NOTE: Message received without reference -- reference believed to be Department telegram 727.

(3)

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GPO 930 500

Interdivided by EMB

0026

Longe de não julgar perfeito o trabalho realizado, pois reconhecemos que as pessoas humanas têm muitas limitações, mas, com o pensamento em Deus, tivemos absoluta honestidade de propósito na escolha dos candidatos ao primeiro pleito eleitoral e restaurador, principalmente, no eleitorado católico, os nomes abaixo:

Para Senadores: Dante Mendes de Freitas Mello
Adolfo de Oliveira Franco.

Para Deputado Federal
Dom Jaime
Emilio Jorge Hasse
Plínio Franco Ferreira da Costa
Newton Guimarães
Romano Muccio

Para Deputado Estadual
Edgar Savaris
Ephraim Requião
Elias Karam
Attilio Biscaia
Francisco Xavier Rolemberg
Alceu Sarmento Mello
Antonio Lopes Junior
João Vargas de Oliveira
Emilio Lazzarotto
Ernesto de Macedo

Para Prefeito - Ivo Arzua

Curitiba, setembro de 1962
a) A COMISSÃO DIRETORA.

0029

Encl to A-22
Curitiba
9-21-62 ARA

Movimento Católico de Orientação Eleitoral

Curitiba - Paraná

MANIFESTO AO ELEITORADO CATÓLICO DO PARANÁ

O Brasil atravessa uma das fases mais críticas de sua história, uma difícil conjuntura, que decorre da atual situação política, econômica e social.

Grande número de brasileiros não vive, apenas sobrevive na violenta luta diária pela vida. Seus sofrimentos e desespero levam-nos a procurar caminhos ou soluções aparentemente para nossos angustiosos problemas, chegando até ao impensável, mas largamente propalado "paraíso" vermelho, mas sabiamente governado por uma "ditadura do proletariado", e em muitos outros alegam comunistas. Esquecem-se de que sonha uma vida sem as liberdades democráticas, com a perda da dignidade concedida por Deus à pessoa humana.

Diante da gravidade desta situação, com agitações populares criadas e agravadas pelos inimigos da Democracia e de Deus, um grupo de católicos, por sua própria iniciativa e com a decisiva aprovação de Sua Excelência Reverendíssima o Senhor Arcebispo Metropolitano de Curitiba, Dom Manoel da Silveira Cabral, organizou-se com a finalidade de colaborar democràticamente, realizando um movimento para esclarecer e orientar o eleitorado católico do Paraná para o pleito eleitoral do mês de outubro próximo.

O grupo de trabalho empenha-se em estudar os candidatos que postulam o respaldo único - ser democrata cristão, sempre fiel aos princípios democráticos, sem nunca ter descambado para concepções anti-democráticas, nunca se apresentado, por exemplo, como "homem de esquerda", "cristão de esquerda", "católico progressista", etc, etc.

Não cristãos, democratas, não podemos admitir tais especificações que no fundo não vendem mais insidiosamente de propósitos políticos eleitoreiros. Para os cristãos a solução certa para os problemas de ordem política, social e econômica do Brasil, tem que ser procurada na Doutrina Social Cristã Democrata. Para os católicos, a Doutrina Social Cristã está contida nos Evangelhos, que proclamam uma direção bem clara, que não é de "esquerda" nem de "direita", mas sim, a DOUTRINA DE CRISTO.

Neste ensejo foi lembrada ao eleitorado também a especialidade combativa e o grande objetivo democrático dos candidatos, pois os laços parlamentares em plano federal como estadual, estão a exigir tal requisito necessário a uma definição e tomada de posição democrática.

* * * * * * *

0024

FORM FS-439a
6-1-60

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Page 2 of 2
Encl. No. 1
Desp. No. 22
From CURITIBA

For Senator: Bento Munhoz da Rocha Neto
Adolfo de Oliveira Franco.

For Federal Deputy: Ivan Luz
Mario Braga Ramos
Plinio Franco Ferreira da Costa
Newton Carneiro
Hermes Macedo

For State Deputy: Edgar TÁvora
Rubens RequiÃo
Elias Karan
Atilio Miranda
Ernesto Moro Redeschi
Alice Souza Netto
Antonio Lopes Junior
JoÃo Vargas de Oliveira
Danilo Lorusso
Homero de Barros

For Mayor: Ivo Arzua

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0023

FORM FS-439a
6-1-60

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Page 1 of 2
Encl. No. 1
Desp. No. 22
From CURITIBA

Catholic Movement For Electoral Orientation, Curitiba, Paraná
MANIFESTO FOR THE CATHOLIC ELECTORATE OF PARANÁ

Brazil is passing through one of her most critical moments in history, through a difficult circumstance which is a result of her present political, economic, and social situation.

A great number of Brazilians do not enjoy life, they hardly survive the vicissitudes of their daily fight for existence. Their suffering and despair induces them to listen to deceitful solutions for our distressing problems, which go so far as to propose an impossible but largely propagandised red "paradise" in a society governed by a "dictatorship of the proletariat" and to many other communist slogans. They forget that this would be a life without democratic liberties concomitant with the loss of dignity bestowed upon man by God.

In view of the seriousness of this situation, accompanied by popular agitation created and aggravated by the enemies of Democracy and God, a group of catholics, on their own initiative and with the decisive approval of The Most Reverend Metropolitan Archbishop of Curitiba, Dom Manuel da Silveira D'Elboux, organized themselves with the purpose of working together democratically to institute a movement to enlighten and to orientate the catholic electorate in Paraná concerning the October 7, 1962, elections.

This work group took an interest in investigating the candidates who possess the basic qualifications - to be an authentic democrat, always faithful to democratic principles, without ever having deviated to anti-democratic concessions, without ever having presented himself, for example, as a "man of the left", a "Christian of the left", a "progressive catholic", etc., etc.

We, as Christians and democrats, cannot admit such designations, which intrinsically are used directly for politico-electoral purposes. For Christians, the correct solution to the political, social, and economic problems in Brazil must be found in the binomial: Social-Christian-Democratic Doctrine. For Catholics, the Social-Christian Doctrine is part of the Gospel which prescribes a clear directive that is neither "left" nor "right" but is the Doctrine of Christ.

This investigation also took into consideration the militant capacity and the degree of democratic traits of the candidates, because parliamentary campaigns, on the federal as well as on the state level, require such qualifications necessary for a definition and assumption of a democratic position.

Far from considering the work done as being perfect, we realize that human beings have many limitations, but with our belief in God, we are absolutely honest in our intentions in selecting candidates for the forthcoming elections and we recommend, principally, to the Christian electorate the below mentioned names:

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DEPARTMENT OF STATE

AIRGRAM

732.00/9-2162

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ARMY 5	CIA 10	NAVY 5
CSD 12	USIA 8	NSA 3

22 — CONFIDENTIAL — AIR POUCH

NO. — HANDLING INDICATOR

TO : Department of State
BUREAU OF
INTER-AMERICAN AFFAIRS
OCT 1 1962

1962 SEP 28 AM 9 45

RM/AN
ANALYSIS & DISTRIBUTION
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FROM : AmConsulate CURITIBA DATE: September 21, 1962

SUBJECT : BRAZILIAN ELECTIONS 1962: REPORT NO. 8

REF :

The enclosed is the translation of a manifesto prepared by the Catholic Movement of Electorate Orientation which is to be transmitted to all of the Catholic priests in Parana in the very near future. This declaration is to be used by them in guiding their parishioners on voting in the October 7 elections. The document was loaned to the reporting officer on a confidential basis and is being submitted as evidence of the intense interest of the Church in this election. The selected candidates are given a good chance to be elected. This list should prove of value in analyzing the Church's electoral influence after the election.

Arthur W. Feldman
American Consul

FILED
OCT 11 1962

Enclosure:
As stated.

CC: Brazilian Desk, Wash.(1)
AmEmbassy, Rio (1)
Mr. Henderson, AmEmbassy, Rio (1)
Mr. Walters, AmEmbassy, Rio (1)
AmEmbassy, Brasilia (1)

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FORM DS-323 4-62

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Drafted by: Arthur W. Feldman:lf
Classified by:
Comments and Classification Approved by: Arthur W. Feldman

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of the Tribunal to reject the arguments opposing the eligibility of several PTB candidates, including Leonel Brizzola, Eloi Dutra, Sergio Magalhães, Roland Corbisier, and Lycio Hauer, on the grounds that they are communists. In Brizzola's case, the Tribunal also voted to reject allegations that he was ineligible to run because of his relationship to Goulart and registered his candidacy. Juracy Magalhães' eligibility, opposed by the PST, had also been voted upon by the Tribunal and his registration accepted.

While the Regional Electoral Tribunal was stating who could run, the Catholic-backed Electoral Alliance for the Family was indicating the names of those candidates for whom the conscientious citizen should vote. It is not surprising to note that the majority of candidates named, among them Juracy Magalhães, Gilberto Marinho, Admiral Neto, Raul Brunini, Danilo Nunes, and Lopo Coelho, are in the centrist-conservative camp.

After having successfully laid the groundwork for the creation of a committee to investigate the funding source for the Brazilian Institute of Democratic Action (IBAD) after the new Congress convenes in October, Eloi Dutra is now using the subject of IBAD's electoral activities as his principal campaign theme and is expected to parrot the accusations of several communist-influenced news media that such funds could be traced to the American Embassy in Rio.

For the Ambassador:

Ronald M. Schneider
Political Officer

APPROVED BY:

Niles W. Bond
Deputy Chief of Mission

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squeakers. In most of these states there is still a sizable undecided element--estimated as 20% in São Paulo--which could swing the election one way or the other. Increasingly it is these crucial gubernatorial elections which are catching the public interest--above all the Arraes--Cleofas duel in Pernambuco.

In spite of a rash of speculation over the effect of the much publicized "reestablishment" of the PSD-PTB alliance in Congress, a development which is still more potential than actual, the events of last week in Brasilia do not seem to have impaired the PSD-UDN alliances existing in such states as Pernambuco, Ceará, and Guanabara, or for that matter the UDN-PTB alignments in São Paulo and Bahia. (In fact during the hey-day of the PSD-PTB coalition, the two "Vargas" parties were bitter rivals in several states, most noticeably Rio Grande do Sul.) Local considerations are still more important in shaping inter-party relationships than are national considerations.

Communism:

In general, the numerous candidates whose eligibility was challenged on the grounds of Communist affiliations have won at least temporary legal relief from the Superior Electoral Tribunal in Brasilia (with final decision still pending in most cases). There appears to have been significantly less interest this year than in the past on the part of the various candidates bidding for PCB support, in part due to a realization that in 1958 and 1960 the Party was unable to deliver a really significant number of votes. In São Paulo, for example, the PCB has instructed its faithful to vote in blank in the gubernatorial and senatorial elections and to concentrate on supporting a few legislative candidates closely linked to the Party. In Guanabara, on the other hand, where the left versus right lines are more clearly drawn and the struggle has relatively more ideological and less personalistic content, "Prestes" candidates have been clearly indicated all the way down the line: Eloi Dutra (PTB) for Vice-Governor, Aurelio Vianna (PSB) and Nourão Filho (PST) for the Senate, Marco Antonio Coelho (PST) for Federal Deputy, and João Mascena Melo (PST), Sinival Palmeira (PST), and Hercules Corrêa dos Reis (PTB) for the Legislative Assembly. The PCB weekly Novos Rumos has been transformed into a four-page daily for the duration of the campaign but is nearly lost in the ocean of electoral journalism. Rio de Janeiro State gubernatorial candidate Tenorio Cavalcanti is repaying the PCB for its support by campaigning for the communist candidates in Guanabara (where he ran for Governor in 1960). Other gubernatorial candidates to enjoy PCB support are Miguel Arraes (Pernambuco), Waldir Pires (Bahia), and Adahil Barreto (Ceara).

Guanabara:

There is little doubt that the busiest man in the state this week was Homero Pinho, whose duties as president of the Regional Electoral Tribunal for Guanabara ranged from the ridiculous task of having to determine appropriate measures to insure non-violence in campaign propaganda and poster activities (the UDN having reported that an armed group of PTB-backed ruffians had taken on a group of UDN campaign helpers who were putting up Juracy and Lopo posters and had completely destroyed the campaign material after frightening away the Udenistas) to the much more serious business of handing down the decision

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DEPARTMENT OF STATE

AIRGRAM

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OSD 12	USIA 8	NSA 3

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TO : DEPARTMENT OF STATE

1962 SEP 24 PM 3 47

DEPARTMENT OF STATE
BUREAU OF
INTER-AMERICAN AFFAIRS
SEP 26 1962
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BRANCH

FROM : Amembassy RIO DE JANEIRO — DATE: September 21, 1962

SUBJECT : Brazilian Election Highlights September 15-21

REF :

RM/R [illegible] 10-9-62

Following the termination of the "concentrated effort" and the failure of the Communist-directed general strike, literally thousands of candidates threw themselves headlong into the physically, if not mentally, exhausting rush of neighborhood rallies. Casting aside their doubts as to whether the elections would in fact be held as scheduled, the politicians are pulling out all the stops and spending energy (and money) at a rate rarely equalled and certainly never exceeded in Brazilian history. With far more voters to reach than ever before (registration in São Paulo alone is up nearly one million over 1958, and in neighboring Paraná the percentage increase is an astounding 61%--from 685,000 to 1,100,000), candidates are making greater use of such modern refinements as helicopters and private planes to reach every hamlet their rivals may possibly have visited.

In those states in which the governor's palace is awaiting a new tenant, campaign activity appears to be intensifying without limit as the several contenders realize that victory is almost within their grasp--or is slowly slipping away. In such states as Pernambuco, São Paulo, Rio de Janeiro, Bahia, and Sergipe it is almost impossible to pick a winner; even in Rio Grande do Sul, Amazonas, and Ceara the races have tightened up. Many rumors are heard of the pending "deals" which will break open a tight race (José Bonifacio will buy Adhemar out; José Bonifacio will withdraw in favor of Adhemar; Miguel Couto will pull out in favor of Paulo Fernandes and vice-versa) and some candidates wink knowingly about the tricks they still have up their sleeves, but most of the political rabbits have probably already jumped out of the hats. While it is still very possible that in a few of these states a bandwagon effect may yet develop, the present fact is for generally close contests with at least three or four real

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Drafted by: R. Schneider and L. Cooley:cgn

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INCOMING TELEGRAM *Department of State*

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ACTION:

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FROM: Recife

TO: Secretary of State

NO: 148, September 21, 5 p.m.

ACTION RIO DE JANEIRO 158, INFORMATION DEPARTMENT 148.

Pernambuco state government employees strike called today so far not generally obeyed. Port, which operated by state, closed for seventh time this year. Employees of water works, state highway department and some office workers struck. Possibility employees power company, formerly Pernambuco Tramways, will also walk off.

Ostensible issue is wage increase. Employees want reorganization civil service system with accompanying 70 to 80 percent increase, while Governor Sampaio refusing budge from offer 40 percent bonus. Bonus plan already presented state legislature, but as majority deputies out campaigning legislative action unlikely until after elections. At any rate workers have already refused proposal.

More realistic motivations behind strike of political nature. Primary aim seems to be embarrass Governor Sampaio and gubernatorial candidate Cleofas, at crucial point in campaign. Leftist ULTIMA HORA giving story big play. In addition, leaders association state employees, Batista de Souza, candidate for state deputy, apparently seeking publicity in role defender workers rights to ensure election.

DELGADORARIAS

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
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
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SERGIPE

As in most of the other states there seems to be no difficulty in predicting one of the senatorial victors. Outgoing Governor Luiz Garcia (UDN) should have little difficulty, but his teammate Eraldo Lemos (PTB) stands little chance of defeating Federal Deputy Francisco Leite Neto (PSD), four times running the biggest vote-getter among Chamber aspirants. The fourth candidate, Julio Cesar Leite (PR), who was elected to the Senate in 1950 and narrowly lost to Dantas Vieira of the UDN in the 1958 senatorial election, could again emerge as a victor this time. In any case, both new Senators will be Conservatives--as all four candidates are so classified.

MATO GROSSO

Two strong incumbents should retain their seats--Filinto Muller (PSD-VII or VI), winner in both 1947 and 1954, and João Villasboas (UDN-VI), victor in 1945 and 1954. In 1954 the elections were extremely close, and there is a chance that Bezerra Neto (PTB-I), running with PSD support, could upset Villasboas and thus add to leftist strength in the Senate.

For the Ambassador:

Ronald M. Schneider

Ronald M. Schneider
Political Officer

APPROVED BY:

Niles W. Bond
Deputy Chief of Mission

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RIO GRANDE DO NORTE

With five fairly strong candidates (none of whom are incumbents) running for the two Senate posts, the decision is still much in doubt. Dinarte Mariz (UDN-VI), who easily won the Senate race in 1954 and was elected governor in 1955, is very likely to win one of the seats, with the other apt to go to Federal Deputy Teodorico Bezerra (PSD-VI), Crypto-Communist Natal Mayor Djalma Maranhão, the PTB-PSB candidate, has a chance of scoring an upset, as do Vice-Governor Walfredo Gurgel (PSD-V) and Federal Deputy Tarcisio Maia (UDN-V); the odds are, however, that these last three will have to wait until 1966 for another try. Thus, there is only an outside chance of the left strengthening its Senate position from Rio Grande do Norte.

RIO GRANDE DO SUL

In Rio Grande do Sul both Conservative incumbents appear to hold an edge. Daniel Krieger of the weak UDN has (as he did in 1954) the support of the PSD and the PL as well as that of the other parties of the ADP. Mem de Sá of the PL, who was elected as suplente in 1954, is the other and probably stronger ADP entry. Their only serious opposition comes from the PTB's pair of Mariano Beck (IV) and Antonio Brochado da Rocha (III), neither a proven vote-getter. Even if Beck were to unseat Krieger, it would be no gain for the far leftist forces in the Senate, for he appears to be a sincere moderate reformer without extremist tendencies.

SANTA CATARINA

In Santa Catarina there are four serious contenders, with two--Antonio Carlos Konder Reis of the UDN and Attilio Francisco Xavier Fontana of the PSD--appearing to be clear favorites. (See Curitiba A-20 of September 6.) Both are Conservatives as is the UDN carry-over from 1958, Irineu Bornhausen. Konder Reis is a two term federal deputy and received nearly 40,000 votes for that office in 1958; Fontana received nearly 30,000 votes in the same election. (In the 1954 congressional balloting Fontana ran nearly 2,000 votes ahead of Konder Reis.) One or the other could be edged out, however, by Vice-Governor Doutel de Andrade (PTB-III) or by Centrist Senator Saulo Ramos, who is running on the PST ticket. With PTB-PSD support in 1954 Ramos won by 10,000 votes over his UDN opponents; Doutel de Andrade made a successful bid for the Chamber in 1958 and was elected Vice Governor in 1960--chiefly as a result of PSD support through a coalition backing PSD leader Celso Ramos for Governor. Here the left could pick up a seat.

SÃO PAULO

As stated in São Paulo Airgram A-45, dated August 29, 1962 (São Paulo Senate Candidates), incumbent Senators Juvenal Lino de Matos (PTN-VI) and Auro Soares de Moura Andrade (PSD-VI) both have an excellent chance of re-election. The only challenger given a good chance of upsetting either of the incumbents is UDN candidate Roberto Costa de Abreu Sodre, classified as a Centrist, so no significant ideological change in São Paulo's Senate representation is anticipated.

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PARANÁ

In Paraná the favored candidate appears to be Amaury de Oliveira Silva (PTB-V), who has the backing of a coalition put together by Governor Ney Braga and including the PTB, UDN, PDC, PTN, and PR. His teammate, electorally untested Adolpho de Oliveira Franco (UDN-VI), may have a more difficult time in finishing ahead of former Governor Moyses Lupion (PSD-VI), who was easily elected Senator in 1954 and Governor the following year. Federal Deputy and former (1951-55) Governor Bento Munhoz da Rocha (PR-V), supported by the PRP, PSP, MTR, and PRT as well as the Catholic Church, could pull an upset. In any case there will be no leftist Senator from Paraná.

PERNAMBUCO

The Pernambuco senatorial contest is one of the most problematical, with each of the five candidates appearing to have a fair chance. Both Senators elected in 1954, Conservatives Jarbas Maranhão of the PSD and Antonio de Novaes Filho of the PL, are fighting to hold on to their seats, which they narrowly won. (To complicate matters Jarbas Maranhão, although a long-time PSD deputy, ran on the UDN-PST ticket in 1954 against two PSD-supported candidates.) A third candidate this year is leftist Federal Deputy Barbosa Lima Sobrinho of the PSB, formerly governor of the state. The other two candidates are electorally unproven, but appear to have strong possibilities of victory. They are communications magnate Francisco Pessôa de Queiroz (PTB-UDN-PR-PRT-PRP-MTR) and millionaire São Paulo industrialist José Ermirio de Morais (PTB-PTN-PST)--the latter linked closely to the Miguel Arrais gubernatorial campaign. While prediction is virtually impossible, it appears that Novaes Filho, who has been in the Senate since 1945, is apt to be a casualty this time and that Pessôa de Queiroz is heavily favored to win. At the present time Maranhão and de Moraes appear to be about even for the second seat. Pernambuco most probably will not contribute to a leftward shift in the composition of the Senate.

PIAUÍ

With no incumbent involved in the three-way fight for the two Senate seats, the probable victors are outgoing Governor Chagas Rodrigues (PTB-III) and Federal Deputy José Candido Ferraz (UDN-VI) who also has PSD, PSP, PR and PDC support. Sigefredo Pacheco (PSD-VI) is not to be counted out--he was the leading vote-getter among the state's federal deputies in 1954. Since Chagas Rodrigues will be replacing one of the two leftist-ultranationalists now in the Senate, 80-year old Mathias Olympio de Melo, Piauí will not contribute to any leftward shift in the makeup of the Senate.

RIO DE JANEIRO

Like the gubernatorial race, the Fluminense contest for the Senate appears to be wide open, with neither of the incumbents seeking re-election. Four of the seven candidates have a good chance of election, with Federal Deputies Aarão Steinbruch (MTR-II), who has UDN-PSP-and PR support, and Vasconcelos Torres (PTB-V) having an edge over Deputy Saturnino Braga and ex-governor Celso Peçanha (both PSD-VI). Three other candidates have little chance of victory--Conservative Mario Guimarães (UDN-PSP-MTR), reformist José Alves de Azevedo (PTB), and leftist Jonas Bahiense (PST). It appears, then that Rio State may well send one fellow traveller to the Senate.

GUANABARA

In Guanabara there are only three serious contenders for the two Senate seats at stake--incumbent Gilberto Marinho (PSD-V or VI), Bahia Governor Juracy Magalhães (UDN-V), and Alagoas Federal Deputy Aurélio Vianna (PSB-IV). Marinho won his seat in 1954 by the narrowest of margins over the PSP and UDN candidates, neither of whom were particularly strong political figures. Nonetheless, as the only real Carioca among the leading candidates and with a much broader base of party support (PSD-UDN-PSP-PTN-PL-PR) than before, he should win handily. Between the "foreigners," Magalhães is a heavy favorite, and a Vianna victory would be a major upset. Thus the left can expect little consolation from the Guanabara Senate elections.

MARANHÃO

Incumbent Senator Vitorino Freire (PSD-VII) seems reasonably sure of re-election; the other PSD incumbent apparently decided not to run, and his seat should fall to former Governor José de Matos Carvalho (PSD), who has the support of Governor Newton Belo. Federal Deputy Antonio Dino (PSP-V), who left the PSD when he failed to get the senatorial nod over Matos Carvalho, may be able to draw some PSD votes but probably not enough to close the gap.

MINAS GERAIS

Both incumbents are seeking re-election (as a team) and they are favored to win. This is particularly true for the PSD's Benedicto Valladares, who ran away from the field in 1954; his PTB associate Nogueira da Gama (elected in 1960 to fill the seat of the deceased Lúcio Bittencourt) could be upset by the UDN's Oswaldo Pieruscetti. All three are political Conservatives.

PARÁ

Best bet in the Senatorial sweepstakes seems to be incumbent Lobão da Silveira (PSD-V or VI), chosen in a special election in 1959. With Paulo Fender of the MTR (V perhaps III) not in the election picture, the second seat is likely to be taken by Waldir Bouhid (PSD-VI), who was elected suplente in 1954 and served in the Senate from 1955 to 1957, when he resigned to take an administrative position. Of the opposition candidates, only former Quadros Health Minister Eduardo Catete Pinheiro (PTN-V), running with some UDN and PSP support, appears to have any chance of scoring an upset victory.

PARAÍBA

The hard-fought race essentially involves incumbent Conservative Senator Argemiro de Figueiredo (elected by the UDN, but now head of the state PTB) and Federal Deputy Drault Ernany (PSD-VI) on the one side against Federal Deputy João Agripino (UDN-III), Quadros' Minister of Mines and Energy. Although many leftist PTB voters may opt for the PSB candidate, Federal Deputy José Joffily (II), Figueiredo should win on the strength of PSD support as should Ernany, although Agripino has been a more consistent vote-getter as a Federal Deputy in four straight elections and could come home a winner. Thus the left may gain one seat from Paraíba.

BAHIA

In Bahia the Senate races appear wide open with at least three proven vote-getters entered in the lists. The UDN-PTB-PR-PRP-PRT-PDC (dissident) coalition put together by outgoing Governor Juracy Magalhães (who in 1954 was by far the strongest senatorial candidate in the State, but stepped out of the Senate for the governorship in 1958) is backing incumbent Senator Lima Teixeira (PTB-V) and electorally untested João da Costa Pinto Dantas Junior (UDN-VI), Magalhães' State Secretary of Agriculture. The opposition forces (PSD-PSP-PST-PTN-PSB-PL-PDC) have Solicitor General Antonio Balbino (PSD-IV or V), winner of the 1954 gubernatorial elections; their second candidate is Josafá Marinho (PL-IV), who has a monopoly on MTR and PSB support. Balbino and Lima Teixeira should get the nod, with Marinho running a strong third. No Senate gains for the far left from Bahia.

CEARÁ

With the retirement of the two incumbents, the Ceará senatorial race still seems to be one of the more predictable. Vice Governor Wilson Gonçalves (PSD-V) and Tancredo Halley are the candidates of the PSD-UDN-PTN coalition, and should on the strength of these parties be favored to win. However, Federal Deputy Carlos Jereissati (PTB-V) has a very good chance of defeating the electorally untested Halley (who if elected is expected to resign to pave the way for Governor Parsifal Barroso (PTN-V) to run in a special election). With 30,000 votes in the 1954 and 1958 Federal Deputy races Jereissati is a proven vote-getter, and he has been making a strong and effective campaign this year. He has PSP and PR support as does his less formidable "teammate" Olavo de Oliveira, who was the loser in the fairly close 1958 senate race when he had UDN support. In any event the Ceará senatorial delegation will be composed of Centrists.

ESPIRITO SANTO

Governor Carlos Lindenberg (PSD-VI) appears certain of election as Senator (a post he held from 1950 to 1958) with the opposition's Burico Resende (UDN-V) making a strong bid to take the other seat from Lindenberg's associate, Vice Governor Raul Giuberti (PSP-VI). Neither incumbent is seeking re-election.

GOIÁS

PSD incumbent Pedro Ludovico Teixeira (VI)--who was first elected Senator in 1945, won the governorship in 1950, and emerged victorious by a slim margin in the 1954 senatorial balloting--should hold on to his seat. (His son, Mauro Borges Teixeira is now Governor of the State.) Ludovico's political rival Coimbra Bueno (UDN-VI) appears to be trailing José Feliciano Ferreira (PSD-VI), who won the gubernatorial election in 1958.

ACRE

Brazil's newest state will choose three Senators (with the low man getting a four year term). While very little information is available from this remote area, the PSD candidates are favored on the basis of that party's traditional strength. Thus, two of the Senators will probably be Colonel Manoel Fontenele de Castro and Dr. Mario de Oliveira. The third is likely to be incumbent PTB Federal Deputy Oscar Passos. Other candidates reportedly include PTB-supported Hugo Carneiro, a former Federal Deputy, and Raimundo Figueira, head of the Amazonas Credit Bank.

ALAGOAS

In Alagoas the senatorial race features two strong incumbents and a pair of formidable challengers. The task of prediction is complicated by shifts from usual party affiliation on the part of two UDN politicians. The very murky crystal ball indicates that incumbent Rui Palmeira (UDN-VI) is a very good bet for re-election. The other incumbent, Afranio Lages (UDN-V), elected as a suplente in 1954 and defeated by 3000 votes in the 1955 gubernatorial elections, failed to obtain his party's renomination and is running instead with PSD support, a factor which dims his chances considerably. Similarly, Arnon de Melo (VI), who was an easy gubernatorial victor in 1950 and lost the 1958 senatorial election by less than 700 votes (in what was considered an upset), broke with UDN Governor Luiz Cavalcante and is running on the PDC ticket. It is very possible that these two dissident Udenistas may outpoll Cavalcante's hand-picked candidate, Vice-Governor Teotônio Vilela (V). With UDN voters so divided, PSP-PTB-PSB candidate Hildebrando Falcão has an outside chance of pulling ahead for the second seat. None of these candidates would aid the leftist cause in the Senate.

AMAZONAS

In Amazonas, close Senate races can again be expected. With the state government in the hands of the PTB, that party's two candidates--incumbent Mourão Vieira (V) and Federal Deputy Arthur Virgílio (II or III)--must be considered favorites. They are being challenged by Alvaro Maia (PSD-VI), perennial leader of the opposition to the dominant PTB and a grizzled veteran of the senatorial sweepstakes. Elected to the Senate in 1945 (8,982 votes), he was victor in the 1950 gubernatorial election with 29,950 votes. In 1954 he fared badly, losing the Senate race to the two PTB candidates--Mourão Vieira and Cunha Melo--polling only 23,358 votes (against their respective totals of 35,568 and 32,000). In 1958 he was edged out by Vivaldo Lima Filho of the PTB, 37,065 to 34,680. This year he should stand a fair chance of nosing out one of the PTB candidates, more likely Virgílio. Alberto Rocha (V), the second opposition candidate, is as yet an unknown quality electorally and must be considered an extreme longshot. In any event, the results of the elections in Amazonas will not significantly add to leftist strength in the Senate.

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Prognostication of this year's Senate elections is not an easy task. In 1958 (as in 1954) the results ranged from lopsided victories such as Milton Campos' crushing of Artur Bernardes Filho in Minas Gerais (by a 365,000 vote margin) down to photo finishes like those of Silvestre Pericles de Goís Monteiro over Arnon de Melo in Alagoas (650 votes) or Vivaldo Lima Filho over Alvaro Maia in Amazonas (fewer than 1500 votes). With two seats at stake in each state this year the prospect is for many more close contests as several candidates fight it out for the all-important second place finish. Under such circumstances the predictions in this report must be considered tentative.

With respect to the probable composition of the new Senate, the UDN fares best initially in terms of carry-over with at least 8 solidly in the fold. The PSD follows close behind with 6 plus one maverick, while the PTB has only 4 of those elected in 1958. The PL has one seat, and there is a former UDN Senator who has as yet affiliated with no other party. The results of the October 7 balloting will probably see the PSD win as many as 20 seats (as against 16 in 1954) for a total of at least 25 or 26; the UDN should elect about 10 (the same number as in 1958) to keep its strength at nearly 20; the PTB may well come up with 10 or 11 victors (compared to 10 in 1954) for a total of about 15 seats. The remaining parties will probably elect only 4 senators--one for the PL, one or perhaps 2 for the PTN, and a possible one each for the PSP and MTR. Ideologically, there are only a handful of leftists who have a real chance of making their way into the Senate--the overwhelming majority of the leading candidates are Conservatives or Centrists.

Turnover in the Senate between elections is sufficiently great to give significance to the suplente contests. At this time only two-thirds of the elected senators are still in the Congress (42 of 63). No fewer than 16 of the 42 chosen in 1954 are no longer around--a majority of these have died (some as long as 4 or 5 years ago). Thus the prospects of a given suplente's reaching the Senate during the course of the eight-year term are about 40%. Under the Brazilian electoral system a suplente is automatically elected (even if an opponent polls more votes) if his senatorial running-mate emerges victorious, so there is no reason to assess the relative strength of the various candidates. Again only a handful of the suplentes will be leftists.

The length of time that has elapsed since these seats were last contested (1954) and the changed nature of the coalitions in many states severely restrict the utility of comparisons with past elections. Nevertheless, the fact that many incumbents are seeking re-election and the relative stability of individual parties' voting strengths over the past 12 years (see the Embassy's A-257, dated September 4, 1962) argue in favor of such comparisons. In the following state-by-state analysis an effort has been made to balance past performance and recent trends and developments in order to arrive at an assessment of the prospects of the various candidates. Those end users who may wish to make their own predictions can find the necessary raw material in the basic reports on the several states submitted by the Embassy and the constituent posts over the past four months. Considerable information on past senatorial elections is contained in Embassy Despatch 526 of November 7, 1958. The electoral records of incumbent Senators have been reported in Enclosure 2 to the Embassy's A-108, dated July 26, 1962. The records of Governors and Federal Deputies now seeking election to the Senate can be found in Embassy Airgram A-286 of August 23 and Despatch 960 of June 8, 1962, respectively.

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TO : DEPARTMENT OF STATE

1962 SEP 24 PM 3 47

DEPARTMENT OF STATE
BUREAU OF
INTER-AMERICAN AFFAIRS
SEP 26 1962

RM/AN
ANALYSIS & DISTRIBUTION
BRANCH

FROM : Amembassy RIO DE JANEIRO

DATE: September 20, 1962

SUBJECT : Brazilian Elections 1962: Report No. 31, The Senate Elections

REF :

RM/IC-Jue
10/5/62-JWW

On October 7 the Brazilian electorate of over 17,000,000 registered voters will elect some 44 Senators and their alternates to serve until early 1971--and one whose term will end in 1967. (There are also 21 holdover Senators elected in 1958.) Although there is little cause for concern that the political balance in the Senate will be altered drastically by the results of the balloting (see Embassy Airgram A-108 of June 26, 1962 for a discussion of the present composition of the Senate), the future of a number of the nation's veteran political figures may be significantly affected. Moreover, the division of strength among the parties may be of greater significance in the coming session than it has in the past, particularly on matters of constitutional reform.

In Senate elections the nature of the Brazilian party system with its 13 legal parties (the number of parties participating in any one state in 1958 ranged from 3 to 11, with 6 as the average) encourages the formation of coalitions. Thus, in 1958 at least 9 of the 21 Senators were elected by alliances of parties rather than by single parties, and in some of the other states there were less formal arrangements for trading support. This year coalition candidates are the rule, with the availability of two seats rather than one in each state leading to far greater accommodation among parties. (In those states also having gubernatorial races, there may be at least six choice electoral offices to be parcelled out among the parties forming a successful coalition--governor, vice-governor, two senators and two alternate senators.) Very few serious contenders are running without the support of at least two or three parties, and the situation is often complicated by dissident groups backing candidates other than those officially endorsed by the party under such alliances.

FORM 4-62 DS-323

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Drafted by: RMSchneider:cgm

Contents and Classification Approved by:

Clearances:

0007

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

AIRGRAM

732.00/9-2062

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A-18
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1962 SEP 24 PM 3 27

DEPARTMENT OF STATE
BUREAU OF
INTER-AMERICAN AFFAIRS
SEP 26 1962

RM/AN
ANALYSIS & DISTRIBUTION
BRANCH

FROM : AMCONSUL, Belo Horizonte

DATE: September 20, 1962

SUBJECT : BRAZILIAN ELECTION 1962 - Supplement Status Report No. 12 for September 13-19, State of Minas Gerais

REF : Consulate's Despatch No. 37, June 28, 1962

ara

The Political crisis having been resolved, at least for the time being, the people have given a deep sigh of relief and returned to the view that after all the elections will take place. According to figures put out by the State Electoral Tribunal, the State of Minas Gerais has 2.5 million registered voters, almost all of whom will go to the polls.

Rumors that the Social Democratic Party (PSD) was about to ask for Federal troops to insure orderly elections in certain areas in the interior of the State where charges of wrongdoing against opposition candidates have arisen (see Consulate's A-17, dated September 14,1962), have not yet materialized. The PSD leadership appears to be split on the practicality of such a manouver. The request for troops would have to be addressed to the State Electoral Tribunal, and the State Secretary of Public Security has assured the Tribunal that his Department has taken and is taking prompt action on every charge of lack of adequate security to conduct the electoral campaign.

As foreseen in the Consulate's A-15, dated September 6, 1962, the State Electoral Tribunal has acted favorably on the registration applications of every contested candidate. The contention was that political beliefs do not constitute grounds for rejection of a candidate's application for registration.

Edmund A. da Silveira,
American Consul

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Pol Section
Brasilia Office

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Drafted: EdaSilveira:kfk 9/20/1962

Contents and Classification Approved by:

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OUTGOING TELEGRAM Department of State

10363

INDICATE: ☐ COLLECT ☐ CHARGE TO

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755

Sep 20 1 24 PM '62

Origin

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ACTION: Amembassy RIO DE JANEIRO NIACT

RIO 755

Deptel 718.

Campos, Bulhoes and Ribeiro met with Secretary Dillon briefly during session Fund annual meeting. Campos essentially repeated para. 1 Reftel. In addition submitted letter formally requesting prompt release Treasury exchange agreement $25.5 million. Said Treasury funds alone being requested as realize necessary procedures make impossible Eximbank and AID disbursements before elections. Dillon stated only that U.S. would consider request carefully.

Your comments requested urgently, especially in view Campos request for appointment Secretary ~~Rusk~~ tomorrow. Campos expected take position imperative provide this urgently needed B/P assistance to Brazil prior October 7 elections. Campos has stressed to USG officials that B/P situation explosive and might well become political issue which would preclude possibility election results which would persuade Goulart collaborate with center.

Would appreciate latest available data foreign exchange reserves.

End

RUSK

E.O. 10501, 5-B-2 or 4
DOS 12.23.71
FRUS 1961-63, Vol. XII
p. 232, 9-20-62

(3)

Declassified by DAUR

Drafted by: TREAS.:Costanzo ARA:HKHay:am 9/20/62

Telegraphic transmission and classification approved by: ARA - Mr. Hay by HKH

Clearances: S/S - Mr. Little
E - Mr. Palmer (in substance)

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FROM: Belo Horizonte

TO: Secretary of State

NO: 4, September 20, 5 p.m.

Impact virtually nil despite good news coverage. Concern with national election campaign and political crisis overshadowed Cuban developments. Such ascertainable official, press and public opinion has disapproved Soviet action and statements and generally supported Presidents declarations.

DASILVEIRA

HAS/4

transfer action to RPA

Belo Horizonte 4 732.00/9-2062

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
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
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0001

9**.84	Medical sciences (dentistry and human reactions to environmental elements, etc.)
.841	Medical aspects of radiology, radioscopy, chemistry, and biology including warfare
.85	Electronics (communications devices, radar, sonar, etc.)
.86	Engineering
.861	Civil engineering
.8611	Sanitary and public health engineering
.862	Mechanical engineering
.863	Electrical engineering
.864	Mining engineering
.865	Ordinance engineering (propellants, pyrotechnics, etc.)
.866	Aeronautical engineering (supersonic, etc.)
.867	Engineering, Power plants
.868	Chemical engineering
.89	Other sciences, Philosophy

9**.8134 Optics
.8135 Heat and Cold
.8136 Electricity and magnetism (gyroscopes)
.8137 Nuclear physics and nuclear chemistry, Cosmic rays, Heavy water
.8138 Atomic and molecular physics
.8139 Miscellaneous, Time, Calendar, Weights and measures
.814 Basic chemistry (analytical)
.815 Applied chemistry
.8151 Liquid fuels and lubricants
.8152 Resins, rubbers, plastics, auxiliary chemicals
.8153 Pharmaceuticals and antibiotics
.8154 High performance fuels (liquid monopropellants, solid propellants and explosives, bipropellants [fuels and oxidants], combustion and flame phenomena)
.8155 High temperature materials
.8156 Fats, fatty waxes, soap
.8157 Other industrial chemical products
.81571 Industrial explosives
.81572 Gases
.81573 Agricultural chemicals
.81574 Leather and glue
.81575 Inorganic NEC (potassium nitrate, sulfuric acid, etc.)
.8158 Chemical warfare
.816 Metallurgy

.82 Earth sciences. For travels, expeditions, and explorations, see 031.**##
.821 Geography
.8211 Geographical names
.8212 Mapping, map analysis, surveying
.822 Physical geography
.823 Geography of settlements
.824 Military geography
.825 Human geography
.826 Political geography
.827 Economic and commercial geography
.828 Geology
.829 Geophysics
.8291 Geodesy (size and shape of the earth, variation of gravity, etc.)
.8292 Geophysical prospecting for location of mineral resources
.8293 Hydrology (distribution of water, underground water sources, dams)
.8294 Meteorology
.8295 Oceanography, Oceanic organizations
.8296 Seismology
.8297 Terrestrial magnetism
.8298 Miscellaneous (vulcanology, tectonphysics, etc.)

.83 Natural sciences
.831 Biology
.8311 Biological warfare
.832 Botany
.833 Zoology

9**.726 Sale, Purchase (** indicates nationality of purchaser), Charter, Registration, License, Libel

.727 Documentation and inspection, Cargo, Manifests, Bills of health, Entry and clearance

.73 Water transportation, Merchant vessels, Merchant marine, Yachts (includes all water transportation inland, coastwise or other). For water transportation reservations, see 9**.73-RES

.73## Water transportation between country or area ** and country or area ## (includes regularly scheduled steamship lines) (smaller country number for **)

.7301 Rivers, Canals, Flood prevention

.731 Laws and regulations

.732 Rates, Concessions, Contracts, Subsidies

.733 Accidents, Disabled wrecked or stranded vessels, Repairs (** indicates nationality of vessel; use name of vessel)

.734 Harbors, Docks, Ports, Port facilities, Maintenance items and services available to or rendered foreign vessels, Stevedoring

.735 Taxes on navigation, Tonnage, light, harbor and port dues, Other taxes

.736 Movements of vessels (** indicates registration of vessel)

.737 Fueling and provisioning (** indicates country fueling vessel)

.738 Documentation and inspection, Admeasurement, Cargo manifests, Bills of health, Ship's papers, Entry and clearance

.739 Sale, Purchase (** indicates nationality of purchaser), Charter, Registration, License, Libel. For construction of vessels, see 8**.3334. Use name of vessel for "libel" only

.74 Navigation (land, air, and water), inland, coastwise and other

.741 Aids and menaces to navigation, Signalling devices, Radar, Radio beacons, Light houses, Lightships. For "LORAN", see 900.741-LORAN

.75 Personnel, Crews, Seamen, Airmen

.751 Discipline, Insubordination, Mutiny, Illegal acts committed by the crew on vessels and aircraft (ill treatment of seamen, desertion, abandonment). For seamens' homes, see 8**.576

.753 Merchant marine schools and academies

.753## Admission of nationals of ## for visit or study

9**.80 Science (general)

.801 Research and development

.8011 Scientific institutions, Laboratories, Bodies

.8012 Scientific publications, Films

.8013 Scientific facilities and equipment

.8014 Utilization of scientific and technical personnel

.8015 Government's relation to science

.8016 Scientific training program

.81 Physical sciences

.811 Mathematics (arithmetic, algebra, geometry, trigonometry, calculus, differential equations, graphs, statistics)

.812 Astronomy (theoretical and practical, celestial bodies, tables and atlases, navigation)

.813 Physics, Rheology, Crystallography

.8131 General mechanics

.8132 Mechanics of fluids

.8133 Mechanics of gases

9**.40	Radio, Radio broadcasting, Radio-telegraph, Reception, Monitoring (see also 5**.##4)
.401	Concessions, Contracts
.402	Laws and regulations
.403	Censorship
.41##	Communication between country or area ** and country or area ##. Use smaller number for **
.42	Amateurs ("ham" operators)
9**.50	Television, Facsimile transmission
.501	Concessions, Contracts
.502	Laws and regulations
.503	Censorship
.51##	Communication between country or area ** and country or area ##. Use smaller number for **
9**.60	Public press
.61	Newspapers, Clippings, Items
.62	Newsgathering agencies (including news broadcasting), Commentators
.62##	Newsgathering agencies (** nationality of newspaper or magazine and ## country or area of operations)
.63	Magazines, Periodicals, Books, Book publishing
.64	Censorship of newspapers, books, and other printed material
9**.70	Transportation (land, air, and water)
.701	Laws and regulations (general)
.71	Land transportation
.71##	Land transportation between country or area ** and country or area ##. Use smaller number for **
.711	Laws and regulations
.712	Railroad, Railways, Rates, Demurrage, Accidents
.712##	Rail transportation between country or area ** and country or area ##. Use smaller number for **
.713	Street railways, Subways, Buses, Taxicabs and other land transport, Accidents, Rates
.714	Automobiles (privately owned and operated), Trucks, Motorcycles, Accidents, Rates
.72	Air transportation (all types, non-military aircraft). For air transportation reservations, see 9**.72-RES
.72##	Air transportation between country or area ** and country or area ## (smaller country number for **) (includes regularly established airlines and non-scheduled flights, private flights [non-commercial], permission for flights). For movements of military aircraft, see 7**.58##
.721	Laws and regulations (air pilot licenses)
.722	Rates (domestic and foreign), Concessions, Contracts, Subsidies
.723	Accidents (** nationality of plane), Repairs
.724	Airports, Landing fields, Landing aids, Radar, Landing rights
.725	Fueling

CLASS 9

COMMUNICATIONS, TRANSPORTATION, AND SCIENCE

9**.00	Communications (general)
.01	Concessions, Contracts
.02	Laws and regulations
.03	Censorship
9**.10	Postal
.101	Concessions, Contracts
.102	Laws and regulations
.103	Censorship
.104	Rates, Postage (domestic and foreign)
.105	Fraudulent use of the mails. For traffic in obscene matters, see 8**.541
.11##	Transportation of mail between country or area ** and ##. Use smaller number for **
.12	Parcel post
.12##	International parcel post transportation
.13	Money orders (domestic and foreign)
.14	Postal savings banks
.15	Complaints against service
.151	Nondelivery, Delay, Misrouting
.152	Loss, Theft, Damage, Tampering with mail
9**.20	Telegraph, Cable
.201	Concessions, Contracts
.202	Laws and regulations
.203	Censorship
.204	Rates (domestic and foreign)
.21##	Communication between country ** and country ##. Use smaller number for **
.22	Codes (commercial and governmental)
.25	Complaints against service
9**.30	Telephone
.301	Concessions, Contracts
.302	Laws and regulations
.303	Censorship
.304	Rates (domestic and foreign)
.31##	Communication between country ** and country ##. Use smaller number for **
.35	Complaints against service

8**.56	Correction and punishment
.561	Prisons, reformatories, jails, penal colonies, farms, etc.
.57	Charities, Philanthropic organizations
.571	Red Cross
.572	Hospitals, Asylums
.573	Salvation Army
.574	Institutional homes, Almshouses, Orphanages
.575	Soldiers' and sailors' homes (military and naval)
.576	Seamens' homes (merchant marine)

8**.45 Amusements, Sports, Recreation
.451 Theaters, Stage, Operas, Museums, Carnivals, Concerts
.452 Motion pictures
.453 Sports, Athletics, Indoor amusements
.4531 Olympic Games

.46 Societies (including social organizations)
.461 Better citizenship organizations
.4611 YMCA, YWCA
.4612 Boy Scouts, Girl Scouts, Camp Fire Girls
.4613 Military and veterans organizations

.47 Etiquette
.471 Ceremonials
.472 Precedence
.473 Salutes
.474## Ceremonial communications, New Year's greetings, Felicitation on national anniversaries, ## country sending felicitations

.48 Entertainment in country **
.481 By the country or its officials
.482 Audience with the chief executive or sovereign
.483 Presentation at Court
.484 By private persons and societies
.485 By resident officers of the United States
.486## By resident officers of other foreign countries, ## nationality

.49 Calamities, Disasters, Earthquakes, Tornadoes, Cyclones, Typhoons, Famines, Fire, Relief measures (see also 8**.03)

8**.50 Public order, Safety and health, Charities
.501 National and state police

.51 Municipal government
.511 Police organization
.512 Protection against fire

.52 Crime, Criminal organizations, Suspects

.53 Traffic in narcotics
.531 Liquors. For manufactures of liquors, see 8**.316

.54 Sex relations, Prostitution, Procurement, White slave traffic
.541 Traffic in obscene matters, literature, etc.

.55 Public health, Diseases
.551 Vital statistics, Birth, Marriage, Death
.552 Disposal of the dead, Cemeteries, Cremation
.556 Hygiene and sanitation, Quarantine against communicable diseases (home, school, vessels, aircraft)
.557 Supervision of food and drugs. For food and drug regulations, international trade, see 4**.##51. Materia medica
.558 Practice of medicine and surgery, dentistry, optometry, psychiatry, pharmacy, nursing, psychology

8**.395 Beautician and barber equipment and supplies
Toilet preparations, Cosmetics
.396 Scientific and professional instruments and equipment (surgical, dental, optical, etc.)
.397 Chemicals and dyes, Industrial alcohol
.3971 Medicinal and pharmaceutical preparations, Drugs, Disinfectants. For illicit traffic in narcotics, see 8**.53
.3972 Fertilizers
.3973 Explosives (non-military) (see also 8**.36)
.3974 Paints and varnishes, Stains, Enamels
.3975 Soap, Cleaning compounds, Polishes
.3976 Chemical specialties, Plastics, Celluloids, Cellulose, Cellophane, Resins
.398 Notions and novelties, Flags, Pennants, Emblems, Badges, Pins
.399 Morticians' supplies and equipment

8**.40 Social matters, Conditions (general)
.401 Population, Statistics, Census

.41 People
.411 Race problems, Disturbances, Massacres, Pogroms, Displaced persons, Refugees. For political refugees, see 7**.00
.412 Language, Literature
.413 Religion, Church. For protection of religious missions, see 2**.##
.414 Manners and customs, Dress, Mode of life
.4141 Marriage, Divorce
.4142 Welfare of mother and child. For child labor, see 8**.063

.42 History
.421 Historical relics, Manuscripts
.422 Monuments, statues, memorials
.423 Public records
.424 Commemorative celebrations
.425 Holidays

.43 Education
.43A Advisers
.431 Elementary education, Primary schools, High schools
.432 Advanced education, Universities, Colleges, etc.
.433 Technical, Commercial, Agricultural
.434 Education of the blind, physically handicapped
.435 Vocational
.436## Reciprocal recognition of diplomas
.437 Libraries (see also 5**.##1)

.44 Fine arts
.441 Painting, Drawing
.442 Sculpture
.443 Architecture
.444 Engraving
.445 Photography
.446 Music

8**.3314 Scrap metal
.332 Building and paving materials (all types, metal, wood, glass, etc.)
.333 Transportation equipment (all types)
.3331 Automobiles, Trucks, Buses, Motorcycles
.3332 Railroad, Locomotives, Cars, Signalling devices
.3333 Aircraft. For military aircraft construction, see 7**.5622
.3334 Shipbuilding (all types, sizes, except naval). For construction of naval vessels, see 7**.5621
.334 Construction equipment (all types)
.335 Communications equipment (all types)

.34 Household, office and school furnishings and supplies. For silverware, see 8**.38; for glass and chinaware, see 8**.3931
.341 Furniture. For antiques, see 8**.38
.342 Floor coverings, rugs, carpets, linoleum, etc.
.343 Appliances (all types), Electrical and gas appliances
.344 Draperies, Curtains, Shades, Blinds, Venetian Blinds, Awnings
.345 Household linens, Beddings, Mattresses, Pillows, Cushions
.346 Other household, office and school furnishings and supplies
.3461 Kitchenware, Pots and pans
.347 Office machines, Adding machines, Calculators, Typewriters

.35 Clothing, Textile industry
.351 Wearing apparel (men's, women's, children's and infants')
.3511 Shoes, all kinds
.3512 Hats
.3513 Accessories
.352 Cotton manufactures, Thread, Piece goods
.353 Linen manufactures, Thread, Piece goods
.354 Wool manufactures, Thread, Piece goods
.355 Silk manufactures, Thread, Piece goods
.356 Hair manufactures. For beauticians' supplies, see 8**.395
.357 Jute, hemp, flax, coir yarn, reed and straw products, rope, burlap, baskets
.358 Synthetic fibers, Nylon, Rayon

.36 Sporting and athletic equipment, Recreational equipment, Toys and games, Musical supplies and equipment, Smokers' supplies, Theatrical supplies and equipment

.37 Photographic apparatus and supplies, Artists' supplies, Paintings, Pictures, Cameras, Printers' supplies

.38 Jewelry, Gold and silverware, Precious stones, Clocks and watches, Antiques. For mining of gold, silver, precious stones, etc., see 8**.253

.39 Other manufactures, Miscellaneous. For building and paving materials, see 8**.332
.391 Lumber, Wood products not otherwise classifiable
.392 Paper, Paper products not otherwise classifiable
Newsprint, Wood pulp
.393 Manufactured non-metallic minerals not otherwise classifiable
Marble, Lime and limestone, Asbestos, Slate. For mining, see 8**.25
.3931 Glass and clay products, Ceramics
.3932 Fuels and petroleum products, Refinery products. For oil, wells, oil-drilling, etc., see 8**.2553
.394 Metal manufactures not otherwise classifiable, Aluminum, Copper, Brass, Bronze, Lead, Tin, Zinc. For manufacture of iron and steel, see 8**.331

8**.256 Other mining products
.2561 Salt
.2562 Sulphur
.2563 Potash
.2564 Sodium nitrate, Saltpeter
.2565 Asphalt
.2566 Lime and cement
.2567 Phosphates
.2568 Asbestos
.2569 Bauxite
.257 Quarries, Quarrying

.26 Engineering, Architecture. For housing, see 8**.02
.261 Public works, Public construction. For harbors, docks, and ports, see 9**.734
.2611 Buildings, Markets, Market places
.2612 Roads, Highways, Bridges. For railroads, see 9**.712
.2613 Parks, Playgrounds
.2614 Public utilities, Electricity, Water, Gas, Power dams
.2615 Sewerage, Disposal plants

8**.30 Manufactures, Manufacturing

.31 Foods
.311 Meat and slaughterhouse products, Meat packing
.312 Dairy, fish, fowl and game products, Ice cream. For milk, cream, and eggs, see 8**.2423 and 8**.24224 respectively
.313 Grain products and preparations, Flour, Cereals
.314 Nut products and preparations
.315 Vegetable and fruit products and preparations
.316 Beverages and beverage materials, alcoholic and non-alcoholic
Breweries, distilleries. For liquor traffic, see 8**.531
.317 Spices, Condiments, Flavorings, Leavening products, Extracts
.318 Sugar and related products, Candy. For honey, see 8**.2424
.319 Animal, fish and vegetable oils and fats, *edible*

.32 Animal and vegetable products, *inedible*
.321 Hides, Skins, Furs, Feathers. For trapping industry, see 8**.2431; for manufacture of wearing apparel, see 8**.351
.322 Leather and leather goods. For shoes, see 8**.3511
.323 Tobacco manufactures
.324 Rubber manufactures, including synthetic. For wearing apparel, see 8**.351
.325 Animal, fish and vegetable oils, fats and greases, *inedible*. For medicinal oils, see 8**.3971
.3251 Tung oil, Palm oil
.326 Miscellaneous animal products, *inedible*
.327 Miscellaneous vegetable products, *inedible*
.328 Cork and cork products

.33 Iron and steel and related industries, Building and paving materials and equipment
.331 Iron and steel, Steel mill products
.3311 Heavy machinery. For transportation and construction equipment, see 8**.333 and 8**.334
.3312 Light machinery, including agricultural and dairy. For household and office appliances, see 8**.343
.3313 Foundry and machine shop products not otherwise classifiable

8**.239 Trees. For manufactures of wood products, see 8**.3 and 8**.391
.2391 Forestry, Fires, Fire prevention, Reforestation
.2392 Lumbering, Timber cutting
.2393 Barks, Cork, Cinchona
.2394 Saps, Resins, Gums, Turpentine, Naval stores
.2395 Rubber (includes all natural rubber). For manufactures of rubber products and synthetic rubber, see 8**.324

.24 Animal husbandry
.241 Practice of veterinary medicine, Outbreak or incidence of animal diseases where no question of exportation is involved
.242 Domestic animals
.2421 Beasts of burden
.2422 Stock raising
.24221 Cattle
.24222 Sheep
.24223 Swine
.24224 Poultry, Eggs
.24225 Ostriches, Ostrich farming
.2423 Dairying, Milk, Cream
.2424 Bee culture, Honey
.2425 Silk culture, Sericulture
.243 Wild animals, Game laws
.2431 Hunting and trapping industry
.2432 Birds
.244 Fur seals. For treaties, see 6**.##7
.245 Fisheries (including sponge fisheries). For treaties, see 6**.##6
.2451 Other products of the sea, Pearls, Pearl fishing
.246 Whaling. For treaties, see 6**.##8

.25 Mines, Mining
.251 Laws, Regulations
.252 Accidents, Prevention
.253 Precious metals and precious stones
.2531 Gold
.2532 Silver
.2533 Platinum
.2534 Radium
.2535 Diamonds
.2536 Other precious metals and stones
.254 Base metals
.2541 Iron
.2542 Copper
.2543 Lead
.2544 Tin
.2545 Zinc
.2546 Uranium, Other atomic minerals
.2547 Other base metals (chromium)
.255 Carbon, Graphite. For fuel conditions, see 8**.04
.2551 Peat, Lignite
.2552 Coal
.2553 Petroleum, Oil
.2554 Natural gas
.2555 Helium

8**.22 Pests affecting plant life, Diseases, Blights, Insects, Methods of combating. For regulations governing importation of plants, etc., see Class 4

.23 Field crops
.231 Grains
.2311 Wheat
.2312 Buckwheat
.2313 Oats
.2314 Rye
.2315 Corn
.2316 Barley
.2317 Rice
.2318 Hops
.2319 Other field crops
.232 Fibers
.2321 Cotton
.2322 Hemp, Sunn
.2323 Flax
.2324 Jute
.2325 Ramie
.2326 Sisal, Cabuya
.2327 Abaca
.2328 Kapok
.233 Alkaloidal plants
.2331 Tobacco
.2332 Tea
.2333 Coffee
.2334 Cocoa, Cacao
.2335 Vanilla
.2336 Medicinal herbs, Ipecac
.234 Forage crops
.2341 Grasses
.2342 Alfalfa
.2343 Clovers
.2344 Cowpeas
.2345 Soya beans
.2346 Vetches
.235 Sugar-yielding plants
.2351 Cane
.2352 Sugar beet
{ For processing or manufacturing of food, etc., see 8**.31
.236 Garden crops (vegetables, such as Lettuce, Tomatoes, Potatoes, Pepper, Nutmeg, Spices, Pulses, Dandelion, etc.)
.237 Fruits
.2371 Citrus fruits
.2372 Berries, Currants
.2373 Grapes, Raisins
.2374 Figs
.2375 Olives
.2376 Bananas, Plantains
.2377 Nuts, Coconuts (Copra), Palm kernels
.2378 Other fruits, Apples, Apricots, Cherries, Dates, Nectarines, Peaches, Pears, Persimmons, Pineapples, Plums, Quinces
.238 Flowers, Bulbs

8**.11 Taxation
.111 Land, Realty
.112 Income. For double taxation treaties, see 6**.##921
.113 Personal property
.114 Inheritance

.12 Lotteries

.13 Monetary system, Coinage, Currency, Bullion, Mint
.131 Foreign exchange, Exchange rates
.132 Currency of revolutionary governments
.133 Counterfeit, Counterfeiting (** country whose currency is counterfeited)

.14 Banks, Banking. For war-time measures, see 6**.##231
.14## Branch banks of country ** in country ##
.141 Interest, Discount

.15 Exchanges, Commodity exchanges. For currency exchange, see 8**.131
.151 Stock
.152 Cotton
.153 Wool
.154 Livestock
.155 Grain
.156 Produce
.157 Coffee
.158 Sugar
.159 Other exchanges

.16 Lands
.16## Rights of nationals of country ## to hold or acquire real property in country **
.161## Colonization in country **

.17 Intellectual and industrial property (see also 6**.##233) (** indicate country in which protection is sought). For treaties, see 6**.##95
.171 Patents
.172 Trade-marks, Trade names
.173 Copyrights

.18 Immigration, Emigration. For immigration to the United States, see 150
.18## Immigration to country ** from country ##
.181 Residence, trade and travel of aliens in **, Foreign visas, Tourism, Foreign exit permits

.19 Industrial matters, Nationalization. Classify subjectively when possible. For monopolies, concessions, franchises, contracts, etc., see 8**.054
.1901 Atomic energy peaceful purposes. Classify subjectively when possible
.191 Expositions, Exhibitions, Fairs (see also 4**. ##174 and 5**.##2)

8**.20 Agriculture
.20A Agricultural adviser
.201 Agricultural clubs (4-H, etc.)

.21 Soil, Properties, Tillage
.211 Soil conservation; Drainage, reclamation, irrigation; Irrigation dams; "Dry farming," Fertilization

CLASS 8

INTERNAL ECONOMIC, INDUSTRIAL, AND SOCIAL AFFAIRS

8**.00 Economic matters, Conditions (general)
.00A Economic adviser
.001 Statistics (general)
.002 Conservation of natural resources. Classify subjectively when possible

.01 Cost of living, Retail prices, Black markets (general). Classify subjectively when possible

.02 Housing, Rents, Building construction (includes commercial and industrial housing)
.021 City and country planning, Elimination of congested and slum areas, "Blighted" areas

.03 Food, Food conditions, Refrigeration, Food shortage, Rationing, Black markets, Hoarding

.04 Fuel, Fuel conditions, Fuel shortage (includes coal, wood, peat, oil, coke), Black markets

.05 Capital
.051## Investment of, or field for investment of, capital of country ** in country ##
.052 Cooperative systems, Rural credits
.053 Corporations, "Big" business (formulation, regulation, bond issues, stock certificates)
.054 Combinations in restraint of trade, Monopolies, Cartels, Trusts, Contracts. Classify subjectively when possible with XR to 8**.054
.055 Domestic trade conditions, Retail trade

.06 Labor, Labor conditions (general)
.061 Hours, Wages (for pensions, see 8**.07), Unemployment insurance and compensation
.062 Organizations, Unions, Relations with employers, Strikes, Lockouts, Slowdowns
.063 Female labor, Child labor
.064 Compulsory labor, Slave labor
.065 Hazardous employment, Accidents, Prevention of accidents
.0651 Employer's liability. For pensions, see 8**.07

.07 Pensions. For military pensions, see 7**.5512
.071 Industrial
.072 Old-age (social insurance)

.08 Insurance. For "social" insurance, see 8**.072
.081 Life
.082 Fire
.083 Accident (includes all types of accidents)
.084 Automobile
.085 Health
.086 Marine (includes war risk insurance)
.087 Aviation

8**.10 Financial matters (general), Budget, Debt, Bond issues, Loans, Public securities, Balance of payments. For war-time regulations, see 6**.##231
.10A Financial adviser

7**.5512 Pay, Subsistence, Retirement, Pensions
.552 Marine Corps
.553 Schools and academies
.553## Admission of nationals of country ## for visit or study (includes admission for observation to war industries, airplane plants, etc.)
.554 Auxiliary services, WACS, WAVES, WRENS, etc.

.56 Equipment and supplies
.561 Armaments, ordnance, arsenals, armories, tanks, trench mortars, flame throwers. For governmental control of arms traffic, see 4**.##8
.5611 Atomic bombs, Hydrogen bombs
.5612 Guided missiles, supersonic weapons, rockets
.5613 Poison gases, bacteriologicals, chemicals. For illegal or inhuman warfare, see 6**.##26
.5614 Small arms, bombs, grenades, rifles
.5615 Helium
.562 Ships, vessels and aircraft (including construction, etc.)
.5621 Battleships, cruisers, destroyers, other naval vessels (all types) (includes construction, purchase and sale, accidents etc.) For international negotiations, treaties, etc., in limitation of armaments, see 6**.##12
.5622 Aircraft, bombers, fighters, gliders, jet-propelled aircraft, all types of military or naval aircraft (includes construction, purchase, sale, accidents, etc.)
.563 Bases and posts
.563## Country in which located ## (includes air, land, and sea bases, landing fields, fueling stations of any type, navy yards, drydocks, etc.)
.564 Uniforms, Clothing, Insignia
.564## Exchange of uniforms with country ##, smaller country number
.5641 Unauthorized wearing of uniforms of country **

.57 Hospitals, Rest centers, Recreation centers, Commissaries, Post exchanges

.58 Missions (** country in which located)
.58## Visits, etc., of military, naval, or air force personnel and/or equipment of country ** to country ##. For admission of foreigners to study in or visit military, naval and air force schools and academies, see 7**.553##
.581 Entrance of naval vessels into the Great Lakes (** nationality of visiting naval forces)

.59 Civil defenses, Civilian (non-military) defense organizations, measures (Air-raid wardens, fire wardens, blackout measures, air-raid shelters; Protection against atomic bomb attacks)

7**.60 Stockpiling

.61 Rubber (natural and synthetic)

.62 Petroleum

.63 Minerals

.64 Drugs (all types of pharmaceuticals, etc.)

.65 Fibers

.69 Other commodities not listed above

7**.20 Legislative branch of government

.21 Proceedings, Debates, Messages to legislative body

7**.30 Judicial branch of government

.31 National courts, Personnel, Rules
.311 Attorneys, Practice of law

.32 Proceedings, Judgments

.33 Jurisdiction
.331 Process issued for service abroad
.332 Rights of aliens to sue in national courts
.333 Absconding defendants and witnesses

.34 Laws, Statutes, Ordinances, Decrees, Acts, Codes
.341 Criminal
.342 Civil. For marriage and divorce, see 8**.4141
.343 Commercial
.344 Probate
.345 Bankruptcy
.346 Admiralty jurisdiction

.35 Procurement of evidence
.35## Procurement of evidence from country ## for use in country **

.36 Effect of judgments and decrees
.36## Effect of judgments and decrees of courts of country ## in country **

.37 Other judicial matters
.371 Authority to administer oaths
.372 Requirement of country regarding authentication of documents for use therein

7**.40 Mixed (international) courts

7**.50 National defense affairs, Army, Navy and Air (general)

.51 Fortifications, Defenses

.52 Intelligence activities, Subversive activities
.521 Biographical data (** nationality of individual)
.52## Intelligence activities, espionage, of country ** in country ##. For Communist activities, see 7**.001. Classify under individual cases where possible

.53 Military and naval courts, Law

.54 Maneuvers, Target practice, Troop movements (use 7**.54 if within territorial limits of country **)
.54## Movements of, and attacks upon, naval vessels and military and naval aircraft of country ## within territorial jurisdiction of country **, Overflights

.55 Organization
.551 Personnel (effectives), Commissioned and enlisted
.5511 Enlistment, Conscription, Draft, Discharge, Desertion

NUMERICAL-SUBJECT LISTING OF DOCUMENTS

IN CLASSES 7, 8, AND 9

CLASS 7

INTERNAL POLITICAL AND NATIONAL DEFENSE AFFAIRS

7**.00 Political affairs and conditions, Elections, Political parties and groups, Political refugees, Defectors, Amnesty, Revolutions, riots, disturbances, Civil war

.001 Communism, Bolshevism
.002 Fascism, Nazism
.003 Socialism
{For espionage, and subversive activities, see 7**.52##}

.01 Agents (other than diplomatic or consular)
.01## In country ##
.011## Immunities, privileges, exemption from taxation, etc. (in country##)

.02 Government, Recognition
.02A Advisors
.021 Mandates, Trusteeships
.022 Territory (including territorial waters, continental shelf), Geographical names, Maps, Aerial photography
.0221 Territory occupied by foreign military forces

.03 Constitution

.04 Flag
.041## Misuse of flag, insults and indignities to flag of country ** by nationals of country ##

.05 Seal, Coat of arms

.06 National anthem

.07 Political rights, Suffrage, Freedom of speech, Human rights

.08 Citizenship. For U.S. citizenship, see 130
.081 Passports, Certificates of identity. For U.S. passports, see 130

7**.10 Executive branch of government. For U.S., see Class 1

.11 Chief executive, President, King, Regent, Governor-General (including family)
.111 Governors of states and districts

.12 Vice president

.13 Cabinet, Ministry (including Foreign Office, and all other government agencies)

.14 Civil service, Salaries, Retirement

Sheet1

		INTERNAL AFFAIRS BRAZIL, 1960-1963
	Roll No.	Roll Contents
	Roll 1	732.00/1-160-732.00/9-1960
	Roll 2	732.99/9-2060-732.00/7-2861
	Roll 3	732.00/8-161-732.00/5-1262
	Roll 4	732.00/5-1462-732.00/9-1962
This Roll →	Roll 5	732.00/9-2062-732.001/5-561
	Roll 6	732.001/5-1261-732.13/5-3162
	Roll 7	732.13/56-262-732.563/8-362
	Roll 8	732.563/8-1662-832.00/10-1060
	Roll 9	832.00/10-1160-832.00/10-661
	Roll 10	832.00/10-1361-832.00/10-962
	Roll 11	832.00/10-1162-832.05111/12-560
	Roll 12	832.05111/2-1061-832.062/8-3160 (and: 832.05156/2-2260-832.10/4-2960)
	Roll 13	832.062/9-160-832.10/2-2161
	Roll 14	832.10/2-2361-832.10/7-1162
	Roll 15	832.10/7-1262-832.131/1-1961
	Roll 16	832.131/1-2661-832.16/3-2262
	Roll 17	832.16/4-662-832.245/1-2263
	Roll 18	832.25/1-1460-832.2614/7-1862
	Roll 19	832.2614/7-2662-832.424/9-1062
	Roll 20	832.424/9-2662-932.30/2-2862
	Roll 21	932.30/3-162-932.84/4-1962

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Records of the U.S. Department of State
Relating to Internal Affairs of Brazil, 1960-1963

Department of State Decimal Files 732, 832, and 932

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